Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill

Members, the House is in committee on the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill. When we last considered this bill, we were debating Part 1, which is the debate on clauses 3 to 53, “Amendments relating to investigatory tools”, and Schedules 1 and 2. Once again, the question is that Part 1 stand part.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I was wondering whether the Minister would jump to her feet, given that a number of questions and clarifications were sought prior to this debate being interrupted.

As I prefaced in my earlier remarks, we really just want to work through the legislation and raise some issues and some clarifications—really, for the record, and to make clear where the line is drawn in terms of this important piece of legislation.

I guess the next point I had was—and I was referring to the amended section numbers in Part 1, new section 79I, which talks about preservation directions and the duration of those directions. It says that they stand for 20 days—and that’s just 20 ordinary days, not working days; a relatively short period—but then it’s got, in subsection (2), that where an application for a production order is made, it continues until that is determined.

Now, I guess my point there: firstly, is 20 days long enough? This might seem a bit strange—is 20 days long enough? And then, until the application is determined, there’s actually an indeterminate length of time. My question is: is it appropriate for it to simply exist for an indeterminate length of time, particularly when a production order can in fact go on for quite a long period of time if it’s challenged? So that’s my first point—I’ll see how many I can squeeze in; I’ll keep an eye on the Minister just in case she wants to leap up because something’s just occurred to her.

The other one is reviews. There is a preservation order that’s made, and the entity against which that order has been made has a right of review. I guess this is a rule-of-law point. The review is by exactly the same entity. It’s against the commissioner who made the decision and also reviews the decision, which does seem very odd. You would usually expect to go one up, which means that this is an entirely administrative discretion, and I would have thought that you’d want some independent oversight. Now, I guess if you don’t like the review, you can go to the High Court by way of judicial review, but that seems very heavy-handed and quite a wasteful approach, when a much more obvious approach would simply be to have a kind of quick-fire right of appeal to the District Court.

I also note that although the review is notionally by the commissioner, the provision, in fact, makes it very clear that it’ll be a delegate—so it won’t even be the commissioner him- or herself who decides that review; it’ll be some delegate, which really buries it into the organisation and makes it highly administrative in nature.

I see I’ve got a minute left and the Minister is not yet ready to respond to these insightful points, and I guess my next question, then, is about new section 79N, which is about pathway information. In particular, when it says that you’re required to produce pathway information, it’s got to be produced in usable form, and the person who’s asked for it has to assist any person nominated by the chief executive. Now, I haven’t had a lot to do with these kinds of investigations, but I do know that it can take considerable resources to do this kind of electronic forensic work, and it doesn’t come cheap. So if you’ve got a provider, and not all these providers are large, some of them are quite small—and that’s a good thing—who bears the burden of this? Because this is an enforcement obligation, and the entity who happens to be communicating this data is being asked to present it in usable form and to render assistance. So it’s a compulsion to, essentially, provide a service and to assist in presenting and developing that evidence. I see my time has expired. I’ll save my further questions.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I am not sure, just before the break, there were already some questions posed, and I assume they’re still in the mix somewhere with the Minister or the Minister’s team. But I’d like to go to clause 10, if I may, new section 64A, “Record of information obtained, made, or generated by assistant”. This clause required anyone assisting in a surveillance operation to either destroy or hand over any information they record during that process. Speaking to new section 64A(2)(a), where the destructions of records are allowed, would the Minister consider whether an exemption or notification process where the data concerned Māori, including iwi, to ensure opportunity for data sovereignty? That’s one.

And if I can just quickly go to the second: will there be provisions, or can the Minister assure that there’ll be provisions, that ensure culturally significant information or data is not destroyed without consultation or oversight? These questions are on the back of that there’s very little recognition or, in our eyes, rigour as to how Māori data will be treated in any case. So the first challenge, I guess: should you or would you collect and for what good reason? And then, once you’ve got it, should you or could you destroy it and for what good reason? So there are my first questions in the first piece earlier this morning—posed the first set—and this is the second for now. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Like colleagues, I’m just recalling that there are some questions that potentially haven’t yet been answered by the Minister. I think the significant one for me is the one that was raised by the Privacy Commissioner in relation to the commissioner being not necessarily or not the appropriate individual to grant a preservation direction and that that should be covered by judicial oversight. Just a question about whether that submission by the Privacy Commissioner was considered.

Going to what is section 79C, inserted by clause 18, that sets out the form and content of applications that the commissioner would look at. It sets out a number of requirements, including that it has to be in writing—and I’ll speak further to that in a moment—but also the content of the application itself and a certification from the individual making the application that everything is true and correct. My question is in relation to the addition of new documents or new information within that one preservation direction and whether that is contemplated as a possibility. I haven’t noted anything specific in the primary legislation regarding that.

My concern is the following section—so that’s new section 79D—which allows the commissioner to accept applications made orally. There are a number of requirements for that to happen, but it would just seem to me that the evidence in that case would not be as reliable as if the individual had to go through the rigour of complying with all of new section 79C(2)(a) to (g), which are a number of criteria. So I think the question really is: what is the rigour around allowing that oral application? Is that a doorway for what would have been additions to the initial application being heard orally as separate applications; or is it considered that if there was truly a second application, that that would also need to be done in writing as well?

Madam Chair, thank you. I just want to respond to the questions raised by Vanushi Walters, on behalf of the Minister responsible. I believe the questions were around the Privacy Commissioner and the Police Commissioner and the variances between issuing orders rather than the judiciary. I’m advised that they did consider the commissioner’s suggestion but ultimately decided it would undermine the effectiveness of the bill. As is patently obvious, the bill grants the power to issue those preservation directions to the Commissioner of Police because it is likely to be the faster option, as opposed to the independent judicial authorisation. The point of that preservation direction, I’m advised, is for the rapid protection of evidence, and any delay, obviously, in issuing a preservation direction will subsequently have an impact. Also, I’m advised that the Law Commission’s 2017 review of the Search and Surveillance Act recommended that the power to grant a preservation direction does sit with the Commissioner of Police.

