Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill

Thank you, Mr Chair, for the opportunity to speak to Part 1 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill. I start by noting perhaps an obvious point—but one with some significance, which I’ll spell out in a moment—that this is an amendment Act. I say that because not only is the word “Amendment” in the title but it will perhaps surprise some to realise that we are, in fact, amending here an Act of Parliament that’s already been passed. It is referred to here, of course, as “the principal Act”, and that, in turn, refers to the fact that a treaty commonly referred to as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has already been signed, entered into by New Zealand, and, indeed, ratified in the form of that parent legislation.

So just to be clear then, as Part 1 does explain very clearly, it is the principal Act that we’re amending by this amendment Act in the act of—excuse me, I’m using the word “act” in two different senses, with a lower case “a” in the second example there within the same sentence. We are, in fact, using this process now to amend that and, from a political perspective, I think it highlights some of the confusion that’s been experienced by members of the public even before I started speaking about this process, and, in particular, the fact that some political parties did not support the TPP—as I shall henceforth revert to—yet supported the revised agreement, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The wording of the clauses in Part 1 really actually highlight that pretty well, as we’ll see with reference to clause 5.

In clause 5, “Section 1 amended (Title)”, new section 1(2) points out that “Every reference in any enactment and in any document to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Amendment Act 2016 must, unless the context otherwise requires, be read as a reference to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership Amendment Act 2018.” The construction of that looks pretty straightforward and benign in that it’s a pretty standard formulation setting out that every reference will mean one thing unless it’s specifically noted to the contrary. Again, the political significance of this is that, essentially, what we’re saying is that everything is the same except for some things that aren’t, but that really, in effect, means that most are. So, from this side of the House, we’ve noted with some bemusement the apparent change in heart regarding the value of trade—this agreement, specifically—again, we’re granting that some amendments have been made, and we’re really noting that in the context of an amendment bill, that actually makes it pretty clear that not many amendments are required to the previous legislation. Hence, again, one agreement is not far different from the other.

As for the way that this will come into force, in section 2 of the 2016 amendment Act , we see that it can be done by one or more Orders in Council that will be used to make this new law effective, and it’s stated that different provisions can come into force on different dates and that there might also be different dates for different purposes. The significance here is that there are different moving parts within the revised agreement that by necessity and operation of the TPP, or—excuse me—the CPTPP, come into effect at different times. So that’s quite an unusual way of highlighting the fact that, actually, we might have somewhat of a piecemeal approach. That’s not an error or a mere indulgence in the drafting of legislation, but, actually, something that’s needed quite specifically to ratify the terms of the treaty itself, which is, after all, the very point of this parliamentary scrutiny.

Of course, the commencement of the amendment Act can’t be before the commencement of the parent legislation, and we don’t yet know that date. I think albeit it was a matter engaged with by the previous Parliament, none the less, of course, this amendment Act won’t come into force until such time as this House passes it and the other one previously being in place, and then, naturally, the date of effectiveness for various parts of it will be after the commencement date and the effectiveness of the parent legislation itself. So I think there’s probably no confusion on that, but perhaps some other colleagues might have some views on that, and certainly, if the Minister’s got any thoughts he’d be prepared to share, that would be good to hear.

Thank you very much, Mr Chair. Could I just say to the Minister of Immigration, who has just, I think, rather gratefully left the chair, I was looking forward to putting some questions to him to tap into his considerable knowledge of this particular agreement and support for the bill. But it seemed to be with a degree of relish that he saw the Acting Minister for Trade and Export Growth enter the committee and swap places with him, so I’ll save my questions to that particular Minister for another day.

I want to commend my colleague the member for Helensville, Chris Penk, not only for demonstrating his considerable understanding of this particular part of the bill with that contribution but also for the very fine contribution he has been making as a new member of Parliament. I hope he’ll accept this with the goodwill with which it’s intended. He is a very fine contributor to the work of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, and when we were discussing this particular bill and hearing submissions I noted with admiration how engaged he was and how constructive he was—

💬 Hon Willie Jackson: Put him on the front bench.

—in assisting. Well, if that were in my gift, I’d say to the Hon Willie Jackson I would be more than happy to do that. While I’m sure the member of Helensville will be delighted to hear that, nevertheless I wouldn’t want to get his hopes up too much, because I suspect that it may take a little while for me to be able to use my influence in that way. But it is good to know that members opposite respect the great depth of talent on our side of the House, and I can assure him, as he has obviously already noted, that the member for Helensville is going places in a very positive way in his career.

Let me return to Part 1 of this bill, because now that the Minister of State for Trade and Export Growth is in the chair, I do want to just point out that one of the things that was most evident as we listened to submitters in the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee was that there was real cynicism from all of the individuals—I stress, the individuals, not the organisations—who submitted on this particular bill about the change in name. Here in Part 1, we are just talking about the amendments to the title and commencement of the principal Act, and in clause 5, section 1 is amended so that “Every reference in any enactment and in any document to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Amendment Act 2016 must, unless the context otherwise requires, be read as a reference to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership Amendment Act 2018.” All of the individuals, as I say, who came to the committee were expressing real cynicism—and I’m looking at the Green member who is nodding her head because she also was there listening to that.

Essentially, what they were saying was that there is no significant difference in this agreement from that which it replaces, i.e., the original Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, which was first negotiated on behalf of New Zealand by the Hon Tim Groser, and that fine work was carried on by the Hon Todd McClay, who had the great pleasure of seeing it come into force while he was the Minister, only to see that upon the election of President Trump in America, the rules changed; the agreement changed. It was then the current Minister, the Hon David Parker, who picked up the cudgels on New Zealand’s behalf and contributed, in a very constructive way—and I do want to acknowledge the work of the Hon David Parker—to assisting this new agreement to come into place.

But we, I think, need to acknowledge that the submitters were not overly convinced by the change in name, and they would want it placed on record. While I’m a very strong supporter of this bill and of this agreement, I think we owe it to the submitters to acknowledge that point. So I would ask the Minister in the chair what practical changes this means for New Zealand and for all of the parties that are signatory to this agreement. It is, after all, an agreement which is worth a huge sum to New Zealand in dollar terms—vitally important, I think, to our export producers and markets and something that I believe will be very, very good for us. But what is the practical impact for country, is the first question, of the change of section 1, the amended title.

