Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill

Members, the House is in committee on the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. We come first to the debate on Part 1. Part 1 is the debate on clauses 3 to 25, “Amendments to Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Act 2017”, and the Schedule. The question is that Part 1 stand part.

I would like to start with clause 5, which is the amendment of the interpretation section. I have three different points to make on this for some clarity. The first one is about “authorisation holder”, and I mentioned in my first reading speech—and I got a nod from the Minister for Space, but I think, and I would like her to confirm this—that the term “authorisation” is used throughout this bill to be a point of difference from licences and permits, which are already existing for launch activities in the primary legislation. That’s one question.

The second question is around ground-based infrastructure, and I’ve asked now in a couple of the speeches what it is that the Minister imagines will be included in that ground-based infrastructure. We saw in the regulatory impact statement that there were 21 different groups consulted. Again, is the Awarua, the SpaceOps, that we heard Ingrid Leary talk about in Awarua in the South and also in the North in Warkworth—is that something that’s included? Tāwhaki—is that something that would be included, or it’s the runway, so it doesn’t count? The Rocket Lab—if the Minister could go through some examples of what she considers in and out, I think that would be very useful.

Then the third question is just, really, I think, a point of clarification, and that is: at “ground-based space infrastructure”, the definition, says “(b) does not include either of the following:”. One of either of the following is “any infrastructure or other equipment … of a type that is made or supplied primarily for personal, domestic, or household use:”. Now, before I ask my question of clarification, I note that Tim van de Molen, before, referred to clause 7 and new section 49A(2)(b)(ii)—that “an activity carried out as a recreational pursuit or hobby:” is not included. I’ll come back to this later, but my question is whether or not this exclusion in clause 5 will not include amateur radio, known as ham radio operators, who communicate with amateur satellites. I think it would be very useful to have clarification of that point on the Hansard if the exclusion excludes those ham radio operators with the amateur satellites.

Also, if she could give some examples of the well-known ground-based space infrastructure that she considers will be covered by these regulations, and if she can confirm that the definition around authorisation as a point of differentiation between what already exists for the launch infrastructure being licensing and permitting.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I too have a number of questions for the Minister for Space, but I think we will kind of go through this systematically, starting from, in this case, clause 5, amending section 4, which is around interpretation. One of the things that has been highlighted in the regulatory impact statement that was considered something that the Overseas Investment (OIA) does not capture is around—for example, in paragraph 21C of the regulatory impact statement, it says the OIA will not cover services provided to foreign customers or collaborators by New Zealand - owned operated ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI), or when there is a sharing of some of the roles when it comes to GBSI. I’m noticing that in terms of the authorisation holder here, the authorisation holder means the person who is the sole holder of GBSI activities. I just want to check with the Minister for Space: in those kind of situations, how does work that is considered collaborative considered? You know, you would consider—who is the sole holder in that particular instance, particularly when we’re looking at international collaboration between New Zealand and, let’s say, another country? On that and also, I guess, a follow-up of the question—if that isn’t something that’s captured here and is still considered captured within the OIA, that is also something that I would like to hear from the Minister that that’s something to consider as well.

Following on from the interpretation, one of the other things that I would like to ask the Minister around is the idea—I wrote it down somewhere. When we’re looking at ground-based space infrastructure, you know, particularly GBSI—and this is going to be quite a, I guess, basic question for the Minister: is the GBSI that we’re seeing separate from the space object that is being tracked? For example, do we have a situation where GBSI can be operated by the authorisation holder, and that authorisation allows that particular GBSI to track or to monitor all space objects, or a space object that is particularly within that jurisdiction of that GBSI? While they’re applying for the authorisation, would that GBSI applying for that authorisation be required—because I’m not seeing it later on in terms of the application process—to give a list of everything that they are particularly tracking, whether they have control or whether they’re managing that particular space object or not?

So I’m going to start with those two particular questions on the definition of “authorisation holder” and the definition of “GBSI”.

Madam Chair, the question I want to pose is whether or not the national interest test, which is set out in clause 7, new section 49C(4), of the bill, is precise enough and whether or not it would benefit from the support of a set of principles like those that apply to the national interest test for payloads. Just to remind folks, those principles prohibit payloads that would contribute to nuclear weapons programmes or capabilities; payloads with the intended use of harming, interfering with, or destroying other spacecraft or systems on Earth—so war fighting in space; and payloads with the intended end use of supporting or enabling specific defence, security, or intelligence operations that are contrary to Government policy—so payloads that might assist the fighting of some foreign war that it’s not New Zealand’s policy to support. I wonder whether or not there needs to be more work on the definition of the national interest when it comes to authorising and regulating ground-based space infrastructure.

It’s self-evident, I think, that New Zealand does not want foreign interests hacking and intercepting or disrupting ground-based space infrastructure or using ground-based space infrastructure to do the hacking and disrupting. But, surely, it wouldn’t be in our national interest either if ground-based space infrastructure was being deployed in New Zealand in ways that were not in our national interest. Imagine, for example, if there was a satellite communications interception station, ground-based space infrastructure, that engaged in mass surveillance of neighbouring and friendly countries and operated without any real parliamentary or public oversight. Imagine if that happened. I am of course talking about Waihopai, which ran from 1989 to 2021 and did exactly that without any real parliamentary or public oversight. It engaged in mass surveillance of our neighbouring and friendly countries. It was run by the Government Communications Security Bureau, and it was ground-based space infrastructure.

