Crown Minerals Amendment Bill

Members, we come now to the Minister’s amendments to Part 2. This is the debate on—[Interruption] Please listen carefully so you can focus your contributions—amendments to clauses 25, new clause 26A to 26C, 27, 28, and new clause 29A, as set out on Amendment Paper 343. The question is the Minister’s amendments to Part 2, set out on Amendment Paper 343, be agreed to.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I want to start with a contribution on Part 2 on the new clause 26A, “Section 41 amended (Transfer of interest in permit)”, on Amendment Paper 343. Subclause (1) says, “After section 41(6), insert:” new section 41(6A). This is going to be quite a short question, but I’ve heard previous speakers mentioning that the Minister for Resources has a particular way with words, and so I just wanted to get a clarification from the Minister.

In this, we are looking at a conditional sentence, so we are looking at an “if” and “then” sentence. The “if the Ministers require an outgoing guarantee under section 41I,”—that’s the protasis of a conditional sentence. However, the apodosis of a conditional sentence is missing here. What I’m not seeing is where the “then” part of this sentence is. At this stage, if we’re saying that if the Ministers require an outgoing guarantee under section 41I, an outgoing guarantee that the Ministers consider to be appropriate—i.e., let’s say an outgoing guarantee—must have been provided in accordance with that requirement. Does that mean that if the Ministers require an outgoing guarantee, then an outgoing guarantee must have been provided already, before the Ministers required it? What we’re also seeing here is that it is using “require” as a simple present, but it is immediately followed by a conditional, which is present perfect, but the present perfect seems to precede the simple present. It does create an anachronistic sentence in this case.

I’m assuming that the Minister means that if an outgoing guarantee is required, that should be provided—am I getting that correct? But that’s not how that is currently worded, so I just wanted to get clarification from the Minister on where the apodosis of this conditional sentence starts.

OK, for ease of comprehension, I direct the member to the actual words that he’s quoted. I’m on page 2, at clause 25(1A): “ ‘section 41A(7)’ with ‘sections 41AG(8) or 41A(6)’.”

If the member races ahead, he will see, on page 678, the wording—why does that wording exist? It exists to cope with transfers or revocations. Why is it included? It deals with a temporal issue, the period of time or grace where either a revocation or a transfer takes place, or, indeed, what money is involved. So I strongly urge the Green Party member, rather than randomly quoting scattered parts of the alphabet, to actually go to the page, and the answers are laid out there in comprehensible English.

Thank you, Mr Chair. So jumping a little bit ahead, then, and speaking in more generic terms, what I’m interested in is the fundamental change here. The bill tells us—the explanatory note—that whereas the previous amendment let you trail back, or have discretion to trail back, to previous permit holders, the Minister’s amendment is changing their ability to go back in time to previous holders of the permit. The hook to do that—the temporal nature—is that any current permit holder has to get the permission of the Ministers—being the Minister and the Minister of Finance—before they are able to on-sell that permit or licence. I’d like the Minister to confirm that that is correct.

Then all of the amendment bill also appears to be about decommissioning, so the decommissioning liabilities. It doesn’t appear to be—and again, this is a question for the Minister—about consent requirements and upholding the operational parameters that will have been set for these permit holders. My question is: does this Amendment Paper have anything to do with the conditions that permit holders have to meet that aren’t decommissioning? Because my understanding is that, normally, you have bonds that address both the “Are you following through with all your consenting requirements?”, and then a separate bond, or some similar financial instrument, for the payment of the decommissioning. So those are my questions there.

I’ve been looking at page 10 of the amendment, and that is the new section 41F that talks about this outgoing guarantee and, I think, the mechanism whereby a permit holder might be on-selling. That goes back to the change to clause 27, so that’s at page 6 of the amendment, which is when the “Minister may consent to change of control of permit operator”, and then there’s a new section inserted after section 41AE(1)(a), a new paragraph (aa): “if the Ministers require an outgoing guarantee under section 41I, an outgoing guarantee that the Minister considers to be appropriate has been provided”. So this language looks very open—and maybe that’s the Minister’s earlier point, to trust the Minister. But if the Minister could comment on the width of that—and I acknowledge that there are further sections that are at pages 11 and 12 of the amendment that do give some parameters, but they don’t seem to be vast, and it does seem to be that there’s a lot of discretion in these new provisions.

Obviously, for those of you who have the actual Act on your computer, and if we look at the specific wording on page 2, clause 25, in section 39 as amended—what does section 39 do? In the magnum opus Act, section 39 pertains to the revocation or the transfer of entitlements to the Minister. It contemplates a situation where a holder is about to suffer the loss of an entitlement. We have had a situation where these things have, from time to time, been triggered because of non-payment. We have had a period of 90 days in section 39 within the parent Act. What this does is prevent any gaming, any protraction of honouring the fiscal obligation to the Crown. It gets rid of the 90-day period, it retains a 40-day period, and it tightens up the conduct and makes it very clear what the obligations are. It also provides for such a revocation to be reported to the Registrar-General of Land, and also, where the land qualifies as ture whenua land, a notice is also sent to the Māori Land Court. This is how this part of section 39 has been improved.

I don’t mean any disrespect. I am being somewhat laborious because I take on board what the Opposition members have said. It’s very finicky and they haven’t had the full amount of time. But I have to say: we are amending the 2021 legislation and we’re also improving the contribution that this Minister brought forward. We have the expert of the 2021 legislation sitting there, so I shouldn’t need to remind the architect of her work.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Of course, the whole, sole purpose of the 2021 legislation that the Minister has talked about in his contribution was to protect the New Zealand taxpayer. As I said in an earlier contribution, it wasn’t from a theoretical risk; it was a real risk that previous National Governments had left New Zealand exposed to, and that our Government fixed when we were in Government. It cost a lot to clean up.

What we did—there was liability if a permit holder failed to decommission or meet the cost of the decommissioning either directly or through a financial security, and the Act placed a liability on all former permit holders. This was about protecting New Zealand taxpayers from having to pick up the tab from global multinationals that decided to just exit New Zealand and not pay for the cost of their own decommissioning and clean up after themselves. As a Government, we could not tolerate that.

What we had then is the Minister we had in the chair in September 2024 brought an amendment bill that watered down those protections and altered the trailing liability protections in the decommissioning regime with his amendment legislation. We then had an Amendment Paper that proposed to extend training liability to a wider range of people, beyond existing and previous permit holders, by adding various persons having a controlled interest in a body corporate to the list of persons.