The second thing is I wonder if the Minister could enlighten probably those who are listening—I think this is one of the useful things about the committee stage of a debate: here in the House, we may know the answers to some of these questions, but there are many members of the public who may be listening. In new section 2, the commencement, inserted by clause 6, we are advised that “This Act comes into force on a date appointed by the Governor-General by Order in Council”—this is all fairly standard stuff—“on the recommendation”—in this case—“of the Minister for Trade and Export Growth.” But new subsection (3) of that particular part states, “However, the date appointed for the following provisions to come into force must not be earlier than the date on which the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, done at Auckland on 4 February 2016, enters into force for New Zealand:”.

Well, of course, that was over two years ago now—[Bell rung] Thank you, Mr Chair. I’ll be reasonably quick. I must admit, I had noticed that the first call seemed to have expired about a minute ago. This particular provision refers to a date that’s more than two years—in fact, it’s 2½ years old, so I’m hoping that for the benefit of those who may be listening and who will have been devouring every word of this particular bill, the Minister might just be able to explain what the practical consequence of having that subsection in this bill would be.

There’s no question that we were advised by officials that it was important for New Zealand to be moving quickly to ratify the provisions, and that’s one of the reasons why we’re, after all, debating this bill here right now—to try to ensure that it can be completed through all its stages in the House before Christmas. Clearly, we’re on target for that—in fact, I assume, if we complete the committee stage today, that we’ll probably have the third reading on the next sitting day. So New Zealand will comfortably meet its requirements. I’m hoping that the Minister will outline, for the benefit of anybody who may be listening, why that is particularly advantageous for New Zealand, and I think that this is the appropriate part of this debate for him to do that.

I know that some my colleagues will have some other questions as well, but those are just a couple of matters that I wish to bring to the committee’s attention that I hope will be helpful for the House and for the public at large. I’m very pleased to have had this opportunity to speak on Part 1 and look forward to speaking again later on in Part 2.

Thank you very much, Mr Chair. I was hoping my colleague Tim Macindoe might’ve thrown another three minutes into that conversation, but thank you for the call. To acknowledge the Minister in the chair, from one O’Connor to another, I’m very pleased to talk to Part 1 of this Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP)—as it’s become known through its acronym—Amendment Bill.

You’ll see, through the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee’s report—I’m very pleased to facilitate that committee—that we’ve made three substantial changes. Most of them are in Part 2, so at this point I’m really just going to keep around the commencement aspects.

First and foremost, we should be clear that when we’re talking about “commencement”, we’re not talking, obviously, about clauses 1, 2, and 3—particularly clause 2, which we’ll get to later—which is the commencement of this particular piece of legislation. Instead, we are, in fact, referencing the commencement of the treaty—the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) itself. I’ve always been at pains in the House—through all the readings and now in the committee of the whole House—to make sure that we’re very clear in the understanding of the difference between what’s, obviously, the ratifying of a treaty and then the placement of domestic legislation to bring that into effect.

So today we are discussing, here in Part 1 and through into subsequent parts, the domestic legislation. But, importantly, in clause 6 we are bringing about the commencement of the treaty. In other words, this domestic piece of legislation, this amendment bill, is empowering, if you will—though probably not just “if you will”; it is empowering—the Minister to ratify. I’ve probably got the exact nomenclature wrong, but, basically, it is empowering the Minister to make the treaty come into effect. Let’s just use some plain English for a second before I get into trouble and your officials start throwing things at me—and quite rightly, probably: after having sat through this for a long time, I should have it right. But, in effect, let’s not confuse the two forms of commencement.

Clause 4, in Part 1, is a renaming of an Act of Parliament that was passed in 2016. It won’t be lost on this House that we went through quite a rigorous discussion of what was then known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. That was agreed by the previous executive and, in many ways, affirmed by the Parliament and passed into law prior to the 2017 election. So there is actually an Act of this New Zealand Parliament in 2016 to bring about the TPP. Two factors in particular, but not exclusively, came into play. One was, of course, that we had a general election, and, let’s just say, things changed. I won’t ask the Minister in the chair to offer an opinion on that; it might cause me to have to keep talking more than five minutes. The other, as was alluded to, was a substantial change in American politics, but I think it’s quite important to understand it wasn’t simply a change from the Obama administration to a Trump administration. Any change, had it been to the Democrats and Hillary Clinton, was also going to see America step away from this pluralistic agreement, which I think is unfortunate, but, being a Westphalian, I really believe that each sovereign nation can choose to do what it wants.

But we are changing the name of that 2016 piece of legislation. That makes sense, and I might come to it later, or other colleagues might as well, but, importantly, that piece of legislation still exists. The TPP legislation, even though it is to be renamed, still exists, and is sort of a preview, if you will. It’s probably more academic than anything, but, strictly speaking, that legislation, that previous TPP agreement, could, strictly and probably academically, be started. Maybe this would encourage my Green colleague to speak to it. It is just a change of title, but an important one there. So that’s in clause 5.

Then we move to new section 2 around commencement. I just want to spend a little bit of time on the commencement. This is in clause 6, replacing the commencement provision: “(1) This Act comes into force”—so this piece of domestic legislation, not the CPTPP—“on a date appointed by the Governor-General”—which makes sense—“by Order in Council on the recommendation of the Minister for Trade and Export Growth.”

Now, intuitively, that makes absolute, perfect sense, but there is actually a question in this, Minister. It’s natural, if you will, that, obviously, the Minister in charge of trade and export growth would be the one to talk to the Governor-General, but it’s my understanding too that, actually, any Minister of the Crown could, strictly speaking, ask and authorise the Governor-General to act. So it makes sense in terms of a partnership agreement, a trade agreement, that primarily the Minister of trade would be that person. Again, it’s probably just a curiosity or a small element, but I’m pretty sure any Minister can, or should be allowed to, advise Her Majesty’s Governor-General to make that decision. So I suppose what illustrates the point is that if the Prime Minister decided for some reason that she wished to provide the recommendation, could she?

