Resource Management (Duration of Consents) Amendment Bill

Members, we now come to clause 5. Clause 5 is the debate on the new section 123C, “Duration of certain current and continued consents”. The question is that clause 5 stand part.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I do have a number of questions on this clause, it being the big one in the bill, but I will start at the start, although other members may have questions that jump around a bit.

What I want to start with is at new section 123C(1)(b). It says there “a resource consent that expired before the commencement date, but only if,—(i) immediately before the commencement date, the holder was eligible to operate under the consent in reliance on section 124; and (ii) the holder’s application for a new consent had not been determined by the consent authority before the commencement date.” The questions about this clause are the retrospective element that comes here and how that then relates to the two years that the Minister has been talking about.

Resource consents are binary—you either have a resource consent or you don’t have a resource consent. If a resource consent has expired, that means you don’t have a resource consent, yet what this provision seems to be doing is saying despite the fact that your resource consent has expired and you don’t have a resource consent before the commencement date, we’re still going to give you an extension.

I’m wondering if the Minister responsible for RMA Reform can comment on that and how it will work, and the justification for it as well, noting that there are two requirements—there is an “if”, and then there is a (i) and a (ii) with an “and” in between. The first one is that they were eligible to operate under the consent in reliance on section 124, and that consent hadn’t been determined. If they were, immediately before the commencement date, eligible to operate under the consent in reliance on section 124, do they not then still have a consent, and why is it referred to as expired in paragraph (b)? If the Minister could take us through that, that would be very useful, and also if he can comment on whether or not there is supposed to be any retrospective element of this legislation.

I mean, I think people could have a debate about if it’s retrospective or not—and even if it is, that’s not the worst thing in the world. Retrospective legislation that confers a benefit is not constitutionally objectionable—

Ingrid Leary: Great! Retirement villages, fairer repayments—brilliant.

Hon CHRIS BISHOP: Yeah, well, I know your views on that.

Ingrid Leary: Thank you. I’m glad you do.

Hon CHRIS BISHOP: Strong lobbying from Waiheke Island. Reasonable people can have a disagreement around whether or not—I mean, constitutional objection is when there is a penalty imposed retrospectively, which is obviously abhorrent.

But I think it’s relatively straightforward, which is consents that have expired before the commencement date are extended if, before the commencement date, “the holder was eligible to operate under the consent in reliance on section 124;”, which, as the member knows, is when consent has expired but the re-consent has not yet been processed, so they can carry on: “the holder’s application for a new consent had not been determined by the consent authority before the commencement date.” The bill reinstates and extends expired consents where an application for a replacement consent has been made but not yet determined. This doesn’t impose any obligations on consent holders; it simply gives certainty to them during transition to the new resource management system.

Is it retrospective? I mean, it’s forward-looking in the sense that it extends things by a couple of years and helps people out who are in the midst of a re-consenting battle or, at least, the process. Some people would say that’s retrospective. I probably wouldn’t. But, actually, it’s kind of neither here nor there, to be honest.

I think it is relevant, because this legislation—this short bill—will give people entitlements that they don’t otherwise have, and if they come to rely on it, they are going to want to know what it means. The Hansard on this, with no select committee process, is very important.

“Has the consent expired?” is one question. If they’re relying on section 124—sorry, I spilt my water over before; it’s in front of me over there—is it not expired? Section 124 is the “Exercise of resource consent while applying for [a] new consent”. It “applies when—(a) a resource consent is due to expire;”—it’s not that it’s expired; it’s that it’s due to expire—“and (b) the holder of the consent applies for a new consent for the same activity; and (c) the application is made to the appropriate consent authority; and”—this is very important to my question about whether or not it is expired—(d) is “the application is made at least 6 months before the expiry of the existing consent.”

The point is that if you are in the section 124 process, your consent hasn’t expired. Like, it can’t have expired, because once you’re in, you’re in. Yet the words in this bill are: “a resource consent that expired before the commencement date,”. Then it’s like, well, immediately before, you are in that section 124 process, but it’s only eligible to operate—but presumably you’re not eligible unless you’ve done all those requirements that I just read out and “the holder’s application for a new consent [has] not been determined”.

