Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill

I move, That the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill be now read a second time.

I want to thank members from across the House for their contributions during the first reading debate. I appreciate the thoughtful engagement with the bill’s intent and provisions. As I outlined in my first reading speech, this bill introduces a new authorisation regime for ground-based space infrastructure. These are facilities and systems located in New Zealand that interact with satellites and other space objects such as tracking stations, telemetry systems, and surveillance equipment. Until now, these activities have not been subject to a dedicated regulatory framework. This bill addresses this gap.

The bill requires operators of infrastructure to have a ground-based space infrastructure activity authorisation before conducting regulated activities. Operators of this infrastructure must notify the regulator that they have protective security and partner due-diligence arrangements to obtain an authorisation. The responsible Minister, the Minister for Space, may decline an authorisation if they are not satisfied that the application is in the national interest.

Importantly, it also provides enforcement powers, including the ability to issue disposal orders, where risks cannot be adequately managed. I want to be clear that the bill excludes activities such as astronomy, emergency services operations, and personal or household use. The regime is targeted at ground-based space infrastructure that poses a risk, or a potential risk, to national interest.

From 29 July 2025—next week—all in-scope operators will be treated as having a transitional authorisation. Enforcement powers will apply from that date, and the Minister will have the ability to revoke authorisations on national security grounds, a subcomponent of the broader national interest.

A formal transition period will run until the commencement of regulations, with a backstop date of 29 July 2026, giving operators time to meet the new requirements. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment will provide guidance and support throughout this period. From the commencement of regulations, the Minister will have the ability to revoke authorisations on broader national interest grounds. This bill responds, by the way, to an immediate need to safeguard New Zealand’s national security. Ground-based space infrastructure is increasingly being used to support satellite operations, and without a regulatory framework in place, we are exposed to risk, including foreign interference, that cannot be adequately managed under current legislation.

During the past five years, there have been several deceptive efforts by foreign actors to establish and/or use ground-based space infrastructure in New Zealand to harm our national security. They have deliberately disguised their affiliations to foreign militaries and misrepresented their intentions. To date, these risks have been managed through non-regulatory measures, including relying on the goodwill of ground-based space infrastructure operators. These measures are no longer enough. By progressing this bill under urgency, we are ensuring that enforcement powers are available from the moment the legislation comes into force on 29 July, which is next Tuesday.

This is critical to maintain oversight of in-scope infrastructure and to enable swift actions if national security concerns arise. This bill is not about restricting innovation; it’s about ensuring that New Zealand’s space sector continues to grow in a way that is secure, responsible, and aligned to our national interests. It complements our broader work on space activities, regulation, international partnerships, and space security.

I thank members again for their contributions and look forward to detailed consideration of the bill’s provisions during the committee of the whole House. I commend this bill to the House.

The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I thank the Minister for Space for two comments that she made just then. One was that we’ll have some detailed consideration in the committee stage, and that is very important. The other one was that the Minister has said there is an immediate need, for national security reasons, regarding potential foreign interference that can’t be managed by the current regulatory framework. That is her case for it coming to us under urgency, and I will accept the need for it to be under urgency at the Minister’s word. She knows much more about these things, given the many different hats that she wears in this field.

But I do still say, and I will continue to say—and I’m interested in the Minister’s answer—why can’t there be some sort of post-enactment review of this legislation that we will pass either tonight or tomorrow morning? That point remains, but I thank the Minister for confirming that there is a reason for the urgency and that we will have a detailed discussion in the committee stage.

Now, I just want to touch on a couple of things, because in between doing my first reading and my second reading speeches, I have been down to the Table and have found there now, just as the urgency motion was moved, the departmental disclosure statement and the regulatory impact statement (RIS). A couple of the matters that I referred to in my first reading speech not that long ago are relevant here as well.

I mentioned in the first reading speech that it would be good to know exactly what the operations are that we’re considering. Is it what we have down in Awarua and up in Warkworth? How many more of these ground-based space infrastructures (GBSI) are there around the country? I note then in the departmental disclosure statement, on page 9, it talks about the external consultation that happened with this bill and notes that 21 operators of GBSI and industry members looking to establish GBSI in the future were contacted for some sort of consultation. Then it says, “We met with 10 operators during the initial consultation and three operators responded in writing in the second round of consultation.” It says that the consultation was positive. Then it goes on to say that “We conducted consultation with two GBSI experts on the bill.” It looks to be that there could be 21 operators of this infrastructure around the country, given the comment in here. It would be very useful to hear from the Minister at some point during the committee stage about what those operators are and what is in and out of ground-based space infrastructure.

