United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill

Members, the House is in committee on the United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill. We come now to Part 1. This is the—

Point of order, Madam Chairperson. I seek leave that all provisions be taken as one question.

Leave is sought for that purpose. Is there any objection? Leave is not approved.

We come now to Part 1. This is the debate on clauses 3 to 12, “Amendments to Overseas Investment Act 2005 and Overseas Investment Regulations 2005”, and the Schedule. The question is that Part 1 stand part.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. It’s my pleasure, on behalf of the Minister for Trade and Investment, the “Hon Trade McClay”, to speak in support of the United Arab Emirates—aka UAE—Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill. It’s legislation, Madam Chair and committee members, that will enable New Zealand to ratify a landmark free-trade agreement with one of our most important partners in the Middle East.

I do want to start by expressing my thanks to those who have been involved with progressing the bill so far, including members of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee—and I notice that its erstwhile chair Mr Tim van de Molen is present. I thank him for that, and, of course, Parliament more generally, civil society and business representatives, and Treaty partners. I emphasise to all those involved in the process that your engagement is a crucial part of the legislative process.

The agreement—or the CEPA, as it is affectionately known—unlocks new and exciting opportunities for New Zealand exporters, investors, consumers, and innovators. It’s a high-quality, modern free-trade agreement that provides preferential access for all New Zealand exports, with tariffs eliminated on some 98.5 percent of our exports immediately upon its entry into force, and I will briefly touch on the time frames involved because we’re excitingly close to the ratification and entry into force of this agreement.

The UAE, so far, has concluded agreements with 20 nations or economies, and so our agreement puts New Zealand exporters on a level playing field within that UAE market. Not only that, though, but I understand that the agreement is the highest quality and the most liberalising among those, so, if anything, our exporters will actually enjoy an advantage. So that’s a great achievement, and, again, I express thanks on behalf of the Government and, hopefully, on behalf of Parliament as well to all those involved in concluding the agreement and getting us to this near-final stage.

I’ll just share a couple of key figures that illustrate the potential scale of the opportunity, noting for a start that the UAE, along with Saudi Arabia, is New Zealand’s largest export destination in the Middle East, with the annual two-way trade now being valued at some NZ$1.3 billion. Our annual goods exports are now almost NZ$1.2 billion, including dairy, meat, fruit, and machinery, and, of course, these are major pillars of the New Zealand economy, domestic and export alike. The UAE is, meanwhile, the world’s 20th largest economy, with a GDP of over US$500 billion. It’s an economy that’s continuing to expand, and we’ll help them to do that in the way that free trade is wont to do. Their economy is projected to grow by 4 percent this year, driven by diversification into sectors such as tourism, technology, and financial services.

I do need to emphasise, though, in providing those different statistics, that the agreement isn’t just about trade volumes—important as they are—but it’s also about strategic positioning. This agreement is our first free-trade agreement within the Middle East, a region of the world which is already and will continue to be increasingly important to help New Zealand achieve greater economic prosperity for Kiwis. It’s the home of some of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds and logistics hubs. By securing preferential access for New Zealand businesses in this way, our businesses will be able to gain a competitive edge and will have increased connectivity in a region that is rapidly transforming and offering new opportunities.

It also reflects our values of having sustainable and inclusive trade, and I should also point out that most of the obligations within the agreement—the CEPA—are already met by New Zealand’s existing domestic legal and policy regime. However, of course, as is often the case, at least some amendments to our legislative and regulatory frameworks are required in order to ensure that we have the alignment necessary to meet the obligations on our side of the agreement. These include amendments to the Overseas Investment Act 2005, the related regulations, the Customs and Excise Act 2018, the Tariff, and the Customs and Excise Regulations 1996. I can see that members of the committee are almost as excited as I am about these, and they, no doubt, are very familiar with them all—again, as much as I am.

On 7 April of this year, the bill was introduced to the House in order to make the changes, and—to conclude—the purpose, of course, is to enable New Zealand to ratify this agreement by allowing our domestic laws to be aligned with the domestic commitments that we have made under the CEPA. So I look forward to the discussion at the committee and I emphasise, finally, that this represents a real moment of opportunity for New Zealand and New Zealand businesses. With the aim of the UAE being to double its GDP to US$1.4 trillion by 2031, New Zealand is well positioned to assist that itself along that way through this legislation.

