Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill

I call Simon O’Connor.

💬 Kieran McAnulty: Argh!

Yeah, it’s probably true actually, Kieran. But look, I’m very pleased to speak on Part 2. As you, Madam Chair, will know, but not necessarily members of the public, this is a bill in two parts. This isn’t a bill as such that has substantial parts to it, which is not meant to be a paradox, but I, again, just to stress, particularly for those listening as we get into Part 2, understand that this is the domestic piece of legislation which is an instrument to bring about the wider treaty—6,000 or so pages. So I certainly encourage—actually, the Minister in the chair, the Hon Damien O’Connor, may edify us later with the exact number of pages so that I get that right, but let’s just say a lot of pages. So for those listening and curious, to get the absolute substance of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) agreement, turn to that, not this particular piece of legislation.

So what we’re here discussing in Part 2 are those, effectively, what I’d call consequential changes to a number of Acts in existing New Zealand legislation, particularly the Copyright Act of 1994, as those who have been following the debate would expect. The Customs and Excise Act of 1996—in fact, that’s a fairly simple change. It’s a tidy-up in terms of just repealing a particular part of that Act. There are some minor—in fact, all of these changes are relatively minor, other than probably the copyright area, where there may be a little bit of dispute, and I might touch on some of that.

This part also changes the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act of 1996. We’re beginning to get a bit of a theme, actually, that clearly 1996 was a fairly busy year. The Legislation Act of 2012 is also changed. Most of it is actually nominative; it’s really just around definitions. In effect, this part, particularly those clauses, or clause 13 onwards in this particular area, are just tightening up so that New Zealand’s domestic law—in this case, the Legislation Act—is aligned with the treaty itself.

Somewhat controversially, we are making changes to the Overseas Investment Act of 2005. This is bringing into effect elements that the Government has discussed, and it’s not my intention to go too much into that. There’s a change to the Patents Act. As friends of mine would note, there are distinct differences between copyright and patents, but that’s a fairly small set of changes, and it’s particularly adding a new Part 2 to a schedule in the Patents Act of 2013. Most of it, again, is around the nomenclature of the title between the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the comprehensive and progressive agreement. So a lot of this part is tidy-up, as too with the Tariff Act of 1988, which you would expect, seeing as this is a bill to bring about a treaty which is to do with trade. Finally, but not because it’s unimportant, the Wine Regulations of 2006 are also to be changed.

If I might, my primary thoughts are around the changes to the Copyright Act. Minister, I’m supportive, as far as I’ve been able to get my head fully around matters of copyright. I think it’s prudent that we are bringing into effect other agreements that we’ve got. So, again, particularly for those who are out there, the CPTPP, while obviously a comprehensive agreement in and of itself, also rests on wider agreements that New Zealand is party to. It may or may not be known, but we are part of a group called WIPO—that’s how I would say it as an acronym, but the World Intellectual Property Organization—and New Zealand is required to make some treaties under a copyright treaty and a performance and phonograms treaty.

So it’s a little bit like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea recently, where obligations through that treaty meant that we had to make some changes to our customs work. It’s similar here that the CPTPP and our—sorry, actually, I’ve got that the wrong way around. I apologise to the Chair and the Minister. New Zealand is party to these copyright agreements. We have signed understandings, treaties, in this regard. We’re conscious that, being good global citizens and engaging with the likes of the World Intellectual Property Organization, we need to make sure that our domestic legislation aligns with that, and in this particular debate tonight—or discussion, I think it is, more than anything—that our Copyright Act, as articulated in this amendment bill, is aligned.

So, really, in a lot of ways it’s a tidy up. Most of the changes being proposed in this bill are around the technological protection measures, often just referred to as TPMs. It’s really just being very, very clear about who is and who is not covered. I don’t think there’s anything particularly controversial in these. When we sat through the select committee, it was very well explained to us—and I would say in advance, if not already, that any lack comes from my own understanding rather than what was given. But, really, it’s just tightening up the requirements and what is proposed to be. So this is in Part 2, clause 8, which is inserting new sections into the Copyright Act. There’s a new section 226F, just around the meaning of copyright information, and just being very clear that we’re talking about the work, the author of the work, the copyright owner, the performer, and when it comes to a film, also the director of that film. So these are small things, but those who work in industry would just see that that’s clearly aligning with things.

I’m not so sure it’s as much a question to the Minister as perhaps I thought, but he’s very welcome to address it. I know, in talking to various people involved in the creative industries, there is concern around just how comprehensive—no puns intended there, Minister—our copyright work is. I’m very conscious that we’re not here discussing tonight the Copyright Act itself; we’re talking about the CPTPP, but, I suppose, just some assurances that we’re not, through this CPTPP amendment bill, locking in poor copyright behaviours. Those who are more expert than I am in the copyright industry would say there are very different laws and approaches in New Zealand between that for books, music, those who are writers, those who are performers, or copyright for computer games. New Zealand’s copyright law is good, but there are different rules, different lengths of protection for those different organisations. In fact, there are even differences, I am told—and always happy to be corrected—for even those who are involved in writing, between those who write books, so what you would particularly get at Whitcoulls, through to those who write technical manuals, through to those who do academic works. What I am hinting at here, poorly, is that there are a whole series of different copyright rules for different media or mediums.

