Summary Offences (Move-on Orders) Amendment Bill

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. We are going clause by clause through this bill, as there are no parts, but you’ll notice that clause 5 has substantially more clauses in it under the new clause 8 than any other part of this bill, so this is where the substantive debate will be.

💬 Hon James Meager: Clause 5 has one clause.

Would you like to take a call?

💬 Hon James Meager: No, I just said clause 5 has one clause.

Yeah, so if you—have you read the bill?

💬 Hon James Meager: Yeah, I’m looking at it right now.

Because clause 5 is here, and then it inserts new clauses, so it inserts new clause 8A—

💬 Hon James Meager: So that’s new sections.

Well, no, they’re not sections until they’re passed, Mr Meager, are they? Thank you. Thanks. I’m happy to take any contributions from the other side, because I know that you would like this debate to be going on as long as possible.

Anyway, there is a lot under clause 5 which does insert these new parts of the Act, so we will need to cover those in some detail. I’m proposing that we move through the different parts of it as far as we possibly can. So—

💬 Hon James Meager: What’s the title of clause 5? What’s it called?

Mr Meager, I’m happy to yield some time if you want to give a lecture on statutory interpretation.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’d just like to read out the title of clause 5. Clause 5 says “New sections 8A to 8I and cross-heading inserted”. Thank you.

Committee of the whole House

Thanks very much for the intervention, Mr Meager. It’s really good to know that you can read.

💬 Hon James Meager: At least one of us can—at least one of us can!

But it’s not a section unless it’s passed, but it proposes to insert a new section.

💬 Hon James Meager: Yes.

OK? I think we agree, but anyway—

💬 Hon James Meager: It’s not inserting a clause; it’s inserting a section.

Well, look, I’m happy for us to debate this all night, so if you want to take another call, I’m happy to yield some time for you, but I do have some questions for the Minister, who’s looking rather left out at the moment.

Under new section 8A, inserted by clause 5, I have a question for the Minister of Justice. This is the power to issue a move-on order, and under new section 8A(1), it states, “A constable may issue a move-on order to a person”. I want to know: has the Minister received any advice on the type of discretion, or will the guidance to constables when they are issuing move-on orders actually cover the type of discretion that a constable should use when issuing a move-on order? Because this is kind of quite fundamental to the way that the bill will operate when it’s in force, because the constables will have discretion. I know it’s obviously up to the constable to decide—and I assume this is the same—that there is the same ability for them to think, when they would prosecute someone, that they had the same independent discretion; and I assume that’s the same with issuing a move-on order, although we accept that that initial step to put forward a move-on order is different from arresting someone or initiating a prosecution. I would like to know if any guidance is going to be given in relation to that.

I also have a question around the part in new section 8A(1) that states whether the person has engaged in, or recently engaged in, some conduct which could be subject to a move-on order. When we talk about “recently engaged”, what is the time frame that the Minister expects that that would be applicable to? Would that be a situation which had just been completed? For example, if someone was sleeping and they were lying down and asleep, and then they got up immediately, would that be “recently engaged in”? Or if someone had been begging that they’d heard of perhaps the day before, or the week before, would that be considered “recently”? What is the scope and the extent to which “recently” would be considered to cover? There might perhaps be some guidance in other statutes that may elucidate that, but maybe the Minister may have some advice, so that would be helpful to know that too.

Then we go down to new section 8A(1)(c), and I wanted to talk about the definition of “unreasonably”. I do have some further questions around the change that has been made to “begging”, which has “unreasonable” in it, not “unreasonably”, but I wanted to ask some preliminary questions first on these initial clauses. When the Minister, because he’s the author of this bill, talks about “unreasonably obstructing, hindering, or preventing someone from entering or leaving a place”, what guidance does he have around what may be considered “unreasonably”? I’ve been trying to think of some examples where there might be a legitimate reason for people to prevent someone from accessing a place. Say if there was a hidden danger that they weren’t aware of, the person might feel that there was some obstruction, but maybe that wouldn’t be considered to be unreasonable. I just wanted to know if there’s been any thought as to how that will be interpreted and would be grateful for the Minister’s thoughts on that.