In response to some of the questions raised by the good Dr Duncan Webb around preservation directions not being conducted independently, I’ve touched on this a little bit, but anyone subject to a preservation direction is entitled to seek a review of the decision by a delegate of the Commissioner of Police, and that delegate cannot be the person who issued the original direction. A review by a delegate of the Commissioner of Police will be significantly faster than the alternatives, like the right of appeal in a District Court.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Just expanding on—certainly not repeating—Vanushi Walters’ point about oral applications, which are quite unusual. I note in the provision she referred to, there’s a requirement on, I think, the commissioner to record the grounds and so on. But my question is: why wasn’t consideration given to a kind of after-the-event written application? That would be quite normal, because there are urgent situations where you’d want to run down, get your preservation order, serve it, but then go back and put on the record, in a sworn or affirmed way, the evidence upon which that was decided, because if, of course, it’s going to be challenged, you need to see it there very clearly. That would, in fact, be a lot more reliable and more authenticated than simply recording what was said in what’s, essentially, a meeting.

However, my next point is about the retention of documents. Obviously, it’s important that the documents are retained, but the obligation on the Police to retain documents—in new section 79W, inserted by clause 17, on page 25 and over to 26—is actually quite short: it’s the date of completion of any proceedings, or the date that is two years after the date on which the application was first retained, which, in terms of retention of legal records where there might be some suggestion of misbehaviour or poor conduct, seems to be quite short. So I’m very curious—and they’re electronic records, right? So my question there is: why so short?

Then, my next question relates to new section 79Y, inserted by clause 17, which is on annual reporting. Look, very good—I’m really supportive of there being annual reporting. But my question is: why is it not the case that the number of orders made—it doesn’t appear to be reported. I might have that wrong, and your officials might be able to point me to the clause there. I think the thing you want to know most, because this is an invasive order for preservation of documents, is why is there no requirement to say, “We have issued a thousand of these”—which I hope we won’t; that would seem a little extraordinary—or simply a hundred? That would certainly, in terms of public scrutiny, give some assurance.

Then, I want to ask a question about new section 88B, inserted by clause 19. We’re moving now into foreign enforcement authorities, so this is foreign countries saying, “I want to know some stuff.”, and we need an order—a preservation direction—to find it out. And 88B sets the threshold, and it says that “an investigation has commenced in relation to a serious offence”. Now, that seems to me to be a very loose term, and it may be that that has a meaning and is defined clearly somewhere in the legislation, but it doesn’t appear to be. Elsewhere in the bill, it talks about offences of imprisonment of two years or offences of imprisonment of seven years. You can argue where the line should be drawn, but it’s clear—or some of them actually name the offences. But simply to say “an investigation has commenced”—which is, of course, a low bar, right?—“in relation to a serious offence”. So what does that mean? That’s my question there. And that’s quite an important one.

But, arguably, not as important—if I’ve got time, and I might ask the indulgence for another 30 seconds if I need it—as where it says that the commissioner may refuse to grant an application on a number of grounds, including where the offence is of a political character, and other things. But it doesn’t do things like, I think, what my friend called “dual criminality”, where the offence is not in fact an offence in New Zealand. It might be an offence we’d find repugnant—homosexual crimes, for example. If someone’s investigating homosexual crimes in a foreign country, and we think that’s a terrible kind of idea, do we have the ability to say no, essentially on public interest grounds—

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The member’s time—

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB: May I have another 30 seconds, Madam Chair?

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): I call the Hon Dr Duncan Webb.

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB: Thank you. I’ll sit down when I make this final point. The other one is the death penalty. If someone’s investigating a serious offence and the punishment is death, is it the case that the commissioner can refuse to cooperate on that basis? So I did say I’d sit down in 30 seconds, and that was only 15.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I did want to just respond to a couple of those questions around new section 88A, inserted by clause 19, and the “serious offence” and whether or not it is subject to a threshold test and/or, indeed, the comments raised around dual criminality and whether or not serious offence is tested against what we deem as an offence here in New Zealand. Well, to confirm to the member: the purpose of the preservation direction is the rapid preservation of evidence. The more matters that have to be considered, obviously, the slower the process will be. Dual criminality—to respond directly to that question—will be considered before any actual evidence leaves New Zealand, alongside those broader human rights considerations. Indeed, I can confirm that the Attorney-General has vetted this bill for consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and hasn’t identified any inconsistencies. But further to that, under New Zealand’s existing mutual assistance legislation, a request for assistance can be refused due to a lack of dual criminality, but it does not have to be. That is the existing law, and this bill does not change that.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

We’re a long way from that I think, Mr Rutherford.

I just wanted to check before I take my call fully—I’ve had a quick look for the regulatory impact statement; if they’re able to direct us to whether that’s available, that would be helpful.

The point I would like to make in relation to this bill is the fact that it also amends quite important legislation, which is the Search and Surveillance Act, and also the new decision-making powers in relation to new offences in the Search and Surveillance Act. What these new powers, effectively, do is they create a limitation on the right of freedom of expression, and the bill grants the chief executive of the relevant law enforcement agency the power to make decisions about whether or not to lift that obligation. It does note that there are only limited circumstances in which the chief executive can decline to lift that obligation. I’m interested to know from the Minister what consultation was done in relation to that, because they are quite significant powers. I do note that we’ve got a section 7 report there, and that’s great, but the bill also does create new decision-making powers within the Search and Surveillance Act by giving the Commissioner of Police the ability to issue preservation directions. So if I understand that correctly, it means if a review of the decision to use a direction is sought, the bill also gives responsibility for conducting this review to the commissioner. So that sits with him as well.

So as a safeguard, the bill contains a delegation requirement to ensure that the decision is not able to be reviewed by the same person who made it. My question is—after my first one; my second question—given the nature of the preservation directions, whether or not these powers are likely to involve decisions that have a significant impact on rights and whether the Minister is satisfied that that checks and balances are satisfactory, particularly if you’re in situations where you’ve got the Commissioner of Police making that direction, and who’s going to be reviewing that. As the bill amends decision-making powers in the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act so that only a High Court judge can issue warrants under that Act—and so, effectively, this creates new decision-making powers to issue those production orders and surveillance warrants. These powers all have the potential to engage the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.

However, the point is that that decision-making power to the High Court creates a significant safeguard for the exercise of power, and it means that the ability to authorise search powers under the mutual assistance legislation is more constrained than similar search powers under the Search and Surveillance Act. So it will be interesting just to hear from the Minister whether she’s satisfied with that process in terms of the significance of the power and how those checks will be operating.