So I suppose, then, it ultimately comes to two questions, Minister: one, should this be slightly broader? Should it just really be saying the “date appointed by the Governor-General by Order in Council on the recommendation of a Minister.”? Does it have to be absolutely specific? So that’s one element to it: should we just widen that out?

The second is: does being so specific about who the Minister is preclude another Minister making that advice to the viceregal representative here in the Realm? The other is—and, look, it’s completely minutiae; it’s unlikely to happen—that Governments, and it would happen on this side too, are very wont to change titles. Very, very quickly—we’ve obviously just had a new ministry around urban development opened. This is a fairly new title, to be the Minister for Trade and Export Growth. If, perchance, there was to be a change in title, would that affect the efficacy of that particular Minister?

So, to illustrate the point, if the Minister for Trade and Export Growth turned into the “Minister for Trade and Comprehensive and Progressive Export Growth”—it’s always good to throw a “c” word and a “p” word in there these days—would that affect the Minister’s ability to act? Would we invalidate this? Yep, I know at some levels it can be seen as tongue-in-cheek, and so forth, but I’ve been in this House long enough now—

💬 Kieran McAnulty: Too long.

Some would say too long, Mr McNulty, but, fortunately, not the good people of Tāmaki, who—

💬 Kieran McAnulty: It’s “Mc-A-nulty”, O’Connor.

Is it “McAnulty”?

💬 Kieran McAnulty: Thank you.

I withdraw and apologise. You’re a good man, regardless, sir, and the great thing is from that new member—and he is going to learn—that when they do an interjection across the Chamber, it gives the person speaking just a few extra seconds to talk, which is fantastic. So thank you very much. Look, it’s a small thing, but, actually, when these changes come through, we need to be, ourselves, quite comprehensive.

The other point is, and we’re moving now into new section 2(3), that it is noting—it’s probably more for information, but I think it does make sense that not all the provisions are coming in at once. The important context here is that New Zealand wishes, quite rightly, I think—and I will acknowledge the Government’s approach on this, as would have been the National Government’s approach, had it remained on the Treasury benches, which is that we want, as the lodging country for this trade agreement, to also be one of the first signatories. There are benefits to the country for us to sign early, which is one of the reasons the committee has worked cooperatively and quickly on this. Again, we were not overriding what people had to say, but, in moving quickly, we understand we should get in early. There are benefits to New Zealand and our economy, in particular, for being some of the early signatories or adopters of this treaty, but it’s really important to note that some factors will not come into effect immediately.

In other words, once the Minister for Trade and Export Growth advises the viceregal representative of a date to sign, the treaty comes into effect, but it’s important in new section 2(3)(a), and then into new section 2(3)(b), that certain elements will not be coming into force. That’s primarily around patents and copyright. Again, we’ll probably have to touch on that a little bit later, but there are elements of what New Zealand needs to do. I suppose when we are working in a trading environment, New Zealand is always looking to other and new treaties and agreements, and it’s my understanding that we have some changes to make first.

Look, I’ll begin to wrap up there. Elements around the Copyright Act and others come up, particularly in Part 2, but, yeah, my fundamental aspects at the moment—working backwards—are just those little questions, or minutiae, if you will, to the Minister in the chair around the specificity of a particular Minister. As I say, should it just be broadened to “any Minister” in order—you know, be it symbolically or otherwise, the Prime Minister wishes to be the adviser. Equally, could it be any Minister—is there a convention that if that Minister is not available, another Minister could step in?

Obviously, there’s just some indications of why there’s a staged approach to the dates, and then just a hint at this point of, obviously, the name change of a previous Act of Parliament, but indicating—as I understand things, but I’m very happy to be corrected—that simply changing the name does not actually change the fact that—strictly speaking, it’s purely academic and, I think, highly, highly unlikely, but I will not be racing to the TAB—that previous Act, that previous Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, could come into effect. So I’ll leave it there for now.

Thank you, Mr Chair. As has been alluded to repeatedly, and I think everyone here and, hopefully, out there in New Zealand knows, the Green Party has always opposed the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPPA), continues to oppose the newly named—and I’ll say a rose by any other name—Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, and will not be supporting any legislation that implements it here. We share the deep concerns of two-thirds of the submitters—and these are hundreds of submitters we’re talking about—who found unacceptable the chilling risks that arise with the investor-State disputes settlement (ISDS) clauses, that are still included in this agreement.

So we come back to this issue that the bill is an amendment bill. It is referring back largely to the TPPA and implementing legislation to that dirty deal, as some would call it, and the ISDS clauses are at the heart of that. This means that this bill requires us—and, with it, this Parliament, this House of Representatives—to sign on to a system that will sit above our law and above our sovereignty and it binds us to protect the profits of foreign multinational investors over the interests of ordinary Kiwis and our environment.

So, as an example—and as a Green—I have to note that in about 85 percent of cases where this type of provision has been relied upon to stop Government policy being implemented it has been in environmental protection cases. But as an example of the chilling effect of this, I would note that when Indonesia tried to adopt laws that would protect against particularly damaging mining practices, the very threat of being sued using this type of ISDS provision was enough to stop them. Their Minister for the environment said, “They will sue us for billions to compensate their losses, and we can’t afford to pay.” That’s the situation that we’re walking into, and that isn’t what Kiwis voted for this election.

So to mitigate some of that damage, some of that risk, I’ve tabled two Supplementary Order Papers (SOPs), the first of which relates directly to the ISDS clauses. Part of the reason this deal was sold by the coalition parties as a changed deal was that a number of the signatory States—

CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Can I just remind the member that those SOPs are on Part 2 of the bill. We’re on Part 1, so—

Oh sorry, they’re in Part 1 in front of me.

CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): —if you could reference your speech to Part 1.

Sorry, Mr Chair. I have them noted as being for Part 1, but I could be mistaken. I’m happy to keep speaking to the ways in which this bill is similar to the TPPA.

💬 Hon Willie Jackson: Chuck it in—time’s up.

Time is not up. So all the ways in which this bill remains the same as implementing the old agreement, the TPPA: I would say that this was sold to us as a changed deal, and it was only because there were some State parties that signed on to agreements that they would not, in fact, avail themselves of the ISDS clauses.