Then I also note that the Minister made some comment there in her second reading speech that the current regulatory framework is not good enough to safeguard us from this national security risk, and she mentioned that in the past there have been some regulations and some goodwill—the goodwill of the current operators has meant that the system has been, hopefully, working OK.

Now, on page 8 of the RIS, there is some discussion about some of the different regulatory frameworks that are already in place. I think this is important, because it talks about the Radiocommunications Act, and that does provide some regulation at the moment for telemetry tracking and control that’s radio frequency - based, hence it is the Radiocommunications Act, but that there is no coverage for the optical. So that is a useful table that shows the gaps in the regulation that I presume this bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, is trying to fill. That is why we are speaking in support of it but want some more discussion on it.

I also note from the RIS that it will take two additional fulltime-equivalent people—that’s an estimation—at the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, the ministry in charge of the bill. Those are important items to understand as we progress through the second reading and go into the committee stage soon.

Of course, normally, in a second reading we are talking about what we have heard from the select committee and what those that were consulted have said. That hasn’t happened in this case. I take the Minister at her word that the urgency is required, but it does mean that we do need to spend some time on the bill in the committee stage.

We’ve heard from my colleagues who were talking about the national interest test. In this test, from my look at the bill and also the primary legislation that’s being amended by the bill, the national interest test is the same. It’s the same for consideration by the Minister when considering the existing launch approvals—which have different names from approvals: licences and permits—and then for these authorisations for the space infrastructure.

We see it in new section 49C, inserted by clause 7, that the Minister may have regard to economic or other benefits to New Zealand of the proposed activity—so financial focus; any risks to national security, public safety, international relations or other national interests; the extent to which the risk can be mitigated by authorisation conditions; and any other matters that the Minister considers relevant.

So, obviously, new section 49D, inserted by clause 7, is quite wide, and I do acknowledge that this is the same test that is in the legislation already, but we’ve heard from some of the speakers, and we heard from the Greens before about, well, where do mana whenua fit in with this? Is there any consideration for any particular concerns that they might have either in the national interest test or somewhere else? Through my quick look through the RIS—I couldn’t see anything in there, but that may be because I skipped the page. We would like to know more about that.

Then we will also be asking questions about requirements to consult the security Ministers. I acknowledge, at the current point in time, that that is all one person, which is interesting, but we will have some questions about that, and also how these apply to people who might be scientists or universities that aren’t the private person that the Minister talked about and who are clearly exempt. What about those other agencies that might not actually have a big bunch of kit like you do in Awarua but might have a small amount of—some of the items that are listed, when they’re operated by certain people, they become infrastructure, but when they’re operated by a private person, they’re not covered; they are exempt. So there’s an interesting balance there of how that decision will be made of where the line goes. That, again, is something that we will be wanting to address in the committee stage. I’ll leave it there for now.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I rise on behalf of the Greens in this second reading speech to talk about the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. For those that are just tuning in right now, what this bill proposes to do is establish a regulatory regime for ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI) activities, and it imposes an authorisation regime on people who operate what we call GBSI to carry out those activities. The activities include telemetry, tracking, and control, including of activities that could disrupt satellite operations of space objects, space surveillance and identification of space objects, satellite data reception, and other activities of concern.

What we have heard so far in this debate is that this bill is coming to the House because there’s a gap. There’s a gap in the regulatory regime, and it is a gap that needs to be filled. As the Minister was saying earlier, there have been incidents of concern where people have disguised their actual intent in terms of their set-up, and so making sure that you have eyes over things, I think, is really important, right? If you’ve got something being built in your backyard, it makes sense that you know what is being built in that backyard, and it makes sense that there is some sort of regulatory regime that is in place to make sure that it does what we think it does. That’s important. That’s the reason—with that particular aspect—that the Greens are supporting this bill, because we recognise that there needs to be something which deals with ground-based space infrastructure activities.