In fact, is all that is meant here that if you are already in that 124 process—so you’ve done it six months before and you’ve met those other criteria—then your consent won’t expire whilst you’re in that process, or is it supposed to mean something else on top of what happens in section 124, and it is supposed to be retrospective to something that has expired, in that binary sense, or is it that it’s already in the 124 process? I think your words are going to be important here, Minister.

Well, respectfully, the courts ignore Hansard; whether or not they should is a slightly different matter. The courts focus on what the words say in the statute, and to be honest, given the nonsense talked in this place, that’s probably for the better. Having said that, I’m prepared to mount a strong defence of words mattering or words being important, as Mr Peters would say. I do intend to lay down a marker for how the Government intends things to work in the new system in the first reading, but that’s all for another day. Whether or not the courts pay any attention is a different issue.

To actually address the point, I think it’s important to read new subsection (1)(a) and (b) together, right? So (1)(a) says, “a resource consent that is current on the commencement date [of this bill] but due to expire before the close [is extended]”, right, and (b) says that if you’ve got a resource consent that’s expired before the commencement date, that’s also extended, but only if you’re in the section 124 process.

Hon Rachel Brooking: So it hasn’t really expired?

Hon CHRIS BISHOP: Well, you’ve got to read it in the light of the next phrase, which is “expired before the commencement date”. If you’re in the section 124 process, then that gets extended too. It’s a belts and braces approach. It’s either expired or it hasn’t. The point is that as long as you’re in the process or your consent is going to expire during that time frame before the commencement date, you get an extension. It’s a belts and braces approach, but (1)(a) and (b) should be read together.

Thank you. That is helpful. To summarise there, the point is it’s not supposed to be a retrospective bonus for expired consents that aren’t actively in that section 124 process?

Then my next question on this aspect is: if a resource consent is due to expire before 2027—and we’ve talked about and we’ll talk about this once we get to (3), about this two-year extension—does it matter where that expiry date is of the consent in relation to the extension? Can you ever go beyond two years, is my question? Will some be a lot shorter than two years? If you had a consent that was due to expire on 30 December 2027, this is my question: does this bill give you, then, a one-day extension?

Hon Chris Bishop: Yes.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING: Yes? Well, thank you. That’s useful.

Hon Chris Bishop: It’s a great benefit.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING: Great benefit.

Well, then I might jump around then a bit and go down to subsection (7). That is that a consent authority must, no later than six months, update a resource consent to which this section applies, record its new expiry date and, if applicable, continue to process and determine the application for the new consent unless it is withdrawn. My question here is around the consultation that has happened with those consent authorities. Presumably, most of the consents and questions here are going to be ones with regional councils or unitaries, because they’re going to relate to water or air and discharges. Most of them won’t be land-use consents.

A number of questions on this: has there been any consultation with councils? What is the requirement on the councils going to be in terms of this administrative task? Has there been any sort of cost-benefit analysis whereby a consent that is due to expire on 1 December 2027 gets a one-day extension? How much resource is going to be required to meet the requirements of subsection (7)?

Then the next question is if he could tell us about the consents that he expects—and there will be further questions on this, particularly in relation to subsection (10), but what are the types of consents that he is expecting will benefit from this extension, given that very few land-use consents have expiry dates unless they’re going to lapse, and what analysis has there been into that, and what sorts of different councils are going to be burdened with these additional administrative tasks?

Well, I don’t know about administrative tasks; I mean, this is reducing the burden on councils massively, or at least for a while, because they don’t have to process consents any more.

Hon Rachel Brooking: Unless they all end on 31 December.

Hon CHRIS BISHOP: But Parliament is legislating for their extension, and so they don’t have to. This will reduce the burden on councils, and I don’t think there’s any doubt about that.

In terms of the types of consents, there’ll be a range, as I think the member herself adverts to in her remarks. In terms of the consultation with councils, there hasn’t been any. This has been done quickly, as the member knows, and so we haven’t engaged with councils on it, but I don’t think anything particularly turns on that, to be honest.