The question, I think, and the lesson, really, from all that was that ground-based space infrastructure on New Zealand’s soil can be used for foreign surveillance purposes without our full awareness or consent. I think that right now, in the current environment with private firms with defence clients building space infrastructure, we risk repeating the same mistake in a new era. I think it’s too simple to think that it’s just about regulating to protect New Zealand - based operations from bad actors who might want to engage in espionage or foreign interference or disruption. If we don’t regulate with a rigorous and precise national interest test, we run the risk of those private firms in our territory that could be, for example, supporting foreign wars that it’s not our New Zealand’s policy to be part of or prosecuting or mass surveillance that’s not consistent with our foreign policy or our national interest.

I think that is precisely the current problem with the launch programme, which has a better, more rigorous, and precise national interest test but no transparency to ensure that the public can be reassured. I’m interested to hear from the Minister for Space whether or not she thinks that the current national interest test in the primary legislation would benefit from the kind of principles that she currently employs in considering the national interest test in relation to payloads and whether this ground-based space infrastructure regulatory framework would be strengthened by that.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, members, for your questions. I realise that members haven’t been able to see the bill, in most cases, until this evening, so don’t take anything I say as a criticism or anything. I know you’re coping with the fact that it was only on the Table today. We have been able to be in a position to brief some members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, because this is a very important issue that we’re dealing with.

I will, of course, refer to some of the points: that this is an amendment bill, that it goes into the primary legislation, so issues like the national interest tests are clearly within the primary legislation. I will point everyone to new section 49C of the amendment bill, inserted by clause 7, which deals with the considerations that need to be taken into account when seeking authorisation or the Minister for Space giving authorisation. I’m sorry to talk about myself as a third party, but I know that in the future, at some stage, after a decade or so, there may be another Minister in that role.

One of the issues that we have is that we have had instances of people—companies, supposedly research organisations—using or seeking to use ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI) in New Zealand, with unwitting and innocent owners of the land or operators of the infrastructure being, essentially, fooled into thinking they were dealing with people who said that they weren’t who they are. When we look at this, it is very important to realise, too, that this is nothing about payloads. It’s got nothing to do with it—nothing to do with this amendment bill. It’s in the primary Act that’s been in place since 2017. This is all to do with people using the ground-based space infrastructure to access other people’s communications, possibly to use some form of shifting—possibly satellites, of course, if they could do that. It is quite a serious issue, given that so much of our communications and even our banking is done through satellite activity, including—might I say, for some people, even more importantly—their rugby games. So it is really important.

I thought I’d take some of the issues that were raised. The use of the term “authorisation” is signalling a different approach to licensing for launch, because it’s not licensing for launch or payloads—because it’s not about payloads. But what could be included—and there’s a question from Hon Rachel Brooking about that, if I can just give her some assurance what that means: it’s activities carried out by companies like, for instance, Space Operations New Zealand at Awarua. It will cover radio and optical GBSI, which is the ground-based space infrastructure. It will cover commercial operators and research institutes that are undertaking regulated activity, but it won’t be including hobby activities including ham radio lobbyists—hobbyists, I should say, rather than lobbyists. And lobbyists too, by the way. It will also exclude things like cell phones and television satellite dishes, which is a great bonus to us all.

It is important that there is a holder of an authorisation who is the person who controls the GBSI, because that has clearly become a problem—that not everybody who says that they are this person are actually really that person. They often could be representing, particularly, a foreign-based actor who may not want to go through the sorts of security clearances that we expect.

GBSI is different from space objects. Yes, they’re all very different, but GBSI operators could track spacecraft they own or operate, or they could track spacecraft owned or operated by someone else, including for surveillance. I think, on the national interest front—it’s been raised tonight by members about how do I define whether or not it’s the national interest. Well, if we go to section 56 of the primary Act, it’s very clearly there—certificates given by the security agencies to the Minister or the security Minister, or the Prime Minister. It’s also, if you look at new section 49C, inserted by clause 7, having to look at all these other issues. It’s about national security, public safety, international relations, or other national interests—and that’s in 49C(4)(a) to (d). Those, I think, are some of the issues that were raised by the Hon Phil Twyford, so they’re in there.

In addition to that, don’t forget that we have regulations that will be coming with this. While the regulations and the full force of this law will not take effect until, basically, one year away, in the meantime, the Minister will be able to actually use national security as a way of cancelling the use of these particular bases. So it’s very important this is done quite quickly.

I would also take the opportunity to say to members that over the last little while—over the last few years—we have, as a nation, had to help other Pacific nations around this issue, where certain foreign actors may have, at times, sought to use other countries to put in ground-based space infrastructure without telling those countries what they’re actually doing. We have been able to tell these other nations, which means that they can take some action. All we’ve been able to do in this country is to ask people on whose land it is to please cooperate. That is no longer something we can take for granted, and so it is very important that we get this sorted.