The Amendment Paper that we are debating today wipes both the bill the Minister brought and the Amendment Paper that was put up and replaces it with a new Amendment Paper. So we are in a somewhat absurd situation of the amendment to the amendment to the amendment and trying to trace our way back through that.

It is in this Part 2, it is in these clauses 25, 26A, 26C, 27, 28, and 29A, that we really have the guts of this legislation, of what this amendment is trying to achieve. That is about bowing down to the oil and gas industry and further watering down the liability that they will need to shoulder for doing business in New Zealand.

Now, New Zealand is not an outlier for saying to oil and gas companies that if you operate in our jurisdiction, we’re going to protect our taxpayers, we’re going to protect the people who live in our country, from cleaning up after you. But what we have is a Government who thinks that it’s a good idea to actually not put the interest of New Zealanders first but put the interests of the oil and gas companies at the forefront.

In the Annex to the Regulatory Impact Statement: Amendments to the Crown Minerals Act 1991 relating to petroleum exploration and mining that has been tabled with this Amendment Paper that is in there, it states that the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) had several meetings with key stakeholders from December 2024 to March 2025 to hear their concerns, and has shared, in confidence, an outline option of option 4. So the paper, which I’ll come back to when we’re talking about the policy that sits behind these provisions that we’re debating in Part 2 of the Amendment Paper—but this regulatory impact statement tells us that the Minister had his officials sharing with some people what the options would be. What I’d like to know from the Minister is who were the options shared with? Who was privy to those confidential discussions?

We know from the regulatory impact statement that has been provided that iwi certainly weren’t. In fact, despite there being Treaty settlement obligations to consult with iwi, they just were ignored when it came to this. But I’d like to know, for example: were lawyers for climate change consulted? They certainly submitted on the previous bill and are experts in many of these areas.

The Minister needs to tell the committee—if this was a select committee process, we’d know who was being consulted with. It would be open, it would be transparent, there’d be a website, people could see the submissions, they could tune in, they could watch the submissions, and people would know what was being discussed. But what we see in this regulatory impact statement is that MBIE has engaged with these key stakeholders—who were the key stakeholders?—who had voiced a strong opposition to the bill. They didn’t manage to get the changes at select committee. They kept on going, and the Minister sent his officials off to consult with them. So who were these people?

They raised two primary issues: “Extending liability to all persons with controlling interest ‘pierces the corporate veil’ ”, is what the regulatory impact statement tells us, “in a way which they consider undermines the foundation of the Companies Act 1993 and common business practices”. What it doesn’t talk about is whether the Minister instructed his officials to go and talk to groups who had submitted, who had New Zealanders’ interests at their heart—the taxpayers of New Zealand, and the protections that have been put in place for those people. Instead, the Minister was more interested that his officials go off and talk to those who had concerns about “piercing the corporate veil”.

It also went on to say that the concern of the “Imposition of liability on all exiting and existing persons a with controlling interest is a statutory overreach”. Well, on this side of the House, we call that standing up for New Zealanders and protecting New Zealanders from the liability of oil and gas companies just leaving the country and leaving New Zealanders with the tab to clean up after them. But this is the priority of this Minister; this is the priority of this Government. They’re showing very clearly where they are.

We would like to know, and this committee deserves to know, who were these key stakeholders that were shared with the different options that were there—that they shared in confidence an outline of option 4, and who else was privy to those confidential sharing of the various options that were there?

I do want to add some force to my colleague the Hon Dr Megan Woods’ speech just now, because I’ve picked up the supplementary analysis report dated 16 June 2025, so the most recent analysis, and, well, there’s some pretty telling lines in it, and they’re rather scary. I’m looking at page 5 of this, right down the bottom: key stakeholders, consultation from January 2025. Flicking over on to page 6 of that, it says, “The sector has been clear that their preference is for no trailing liability in the [Crown Minerals Act].” Well, no kidding. Like, of course they don’t want the liability. Of course they’d like to just, you know, make a mess and walk right away. Then it goes on, “They consider it adds significant costs”—well, those are costs that will be borne by the New Zealand taxpayer if the members of this industry don’t bear the cost themselves—“and [it] reduces the likelihood new entrants will come into the New Zealand market.” But oil and gas is a dying industry anyway. You know, it’s on the way out. I don’t think the new entrants are coming here, and they weren’t coming here a few years ago. They’re certainly not coming now.

Then here’s another telling line: “Despite this position, those consulted preferred Ministerial discretion to the current Act and approach in the Bill.” In other words, these shadowy participants in the oil and gas industry—a dying industry—who we don’t know who they are, much prefer to be able to lobby a Minister and get that Minister to apply ministerial discretion instead of to go through some pretty clearly set out steps in legislation.

This kind of stinks. It actually stinks. You know, does something pass the sniff test? Well, this does not. I think one of the only ways for it to get to pass the sniff test will be if the Minister can tell us exactly who he was consulting with. We don’t know—just that they were participants in the oil and gas industry. And we do know that ordinary New Zealanders have not been consulted, iwi have not been consulted. So this is really worrying.

The next line says, “Targeted consultation was limited to those directly impacted by the proposed change,”. Well, I propose that the New Zealand taxpayers, who have to pick up the tab when these guys just skate off into the never-never and ignore their liabilities—we are directly affected by this too. Why was there not much wider consultation?

So to sum this up: it stinks, and the only way to clear this stink up is for us to know who was consulted with.

Thank you, Mr Chair. You know, gas doesn’t have an aroma; they have to add one to it so that it doesn’t kill us all.

Simon Court: Indigenous gas is the best gas.

STEVE ABEL: And “indigenous gas”—really? Really? That’s such a cooked-up concept.

Simon Court: What do you call it?

STEVE ABEL: Fossil gas is what you’re talking about, and it is a dying industry.

I want to speak to clause 26B, replacing section 41AA. I was so excited to ask this question, and I tried to make it my first question today, but we’re there now—we’re there now. I want to, specifically—there’s other parts to this clause that deserve some prosecution, but I’m going to jump down to new section 41AA, on page 3 of Amendment Paper 343. That is new section 41AA(1): “outgoing person means any of the following: (a) a person who ceases to have a controlling interest in a body corporate that is undergoing a change of control:”—that’s logical; that makes sense—“(b) a person who ceases to have all or part of an interest in a body corporate that is undergoing a change of control that results in another person acquiring a controlling interest in that body corporate:”.

