Residential Tenancies Amendment Bill

Members, we come now to Part 2. This is the debate on clauses 21 to 29, “Termination of tenancies”. The question is that Part 2 stand part.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I have two questions for the Associate Minister of Housing to start this section off. This is the part of the bill where the rubber hits the road for tenants, where their rights are being stripped away by a Government that does not care that it is weakening their position, where it is making landlords empowered to not only kick their tenants out with 90 days for no reason but also to weaken their rights in other ways.

We’ve spent a whole part discussing how the Government is being so kind with its approach to pet bonds, without any sort of analysis about how the market will be affected. Not only will rents continue to rise under this approach, as the Treasury predicted at its Budget predictions, but also people will be affected here. There is no intention, as the Government Minister in the chair previously said, for Ministry of Social Development clients and those receiving a benefit to be able to use the benefits to increase the availability of pet bonds. There’s no intention here for further work to be done on that.

My question to the Minister is: if we’re weakening the rights of tenants here by increasing the incentives for investors to buy up more of the existing stock of properties—that’s the effect—and at the same time we’re making insecure tenants feel even more desperate that they need to get into a house of their own, both of those factors will push rents up, up, and up. Is it his position that clause 22, which reintroduces 90-day no-cause evictions, will drive up rents? And does he agree with Treasury’s predictions at the last Budget that rents will continue to rise under his watch?

Thank you, Mr Chair, and kia ora Minister Potaka—nice to have you here and hope that you’ll be able to respond to some of my concerns that I’m about to bring up.

I believe this is the appropriate part to bring up what I was trying to get at previously. I want to dig into the evidential basis behind no-cause evictions, because, Minister, you’re making a really big call in bringing these back, given that this is going to impact more than 1 million renters in our country and make them vulnerable to being evicted and kicked out of their home for no good reason. I want to understand: where’s the evidence? We were told throughout the select committee that the rationale behind this bill was that it would allow landlords and property managers to take a chance on risky tenants by bringing them in and being able to kick them out if they don’t like their behaviour. Where’s the evidence for that? I mean, that didn’t come up at all throughout the select committee process in my recollection of it. I’m just trying to understand where the facts are to back that up, because I don’t think they exist.

I believe that the reason that these no-cause evictions were brought back was because it’s politically popular to do so, despite the fact that in the submissions on the bill around no-cause evictions—again—97 percent of submitters were opposed to no-cause evictions being brought back, and 53 percent of property managers and landlords were also opposed to no-cause evictions being brought back. Where are the facts to back up bringing them back, given there’s such huge risk to the 1 million - plus New Zealanders who are now vulnerable to being kicked out for no good reason at all?

I sat through the submissions, and this was the most contested part of the bill. So many issues were raised with the additional vulnerability that will be put on tenants as a result of reinstating the no-cause termination for tenants. We were all concerned, sitting in the Social Services and Community Committee, that we’re going to see more transient families, concerned that we are going to see families discriminated against, and they will not take up their right to that retaliation clause that’s in here because that is incredibly complex. As we know, many of these vulnerable families are not likely to go to the Tenancy Tribunal to complain about the landlord.

There are a number of things that I’m concerned about when I look at even the disclosure statement for the bill and also the regulatory impact statement. I want to know from the Associate Minister of Housing why he has decided to ignore the advice in the regulatory impact statement where it states: “Landlords’ ability to terminate a periodic tenancy ‘in any other case’ (a no-cause termination) was considered to negatively impact tenant wellbeing and disincentivise them from exercising rights and raising concerns”. That’s what I was just speaking to and it’s actually in the advice that accompanies the bill. The statement also noted that “although the RTA enables tenants to challenge terminations they suspect have been issued in response to them exercising their rights, tenants may not feel empowered to do so as it may be difficult to prove this if no reason is provided.”

I need to question the Minister on how he would allow this to go through, why he will not consider any changes, given the fact that the submissions were overwhelmingly opposed to this and even the officials’ advice states or reiterates the same concerns that were raised by—I do believe, as Tamatha said—97 percent of submitters.

During the select committee process, I raised a question that was unable to be answered by the officials. However, I wanted them to go away and see if they could find the answer. I’ll put that question now to the Minister. That question is in relation to how long it actually takes an individual or a family to find and secure another rental property once they leave—have their tenancy terminated—the property that they are residing in. I’m concerned that we were never presented with any evidence to show that. In cities, in areas where there are housing shortages—places like, I can say, West Auckland, Auckland, where it’s quite often difficult to secure a rental—90 days may not even be sufficient for that family or individual to be able to secure their next rental property.

As an electorate MP, we have seen this over the years—particularly, I have to say, between 2008 and 2017—where we had a number of constituents who would come through our office very clearly stating that they were not able to get into another rental property so, therefore, were in a position where they were seeking out emergency accommodation because of the fact that rental properties were not widely available or easy for them to access.

I want to know from the Minister whether or not he received any advice on the risk of those who have their tenancies terminated and are not able to find their next rental property are having to seek out support from the Ministry of Social Development for emergency accommodation, and what that might mean for the Minister’s own target of reducing emergency housing in this country.

Thank you very much, Mr Chair. It’s pretty disappointing, to say the least, that the Associate Minister of Housing hasn’t taken the opportunity to stand up and respond to what are genuine and, frankly, straightforward questions. If we are actually to be able to dive into this part—the substance of the bill, essentially—we need to understand the Government’s rationale. We need to understand what they have based that on before we can actually look in great detail about why they’ve landed where they’ve landed, the number of days, etc. We know that when this bill was announced, and as it has progressed through the parliamentary system, the Government have claimed that this bill will help address the housing crisis.

Now, in the first part, we have discussed this, I think, quite constructively—we’ve come with ideas on how to improve it—but we can’t even start to look to improve this until we understand what it’s based on. Previously, if a Minister wasn’t getting up to answer questions, we could rely on the regulatory impact statement to give us an idea, but it’s quite clear when this is read that the Government didn’t give departments enough time to actually come up with analysis to assist Parliament. Now, that’s not the department’s fault. It’s another example of the Government cutting corners to try to avoid scrutiny, which makes it even more important that the Minister stands up and answers questions. If we dive into the regulatory impact statement enough, we will see that the Government’s claims that this bill will help the housing crisis appear to be unfounded. I say “appear” because it hasn’t been able to reach that conclusion because they weren’t given enough time. The only way that we can get to that conclusion, or otherwise, is if the Minister answers questions.

I’ll bring it right back to the most basic point. In the absence of a response—once the Minister does respond, we will certainly have more questions—I’ll keep it real simple. How does this bill help solve the housing crisis? There’s no mention in this bill about building houses. Actually, we’ve got to look at this bill and this part in the context of the other changes that this Government has made, because the Minister needs to answer that pretty simple question in the context of them reversing the changes the previous Government made around interest deductibility, in the context that at least in part—but, I would argue, predominantly—because of that change, rents have gone up 7 percent according to the regulatory impact statement in the year leading up to this. What is going on here? We need to know from the Minister how this is going to solve the housing crisis.