The other point—I think it was made from the Green member around other Pacific nations, as well, and what help we could give them. Well, this is quite an edgy piece of legislation in terms of not everyone else has got it yet. What is really clear: we get this through, we get our regulations done—I think it’s very important that we make this available to other Pacific neighbours who might well want to take advantage of this themselves and slot it into their law. I think that one of the obligations but also the duties we have as a Pacific country is, where we can, to help our neighbours, because they’re often up against people with significant resources and significant pressure and levers. This would help them as well.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I just wanted to get some clarification from the Minister for Space in terms of some of the questions that were asked. I think the Minister was talking around it, but just to be more specific, would Waihopai, for example, fall under this legislation? It was ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI) when it was fully operational, and they would monitor satellites and so on and so forth. So would that fall under this as well? I also would assume—and I do want to check with the Minister as to whether this is accurate or not—that Rocket Lab in Māhia would fall under this legislation as well, given that if you’re going launch something up in space, you’ve got to be able to monitor it at some particular point in time, so it’s a question around coverage in terms of what’s happening there already. I’d like to get an answer on that as well.

There was also an interesting point made around the authorisation and the collaborations to make with authorisations as well. I think the committee understands that somebody could be setting up a GBSI and they’re working with someone, but they might not know that this other group or company is being influenced by nefarious actors or by foreign actors and they haven’t been upfront with it. How does that work? How does the legislation enable that person, that group, that might not know that they’re being used and what are the steps for that clarity to be reached?

So there are two questions there. One of them is around: is it going to cover Waihopai and Rocket Lab? Also, there’s that question around the authorisation, because I think it would be important to get that clarity for people out there. I note that you reached out to 21 operators as well, so maybe there are some specific examples that the ministry might be able to use to actually illustrate the different points or the answers that I’m seeking. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair. There is an exemption for operations from New Zealand Defence Force and also for our security agencies. So when you’re talking about various activities that we take in order to keep our country and our neighbours safe, those will be exempt. But in terms of all other commercial activities, they’re of course covered by it.

Ryan Hamilton—I’m always hesitant to call you.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

No. We’re in urgency. We’re not ready for that yet.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to thank the Minister for Space for acknowledging that some of us have only seen the bill this evening and have not had a briefing around this either. Thank you for taking the questions that we’ve asked.

I do want to just tease out that bit—I did read, obviously, new section 49C(4) and (5) that the Minister mentioned, and I do get that the national interest test here does include risks to national security, public safety, and so on. It’s really (5) that I was referring to in my contribution, where it says, “Before granting a GBSI activity authorisation, the Minister may consult the intelligence and security agencies about—(a) … risks … and (b) the extent to which the risks can be mitigated by authorisation conditions.” It’s that bit around “may”, where it seems optional to me rather than a requirement, and that’s the point that I was trying to make and the clarification that I was seeking and continue to seek.

The other bit that I spoke about, Minister, is around clause 10, “Section 53 amended”, down to subclause (7), so “Replace section 53(4)(a) with:”, and there’s a whole list of—“in the case of a launch licence”. The Minister outlined the difference between the launch and the permits relating to payload, if I understood correctly, versus the authorisation, which refers to the activity which is being regulated here. But there is, in (7)(a), “in the case of a launch licence, payload permit, overseas launch licence,”—and so on and so forth—“or high-altitude licence, must consult the security Ministers in accordance with section 55; and [then] (aa) in the case of a GBSI activity authorisation, may consult the intelligence and security agencies about—(i) [the] risks … and [again] (ii) the extent to which the risks can be mitigated”. That’s my second question around the difference there and whether the Minister could give us an explanation as to the difference in requirement there to consult with security Ministers between the launch licence, etc., and the activity authorisation.

That’s one part of the questions that I’d raised in both my contributions to the first and second readings. I did also have a question around clause 5, going back. Of course, that is around the definition of “GBSI” in that clause and also “regulated activity” that’s defined.

My question is really around the options that are laid out in the regulatory impact statement (RIS). I’ve had a quick read of them this evening in the sense that I get outside of the counterfactual, which I’m not considering for the reasons that everyone’s traversed in this Chamber—clearly there is a need for this. Outside of that, the other two options that didn’t make the cut—so the introduction of the notification and call-in regime—I’m assuming were too lax perhaps and wouldn’t necessarily lead to the national security risk mitigation that we’re looking for in this legislation. The analysis of option two in the RIS—it says, “as the least stringent of the options considered, it was the least regulatory cost to both.” It was a light-touch regulatory option. My question to the Minister is: was there a consideration of starting with that and then escalating to a tighter system, perhaps? Obviously, that was not the option that Cabinet has settled on, but I’m keen to get a sense of the Minister’s thinking around those options that were laid out and some of the costs and benefits of those.

Members, the time has come for me to leave the Chair. The House is suspended until 9.a.m.

Debate interrupted.

Sitting suspended from 9.56 p.m. to 9 a.m. (Wednesday)