Look, acknowledging the exceeding complexity of these corporate structures, which, let’s be honest, are designed very often to avoid the liability of those corporate interests—so getting this stuff right is important, because these companies, as my colleague just prior articulated, would like to not have any trailing liability; they would like to avoid liability for the mess that they leave behind, of course, just as they would like to avoid liability for climate change, which is a consequence of their whole industry. Paragraph (b) says “a person who ceases to have all or part of an interest”. Paragraph (c) also says “a person who transfers all or part of their participating interest in a permit or licence for petroleum, or transfers their licence for petroleum, to another person”.

So my question to the Minister is: does the definition of an “outgoing person” include those who might have ceased only part of an interest in a body corporate, or part of their participating interest in a permit or licence for petroleum? Can the Minister explain why a person who has only ceased part of an interest in a permit or licence is still captured as an outgoing person, even if they were to retain a significant commercial stake? Thank you.

Going back to my question—and I think the Minister answered part of it; I’m not entirely sure. He kept telling me to go back to the primary piece of legislation, which—obviously, there are a lot of bits of paper to look at here. But my question was around: those outgoing guarantees clauses just seem to be about decommissioning, and I was asking about the ongoing permits and the conditions associated with those. I think he referred to “clause 39”—but I think he might have meant “section 39”, and I’d like that confirmed—of the primary legislation, which is about when the Minister can revoke a permit. At page 8, there is reference to section 39, and there’s a change here on whether or not—or there’s a reference to section 39. So it says, “The Minister may revoke the permit in accordance with the procedure set out in section 39”—which is of the principal Act—“if (a) subsection (1) is contravened; or (b) the Minister is not satisfied that, following the change of control, the permit holder has the financial capability to meet its obligations … or (c) in the case of a change of control of a permit participant that is a permit operator, the Minister is not satisfied that, following the change of control, the permit holder has the technical capacity to meet its obligations under the permit.”

So my question, then, in relation to the Minister’s answer, is: what is the relationship between section 39 and being able to revoke a permit, and the next provisions that are related to decommissioning? What is the relationship between the permits and the operation and the decommissioning? If he could explain that, that would be—

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): Can you just say that again? Sorry.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING: Yeah. The Minister, when he was answering my last series of questions, I think he referred to section 39 of the primary legislation. I think he said it was “clause 39”, though, so I was looking around for it, and I think he was referring to section 39, because that is about revoking permits. My question is: what is the link between the financial instruments and the controls that the Minister will have over both the ongoing conditions around the permit and, separately, the decommissioning of the infrastructure? How do those two relate and what is this amendment to the amendment bill doing to that relationship?

For members of the committee, I’m on page 9. We’re still on Part 2. Please don’t imagine that I’m not treating this seriously. I’m on new section 41E. The Labour member is absolutely correct: the authority now rests with the Minister. This section, if I understand her question correctly, identifies the nature of the guarantee, and when we go over the page and then we go to new section 41F, when someone does move on, what exactly can the Minister impose upon them as a trailing responsibility liability. That, in contrast to the old regime—and I’m not going to refer, because there’s no profit in it, to the contributions earlier about who we were talking to, because I can’t see what section in Part 2 those remarks actually relate to. So if I come back to new section 41F, “Ministers must consider outgoing guarantee: permits and licences for petroleum”, obviously, the Minister and the Minister of Finance, or the Minister of Finance, may delegate in the unlikely event they’re conflicted or someone’s more appropriate to undertake that issue. I presume that’s where you get the term “others”, which we’ve already spoken to.

So a question was raised: what part of the infrastructure is going to be actually covered where decommissioning obligations can be enforced against someone who is no longer directly involved in running that business? I direct your attention to new section 41F(3)(b)(i): “the petroleum infrastructure and wells were, at the time of the relevant transaction, in place or used for the purposes of carrying out”. A good point was made earlier: is this going to be as thorough or as exacting as what the former Minister for Resources talked to? I hope not. That was a gross overreaction. It was something, in my view, as the surprisingly sensible remark from the Māori Party—I’ll have to bottle that sort of lightning in a bottle. So that gives you an indication as to what needs to be considered, what is the criteria, which I think I understand that to be the essence of the question from the last contributor, the Hon Rachel Brooking.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I actually just have two very short questions. I think, in terms of what the Minister is talking about in reference to Part 2—I think it’s page 10, new clause 29A, which is inserting new section 41F(1). It perfectly captures the previous question around the fact that the Minister of Finance, as far as we believe in terms of our understanding, is singular. Therefore, the Minister has accurately pointed out that new section 41F is in relation to clause 10. But I think the Minister hasn’t answered the question of who those “others” are. Is there another Minister beyond the Minister of Finance? That “other” doesn’t include the responsible Minister, because the responsible Minister is stated earlier in that clause. So that’s the first question. I think the Minister has very accurately pointed out my colleagues—both the Hon Dr Megan Woods and the Hon Dr Deborah Russell—have been asking consistently on who that other is.

The second question is in terms of what the Minister mentioned before around the policy statement. I think it is important for the Minister to elucidate the committee in terms of some of these consultation processes and who the Minister is consulting with, because, again, we are seeing this for the first time and we have no idea. As part of this committee, we would like to trust in the Minister, but it is also the role and the job of this Parliament and as the legislature to ask these sorts of questions of the executive. So we do understand where the Minister’s coming from as a member of the executive. The Minister has also shown a level of appreciation for the way that us as the legislature are also scrutinising this particular amendment. But the reason I mentioned the part about who the Minister is consulting with—and I’m looking at page 3 of the supplementary analysis paper report—is the fact that when we are looking at something like this, there is the opportunity and the potential risk of judicial review. I think that is something that we haven’t heard from the Minister in terms of what would then be the additional risks of the judicial review as a way of maybe the opaque nature of the way the consultation has been conducted.

OK, I’m about to put a stone on my tongue, but I want to respond in an instructive way to what I understand the member to be referring to. Can we please go to new section 41F(1)(a) and (b), in new clause 29A. Can we contemplate a situation where a party has done a transaction and party B now is the owner of the assets, including what’s in subsection (2). What obligation can the Minister put upon the seller? To understand that, let us go to a definition—and there’s some pretty sharp lawyers on the other side of the Chamber, although things have diminished since my friend David Parker went away, but anyway. At subsection (1)(a), we see “outgoing person”. It gives us a definition of who is qualified to be pursued as the person—and I use that in a figurative sense as well—who formerly owned the asset.