I will come back to “unreasonable begging” because I think that’s a separate question that I won’t have time for. But just while I have a few seconds, when we talk about rough sleeping, there’s quite a detailed description of setting out personal possessions, and there’s been some concern that, maybe, that might cover camping, festivals, that kind of thing. How is the Minister assured that those types of legitimate activities would not be covered under that definition in paragraph (f)?

Committee of the whole House

The member said that she assumed that the guidance and the usual discretion that police officers would apply in other cases would apply in this case, and that is indeed the case. They will be given some guidance on all these matters and then they will use their discretion accordingly.

I want to take this opportunity, while I’m on my feet, to point to the main Amendment Paper that I’m making. When it was introduced, this legislation, it just referred to “begging” in the grounds for issuing a move-on order. Throughout the discussions in the Justice Committee, some parties in the select committee agreed to change that to “unreasonable begging”. As Ms Belich has referred to, the National Party and the New Zealand First Party didn’t support that change, but the ACT Party did. We were concerned about the enforceability of that, and so, subsequently, we’ve given some further thought to the question. That’s why I have Amendment Paper 804, which replaces “unreasonable begging” with “begging that unreasonably interferes with the use or enjoyment of the public place by another person in the vicinity of the begging”. We’ve done that because we think that will be a clearer definition and will more effectively be able to be enforced by the police. I’ll be making that Amendment Paper available for a vote further on, and happy to be answering any questions.

Committee of the whole House

Point of order. I seek leave to correct the Green Party’s votes on clause 4 for Tamatha Paul’s amendment set out on Amendment Paper 794, Duncan Webb’s tabled amendment replacing the definition of “begging”, and Chlöe Swarbrick’s tabled amendment to be 13 votes in favour.

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Jenny Salesa): I seek leave for that correction to be made. Are there any objections? There are none.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to ask a question about the new section 8A(1), inserted by clause 5, at the moment, and I want to ask particularly about the discretion of the constable. The use of the word “may” is permissive, and I understand that I said that the actual discretion is not necessarily a bad thing because there is a capacity to be more humane, but what I want to know is what kinds of checks and balances the Minister of Justice has or intends to put in place with regard to the use of a discretion, which could easily be used to enforce prejudice.

That is because that happens in life. We’ve dealt with it in other laws where we’ve been careful because people come with prejudices that are built in, and they don’t even recognise themselves. When you’re making a decision about a move-on order and whether to issue it, and the nature of what’s happening in front of you in terms of reasonableness, then I would be very concerned that those baked-in prejudices turn up with statistical evidence that some people are being issued with those orders and not others. I want to know from the Minister, and I’d like an actual answer to this, what thought has been put into place in terms of making sure that we are tracking who is getting these orders and who is not, and what sort of checks and balances are in place with regard to that?

I’d also like to ask a question about the new paragraph (f), the rough sleeping paragraph. What I want to know there is that it’s actually related to the issue of the violence that we see in our society at this present time. We have a real housing crisis, a housing shortage, and we have a lot of people coming out of violent situations, often women, and sometimes—more often than ever should be—young people coming out of those situations, and they tend to sleep in the light in the street.

I asked the commissioner of the city mission this question in the submissions period. I said, “Are you concerned that people will move from light places to dark ones because of this law and that they will be at risk of more sexual violence and violence as a result?” I was told that that was a serious concern of the mission, and I’ve also heard the same thing from Lifewise. So when it comes to the inclusion of rough sleeping here, I want to know if that is going to be something that is taken into account—that a constable making a decision may not be the best thing to do in the circumstances. How much is the Minister expecting the constable to take into account the vulnerabilities of the person on the street and the risk to them of moving? How much is that going to happen when it comes to that discretion, and what sort of guidance have the constables been given about that?