There is controversy, Minister, around this. There is concern for those in the industry, and there has been a long desire that this be tidied up. But, importantly, where it affects here is probably just some assurances that our agreeing to the WIPO agreements and putting it in here, in Part 2, does not stop New Zealand making its own consequential changes in the future. Or, to put it another way: if this year, next year, it was the will of the Government to implement a lot of the changes that those in the creative industries are asking for, which is, basically, an alignment of copyright rules and some new ones, particularly around the notion of gaming and digital rights, will our having been part of WIPO, but, more importantly, our having put those provisions into this Part 2 of the CPTPP amendment bill, preclude the executive and the Government, this Parliament, from actually making those changes?

So it’s relatively technical, the rest of the sections. It may seem like a lot of words to those reading through, but, in effect, it’s just bringing about changes that we as a country have already agreed to. So I think I will leave my contribution on those parts there. I’m conscious there are two Supplementary Order Papers in the name of the Greens. As, perhaps, a courtesy, I will let that member, who I suspect will speak but I cannot be absolutely sure, address those. I may, if I get the opportunity, have some comments on those later as they relate to new parts within Part 2. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Madam Chair. It’s a pleasure to talk on this Part 2 of this bill. I want to, in this contribution, limit my comments to the technology protection measures (TPMs). My colleague Simon O’Connor spoke about copyright and potential ramifications there. I actually don’t want to talk about where that copyright might go, but I want to hear from the Minister in the chair, the Hon Damien O’Connor, because the Government has claimed they made substantial changes that merited a name change, to “Comprehensive and Progressive”.

I’ve read through these changes here in new section 37A in clause 8, that the bill would amend—

💬 Kieran McAnulty: They’re comprehensive and progressive.

Yeah, they comprehensively do very little, Mr McAnulty. So we’ve got some minor wording changes to how you, basically, define a copyright owner of a work that issued a copy of the TPM to the public or communicated the TPM work to the public, or a person under licence from the copyright owner who issued a copy of the TPM work to the public or communicated the TPM work to the public. It’s not really a substantive change from what was already there.

So if this is comprehensive and progressive, Minister, what has the Government negotiated and how is that reflected in this bill before the committee that seeks to address the concerns that were raised across the technology industry, the ICT industry, across the years that this agreement—both the original and this latest change—was in negotiation? What changes are there in this bill that addresses the concerns of that industry about what the TPM measures would mean for users of accessing content over the internet, over physical devices, over new media, and with new technologies? For instance, their concern at a most basic level was that this entrenches geo-coding through the likes of DVD regions, although DVD is all but a dead technology now. Particularly, they were very concerned that technologies like geo-coding or geo-blockers would—that signing up to this agreement without particular exceptions would open otherwise law-abiding New Zealand citizens up for potential prosecution—for instance, by using a DNS re-router, a domain name system re-routing service, so that they could watch US Netflix content instead of the curated Netflix New Zealand content.

So simply signing up to those, their argument was, exposed New Zealanders to risk. The only way that risk could be addressed was through court action, because it wasn’t sufficiently explicit in the legislation or the agreement as to what they could or couldn’t do. They have for years signalled their concerns. They have spoken when the Minister and his team were in Opposition. They spoke with these people a lot. The former Minister for Government Digital Services, when she was an Opposition spokesperson, spoke to these people all the time, including the likes of InternetNZ, and their support partner, the Greens—this is how important the groups like this were to these members in the past—have actually suggested that the Government should just make InternetNZ the Government’s Chief Technology Officer.

So, given the Government members had expressed so much concern for what these groups had been advocating when those Government members were in Opposition, I’d like the Minister to spell out for us now that if this bill is worthy of being called the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, then how, in Part 2, has the Government addressed the concerns from within the ICT community that just signing up to these TPM measures would expose New Zealanders to legal ramifications—simply using software services that would allow them to present themselves as being resident other than the physical place where they live, which might then allow them to access certain content from overseas that is normally curated or not even available at all in New Zealand. Let’s just be clear: these people aren’t talking about stealing or not paying for this content; what they’re talking about is New Zealanders who will legitimately sign up and pay to view the content but who use software tools to present themselves in a fashion that would open up their access to larger and different content libraries.

So, Minister, if this is comprehensive and progressive, then point out for us—answer the question—where the changes are here that address those concerns.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I rise again with pleasure and a bit of heartbreak as the lone voice in this committee speaking against this agreement, the agreement that it was designed to project, and also the bill itself, which seeks to implement that damaging and dangerous trade model.

So we’ve heard earlier this afternoon and this evening a couple of things that really jump out. One is that this trade agreement appears to be changed in name only, and in the second part we see the breadth of it—just how much there is here that we’re implementing that has very little to do with free trade.

Now, the Green Party is not against trade. New Zealand is a small country and we need trade.

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Anne Tolley): Can I just ask the member to speak into the microphone, otherwise Hansard will have difficulty picking it up. Thank you.