Thank you for the opportunity to stand and respond to some of the questions today. It was really unfortunate I was unable to sit in the chair in relation to the pet bonds, because that’s quite an issue dear to my heart here in the fishbowl of Wellington.

The changes that are being proposed in this part of the bill are sensible and much needed, and they remove some of the barriers to ensure supply and flexibility for landlords in the market. Of course, there have been some observations—or may I say allegations—around rent increasing as a result of some of these changes, but, as we know, rents have dramatically increased over the last five or six years, and over the last 12 months there’s been some stabilising of rent.

Rents do get influenced by a number of matters—for example, immigration, supply, wage growth—and it’s clear to us that an increase of an average of $170 over the six years prior to the 2023 election, despite an extraordinary amount of coin being tipped into the housing market by way of subsidies and build costs, rents continued to increase. Despite some of the current determinations around terminations being put in place, rents continued to increase at a pace that has actually contributed significantly to the cost of living catastrophe that has faced ordinary New Zealanders, including those ones in West Auckland.

The view is that changes will increase supply, and whilst that might come as a surprise to our colleagues on the other side of the Chamber, it is our view that the changes that are being proposed—in the context that they’re being proposed, and together—will increase supply at the margins by giving landlords greater flexibility to rent to tenants and to a broader suite of tenants. That’s something that I’ve, obviously, witnessed, being involved in the property sector myself for the last two decades. The sense and the view that our team has on this side of the Chamber is that, by making these changes, we are able to see a lot more landlords be interested in broadening the suite of tenants and people who may rent homes, rent tenancies, from those landlords, because there’s an increasing flexibility to deal with some complexities which currently cannot be dealt with under the current legislation. You actually get more choice for access by tenants.

Whilst there have been some observations around 52.8 percent of property associations and landlords opposing the change, actually, within some of those associations and groups who presented or who submitted during the select committee process, there were a number who submitted on behalf of many, many other landlords. So, yes, I acknowledge the submitters and the percentage of submitters, but when you actually get to the percentage of landlords opposing or not opposing, we haven’t been able to penetrate that number. Whilst there are some observations around the reletting and the impact on the tightness of the market, recent evidence suggests that the time taken to re-let properties is actually longer, suggesting that the changes and the approaches that we have made are showing that the tightness in the market is easing.

Again, we believe that there is a sensible, much-needed change, and that’s captured here in this part of the bill. We do believe that it will increase flexibility for landlords, but it will also generate a greater opportunity for tenants to access rental arrangements. It’s very sensible, and I commend Minister Bishop for his hard work on this matter.

I’d just make the note that, of course, the Associate Minister of Housing, by covering quite a broad range of issues there, has actually opened the debate considerably, and that will be no doubt taken into account in considering the subject matter of questions.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I do want to continue on. The Associate Minister of Housing started by stating that he wishes he’d been here for the previous part of the bill with respect to pet bonds because pet bonds are close to his heart. I want to know whether or not Treaty of Waitangi obligations and Māori are close to that Minister’s heart, given what is in the regulatory impact statement for this bill.

It’s important to note that in this bill it states: “Evidence suggests that the termination related proposals will negatively impact on actual and perceived security of tenure for many tenants compared to the status quo. These negative impacts are likely to disproportionately affect Māori, as Māori are more likely to live in rented accommodation, have a lower overall median income, and are more likely to experience discrimination than the general population.”

It’s lovely that that Minister cares so much about pet bonds and that those are close to his heart, but this part of the bill is about the termination clause that he’s bringing back in so that there will be no cause for termination and people can be booted out of their homes with no reason whatsoever. His own advice is telling that Minister that Māori are going to be disproportionately impacted.

Now, I want to know if Māori are close to that Minister’s heart, and how he can justify this particular change, given that the evidence is right in front of him to say that, actually, they will be negatively affected. We heard the spin from the Minister: that this will result in more properties being tenanted and a “broader suite” of tenants getting access to rental properties. I don’t know what “broader suite of tenants” means, but I do want to assume that he means Māori getting access to rental properties as well. However, if he is inferring that, then it’s interesting to see that the evidence he was giving contradicts what he said when he took his feet.

Minister, I want to hear from you that Māori are close to your heart and to understand why you think this particular provision is going to be a benefit to Māori when what we have in front of us in the regulatory impact statement says the exact otherwise.

Thank you, Chair, and I’ve got a number of questions for the Associate Minister of Housing about Part 2, clause 22, which seems to return the imbalance of power between tenants and landlords.

The benefit to landlords is clear, but what does the Minister think is the benefit to tenants? Does he think that tenants will really be empowered to raise the retaliatory power? Do you think that they will be able to take that up? I’m a car owner and I am a landlord. To check that my car is safe and healthy, it’s not me who says my seatbelts are fine and my brakes are fine—I take it to the garage to have that checked. Healthy homes—I just make a declaration about the house, which I firmly believe is a healthy home, but there’s no inspection unless there’s a complaint. That’s not fair. If a tenant wants their home to be healthy, not cold, not with non-compliant fires, poor heating, non-compliant smoke alarms, they are not in a position of power to raise those things.

Let’s look at what this removal—this return to no-cause evictions—does for tenants’ health. Their physical health I’ve alluded to with the healthy home aspect, but the mental health, the insecurity, the chance that they will have to move not just within the suburb where their child goes to school or they’re on a doctor’s list—if they’re lucky—but they might have to move somewhere else, and the worry about it, even if they don’t, is completely unreasonable.

I have a little bit of insight into this issue, both as a landlord who is happy to have a healthy home but also I grew up in a council flat in London. At the age of 18 months, which I do not remember, we actually did have to move because the house was demolished for widening a road—which may have formed some transport views, I admit! But then my grandmother, my half-sister, my parents, and I were rehoused in another home, and we never worried about whether next Christmas would be somewhere else, whether I’d be able to go to the same preschool or the same school. We were able to be in the same place.

What does the Minister think this change, making families move, will do for school attendance rates—which are very important, we agree, across the House? Would they consider an exception for families with school-age children? Would they consider—and I’m surprised New Zealand First hasn’t perhaps brought this up—an exemption for 65plus? My other half-sister—I have a few—lives in Austria. She lives in a private rental. She’s lived there for years. She’s got gardens, she’s got chickens—I don’t know whether they count as pets—she’s got a cat and a dog, and she feels safe there as long as she wants to continue living there. She’s been there for eight or 10 years, whereas most people’s tenancies in this country are far shorter. She knows that she can invest in furniture, curtains, the garden, the fencing without fear of being moved on in three months.