The point about 30 December 2027—I mean, yes, there will be one or two consents which will be in the slightly odd situation of getting a one-day extension, but there will be a bunch that expire quite soon that will no longer have to go through that process. That is the nature of time. It is what it is.

I want to start by addressing quite a big concern in the departmental disclosure statement (DDS), and that is about some of the Te Tiriti o Waitangi obligations and also external obligations. As is mentioned in the DDS, there are broader implications in terms of “Post-settlement governance entities, Ngā hapū o Ngāti Porou, groups yet to settle their historical Treaty claims, Pou Taiao and Te Tai Kaha”. They’re all being mentioned in here, but I guess the concern is that over here, it says that “Extending consents without engaging Māori raises Treaty implications, as the Crown is generally obliged to consult on proposals affecting Māori interests.” But instead of consulting, it just says that the Minister will “inform”, which is different from “consult”. On top of that, it says that “the Minister intends to inform”—i.e., it hasn’t happened yet—and, on the next page, it says that “Post-settlement governance entities, Ngā hapū o Ngāti Porou, … Pou Taiao and Te Tai Kaha are being informed”.

Are they being informed as we speak, as this bill is going through? I do find that of concern, and I’m hoping that it is of concern for the Minister responsible for RMA Reform, as well, in terms of our general Treaty obligations with our Treaty partner. Not only have they not been consulted; they haven’t even been informed yet, according to the DDS, of what has been happening here. I just wanted to check with the Minister: have they been informed, and if they have, is the Minister intending to consult with them at any stage on the policy proposal of this particular legislation?

The second thing that I wanted to address is the date. Now, this is a question that I held back on asking the Minister about in the earlier clauses, particularly on the commencement date, but the date that is being used here, of 31 December 2027—where did that date come from, and what other considerations did the Minister, in consultation with officials, etc., have for that date?

Now, I understand that we have talked about the fact that this bill is a transitional measure for the other two bills. But if we’re going through the other two bills, both of the other two bills refer to commencement being the day of the Royal assent. I am assuming that the Minister has indicated that the bill will be passed next year, in which case, it will at some point be the day after the day on which it passes next year. In that case, why does the consent need to be extended by two years and not, for example, by a year up until 31 December 2026, if the other two bills are going to be in effect?

Those are my two questions to start off with. They are on our Treaty obligations and also the arbitrariness of the date.

To deal with the second question first, which I think has been well canvassed, to be honest, for quite a degree of time, it’s a belts and braces approach. The intention of the Government is to legislate for the Planning Bill and the Natural Environment Bill next year, at which point the new consenting regime will kick in and this bill—this Act—and the Resource Management Act (RMA) itself will wither away, but it just gives a bit of extra flex, just in case. That, I think, deals with that. We’ve well canvassed that issue; people are entitled to disagree.

In relation to the member’s point around consultation, I wrote, as Minister responsible for RMA Reform, to post-settlement governance entities and Te Tai Kaha and a range of other groups on Friday, so they’ve had not extensive consultation or engagement but—

Tangi Utikere: Friday—how many days is that?

Hon CHRIS BISHOP: Well, you can do the math. I know you’re not very good at it, but you can figure it out. In relation to—

Hon Rachel Brooking: Would the letters have been received yet? Were they sent by NZ Post?

Hon CHRIS BISHOP: They were emailed. We do have emails, you know. I would note—and I suspect members will raise this anyway, because it’s relevant to the point the members are making—at new section 123C(3), inserted by clause 5, the limitation of the extension of water-related consents to a maximum of 35 years. You can’t go beyond the 35 years for water-related consents. As I think some members will know, this was the maximum consent duration for fresh water agreed to by the Crown when the Crown settled the litigation in the lands case, New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General, a famous case back in 1987. The bill aligns with that case and aligns with that long-settled matter of policy across successive Governments, so you can’t go beyond a 35-year extension for water-related consents.

New section 123C(4) introduces a specific cut-off for certain historical water consents that were grandfathered into the RMA to avoid unintended long extensions—in other words, past the 35 years mark. It’s the same point. Both those two things have been written in specifically, and that’s been done with post-settlement Government entities and other Māori groups in mind.