Finally, I would just like to touch on the provision creating a new decision-making power in the mutual assistance legislation by enabling the High Court to enable a judge to lift that obligation to notify affected parties before evidential material can be collected or sent offshore. So it’s, essentially, like a heads-up, and I’m assuming that that’s in place because it will be an investigation with police, and it’s a sensitive area, so there’s an ability for that to be lifted and to give that heads-up.

As the obligation has been included within the bill in response to a Supreme Court finding that notification is necessary to protect rights, dispensing of that requirement will naturally also have an impact on rights, in addition to limiting the decision of the High Court.

So, in those areas, I’m really interested to hear back from the Minister in terms of her satisfaction with where those checks and balances are, given there’s some pretty significant new powers that are being enabled through this legislation.

I’m wanting to talk to Part 3, Subpart 2, and looking at, specifically, new section 88B, the “Applications for preservation directions”. I just want to point out that this is different to the new section 79B around preservation directions that previous members have spoken to; even though it says, “preservation directions”, it is a different part of the legislation that we want to scrutinise here.

I’m wanting to look at that new section 88B and understand why it uses mandatory language, requiring a constable to apply for a preservation direction upon receiving a request, and what that actually means—that mandatory use of the preservation direction—whether any discretions are in place, and what exists in practice there. We’re wanting to make sure that this legislation is in line with our own laws and the way we do things here in New Zealand. So it’s really important that we understand what this sort of mandatory language actually means.

Speaking to, again, that new section 88B in Subpart 2—and this is on page 30—can the Minister please explain what oversight mechanisms exist to ensure that applications for preservation directions under that new section 88B are proportionate and consistent with privacy and human rights standards? Now, I know that the Minister has acknowledged that the Auditor-General has said that this bill is in keeping with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, which is wonderful—we all want to make sure that human rights are upheld. What I really want to understand is: what is in place to ensure that that proportionate and consistent application of this legislation is in line with privacy and human rights standards? We know that surveillance is a big topic, and New Zealanders really want to know how this will affect their lives and the lives of their friends and neighbours. We know that there are countries that are over-surveilled, and we don’t want to join in that wave.

Still speaking to that Subpart 2, new section 88B: can the Minister explain the intention behind new section 88B(2)(b), and whether any independent verification is required before relying on information supplied by a foreign enforcement agency? Of course, verifying evidence is a really important part of upholding truth and justice; it’s something that, here in New Zealand, we take really seriously. When a piece of information comes in, when evidence comes in, when there is an accusation, we make sure that that evidence is verified. So if the Minister could just engage with this question about whether there is any independent verification, that would be wonderful.

Before the break—before lunch, when we started committee of the whole House—I did ask the Minister questions around Part 3, Subpart 1, and the interpretation of new section 88A, which is on page 28, which haven’t been answered yet. It would be wonderful if we could get some clarity around the term “serious offence” and whether there is a threshold test for the proportionality around that. Thank you so much.

I’m going to wrap those two questions from both members from the Labour Party and the Green Party together, if I may, but just to respond to the last question first by Kahurangi Carter. She hadn’t quite made it to the House, but I did cover, in my previous response, about whether serious offences are tested against what we deem an offence in New Zealand, so I feel like I have covered that.

The questions around how the bill protects human rights—first up, the expectation of this Government is that all bilateral agreements are assessed against New Zealand’s human rights law before we enter into them, and that our Parliament itself plays an integral role in that process, particularly in its undertaking of parliamentary treaty examinations before New Zealand enters into any of these international arrangements, as it did with the 2021 Budapest Convention.

To respond to some of the questions raised by the Hon Ginny Andersen, to confirm, existing protections in the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MACMA) and the Search and Surveillance Act are extended to new powers in this particular bill, and that includes provisions in the MACMA to refuse assistance to a foreign country if their request appears to be aimed at persecuting—I was going to say prosecuting, but persecuting—someone due to the likes of race, ethnic origin, sex, sexual orientation, relation, nationality, political opinions, etc, and then also to confirm that surveillance device warrants and production orders will only be issued under MACMA if the existing requirements for these warrants under the current Search and Surveillance Act are met.

Tēnā koe. Tēnā tātou. Just re-reading one of the obvious expectations of the Budapest Convention, which is the harmonisation of laws, it’s ironic, given that there’s about as much harmony in Aotearoa New Zealand across laws, which I would compare it to Heaven and Hell. So we’ve got a long way to go.

Let me, if I can, take you to clause 12. In fact, if I may, just before that, the questions that I posed earlier today around surveillance and traffic data, I’m keen to get some kind of a response from the Minister in the chair, please, if I can.

I’m going to take you to clause 12, “Section 71 amended”. This clause sets out the information that enforcement officers must provide when requesting access to documents from someone, including for ongoing access. It always makes Māori really nervous, just saying—but you can only know that if you read about that, if you understand that, and only then can you appreciate it, but clearly that’s not the case.

Can the Minister confirm why after clause 12(2), there is no consideration of Te Tiriti obligations or the potential impact on Māori data sovereignty before applying for an order? Again, I mean, I emphasised it this morning, and probably in every conversation—it must be repeated in the House, for the House to understand what the founding documentation means in every possible way.

Then, let me take you to clause 13, “Section 75 amended (Form and content of production order)”. This clause updates what a production order must say, especially when it’s asking for documents to be handed over more than once over a period of time. There are so many comments that I want to make to that, but I’m just going to move on—just to say the constant, you know; I mean, we all know how hard it is to be asked about the same story a thousand times, but anyway. In new section 75(1)(a)(ii), it says that documents may be collected on an ongoing basis. In this case, what safeguards exist to prevent excessive or indefinite monitoring of Māori, especially where data may not relate to serious offending?

Additionally, Minister, in regard to ongoing production orders, should there be a review by an independent body or a Māori oversight entity when they relate to Māori data? I opened up, earlier this morning, by saying that it’s easy to go from a no to a yes. We’re still in the “no” lane. I’m really looking forward to hearing some affirming, really, if not informative responses to the questions. Thank you, Mr Chair.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I am looking at page 22, where we have new section 79Q inserted by clause 18, “Disclosing matters relating to preservation direction”. Of course, the Minister will know that this is the section that sets out the grounds for committing an offence as a person knowingly discloses to any other person that the direction has been made. It sets out some fairly serious penalties in subsection (3): so “(a) … imprisonment not exceeding 6 months; (b) if they are a body corporate, to a fine not exceeding $100,000.”

