Counter-Terrorism Acts (Designations and Control Orders) Amendment Bill

Members, we come now to the Counter-Terrorism Acts (Designations and Control Orders) Amendment Bill. Members, we come first to Part 1. The question is that Part 1 stand part.

Mālō e lelei, Madam Chair. Minister, I just want to touch on section—I’m in the wrong part, my apologies. I’m looking at Part 2 now, and I just realised. I’m going to sit down, Madam Chair, because I was in the wrong part.

Point of order, Madam Chairperson. Can I seek leave to hear all parts as one?

Leave is sought for that purpose. Is there any objection? There is no objection. The question is that Parts 1 and 2, Schedules 1 and 2, and clauses 1 and 2 stand part.

Let’s try that one again. Minister, I just want to reflect on Part 2, clause 15, because during the select committee process, this was really gone through by both the Justice Committee, and also we had submitters who were quite concerned about the restrictions that we were going to put on some objectionable materials. There was concern from some submitters that this would actually make criminals out of people who inadvertently perhaps, say, just imported a game that was particularly violent, and it would put them into the scenario of being potential criminal terrorists that needed designations on them. We fleshed this out as a select committee, but I think it would be great if we could actually flesh it out so that it’s covered in here to alleviate some of those concerns that those submitters had, because it was made very clear to us that it wasn’t the objectionable material itself that would cause a person to be designated as a terrorist, but, rather, other activities too. I just wonder if you would be able to respond to that and give clarity to those submitters, please?

Thank you very much to the member. We were just actually having a conversation about this. So it’s two-gate or two-tier in terms of how it works in the legislation, and you’re right that a significant number of the submitters felt that objectionable publication offences should continue to be limited to publications that have been deemed objectionable due to their explicit support and promotion of terrorism.

The expansion of deeming grounds is based on advice from law enforcement agencies that the possession, the consumption, or the use of those objectionable publications that depict extreme violence or cruelty can indicate terrorism risk, and they are a feature of cases where people have been investigated for violent extremism or have committed a terrorist act. But it’s important to note that this change is limited to the types of publications deemed objectionable under the existing offence, rather than introducing any new qualifying offences—and I think that’s really important to know.

So a conviction for an objectionable publication offence is not sufficient for a control order to be granted on that alone—you don’t get a control order just on that. It must also be proven that the person presents a real risk of engaging in terrorism activity, and that harks back to the primary legislation of the control orders Act.

So, number one, you have to be engaging with that material; number two, that has to be tied to a real risk of terrorism. So I think it’s important to reiterate to people who are concerned that it’s not enabling people to be subject to a control order just for the fact that they have engaged in some objectionable material alone.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’m very happy to stand and take a call in the committee stage of the Counter-Terrorism Acts (Designations and Control Orders) Amendment Bill.

Look, can I firstly just thank Minister Ginny Andersen for the clarification. I think that was a very good point that was raised by my friend and colleague Nicole McKee, who, of course, is on the Justice Committee with myself. I think that at the end of the day, there is always an opportunity through our justice system that should the intent of legislation or the intent of this House not be followed, there is always an ability to come back and look at that and make any changes or address it. But I think that the Minister’s response to it can give us some sense of confidence that we’re not going to capture or catch people and designate them as a terrorist because they’re looking at some objectionable material or accessing that material but that there actually has to be a link to the planning of a terrorist act.

Can I acknowledge the chair of the committee and the rest of the committee and our advisers—thank you for the work that you have done. This is really important legislation for us as a country, as always. National security is one of the primary responsibilities of any Government, and I think it’s always incumbent on the Opposition, and certainly the biggest Opposition party, to try and work with the Government as much as possible around national security. I think that starting right from the original meeting with the Minister and myself and my friends and colleagues Christopher Penk and Paul Goldsmith, and actually engaging in this genuinely, taking some recommendations that we’d made—and we wanted to see some changes. They were made, so we acknowledge that.

But my departing comment, Madam Chair—if you will allow me—is just to quite simply say that the LynnMall attack was horrific for us as a country, and we’ve been very lucky and very fortunate that we haven’t had another attack like that since LynnMall. I want to acknowledge all of our security and intelligence agencies, which work hard to protect us and make sure that that doesn’t happen again.