Madam Chair, thank you very much. It’s great to have the Minister in the chair, the Hon Chris Penk. It’s quite relevant, given that Part 1, which we are discussing here, is “Amendments to Overseas Investment Act 2005 and Overseas Investment Regulations 2005”. He will be overseeing the process, and, actually, I think in summary, the select committee saw the provisions in the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement as being sound. They extended from $100 million to $200 million, the threshold, but there was a qualification that the $100 million threshold remains for investments outside the relevant service sectors where the commitments have been made and do not impact our national security and public order. So I just applaud—the officials, in negotiating this, have kept a $100 million threshold for sensitive asset areas.

The question I have for the Minister, though, is that the Government is making changes in other areas of the overseas investment oversight. So while negotiating this bill was under the previous legislation, the oversight of those new investments will be with a different framework. I think in supporting this legislation, as we have at every stage, and facilitating through select committee, the questions we have for the Minister, in one area, handing over decision making to officials—so it won’t even come to the Minister. So maybe he can explain the thresholds there and what he is going to use as a justification for intervention. Because there is a lot of money in the UAE and other Middle Eastern countries—in fact, in the Gulf Corporation Council, which is the next agreement that will come through.

I think every New Zealander has the right, and, in Labour, we’re asking the questions: can we be assured that the officials will maintain the objective of certainty of the previous Labour Government that was to make sure that we did protect our sovereign rights, that we protected the rights of Māori, of iwi, and other sectors of our economy that are exposed? So the question for the Minister is: while we’ve had, in negotiations, protections at an official level, ultimately, because the oversight provision and regime will change under new legislation, can the Minister give us some assurances in that area?

Thank you, Madam Chair. I thank the member of the committee, who was a Minister for Land Information so is familiar with the operation of the Overseas Investment Office (OIO) and as part of land information more generally, so I acknowledge the fact that his question comes from an informed space of wanting to test how the decision making will take place in that realm, as well as his former role in the trade space as a Minister, as well.

I take seriously the question that he’s posed, and I think it’s worth me providing the assurance that he seeks, on behalf of the Government, that we are very confident indeed that none of the changes that we’ve made, in terms of the way that decisions for the OIO are made by officials, as opposed to Ministers in most cases—we’re confident that those will continue to be made in an appropriate manner, considering national benefit—and I use that term in a pretty broad sense—but including with reference to questions of sovereignty and also other rights and interests that we, in New Zealand, are determined to uphold and protect.

I think the officials who have been weighing those individual decisions in a business-as-usual kind of manner, but also in relation to particular trade obligations, will continue to do so in a way that’s very appropriate. But I’ll also point out for the committee that it’s the case that Ministers—being the Minister of Finance or her delegate, the Associate Minister of Finance, David Seymour, and the Minister for Land Information, being myself at the present time—still have the ability to call in applications, should we think that it would be prudent to do so. There’s no particular specific test for that, except only to say that the aims of the Government, on behalf of New Zealand—for example, in promoting the exercise of free trade, part of which, of course, is the ambition to double our exports within the decade—are part of our decision making as to whether to call in an application and then, of course, the decision to approve or not at that point.

I’m confident that good decision-making will continue to be made, predominantly by officials but with ministerial oversight as and when required.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate that clarification from the Minister for Land Information. I acknowledge that the deal also does not include investor-State dispute settlements, which was a concern—international dispute settlement criteria that would have allowed, and does allow in other negotiations around the world of trade agreements, private companies to sue Governments. That has been excluded; we applaud the Government for that.

Can I just come back to the criteria around the investments because Invest New Zealand, which is a piece of legislation we’ve passed through the House, had very vague criteria about the objective of that organisation. They will now have access to a market in the UAE with a higher threshold. As the Minister says, there is ultimate oversight by two Ministers, himself and the Associate Minister of Finance—I trust that Minister, but unfortunately, I think the other Associate Minister of Finance would sell his grandmother if he thought he could make a buck. It is indeed quite a lot of pressure on that Minister, and we need to be sure that the money coming from the UAE, from this trade agreement, actually is for the benefit of New Zealand. Of course, there’ll be some benefit to the investor—but to make sure we have a balance in those results.