Now, does the Minister, acting jointly with the finance Minister, have the ability to secure, as they go out, a guarantee? Yes, they do. What does it apply to? It applies to the infrastructure outlined in the statute. Is it possible that if you look at paragraphs (a) and (b), that obligation can also be imposed upon a related body corporate to overcome any chicanery? I remind everyone that part of the motivation is that a loophole was discovered. You could effect a transfer of script, of equity, and, in an earlier version of this legislation, including the legislation of 2021, escape liability. Upon myself learning about that in discussions with the officials, it did not seem correct or moral that the Crown should be left with that liability and the people with some very shrewd manoeuvrings of script would escape liability. We have solved that problem.

So about to finish. If you look over the page—

Hon Rachel Brooking: Which page?

Hon SHANE JONES: —I’m now on page 11—we have sought high-quality advice as to what and who is a related body corporate, but what problem do we think we’re solving here? We’re solving the problem of corporate chicanery where shifty transfers of equity did not attract an ongoing liability. That has now been solved; the way in which it’s been solved and what assets it relates to is on page 11. The entities, to the solicitors in the Chamber, are identified in subsection (4). Now, I know it’s technical, but—and I repeat it again—it’s designed to ensure that we capture people who don’t want to be held responsible, therefore they transferred script. That will no longer be legal. They are now caught in terms of a trailing liability.

Thank you, Mr Chairman. I appreciate the Minister’s sensible contribution there, to talk through the details of this. I do have some questions around the trailing liability because, of course, the 2021 amendment that the Minister is speaking to did put in place a trailing liability for the real reason that these are technical and complex transactions; that the situation that we had, where New Zealand taxpayers were left to pick up the tab, was a result of a parent company selling to a subsidiary and the parent company exiting, and a subsidiary of that parent company, essentially, holding that licence.

Now, one of the concerns that we had at the time, when we were making the changes to protect New Zealanders, and what has been unpicked by this Government, is that if you don’t have trailing liability, you just have enough transactions to go through the line to ensure that the liability doesn’t sit with the permit holder, that there can be liability loopholes. From the Minister’s explanation—I appreciated it—I’m not convinced that New Zealand taxpayers are being protected.

What we see is that this is a Government that has watered down those protections that we’d put in place for New Zealand taxpayers to make sure that if someone does come into New Zealand waters and that they do drill for oil and gas, they are the ones that are responsible for their costs and their fair share of decommissioning. That is not unreasonable, for a Government to put some cast-iron guarantees around that to protect New Zealanders in that way. That is what is being undone, and further undone, in this bill.

As we’ve identified, the sanctions that we’re debating here in Part 2 really are the guts of this trailing liability. What we’ve seen in this regulatory impact statement—the annex to the regulatory impact statement that has been tabled—is the work that has gone on after that committee of the whole House stage and the options that were put to the Minister. This is the updated policy work that has resulted in this Amendment Paper, and it goes through the problem definition but also the proposed policy changes. I think, in this Part 2, it is the time for this House to question him, and for the Minister to have a serious discussion with the committee of the whole House, around the policy process he went through, what the rationale was, and what the merits or otherwise of various options were.

There were five options that officials put to the Minister, as outlined in this annex. One was to maintain the status quo, which was the original amendment bill that he had brought to the House; option two was to partially extend liability by statute in the context of change of control only; option three: extend liability by statute introduced to the bill through an Amendment Paper prior to committee of the whole House—there was an amendment then; option four: extending liability by ministerial discretion at the point of approving transfer changes of control; or option five: broad ministerial discretion to apply liability at any point.

Now, there is a big jump in here. It is one thing to want to tidy up a piece of legislation—it’s not unheard of for a Minister to bring an Amendment Paper—but it is quite unique the way we’re doing this one in terms of how we’ve pulled the bill back from its third reading back into committee of the whole House to do this amendment. This isn’t just tidying up the will and the policy of the Government that was being done through statute; what this has done is actually give the Minister ministerial discretion, and that is a change from the bill that was brought to the House. That is a leap in policy.

The Minister needs to tell us why it was that he was convinced by officials that the only way to solve this problem was for Ministers to make the decision, not as it was—and I may not agree with the Minister’s policies, and I don’t in this area; in fact, I vehemently disagree with them. But why is it that he made the decision to remove it from being a statutory set of provisions that were outlined in a bill to then giving himself and the Minister of Finance discretion to decide this? We’ll come to those discretionary powers and the perimeters of those discretionary powers in other parts of the bill, because I think that the paper goes through some of the critical aspects of each of those options, but we need to understand how the Minister’s thinking thought into this.

What we also know from this regulatory impact statement is that his officials went away and had had confidential meetings with key stakeholders and shared an outline of option four. Now, this wasn’t shared with everybody who’d submitted on the previous bill; this was key stakeholders. It is critical that, in the course of this debate in the committee of the whole House, the committee understands who it was that was privy to these inside conversations that were shared confidentially with some people and not all.

I have here a list of everybody who submitted on this bill. It is long and it is varied. Unless we get a list of who it was that officials went away and did consult with, I think it would only be fitting for the committee to ask, submitter by submitter, reading out from their submissions any contributions they’ve made on the trailing liability and decommissioning regime, what their thoughts were, and ask if the Minister considered this in coming to the policy decisions that are contained in Part 2 of the bill.

That is the alternative. The Minister can give the House a list of who it was that was consulted on in this confidential manner, or we can go through, one by one, everybody who submitted on this bill and ask the question whether their contribution to the trailing liability and decommissioning question was considered. That would obviously be a very lengthy process, but one that we’re willing to do. When you have a look, I think it numbered in the hundreds, the numbers of submitters on this bill, and most were concerned with that issue of decommissioning and the trailing liability question.

This is not just a trifling question; this is fundamental to how law is made—that we had an industry group that were not happy with what had happened through a select committee process, or the committee of the whole House, who then got special access to officials. Not only did they have meetings—what the regulatory impact statement is. They also had the option to provide written feedback in the days following those meetings. So not only face time—and not everyone got that. They’ve had fundamental input into this Amendment Paper that we’ve got before us, and it is the job of this House to understand exactly who those people are.