So Part 2—we’re talking about a lot of things that don’t seem particularly related to trade per se, but they are part of this corporate privilege framework that this trade agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPPA) before it was based on. We heard from hundreds of submitters, two thirds of whom opposed this agreement, and they opposed it on the basis that it was rather unchanged and that it went far beyond what is necessary to ensure trade.

We have 6,000 pages that were negotiated without transparency and much of which are about things like copyright, things like the privilege of foreign corporate investors to keep their information offshore so that they can avoid our privacy laws. We’ve promised not to regulate future unknown technologies—not much to do with trade—and, of course, the investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) clauses, the provision that allows foreign multinationals to sue our Government if we legislate or if we adopt progressive policy that protects New Zealanders, our environment, our workers’ rights, our Treaty of Waitangi, over their profits. And we’ve talked about that a lot.

So I have tabled two Supplementary Order Papers (SOPs), and I will speak to them. The first is to add a provision into this law that ensures that no future new States can join without signing binding agreements that opt out of the ISDS provisions. This agreement was sold to us as being completely changed, in part based on the fact that a number of member States have signed side agreements, so to speak, that say that investors based in those States won’t avail themselves of the right to sue us under the ISDS provisions. Now, we know that any level of ISDS is too much, because, of course, multinational corporations can base themselves anyway and sue us. An Australian company can sue us from Singapore bases. But let’s mitigate that risk at least, and the Government has said that we’re not going to sign on to any further trade agreements that include ISDS clauses. So let’s limit the risk that ISDS will be used against us under this agreement or, in fact, the old TPPA, because we have heard from officials that that can be resurrected were the US, for example, to join it. So the first SOP seeks to include a provision that says that no further States can join and avail themselves of that ISDS provision. That’s important to our democracy.

The second Supplementary Order Paper that I’ve proposed we adopt seeks to bind the executive in bringing back this agreement for select committee consultation, for New Zealanders’ voices to be heard, were new member States to join and change the agreements. Now, the other way that this agreement was sold to us is by way of all of these suspended provisions, these protections, that could be lifted if new member States join—the protection of Pharmac to set fair prices and provide high-quality medical care for New Zealanders is in there. We want parliamentary oversight if new members are to join and to opt out of the suspended clauses. That’s about democracy. It’s about a new way of doing trade. It’s about trade being transparent and subject to parliamentary oversight, democratic oversight, by New Zealanders, which we weren’t given when this Government signed on to this newly named trade agreement.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Well, now I do get to speak on Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 140. Thank you for your guidance, Madam Chair. We just heard the person whose name this SOP is in, Golriz Ghahraman, and, when I look at the commentary and the Green Party minority view, it really was a bit hard to follow, in a lot of ways. They say that they’re for trade, but, when they explained the qualifications that would be required for them to be in favour of it, basically, they’re not in favour of free trade at all. But this SOP, as the member who just sat down said, the new bill—the CPTPP—is a change in name only, and then she goes on to talk about a number of things in there: it has very little to do with free trade. And then she mentioned corporate privilege. I’m not quite sure what she means by that. She didn’t explain what that means.

Her SOP seeks to ensure that the executive must not agree to any country joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership or any other changes to that agreement unless the House of Representatives has examined the resulting amendments. And it’s, basically, I suspect, to try and keep the US out, and it seems a very strange thing for the Green Party to have a hatred of the United States, which I can’t understand why that would be, other than the fact that they’re successful—perhaps that is what is driving that. So that doesn’t make a lot of sense.

She said there was no transparency and that they really don’t like anything without transparency, and yet they signed up to a coalition agreement that they had no idea what they were signing up for. So I think, on transparency, it’s a bit rich for them to start complaining about that when they were very keen to sign up to their coalition and had no idea they were agreeing to supporting the waka-jumping legislation, which was anathema to Rod Donald, et al., who set up the Green Party in this Parliament. So transparency is just very odd. It really hurts—you can see it hurts when you talk about it. The truth hurts. We do hear that.

So, OK, they feel there wasn’t any transparency. Well, no one would agree on any trade agreement negotiated in an open forum. You would never get anywhere, and people wouldn’t agree on anything. I think everyone understands that, except for them. They said it was sold to us in lots of ways.

The investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), which seems to be lost on the Green Party, protects us from other countries doing what they’re afraid that we might be sued for—that is, a Government coming in over the top and bringing in a law that would single out a company. So the example could be, let’s say, a motor vehicle producer from a country that is banned—[Interruption]

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Anne Tolley): Excuse me, could we just have a bit of quiet.

—because the other country doesn’t support it. That would be an unfair practice, and that has to be dealt with in free-trade agreements. We have used those provisions—not those provisions directly, but provisions within these trade agreements—to our advantage, going to the World Trade Organization. If we don’t have those things spelt out very carefully in our agreements—and ISDS has that all spelt out for us so that if a country’s Government steps in over the top and disadvantages our producers, we’d have recourse for that. There are serious sanctions for that and the ability for a small producer to protect themself. I just can’t understand how the two sides of their argument are so opposite—they’re arguing against one another—and they don’t seem to be able to see that.