The other big change that we were sold on was that there are these suspended provisions now in this agreement. Some of the damaging provisions in the TPPA were now suspended—things like protections around Pharmac’s ability to set fair prices and to make high-quality medicine available in New Zealand.

We now have found out through official advice that all of that could go were the USA, for example, to join the agreement and revive the TPPA. Any member State could join and not sign on to the suspended provisions, we’re told. Chillingly, the very changes that were sold to us could go, and they go through this bill without further parliamentary oversight. So it is important to note that this is an amendment bill because, in fact, what we’re implementing is so very close to the old TPPA and not only that but the old TPPA is actually up for grabs. We’re signing on to give away our parliamentary oversight of those provisions coming back, of the old agreement coming back through this bill.

I move, That the question be now put.

Mr Chair, thank you very much. Here we are at Part 1 of the debate, and if one reads the press release from the Minister last week or had just paid attention to question time on Thursday, the Minister for Trade and Export Growth was speaking about how inclusive his Government wanted to be and how widely they wanted to consult on issues of trade. It’s appalling that after four or five interventions on Part 1, we’ve got a member of the Government standing up to try to close the debate down. There’s a lot more to be said here. At least that counts as one speech from that member, Kieran McAnulty, in this debate, and what he has done is he’s saved the public from four minutes and 55 seconds of his ranting. But he can take another call, I suppose, if he took the time to read the bill.

Now, the point here is in Part 1, it goes directly to what the Government said and to its credibility on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), because they’ve come forward and they’ve said, wholesale, that it is a different agreement. It’s virtually completely different from the original TPP, and the Government has taken a lot of credit for that. But if we look at Part 1, largely, all it does is says to do a search and replace, where, if the original Act says the TPP—the Trans-Pacific Partnership—replace it with the “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership” (CPTPP). So I ask the Minister whether he could explain to the committee and to those listening in exactly why he believes it’s important to go through and change the title of the original Act—the title of the original Act; not the parts within it, but the title of the original Act—to demonstrate it is comprehensive and progressive.

I heard a story many years ago about African countries that were ruled by dictators. They would change the name to be called the “Democratic” such-and-such country. Well, they say that if you have to put the word “Democratic” in the name of your country, you might not be democratic, and, in this case, if all Part 1 is largely doing is changing the name of the principal Act from the “Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Act” to the “Comprehensive and Progressive …”—if you must put the words “Comprehensive and Progressive” in it, perhaps it’s not.

Now, the second thing here that I think is very important for the Minister to answer for this committee and for the public is exactly what happens to the original TPP legislation. We know that it actually remains there on the books, but can the original TPP enter into force, or is the comprehensive and progressive TPP legislation we see today taking it off the book so that it never can? And if it can enter into force—well, we know it’s ratified, but can it enter into force?

So we have an agreement that’s ratified that hasn’t entered into force around the world yet: can it enter into force? If the answer to that is no, be up front and say that very, very clearly. If the answer is that it can enter into force—if the TPP comes into effect—what happens to the comprehensive and progressive TPP if it too is entered into force?

Now, perhaps what the Minister is going to say is “Well, the CPTPP is better. It’s comprehensive and progressive. It actually does many, many things that the original TPP didn’t.” If that’s the case, I would invite him to make that case and to be very clear with us, because what we do know with the original deal, the TPP, under the agreement that was reached to get to CPTPP—isn’t it lucky they didn’t put more letters of the alphabet in it? It would have been very, very hard to actually roll this through—the changes, the bill itself, would be longer. But what we do know is that there are a number of clauses in the original legislation, the original agreement, that are being suspended, and that word “suspended” is the important one. I would believe that there are many, many New Zealanders who campaigned against the TPP, who marched in the streets against the TPP, and who have voted for parties in this House at the last election because they were told that they would stand against the TPP that have now been told that the clauses that they were concerned about have been suspended.

But I say to the Minister, exactly what does that mean for them to be suspended in so far as the CPTPP is concerned to make it so comprehensive and progressive? Secondly, what does it mean in so far as the TPP is concerned should it be able to enter into force at some time in the future?

It’s a pleasure to speak to Part 1 of this bill. I think we should remind ourselves that this is a very significant bill for New Zealand. Really, what we’re doing—really, what we’re doing—is simply changing the name of all the hard work that had been done by the previous National Government. It’s like this: already in this Parliament this evening, Mr McAnulty has said that he prefers to be called Mr McAnulty than Mr McNulty; another member, Jo Luxton, prefers to be called Jo Luxton than Jo Luckton; and the Hon Willie Jackson, I profess that his proper name is the Hon William Jackson, probably. But despite all that—

💬 Hon Members: Wīremu.

Yeah, I couldn’t think—one of you, the Hon Iain Lees-Galloway. But despite all of this—despite all of this; the first list MPs, one is a Minister—how we actually pronounce their name makes very little difference. I know it does to the member and I respect the honourable member, the list member from the Wairarapa, but what I’m saying is whether we call it the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in my view makes very little difference to what we’re doing. In fact, the only thing that has been changed as a result of going from the TPP to the CPTPP is the fact that some other legislation has meant that we have banned foreign buyers.

I remind this committee that that legislation is effective over this weekend—

💬 Kieran McAnulty: Overseas buyers.

Overseas buyers.

💬 Hon Tim Macindoe: It’s ironic, isn’t it?

It’s ironic; that’s the only thing. It wasn’t even part of this legislation; it was something that was done on the outside. You can’t even find it in this legislation, because it’s not mentioned any more.

So I want to honour the various Ministers: the Hon Todd McClay, the Hon Damien O’Connor, and the Hon David Parker for making this get to this point.

💬 Hon Member: Tim Groser.

And the Hon Tim Groser before that. But let’s not kid ourselves in this Chamber tonight, as we take it through this committee stage on the first part—there’s very little that has changed other than the name.

I would like the Minister in the chair, the Hon Damien O’Connor, to address one issue, and it’s been raised already, and that’s under clause 6. New section 2(1) says “This Act comes into force on a date appointed by the Governor-General by Order in Council on the recommendation of the Minister for Trade and Export Growth.” My colleague Mr Simon O’Connor raised earlier that if the name of that title changed, what would that mean? I’m suggesting that maybe the term “for Trade and Export Growth” be taken out and just “the Minister” be said, because we do not want to have to come back to this Parliament or change something in the future because the title of somebody changes.