In fact, we are completely out of sync with many countries in our rules about tenancies. I’d like the Minister to respond as to whether he thinks Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland, and Spain are mistaken in not having no-cause evictions. There’s got to be a serious reason. In Spain, for example, if the landlord wants to sell the house, first of all, the tenant has the right of first refusal, I think; but secondly, if the house or the flat is sold, the tenant can remain through that process and be a tenant of the new owner. We are very, very unreasonable, unfair, and uncompassionate towards people who rent, and that results in them being regarded as second-class citizens, whereas in other countries it’s perfectly fine to rent all your life, to expect that your children will carry on renting in the same place.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’d like to get some more information from the Associate Minister of Housing, Tama Potaka, because he made some interesting statements and we still haven’t quite managed to get to the point of what the policy problem is in relation to reintroducing those 90-day terminations. He did say, and I think the term he used was “wider suite” or a “broader suite” of tenants would be available, like it’s a box of chocolates or something. I didn’t quite understand that.

When we go back to the regulatory impact statement, what it says in there is that the National Party’s manifesto document and the ACT Party, in the coalition agreement, committed to reversing some of the changes made in 2020 to the Residential Tenancies Act. My question to the Minister is: maybe that’s the primary underlying purpose? Maybe he would like to speak to that, because the regulatory impact statement does say that there is no clear evidence that the changes in 2020 caused an increase in rental supply or caused rent prices to go up. It states in there that a wide range of complex factors influence rental supply and rent prices, and that assessing the impact of individual factors is not possible. It is not able to be stated that that is, in fact, the case.

The Minister’s own regulatory impact statement states that landlords, property managers, and investors, and organisations representing these stakeholders made a big plea to the Government and wanted those 90-day terminations with notice given to be reinstated. From the regulatory impact statement, it does appear that there is no causal link between increased rent prices and that it is a clause or a part of a political agreement that underpins how this Government got power, and that they were strongly lobbied by those landlords and those who stand to gain from kicking out people with no notification.

That is a real concern. The Minister needs to provide some evidence regarding the impact of the 2020 tenancy law reforms on rental supply and rent increases to demonstrate why this has been lifted. As we’ve already seen from recent evidence provided by Statistics New Zealand, rent prices have continued to be high for tenants. In fact, their inflation rate is going up at a higher rate than the Consumers Price Index given what the Government’s already done to take away the interest deductibility from landlords. If they’ve already given landlords a tax cut and that’s made no real impact on rents coming down—they are going up more than food—then how is this additional provision going to? It looks like he’s just helping out his mates by giving tenants a rough deal.

Does the Minister think that by giving tenants a puppy, they’re going to ignore the fact that they can get kicked out of their house with no real cause? That’s the kind of sickening part about this bill, when you put Part 1 and Part 2 together. Does the Minister think that giving people a puppy or a kitten compensates for the fact that he’s taking away their right to live in a home? His own regulatory impact statement talks about the direct impact upon tenants in terms of family violence risk, mental health risks, and children attending school—all of those crucial factors that already impact on people receiving lower wages. If they are kicked out of their home without any real reason—because landlords can—what are the social impacts on those people and how they continue to provide for their families and have stability in their lives?

It seems to me that the regulatory impact statement provided by the Minister indicates that there are some significant risks. I think it is incumbent on the Minister to explain the actual policy problem that he is trying to fix with this legislation, which does appear just to be serving his mates.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Noting that the previous Chair, Greg O’Connor, had talked about broadening the scope of the debate as a result of the Associate Minister of Housing, and noting how Part 2, particularly, touches on the impacts of no-cause evictions on people, I wanted to take it first of all to the Growing Up in New Zealand study, which identified that young people who had to move from their homes for reasons outside of their control, such as tenancy terminations, were more likely to experience homelessness and live in greater levels of hardship.

My first question was: how can the Minister say this is to help landlords take a chance on people who might otherwise be homeless when the flip side of that is that no-cause evictions and weaker security of tenure also lead to more people becoming homeless?

The second question I have in relation to this is: what difference does it make if you’re hoping that this Government policy will reduce homelessness on one side and then the policy causes homelessness on the other?

My third question was in relation to the language that has been used by the Minister and other Government Ministers about landlords taking a chance on people. I wanted to understand if the Minister had a more granular definition on the types of groups that he believes landlords will be taking a chance on. I have heard language like “risky tenants”, for example, from some Government Ministers, and I want to understand: what does that mean to the Minister, actually? I actually think there is a bit of marginalisation happening when it comes to the language that is used in relation to the types of tenants that we’re talking about, particularly in Part 2, when it comes to the argument that landlords will take a chance on specific people. Like, what does he mean by that? To me, I can imagine some of the types of people that he may imagine, but I don’t think those people deserve to be labelled as “risky”.

My fourth question—and then I’ll recap all of those—related particularly to some of the outside influences that he has alluded to in relation to the need for, particularly, the provisions in Part 2 of the bill. I am really curious to understand what evidential basis he’s drawing upon to justify immigration settings to speak to the need for these provisions in Part 2.

I’m particularly interested because he’s made those comments in this debate. I think those comments should be based on evidence and I just simply don’t think that it’s helpful for a Minister to be whipping up immigration settings to justify no-cause evictions when actually, like, no-cause evictions will affect migrants; no-cause evictions will affect other members of the communities, and if the Minister wants to summon immigration settings to justify this bill, I think we deserve an evidential basis for that. What we do not deserve are Ministers whipping up anti-immigration sentiment to justify this bill when actually the reality is that this isn’t even a Government that is committed to building enough public housing.

Anyway, to recap my questions, I wanted to understand whether he used the Growing Up in New Zealand study at all when it came to making decisions on this bill. How did the research that’s available to the Minister play a role into this? Then the second part is around the evidential basis for his arguments that this may reduce homelessness versus, for example, the risk of increasing homelessness. I wanted to get a clarification and a more granular definition of the types of tenants he perceives to be the ones that landlords will take a risk by taking them on, and then, finally, the evidential basis for how immigration settings justify this bill.

Thank you very much, Mr Chair. Some of mine, I think, really carry on from Ricardo Menéndez March but also some of the earlier questions that I asked. I do want to clarify that earlier I was speaking about the impacts on Māori; I think I might have said it was in the regulatory impact statement, but it was actually in the disclosure statement—just to make that clear.

Now I am looking at the regulatory impact statement and very interested to see that this policy of reintroducing 90-day no-cause terminations has been assessed for effectiveness and efficiency. For effectiveness in terms of landlords and giving them what they’ve asked for and the reassurance that they’ll be able to regain control of their property whenever they want—well, that’s double plus, so highly effective. In terms of supply, though—which I think is important to mention, given that the Associate Minister of Housing said earlier that this will lead to better supply of rental property—it’s zero; this policy will not necessarily lead to more houses or more rental supply on the market.