Again, a question to the Minister, given that he shares the responsibility, is to make sure that what we generally agreed through the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee will not be overwritten by some short-term objective of Invest New Zealand as an agency, and perhaps the Associate Minister of Finance, who is the ACT Party leader, and who has expressed time and time again a desire to just drive economic outcomes over and above any of the cultural and other social outcomes that we would always have—and we hope that the Minister in the Chamber has—in any trade agreement or any negotiation process. I think it has been kept, it’s been maintained through the conditions of this agreement, but when it comes to final decisions by the two Ministers over that investment, we need to have some assurance that actually there will be those principles maintained.

Thank you, Madam Chair. The question that the member poses, I hope to be able to provide assurance to along the lines that the criteria for Invest NZ, in his characterisation, are vague. I suppose I’d point out the obvious, that there’s always a tension between flexibility, which is helpful in the case of wanting policies and practices to respond to general aims of the Government on behalf of New Zealand, as opposed to being so prescriptive as to lock down or preclude opportunities being taken for the benefit of New Zealand.

I mean, reasonable minds can differ on the quality of decision making by any Minister, and I obviously don’t share the view that’s been expressed by the member in relation to other Ministers, but I will say that all aspects of Government—and I’m sure the Overseas Investment Office would want me to say on their behalf that they will continue to exercise their judgment in a thoughtful manner, as will New Zealand Invest, and, for that matter, in the converse, so to speak, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, also working diligently on behalf of New Zealanders for the export as well as the import opportunities.

Speaking for myself, at least, I’m confident that I and other Ministers will have regard to the best interests of New Zealand, which are economic in many cases, as the member’s quite rightly mentioned, but also bearing in mind more strategic considerations that go to the fabric of New Zealand society, including the opportunities that we want for our businesses, but also members of the New Zealand community more generally.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I rise on behalf of the Greens to ask a few questions of the Minister—actually, building on the contribution of the Hon Damien O’Connor. It is around that part where we’re looking at the increase from the $100 million to $200 million monetary threshold, which we see through the Overseas Investment Act 2005. I am looking specifically at clause 4 in the bill, Subpart 1, “Amendment to Overseas Investment Act 2005”—clause 4 “Section 61A amended (Regulations regarding the alternative monetary thresholds for overseas investments in significant business assets)”. If you drop down to paragraph (k), it says, “the New Zealand—United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement”.

It’s that particular paragraph in the legislation that draws in the agreement. I guess I am building on some of the concerns that were raised by the Hon Damien O’Connor, and that is around questions around how that threshold went from $100 million to $200 million, and whether there was any analysis on not just the cultural or social impact, which is of course incredibly important, but also around labour rights laws as well.

As was canvassed during submissions on the agreement part, which this legislation leads to, there were concerns around migrant exploitation, there were concerns about the differences in labour standards in terms of what we would consider acceptable here in New Zealand, and the incredibly different and very punitive labour regime that they have in the UAE.

My question to the Minister is linked to: how did you go from the $100 million to the $200 million, and was there any analysis, by moving between those two numbers, on whether that would actually exacerbate migrant exploitation in the UAE, or what impact, if any, it would have on workers’ rights and labour market concerns over in the UAE?

Thank you, Madam Chair. I am very certain that the Government, including through its excellent negotiators and officials involved in the preparation and discussions around the agreement and ultimately its drafting, wouldn’t place in front of this House for ratification a deal that we would knowingly consider likely or even possible to lead to outcomes of migrant exploitation or other labour-type laws or principles being flouted.

As for the $200 million threshold, my understanding is that that’s in line with other free-trade agreements, so it’s a matter of consistency and certainty and alignment with those that that figure was reached.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I just appreciate the Minister for Land Information answering these questions so diligently. For those of us who weren’t at the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, and everybody who’s listening to the debate this afternoon, I think it would be just good to get onto the record a bit more about the thinking behind raising that threshold to $200 million. I wonder if there was any cost-benefit analysis done of lifting it up to $200 million, doubling the threshold. I’m interested in whether there was any modelling or projections about the effect that it might have on levels of investment, comparing, for example, if it had been kept at $100 million or moved to $200 million, and what sectors that investment is likely to be going into.