It’s OK for the rest of the country to forget about it or form some sort of complacency—that’s a good thing. But, as lawmakers and as the people responsible for making sure that we remain vigilant and we remain focused on making sure that there isn’t another terror attack, I would draw our attention to the royal commission of inquiry, and I would ask the Government to remain focused and vigilant in expediting the implementation of those recommendations, because there’s still a majority of those recommendations that haven’t been implemented. There are three that we feel very strongly about: recommendation 1, which is to appoint a Minister to lead and coordinate counter-terrorism efforts; recommendation 2, which is to establish a new national intelligence and security agency; and recommendation 4, which is to develop and implement a public-facing counter-terrorism and countering - violent extremism strategy.

So I’ll finish on that point. I would ask the Government—rather than slow down—to speed up the implementation of these recommendations from the royal commission. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I’m actually wanting to follow up on what Nicole McKee was asking, and as it was very much teased out in the Justice Committee while trying to get to the heart of it around objectionable materials—and I know the likes of the Free Speech Union here in New Zealand were quite hot on this about clause 15.

So I think we’ve got in the right space, and I think I want to say that first and foremost, but I think it’s important to get it on the record, and the question—if I can articulate it right to the Minister—is ultimately that it’s not so much that the material is objectionable, though that’s part of it, but what really triggers the dynamic here is the person who is accessing it. So it’s sort of the Free Speech Union’s objection—sorry, there are too many objectionable words there. The Free Speech Union and others’ concern was that we are widening the notion of what is terrorist material, with their basic concept being that this bill could now make a whole lot of other materials be deemed objectionable and then, consequently, terroristic, and they had a whole lot of examples of very violent video games and the like. As I’ve mentioned to the Minister and others before, I don’t want any of that stuff—period—but in some ways, in a free speech environment, it’s not for me to decide.

So their concern is that we are expanding the notion of what’s terrorist into objectionable materials. I think we heard clearly in the select committee—and Nicole McKee was touching on it too, and I think we heard it from yourself, Minister—that what will trigger a control order is that the person already has crossed a threshold when it comes to terrorism, and, consequently, should not have access to these materials now deemed objectionable. To put it another way, the ordinary citizen—while we wouldn’t want them to—could still obtain those objectionable materials and not be deemed a terrorist.

I don’t know if I’m articulating that OK. But, if so, I’ll sit down, see how the Minister goes, and hopefully—yeah.

Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Mr Simon O’Connor. Look, I think I recall the submission in relation to the Free Speech Union, and I take note that what this legislation aims to do is, number one, respond to an increasingly complex global terrain in terms of what those terrorism risks are in the way that they present. It’s important in that context that we are equipped to respond readily, but it’s really important that not only do we make sure that our legislative settings are clear but that we also protect the rights and freedoms of those designated individuals—so striking that balance, to be clear.

So to go get to your point, which is the same point I made in relation to the member Nicole McKee, it’s really important to note that a conviction for an objectionable publication offence is not sufficient for a control order to be granted. So it is important that we go back to the primary legislation—the Act related to control orders, which has been passed by this House already—to look right up front in that bill to show that there are some very clear grounds that a real risk in terms of terrorism must be presented. It is really crucial to reiterate to submitters such as the Free Speech Union that just accessing the objectionable material alone is insufficient. It must also be in that second tier in which it poses a real risk outlined under that primary legislation. So I hope that addresses the member’s question.

I’m 99 percent sure it does. So, in effect, and, again, for the listeners at home—[Another member drops a glass of water] I’m just making sure colleagues are OK. In effect, the control order has already been triggered for a New Zealander or an individual, and, consequently, this bill is going to limit a little bit further what they can access—that’s the important part. The control order is already triggered. This particular person is already, if you will, on the radar, and, consequently, we are slightly expanding the definition of what they can or, in this case, cannot access.

The question is that the Minister’s amendments set out on Supplementary Order Paper 330 be agreed to.