Thank you, Madam Chair, for giving me this call to examine what I believe is quite a substantial aspect of the bill. This is particularly about the implications for council, and this clause makes it really clear, across the many parts of it, that there will be—like the Minister responsible for RMA Reform has said multiple times—less work for councils. With the very, very limited analysis that we have in the departmental disclosure statement—and this is on page 5. It’s talking about the potential costs and benefits—they make it really clear that they haven’t been able to undertake a broad analysis on those.

But my question is, specifically, then—it basically sums it up that this is a continuation of business as usual, and with respect to, particularly, “the potential for any group of persons to suffer a substantial unavoidable loss of income or wealth”, it says that this is not expected. My question is: what are the actual implications for council staff? We know that a lot of council functions are user-pays, and we also know that in the system ahead of us, councils will be under increasing resource strain, because they will be undertaking the implementation of the Resource Management Act’s—the replacement bills that will come into effect. What is expected to happen to council staff jobs, particularly in the consent and compliance space, with the enaction of this?

Now, the Minister, I think, in his earlier comment, mentioned, “Oh, they’re expecting, like, a few thousand.” I’d like clarification of what the number was that the Minister says about how many consents they’re actually—if they have any take on the magnitude of this, because if it is a great amount, then it could actually have significant impacts on those council staff and result in potential joblessness, presumably, for them. I’d really like to hear whether that has been considered, and to what magnitude.

There is expected to be a light implementation requirement. Councils just simply have to update their records. Parliament is, essentially, legislating extensions for these consents. Councils have to update their records. That’s not burdensome. It probably takes longer than five minutes because we don’t have e-plans and digital records, but it shouldn’t, theoretically, take that much longer.

In relation to the member’s other question around how many consents, we’ve canvassed this at least two or three times now. We don’t know exactly, but we think, roughly, between maybe 2,000 and 2,500—about that many.

Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the Minister for taking us through some of the logic in new subsections 123C(3) and (4). I was going to ask about new subsection (4) and the bit right at the end of (4), which is “granted under this Act”, but it does seem clear that this is the Resource Management Act that that applies to.

Looking at new subsection (5), then: “Any conditions applying to a resource consent … before it expired … continue to apply unless a change to a condition is required as a consequence of extending the consent under this section.” Can the Minister explain what type of change to a condition might be required as a consequence of extending the consent under the section? Is he thinking it’s just about timing—temporal factors—or are there other factors, as well? For instance, if you had a consent that was trying to reduce, say, nitrates into the river by a certain time and you got it extended, do you think there’d be some circumstance where you would—I’m just going to ask you another question, too.

Hon Chris Bishop: OK.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING: Thank you—[Knocks microphone] Oh, sorry microphone. Thank you in anticipation of you answering that one.

But, also, related to this point is whether or not those conditions on that consent that are getting the two-year extension—can they be reviewed? Do the normal review provisions apply? I’m seeing a nod there, so I’ll let you answer.

I’m advised it’s really just to make clear that it doesn’t change any consent conditions; it’s just for clarity. It’s to make clear. If you’re talking about new section 123C(5), consent conditions continue to apply, and yes, there can be reviews. It is just a time frame extension for a couple of years. Everything else carries on.

Are there any examples, though? It does say, “unless a change to a condition is required as a consequence of extending [that] consent under this section.” Has he got any examples of what that might apply to, other than a temporal requirement in a consent condition?

Lan Pham—you can ask your question in the meantime while the Minister—

Thank you. Mine is an extension of just that, because it implies that there is some sort of assessment or review, whereas this is talking about blanket extensions given set criteria, so I’m really keen to hear the Minister expand specifically on that.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Look, something’s occurred to me, because I know that members of the coalition Government have indicated—and I haven’t seen the legislation; my colleagues may have read through it. In the two substantive pieces of legislation that we’re about to see, the implication is that if there is any imposition on property rights, then there will be some access to compensation.