So as we head into the dinner break, I think we should all congratulate ourselves across the Parliament that we have actually got to a position, despite the fact that the United States has withdrawn, to have a fantastic trade opportunity when six countries sign up. I think we should also acknowledge that this is a National bill that’s been adopted by this Government. They’ve changed the name and we’re working together—but actually in the interests of New Zealand, as we should do—to make sure that our trade is strong.

💬 Hon Mark Mitchell: Just say thank you.

So absolutely, the Hon Mark Mitchell. Some thankyous on the other side would be helpful.

💬 Kieran McAnulty: You got his name right.

Oh, would you like me to repeat your name, Mr McAnulty? Have I got that right?

💬 Hon Member: The member from Napier.

I’m not from Napier. I am the member—

Order! Sorry to interrupt the member, but it’s become time for me to leave the Chair for the dinner break. The committee will resume at 7.30 p.m.

Sitting suspended from 6 p.m. to 7.30 p.m.

Members, the committee is considering Part 1 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill. Lawrence Yule has the call, and he has one minute left. I call Simon O’Connor.

How unexpected. Ha, ha! Madam Chair, thank you very much. I think this may well be my last contribution to Part 1.

💬 Matt Doocey: Two more.

Thank you to the whip, who very helpfully said that I have two more, but we’ll see how we go. Now, look, Part 1’s around, obviously, the amendments to the title and commencement of the principal Act, and that being, again, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Amendment Act of 2016. In my prior contribution, which I still welcome the Minister in the chair to engage with if he so chooses, if only for academic “fullity” just to elaborate a little bit on the one area I touched on, is the question which was raised in committee—and is, in fact, referenced in the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee’s report—around whether or not the previous Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) could come into effect.

In other words, the current legislation passed in 2016 for the TPP is about to be renamed in this Part 1, clause 5, to call it the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). However, even with that change of name, the previous Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement remains. So the argument, as was brought up in committee—and it would be good to get some surety from the Minister in the chair, or perhaps other Ministers who are keen to opine—is that strictly speaking, and I hope I’ve got this right; I’m more than happy to be corrected—

💬 Kieran McAnulty: Probably not.

But if the likes of—in fact, that’s probably the one truthful thing that Mr McNulty has said for a while—McAnulty, sorry.

💬 Kieran McAnulty: McAnulty!

Um, actually, that’s probably getting close to breaching a Standing Order.

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Anne Tolley): Yes, it is. Ha, ha!

Look, the long and the short—ha! The current situation, to illustrate the point, is, in theory, if the likes of the United States of America and probably two other countries who have not engaged—well, sorry, if the United States of America and other parties came in, ratified, and signed up to the terms of the previous TPP agreement, that we passed domestic legislation to approve in 2016—if that were to occur, we would find ourselves beholden to that. We would all of a sudden find ourselves linked in to those previous conditions.

So the changes in this piece of domestic legislation and the changes—and I know colleagues have argued they are minor—in the CPTPP would likely continue. But there is that academic, if you will, chance that if the previous agreement was to come into force, then New Zealand would be bound to follow those. So any clarification the Minister would care to provide would be welcome.

I know it was something we interrogated the officials on at length. I think we have a relatively good handle on it, both in terms of what would happen and how it might happen. There was discussion on whether it would need to come back to the Parliament or not. We looked into the Standing Orders, whether it would be a further examination, whether it remains in the hands of the executive, or whether, in fact, because we’ve already agreed that treaty that we’ve already passed legislation on in 2016, that, in fact, there would be no need for further discussion because we’d already agreed with it.

So it’s just raising the question of whether we’ve got that right. I would stress to the Minister—as I’m sure he appreciates, as do the officials—it is a relatively academic argument. It would be rather odd for it to come into being. But a little bit like my previous contributions, particularly around Part 1, clause 6, around the commencement and the title of the Minister of Trade and Export Growth, we’ve just got to be absolutely clear. There’s been a few too many times in this Parliament where we’ve sort of overlooked something, thinking it was all OK at the time, and then circumstances arise and we go, “Hold on, we should have thought about this more clearly.”

So if the Minister would like to engage with that again. I’d like to stress, it’s more academic than actually an existential issue that we have to face. But it really is just in this contribution to highlight that simply amending Part 1, clause 5, around the title—while it makes sense, it tidies up the statute book a little bit, it does not, as I understand things, materially change a possibility that actually the former TPP would come into effect.

Again, it is highly unlikely. The Americans have indicated that they, as far as I’m aware, are not interested in coming on board, and without them this couldn’t be enacted. So that’s really my only further contribution on this part. Elements around the Copyright Act and the Patents Act and so forth are touched on in the commencement—that they will be in a staged fashion—but the particular changes themselves, I’ll address later in the contribution.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’ll just take this opportunity to answer a couple of queries that have come up from the Opposition. I think they have reasonable questions. Regarding the one from Mr Simon O’Connor, yes, we would have to adhere to the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPP) if the US, of course, came in and agreed—hell would probably freeze over before that would occur—and then, of course, Mexico, Canada, or Australia, so that we had greater than 85 percent of the total GDP for the agreement. The chances of that happening are highly unlikely. Of course, ultimately, though, New Zealand could withdraw its consent to the TPP. So it’s a reasonable question, but there are a number of safeguards in there.

Can I just take the opportunity to acknowledge the Opposition—or the then Government, I guess—for progressing the TPP. This is a treaty that was signed up to by the Government in 2016—of course, it hasn’t come into force. We, as a Government, did commit to a few qualifications for support and, having been voted into Government, followed through with the reasonable requests that we needed to see before we would support the TPP.

We believe that the “comprehensive” and “progressive”—the questions that have been asked by the Opposition—indeed, those two words do encompass the objectives of the Government. This must be an agreement that supports and benefits all New Zealanders, not just a few, and it does need to be thoroughly researched, and we need to know exactly what it would mean. There were provisions that a Labour Party in Opposition—and I know the Greens shared that—needed to see change before we would endorse what was the TPP in law but not in force, and we took the opportunity. I have to acknowledge the commitment of David Parker, the Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, and the trade negotiations team, who worked very, very hard in a cooperative way to get the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) over the line.