What I am particularly concerned about is efficiency where it states that, as a result of the reintroduction of 90-day no-cause terminations, there may be more churn in the market and higher residential mobility among renters: “Higher residential mobility is associated with … [lower education,] employment, health, and … [wellbeing] outcomes.” I want to ask the Minister what impact this policy—with that in mind—is going to have on their Government priority targets in various other areas, including their education targets and their target to reduce the number of people on jobseeker benefits. It’s really clear that the advice is stating that this could lead to more transients, more housing mobility, and that there are social repercussions for that.

So, from the Minister, what is the advice that he’s received on their Government targets and their ability to reach those targets as a direct result of this policy being implemented?

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’m grateful to take a call on this, particularly following the previous Chairperson’s, Greg O’Connor’s, guidance around the Associate Minister of Housing’s answers kind of opening up the broadness of what we can cover in our questions.

I will stick to no-cause evictions because, obviously, that is the part that we’re on. I notice that there’s been a number of calls now—three or four of them—and the Minister hasn’t stood up and answered any of those questions, so we still don’t know what the evidential basis of this bill, and particularly behind no-cause evictions, is. That basically leads me to all of my questions, because there’s so much in the regulatory impact statement (RIS) and in all of the supporting information around this bill that points to the fact that there is no evidential basis for the bill.

The problem is that he doesn’t answer the question and doesn’t clarify what we’re all trying to understand, which is: what led this Government to make the decision to bring back no-cause evictions? It just leaves a whole bunch of space for speculation. That’s why all of us are all asking the same questions, trying to determine what the driver of this bill was. What was the reason? There isn’t a reason, because if you look even at the RIS, it talks about the fact that this was something that was agreed to in the coalition agreement.

You can see that there’s a bit of a track record going on here, where we’re having decisions made for us and decisions made that impact a lot of people in this House, simply on the basis of a coalition agreement. That’s not a responsible way to make legislation or policy, and then to have the Minister stand up and say in response to the lack of evidence behind it, making all of these claims—if you actually look at the RIS and those statements that you were making, they do not match up at all. How are we supposed to do anything except speculate on the intentions of this bill when we’re not getting any answers and there’s a big vacuum that’s been left?

We can move on from that one, because the question that I want to understand is this. It’s like what Ginny said, and didn’t get an answer to: what is the policy basis and what is the problem that we’re trying to solve for this bill?

That question has already been asked, but my follow-up to that is this: did the Government explore other potential ways to achieve that outcome that you seek? If the so-called intentions of no-cause evictions are to make it easier for landlords to take on “riskier tenants”—whoever that is supposed to be—then, surely, there are other ways to achieve that outcome that actually are founded in evidence.

Clearly, no alternatives have been explored in developing a solution to that policy problem, because the outcome was already predetermined in the first place. They already knew exactly what they wanted to do because, again, it’s in this magical coalition agreement that seems to overtake literally everything, including the founding document of our country—but I won’t go there.

Francisco Hernandez: You should.

TAMATHA PAUL: Yeah, I might—I might—because we’ve opened up the can of worms, haven’t we?

Francisco Hernandez: It’s been widened.

TAMATHA PAUL: Yeah, the can of worms is open. We’ve got Hana-Rawhiti Maipi-Clarke over here—no, I’m just kidding. OK, all right, back to this—back to this.

There was one point in particular that I wanted to touch on in the RIS, and it’s paragraph 106—oh, and it just so happens to be the Treaty of Waitangi analysis of the termination proposals. That’s great—that’s convenient. OK, paragraph 106: “As a result, the proposals may increase the risk that more households will need emergency housing and/or social housing.”

Again, that makes me scratch my head about why we are pursuing this policy that is going to have major implications for the amount of people having to access emergency housing and public housing, because we’re talking about these riskier tenants—and I’m sorry, but it’s hard to not jump to the conclusion of who you’re talking about when you’re talking about these “riskier tenants”—and also those are likely to be the people that do need to access emergency housing and social housing. Have we thought about those implications in terms of bringing back no-cause evictions?

The other thing is that my colleague Celia Wade-Brown made a number of questions and talked about her experience within housing, and I think she raised some really important points that, again, were not responded to about the way that different countries have chosen not to adopt no-cause evictions. The particular example that I wanted to bring up that she didn’t touch on was no-fault evictions—

The member’s time has expired.

Mr Chair, thank you for the time to stand and to respond to some of the opinions that have been surfaced. Again, I hark back to one of the whakataukī, or proverbs, of my father: you are entitled to your own opinions but perhaps not your own facts.

The Government’s proposals are intended to support supply and continue to keep downward pressure on rents. Whilst the opinions of various members opposite are very strongly and genuinely held, might I add, the opinion of the Government is that at the margins, the changes that are proposed will support supply.

There has been a comment—quite a podium comment at the hyperbole Olympics—around immigration being a driver of my observations. In fact, I’ve had very, very little comments, and I think that that myopic nature of that particular comment is merely to fill out the Hansard. Please do not put words in my mouth when I didn’t talk about immigration being a cause of my observations and the policy basis.

Hon Kieran McAnulty: You did actually, Minister. Check the Hansard. You mentioned it.

Hon TAMA POTAKA: Right, right. I did mention it. However, I did not mention it in substance, and starting to leverage that concern around immigration up and putting words in my mouth is highly unbecoming of that member.

There was also a number of comments around Māori and Te Tiriti o Waitangi. Guess what, people? Māori are disproportionately renters in this country, but also Māori are landlords, and those Māori landlords would welcome the flexibility to offer tenancies and houses to renters, whether they are Māori or not Māori. Whilst the members have opined and pontificated about what broadening choices for Māori renters means, I’ll make sure to get those tamariki Māori out of emergency housing, when the members opposite consigned many tamariki Māori to living in dank emergency hotels and motels throughout the country.

Fact: price inflation for new rentals has actually gone down from 7 percent as at the end of the previous Government’s administration, to 0.7 percent in the last couple of months. That, again, is an absolute illustration of the contextual changes and signals that this Government is undertaking. And, again, the provisions in this part of the bill are all about resetting the housing system as a whole and ensuring that we actually do provide for those many thousands of people who actually need a house—particularly those at an affordable level and an affordable rental.

Again, there’s a whole range of comments that have been made by members opposites about risks, but as the previous Minister for social development knows, and knows very well, the actual social-allocation system is based on risk and need. So, again, those members opposite who have commented around risk should take some time to undertake the relevant research required to better understand the housing system.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Well, it’s been quite interesting hearing the comments from the Associate Minister of Housing, accusing us of having a bunch of opinions when actually he’s responded with zero substance on the matter. I think that does a disservice to the process here, which is to actually scrutinise the Government and the Minister’s own understanding of his own legislation.