My question in relation to this is that if we, indeed, are having an extension, and it’s for two years, on consents that were processed and approved, fees paid for, and there may have been some payment for that right—so it’s a property right; we accept that—then the extension of that automatically may incur a liability; that is, that someone gets a free property right. The Minister responsible for RMA Reform said that it’s a certainty. If we’re going to see the principles of compensation as applied in the legislation that we’re about to see, then should these people who have applied and have probably paid some money to get that consent extended—if it’s automatic, then is there going to be a fee automatically paid for the extension of a property right?

The answer is no, although good question, and also there will be no refunds for people that are in the midst of consent processing, either. This is just Parliament taking the problem away for everyone. No compensation and no refunds.

I mean, property rights accrue to not just a private landowner; property rights accrue to taxpayers, to the Crown, to iwi, and we may be forgoing property rights, and so what about us getting compensation? The Minister responsible for RMA Reform chortles away there, but I’d suggest to him that very soon after the implementation of his new Resource Management Act regime, the country will be tied up in huge litigation over whose property rights are paramount and who should be paid compensation. If we are to establish property rights in the hands of private individuals, then we must assess property rights across the collective, across the Crown, across iwi, and where’s that going to end up?

The Minister smiles. I’m glad that I’ve kind of tickled his fancy, I really am, because if he can’t see this coming down the track, then he should wake up. It’s an inevitable outcome of what he will be setting up. But for this piece of legislation here, the automatic rollover, did he—and he’s indicated no. Well, why not consider compensation to those who are passing on the additional property rights as a way of a reasonable commercial deal?

I refer the member to section 122 of the Resource Management Act (RMA): consents are not a property right—although sometimes people think they should be. I think the reason I was sort of chortling away and smiling is that, I mean, the member’s right and makes good points around—and we are going to have a debate in the next little while around the appropriate role of Government in regulating for the national good and the public good in the commons and on private property. We live in a mixed economy, and the Government’s view is that we have got the balance wrong when it comes to the ability of councils and Government to impose significant restrictions on private property for the public good, and that there needs to be a greater delineation between the public and the private realms. Now, that’s quite a big debate. It actually happened when the RMA 1991 was passed, and we’re going to have the same debate again.

I am not someone who thinks, for example, that you can’t have zoning. I mean, there’s a school of thought, in the hardcore anarcho-libertarian world, which suggests that zoning is a violation of property. I mean, sort of by definition, it’s true. I live in a residential zone; I can’t set up an industrial effluent discharge factory. That’s outrageous on one level. Clearly, there needs to be zoning. There’s a debate around the extent of it and the rules and how clear it is and the consistency, and we’re going to make some changes in that direction, but zoning is not offensive as a concept. Actually, it’s a legitimate planning role in order to separate out incompatible land uses so that you don’t rely on the tort of nuisance, which would be completely inefficient from a property rights point of view. It’s got its place, but it would be inefficient, so that’s partly why we have planning. I’m not an extremist like that.

On the other hand, when councils or Governments can turn around and say, “Hey, by the way, you own that piece of land; 90 percent of it’s now a significant natural area.”, such that you can’t do anything with that land, that has an impact on your land. If I own a house and the Government turns around, or the council turns around, and says, “We’ve decided that it’s a heritage house.”, and I can’t add a second storey or subdivide or paint it a different colour, that has an impact. I think most people reasonably understand that, and the debate is in the middle rather than on the extremes. The debate in the middle is around what the appropriate kind of regulatory response to that is. We’re proposing a series of changes that force harder decisions around those choices. Well, I’m happy to have a debate about it, and no doubt we will. It’s not the focus of this, but, anyway, I just thought I’d take that opportunity to lay it out of it. I’m looking forward to the actual debate in due course.

Hon Damien O’Connor: Madam Chair.

Is this a subsequent question?

It is a subsequent question, absolutely, because I—

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): Related to here or the upcoming legislation?

Hon DAMIEN O’CONNOR: Yes, it does go to this, because it goes to the heart of the automatic transfer of rights, which you’re talking about, because these consents are being extended. These consents are being extended with no compensation, the Minister has said, and the question is a legitimate one for us, given there’s no select committee process. In select committee, I’m sure this would be kicked around. There’s no select committee process, and it’s the only opportunity we have to quiz the Minister, and it’s a legitimate one: are there precedents being set here? That is that the compensation is only going to be one way under the Resource Management Act (RMA), and I think that is totally unjust.