Now, I appreciate that later on we’re going to come to an amendment in the law, from 14 to 18 years, but there are a lot of vulnerable 18-year-olds out there. There are a lot of vulnerable people out there, and they tend to be the people that end up on our streets.

Committee of the whole House

On the question of discretion and prejudice, obviously we back the thousands of New Zealanders of every ethnicity who are in the police force and who strive every day to do their best and do not seek to act in a prejudiced way but seek to enforce the law. We back them in doing that. Of course, the police, as part of this legislation, will be regularly reporting on their use of move-on orders, and people will no doubt be able to study those as to the extent to which those move-on orders are resisted and ignored, and people are sent before the courts. Then, obviously, the courts will have oversight of that.

In terms of the question about safety, obviously the Government is very concerned about public safety and that’s why we’ve had an absolute focus on reducing the number of victims of crime, and the good news is that we’ve been making good progress on that. There are 37,000 fewer victims of violent or sexual offending since we took office, according to the latest figures. So that is very much our focus. Police make all those considerations when making move-on orders.

But, of course, there are many, many things—and I’ll be getting very repetitive if I keep reminding the committee of this—and this legislation is not designed to be the Government’s sole response to homelessness and the many other problems that people confront and face. There are many, many other things that the Government does on behalf of New Zealanders to help those who are in need, and we have huge resources devoted to those. This legislation is about giving the police an extra tool to deal with behaviours that are creating a sense of dysfunction and chaos in our CBDs and in our town squares so we can reclaim those areas for the benefit of those who live and work there.

Committee of the whole House

That last sentence from the Minister is actually what I was going to ask about, because my understanding of the intent behind this bill is to address the issue of people rough sleeping or begging in the central city, within the CBD. However, section 8A(1), in clause 5, is in relation to conduct in a public place, which is incredibly broad. My question to the Minister in relation to that is why not define that to add some parameters around where this actually applies?

As the Minister knows, there are public places everywhere and this isn’t targeted to the area that he has talked about so often when he’s talked about this bill and who it is designed to, apparently, be for. So why did the Minister not consider adding some parameters around that? And because this is about a public place, did he consider that if you moved a person on, if there were sufficient numbers of constables who chose to enforce this against every single person who was rough sleeping in this country, everywhere, not just in the city spaces, that that would move people out of public spaces and into private places? In terms of people who are rough sleeping and squatting in abandoned buildings, which are private property, did he think about the implications of people moving from public spaces into private property?

The other question I have—and this is still on section 8A(1)—is around the term “engaging in, or has recently engaged in” and this is about the behaviours listed. I think “engaging” is an interesting term, and I am keen to hear what the Minister’s and his advisers’ definition of “engaging” is because when you look at rough sleeping, for example, engaging is a word that seems to imply an intent—you’re engaged in something; you are participating in the thing. But rough sleeping could be as simple as falling asleep.

I had a genuine example of that recently at one of my events where a homeless person came along and fell asleep in a chair, a young person, and we were all kind of going, “Is this person all right?” only to find out that they had fallen asleep because they were tired. And that is kind of the point. If you engage in an activity—I don’t know if anyone ever says, “I’m going to engage in a sleep.”—there is an intentionality behind the word “engaging”, which I don’t think is captured when you are rough sleeping.

Homeless people are running on adrenaline because they have no shelter, because they are in a public place, because they are constantly under threat, because they are trying to avoid conflict with all the people and all the politics that might be happening on the streets, and they might not actually choose where they fall asleep. When we think about the people who are older or disabled and might be rough sleeping, they might not choose to fall asleep in a particular place. If someone who doesn’t have fixed accommodation was sitting outside a business on a park bench or a street bench outside a shop and they fell asleep there by chance, they didn’t necessarily engage in any particular behaviour. They just fell asleep. I think that what a lot of the submitters were trying to capture when it came to rough sleeping was that rough sleeping is sleeping. It is something that everybody does, that every human being has to do. The “rough” component is where you do it. If you don’t have fixed accommodation and you simply fall asleep, this bill means you’re committing a crime. So can the Minster talk to us about how he and his officials came to the word “engaging” and how someone could ever be engaging in sleeping. It simply doesn’t make any sense.