I do agree with the point, though, that this is coming through the House under urgency, and we have heard concerns that it needs to be done quickly because there are possibly incidents afloat. But the suggestion that we could actually take a look at it a bit afterwards—having a post-legislation review on it—I think, is a good idea, because this is an incredibly important space but also a way for us to make sure that we’ve done the job properly. The issue is that if you take things for urgency too quickly—you know, you’ve got to be able to road-test the tyres, and so on and so forth. We don’t want any of the wheels falling off. So I do support that suggestion.

I think it was the Hon Phil Twyford who talked about his concerns around the national interest. Yes, it’s important for there to be eyes over it and to have a regulatory regime so there is some sort of form of law to be able to make sure that everything is happening in a way that makes sense, and that’s important. But we also need to understand that all of this stuff hooks on to what we call the “national interest”. I guess, for me, the national interest can always change. I note, within the regulatory impact statement here, that ground-based infrastructure refers to GBSI but also that this legislation is focused on foreign actors that do not share New Zealand’s values. I think that’s an important point, because values change over time, right? What are New Zealand’s values? As we become, hopefully, more enlightened as a society, our values change; they evolve.

I think the question that I have—which is linked to this bill but is perhaps a wider discussion, I think, that needs to happen in the context of the Act itself—is actually: have we got it right in terms of how we determine what the national interest is? There are a couple of examples of things, that I’m aware of, that are against the national interest. For example, if you launch something into outer space and you hit someone else’s satellite, well, you’re creating damage to someone else’s property, so that’s against the national interest. We’ve got, proudly, a nuclear-free status, so we can’t—shouldn’t—be launching things into outer space which contravene our nuclear-free legislation, and so that would be seen to be against the national interest. There is another debate there around dual use: if you fire something up which could be agnostic in terms of its usage, what says that afterwards someone might actually use it for nuclear purposes? How do you actually monitor that? Those two things would be considered to be against the national interest.

I think the legislation needs to be a lot more nimble to be able to accommodate the changing world that we live in. We are living in a world that is incredibly fractious. Things change very, very rapidly. Is that particular part fit for purpose? I don’t think it is. The need to actually have the regulatory regime to make sure that we know what we’re doing and that there’s eyes on the ground-based space infrastructure stuff—point made: that’s really important. But it actually hinges on what the national interest is.

We did hear concerns—that I have—around what’s being launched over in Māhia, as well. I note that BlackSky itself, which is a third-party provider who is providing geospatial data to countries like Israel—literally, with Israel. They’ve got a $150 million contract with Israel, and that’s incredibly problematic, because we had a debate today and this whole House is concerned about what’s happening there, as well. The question that I have is: is this now in line with our national interest? Well, I would argue that it isn’t. I would argue that what is happening over there is incredibly problematic and that we must do everything that we can to actually stop what is happening there, or to at least not be part of that. That hinges around that question of national interests.

Just coming back to the bill, I do acknowledge that there have been assessments made by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, and I’ve got a quote here from their assessment, which says, “The full capabilities, and some of the affiliations of these entities, were deliberately hidden”. That’s not good. “If these projects had gone ahead, we would have inadvertently allowed another country to install equipment in New Zealand with a plausible military or intelligence function. To have done so would have risked New Zealand’s sovereignty. By hiding their affiliations, the foreign entities undermined New Zealand’s ability to make informed decisions based on our national security and national interest.” For me, that’s at the heart of why you do need to have a regulatory regime and, in this case, to make sure that GBSI—ground-based space infrastructure activities—do have eyes over them and are regulated. That’s incredibly important.

The other part that I have heard made by some other commentators—which I do support, as well—is concerns from mana whenua. The time that I did go out to Māhia to meet with Māori communities, they were really concerned about what activities were happening there, and what they told me was they were told one thing—these launches weren’t going to be military payloads or surveillance payloads—and then something else happened completely. I think there is another part there. Yes, it’s incredibly important and urgent to deal with issues that are right in front of us, and if there are companies either knowingly or unknowingly being used by nefarious actors, well, then of course we need some legislation to actually be able to deal with that. But we also need to be able to deal with local communities, right? Some of these ground-based institutions—for example, in the case of Māhia—have connections. You have mana whenua who have really legitimate concerns about environmental impacts, for example. Having that weaved through, I think, would be important. I see that as a missing part and component which would actually strengthen, I think, this bill that’s going through, as well.