The Minister refers to property rights of the commons versus private, except that we’ve started to touch on what is a critical issue. The Minister may talk about the middle, but his coalition partner in ACT talks about the extreme; that is, that private property rights trump everything else—trump being the right word. I am concerned that what we’re doing here by automatically extending a consent, and people thought it was “just to offer certainty”, is setting the precedent for free property right extension for private property owners with no payment of compensation—call it what you like—for the commons or for the taxpayer.

That’s why I asked the Minister, because while I respect his view that we’re trying to work in the middle, all the rhetoric that we hear around the RMA reforms is at the extreme end of property rights and upholding them. The Minister refers to one of a house. There are always restrictions on what you can do in and out and around your house, always. There will be, we hope, because to have completely laissez-faire, and a private property owner able to do whatever he or she or they want, is outrageous, because we live in a community. We live in a society, and we have to have some guidelines, and the Minister accepts that. The question here is: are we setting a precedent here that automatically extends property rights for private landowners—that is, the person who’s got a consent—but doesn’t require any payment or compensation or consideration for that?

I’m no lawyer, but I know that deep in the heart of law and law journals and learnings, there are some key principles there. I’ll leave that question with the Minister, and maybe he’d like to come back and answer it.

I’m going to call Lan Pham. We’re seriously running out of clauses on this part, but before, when the Minister was taking advice, Lan Pham, you asked a question about assessment or review, and I don’t know that we actually got to the point where the Minister heard it and was able to answer. If you want to, perhaps, repeat that question as part of what you’re going to ask.

Sure.

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): I think you were asking whether there was going to be an assessment or review while this process was happening.

LAN PHAM: Yeah. Was there assessment? I’m just trying to find the clause that I followed up Rachel Brooking on—

Hon Members: Five.

LAN PHAM: Yes, it is clause 5.

The Minister’s actually said he can deal with it.

Well, I mean, this point was raised by Ms Pham and also Rachel Brooking. I’m advised it’s a belts and braces approach, just to make sure that conditions applying to resource consent continue before it expired and they continue to apply unless there’s a change applied as a consequence of extended resource consent. We don’t know if that would be the case, necessarily. I think the member asked for examples. We don’t know of any examples, but it’s just a belts and braces approach to say that if there needs to be a change in conditions as a result of the two-year extension—frankly, I think it’s unlikely, but if there was—there’s the ability for that to happen, and that’s all there is to it, really.

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): Arena Williams, you’ve been seeking a call for a little while, so we’ll take one from you, thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I have some specific questions for the Minister around new section 123C(1)(b), and I was waiting for the opportunity to ask him, because it is specifically about Auckland and different subject matter to what my colleagues have dealt with. I flagged for the Minister, in the earlier stages—I think it was the clause 1 debate—that I’d be asking about Plan Change (PC) 78 and PC 120, so I’ll turn to that now.

The question I have for the Minister is—he’s helpfully explained the word “expired” here, so I want to clarify with him what he means about consents which had inoperative effect before PC 120 came into effect, which followed his amendments to the Resource Management Act previously passed in this House in this year. Auckland Council responded to that by introducing PC 120 from 3 November 2025.

It will help, Madam Chair, if you’ll allow me to set out an example for the Minister here. What I’m asking about is those developers—in many cases, we’re talking about small developers—who were building three-storey townhouses and were relying on the medium density residential standards (MDRS), because the underlying zone in Auckland allowed for two-storey-high developments. They had a resource consent, in those cases, which didn’t cover permitted activities, because that was permitted by the MDRS, but they would have had consent for other things, like the civil works. Then, they would have either had a building consent or been in the process of having a building consent. When the MDRS became inoperative, and when PC 120 then applied, from 3 November, those developers were, effectively, in the situation where they no longer were able to develop their land. I’m asking him very straight whether new section 123C(1)(b) fixes the problem for those developers?