The other thing I wanted to talk about is section 8A(1)(a), which mentions behaving in a manner that is disorderly, intimidating, or threatening. Can the Minister talk to us about the term “intimidating”? What you might find intimidating or what he might find intimidating , and what I might find intimidating, and what everybody in this room might find intimidating could be completely different. For example, he might be walking down the street and see someone with a hoodie pulled up and be intimidated. Is that intimidating? What guidelines would the police, who are enforcing this law, develop in order to determine whether something is intimidating or not? I’m really keen to understand what “intimidating” means. Also, what is the threshold that makes it criminal? You could ask—and I know the Minister knows this because he would have engaged with lots of violence prevention organisations and advocates when he was developing the stalking law. What a young woman might find intimidating might be not completely unsafe. It’s subjective. It’s a subjective term.

So what we’re trying to do is clarify—

💬 Hon Paul Goldsmith: You were very happy with it with the stalking legislation.

You can answer when you take a call, Minister. I’m still asking my question.

What are the guidelines by which these police officers will define “intimidating”? It’s not good enough to stand up and say, “Oh, well, I have faith in the hard-working thousands of people who are in the police.”—that’s not good enough, because this process is to determine what those people, actually, do in real life. So to stand up and give these broad-brush statements that provide no legal clarity, since the Minister’s such a big fan of legal clarity—Treaty of Waitangi clauses—then, maybe, he should tell us what that means, so that it is clear for police officers, so that, if any those police officers end up in trouble, or end up before the courts because their decision to classify something as “disorderly, … intimidating, or threatening”, is challenged, they’re not going to have a leg to stand on. They won’t be very happy with the Minister because he didn’t want to stand up and tell us what “intimidating” means. While he was at it, he could have explained what “disorderly” and “threatening” is. Sure he might say, “it’s based on case law”—go for it; just an answer would be awesome.

The other question that I had was in relation to new clause 8A(1)(b), which is about “behaving in a manner that is disruptive”. What does “disruptive” mean in this sense as well? Does that include people who are protesting outside of a store? Because, in Wellington, Cuba Street, Left Bank, there are constantly protests outside of there. Does that behaviour—will those protestors be moved on? Sometimes they’re really small protests. Sometimes they’re only three or four people—do those people get captured within the manner that is disruptive? Who defines what is “disruptive”? This is the problem with the bill, that we’re going to be having—we’re going to have to spend a lot of time on this. Because it is so vague, because it is so unclear , we’re just going to have to keep asking—even if we have to ask what each and every single word means—because it is so uncertain.

The other question that I had, actually, in relation to the answer that the Minister gave previously around his Amendment Paper that he’s introduced, which changes “unreasonable begging” to “begging”—da, da, da, the bits he’s added on—can he explain what the difference is, practically, between the application of “unreasonable begging” and this new phrasing, which is “begging that unreasonably interferes with the use or enjoyment of the public place by another person in the vicinity of the begging.” I would really appreciate knowing the difference between that sentence and “unreasonable begging”.

Committee of the whole House

Right. There was a lot in that 10 minutes. In terms of “falling asleep”—and that’s something that I’m sure is on the mind of many members at the moment—of course, that is the purpose of the move-on orders, in the sense that it may be that some person may fall asleep, and they are not subject, of course, to any criminal liability. What we’re providing here is the tool; that the police officer could wake them up and tell them to move on, and there is no great suffering on the part of the person involved other than to move, which may be inconvenient, it may be not what they want to do, but it is not the most difficult thing in the world. So it’s only the refusal to follow that order that creates any liability.