I may just test the Minister on a more technical matter, particularly in clause 22 and the changes to termination by notice, particularly in the provisions that allow for less than 90 days to be given. If we go to subclause (2) around the landlord “may terminate a periodic tenancy by giving at least 42 days’ notice”, there is a part there that includes “the owner of the premises requires the premises, within 90 days after the termination date, as the principal place of residence for at least 90 days for the owner or a member of the owner’s family;”.

I want to understand the Minister’s technical understanding of this part of the bill around what recourse exists for tenants who, basically, get kicked out of the place where they live, the home that they live in—if the landlord tells them that they need it for a family member—in the instance that that family member never moves in, also if the family member moves in for just a week. I think this part of this bill, this provision, makes it so easy for landlords to give way less than 90 days’ notice, makes it so easy for a landlord to basically just say, “Well, turns out I’ve got a sibling coming over.”, “Turns out my son’s coming over to stay for the holidays.”, and if those plans never eventuate, you could end up easily kicking out a tenant, with that home remaining vacant and the tenant may find themselves with no recourse.

If there is recourse, I’m keen to know what it is and how easily the Minister thinks it can be accessed—and whether the Minister thinks it’s fair for the provisions of this bill to allow, for example, a tenant to be kicked out under clause 22 for, say, a family member to stay in that property for one week, when actually for the tenant that’s been kicked out there’s a whole life being turned upside down potentially, as my colleague Tamatha Paul noted. It was noted in the regulatory impact statement—which I’m surprised that the Minister’s dismissing as just kind of opinions and ways to fill the Hansard—as potentially increasing the need for emergency housing.

I go back to the fact that it seems to me there are provisions in this bill that have enabled landlords, with very few protections for tenants, to tell someone that they’ve got a family member staying over for a week. That is not good enough. We should not be allowing landlords to actually kick someone out, to turn someone’s life completely upside down, to potentially push them into emergency housing because a family member wants to stay there for a week—potentially, provisions that may not need to even be substantiated by the landlord. I want to understand: what’s the Minister’s understanding of the recourse that exists for tenants to address this, if they find out that actually that family member never moved in, or if the family member moved in for, say, a very, very short period of time—and if that recourse exists, whether he thinks it’s realistic?

There’s a reason we keep asking the Associate Minister of Housing for evidence: it is because he has refused to provide any. It’s very difficult to then dive into the detail of this part without understanding what the Government has based their policy position on. We cannot rely on the regulatory impact statement because, as I said earlier, the Government didn’t give the department enough time to provide that detail. If we are to understand why the Government landed on 90 days and why in certain circumstances they landed on 42—as is outlined in clause 22(2)—we need to understand what it is that they’re basing it on. The problem for the Minister in refusing to answer a pretty simple question is that it becomes very clear that it’s not based on any evidence.

The other issue that the Minister has in trying to stand up and be clever is he’s broadening the debate every time he stands up. This was something that was noted by the previous presiding officer, Greg O’Connor. Instead of just answering the question—like, in fairness, the previous Minister did. If you look at the way that Minister Bishop deals with this, he stands up and says, “Now, the question from this member: here’s the answer. The question from this member: here’s the answer.” What do we get from this Minister? Bluster and arrogance.

He has introduced State housing, he has introduced emergency housing, which is very interesting, because the Government claims that by—as outlined here in this part—bringing it to 90 and in certain circumstances 42 days, this will help solve the housing crisis because it will mean that more landlords enter the market. I presume that’s the case. They haven’t actually made that connection. They haven’t based it on any evidence. At the moment, it’s just their reckons. Now, Minister, you are a landlord. Can you honestly tell the committee that these changes are going to help your tenants? I don’t think any landlord can. But it does help landlords. Now, if this was part of a broader policy programme, perhaps they might have a point.

Since the Minister mentioned social housing, let’s look at the broader context in which we need to look at this bill. This Government has sent a letter of expectation to Kāinga Ora which says that houses built next year will be 50 percent of the number of houses built the previous year. The houses after that will be only 400, and in Auckland, that number will reduce by 200. Kāinga Ora isn’t going to be building houses in the future. If we look at the community housing sector, this Government has funded only 750 a year over the next two years. Additionally, during scrutiny week it was clearly established when talking to the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development that this Government’s policy of tightening criteria in emergency housing is meaning fewer people are getting in. They’ve accepted that the need has not reduced but acceptance rates have. Now, the way the Government is spinning that is that they’re reducing the numbers in emergency housing. What’s actually happening is they’re not letting people in.

Why is that important? Because the Minister’s made it relevant by his responses, and it is in that context that we ask the Government: how is this going to help the housing crisis? If they are not building Kāinga Ora houses in the future, if they are not funding community houses to the extent that they have been funded and to the extent that is needed, and fewer people are getting into emergency housing, this, by the Minister’s own suggestion, will lead to more landlords entering the market. The level of consents have fallen through the floor and 12,000 construction workers have been laid off since this Government came in. Where are these people going to go? This here means that fewer first-home buyers will be entering the market if, by the Minister’s own logic, reducing it to 90 days and in certain circumstances 42, more landlords will be going for existing stock. How does that solve the housing crisis? Two very simple questions which the committee deserves a direct answer to. What evidence is this based on and how will this help?

Thank you, Mr Chair. I thank the Associate Minister of Housing for engaging on this point about the effect of this change, specifically to 90-day no-cause evictions, to the availability of rental properties, and to the price of rents. It’s helpful to have the Minister’s analysis on the record, although I don’t think we’ve gotten to the bottom of whether this helps or hinders.

Even if we take his sort of framing of what this is meant to do as “just around the margins”, as not something which will fundamentally change the supply and demand for housing in New Zealand’s market, I want to test with him some of what he’s told the committee about the evidence that he has to refute Treasury’s position that rents will continue to increase in this forecast term, because he has refuted that but not said why. I’m going to put to him what I think he’s said, in a way that we would also agree with, and then test it out from there.

I think what he said is, to use his words, this is part of resetting the housing system as a whole. And I think what we are debating here is how to achieve better outcomes for both first-home buyers and renters. I would posit that that requires Ministers to move away from the zero-sum cycle of speculative investment which has characterised the New Zealand housing market in the last two decades.

My question for the Minister is: in the situation where we have a limited supply of housing, where this measure does not increase the supply of housing but, by weakening renters’ rights, it does both incentivise landlords to buy up the existing stock and it incentivises first-home buyers to buy, because it is now harder to be a long-term renter—not at the sort of 25 to 35 stage, but if you’re a 35-year-old to 45-year-old that might have the capital but might be choosing to rent anyway with young children, it now becomes even more important that you are not subject to the vagaries of your landlord’s whims, where you might be required to move within 90 days for no reason. It’s even more of a desperate situation to get into your own house, and so both of those things are being driven up under this law change.