My first comment is a positive one, because there are a number of exceptions listed in subsection (4) which I think are really useful in terms of clarifying that for those people they can still seek legal advice and, under a number of other circumstances—for example, if they’re complying with the enforcement or with an enforcement order, they can then go ahead and disclose. I think there’s, of course, a practical consideration of whether one would feel that one could seek legal advice in those circumstances and whether they would actively do that or whether they would feel a certain amount of pressure, but, none the less, it’s good that that section of exceptions is in there.

My first question is really around the definitions of who is affected by a preservation order, which is in subsection (5) of that new section 79Q. It defines the affected person as either “(a) the person against whom the direction was made; or (b) an officer, employee, or agent of the person against whom the direction was made.” My sense is that there could be other individuals whose privacy rights are potentially impacted by a preservation direction. I wonder whether there was consideration of broadening out that provision to recognise that there may be other associates who are not necessarily agents of—there could even be family members who would fall within that affected person’s provision. To what extent does the Minister believe that the Privacy Act would protect those people’s rights, given that they’re not included within this definition section?

Then, turning the page to page 26, new section 79R inserted by clause 18, which is where written notice needs to be provided by the chief executive of the law enforcement agency and they must give, essentially, written notice, but it also sets out a number of exceptions to that, which are all framed very broadly. So I’m looking at subsection (2)(a) to (e). I wonder, in terms of limiting the powers, whether it would have made sense to just put some limitations on those powers. Right now, they’re framed as broadly as “(d) would prejudice any international relationships of the law enforcement agency”. Reading that one on its own, in the context of the Minister’s comments about New Zealand retaining its autonomy before it sends information out of the country, I would just be curious as to which takes precedence? Is it the international relationship or is it the rule of law as we know it within the country?

Then I would look also at—let me just find it—new Part 3A, new section 88A(1), inserted by clause 19. So the definition of “foreign enforcement authority” is defined extremely broadly. I don’t think it really does give us direction as to who the other entity overseas would be who is making these requests. It sort of just says that that would be akin to New Zealand Police set out in section 9 of the Policing Act, but could potentially be more broad than that. So I’m just asking if that is correct.

Lastly, Subpart 2 inserted by clause 19, new section 88B, says that “(1) A constable must apply to the Commissioner for a preservation direction against a person if a foreign enforcement authority requests the New Zealand Police for a preservation direction against the person”. So while there might be discretion in terms of the sending of that information overseas in line with our beliefs of the rule of law, the legislation is actually very directive about the constable having to apply to the commissioner for a preservation direction. The preservation direction is, potentially, prima facie rights breaching as well. So I’m wondering whether there was consideration of giving some more flexibility and perhaps using the word “may” there.

I just want to acknowledge and respond to questions raised by the member for Te Pāti Māori. In between the political points attempted to be scored, I think the questions were really around data sovereignty and the safeguarding of Māori data. It’s really important to acknowledge that in bringing this bill to the House, this is the Government of New Zealand taking responsibility and taking measures that help protect all New Zealanders from harm caused by cyber-related crimes, and that includes attacks on data.

Speaking specifically to Māori data, I don’t think cyber-attacks acknowledge creed or race or ethnicity. Cyber-attacks risk harm to Māori data sovereignty. If a cyber-attack on Māori data was carried out, this bill would in fact provide the tools necessary to detect and investigate and, of course, prosecute that crime, ultimately. It’s a real shame that that particular party can’t bring itself to be supportive of the impetus behind this, because data sovereignty concerns all New Zealanders, and so, as the Government for all New Zealanders, we are concerned that these questions raised must be balanced against the need to protect all New Zealanders from harm.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I just have a short question for the Minister at this stage. Now, I want to pick up from the previous speaker Vanushi Walters’ question. Specifically, when we’re looking at new section 79Q, which I believe is clause 18, new Subpart 2A of Part 3 inserted. And we’re looking at the exceptions. Specifically, when we’re looking at a person who is affected by a preservation direction and is able to make disclosure concerns, and they’re able to raise those kinds of concerns—it does list some of the criteria, but I want to check with the Minister in terms of the kind of consultation in this that was had with the ethnic communities, and particularly when we’re looking at it from the context of those who may not be able to speak English.

When something like this happens because of the fact that we do allow these sort of—particularly when we’re looking at foreign authorities and being directed by foreign authorities on certain elements, I did want to check that when something like this is happening, the person who is affected by a preservation order will be, at least at the minimum from the authority’s or appropriate enforcement officer’s perspective, eligible for translation services.

Just because of the fact that, you know, there’s one thing around translation, but there’s also another element. Sometimes, when we do look at direction from foreign authorities that we have that agreement with, that those who are affected here may not be able to express themselves or feel that they are able to challenge authority, because it’s not the standard norm from their country of origin.

So I want to check with the Minister that when we’re looking at this particular exception of new section 79Q(4) and that those two considerations have been made: number one, translation, and number two, the cultural and political needs of the people who are affected by a preservation order.

I had a couple of questions in relation to the preservation orders. In the actual convention itself, it says that New Zealand is required to implement these new search and surveillance tools, providing for the preservation of specific electronic evidence of criminal offending—and that’s exactly what this bill does—but the questions that I have are about how long data can be held for, and how long does this legislation require telecommunications providers to hold on to that data? We know that evidence is not deleted or modified before law enforcement agencies are able to obtain a production order from the court to have that information produced. But potentially, there could be quite a long period of time that would go on—it’s hard to estimate what that period of time would be—and given the rapid exchange of data that occurs in the current day and age, there could be situations where there is heaps of data that would be acquired under the production order.

So I think there’ll be some pretty valid questions from telecommunications providers or others impacted, where they would want to know how long they are required to be holding on to this data, and what are the implications if they’ve deleted it. So, say they did have a bunch, but it’s gone now—and, yes, there’s a request made for that data—what are the implications in situations such as that? An unlimited amount of traffic data is disclosed to law enforcement agencies so that other relevant service providers can be identified and served with preservation orders, if necessary. So it is also how do we define how wide that is going, and how does that work?