In terms of the definition, the definition of “intimidating”—for example—that is well-defined by the courts, and we’ll be referring to those, no doubt: intending to cause and instil fear in order to influence conduct. I do find it very interesting that the member did make the point that some people will find behaviour intimidating, which others wouldn’t find intimidating. And she did refer to the stalking legislation. I do find it fascinating that that member was very supportive of the stalking legislation, which has subjective things like “fear” and “distress”—very subjective—and she was very happy to support those. But, of course, she’s not happy to support these, which are something that can be handled by the courts. So that’s an interesting difference that we’re seeing.

So all I’m saying is, in terms of “if somebody was to fall asleep”, then the worst that can happen is that they could be woken by the police officer and then invited to move on—and then the relations of the Act would take place.

And so the definitions of “intimidation”, “disruptive”—all those things have case law definitions that have been developed over time.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate the opportunity. I do note my colleague Dan Rosewarne is very keen to take a call. So I just note that for the Chair’s information.

My colleague Tamatha Paul has moved on to “unreasonable begging” and I will now, too. This is a big subject because this is a change from the original bill. We talked a little bit about—

💬 Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan: Last-minute amendment.

—that’s right, a last-minute amendment—we talked a little bit about this in the definition of “begging”, but I want to go into a little bit more now what the Minister of Justice is proposing. I have to say the Labour Party will not be supporting the Minister’s Amendment Paper, and I wanted to outline why that is.

The reason is because I think what the Justice Committee put in place is a stronger and more robust definition of “unreasonable begging” compared to what the Minister has put in place, and I can go through the reasons for that. The reasons for that is not only do we have a change of the definition of “unreasonable begging” from “unreasonable begging” to, as Tamatha Paul said, “begging that unreasonably interferes with the use or enjoyment of a public place by another person in the vicinity of the begging”, which is, you know, on a plain-language test, probably not as good as “unreasonable begging”—it is more descriptive.

Now, I note that also there have been subsequent deletions. If we’re looking at the primary bill here, 8A(1B) has been deleted by the Amendment Paper. That provides the detailed information of what might be considered to be “unreasonable begging”. This has actually got a basis in case law, so it’s important to understand why I think that this is not the right approach to take. This is really helpful because it says, for a constable, it allows them to have regard to the “time at which the begging is occurring or occurred; the duration of the begging; where the begging is occurring or occurred; the effect of the person’s begging on the enjoyment of public spaces … in the vicinity of the begging.” That is very descriptive.

Interestingly, we’ve got—and I don’t think we’ve referred to this before—a second vet by the Attorney-General, under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, and that was only tabled, I think, on the 15th—it’s still the 15th, so today, in parliamentary terms. This was really interesting because this bill—actually, what we asked for at select committee, was “can we understand if the amendments that we’re making at select committee seek to mitigate the concerns that were raised around the breaches of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act by”—

💬 Hon Paul Goldsmith: And it has.

Pardon me, Minister?

💬 Hon Paul Goldsmith: Yeah, and it has.

Well, we asked that question at select committee and we—regretfully, due to the way that parliamentary advice happens, the Ministry of Justice told us they’re unable to give legal advice. So I was actually going to say, it was actually quite helpful to have this set out in this way by the Attorney-General, so I do thank him for providing this. It’s quite unusual. I don’t know if I’ve seen that before—a view on an Amendment Paper—but, actually, it’s what we requested at select committee and it is helpful.