In short, the Supplementary Order Paper we won’t be supporting. It is poorly drafted, it is poorly thought-out, it is actually against our best interests, and it’s against the best interests of trade around the world. Trade is what puts food on the table: it gives people jobs and it makes societies far better than they would have otherwise been rather than being a Fortress New Zealand with a very low standard of living.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’ll just take the opportunity to answer a few queries that have been made by members of the Opposition and by the Green Party. Can I just, in starting, acknowledge the members of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, who have scrutinised this piece of legislation. Most of the points they have raised in the committee here tonight are legitimate and reasonable points, and I’ll try and work through a couple of them.

In response to Mr Simon O’Connor’s question around how many pages, I’m told there are about 30 chapters, and we’re still counting the number of pages. This is a substantive agreement. Moving on to Mr Hudson’s point about no substantial changes, I have to say that the changes, while they seem to be technical—and they are, effectively, to, I think, seven pieces of legislation and then of course to the Wine Regulations—are all significant from New Zealand’s perspective. That is to ensure we have protected the rights of our performers in terms of copyright, the sovereign rights of Government to ensure we can have a say over who buys our land, and that we can have a say over other key pieces, like who can trade pharmaceuticals with us. Those are things that this Government, prior to coming into Government, determined were important, which is why we went to renegotiate and why we’re now dealing with this.

In terms of the points raised by the Green Party regarding investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), as I’ve said before, I respect their view on that. Can I just clarify, because no negotiated agreement is ever perfect for both parties. We accept that. We were opposed to ISDS clauses, but, of course, we go into negotiation to get the best outcome overall—not perfect, but the best overall outcome, ensuring that New Zealand’s sovereign rights have not been traded away. Can I say, we have also agreed to reciprocal limits on those able to use the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership’s (CPTPP) ISDS provisions.

New treaty-status side letters were signed with Brunei, Malaysia, Peru, and Vietnam to either exclude CPTPP ISDS between us or require prior consent by the Governments concerned—that is, we’d both have to agree before any such action could be carried out. We also reconfirmed a side letter with Australia which excludes ISDS between the two countries—again, the country we do most of our trade with, so, really important. These side letters are significant and, effectively, exclude up to 80 percent of the current investment flows from the CPTPP group into New Zealand from using ISDS.

We are opposed to it, and we will be in future trade agreements. I believe that Minister Parker and Prime Minister Ardern got the very best deal, while protecting our rights, through this agreement. So it is not perfect, but it’s certainly one—and I can assure the Green Party that we will adhere to the provisions in the side letters and the protections that we have, and we will continue to oppose, as a starting point, ISDS provisions. But any negotiation is, by virtue of its nature, a compromise over certain particular issues, keeping in mind that, overall, we believe this is a very significant step for a nation that relies on trading for our existence.

Unlike most of the other countries involved where they consume most of what they produce, we export most of what we produce, hence the significance of this agreement and, I guess, the sensitivity around the provisions that we are changing here tonight.

It was the wave that did it—Madam Chair, thank you for your excellent choice there. Could I also thank the Minister who’s just resumed his seat, Damien O’Connor, because, as I mentioned to him when we were having a discussion at the start of this session, it is appreciated when Ministers engage with the Opposition and their questions. I want to thank him for having responded to a number. I was just a little concerned that he got the call when he did, because I have a few more questions I’d like to put to him, and I hope he’ll have a chance to respond.

💬 Hon Member: Gosh, that’s a surprising tactic!

I do also—ha, ha!—want to acknowledge my colleague the member for Kaikōura, because I was utterly incensed when he stood up and got the call before I did, but I thought that he actually gave—

💬 Andrew Bayly: A very good speech.

—a very good summary. It was a very good speech, Mr Bayly. You’re quite right.

💬 Andrew Bayly: But you could be even better.

Thank you. I’ll do my best. If you would stop interrupting, I’ll certainly get on with it. The point I was going to make was that not only did Mr Smith answer, in an intelligent and clear fashion, the National Party’s thoughts on the Greens’ Supplementary Order Paper, but also he gave a very clear explanation at the end of his speech as to the primary benefits of this particular agreement and free-trade benefits overall. So that is constructive and useful.

My colleague the member for Tāmaki made the point in his contribution earlier that this is a fairly technical bill with two quite small parts. I want to acknowledge him again for the fine job that he has done steering this bill through the select committee. He is an excellent chair of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, and that’s widely felt right across the House. It’s a great pleasure to work with him, and I know that submitters felt that he treated them with great courtesy throughout the whole of the submission process.

Let me just remind the committee that what we’re dealing with here is a bill which makes changes necessary for New Zealand to ratify the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). That’s probably fairly self-evident. The second thing is that it incorporates most of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPPA), which had been signed and ratified back in 2016. The third thing is that the bill would amend the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Amendment Act to reflect the new CPTPP agreement.