Of course, there are going to be quite clear implications in relation to the Privacy Act, which does require companies to delete personal information that is no longer required for lawful purposes. So I’m just interested to know: if companies aren’t able to hold personal information that is no longer required, but then subsequently a preservation order comes around, how do those two coincide in terms of the practicalities of how that might work? The regular deletion of data is a common business practice, particularly when a person closes an account, for example, and we know that offenders commonly close their accounts when they’re seeking to conceal or even to destroy evidence of their offending.

We know that the Privacy Act has an exception that allows companies to voluntarily refrain from deleting personal information if it’s to avoid the prejudicing of a criminal investigation. But it’s going to be really difficult for them to ascertain, when there’s large amounts of data, as to what to keep and what not to keep. So it would be interesting to know, with the passing of this legislation coming into law, whether there is any public engagement that the Government intends to undertake to talk to stakeholders who will be directly impacted by this—or will there be some guidelines for those businesses impacted on how to store their data and what to do with it, and is there any potential cost to these businesses for additional storage, to have to meet these obligations?

I do note—just saying that the Privacy Act exception allows companies to voluntarily refrain from deleting personal information to avoid that prejudice of a criminal investigation. This is not enforceable, and voluntary preservation is not adequate to meet the requirements of this convention. So I’m interested to know from the Minister how the practicalities of those preservation orders would operate—if they’re requiring entities to hold the specific information, relevant to a specific criminal investigation, to temporarily preserve that information on their systems, when an application for a production order or a request for mutual legal assistance is about to be made or has been made.

Like other search and surveillance powers, a preservation order would, I understand, override normal Privacy Act obligations. So I’m interested to know, from the Minister, if that is the case, whether a preservation order would override those Privacy Act obligations, and whether there is any guidance or communication that the Government will be entering into with all of those entities that will be impacted by the implementation of this legislation.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I remember this bill, so I will address a couple—I’ll get some advice from officials on the specific questions around preservation orders and how long data needs to be kept for and the implications for deletion, but in terms of the interaction with the Privacy Act, the Privacy Act’s quite clear. As the member mentioned in her speech, the requirement is to keep personal information only for as long as is reasonably necessary for the purposes of that useful collation. Of course, if that information is then deleted or returned back to the individual from whom it was collected and then there is a preservation order put in place, if the information no longer exists, then the information no longer exists and there’s nothing to preserve. I’ll get some further advice on those first two points.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’m just going to keep going through the provisions of the Act, and I’m interested in the cross-border stuff now. I’m looking at new section 88G, and it talks about the duration of preservation directions when it’s a foreign enforcement authority that’s requested it. Now, you will recall that the preservation order sits for 20 days domestically with no particular right of extension. But when it’s a foreign enforcement authority requesting it, it lasts for up to 150 days, which seems a very long time to have a preservation order. If you turn the page to page 34, new section 88I, you can apply for a renewal four times. So that’s roughly two years that the preservation order can sit. Now, the only reason a preservation order might properly sit is to get a production order, and it seems to me that that’s an extraordinarily long time. That actually requires some justification, because, as we’ve just heard, there’re genuine issues about the holding of personal information, and it is, essentially, a precursor to a search. So that’s the first thing: why is it up to 300 days for the preservation order to be in place?

The other thing is kind of a “please explain” and it’s about new section 88H. It’s this really peculiar section where a constable, a “responsible constable”, it’s called—you’d hope most constables are responsible—but forms a belief that serving a preservation order would prejudice an investigation or would be unlikely to result in preservation. I guess you’re thinking—and I’m really inviting the Minister to give us the case—about if you think serving the preservation order would be a tip-off to someone somehow, then they’re going to delete the information, and then you’ve got to go back. It appears you’ve then got to go back to the foreign authority and say, essentially, “Are you sure?” It’s just a very odd section. I may have that right, but it seems very odd that you’ve been requested to issue a preservation order and, essentially, the constable thinks it’s a bad idea and then has to go back and say, “Are you sure you want to do this?” Then, if they come back and say, “Yes, we’re sure.”, it appears you must do that.

I’ll try to squeeze three in at a go. The third one is around—yes, still on Part 1 and clause 36, but I think we’re at that for now, which talks about the different offence triggers. I talked earlier—and I don’t think the Minister’s responded on what’s meant by “serious offence”, earlier in the legislation. But then, we get to requests for “obtaining a thing”, which is a pretty serious thing—so it might be a computer hard drive, could be anything—and it relates to a criminal matter in a foreign country that is punishable by imprisonment of two years or more. So you’ve got a serious offence, on the one hand; elsewhere in the bill, you’ve got a seven-year trigger; you’ve also got triggers of particular offences; and now you’ve got a two-year trigger. Can we, perhaps, have an explanation of why there are these kinds of very different measures across what are fundamentally the same kind of things—which are preservation orders, production orders, and assistance in obtaining a thing—but they’re all, fundamentally, search and seizure orders. So why have we got this different range for different orders across those different things?

I think I’ll probably leave it there and let some colleagues have a go, and I’ll come back with some more.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’ll just finish off the questions raised by Ginny Andersen. In terms of preservation orders, how long does the data need to be kept for? Well, for the preservation order, for as long as the order itself lasts—or the application lasts for, once it’s successful; and then following a preservation order no longer being effective, then the other legal requirements around Privacy Act requirements, other corporate responsibilities around maintenance of data, apply. What are the implications for deletion? It is an offence to delete while a preservation order is in place.

Then, Dr Webb’s questions: the first one he raised was around why the duration of foreign preservation directions are longer than the domestic preservation directions. The officials provide that “The reality is that mutual assistance requests can take months or years. It’s an internationally recognised problem, and so, as such, the bill contains a longer period for foreign preservation directions to ensure the directions can be effective and do not expire before decisions are reached.”

Then on those last couple of questions around why the variety in the different measures for the offences: the official is going to provide some information shortly.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I want to first just remind the Minister that my questions around new section 79Q(4), inserted by clause 18, are still outstanding. There was a change in the Minister in the chair, so it’s fine if we’re still waiting to hear from that—that was: for a person who’s affected by a preservation order, has the Minister considered whether translation services would be offered, or taken into account the cultural and political context of the person who is affected by a preservation direction and where their country of origin potentially could be, especially if a foreign authority is involved in this?

I want to start by talking about new section 88A, inserted by clause 19. I really want to highlight two of my colleague Kahurangi Carter’s Amendment Papers. I would ask that the Minister would consider the two amendments, which are around two new sections being included.