I direct the Hon Megan Woods to page 11, clause 29A inserting new section 41G, carrying on with new section 41H and new section 41I. I’ll overlook the highly conspiratorial and clumsy attempt to talk about subterfuge, because the matua is a nationalist. It has fallen to me to restore this part of our economy, and, of course, how I have provided that leadership is reflective of my strong pro-industry approach, something I’ve never hidden—pro-industry to the point that why would you not engage with the stakeholders, the risk-takers, the providers of what precious little gas we have, ruined by the cancel culture? So, yes, of course you should expect nothing less than Shane Jones to be talking to a source of expertise: the people who have prepared themselves to remain involved in this essential industry.

Now, what has come out of that? Here, new section 41G outlines that the Minister, statutorily, has the ability to impose burdens, enforceable claims, liabilities. What sorts of things do they talk about? They talk about, i.e., the proximity that a particular party, person, company may have actually had at the point where the guarantee is either called upon or required. Not only that—what’s the nature of their financial strength beyond that? Will they be expected to offer an ongoing guarantee?

Now, to move beyond these common-room conspiratorial charges, most not befitting of the committee in its tone and its culture and its heritage at all—this is a demonstration that these tawdry attacks show—and I’m sad to say this, Mr Chair—that the contributions are now descending into cant, well away from facts. The facts are laid out here; they provide guardrails. Yes, the decision will lie with the Minister. That is a policy decision that has been taken to ensure that we have a segment of our economy flourishing. In fact, I’m looking forward to some investors coming down off the coast of the South Island to reinvigorate what people were forced to leave because of an abrupt, awful decision—and I’m only sad the person who made that decision is still a fugitive from electoral justice.

Thank you, Mr Chairman. Now, the Minister has just told us in terms of one of the policy options that he went through—that are outlined in the regulatory impact statement—that it was to ensure a flourishing sector. What he needs to tell us is why that was. What was the evidence? What was the evidential base for this policy decision that the Minister taking that decision was making? He may want that sector to flourish. If that was the outcome he was looking for, why was he convinced that for Ministers making that decision—what was the evidential base that that would ensure that there was a flourishing sector?

I’m very interested that the Minister thinks that him making the decision will ensure more investment on the east coast of the South Island, given the hundreds of millions of dollars, if not billions of dollars, that have been invested in the exploration in those basins and exited because there were not commercial finds. I guess this is what the Minister’s $200 million subsidy fund is for. But why was it that the Minister was convinced that it was ministerial decision-making that would ensure a flourishing sector? That is a causal leap that is not covered in the regulatory impact statement. It jumps from there being statutory fixes along the lines of what the current Government’s policies wanted to be, and that is their prerogative, but then there is a causal link to the Minister having that discretion and him assuming that what will eventuate is a more flourishing sector. I have not seen anything in the documents that have been tabled that showed that there was any policy advice put to the Minister, but I would be very interested to hear what policy advice the Minister received on that.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

Thank you, Mr Chair. The question that my colleague Dr Megan Woods just asked is actually a very significant one, because the whole premise of this legislative approach that we’ve seen from the Minister for Resources—to respond to his previous comments—is the presumption that there is some vast reserve of gas or oil to be found. The specific narrative that the Minister has raised and therefore entitled us to respond to—in his previous comment, he referred to himself as a nationalist. In fact, it is offshore oil companies that come and look for oil and gas here.

He then said that it was cancel culture that caused the demise of that industry. Is the Minister aware that before the 2018 ban was put in place, Statoil had come and explored and then relinquished their Northland permits? Is he aware that Petrobras had been awarded a permit in the Raukūmara Basin? They came, they searched, they got rightly harried by some excellent activists out at sea with Te Whānau-ā-Apanui, and they found nothing and they relinquished their permits. Is he aware that Exxon Mobil searched in the Great South Basin and relinquished their permits? Is he aware that Shell Oil sold up their entire domestic infrastructure, and a month before the ban came into place, they sold what remnants they had to OMV? Is he aware that Anadarko did the same thing? They came, they searched for oil, they prospected, they found nothing, and they left.

It’s a very important point, because these companies were coming and looking and leaving before the ban came—

Just to help the member, please relate it to Part 2. Yes, the Minister has said some things and members are able to respond to that, and there is some leeway, but then we also need to bring this to Part 2, so if that could be done, I’d appreciate it.

STEVE ABEL: Thank you, Mr Chair. Yes, I will bring it to Part 2. I’ll finish up. I’ll wrap up with that point. Essentially, those companies cancelled themselves. They were not cancelled. This is why this legislation is all the more important, because the premise that underpins it must be an understanding that, in fact, there is a significant risk for us if we don’t have proper decommissioning regulations in place that don’t rely solely on the enthusiasm of the Minister of the day to try and desperately get that dying industry back.

I will go to replacement sections 41AA and 41AB in clause 26B. This might seem a minor question in the context of the overarching issue, but I note that it refers to tier 1 permits for minerals other than petroleum. Why is the change of control provision extended to tier 1 permit operators for minerals other than petroleum when most of the surrounding obligations relate to petroleum? What’s the rationale for this inclusion? That’s the first question.

The second one is replacement section 41AB(3)(a). The bill notes that permit participants must notify the Minister for a change of control. Replacement section 41AB(3) notes that a copy of any agreement or document that specifies change of control must be given to the Minister. Is the requirement to provide a copy of any agreement or documents specifying the change of control sufficiently precise? That’s my question.

What if the change in controlling ownership occurs through a series, for example, of indirect offshore share transactions with no single agreement? How is the Minister or the regulator to keep track of where such a change in control has occurred? What are the obligations on the regulated entity, those corporates, to make sure that they will provide a copy of any agreement or document specifying the change of control? That’s the gist of that question. Thank you very much.

Given that I’ve been so lucid in my stewardship of this bill, I direct the member’s attention to page 8—this is what I think the member is talking about—replacement clause 28, amending replacement section 41A. The member also raised what level of obligation is on a permit holder to furnish the necessary information to the Crown via the Minister. Well, I direct the member’s attention to 41A(1). The word “must” is not discretionary. The word “must” is, essentially, an enforceable duty. I need to say no more than that.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Just briefly, noting that the Minister for Resources and the Hon Dr Megan Woods have been talking about some policy decisions and also the role of the Minister, I appreciate that there is a “must” for that notification of a change of control, but then there are a lot of “mays” about what the Minister can do when deciding whether an outgoing guarantee is needed or not. But going back to the conversation I’ve been having with the Minister about that outgoing guarantee and what it applies to, and if it just applies to decommissioning—and I’ve referenced section 39 of the principal Act before, but I still can’t see the hook.