I made the point, when we were debating Part 1, that a number of submitters came along to express their real concern and, in particular, their feeling that it was a cosmetic change and really there was no substantive change. What I’d like to do now is just give those submitters a bit of a chance to be heard, because I think while I am firmly in favour of this agreement and, by extension, naturally—

💬 Andrew Bayly: It’s not called an agreement; it’s a treaty.

—support this particular bill—thank you, Mr Bayly. I see you’ve piped up again. I will try to do my level best to help you through yours as well.

What I just wanted to put on record was that when submitters came to talk about the different sections of this bill, it was notable that all of the individuals—and I do mean all of the individuals—who made submissions were opposed to the bill. I looked through and I recognised quite a few names—in fact, I think we’ve got quite a strong list of Green Party members here. But nevertheless it’s valid that their concerns are not only put into the record—and to some extent we did that in the second reading—but in the committee stage, to give the Minister in the chair a chance to answer some of those questions because, ultimately, it is desirable for the public to have a good understanding and a clear—if not acceptance, at least an awareness of why decisions have been made.

So I’m going to ask the Minister a few questions which I think are relevant to this Part 2 of the bill. In particular, one of its key features is that it includes commitments to safeguard and enforce high labour and environmental standards across the Asia-Pacific region, and yet one or two of the submissions—and I can’t cover all of them, but on behalf of Mrs Bronwyn Judge, her submission included the concern that “The haste with which the CPTPP has been signed leaves the question as to whether the goals of the CPTPP have been considered in relationship to more important goals such as the zero carbon emissions target by 2050.” I would simply ask the Minister if he would like to comment on that. I’m sure that Mrs Judge and others who share that view would be grateful for an answer, even if they may not necessarily agree with it.

Oliver Hailes is a well-known submitter to select committees, and he came along to our committee both in the previous Parliament when the TPPA was being discussed and again when the CPTPP came up. One of the points that he made was that “The overriding purpose of the TPP has always been to secure the formal separation of politics and economics”—well, that’s his view—“Thus it serves disproportionately the interests of foreign investors and multinational corporations over those of voters, workers, consumers, local businesses, indigenous peoples, taxpayers, patients and their environment”—[Bell rung] Thank you very much, Madam Chair; pity the bell has interrupted—“And when the projected economic gains are so trifling”, says Mr Hailes, “it is clear that ratification of the TPP”—or, in this case, the CPTPP—“would be against New Zealand’s national interest.”

Now, I accept the fact that the Minister has already, to some extent, covered the national interest, but I now would like just to pick out a little bit more from Mr Hailes’ submission in the hope that the Minister will be able to answer some of his concerns: “One need only turn to the NIA’s breakdown of the sectoral winners”, says Mr Hailes, “in order to see how the TPP is unlikely to create new opportunities for international trade: meat, dairy and other agriculture are poised to enjoy nearly 72 percent of the total estimated tariff savings.” Now, I fundamentally disagree with that view, but I’m hoping that the Minister might be able to take the call and explain to Mr Hailes—because I’m assuming that he disagrees with that view as well—why he feels that way. Mr Hailes also went on to say “it is clear that the TPP is likely to entrench New Zealand’s long-lamented dependence on animal agriculture rather than create new opportunities for economic diversification.” It’s really helpful that not only is the Minister in the chair the Associate Minister for Trade and Export Growth but he is also the Minister of Agriculture, because I’m sure that he would want to be able to answer that question from the benefit of his considerable knowledge of that portfolio and that issue.

Just another one from Jen Olsen, who’s the organiser for TPPA Action Dunedin—and I apologise to the others who submitted on this bill; time obviously wouldn’t permit me to go through all of them, and I am trying to ensure that I make this relevant to Part 2 of our discussion. Jen Olsen, who’s the organiser for TPPA Action Dunedin, said that he was “seriously concerned by the potential human, social and environmental impacts of the … (CPTPP).” He is a social worker, and he concluded by saying he didn’t want to see a future “where we are locked into a system that permanently damages our social and environmental well being.” So I hope that the Minister will be able to respond to his concerns when he takes his next call.

Maybe just one last one—and I’m not entirely sure that I’ve got the name of the submitter, but he had previously opposed the TPPA, he continues to oppose the CPTPP—or “whatever it’s called”, as he said—and he made this particular claim: “There are many errors in the cult of free trade that has dominated New Zealand thought since the mistakes of the mid-1980s, and the unquestioning allegiance to principles that are fundamentally and fatally flawed remains evident in the blind pursuit of a path that will lead inexorably to ruin within the next two decades.” Now, I have to say, there’s such a rhetorical flourish in that, it could almost have been uttered by my learned colleague the member for Hunua. Although I’m not sure that it would’ve met philosophically with his direction, certainly the hyperbole, the rhetoric, seems Bayly-esque in the extreme.