The provisions that we were seeking were, of course, to ensure the Treaty provision, or protection for the Treaty obligations in this country. We needed those, firstly. The second was that we needed to protect the Pharmac model, and that wasn’t guaranteed under the TPP. I have to acknowledge, once again, the National Party, who brought Pharmac into being. We believe that that fine structure around pharmaceuticals needed to be protected—so that was the second one. The third one was that we needed to protect the right to regulate for our own good—the sovereign right in our own country—and that was upheld. And we needed decent gains for exporters in terms of market access to make the whole deal worthwhile. It has been, as I say, somewhat contentious, and I accept that people have had concerns. Then, of course, the last one was that we needed to protect the right to who owns land in New Zealand—a sovereign right, again.

And so we negotiated all of those things. The investor-State dispute settlement process has not been negotiated out of the agreement. It’s still in there, but we have protections through side letters and agreements in principle with other countries to ensure that a country like New Zealand that generally upholds the law—I doubt whether we’re going to see any of the provisions or concerns from our trading partner countries. But, anyway, we moved to ensure with those protections that we ended up with the comprehensive and progressive trade agreement that has been put in place. What we are doing here, of course, is going through the process to ensure that there are suspensions in the TPP agreement that indeed give effect to the negotiator positions that New Zealand has found itself and negotiated.

So, again, just answering a few of those questions, there was another one about whether any Minister could bring the bill into force by an Order in Council. Yes, that is true. Any Minister can, but, clearly, that would be if the Minister for Trade and Export Growth wasn’t available. I hope I’ve answered a few of those questions that have been legitimately raised by the Opposition, but I think we’ve worked through. In terms of issues that the Green Party still have, we respect their right to have those concerns, but we believe we’ve moved a long way to protect the sovereign right of New Zealanders and New Zealand in terms of moving forward, particularly in terms of those four provisions that we were seeking.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Well, it’s a great pleasure to speak on the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the CPTPP. I actually sat on the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, hearing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), for some of the hearings. I want to turn to Supplementary Order Paper 141 in a moment; but to lay the groundwork for that, I well recall sitting in Christchurch listening to submissions on the TPP. There were really two features of the day: a lot of submissions that really said the same thing over and over again, particularly which will relate to the Supplementary Order Paper in a moment.

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Anne Tolley): Part 2.

It’s in Part 1, isn’t it? 6A?

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Anne Tolley): No. Part 2.

OK, Part 2. Well I won’t talk about that, then. I’ll talk about that in another call. But the feature of that day was Sir Graeme Harrison speaking from ANZCO about the TPP and market access and the importance of that and how it would work with his company’s particular issues that they were facing with trade. It really highlighted these actual treaties and how they work. It’s not just about tariffs; it’s about the non-tariff trade barriers, and how the Trans-Pacific Partnership and now the CPTPP—it’s a bit of a mouthful, really—lay out those particular rules to make trade so much easier. In the case of ANZCO, having their access for their beef was a massive gain for them and for the beef industry in general, and that goes back right through to behind the farm gate. So it has a huge impact on our economy, right through our farming sector.

I think that that is often lost on many of those other submitters that were there on the day, which were talking about the investor-State dispute settlement and those particular clauses that were related to that. Most of their submissions, while heartfelt and well-intentioned, really missed the mark and didn’t understand the impact that could be on New Zealand companies trading overseas. That’s particularly why those clauses are in the bill. So market access is absolutely a massive plus.

The Pharmac provisions in the bill—I understand why they are there, and I think that’s obviously a very good thing. It is a great model for us in New Zealand. They’re a bit like banks, really—pharmaceutical companies: everybody doesn’t like them, but they quite like to use the products that they have when they’re quite ill. So you can’t have new pharmaceuticals if pharmaceutical companies don’t make money out of the production of those and the research that they put into those drugs before they become available for us here in New Zealand.

But trade’s very important for us and, obviously, having this particular bill go through will shore up our place in the world trading scene. I think the renaming of the principal Act—that’s in clause 4, the principal Act being renamed—the name isn’t all that much of a concern to me, but that’s the new Government’s right to put their spin on it, and that’s what’s happening in this particular bill. I think, well, you know, what’s in a name? At least it’s still going to do exactly, pretty much, what the original TPP—very good work that was done—

💬 Kieran McAnulty: Rubbish! It’s completely different.

And the member across the way wasn’t involved in the previous Parliament, so I’m not sure how he knows what he’s referring to. But I’d welcome him getting on his feet and putting his point forward. I’m sure that everybody would love to hear that, particularly the good people of Wairarapa—they’d quite like to hear what’s going on and running through their anti-trade person, who is not a representative for them but resides in their area. So we’d love to hear what they’d have to say about it, particularly since most of the income in that particular area relies on trade.

This bill will, in fact, make it a lot easier for people—well, although it’s only adding on to the good work of the National Government. But I acknowledge the Minister’s role in this, and I commend it to the House.

Thank you, Madam Chair. It’s an absolute pleasure to be talking on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill—

💬 Simon O’Connor: You missed “Comprehensive and Progressive”.

Well, that’s part of the debate. My colleague is just identifying that I’ve missed the “Comprehensive”, but, of course, that is one of the issues that we’re talking about in Part 2, isn’t it—

💬 Hon Member: Part 1.

—Part 1—which is that we all knew that this bill was about the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, and, of course, that was when it came into force under our Government some time ago. Obviously, there was a lot of opposition at that stage, but—

💬 Simon O’Connor: Who from?

Who from, my good colleague asks. There was, of course, widespread opposition, including members from the other side, but also renowned commentators from the outside. Professor Kelsey springs to mind as someone who is always prepared to share her views in the most open, transparent manner, and, of course, she’s got a lot to say on this issue.

So the issue was that we understood it as the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, TPPA, and it was a massive agreement that we put in place which was going to be a catalyst for huge amounts of growth in the Pacific—huge amounts. And, of course, it was going to have a huge or a significant impact for New Zealand. I seem to recall, I think, an estimate of about $2 billion a year—from memory, I’m going from here. But what Part 1 talks about is the issue around what title we should give it, and, of course, we’ve now got this new rather unwieldy title, “CPTPP”.