Given that he’s used the word “expired”, you’d have to read that up. He might improve the situation by talking about resource consents that were operative before the commencement date. That would be a simple change that would make sure that the situation that I’m talking about would clean that up. There’s a real need here for natural justice, especially because in that situation, there were developers who were doing everything right and progressing their developments under the rules as they applied then and were hearing policy intentions from political parties of both colours that the intention was to continue with intensification, so those three-storey townhouses were not only encouraged at the time they were developing them but were also something that they probably should have been able to rely on being allowed for in the future. That is, in fact, the case with PC 120, but they can’t rely on PC 120. I think the Minister gets the gist. I have some other questions about the natural justice questions.

I’m very familiar with that issue. It’s not for me to give legal advice. It’s not the intention of this bill, in the clause the member refers to, to assist. I am familiar with the examples that the member raises, and it would be fair to say that there is dialogue between the Government and council.

Arena Williams: But you can fix it now.

Hon CHRIS BISHOP: Well, it’s slightly more complicated than that, because these were consents that had, largely, permitted activities. I’m getting away from the bill now, but they had permitted activity standards, which—because of the immediate withdrawal of Plan Change 78 and the replacement by Plan Change 120, they no longer have any form of consent. The 124 carry-over doesn’t apply, so they sort of fall within this lacuna, which is, frankly, pretty frustrating for everyone. I think the member is nodding. I can talk to her offline about it, but there is dialogue between council and the Government in relation to that issue. It’s not the intention of this section to help that particular situation.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

I’m going to take a call from Tangi Utikere, but I am looking for new clauses now, because I think we have pretty much canvassed the main part of this and there’s very little left in this piece.

Kia ora, thank you, Madam Chair.

Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan: Point of order, Madam Chair. I actually just want to seek your guidance on something, and this is something I’ve been observing. Madam Chair, you were the Chair that was in the seat at the stage when we were going through the committee stage for the Companies (Address Information) Amendment Act, which was a member’s bill by the Hon Dr Deborah Russell. That was a bill that went through select committee stage and it was a member’s bill and it was four pages long, and in those processes, the Chair has allowed for a four-hour debate on those bills. I just want to seek the—

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): Yeah, no, I think where you’re conflating the two issues is that—that was a member’s bill, and you will have observed in your time in the House, because you’re very perceptive, that members’ day bills run quite differently. Because of the dynamics of the House and the numbers on each side of the House, it almost goes in reverse. In this situation, what I’m actually wanting to do is to get the best out of each clause. It’s a very specific bill that’s setting a time frame. The questions have been relevant, but I think we’re getting to the end of new questions.

TANGI UTIKERE: Thank you, Madam Chair, it’s a pleasure to put some questions to the Minister responsible for RMA Reform on what is the most significant part of this bill.

Earlier in a contribution, the Minister talked about how the courts would perhaps not be looking at the Hansard but would be more interested in what’s actually contained in the bill. There are a couple of questions around this. The first one, for me, is whether or not the Minister has looked at a shorter period of time. For example, what’s proposed currently is that it would be a two-year period through to 31 December, but the Minister hasn’t indicated in committee as to why a shorter period of time, perhaps, would not be more appropriate.

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): I wasn’t in the Chair, but I believe that may have been traversed during the commencement clause.

TANGI UTIKERE: The commencement clause.

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): Yes.

TANGI UTIKERE: OK, thank you. But not related—it might have been in the commencement clause, but not in relation to this particular clause—

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): But it has been discussed.

TANGI UTIKERE: Clause 5 outlines the particular dates that things come into effect. The question I have for the Minister is—it’s curious, when one looks at new section 123C(1)(a), the language that is used throughout this clause when it comes to the date is actually around “before the close of 31 December 2027:”, and then further down, that’s repeated, I think, at least on two other occasions, and then there is “expires on the close of 1 October 2026” in subsection (4). The curious nature of that, of course, is that often when we talk about the close of something, it could be the close of business. One assumes that it is midnight here. Why does it not just say 1 January 2028? I mean, effectively, it’s the same aspect, right? I mean, consistency with other legislation in terms of when a particular date comes into effect—that is my first question.