He’s talked about the trading liability. The Minister has talked about how he’s fixing a loophole here. So, as I said in my initial contribution on this part, if this amendment is changing things so that we can’t go back in time to old permit holders and the “must” that the Minister just referred to is when a permit holder wants to sell the operation to somebody else, then they must tell the Minister, and the Minister may set this outgoing guarantee, and that outgoing guarantee is always referring to decommissioning. There is some link to the information that’s required to relate to the permit, but my question is: is there anything in here that links to the Minister, or is it already in the existing legislation and so it doesn’t need to be changed?

Can the Minister require a financial instrument for the ongoing conditions of a permit—so not the decommissioning, but the ongoing permissions? That is the question.

The time has come for me to leave the Chair. The House will resume at 7.30.

Sitting suspended from 5.58 p.m. to 7.30 p.m.

Good evening, members. When we broke for the dinner break, we were on the Crown Minerals Amendment Bill, and we were on Part 2, the debate on amendments to clause 25, new clauses 26A to 26C, clause 27, clause 28, and clause 29A, set out on Amendment Paper 343.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to go to clause 27, in Part 2 of the legislation. There’s some quite specific legislation. I think we’ve still got a lot of the bigger policy questions that particularly pertain to clause 26, which is where the meat of the changes that we’re seeing come through. But if we go to clause 27, which will replace clause 27 in the amendment bill, one of the things is “Section 41AE amended (When Minister may consent to change of control of permit operator)”. One of the things in clause 27(3) is “In section 41AE(1)(a), replace “change in control” with “change of control”.’ Now, I’m not trifling; this is an amendment that officials and the Minister have decided was important enough to put in an Amendment Paper. Can the Minister explain to us what the material difference between the “change in control” and “change of control” is? Also, what was the policy difference and what was the policy driver behind deciding to use the committee’s time in terms of an amendment to move from “change in control” to “change in control”?

Furthermore, just sticking with clause 27—and, as I say, these are very specific questions—clause 27(5): “In section 41AE(1)(b), replace ‘health and safety requirements of the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015’ with ‘health and safety and environmental requirements of all specified Acts’.” Why was that change made? What was the thinking behind it? Why was the original amendment to the Crown Minerals Act limited to only the Health and Safety at Work Act? Is it a legacy from the parent legislation that was drawn through? Why the change? What drove that? What was the policy thinking behind it, and what other Acts is the Minister, in bringing this amendment to the committee, thinking will be covered off by clause 27(5) when it says the “ ‘health and safety and environmental requirements of all specified Acts’ ”? It’s been broadened out—why is it, and what in particular does it pertain to?

What we are wanting to understand throughout all of this is—there are some very big changes, like going from having statutory decisions being made and a criteria where officials do that, to the Minister seizing discretionary powers, but then there’s some very specific things, like “change in control” to “change of control”, and we’re trying to understand what’s driving both of these changes that we’re seeing in this amendment bill. On clause 27, we’ll be really looking for some insight from the Minister around that.

I just want to remind the committee that before the dinner break, one of the issues we were discussing was who exactly was consulted with by the Minister. There is very targeted consultation, limited to those directly impacted by the proposed change. We’ve asked the Minister for who he actually consulted with in terms of these changes, and the Minister doesn’t seem able to tell us, so we are going to go on a bit of a forensic process here.

I’ve gone to some of the submissions that have actually come up that were made. If the Minister won’t tell us who commissioned him, we’re going to have to ask for it. I’m looking right now at the submission by Energy Resources Aotearoa, “Powering a better New Zealand together”. I just want to go to paragraph 36 of their submission—“Updating the decommissioning provisions”—and they absolutely argue for much less liabilities for energy resource firms. They say, “Our concern is that the changes”—that the Minister had put in, that were there—“do not sufficiently or more fairly reallocate risk between the Crown and permit holders. The unequal burden on permit holders will continue to dampen the desire to invest in new exploration, appraisal, and development,” and so on. So they were actually quite strong advocates for much less liability. In fact, if we go down to paragraph 41, they say “trailing liability is redundant with appropriate financial security arrangements”.

This is a group of people who are very, very, very clearly in support of much reduced liability for energy companies, when it came to decommissioning wells. Given that the Minister won’t tell us who he consulted with, we’re going to have to go, one by one, through all these submissions and ask a very straightforward question.

If the Minister won’t tell us, we’re going to ask, one by one: in terms of forming this very last-minute Amendment Paper, did the Minister or his officials consult with Energy Resources Aotearoa Ltd? Straightforward question, Minister.

Obviously, we’re no longer talking about Part 2, which is disappointing because I was hoping to raise the quality of contribution by ensuring it’s of some technical relevance. However, needs must.

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): We do have some questions from Part 2, Minister.

Hon SHANE JONES: I’ve been asked a question of clause 27. The improvement and the change reflects, from the drafting personnel, a superior form of wording. There is nothing else beyond that.

I got asked a question also—and I’m on page 6, at new clause 27(4)(aa). It is evident that when the Minister exercises his or her discretion, then it’s what the Minister considers to be appropriate, but, once again, the appropriateness is measured against the schema, the criteria outlined in the various sections, which I took us through prior to the dinner.

There was one other question which I do want to respond to. A reference was made to bonds—so, this pertains to the decommissioning obligations under the Crown Minerals Act. Any other obligations that may have been incurred by an operator will inevitably fall under environmental legislation, and that is where they may also attract enforceable obligations. But our attention tonight is dedicated to the Minister enjoying the statutory authority, his or her judgment, based on criteria which is clearly and lucidly articulated in this pithy but lucid amendment bill.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a very small question for the Minister. I really appreciate both the Hon Dr Megan Woods and the Hon Dr Deborah Russell for their forensic analysis of the submitters, but I’ve done a little bit of forensic analysis in a different way and I’ve gone through the comparable sections of the Crown Minerals Act. The section I’m referring to is clause 28, which is replacing section 41A(1). This is a section that the Minister was referring to just before the dinner break.