But I do hope that the Minister would like to respond to that particular submitter, because, as I say, I think it is an important part of a functioning democracy that we give the Minister the chance to respond to the concerns of submitters. These were the things that we were hearing, along with many other concerns, during the course of the select committee process. I recognise that this is a very technical bill. To some extent, it might seem that, philosophically, this goes well beyond the provisions of the bill, which is simply designed to make the changes from the TPPA to the CPTPP, but I think that the public of New Zealand, in particular those who take the effort to make submissions, do have a right to feel that their concerns have been heard, have been articulated in the Parliament. I do again acknowledge the fact that the Minister in the chair has been responding to a number of questions and concerns that have been raised by speakers in the committee tonight, and I’m hoping that he will take the opportunity to respond to some of those submitters at all.

Now, having mentioned that all of the individual submitters were against the bill—and I do farewell the Deputy Speaker as she makes her way—it would, nevertheless, be remiss of me not to point out that of the organisations that submitted on the panel, a large number were in favour, and they included some pretty significant players. Perhaps, if I could just mention a few: we had Agcarm, Export New Zealand, Federated Farmers of New Zealand, Fonterra, the Fresh Fruit Company of New Zealand, Horticulture New Zealand, Medicines New Zealand, the New Zealand Horticultural Export Authority, New Zealand Winegrowers, the New Zealand International Business Forum, the Wellington Chamber of Commerce, and Zespri, just to name some of the better-known ones. But the fact that all of those organisations took the trouble to make detailed submissions to the committee in support of this bill and in support of this agreement shows that it is something that is having wide-reaching implications and, as the Minister in the chair and Mr Smith have both noted, underlines just how significant and how special this opportunity is for New Zealand.

I move, That the question be now put.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I think we’re witnessing tonight the strength of a strong, united Opposition. I just heard a series of speeches tonight that just demonstrate the breadth and interest in this topic, and this is from active members of this very good Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. I particularly want to just acknowledge the chair, a good friend and colleague from—

💬 Hon Tim Macindoe: And the deputy chair.

And the deputy chair—ha!

💬 Hon Member: What about the other members?

Well, I’m getting there. But the 10-minute speech from the chair—lucid, concise—and then I looked at that speech we just heard from the member from Hamilton West—

💬 Hon Tim Macindoe: Yeah, the deputy chair.

And deputy chair. But good points were being made, questioning of the Minister in the chair, Damien O’Connor, and I think the way that the Minister stood up and answered some of these questions has been very good too.

One of the things I just do want to highlight is this discussion around investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions, which are, effectively, a dispute. I listened very carefully to the Minister’s response before, and, Minister, honestly, you could be one of us—you could be one of us—because your explanation around trade and the importance of trade was very good. I just hope your learned colleagues are listening to you intently in Cabinet, because we need good people like you who promote trade and make sure we get the right framework and legislation in place. I think the ISDS—I know last time certain members of Cabinet, on our Cabinet, were very, very opposed to them. What you pointed out is the importance of being—[Chairperson gestures to himself] Sorry, what the Minister pointed out was the importance of being flexible. Last time, when we were negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, we just had these irrational comments around the inappropriateness of the ISDS provisions, and I think what you’ve talked about tonight is very useful.

Now, I see Mr Chair just looking at me slightly—I want to turn my mind to Part 2, clause 13A. This is inserting new section 68A, and what it reads is “In section 61(1)(i) (as replaced by section 46(4) of the Overseas Investment Act …), [to] replace ‘either or both of overseas investments in sensitive land and overseas investments in significant business assets’ with ‘overseas investments in sensitive land’.” Now, we’re all very aware of how important the implications are of the Overseas Investment Amendment Bill, which is now an Act, that’s just recently passed its way through Parliament, and the chilling impact that is having on foreigners looking to invest into New Zealand to help us do a whole lot of additional activities that we would not otherwise achieve. These are responsible investors, but that Overseas Investment Act has had a chilling impact on it.

I just want to highlight that with the current arrangements, we already have certain thresholds where overseas investment coming into New Zealand is subject to strict oversight. We have those under the most favoured nation clauses, and, of course, we’ve got arrangements with China, China Taipei, Korea, and Hong Kong. Then we’ve got the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, or the P4, which, of course, includes New Zealand, Brunei, Singapore, and Chile, and, of course, our obligations under CER. What most people don’t realise is that there are already these thresholds, and so, under the rules, the thresholds now are $200 million, other than for Australian businesses, which have a half-billion-dollar threshold.

The issue with the Overseas Investment Amendment Bill was that what it did was it promoted and allowed for our forestry industry, which is 75 percent owned by foreigners now, to, basically, have a free ride. It could invest in a whole lot of additional forestry, and anything over 1,000 hectares was open slather. So what that means now is that this bill helps allow that.

What it’s done, in my view, has actually made the issues around overseas investment a difficult topic, and even more so under these arrangements. I don’t think anything in this bill that’s before us tonight actually helps in terms of making sure that New Zealand continues to be a good place for people to invest in.

Thank you very much, Mr Chairman. I’ll concentrate my remarks on the Supplementary Order Papers (SOPs) in the name of Golriz Ghahraman of the Green Party, who has spoken to those already herself and, I think, has made some good points that certainly make sense in terms of the Greens’ position in relation to this bill, and they have some interesting constitutional points about them. On this side of the House, we’re comfortable with not only the arrangements that we in Government in the previous Parliament and through our executive had implemented but also those that have been made by the Government subsequently, and I acknowledge the Minister in the chair, Mr Damien O’Connor, for his contribution to the debate, as well.