Point of order. Thank you, Madam Chair. Look, I just wanted to pick up on a technical aspect here, because the questions we’re hearing are in relation to the monetary threshold. Now, that’s part of the consideration that the select committee undertook when it was first considering whether or not to recommend that the New Zealand - United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and its accompanying bilateral investment treaty be agreed. That is a separate process and that is the appropriate time for questions in relation to the monetary threshold and other clauses within the agreement itself. What we’re doing here, though, is simply debating the legislation that then gives effect to that agreement that we’ve already completed and closed off discussion on that. Therefore, this legislation is tightly around the specific clauses that need amending, not the intent behind why they’re being amended, which has already been dealt with.

No, look, we have a committee of the whole House stage. We have two stages, the select committee and the committee of the whole House, so that people can take the opportunity to ask further questions, whether or not they’ve been part of that process. I’ve just been advised that that’s OK.

Point of order. Just to clarify, I’m not talking about the select committee in relation to this. The select committee does two separate processes. We did one process earlier in the year, looking at the treaty, the CEPA and the bilateral investment treaty, which was completed and finished, and now we’ve had a second select committee process specifically pertaining to the bill, to now give effect to that. Absolutely, we should be able to talk to the legislative select committee process and, therefore—

I’m told that this bill affects the threshold, so it’s still relevant to the process.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate the opportunity to engage with the Minister in regards to, potentially, a few technical questions.

Just going to clause 4, which amends section 61A of the Overseas Investment Act, amended section 61A provides for alternative monetary thresholds. It, essentially, says that regulations made under subsection (1) may provide for alternative monetary thresholds under section 16. Under subsection (3), “The Minister must be satisfied, before making a recommendation under this section, that the regulations do not provide for an alternative monetary threshold that is higher than the amount provided for in the relevant international agreement referred”. My reading of that, Minister, is that the responsible Minister would, in effect, be able to lower the threshold via regulation. My questions, really, are in what circumstances that might happen—firstly, whether there was consideration of inserting the threshold itself in legislation, and whether that has been done in regards to other trade agreements.

There were also some questions from the select committee about cumulative investments and how they were treated. I understand that the information to the select committee was that that judgment would be made by Land Information New Zealand. My question, just on the basis of that, would be: was there consideration of including some criteria within the regulations or within statute in terms of guiding that decision, which seems like quite a significant decision in terms of who gets through that non-monitored window and who doesn’t. I understand that there will be some monitoring of how this is used and how it’s played out, but I would just appreciate some guidance in regards to whether that is commonly done or not.

I’m also looking—while I have some time—at the regulations. Subpart 2—this is clause 7, regulation 85, which talks about inserting the type 5 investor provision into the definitions. Then it introduces a number of terms as well into the regulations under 85(1). I looked at the definition of UAE branch, which mentions both that the branch of an enterprise has to be located in the UAE territory but also that it has to carry out business activities in the UAE territory. I was curious about the definition of business activities, so I looked then at the regulation 96B(1) which is being inserted. However, that regulation also doesn’t define what a business activity is. It just repeats that provision.

I’m just wanting some guidance from the Minister in terms of where that definition is contained or whether there is flexibility in terms of an entity being able to make that decision just in regards to that higher threshold. I do think that there’s importance in terms of understanding the scope of who may have access and who may not have access to that unmonitored entity.

I do have a number of other questions—just to flag them for now. One is in relation to regulation 88 as amended, and that is at clause 9. I see the inclusion of “a Hong Kong individual” in the legislation, which is obviously broader than the title of the legislation in front of us, and that there are a number of changes in that regard that have been made. I’m just wanting to hear from the Minister the rationale of that expansion.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and afternoon, colleagues. It’s great to be here on what is a really important piece of legislation. Just coming through a number of the questions, I came in just at the end, but I’m pretty sure it was new section 96A about the $200 million threshold. Good.

The short answer is there are three questions there. First and foremost: precedent. Yes, the $200 million precedent is pretty much in most of the similar types of agreements that are in place between the Governments. This is consistent with that.