My other question is around new section 123C(8), and this relies on the issues that have been raised previously in contributions, and certainly in the second reading and first reading, around the lack of information that is available. The Minister has talked about thousands of consents being impacted in this particular space, but when we look at subsection (8), this is talking about the extant waste-water consents which relate to constructing or operating a waste-water network. There are not huge numbers of those. When that’s broken down, this is, effectively, a caveat that doesn’t apply—it’s an exemption, basically—but it applies in two particular quarters or two areas: the first is section 139C, and the second one is 139D; the “D” one is about the Minister making an extension.

My question for the Minister is: does he have any information on the numbers of consents that fall into this particular provision? It’s not about, you know, there are thousands out there; I accept the Minister has said that we don’t have the information specifically in front of us. But when we are talking about, effectively, carving out the applicability to certain types of consents, when it comes to extant waste-water consents that have already been extended either by application or, indeed, by the Minister, I think it is still important to understand how many we are talking about in that particular space.

Good questions from the member. In relation to new section 123C(4), as I talked to Ms Brooking about around this, it introduces a specific cut-off with certain historic water consents that were grandfathered into the Resource Management Act, hence the 1 October 2026 time frame. Subsection (8) is important. Waste-water consents were extended to allow for new waste-water standards to now, which have now been introduced. They are extended beyond 31 December 2027 to August 2028, as I think the member knows. The purpose of subsection (8) is to avoid overriding that, so we’re not shortening their extension via this bill.

Just for clarity, the waste-water consents have already been extended by the Local Government (Water Services) (Repeals and Amendments) Act 2025. That’s already happened through to August 2028, and everyone’s—well, there seems to be broad agreement that that’s OK. That’s the law, anyway. It is what it is. The purpose of new section 123C(8) is to avoid overriding recently legislated arrangements for waste-water network consents. The bill excludes waste-water consents from the general consent transition provision. For maximum clarity: waste water, August 2028; everything else, two years through to December 2027. But it’s to avoid overriding that.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C, replacing “31 December 2027” with “31 December 2026” in all instances be agreed to.

Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C, replacing “31 December 2027” with “1 December 2026 at 5 p.m.” in all instances is ruled out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

The question is that Mariameno Kapa-Kingi’s tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C, inserting new subsection (1A) be agreed to.

The question is that Mariameno Kapa-Kingi’s tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C, replacing subsection (2) be agreed to.

Mariameno Kapa-Kingi’s tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(2), amending paragraph (a) is ruled out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

The question is that Lan Pham’s tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C, inserting new subsection (2)(a) be agreed to.

The question is that Lan Pham’s tabled amendment to clause 5, deleting section 123C(3) be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(3)(a) be agreed to.

The question is that the Hon Rachel Brooking’s tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(3)(a) be agreed to.

The question is that the Hon Rachel Brooking’s tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(3)(b), to replace “35” with “30” be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(3)(b), to replace “35 years” with “20 years” be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(3)(b), replacing “35 years” with “12 years with a right to renewal of another 12 years” be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ remaining tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(3)(b) be agreed to.

The Hon Rachel Brooking’s remaining tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(3)(b) is ruled out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

The question is that Lan Pham’s tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C, inserting new subsection (3A) be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C, inserting new subsection (3A) be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(4), replacing “1 October 2026” with “1 September 2026” be agreed to.

The question is that Mariameno Kapa-Kingi’s tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C, inserting new subsection (5A) be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(6) be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(6) be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(7), replacing “6” with “9” be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(7), replacing “6” with “8” be agreed to.

Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(7) is ruled out of order as being the same in substance as a previous amendment.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(7), replacing “6” with “12” be agreed to.

The question is that Mariameno Kapa-Kingi’s tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C, inserting new subsection (7A) be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, deleting 123C(8) be agreed to.

Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, deleting section 123C(8), is ruled out of order as being the same in substance as previous amendment.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(9) be agreed to.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(9) be agreed to.

The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5, section 123C(10) be agreed to.

Mr Speaker, the committee has considered the Resource Management (Duration of Consents) Amendment Bill and reports it without amendment. I move, That the report be adopted.

Motion agreed to.

Report adopted.

This bill is set down for third reading immediately.

Third Reading