My question is in the existing Crown Minerals Act, in section 41A(b)—and it is quite small, and, hopefully, it’s a quick confirmation from the Minister. There is a definition that is given to a “guarantor”, but that definition, in the updated version of section 41A in Amendment Paper 343, has been removed. In the Crown Minerals Act, the definition for “guarantor” is right after the body corporate “has provided a guarantee for the permit participant’s obligations under the permit (a guarantor) has undergone a change of control.” But that bracket with the definition of “guarantor” has been replaced by “other than a body corporate that has provided an outgoing guarantee for those obligations”.

I just want to check with the Minister, in lieu of having no definition, that the definition of a “guarantor” is still the same—that is, a body corporate “that has provided a guarantee for the permit participant’s obligations under the permit”, “other than a body corporate that has provided an outgoing guarantee for those obligations”. So is that still the definition of “guarantor”? And I’m guessing that a body corporate that is for providing an outgoing guarantee is not a guarantor. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Going from that very specific clause 27, going back to the question that I had posed before the dinner break around who are the stakeholders that the Minister had officials meet with, it’s talked about that there were confidential forward drafts of the proposed amendment given to them. We’ve asked the Minister to give a list. He hasn’t been forthcoming with that, so we’re left with no option but to go through each and every submitter and ask the Minister if this was an area that did feed into the final Amendment Paper that we have here. I think everyone in this committee will note there’s around 500 submissions.

I want to turn us now to the Lawyers for Climate Action submission that was a very fulsome submission to the original bill. I want to know whether or not they are one of the key stakeholders that were consulted with, as set out in the annex to the regulatory impact statement that’s been tabled along with this Amendment Paper, which pertains to the meat of this legislation, which is in this clause 24 kind of area. Paragraph 27 of their very fulsome submission to the select committee—the Lawyers for Climate Action, who are a group of legal professionals in this country who have a great deal of expertise in this area—noted that “perpetual liability on the last remaining permit holder for decommissioning costs is not an adequate substitute for requiring payment of upfront security for such costs. New Zealand would be left with no recourse if a company ceased to exist, had insufficient assets to pay, or if its assets were in jurisdictions where rights of recovery were not recognised. These are all highly likely scenarios [and] there are already plenty of contaminated sites in Aotearoa New Zealand caused by private companies that are no longer around to clean them up.”

This is a group of legal professionals that have a lot to offer. I would expect that this would have been part of the group of stakeholders, given their expertise, that the Minister would have had his officials meet with and who would have been privy to confidential briefings—not only a meeting and a confidential briefing, but given the opportunity to give further advice in writing, as is outlined in the annex to the regulatory impact statement. So I’d like to know from the Minister whether or not the Lawyers for Climate Action were one of the key stakeholders that were consulted with.

Thank you, Madam Chair. A small question here, and it is on page 4 of Amendment Paper 343. It is related to new clause 26B, which is inserting new section 41AA, which is an interpretation section, and at subsection (2), there is a definition of “controlling interest”. It is a controlling interest if they have control of “50% or more of the voting rights in the body corporate” in terms of “person A” in subsection (2)(a) and (b). The question is whether or not the Minister has looked at any advice to say that this is enough of a controlling interest, and how this definition relates to the people who are in control. “Change of control” is a phrase that is used throughout the amendment.

Again, I’m interested in how this links through to the legislation and whether it’s a change or not, and that goes to the wider policy point that the Minister was making before the break about the whole idea of his amendment being to stop loopholes and to stop companies—I can’t remember the word that he used, but to stop companies sliding out of some obligation. So does he think that that definition of “controlling interest” is strong enough in the new section 41AA?

Tēnā koe, Madam Chair. Perhaps, because I can with the Minister, in this exchange if I may, Madam Chair, I’ll speak in te reo Māori, because I think it will capture exactly the spirit in which this question is asked towards his Amendment Paper.

E mōhio ana au, e te Minita, i te wā i whakaritehia tēnei pepa hei whakaarotanga mā ngā iwi me ngā hapū huri noa, i haere, i whātoro atu koe, otirā ō āpiha, ki ngā tini hapū, ki ngā tini iwi. Engari ki roto i tēnei o ngā pepa tāpiri, Amendment Paper and an amendment, me te panonitanga i tērā o ngā pepa tūturu nei, ko te pātai nui ki a koe mehemea kua whātoro atu ō āpiha, tō tari anō hoki ki wēnei o ngā iwi i noho ki roto i te nohoanga tuatahi o tēnei pire?

Nō reira he maha ngā iwi ki roto i tērā o ngā rōpū, ki tērā o ngā rārangi ingoa. Ko ētahi, anā, ko ngā mana nui me ngā tapu nui o Te Arawa waka, me te mōhio anō hoki he tini ngā hapū me ngā iwi kei roto, ā, ko te hiahia kia whakarongo atu mehemea ki roto i wō pepa e whakarerekē nei i te pire tuatahi, mehemea kua noho ngātahi ō āpiha me tō tari ki te taha o Te Arawa waka whānui.

Engari e mōhio ana koe ki ngā rārangi ingoa ki runga i ngā rōpū e pā kau atu ana ki tēnei pire, mai i Te Rarawa, ka huri tua atu ki roto i a tāua i Te Taitokerau, anā ka heke iho rā ki roto i te Waipounamu me te tini o ngā rawa o te whenua kei raro iho i ngā mana whakahaere a te iwi, kei raro anō hoki i ngā mana kua whakaritehia e tēnei Whare e pā ana ki ngā take Tiriti kua tatūngia ki roto i ngā tau kua pahure ake.

Kāre au i te whākī i te roanga ake o ngā rārangi ingoa ki roto i ngā rōpū kua kōrerohia nei e au, heoi anō ko tāku e hiahia ana kia whakarongo atu mehemea kua hoki atu anō ngā āpiha me tō tari ki wēnei o ngā tāngata e whai pānga ana ki te kaupapa.

[I am aware, Minister, that at the time this paper was prepared for consideration by the iwi and hapū all around, you went, you visited, indeed your officials, the many hapū and manu iwi. However, within this Amendment Paper and amendment, and the amendments to this particular original paper, the main question to you is whether your officials, your office has visited these particular iwi that engaged in the first sitting of this bill?

And so there are many iwi within that particular group, on that list of names. Some of them, indeed, are significant and sacred authorities of the Arawa confederation, and I’m aware that there are many hapū and iwi within it, and I would like to hear whether within your papers that amend the first bill, whether your officials and your office has engaged with the wider Arawa confederation.