We do support this. We do need to have eyes on ground-based space infrastructure. Everybody needs to know what’s happening in their own backyard. But I would ask the House to really think about what New Zealand values mean. For me, it means we’re, of course, looking after ourselves but we’re also thinking about our neighbours as well. We live in the Pacific, and we’re a family of Pacific nations, so doing what is the best not just for us but also for the Pacific—in everything that we do—I think, is incredibly important, while also noting that in the fast-changing world that we’re living in, we do need to have legislation that is accommodating, legislation that can actually deal with the fluctuations with what’s happening, not just in the Middle East but also all around the world as well so that if our values change or differ, the legislation matches the evolution of those values—the evolution of those values, I think, that will, hopefully, be a step in the right direction. On that, Madam Speaker, thank you.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I’m taking this call on behalf of ACT to support this bill. I want to thank the Minister for bringing this bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, before the House, and it’s justified, in our view, that it goes through under urgency, because the risk has been already identified. Despite identifying the risk, if nothing is done, then it would be really irresponsible, and that is not what we do in Government.

That’s why it’s good to see that this bill is going through under urgency, because at the moment, the non-regulatory approaches that are available for any actors, those who come here into New Zealand and set up any ground-based space infrastructure, basically, don’t have any teeth. It’s about education. It’s about outreach. We are relying on their goodwill, and, at this stage, even if we find something that is malicious, we cannot go and stop them, so having this regulatory regime will actually send a really good message—a strong message—to anybody who is wanting to come here. At the moment, if somebody will see how relaxed our approach is, they will see New Zealand as a very easy place to go and set up these kinds of infrastructures and do, kind of, malicious activities that we don’t want happening here in New Zealand.

It’s good that, from next week, all authorisations will become transitional authorisations, and then, on a case-by-case basis, they will be changed to fully authorised activities, based on what their activity is, and also giving the opportunity for us to be sure that none of those activities are compromising our national security. It’s a great bill, and I support this bill, and commend this bill to the House. Thank you.

This bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, is going through a very rapid passage and, for most of us, the first time we saw anything of it was when the Minister introduced it and we saw the papers put down on the Table in front of us. So I think we’re all getting to have a greater understanding of what the bill is about.

I just wanted to pick up on one thing, because my understanding is that the Hon Phil Twyford talked about a lot of things related to payload—things which are actually being launched into space—which I understand has actually been covered by other legislation for some period of time, I think since 2017. So what it’s more about is the things which are on the ground, surveilling space. If you look at the list—and it was Teanau Tuiono who very helpfully read those out—it’s telemetry, tracking, and control of space objects; space surveillance and identification of space objects; and satellite data reception.

I really want you to think about the place of New Zealand in the world, because we are an island nation. We’re quite a long way away from anywhere else that anybody can do that kind of tracking, in a location which, as I understand it, a lot of satellites will be going over—the South Pole area—so we are going to be strategically important. If somebody wants to surveil those—to interfere with them, potentially, if they’re a malicious operator—we are quite a handy location to do that from.

It’s quite important that we do that, not just for us but also for our friends and our neighbours. If I might say to the Green Party there—you talked about our values. Looking after our friends and neighbours is a really good part of our value system.

I’ll just finish off with saying that we’ve had two separate comments from the Opposition. One is to say that this idea of national interest is vague, and then the other is to say that we want the idea of the national interest to be flexible, to be able to respond to different situations. Can’t really have it both ways.

Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan: Yes, you can.

ANDY FOSTER: Well, it is really about allowing for a judgment call to be made for the Government of the day as to what is in the national interest. I commend this bill to the House.

This call is a split call.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I’m here to speak on the second reading of this particular bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. I mentioned in the first reading speech that in the second reading I’d be diving a little bit deeper into the bill itself and some of the questions we have for the Minister for Space in the upcoming committee stage, and, also, this gives me a chance to go into some of the specificities around the regulatory impact statement as well.

I think, to start with, in terms of the different clauses of this bill, one of the things we heard from the Minister was in terms of the reason for urgency. But one of the things we do see in this particular bill is around the transitional arrangement, whereby there’s a transitional authorisation for all persons operating ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI) from the date of commencement until one year—so 29 July 2026. Again, if there is already a transitional arrangement in place which opens the opportunities for the Minister to be able to review the authorisation, it raises the question of why we are then needing to introduce this urgency where, currently, no operators’ authorisation is secure. That’s one of the questions that we’ll be hoping to tease out.