My question to the Minister is: even if we accept that this is just about addressing housing supply at the margins and demand issues at the margins, doesn’t this create a situation which is worse for the housing market—that we incentivise the prices of houses to go up and up, even if it’s just at the margins?

And my question, really, to him is about whether this change is something that could not have been designed in a way where it only was about new stock. Because he has given us a good sense that this is about a suite of changes which reset the housing system, was there not a way that this campaign promise of various coalition partners could have been introduced to only affect new housing stock? The Minister, in his answer to my questions, said that there was a need for more houses to be built. That is right; that’s not what this does. There’s no incentive here for investors in houses—for people who can afford to be landlords—to buy new houses or to build new houses themselves and then rent them out. This actually incentivises them to buy older houses and to sort of play in a market of renters who are “on the margins”—by his own admission. If this is about offering “risky renters” more housing options, then we’re down at the bottom of the market there, rather than the top of the market creating more additionality of housing supply.

Can the Minister help us understand, when he says that this is around the margins, what actual effect this is going to have on rents? And can he clarify for the committee whether he disputes the predictions that rents will continue to rise in the Stats New Zealand figures? Though he’s given us the figures which support his claim for downward pressure on rents, we dispute that, given the official statistics show that there is not a change overall in the market. There are some regions where that does seem to be the case, I’ll give him that—South Auckland is one where migration is having such an effect that rental properties seem to be coming down in price or are hard to rent at the moment—but, overall, the Statistics New Zealand data that is the latest set of data shows that rents continue to rise as Treasury predicted.

Thank you, comrade Chair—Mr Chair—for allowing me to take this call. I just have a question for the Associate Minister of Housing—a few questions. My first question is—

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): I’ll go with “Mr Chair”.

FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ: “Mr Chair”—I clarified and said, “Mr Chair”, Mr Chair. My question to the Minister is: I appreciate your reply on the question of immigration, so I just want to invite you, in your own words, to explain why you even mentioned it in the first place in response to some of the earlier questioning. If your intention was, as you say—and I’ll take it in good faith that you didn’t intend to kind of link the issue of immigration to the housing shortage at all. I think we appreciate, I guess, in light of international events and how there’s been a rise in xenophobia and anti-immigration politics overseas, why we might be sensitive to it here.

I also want to ask questions, turning to clause 22, around the question of termination by notice. We know that the regulatory impact statement states that the positive welfare implications that come from security of tenure are one of the most common findings recognised through multiple studies and surveys, which includes reduced levels of stress and depression. I know that this Government has been working on the mental health strategy, and I think that is something that’s been supported by all parties in this House. I think it’s really good that there’s a mental health strategy and we’re working towards addressing that. I do note that the mental health strategy takes into account the social determinants of health.

My question is: has the Minister or the department quantified the impacts of no-cause evictions and the Government weakening security of tenure on mental health, and what the detrimental impacts of that might be on depression? The regulatory impact statement explicitly states the positive welfare implications that come from security of tenure. It also explicitly states, if you look at the impacts of this legislation, that there’s a risk that it will increase the rate of emergency housing and/or social housing. We know that it will definitely reduce security of tenure. I know that there is a section here—you know, there’s some recourse that tenants might have around retaliatory notices, and we’ll get to that later.

Again, restating my questions: if your intention wasn’t to bring immigration to the issue of housing stock at all—because, you know, they’re kind of unrelated concepts—why did you mention it in the first place? What was the kind of rationale behind it? And what is the quantification of the no-cause evictions and the Government weakening security of tenure on mental health and depression? We already know that these services are under severe pressure and in many ways are lacking. I know that there’s a mental health strategy that’s kind of been drafted in place—I know that resources are being progressed to address that—but if there’s no quantification of them, or if there’s no wider analysis that’s actually been done on them, why has the Government been so comfortable in making these changes that are likely to exacerbate the risks to mental wellbeing around New Zealand?

I think we have to acknowledge that mental health is a challenge that successive Governments have not risen to the challenge on, and I know that there is a cross-party plan to kind of work on it together. I think that’s one of the best ways we can get enduring change on mental health issues in the House. It just seems like actions like this, where the Government’s own explicit advice has said that it’ll weaken tenancy security and therefore reduce the positive welfare benefits of secure tenure—why are we proceeding with this in the first place? Thank you.

Mr Chair, I appreciate the time just to stand and make a couple of comments. I just want to address the observation that perhaps my name is on the door of xenophobia and the innuendo that’s been introduced in some of the observations in the Hansard today. Just to reject that innuendo, the comment that I made was that rents and supply can be affected by a number of factors: wage growth, cost to build, immigration—a whole range of things can influence supply and can influence rents. That’s the context in which it was made, and we got a little bit of a run-on of what the implications or consequences or interpretations of that might mean.

In relation to tenants and retaliatory notice provisions, the Residential Tenancies Act proposals actually give tenants a little bit more assurance that they can’t be removed from a tenancy for enforcing their rights. The bill will do this by expanding the retaliatory notice provision to include a notice given by a landlord in response to enforcement action taken by a person or regulatory body such as the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, and repealing the 28-day time limit for tenants applying for an order that a termination notice was retaliatory, and, of course, misuse of termination ground is an unlawful act that may result in a $6,500 penalty.

The additional item that I thought it’d be useful to mention is just around the point that for tenants who want to terminate a periodic tenancy, it will be reduced back down to 21 days from the 28 days that it is currently, and this actually, in our view, provides a little bit more flexibility for tenants.

There were other comments that were made, and I was invited to make a response on them by the member for Manurewa. I’d just say that if I was in a situation where I was a developer and I wanted to build some rental apartments or some rental houses, but I knew that I had no flexibility—if I am the landlord—around no-cause terminations, that, in the view of the Government, is a disincentive to actually build those houses or those apartments, and that’s the sort of context in which we view these.

Again, the Government is very, very clear that we want to ensure there’s the right balance and flexibility for landlords putting on rental arrangements and to ensure that sensible and considered changes are made in alignment with our coalition arrangements, and, of course, we’re trying to ensure that there’s a better housing system in place. Kia ora.

I spoke a little bit to the departmental disclosure statement with respect to Māori, and I know that Tamatha Paul has spoken about this, but I have a couple of questions. If we turn to the regulatory impact statement and the Treaty of Waitangi analysis of the termination proposals, it’s really clear that it will negatively impact Māori for a number of reasons, and I won’t traverse that all again.

The point that I think is of note is that the Waitangi Tribunal has indicated that where disparities exist, active intervention may be required by the Crown to remove those disparities, and it is likely these proposals will raise concerns and criticism from the Waitangi Tribunal in relation to the risk they result in further inequity—article 3—the lack of consultation with Māori, and inconsistency with the principles of partnership, participation, and active protection. I think this is big, and I want to know from the Associate Minister of Housing how he thinks that a policy like this that has that type of description about it is therefore conducive to good Crown-Māori relations.