The first one is the part that we’re looking at in terms of preservation direction and also investigation relating to foreign investigation or proceedings. It’s not applicable to a person who has been recognised as a refugee or is seeking protection on a political ground or has made a claim for such recognition, but it has not yet been finally determined. Now, the reason for this is that what we have seen in the legislation and through the select committee process is that there isn’t a sufficient safeguard from our end for these people who potentially would be prosecuted in their own country for something that we would consider as our inherent right under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. How would they be protected under this legislation? We have seen news being reported where people have been able to express their freedom of speech here in Aotearoa New Zealand by right; however, they have been subjected to investigation with the cooperation of New Zealand authorities while they are here on New Zealand ground, so it’s really important that there are protections for those who are either refugees or seeking protection.

Now, the second Amendment Paper that I will ask the Minister to consider is also applicable to new section 88A(5), inserted by clause 19, which is that this part does not apply to a person who engages in conduct or activities that are part of a lawful protest or demonstration or that engages in acts primarily motivated by economic interests, including industrial action or economic boycott.

Now, again, the reason for that is just to protect or provide some safeguards around some of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act sections, particularly around freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and freedom of association, so I would ask, as a starting point, for the Minister to consider those two Amendment Papers. They are crucial in terms of how the Greens would feel about this bill.

Now, the next thing I would like to address is around new section 88B, inserted by clause 19. I just want to check that when we’re looking at foreign enforcement authority—and forgive me; apologies if this has been covered already—what the scope of that is and how the commissioner on our end would potentially look into it when being requested by a foreign agency.

Now, moving further along in terms of section 88, the final question that I have is around new section 88V, which is when section 88U ceases to apply to affected person, but what we see in subsection (2) of this is if the commissioner gives written notice, before the date on which the direction expires or is revoked, to the person against which the direction is made. Now, my question is: under subsection 4(c), when we’re looking at something like “would prejudice the supply of information to the law enforcement agency”, what would be the threshold for that particular prejudice?

And we’re looking at new section 88V(5)(a), “keep under review the appropriateness of a notice given under subsection (2)”. What would be an example of that appropriateness? So there are a number of questions there for the Minister, and I look forward to the Minister’s engagement.

Oh, thank you, Mr Chair. We’ll just backtrack a little bit to Dr Webb’s question around the penalty thresholds. I’m advised that, in terms of the difference between two years and seven years, two years is the existing threshold in the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MACMA) and the bill replicates that in its amendment to search powers, and seven years is the existing threshold in MACMA also for highly intrusive surveillance—so trespass surveillance and interception domestically—and the bill replicates that from MACMA as well.

Just to address Dr Xu-Nan’s questions around member Carter’s proposed amendments: we don’t support the amendments. We think there are sufficient protections in place already. So, for example, section 27 of MACMA applies to any mutual assistance requests—that’s around freedom of expression. That sets out that mutual assistance cannot be granted for political offences. It also allows requests to be declined on the basis that the activity would not be an offence in New Zealand. That addresses some of the protections in place and it’s why we won’t be supporting those amendments.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I have some questions, beginning from page 31—so this is new section 88D, inserted by clause 19, under new Subpart 3. It’s in relation to the commissioner’s ability to make preservation directions, but I think it’s drafted in quite an unusual way, because it’s drafted with a presumption against being rights protective, and I think it’s quite unnecessary. Section 88D(1) says, “On an application for a preservation direction against a person, the Commissioner must make a preservation direction against the person.”, and then it proceeds to outline circumstances where the commissioner may refuse to grant the application in new subsection (2). I would just question the drafting style in terms of the presumption that a commissioner must make a preservation direction as a subsection (1) statement and then moving to circumstances where the commissioner may refuse to. So I’m just wanting the Minister to respond to that.

Also, new section 88D(2)(b) states that “the foreign enforcement authority’s request for a preservation direction”—this is where the commissioner might refuse. It’s where a “foreign enforcement authority’s request … relates to the prosecution or punishment of a person for an offence that is, or is by reason of the circumstances in which it is alleged to have been committed or was committed, an offence of a political character”. I can’t find the definition of political character, but just curious about the Minister in the chair’s comments that there was this sort of human rights lens, if you like, that was going to be applied. If it was, then I would question why we hadn’t used more broad language than simply using the words “political character”. However, it would be useful for the Minister, if the Minister would, to explain the scope of what is included within that.

On the same section—so 88D—there is also grounds to refuse the application if the commissioner believes “that the request has been made with a view to prosecuting or punishing a person for an offence of a political character”. So my question on this side, the lean is slightly different—it’s: who constitutes a person? The reason I ask that question is in reference to my second reading speech, where I quoted some of the work that’s been done internationally by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International and others as well who reported on seeking information for the purpose of committing human rights abuses against family members of the individual concerned in a home country. So is that part of the considerations that would be taken into account under 88D, or is it purely in relation to the individual against whom a preservation direction is being considered?

I then go to new section 88E, “Form and content”. This is the section where, if the documents described in the direction are no longer in the possession or control of the person, then they have to provide information to the best of their knowledge as to the location of the documents to a constable identified in the direction. Of course, it may be, in some circumstances, that the documents were never in the possession of this individual, and I just wonder whether it would be prudent to make it clear that, obviously, they can just say they do not know.

Also, the section states that they have to disclose this information “by the time, if any, specified in the direction”. My question here relates to their ability to get legal advice, which we’ve spoken about earlier, but certainly, if they have a direction which specifies a rather short period of time, they may not be able to seek that legal advice. So I’m wondering whether the Minister considers that it would be reasonable to insert that into 88E(1)(c). Thank you.

I’ll do my best to run through answers to a variety of questions. There was a question around why is it that the constable “must” make a direction and not “may”, and I am advised that although both foreign and domestic preservation directions are required by the Budapest Convention, the convention is more prescriptive about the circumstances in which a foreign preservation direction must be available. In section 88D, the new section provides that a request from a foreign country must be granted so long as mutual assistance request is required. So I’m not sure if that exactly answers the entire question, but, essentially, it is a requirement of the convention itself.

I’ll go to the question raised by Dr Xu-Nan around translation services, whether they would be provided. There is a general obligation in our criminal justice and in our justice system to make sure that anyone faced with legal rights or obligations are aware of those legal rights and obligations, so the expectation would be that translation services are enabled so that individuals can be made fully aware of their rights and what they are obliged to do—and of course, any court of law would enforce that.