The other one that is really important, and, I think, quite a few people have mentioned this—and, again, this is something for us to highlight during the committee stage—is the fact that there is immense power embedded in the Minister. The Minister, in this case, has a lot of discretion and regulatory-making power in terms of the ability to authorise such GBSI operators, with—from what I can see within legislation—not a lot of checks and balances. This is, again, something that we would like to tease out. One of the things I have learnt on the Regulations Review Committee is this immediate nervousness around when there are unchecked regulatory-making powers by the executive.

Also, I mentioned this in the first reading and I would just like to reiterate that we are now at the second reading, and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act report is still not available on the Ministry of Justice’s website, which makes our job incredibly difficult in terms of analysing and scrutinising any legislation in the House.

On to the regulatory impact statement: one of the things that we have seen is the fact that this particular bill had a number of options. We can talk more about what is considered to be the national interest and what are considered to be New Zealand values, and we’re going to tease some of that out as part of the committee stage. In accordance with the regulatory impact statement, one of the things that we have seen is that this particular concern—and we have addressed that there is a gap in this particular area and the coverage between what is currently the regulatory environment and the non-regulatory environment that has been used to sort of jigsaw together the current status quo doesn’t cover certain areas. Particularly, if we’re looking at the regulatory impact statement, the current environment doesn’t cover telemetry, it doesn’t even cover space objects surveillance identification, or SOSI, and it doesn’t cover data reception, and also particularly around passive radiofrequency or optical—those two are the most frequent ways for us to be able to track some of these space objects, so to speak. There are certain areas where the current regulatory and non-regulatory environment doesn’t cover, so it is important for there to be an altered measure.

Now, four options have been given. One of the things I’m more interested in is that there is a third option, which is offering authorisation for this particular regime, and the next option is actually offering a licence. Based on the regulatory impact statement, there is a difference, but there isn’t a lot of information within that that suggests one is better than the other. So, again, the idea of authorisation versus licence is something that we would like to have a conversation with the Minister around during the committee stage.

I think, finally, when we are looking at this—and this is also important to tease out and this is something that is currently covered under the regulatory impact statement—a large amount of that current guidance is largely based on the Government’s existing published guidance in these areas, through areas such as the Government Communications Security Bureau, but also in terms of New Zealand Security Intelligence Service. So there will be more conversations around those, because, as we’re seeing with some of the other legislation, that has been a sticking point. We look forward to the committee stage.

Well, we’ve heard already that ground-based space infrastructure plays a vital role in supporting global satellite operations and space activities. That’s why we’re bringing this regulatory regime in, because, of course, there is a risk that there may be foreign entities that don’t share our values or interests looking to engage with this ground-based space infrastructure.

I do just want to give some confidence to those hobbyists that they will not be captured by this law. The intent is that for members of the public looking at satellites as a hobby, for example, they are excluded. So I just wanted to note that piece—because it hasn’t come up so far in debate—before we get into the committee stage. But I do commend the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill to the House.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. We know that space is increasingly contested and competitive. That leads to, often, an increasing view of space as a geopolitical domain. We know that countries seek to use space technology to further their own military and security ambitions. We have seen, as I previously mentioned or laid out in my contribution to the first reading of this bill, that the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) themselves have laid out in their threat assessment for 2024 how this has happened in recent years, the fact that there are malicious actors, and the lack of a stringent regulatory framework—because there is some regulation—and that the gaps in that mean that we could have opened ourselves inadvertently to be used in a way that goes against our own national security. So here we are.

We also know from the work that has been done to date on this bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, that New Zealand is increasingly an attractive location to host ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI), and so the two together mean that we need to take some action, and that’s what this bill is about. That’s why we are supporting it: because we do recognise that there’s the potential for increased activity in this space—excuse the pun.

We also know that GBSI is dual use: it could be used for military purposes; it could be used for civilian research purposes, for example. I acknowledge that this bill aims to narrow the scope so that it captures, within the scope, some of those more problematic aspects of GBSI use but doesn’t capture, as the previous speaker said, some other things around hobby and astronomy and so on and so forth. We would like to tease that out a little bit at the committee stage to make sure that that is indeed what the outcome will be.

In terms of the regulatory gap that this piece of legislation aims to fill, to date a lot of it has been around non-regulatory measures—so engagement between officials and known GBSI activities, I suppose, or providers, and education there. It’s been recognised that that’s not enough. There needs to be better tools or better levers to be able to manage the risk herein.