I would also like to know from the Minister why he has chosen to actively reinstate the disparity, given that it was only a few years ago that we took this away and ensured that landlords couldn’t enforce no-cause terminations. Now he is reinstating the disparity that, clearly, disproportionately impacts Māori.

There are two questions there, relating to the Treaty of Waitangi and to Māori, and I’d really like an answer from the Minister.

Just before I take the next call, I do note that the Associate Minister of Housing has addressed some of the broader questions that are being asked. If I can ask members to make their questions specific to clauses in Part 2, it would help the committee.

All right. Thank you, Mr Chair; I’ll set aside my notes on the economics of this change and focus now on clause 17, which inserts new section 43AA. This is the provision that clarifies the extent to which a tenancy agreement may prohibit smoking in—

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): That’s in Part 1.

ARENA WILLIAMS: Sorry, Mr Chair.

I have a very specific line of the bill, found in clause 22(1), which inserts new section 51(2)(b). I was asking about paragraph (a) beforehand. I think these deserve separate scrutiny because they’re actually quite different ways in which a landlord can actually kick someone out way earlier than 90 days. The previous question I asked was in relation to a family member moving in. It seems to me that the Associate Minister of Housing confirmed to me that there’s nothing stopping a landlord from literally lying and saying to a tenant, “I’ve got a family member moving in”, but that may never eventuate and someone’s tenancy gets basically ended in 42 days and someone’s life gets turned upside down, or that family member just moves in for a day or a week. I’d like some confirmation of that.

In subsection (2)(b), in clause 22(1), though, what I’m referring to—which is my new point—is the line that says, “the owner is required, under an unconditional agreement for the sale of the premises, to give the purchaser vacant possession;”. It is our view that tenancies should transfer to a new owner. A landlord doesn’t actually have to sell the property with a vacant possession. It’s often considered that those properties may be worth a bit more, and I wondered whether the Minister did any analysis of exactly how much more those properties are worth when they’re vacant as compared to otherwise, and compared that with the negative impact of someone’s tenancy being terminated—in 42 days, in this case—as a result of this.

I say this because this is a genuine issue. This has been raised in The People’s Review of Renting. We have people who said, “I usually need to move house every 12 months due to landlords selling the house I live in to realise their capital gain. This has happened three years in a row and it costs me upwards of $1,500 for movers and cleaners and uses up my annual leave. Emotionally exhausting. No security at all when renting.” And this is why I asked this question.

We do know from tenants about what this specific subsection (2)(b), found in clause 22(1), will cause to them. Therefore, I think the onus needs to go back to the Minister—because he claimed to care a lot about facts—to actually tell us what robust analysis has been done in terms of ensuring that, actually, this provision doesn’t create financial hardship, stress, as has been identified by tenants and The People’s Review of Renting, compared to, for example, the additional capital gains that a landlord or a property investor will be able to make by having a property being vacant when trying to sell. I’m worried that this isn’t substantiated. For somebody who’s been criticised—well, several of us have been criticised—for just putting out their opinions, it seems to me that he wasn’t able to substantiate subsection (2)(a) in clause 22(1), and I’m really curious to know whether he can substantiate with facts why this paragraph (b) was put in when we do know from reviews that it has caused harm to tenants.

I recommend, if the Minister hasn’t read The People’s Review of Renting, which was launched in 2017, that he does so, because he’ll find plenty of robust analysis from people who have experienced his policies about what this specific paragraph in the legislation will cause.

I do want to signal to the Chair that I do have other questions that are yet to come, particularly on clause 24—that’s paragraphs (a) and (b) of new section 54(2), inserted by clause 24—but I’m hoping that the Minister will address my comments and questions in relation to clause 22.

Kia ora, Mr Chair. It’s interesting listening to the debate this morning. I’m going to speak on clause 24, but I did want to make one brief comment before I jump into that, and it was the previous address by the Associate Minister of Housing around making it easier for developers to build and certainty for them and the fact they can kick people out whenever they want and do whatever they want. I think we’ve got to consider, firstly, a mindset change here, because in New Zealand owning rental properties is an investment, whereas in Europe it’s a home for life, right? We’ve got to, I think, challenge the Minister to really consider the fact that it’s a mindset shift in terms of what actually being a good landlord is. That’s just a comment, but I’ll move to clause 24, in Part 2.

This is around the replacement of section 54, where the tribunal may declare a retaliatory notice of no effect. This replaces section 54 where the tribunal may declare notice around retaliatory issues. We’re considering this, because this is important, and so I guess my question is around whether you feel like the settings are right in this section. If I go to clause 24, inserting replacement section 54(2), “The tenant may apply to the Tribunal for an order declaring that the notice was retaliatory on either or both of the following grounds:”—and it goes on with (a) and (b). Again, we’re being thoughtful around this, because I think this is the issue, and the power imbalance of tenants and landlords is that there can be things done and issues created and then retaliating. The power imbalance means that the landlord obviously has all the power, whereas the tenant has less power.

We think this could be OK, but we just want to get assurance from the Minister that he feels this is tight enough. I note that in section 54(3) the tenant is able to make an application within 28 working days after receiving the termination notice, and the tenant may at the same time apply for an order declaring the notice to be of no effect. And then, of course, it’s around what the Tenancy Tribunal then engages and does. I mean, it saddens me that we even have to have the conversation about what landlords may choose to do, but I think this part actually is potentially around the protection of the tenant. Does the Minister believe that he has got this right; that it’s tight enough and that it has good checks and balances to ensure that the tenant is protected when it comes to—I can’t even say the word!—retaliatory provisions and just meanness from the landlord?

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to have a kōrero on this matter in relation to the questions that were just asked regarding the retaliatory provisions. We do believe that there is a strengthening of the notice provisions in the Residential Tenancies Act, giving tenants a high level of assurance.

In relation to the notice periods and the comments made around the notice periods for vacant position, there already exists one of those and it’s called periodic tenancies. Of course, with fixed-term tenancies, that’s slightly different because tenants continue to stay on, but for periodic tenancies, that notice period in the proposed legislation reduces from 63 to 42, and we believe that’s a better balance and a sensible change. In addition, where family members move in, whilst there was an implication, from the comments, around landlords potentially lying, there’s also a requirement that family or whānau members that move into a home stay for at least 90 days. Of course, if not, then there’s potential to give rise to a Tenancy Tribunal matter. Kia ora.

I’m going to take a call from Ricardo Menéndez March, because you referred to some questions you had around clause 24, if they are different from the questions that Glen Bennett just asked.