However, you know the list of names on the parties that are affected by this bill, from Te Rarawa, and turning beyond that to you and me in Northland, and then coming down into the South Island and the various assets of the land that are under the governance authority of the iwi, and also under the authority that was arranged by this House with respect to the Treaty issues that were resolved over the years that have passed.

I will not recount the entire list of names within the parties that I have spoken about, however I would like to hear whether the officials and your office have returned to these particular people that have interest in the topic.]

Tēnā koe e te Tiamana. Me huri e tātou ō tātou whakaaro ki te wā i whārikitia mā tā tingia ai te pire. Kātahi ka kitea he kōhaohao. Ka haria mai he menemata nō te marama o Nōema. Ka whakatakotongia tēnā menemata, kātahi ahau ka mōhio ko te takoto o ngā kupu kāhore e tino ū ana ki tāku i hiahia ai.

Kīhai ahau i whakapapā atu ki te tangata whenua, heoi nā noa te wā i whakapapā atu ahau ki te tangata whenua, te wā i waihangatia ai te pire ake.

Ko tātou e kōrero nei mō ngā menemata, ngā pepa nonohi nei, pēnei me te matikara o te pepa ake. Te hunga nāku i whakapā atu, ko te hunga e whai pakihi ana, e whai pānga ūmanga ana ki roto i tēnei rāngai o te ao ohanga. Kīhai ahau i whakapā atu ki ngā kākāriki, ki ngā tāngata e pahupahu ana mō te huarere. Koinā noa te hunga i whakapā ai ahau ko te hunga e whakangao ana o rātou pūtea ki roto i tēnei rāngai o te ao ohanga.

[My acknowledgments, Madam Chair. We should think back to when the bill was first presented. As it was then that gaps were noticed. In November, an amendment was brought. When the amendment was tabled, I saw that the wording did not align with what I wanted.

I didn’t initially contact the locally affiliated tribal groups, but when the bill itself was put together, that was a time that I did contact the affiliated tribes.

We are discussing the amendments here, these little documents, like the fingerprint of the paper itself. The people that I did contact were the people who have companies, those who have a business involved in this sector of the economic world. I didn’t make contact with the greenies, with people who yabber on about the weather. The only people that I contacted were those who invest their own money in this sector of the economic world.]

The consultation with tangata whenua ended when the bill was established, and they were very keen on a decommissioning regime that avoided the pitfalls of the Tamarind imbroglio. When the November amendment, which sought to redress a failing, which was the ability of people to trade shares and, potentially, evade liability—there was no consultation with the tangata whenua. Then when that amendment—I’m talking November now—was studied, and it became evident to me that the words in that particular amendment did not capture the outcomes that, from a policy perspective, we determined were necessary to reinvigorate the sector. I spoke to no climate group. I spoke to no tangata whenua group. I engaged with the people who are investing and who will be the risk takers to salvage and rescue this sector, and I’m extraordinarily proud of myself that I’ve done that.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

I’m going to take a question from the Hon Dr Megan Woods, but I do think now that the Minister has answered the question around consultation—not as comprehensively as members may have wished in terms of not naming each of the groups, but that is the Minister’s answer—I’m looking for broader questions now.

Thank you, Madam Chair. The Minister has said he has not met with any environmental groups and he has not met with any iwi. So I will not ask him any questions about whether or not he has met with those, because that has been answered.

What I am interested in is: where’s the expert legal advice, given that a number of submitters came at it from a legal perspective in terms of offering their submissions on the original bill? I’ve already asked the Minister about the Lawyers for Climate Action; I won’t be asking about them again. What I am going to ask the Minister about is the Environmental Law Initiative submission, which is an incredibly comprehensive submission on the original bill that went in there. It goes through the changes that were made in 2021 around how the changes were made so we could avoid the situation where taxpayers were lumbered with the liability again and then goes through the changes that the Government was proposing in that original piece of legislation that was brought.

They made a very good point, and I would have thought something that the Minister would want his officials to have followed up on. He would have wanted this point to be taken into policy advice in bringing this Amendment Paper to the House, because they made the point in paragraph 30 of their submission: “While the Government has argued that it is possible to ‘make adjustments to the petroleum decommissioning regime in a way that does not materially increase risk to the Crown’, it is ELI’s”—that’s the Environmental Law Initiative’s—“view that the changes proposed will undermine the intent of the whole regime by making it much easier for companies to avoid liability for decommissioning by transferring permits to smaller, less well-resourced companies towards the end of the productive life of the field, as is known to occur in New Zealand and overseas. These smaller companies are less likely to have the resources to pay for decommissioning, increasing the risk that the Crown will end up having to foot the bill.”

Now, for any Minister whose job it is to put New Zealand’s interests first, this is exactly the kind of advice that should be followed up. To only go to the largely multinational companies that want to come into New Zealand, who have made it clear they don’t want to pay their own way, and seek their opinion is a dereliction of the duty of that Minister to stand up for New Zealanders, to make sure that he is protecting the interests of the taxpayers of New Zealand. Putting corporate interests before the interests of the New Zealand taxpayer is not something that New Zealanders expect of their Ministers.

So it is imperative, when we know that there have been comprehensive legal submissions into a select committee process, and the Minister then decides to have a very unusual process for amending that legislation in terms of bringing the bill back out, when it was due for third reading, and recommitting it to committee stages, that this is the only chance we get to examine this. There were some expert opinions that were put into that select committee process—that was bypassed, and we’re going through this quite extraordinary process to do it. The Minister needs to tell us: is this the kind of meeting that he instructed his officials to have? We’re told that there were confidential briefings on different options that were under consideration. I think the New Zealand public and this House, in deciding whether to pass this legislation, needs to know whether warnings like this factored into the paper that the Minister has brought to the House.

I’ll make a few additional remarks. I did not meet in the engagement pertaining to this document, which establishes the Minister, within guardrails, to enjoy a certain level of discretion to deal with the ebb and flow of decommissioning. There was no contact with the Environmental Law Initiative group. They are a shadowy organisation funded from Americans, and I will never ever talk to them.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

The question is that the Minister’s amendments to Part 2 set out on Amendment Paper 343 be agreed to.

The amendments are agreed to; therefore, Part 2 as amended stands part.

Amendments to Part 3 set out on Amendment Paper 343