I do want to raise, within the regulatory impact statement (RIS)—and I accept the Minister for Space has said that there is a security risk, and that’s why all stages of this bill are being considered under urgency. However, I will still say that we do still feel that a post-enactment review clause should be included in this bill, because it is potentially a significant bill, and there has been limited consultation. It’s that point that I want to make. I’ll just find the particular section of the RIS that talks about some of the consultation that’s happened to date. I understand it’s on the policy intent of the bill, not the bill itself—that it was the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment approaching 21 known GBSI operators to provide them with the opportunity to give some feedback on what the scope of the policy intent of this bill, and the design of the regulatory regime itself, would look like.

I see from the RIS that only three of those operators actually responded to the call—the consultation document—and that made it quite difficult to then get a consensus around, I guess, the scope of this regime, what it should capture, and what it should exclude intentionally. In fact, of the three, only two of them responded supporting an authorisation regime, while, apparently, one operator felt that choice was not consequential because they offer GBSI services to foreign third parties and would expect a high level of scrutiny, so I’m not too sure what to make of that feedback. It does also say earlier on in the RIS that there was broad support for this regime. We, of course, haven’t seen the consultation document, it being a targeted form of consultation, but it would be useful to know what some of that feedback was in a little bit more detail, I guess.

The other part of the RIS that had me a little bit nervous was the part that says that there’s currently no funding identified to support the implementation of the regime. From reading the bill, there are a number of parts to it, but a large component of it would be the compliance and the penalty regime, I would have thought, because that is the lever that is being sought to address the national security, national interest side of the risk of this whole activity. Not having any funding to implement the regime and no information around where that would sit or how that would happen is, for me, problematic. Perhaps that’s also in the regulations, but there is a lot of detail in the regulations of this bill, and so I do think some questions around that, to the Minister, would be prudent at the committee stage.

The final point that I wanted to make—given that, as I mentioned previously, there is a section of the NZSIS threat assessment from last year that lays out a case study around the risk involved here. There is also a section of the RIS that talks about how managing GBSI risks aligns with New Zealand’s National Security Strategy. I know when we were in Government there was a comprehensive piece of work around countering foreign interference. That has continued as well. Foreign interference and espionage, alongside space security, are included as core issues for this Government to focus on through the security agencies, and I will once again raise the point that I see no interaction or requirement, through this legislation, for the national security agencies to be consulted when it comes to the national interest test. I will put to the Minister that I will be asking a few more questions at the committee stage around that.

Given that the whole point of this legislative fix is to improve national security, I find it slightly bizarre that there’s no requirement around that consultation either of the Minister. In this case, it’s not too much of an issue, but in future cases, if it’s not the same Minister for Space and security agencies but also overarching intelligence and security, I feel there probably should be a requirement to consult in that space. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. Look, I’d just like to rise and take this call on the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. Please could I just take one minute to acknowledge the Star Trekkers from Gisborne in the gallery tonight, here for a night of fun in the House.

I think the purpose of the bill, being to strengthen New Zealand’s space regulatory framework, is one that is well needed and it’s a good piece of work. I commend the Minister for her hard work and I commend the bill to the House.

This is a split call.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I would like to use the time that I have to really encourage and urge the Government members and the Minister for Space in particular to look at the post-enactment review that has been called for by my colleague the Hon Rachel Brooking. I accept, as my colleagues do, that there is an important reason why we’re going through urgency and why everything needs to be done in a hurry, but I am really concerned about a number of issues and the context in which this has been created—that the national interest that we are serving is New Zealand’s national interest and that it cannot be hijacked by any of our friends in the global terrain.

I say that as the MP who has the privilege of having Awarua, which has been mentioned a few times in the House, in the electorate that I look after as what we call a buddy MP in Invercargill. The reason Awarua is such a great site is that we have clear skies down there near Invercargill but also really fantastic launch angles. The Hon Rachel Brooking and myself were lucky enough to go down and see what almost felt like something out of a Dr. Seuss book, with these strange contraptions that would lie dormant and then very occasionally suddenly wake up, turn, and provide vital information. I do want to acknowledge Robin McNeill and his team for the incredible innovation and what they have created for the sector with what has become SpaceOps.