Well, there are several amendments we haven’t had a chance to speak to either, so—

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): I’m suggesting that it be specific to the point. It’s not always on every bill that every amendment gets spoken to, because there’s been lots of chances to do that, so stick to the clauses. If you want to bring an amendment into those clauses, then that’s fine.

RICARDO MENÉNDEZ MARCH: I appreciate that. And if you check the Hansard, beyond the stuff that one of the previous Chairs, Greg O’Connor, talked about on the broader economic settings, two of my other calls have been incredibly granular about the clauses that I am referring to. I hope some grace is given in relationship to that, and that I am doing my best to pinpoint where I am talking about in the bill.

I want to talk about one of our amendments around the limit of the number of times no-cause evictions can be used for. This particularly relates to, actually, several provisions, including in clause 24 around the retaliatory way in which these no-cause evictions are used. The reason for that is that as we identified in the debate around clause 22, some of the provisions actually allow for some retaliatory methods to be used by nature of just a landlord lying—for example, around a family member—and then that actually can leave very little room for the provisions in clause 24 to take effect, particularly around paragraphs (a) and (b) in clause 24(2).

The amendment that we’ve got would restrict the number of times a landlord can use no-cause evictions to three times a year. This is because in the analysis that we’ve heard from tenants, we’ve heard from tenants that no-cause evictions had, in the past, been used multiple times a year for people. I wonder whether the Associate Minister of Housing had—particularly when it comes to the provisions in clause 24 to protect tenants against retaliatory measures, but how those interact with how, actually, other parts of the bill—given any thought to the number of times no-cause evictions should be used in a year.

Actually, if we go back to some of the provisions I was speaking to in clause 22, there’s so many days in a year that you could—you know, if you divide it by 90. Because some of those provisions allow for 42 days to be given, you could have a landlord literally using no-cause evictions several times a year. Our amendment would actually put some protections in place to ensure that no-cause evictions can only be used by a landlord three times a year, which we none the less don’t believe will mitigate all of the harm but it will go some way towards addressing what I believe is a lack of answers and even addressing from the Minister from the questions I asked in relationship to clause 22.

When he refers to the retaliatory issues, that actually leaves the gap, because I feel like he’s going back to clause 24 when I asked questions about clause 22. Actually, those are quite different issues. I wanted to understand—and I do still have more questions on clause 24, but I did want to make sure that we brought our amendment. There are many other provisions in the bill, in Part 2, and several clauses that are yet to be addressed, but I did want to check whether the Minister had considered whether there’s a balance to be struck here in the intent he’s trying to achieve and then the number of no-cause evictions that can be executed by a landlord.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’m really pleased to take a call on this. I realise that there are some areas that may have been traversed, but I need to, particularly with this Minister in the chair, the Hon Tama Potaka, traverse some of the impacts for Māori on this.

Obviously, I’m talking about clause 22(1), replacing section 51(1), where a landlord may terminate a periodic tenancy in any case or at least 90 days. As I said, I do appreciate that there’s been some areas that have been traversed in terms of Māori, but we have to ask today, particularly given the climate at the moment, what this Minister in particular has done in his relationships—what has he done in terms of his relationships with Māori?

I appreciate he’s got quite a wide brief in terms of what he’s doing in terms of Māori development and Māori-Crown relations—

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): I think the questions to the Minister should relate to the clauses in the piece of legislation. Thank you.

Hon WILLIE JACKSON: I was coming to it. I just talked about the clause, and I’m talking about Part 3, clause 3.2. What steps have been taken to determine whether the policy to be given affect by this bill is consistent with New Zealand’s international obligations?

The Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) considered this bill and whether it is consistent with the Government’s Treaty of Waitangi obligations. HUD has considered the impact of the proposed bill through a Treaty of Waitangi lens, including discussions with HUD’s legal team and Māori policy team. HUD also consulted with Te Puni Kōkiri during the policy development. There’s a bit of an overlap here with this Minister, who has Māori development and iwi relations and, of course, this particular kaupapa. We always say that Māori development goes across all different portfolios. And the good thing about this is we have a Minister who has an associate housing responsibility.

I would like to know from the Minister what type of kōrero has gone down with him and Māori, not just as mana whenua but with our different Māori providers around the country. Has he signalled and is he looking to work in coordination with some of those Māori providers—which is incredibly important at the moment, as we have, as he well knows, the Whānau Ora kaupapa now being put up by this Government and being tendered for by many organisations, not just Māori organisations. So, coming back to this 3.2—

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): Can you just refer us to the page? We’re just having a task finding—

Hon Member: Are you on the right bill?

Hon WILLIE JACKSON: I think I’m on the right bill, but I’ll come to you. I’m talking about page 12, clause 22(1), replacement section 51(1) “A landlord may terminate a periodic tenancy in any case by giving at least 90 days’ notice.” And what I’m talking about here—

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): Oh, right, OK. You were talking about 3.2 and we lost you. Right, OK, thank you.

Hon WILLIE JACKSON: That’s right—yes, yes. No problem to clarify. Anything else you want to clarify?

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): No, that’s it. Thank you.

Hon WILLIE JACKSON: I’m happy to clarify and continue talking about this kaupapa because the ramifications for Māori are huge. I can see the Minister thinking about this—whether he’s actually consulted with any Māori with regards to this kaupapa.

Now, we know he has a relationship with the Iwi Chairs Forum, but there is some kōrero on the street that he has forgotten to speak with Maataa Waka and some of the key providers here—[Interruption] No, no, this is important for the other side, because the Māori rate has dropped in terms of housing ownership, which this Minister is in charge of. In terms of rentals, Māori are transient—they’re moving from house to house. Now, this 90-day clause, as he well knows, threatens to put so many Māori out on the street. What is the plan around that? What are the Treaty ramifications? Should Māori be scared because this Government is proceeding with this Treaty principles legislation? What are the effects in terms of our different communities going forward?

Can I ask him—has this been part of any kōrero with the Whānau Ora kaupapa, for instance, which is a major kaupapa at the moment because the Government—[Interruption] Everything is Whānau Ora, but I’m happy to explain this to members—particularly to my good friend over there, Dana Kirkpatrick. Very happy to take another five minutes to explain the consequences of this decision in a Whānau Ora sense. This kaupapa has been put on the floor.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 22 set out on Amendment Paper 226 be agreed to.

The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 22 set out on Amendment Paper 227 be agreed to.

The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendments to clause 22 set out on Amendment Paper 228 be agreed to.

The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendments to clause 22 set out on Amendment Paper 229 be agreed to.

The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendments to clause 22 set out on Amendment Paper 230 be agreed to.

The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 24 set out on Amendment Paper 231 be agreed to.

The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 24 set out on Amendment Paper 232 be agreed to.

The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendments to clause 27 set out on Amendment Paper 233 be agreed to.