Vanushi Walters asked a range of questions, one of which was: what is the scope of political character; how is it defined? The definition mirrors the existing mutual assistance law, which is section 2(6), of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act—the MACMA—which sets out that an offence of political character does not include conduct which we have already agreed with another country will not be treated as such. Also, it’s hard to prescribe what political character would look like. We don’t prescribe this in the law because it would be generally considered on a case by case basis, and once we start prescribing it in legislation, we limit what that could or could not look like. In terms of who is a person—I understand this was in relation to new section 88D. If you look in new section 88D(1), it’s kind of a circular answer, but, essentially, a person is the person against which a preservation direction is made. So it is that person in the context of that section.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’ve got a few questions. I’m actually getting through them, which is good. I guess my first question relates to replacement section 49A, inserted by clause 37, which starts on page 55. It talks about when matters are disposed of. Just clarifying in replacement section 49A(2)(b) and (c), first of all, that the matters disposed of when “(b) any proceeding in New Zealand that is commenced by a notifiable person and relates to the search warrant,”—so this is around those search warrants—“production order, or the proposed direction has been finally disposed of”. Now, I’m assuming that’s judicial reviews and appeal processes. Then the second leg of it is that “(c) the foreign country has given undertakings about any matter that the Attorney-General considers appropriate.” Now, I understand the Minister’s just identified that you can’t be too prescriptive in legislation about that; I accept that. But I think just an indication, for the record, from the Minister what those undertakings might be—I understand that it may well be, for example, the return of the property, it might be fair trial rights that the person will be given full ability to have counsel, or it might be that the death penalty won’t be imposed. So I’d be interested in that.

Then, the second question is about new section 49B, inserted by clause 37. This is quite interesting because it appears this is dispensing with the obligation to give notice. So “(1) The Attorney-General may authorise the New Zealand Police to apply for a dispensation from the Attorney-General’s obligation to give notice under section 49A of the … intention to direct that a thing seized … be sent out of [New Zealand]”. So if you’re Kim Dotcom and your hard drives are going to be sent overseas, you might think that that’s a very bad thing, and you might think that, in fact, it will be highly prejudicial to you or a third party, and you should be able to seek to stop it being moved. Now, that makes perfect sense to me, but this is the ability to send evidence overseas without the ability for it to be challenged; is that right? I mean, honesty, is that how it works? That does seem truly extraordinary that you’ve got, essentially, a secret and unchallengeable process. In terms of there being an exercise of State power, the stuff’s been seized, and then a further decision—a decision to send that evidence to a foreign power. Now, any exercise of State power should be challengeable, but you can’t challenge something you don’t know about.

So my question is: what’s going on here? Am I right about that, and, I guess, if I am, what the heck is the protection for the person whose evidence is being sent overseas from misuse of that evidence? If, as Vanushi Walters identified, the hard drive has family photos and addresses on it and all those kinds of things and that could be used for nefarious purposes—that, at the moment, the Government doesn’t accept, but you want to make that argument—you should be able to go to court and make that argument, and for it not to be sent overseas before that argument can be made. I want to leave my current contribution there because I think that’s an important point I’d like to hear addressed.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I just have a couple of questions that I wanted to ask the Minister that were sort of in relation to the economic effects of this legislation coming into force. So we know that cyber-crime, such as fraud, causes a huge economic loss for businesses, as well as for the Government and individuals. This is a big step forward for us as a country, for New Zealand—that we’re actually putting into place some important changes that will give our law enforcement agencies the ability to work alongside of other countries to be able to do this.

But I would be interested to know if any analysis has been undertaken as to what the potential gains would be for our economy by having this in place. We know that Search New Zealand has recorded approximately 4,700 security incidents—the last recorded was in 2019—and that had an impact of about $16.7 million in financial losses. The most common incidents were things like phishing for credential harvesting—which is stealing passwords—scams, frauds, and also things like unauthorised access. These are the things that concern Kiwis the most; these are things that people are constantly vigilant about in terms of protecting their passwords and protecting their financial security.

So, given the fact that we’re passing legislation that will make these changes, it would be good to understand what type of analysis has been done on the impact of preventing such crimes happening in the future. A half-yearly report from 2020 shows that cyber-security incidents have increased by 42 percent, compared to the same period in 2019, and that’s quite dated information that I found available. So is there any more recent information available to know this increase, because it would be really useful for us to start measuring the impact of this legislation on the increasing incidence of financial crime that is happening by cyber-crime?

The Reserve Bank themselves released a report back in February 2020, and that specifically focused on cyber-incidents in the financial sector. The rough estimate there was the average cost of cyber-incidents are around $104 million per year for the banking industry alone, and around $38 million per annum for the insurance industry. So there are quite significant implications. If those are the benchmarks we have now, it would be really good to know whether there are any processes in place, which Government department will be looking at this to see what the impact of this legislation will be, and what the benefits will be of being part of an international network of countries that are, effectively, working together, cooperating together, to be able to prevent cyber-crime.

We know that the National Cyber Security Centre recorded around 352 cyber-security incidents in the year it was last looked at, in 2020. And so, in addition to economic loss, cyber-security incidents have negative impacts for public confidence as well—public confidence in computer systems, for example, in relation to conducting business over the internet, and in providing personal information as we’re wanting to move into a digital age where digital identities provide a lot of our information online. People have real concerns, because they’ve had negative instances in the past, which have compromised not only their personal security but also their financial security.

So there’s been a lot of discussions—a global campaign in terms of deep “denial of service” attacks affecting a wide range of New Zealand organisations. New Zealand’s not alone in terms of its impact, and even our Parliament website has been impacted as well in the past. So in terms of making sure that we are, I guess, benchmarking where we are at now, what those financial impacts are, not only to businesses but also to individuals, and also to public trust and confidence in using the internet and providing personal information, I would be really interested to hear from the Minister in terms of what framework is in place to look at how useful signing up to something like this has been for preparing us for the future and encouraging, I guess, a society that has trust and confidence with using the internet safely.