My concern, really, is that there have been issues raised in terms of the use of urgency, in terms of the caveated and the very high levels of trust element that we have regarding the imminent threat to Aotearoa New Zealand—the fact that the Government Communications Security Bureau, as the Hon Priyanca Radhakrishnan has said, is not required to be consulted. I think about the context of Rocket Lab and also about the dual use of these facilities, and I think it’s really important that we accept and trust there are good reasons to do this but that we understand what agendas are at play here. The post-enactment review will provide full transparency and full scrutiny so that we can be clear this is really about New Zealand’s national interest and nobody else’s.

I also look at the powers of the Minister, which are undefined considerations of economic benefit, national security, and international relations. They are not prescriptive, and that means they are potentially subject to the political whims of the day, regardless of who is in power. I also note that there are some who fear that New Zealand’s space sector would become a proxy for foreign defence interests. It’s really important that, for those sceptics out there, we can provide a comprehensive and full disclosure, full transparency, and rationale for enacting this bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, and for doing it with so much urgency. When I look at the national interest, it has a heavy tilt towards economic benefit, and economic benefit and national security can be mutually exclusive. It’s really important that we distinguish, again, the agendas that are at play here and that we appease people who think this is maybe not about New Zealand’s national interests but about others’ in the geopolitics that we are seeing play out in our region. I’m thinking here about the Pacific region but also Antarctica and that triangle of geography that is so important to our national security and also to global peace and security.

Finally, I am concerned that the operational detail of the regime will be only introduced in maybe 2025 or 2026. There is a transitional period where actors are deemed to be compliant. Again, they may well be fine, but in the interests of transparency, which is the best way of garnering public support and confidence in this, I think it’s really important that we have a post-enactment review that can ventilate and shine a light on all of these concerns so that people in New Zealand really know that the excellent work done by Robin McNeill’s team in Awarua and also up in the Far North is in New Zealand’s national interests, without agendas from partners, without pressure from any foreign partners, and that we are really doing the right thing by our country. Let’s get that post-enactment review in place, and then everybody can sleep well. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. It’s a pleasure to rise in support of the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. This bill brings into place a regulatory framework to help with the ground-based space infrastructure that we know is in place, and it enables us to protect our national interests. I commend the bill to the House.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. Like my colleagues, I rise in support of the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, which, in my view, does send a clear message that the country considers its national security a serious matter and that we can take action and have an appropriate regulatory framework in place to address threats. I do support the bill and, of course, have trust in the Minister, the Hon Judith Collins, given her knowledge in the sector, in terms of the need for urgency. However, like my colleagues, I would support a post-urgency scrutiny process.

Just as a bit of a sidestep on the urgency, I note going into the Standing Orders review that this is an issue that comes up fairly frequently and that the Clerk has proposed changes in this respect as well. Post-legislative scrutiny is a good way of ensuring that where legislation does need to proceed through the House urgently, we can still examine it after the fact. However, unfortunately, the Standing Orders Committee has yet to act on those recommendations. It’s not an unusual procedure to have in a House and, just having done some looking into this, I understand that in the United Kingdom they have had a post-legislative review process in place for all legislation, including fast-track legislation, since 2008. With their process, it actually allows a departmental review—it’s a different process—within three to five years of the Act entering the statute book. However, the UK House of Commons also engages in a post-legislative scrutiny process as well, where there are select committees that examine legislation, and sessional committees specifically put together to go through whether there have been legislative flaws, which often happens as well, or whether there are policy issues that ought to be examined.

There are other countries still, like Denmark, who adopt other ways of regulating or managing legislation that needs to go through the House under urgency. Again, I’m completely accepting that there will be times when this does need to happen. For example, Denmark in 2022 announced that they would provide for fast-track legislative proposals to come with a sunset clause of six months. The aim there was that they would then go into a period of immediately reviewing the legislation and allowing for public submissions. That’s, of course, not what we’re asking in this case. I think we’re asking for something that’s extremely reasonable in terms of a post-legislative framework to examine the rationale behind the bill. I’m just wanting to emphasise that I do think it’s extremely important, not only because we’re going through an urgency process but because of the nature of the legislation as well, which I’ll speak to part of in a moment.