💬 Dr Duncan Webb: Come on, you can spell.

Yeah, I can. I can spell. Thank you for that helpful comment across the way. And, of course, it says “Comprehensive and Progressive”.

💬 Hon Tim Macindoe: What do you think the impact of adding those words is?

I don’t know, but we’ve dropped the “agreement” at the end, so it’s now the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership. I personally prefer the word “agreement”, because I think that implies some form of negotiated outcome where all parties actually know what they’re going to do. But for some reason—and no doubt Minister Damien O’Connor’s got a view on this—it is far more important to have the words “Comprehensive and Progressive”. I’ve got to just suggest to you if you’re going to sign an agreement, surely you want to achieve comprehensive and progressive development. That’s self-evident. That’s why you enter into these agreements, because you want to see the country grow, or you want to see living standards improve, or all those sorts of things. But for some reason we think we have to put a self-evident title in front of it, which says “Comprehensive and Progressive”. But, as I said before, the missing word is that sense of agreement. That sense of cohesion.

💬 Chris Penk: It’s agreeable.

Agreeable—that’s another alternative. I could’ve quite happily lived with that, or even an alliance. Those are all good words. They’re excellent words, because they sort of show what you’re trying to achieve. But anyway, we’ve got to that outcome. I’m sure the Minister is going to explain to us one day why this is so vitally, vitally important that we have these words.

The other thing, of course, is around the commencement date. I think we’ve got to differentiate between the two dates. One is the date that the bill comes into existence, and one is the date that we, essentially, allow this piece of legislation, this bill as it currently stands, to come into existence. Of course, I haven’t actually checked the day that the bill comes into existence. I think the bill comes in after the third reading and Order in Council. There’s nothing unusual about that. But the interesting thing about this, in Part 1, is the issue around when this bill actually becomes operative—operative.

Of course, in this bill we’ve got a couple of processes. Normally such a thing is undertaken either through an Order in Council, but when is the treaty operative? In this case we’ve got this double approval process—one might even say double jeopardy; oh no, maybe that’s not very appropriate in this case—but, anyway, this requires the Minister for Trade and Export Growth to do that.

I think this is an interesting bill. I’m looking forward to the debate on it as we go forward.

Thank you, Madam Chair. It’s a pleasure to speak again on Part 1, my ante antepenultimate contribution in this part—for scholars of Latin and, indeed, trade.

💬 Hon Tim Macindoe: I got that one.

Mr Macindoe got that one. Of course he did. I wonder if it’s good timing, when we’re talking about the commencement, to sort of understand how this fits in with our broader constitutional arrangements. I’m going to let the committee into a secret—indeed, the whole nation, as I’m sure everyone is following closely—and just explain that I’ve received some advice from the Parliamentary Counsel Office (PCO) some time ago. It was general advice, not related to this particular bill, whereby a set of criteria is established for understanding whether legislation is going to be “great law for New Zealand”. There are different aspects of that, and I’ll relate to each of those to new section 2, in clause 6, within Part 1 of this bill.

The first is that it’s accessible—namely, easy to understand, easy to find your way around, and easy to find. You’ll excuse me using the second person pronoun, hopefully, Madam Chair—easy for one to find one’s way around, I suppose. No doubt, you will have no difficulty in finding your own way around it, ma’am. So, in terms of the way that this particular clause is set out, it’s pretty obvious, I think, the way that it has effect. It talks about the Act itself having effect; the Act being the parent Act, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Act, as distinct from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill, as Mr Bayly has explained very helpfully. It sets that out in a way that I think is very easy to understand because it establishes that that will take place when a particular Minister gives some advice to the Sovereign—

💬 Hon Member: Return of the King!

More specifically, it is, of course, the Governor-General—and I say the “Sovereign” coincidently with Matt King coming into the Chamber, but that’s entirely coincidental in terms of his surname. But it’s the Governor-General, of course, standing in place of the Sovereign, who receives that advice from the relevant Minister. I say “advice”; technically, actually, the word used in the clause is “recommendation”. Advice is a term of art, I suppose, in constitutional circles regarding the functions of the Ministers of the Crown, the Ministers of Her Majesty as it currently is, and through the Governor-General, of course. It’s the Minister for Trade and Export Growth who would be making such a recommendation or, as I say, advice.

It’s worth noting perhaps, just in passing, that the advice would come from the Minister to the Sovereign via the Governor-General, no doubt as part of a Cabinet decision that would have been made by the executive more broadly, but to meet the particular requirements of this bill it would be that particular Minister, whoever he or she might be at that time. I think that’s appropriate. So as far as the PCO’s advice on the way that law should be structured in a way to be accessible, that passes the test as far as I’m concerned.

The next major category of appropriateness is whether it is fit for purpose. It is fit for purpose, in my view, because the purpose of the Government of the day—represented by the Minister in the chair, Damien O’Connor, at the moment; and, indeed, this side of the House is supportive of the purpose of the bill itself, as well—is clearly to enable legislation, or rather to enact legislation, that will ratify the amended trade agreement popularly known as TPP or CPTPP, depending on who one is talking to and how much weight one attaches to certain amendments that were negotiated.

Certain and flexible for the future? That’s one other criterion within that overall aim that legislation be fit for purpose. The date appointed by new section 2 under the heading of “Commencement” is indeed pretty certain, and it says it’s flexible for the future, and, actually, I think it’s quite wise in that regard because it specifically outlines that there can be different parts of the Act entering into force or into effect at different times, and that again relates back to the nature of the agreement itself.

Finally, constitutionally sound is what the PCO recommends for us in drafting all law, including this particular provision that is before us today. It does follow good process notwithstanding that there are some different views out there in the way that Parliament and the executive interact in terms of treaty making. That’s something that’s covered by a Supplementary Order Paper that relates to Part 2, and no doubt our colleagues in the Green Party and my colleagues in National too—and perhaps even, who knows, Labour and New Zealand First—might care to take a call on it very shortly. That’s all I have to say on new section 2, “Commencement”. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I move, That the question be now put.