I’ll just touch on Dr Webb’s question—or examples, actually; pretty good examples of the kind of undertakings that the Attorney-General might seek from foreign countries. He also raised the question of what happens when you don’t know that you’re subject to a preservation order. The bill introduces provisions to require notifications precisely so that people have the opportunity to challenge them in court—but, of course, there are some times where notifications could seriously prejudice ongoing investigations. In that case, the Attorney-General can seek a waiver of notification, but that waiver will require approval of a High Court judge. So there are some protections in place from our judicial system. There are other examples of parts of the law where, from time to time, a court will make a decision in absentia of the individual that is being affected.

Questions from Ginny Andersen: I’ll look at some further advice around what kind of analysis has been done and how do we know how useful this has been. But of course, the thrust of this bill, as well as enabling participation in the Budapest Convention, is, essentially, we are changing the law to enable foreign requests for preservation and production orders in New Zealand. So the changes in this bill won’t actually do much to, I guess, affect the level of crime in New Zealand, but of course it enables for that mutual assistance to be undertaken in other jurisdictions, and we can get some further information on that.

I’m going to take a call from Lawrence Xu-Nan. I want them fairly homed in now. We’ve covered a wide ground, but the Minister has just said that he’s going to get some further advice—so, really, just anything new. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I just have a short question around clause 19, new section 88Z—also, this is in combination with new sections 88O and 88P. Now, one of the things that we do see is, from new section 88Z onwards, that would provide a level of immunities relating to functions of commissioner and reviewers in the case of issuing preservation directions. I wanted to check with the Minister, with new sections 88O and 88P, for a person who may not be satisfied with the decision that was made by the commissioner but the commissioner has immunities, are new sections 88O and 88P—the ability for someone who is affected by preservation direction the right to review—the only avenue that is available for them in those kinds of cases?

I want to check with another thing the Minister said before—and I’m very grateful to the Minister for responding to my question, which is that translation services will be available for people within the criminal justice system, but would that extend to when the review is conducted as well under new section 88P? Would translation services be available for people then?

So those are my questions, which are: commissioner and reviewer have immunities, so is the only tool for the person affected by the preservation order stated in new sections 88O and 88P, which is ability to review, which means the ability to have, in accordance with new section 88P(4)(a)(iii), the revocation of a preservation direction, and whether translation services will be available for this, because it’s technically not within the criminal justice system?

I can see that Duncan Webb’s just got one more burning question while he’s waiting for the Minister to get his advice.

Thank you for that indulgence. First of all, I just want to say I think the Minister in the chair, James Meager, answered a question I didn’t ask, because I actually asked about new section 49B, inserted by clause 37, which is not about preservation orders at all; it’s about sending seized things out of New Zealand. I get that you don’t have to notify preservation orders all the time, and they’re a kind of a low-level thing, because they don’t even give evidence to a third party. I was interested in not telling someone that you’re sending something that you’ve seized from them overseas. That seems very Star Chamber, to not let them know and not give them an opportunity to challenge what might be very sensitive information going overseas. So I’d invite the Minister or his officials to address that.

The other thing is this, and it’s about—you’re surveilling someone, or the Government or police are surveilling someone, for a foreign nation, and then, under new section 50U, it says something quite unusual. We love the Parliamentary Counsel Office, but they seem to love double negatives, because they say in 50U(2), of this evidential material that’s being gathered, “The evidential material is not inadmissible in criminal proceedings in New Zealand merely because the surveillance device warrant … issued in relation to an offence against the law of a foreign country.” I hate double negatives. I’m not sure if they’re saying the evidential material is admissible even though it was about an offence in a foreign country, but I do think that is a really important point to clarify what that means. If it’s saying it is admissible, that’s one thing; if it’s saying it might be admissible, that’s quite another. At the moment, it appears to say it might be admissible rather than it is admissible, because “not inadmissible” doesn’t actually mean admissible; it means something less. If I was challenging it, it would suggest that I can say, “Well, it shouldn’t be admissible for the following reasons: the warrant wasn’t appropriately given”—or whatever it might be.

But I do think that’s an important point, because there is a danger here. This is a search, and you’ve searched someone for one purpose and you’re getting evidence for another purpose. Now, that does happen, and certainly, under domestic law, you might enter a property on a domestic violence matter and find a stash of drugs, and that would be admissible. Now, if that’s the rule for searches and surveillance for foreign powers, I think we need to say that clearly and not by use of some strange double negative. So those two things: first of all, things taken out of New Zealand being secretly taken out, and, secondly, is this evidence admissible or not admissible?

Thank you, Madam Chair. Dr Webb answered his own question. Essentially, you could read it as being it might be, but you can’t phrase it like that. So there are a whole range of reasons why evidence might be inadmissible. What this subsection is saying is that—OK, here we go; without reading the clause out itself—you know: you can’t reduce the double negative, otherwise you’re right, it would say the evidence is admissible, which is not the case. What it is saying is that evidence is not necessarily inadmissible just because the device warrant was issued in relation to an offence against the law of the foreign country. It might be inadmissible for a whole range of reasons as per the Evidence Act, but there is really no other way of phrasing it, and I think Dr Webb answered his own question.

To his earlier question about notice or what protections are in place for when things are actually being removed from the country, that’s what I was referring to rather than the preservation orders themselves.

Then to Ginny Andersen’s questions around what impact this will have on crime in New Zealand. Well, we know that cyber-crime has a cost of about $1.6 billion, and so time will tell what impact this will have on that, but, hopefully, over time, we will see that cost impact being reduced. There’s nothing in the legislation, and very rarely is there in legislation requirements for reports or research or evaluation on things like this, but I would expect that any sensible Government that implements these kinds of rules would do so with some sort of cost-benefit analysis or useful analysis along the way so we make sure that things that we are implementing actually work in our country.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

The question is that the Minister’s amendments to Part 1 set out on Amendment Paper 333 be agreed to.

Amendments agreed to.

The question is that Kahurangi Carter’s tabled amendment to clause 19 inserting new section 88AA to provide that new Part 3A does not apply to persons who engage in conduct or activities that are part of a lawful protest or demonstration be agreed to.

Quiet during voting, please! The question is that Kahurangi Carter’s tabled amendment to clause 19 inserting new section 88AA to provide that new Part 3A does not apply to a person who has been recognised as a refugee or is seeking protection be agreed to.

Kahurangi Carter’s tabled amendment inserting new clause 23A is out of order as being outside of the scope of the bill.