I did want to just refer back to comments made in the House earlier this evening by the Hon Phil Twyford and Lawrence Xu-Nan. They referenced the national interest test and the fact that while this regulates a particular a gap in our regulatory system in terms of infrastructure on the ground, we do always also need to consider how the launching of payloads affects our national security as well. I think it’s part and parcel of the same considerations in terms of national security. I would just note that there was a call earlier this year from a group of eminent lawyers asking for an Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security review of our intelligence sharing and whether that posed a risk in terms of our obligations under the Genocide Convention. This is an important area of the law, and I do think that we need to be actively considering what we believe to be national interest. For me, it includes our commitment to international law and the rule of law and making sure that we comply with that as well.

I did now want to go to a few issues that, had this gone to select committee, I would have raised, and perhaps there will be time to discuss during the committee stage. The first is whether certain provisions are most appropriately placed within primary or secondary legislation. This is actually an issue I raised in regards to the Legislation Amendment Bill earlier today. In terms of this bill, clause 24 amends section 88, which concerns the power to make regulations for various purposes related to the principal Act. I just wanted to point out the difference in some of those powers. There are some powers that prescribe the requirements for protective security arrangements and partner due diligence, some that prescribe conditions for authorisation—in my view, that’s very appropriate to be done in secondary legislation—some that prescribe the form of authorisations and the information that they must contain, and some that prescribe requirements for authorisation holders to provide information to the Minister. In my view, this very appropriately sits within secondary legislation.

Then there are some other provisions that create powers to amend the definition of “ground-based space infrastructure” by prescribing things that are or that are not within the meaning of that term. There’s another one that allows amending the definition of “operate” by prescribing acts that are or that are not within the meaning of that term, and another one that allows a power to amend the definition of a regulated activity by prescribing activities that are or aren’t within the meaning of that term. There’s difference in terms of the powers created here—some of them are very technical, while others appear to touch on very substantive policy decisions. The question I would have asked is whether it would be more appropriate for those terms—those substantive terms—to be outlined within primary legislation. This is a point that has been made before by the Regulations Reviews Committee, and certainly many academics as well, who have critiqued the making of very broad legislative powers and the fact that it then becomes very difficult to monitor how those powers are used.

Now, some might suggest that we don’t need to be overly concerned about this because there are executive checks on the system in terms of creating those secondary powers. Certainly, as regulations are created, there is an obligation on the Parliamentary Counsel Office to notify the Attorney-General if there is a sense that the regulations are being drafted outside the scope of primary legislation. The issue here is that when you draft primary legislation so broadly, it is very difficult to hold back those regulation-making powers. Likewise, if you wanted to challenge the regulation in the courts, it probably wouldn’t be deemed ultra vires—outside of the power or scope of the primary legislation—however, it might be deemed unusual.

I do think, as I mentioned earlier this evening, we have to be cautious of legislative decision-making that takes us on a slide towards framework legislation as the acceptable model all the time. I think we need to be especially cautious of a model where we’re dealing with security and intelligence - related substantive policy. The reason for that is that that’s the very type of secondary legislation that I could see as being the type that might be exempt from publication, that might be less subject to review, and so we must really be very, very careful of that.

There’s another point on, I think, new section 49B, which speaks to the application, in terms of being authorised. There’s an obligation on the applicant to establish reasonable measures to manage the risks that are present in terms of producing their application. It’s another example of a place within the legislation where I would ask: should we specify what those risks are rather than leaving them fairly broad? Hopefully, Madam Speaker, we will have time at the committee stage for some of these questions to be answered by the Minister for Space, but, at this stage, I will support the bill through to the committee stage.

Can I just say I always admire as we sit here in urgency the House staff and the security staff that serve us so faithfully, and it’s appropriate that we would be here in urgency passing this legislation.

I did hear the call from the Greens, the question about, “Well, what about the Pacific?” It’s an interesting one. Of course, New Zealand has not just security interests in the Pacific but we’re a Pacific nation and we’re a good friend and a good partner. Of course we’re interested in that, but first we need to sort out our interests at home. We need to get our own house in order.

That’s what this bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, is about, and how appropriate that the world’s first Minister for Space would be the one to bring it to the House. I commend this bill. We should all vote Aye.

It is my pleasure and honour and privilege to commend our Minister for Space, the Hon Judith Collins, for putting this bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, to the House. I commend the bill to the House.

Motion agreed to.

Bill read a second time.

This bill is set down for committee stage immediately. I declare the House in committee for consideration of the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill.

In Committee

Part 1 Amendments to Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Act 2017