There were questions asked around what circumstances, potentially, that would change. I think the reality is very, very rarely or seldomly. The reason for that is because, in effect, to make that change, you’d have to renegotiate the agreement and undertake that process. The circumstances that would lead you to that point, again, would be very rare or seldom, and so, in reality, it is highly unlikely that one would actually change that threshold. But, of course, there are and there is a mechanism if those circumstances did evolve, which is possible, but I think just being realistic in terms of where we’re at around that.

I think the member highlighted regulation 88, in clause 9. I don’t think there was necessarily a question there yet, other than to signal that there might be one coming, so I look forward in anticipation to it.

Just for the benefit of the Minister, I just wanted to repeat the questions that I posed just before he took the chair. One of them is, just for the benefit—

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): Are you concerned that the questions haven’t been answered—

Hon PHIL TWYFORD: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): —or are you just asking for another Minister—

Hon PHIL TWYFORD: They weren’t answered in the—

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): OK, so can you be specific about that. Thank you.

Hon PHIL TWYFORD: Yeah. The first question was: when the consideration of alternative thresholds was made, was there cost-benefit analysis done? It looked at the likely scenarios between the hundreds of million threshold and the 200.

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): That’s fair. I think we swapped Ministers at that stage.

Hon PHIL TWYFORD: We did. That’s why I’m asking the question.

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): Thank you.

I can answer that question for the member if they’d like. The short answer is, yes, that was undertaken as part of the process.

And further to that, is the Minister aware of what the projections might be of the likely investment amounts that might come in, in those two respective options? The third question was really about the sectors that we think investment will go into.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a question to the Minister of Revenue regarding clause 4, but it also ties into the definition of “UAE enterprise” under clause 7. I think one of the things we did see, as part of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee process, that was brought up as a concern of the agreement was around labour-right issues in UAE, and I want to check with the Minister. Now, when we are looking at, for example, the kafala sponsorship system in the UAE, any company that has business in UAE, or with a UAE enterprise, technically is functioning under the law of the UAE, despite the fact that it may contravene international legal obligations. How would we then reconcile imports from UAE on something like that, which then potentially will contravene our domestic legislation around workers’ rights? I guess that’s the first part of the question.

The second part of the question is around those kind of circumstances when you do get countries where they potentially pay a significantly lower amount because of—for lack of a better word, if you’re looking at worker exploitation, or even in terms of the migrant issues that has been experienced by UAE, albeit they have been improving. The kafala system still has been raised as an issue internationally. If because of the fact that they’re able to produce certain goods at a lower cost than if we were to produce them domestically and we are importing them here, what sort of analysis or risk assessment have the officials or the Ministers done to check the fact that a similar product that can be produced domestically, albeit at a higher cost, will have that kind of competition or challenge against something that is being imported as a result of this particular agreement?

Now, the reason I raise this particular point, if you’re looking at another example, is when we import animal products—in the sense that if we have countries that have lower animal welfare standards than we have here domestically, then they potentially are able to produce things at a much cheaper rate which domestic producers here in Aotearoa New Zealand cannot. Therefore, it creates an imbalance that domestic producers will have to match domestic legislation, but international imports do not have to.

That is my second question: has there been any sort of risk analysis done on UAE enterprise that fulfils the requirement of UAE law but doesn’t fulfil the requirement of domestic New Zealand law, which then creates a competition to domestic producers?

Thank you, Madam Chair, and I thank the Minister for his answer to my first question, which was in terms of why the threshold figure was in regulation as opposed to primary legislation. However, I do think a number of the other questions still remain unanswered, so I’ll just very quickly traverse them again.

The first was around whether there was any thought to giving some guidance about cumulative investments and how they ought to be treated, rather than leaving that to Land Information New Zealand to determine and then reviewing it post fact.

The second was in relation to clause 7. This amends regulation 85 and the meaning of “business activities” both in that clause as well as in the new regulation 96B(1), which also uses that language. I just couldn’t find what that definition was.

The third question was in relation to clause 9, which amends regulation 88. That was the inclusion of the term “a Hong Kong individual” in the legislation, and just getting some understanding of that amendment, given it’s just outside the scope of what I had thought we were looking at, but I’m sure that there’s a response to that.