The Supplementary Order Papers that would be within Part 2 if agreed to are numbered 140 and 141. They are similar in structure, but they do have a couple of significant differences between them, which I’ll highlight as I go through. First, I’ll note that it could be said that these are themselves comprehensive and progressive, so perhaps they would have a certain appeal to the Government of the day, seeing as it has some penchant for renaming legislation and perhaps allowing things to slip through to the keeper on that basis. Perhaps they will be moved by that or perhaps not, but in any case, we will find out whether they agree or not in due course.

But Supplementary Order Paper 140 talks about new countries being prohibited from entering into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and it does actually set out both of those, so it’s certainly comprehensive in that respect. I thought the wording would be helpful to look at rather closely, because if it is the case that the fellow Government parties join their Green colleagues in voting for this SOP, then it will be as well that it’s well-constructed and fit for purpose in that regard.

So it starts by saying that “The Executive must not agree to any country joining the [CPTPP]”—excuse the acronym, again—“unless New Zealand has negotiated and signed a binding instrument with that country”, and it then goes on to talk about the investor-State dispute settlement provisions, or ISDS. So the words “The Executive”—I think that’s the Green Party member looking to be as broad as possible about the nature of the agreement. That’s actually a sensible thing in itself as a matter of good drafting, I think, because it includes not only the Minister for Trade and Export Growth but, actually, the whole executive, which would mean, presumably, the officials within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, who always do a good job for our nation in negotiating such agreements, and also the Cabinet colleagues who would no doubt be working alongside the Minister himself—or herself, as the case might be, from time to time—in a collective Cabinet responsibility kind of a way.

So it’s the executive, then, who the Green Party by way of SOP 140 would look to preclude from agreeing to any country joining this revised agreement. Their proposal is that such a country would prohibit its own investors from being able to access the ISDS provisions against New Zealand, and in the Green Party view of things, that’s a necessary safeguard for New Zealand sovereignty.

I wonder if, in fact, their phrase “existing or future agreements” is perhaps a little broad. I expect that they mean trade agreements specifically, or even trade agreements with other elements added, but trade agreements rather than, for example—oh, I’m lost for an example—other agreements, in any case, on non-trade matters. So perhaps as a matter of good drafting, that could be amended, but most significant, actually, is really the substance of the SOP that they’re putting forward.

The other significance of the phrase “The Executive”, I think, is that it highlights exactly who within our constitutional arrangements would be prohibited from making such a change. It’s balancing or setting the executive against, for example, the legislature. So the Greens, I think, are anticipating that it would be Parliament, as the legislature, that would be a check on the power of the executive, because it would be Parliament that would be scrutinising each new, individual country that would seek to join the CPTPP in that scenario.

Of course, the word “executive” does mean by its very—[Bell rung] Mr Chair?

CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Chris Penk.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I appreciate the opportunity to continue. I was just pointing out that the word “executive”, etymologically, means the body that executes, so it’s executing Government policy. So it’s a group that this Parliament—and, indeed, this nation more generally—says can go out and execute policy on its behalf, can sign up to agreements significantly, in the current context, and, of course, can negotiate agreements too before they enter into force.

💬 Hon Tim Macindoe: That’s eliminated any obfuscation, thank you.

I’m grateful to Mr Macindoe for saying that I’ve eliminated any obfuscation. I’m assiduously pursuing hyper-verbosity, he will no doubt also observe. So it is that the historical basis is, of course, the executive being sovereign—being able to commit a nation, State, or a realm to certain actions—and in the Greens’ view, that should be limited somewhat in the 21st century in the New Zealand context by way of parliamentary scrutiny every time a new party wishes to join.

I do note that the phrase “any country” is pretty broad. Again, it’s comprehensive in that sense, and I expect that that’s intended quite specifically to include the United States of America, which may or may not wish to join subsequently, and so they’ve certainly covered their bases on that one.

As for the proposed amendments being progressive, which was the other half of the “comprehensive and progressive” phrase that I referred to earlier, well, as far as the progressive nature of it goes, I suppose in a general sense it might be said to be progressive—in the general political sense, that is. But also it reflects a notion that changes such as this, that the Greens feel strongly about from a sovereignty perspective, should be incremental—so just take steps progressively, or incrementally in that sense. It is at least consistent with their position that the TPP should not be signed. Again, I note for the record that our party disagreed with that, to the point, of course, of having been the ones to have promoted, negotiated, and signed that in the first instance.

So it’s consistent with the Greens’ position on that that they would also oppose the CPTPP, at least in the sense that they maintain that there is little or no change between those two agreements. That’s a position that we also hold, but from the perspective that what was acceptable before remains acceptable now. Of course, other members of Government parties have taken a different view, but it is, as I say again, at least consistent of the Greens to maintain that caution in wanting a progressive approach in the sense of limiting progress. That’s slightly Orwellian, perhaps—not my fault; it’s not my SOP, not my position—by saying that progress should be limited in respect of any new countries that would join. So that’s in relation to SOP 140.