Thank you, Madam Chair. It’s great to take a call on this, on Part 1, seeking to change this name: Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). I think we’d probably have far less of an issue if the “CP” were instead to be renamed “Carefully Presented”, because, in essence, that’s all the Government has actually done with these changes. They have carefully presented a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is still the TPP that we all knew and loved on this side of the House, but they pretend that they’ve somehow made some substantive change to it.

But in doing so they perhaps are careful not to say what would happen to this CPTPP if the US were to re-enter the Trans-Pacific Partnership as it had been originally agreed. So it’s actually the Minister Damien O’Connor’s comments that I want to take the time to talk about in this my first contribution on this part. The Minister claimed—in response to one of my colleagues saying that “Well, what happens if the US actually changed their mind and decided to enter this thing under the terms and conditions that were agreed to by all the parties?” The Minister tried to claim that (1) that was incredibly unlikely and (2) that we would be able to do certain things. Well, let’s take a look firstly at the first part of that.

Even under the name CPTPP this agreement affects a huge amount of the world’s GDP, particularly in the region of which we are one of many inhabitants. So as those nations that are a part of this use this agreement to mutual benefit—each of us growing our opportunities, growing our economies, creating jobs, and lifting incomes in our country—it is not by some far-stretched hypothetical to think that another country that could still be a member of it, the US, will stick to a position that it is not good enough for them. In fact, the more successful the nations under CPTPP are, under this agreement, the more likely it is the United States will review its position and look to find a way to re-enter, because it’s only alternative against that entire bloc, if you will, of economic might across the region is to seek to negotiate bilateral agreements independently with each of the nations. That is a very, very difficult thing to do whilst maintaining the sort of opportunities that a multilateral agreement can yield.

So I think, Minister, it is not some amazing far stretch of the imagination that the US would seek to re-enter the agreement under its original terms, which they are unable to do and which would then have significant impacts to those not quite substantive changes the Government did negotiate into the renamed CPTPP—most or all of which would go out the window if the US decided to re-enter the original agreement.

The second part, then, the Minister raised that I think is extraordinarily troubling for this Government and for New Zealand is he made the statement that if the US did choose to re-enter, then we have a reserved right to withdraw our consent to the TPP. So he’s just sent a message to every business in New Zealand and every exporter that they cannot be certain of what would happen to their international market access and their opportunities under this agreement should the US unilaterally decide they will re-enter TPP, which they are absolutely able to do. The Minister has sent a message to them that they might lose all of that opportunity, because this Government would have the option to withdraw from it. Well, given the environment that this Government has existed in, pretty much since it came into being, of low and decreasing business confidence, that one statement in this Chamber by the Minister can only have made that worse. That comes on top of the news tonight in the Colmar Brunton poll that more people think the economy is headed backwards into the future than is heading upwards.

So really, the Minister has introduced a sense now of absolute uncertainty across those businesses—the businesses we need to prosper under CPTPP, or whatever you want to name it; the businesses we need to grasp the opportunity and make the most of it. Ultimately, when we talk about the economy, we are simply talking about jobs and incomes. Harnessed well, this, along with our other trade agreements, is all about growing jobs and growing incomes. The Minister has just really put a huge at-risk component into that.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I too would like to contribute briefly on this on the words “Comprehensive and Progressive”, because one has to consider all the work that was done prior to today in other bills to enable this bill to pass.

It’s not comprehensive—progressive, yes, because one step in the right direction is progress, but comprehensive it is not. When we talk about this, the Government had to pass, to suit themselves, an amendment to the Overseas Investment Act which did not allow foreigners to buy existing houses but did allow them to buy houses off the plan, for example. So comprehensive this is not. If it was comprehensive, it would have included those types of things in this bill.

Trade is really important, and it’s really pleasing to see that, essentially, both sides of the House, with a few exceptions, are in support of removing tariffs and progressing free trade. Free-trade agreements, as Mr Hudson has talked about, increase GDP, increase income, and create jobs. That’s really important. It’s particularly important in these times, given some of the barriers and tariffs that some countries are putting up to protect—or so they say—the jobs in their own economies. Thankfully, we know here in this House, on both sides, that we’re a trading nation and that we must continue to trade and enable greater access and freer access to all of the markets in the world to enable our small economy to progress.

Even the larger economies that are supporting tariffs and barriers—in the short term it might appeal politically; in some places it does appeal politically. It’s protectionist. You get a group of people who believe they are being protected. They do believe that their jobs are being protected in their own domestic economy, but on both sides—I think I can speak, because this is what we’re talking about: free trade—we know, in the medium to long term, tariffs and barriers to trade do not protect jobs at all. They increase the cost of production in the domestic economy, making those jobs uncompetitive compared to others. That is why we, on this side—and I’m hearing from the Labour side—support free-trade agreements generally.

So that’s a good thing. So free trade is a good thing. So the “Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement”—which is what it was—those words are absolutely appropriate, but comprehensive it is not. Progressive, it may be in small steps, which is excellent. Some people would say that we don’t do enough here fast enough and soon enough, and I might be one of those people in fact. But a step in the right direction is still progress, and that is why we support this document. We will support even the title of “Comprehensive and Progressive” in the title, because it’s important that the bones and the substance of the bill is enacted for the benefit of all New Zealanders, to increase incomes, to increase the GDP, and to support more jobs in the economy.

I mean, even a year ago we were doing around 10,000 new jobs a months. That’s what a growing economy gives. That’s what free-trade agreements do.

💬 Hon Member: How many?

Ten thousand new jobs a month.

💬 Andrew Bayly: What are we at now?

Four or five thousand. So we’ve slipped. The economy’s slipped. We can’t blame it all on the global economy. The Government has to take some responsibility for a slowing economy, for lack of confidence in the business community, and a lower currency which reflects that—and that’s not good. So the Government’s got quite a lot of work to do to regain the confidence in the business community. They’ve got a lot of work to do to increase, basically, the trade-weighted index of this currency, because it’s weakened significantly in the last 12 months. So the Government’s got a lot of work to do in that area, but at least, by ratifying this Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, we are taking a small step in the right direction.

I move, That the question be now put.