Also, just staying with that clause, how does the Minister believe that the definition of a type 5 investor will be verified in practice to prevent misuse? Obviously there are criteria there. I’m just wanting some guidance in terms of how the Minister expects that that will be monitored.

Still looking at new section 96A, inserted by clause 11, I did note the inclusion of protections against an associate of a person who’s able to invest if they have a beneficial entitlement to the investment or power of control, so essentially excluding someone who’s just working essentially as a vessel and what protection there will be against abuse of the system in terms of identifying what “beneficial entitlement” is, which is the term that’s used.

So just, again, I’m curious where I can find a definition of “beneficial entitlement” to understand how we’re going to protect around that vessel-type use of investors who don’t fit within the definition of the investors who we are attempting to give a privileged provision to. Perhaps I’ll leave it there, but I do potentially have some other questions as well.

Thanks very much, members, for your questions. Firstly, for the Hon Phil Twyford’s questions in regards to investment components: Land Information New Zealand keeps the record of those investments, so that’s on the public record, and that would be, in effect, the area repository to be able to access information. Also a question around what sectors: the service sector is the key area which is focused here.

Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan asked a question in regards to imbalances, particularly around labour. There is a labour chapter within the agreement, and in effect, that provides a mechanism for bilateral discussions in regards to any issues in the matters in which the member has noted.

The member Vanushi Walters noted, in regards to cumulative investments: in effect, the short answer is that that doesn’t impact what we can do domestically, so that is not an issue.

The question in clause 7 around business activities—it’s the same question that the Hon Phil Twyford asked, which refers to services—and the last part of the question that was referred to in that context is something that we will come back to you.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I just have a quick question. It’s a clarification really around one of the answers that were given around moving from—this relates to Part 1, Subpart 1, clause 4. It is around the monetary thresholds moving from $100 million to $200 million. I think the remark was, if I can recall it: “It was because it was what we’ve done with all the other free-trade agreements, because they’re similar.” I want to get some clarification from the Minister about what those similarities are, and I want the clarification to be within the context of the concerns that we’ve raised around migrant exploitation and the kafala sponsorship.

I do note that the Minister did mention that there is a mechanism there to deal with those issues, and that is noted, but I would like to know why it went from $100 million to $200 million and whether the concerns we’ve raised around workers’ rights and around migrant exploitation and the contradictions that could be there between our domestic legislation and international legislation in terms of the way that we do things, because it seems to me that if the answers are only, “Well, it’s all about the economics.”, then I think we should be a lot clearer about that.

I ask that because I look and think about the EU free-trade agreement comparable Parliaments where there are more protections—there are climate protections, more workers’ protections—and so that makes sense. If the Minister could give us some clarification in that area around the $100 million to $200 million monetary threshold and how that links through or doesn’t, and the reasons why it will if it does or does not.

It’s a fair and reasonable question in the context of those scenarios. To the point the member raised before, in terms of concerns with labour laws between jurisdictions, there is no financial threshold for the mechanism in which countries can actually undertake dialogue in regard to those issues, so in matters such as that, a fiscal threshold is not specifically relevant. It’s in the context of, if they want to have a discussion, the mechanism is within the agreement to have a discussion on those matters—so that deals with that component.

I covered the points around the broader threshold, in terms of the consistency with other legislation—it’s generally inconsistent with other agreements that we have in place.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

Thank you, Madam Chair, for allowing me a quick question. I will keep this very brief. It relates to the costs of implementing this agreement. I consulted with my colleague Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan, and he assures me that this matter hasn’t yet been canvassed during the select committee process, so this is something fresh.

I’m referring to page 89 of the international treaty examination and section 8.3 where it talks about costs to Government agencies of implementing and complying with the treaty. My question is which agencies are anticipated to bear costs as a result of implementing and complying with this treaty, and is there a breakdown of the costs per agency of complying and implementing with this treaty, and is there a breakdown of exactly how the costs are actually going to be incurred? Is it in the nature of hiring interpreters? Is it in terms of interpreting the regulation legislation?

I am just interested around this issue of cost as the public services spokesperson for the Greens. I promised to keep my question short, so I’m going to sit back down now.

I move, That debate on this question now close.