SOP 141 is along similar lines in emphasising the need for parliamentary scrutiny, but this one is actually somewhat broader because it seeks to prohibit changes in general to the CPTPP or the TPP—again, setting out both. Actually, the way that this is phrased, it talks about the executive being disallowed from agreeing to any country joining the agreement or any other changes to that agreement.

So actually my observation is that the two SOPs do overlap somewhat, so actually if the Greens are successful in convincing their governing party colleagues of New Zealand First and Labour that they should support SOP 141, that would preclude other countries from joining without parliamentary approval, and other changes—meaning SOP 140, which is in relation to other countries only—would actually become completely redundant. So perhaps that’s food for thought for any members opposite—or parties opposite, I suppose, inevitably in this MMP environment—who might wish to vote for one or the other, but maybe, I would suggest, not both.

So that, I think, brings to a conclusion my remarks on these two different SOPs. I’ll watch with interest to see if the Government agrees about the logic of their colleagues and can accept any kind of comprehensive and progressive nature within that. If the Minister has any views on those and can indicate to us whether his party and his Cabinet colleagues on the New Zealand First side are likely to support it, that would be very interesting indeed.

I move, That the question be now put.

Thank you, Mr Chair. It’s a great opportunity to take a call—and I’m not sure why the Government wants to close down the debate on such a very serious and important issue. I would have thought the whip from Canterbury, the Hon Ruth Dyson, would have realised how important this bill is to her constituents, particularly out there on the Port Hills—quite a few farmers and growers out there. But anyway, we should focus on Part 2 of this bill this evening.

But before I do that, I want to acknowledge the two former Ministers: in particular, Tim Groser for the work that he did in the early stages; and Todd McClay, the former Minister of Trade in the last National Government for the work that he did. There was a huge amount of work to get to this point, and I know David Parker, with the support of the Prime Minister, came in and did a couple of title changes, and here we are now with the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (CPTPPA), and it’s a very important bill that we have in front of us.

I want to talk specifically about tariffs this evening, which is a part of Part 2—it deals with the Tariff Act 1988. I also, in passing, want to mention the uniform rules. I haven’t been able to find that particular part. It might be in the schedule, or, indeed, because this is quite a technical bill, it might be elsewhere. I’d be very keen to hear from the Minister about that particular part to do with uniform rules, and I’ll come on to that in a moment.

But it’s interesting from the outset to acknowledge the Minister in the chair, the Hon Damien O’Connor. He wears a couple of hats in the Government, and the interesting one is that he had a title change recently in terms of one of his portfolios. Not many people will realise that Damien O’Connor was the Associate Minister for Trade and—

CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): The member needs to come to Part 2.

Yes, I will come to Part 2. The Minister—

CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): He actually needs to do that straight away.

Yes, I’m coming to Part 2 now, Mr Chair. In particular, I want to talk to you about—

CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Well, relevance will become an issue.

—the Tariff Act, but in doing so, we have the Minister in the chair, who is the Minister of Agriculture. He is now also the Minister of State for Trade and Export Growth, and it relates to, in particular, Part 2.

A few months back, he was the Associate Minister for Trade and Export Growth, but what is not well understood is he couldn’t get appointments around the world, so they had to come up and create a new name, which is the Minister of State for Trade and Export Growth, so he could meet other Ministers around the world. He nods and glows and looks down at his papers, and he knows exactly what I’m referring to.

Now, in particular, the Tariff Act of 1988 is really important, and I’m disappointed by the Green Party’s minority view and their amendments that relate to Part 2 this evening, because the Greens obviously don’t care about free trade. When you think about the Tariff Act and the savings for the New Zealand economy and for our farmers and our growers, it indeed is immense: $222 million of tariff savings as a result of this bill passing. Admittedly, it will take some time, but there is about $92 million of tariff savings that come directly after this law comes into force. That money flows into the New Zealand economy.

There are over 600,000 jobs in New Zealand that relate to exports, and when you think about those other 10 countries that this very important bill and law relates to—and I want to, importantly, touch on a couple of things. One is that there are 480 million people in this huge bloc that we are now going to have almost free trade access to. There is 9 percent on the beef tariff into Japan. Unfortunately, we couldn’t get that down much lower. That may be in time and, of course, when everyone flocks there for the Rugby World Cup, not only will they want to consume Japanese beef, they’ll be looking, I’m sure, for some New Zealand lean beef on the menu as well. Whether it will be there by that time or not, I’m not quite sure.

What I’m keen to hear from the Minister, a little bit this evening, if we can, is about these uniform rules, because for exporters from New Zealand—[Time expired]

I move, That the question be now put.

I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. Mr Chair, I just wonder if you would care to remind members of the committee, following the interjection by Matt King, that votes should be taken in silence. It was clear that the Table was busy and you may not have heard it, but it was a pretty offensive interjection during the votes being taken.

The member is correct; I did not hear any interjection. But the point is correct; votes are taken in silence.

Part 2 agreed to.

Clauses 1 to 3