The reason I raise it—also for the committee to be aware that it exists—is the Attorney-General specifically addresses, in his Amendment Paper, whether the change to the definition, as proposed by the Minister, would still alleviate the New Zealand Bill of Rights concerns. In paragraph nine of his opinion he states that he considers that the courts could be able to consider the factors that have been removed by the Amendment Paper. He says—and I quote—“I consider that the courts will interpret ‘unreasonably interferes’ as including these factors and constables can be expected to exercise their discretion to issue move-on orders consistently by considering these and any other relevant factors.” So, essentially, the Attorney-General is stating that, in his view, even though the Minister’s Amendment Paper has deleted 8A(1B) that these should be considered by constables in a practical sense when they consider whether to issue a move-on order for unreasonable begging. So that is quite an interesting perspective that the Attorney-General has indicated.

Essentially, the Attorney-General is stating that, in his view, even though the Minister’s Amendment Paper has deleted new section 8A(1B), these should be considered by constables in a practical when they consider whether to issue a move-on order for unreasonable begging. That is quite an interesting perspective that the Attorney-General has indicated. Essentially, the Minister’s Amendment Paper has deleted a clause, and the Attorney General says, “But we still envisage that constables will take those into account.” The reason that the Attorney-General states that he thinks that that should still be taken into account is actually because of a Supreme Court decision in Brooker v Police where they looked at disorderly behaviour and the right to freedom of expression, and the Supreme Court of New Zealand applied the factors of time, place, and duration to find out if it was reasonable or not in terms of the behaviour. My question to the Minister—

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Jenny Salesa): Can I just ask members on my right—the Minister wants to hear the contribution—on the chatting. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair. The question that I have for the Minister is: does he agree with the Attorney-General’s view that despite the deletion of new section 8A(1B) in his Amendment Paper, in fact the constables issuing a move-on order should consider those factors before issuing a move-on order? That’s quite important. The other reasons that I don’t consider that the Minister’s paper is an improvement on what the select committee did is because of the other clauses that it deletes. Those come up a little bit later, so I might leave those for now, but, essentially, I do think that is an important question to have on the Hansard. Does the Minister agree with the Attorney-General around those deletions? Is he expecting constables to still consider those factors prior to the issuing of a move-on order?

Committee of the whole House

Thank you for picking me, Madam Chair; it’s much appreciated. I’m really interested to hear the Minister of Justice’s responses to Camilla Belich’s questions. I just want to also just touch on clause 5, new section 8A(1) just around the “reasonable grounds to suspect”. What strikes me about new section 8A(1) is that it’s not based on a finding that an offence has occurred or even a prosecution or conviction. Instead, it rests on the constable having reasonable grounds to suspect that conduct is occurring or has recently occurred. This is, therefore, a preventative power rather than a traditional enforcement power. Because it is the foundation on which the rest of this bill or this regime sits, it’s important that Parliament understands—or we all understand—exactly how it is intended to operate. My question to the Minister is: could the Minister explain why “reasonable grounds to suspect” is an appropriate threshold for restricting a person’s ability to remain in, or return to, a public place for up to 24 hours, and what safeguards exist to ensure that the power is exercised consistently across the country and appropriately?

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. I was asked to comment on the Attorney-General’s section 7 report on this legislation and whether I agree with it. I’m looking at paragraph 13, the conclusion that the Attorney-General considers that the bill as proposed to be amended by the Justice Committee and the Amendment Paper—that’s my Amendment Paper—would no longer appear to be inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. I agree with that conclusion, and I’m pleased about it.

💬 Camilla Belich: What about the other parts? What about his reasoning?

Well, I mean, he’s made various comments, and people can draw conclusions from them. The Amendment Paper, I believe, provides a more objective standard for police to apply, instead of relying on a list of factors. The police will take consideration of those factors, such as the time, place, and duration into account as part of their operational guidance.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. I do want you to pick up on some of the stuff around what has been removed in Amendment Paper 804, but, this is my first call for clause 5. I do want to touch on a few additional questions and responses from the Minister of Justice. First of all, the point that my colleague Tamatha Paul is trying to make in and around intimidation is not about the test that we’re looking at it. We’re simply looking at the clarity around what is to be expected when a constable is making a determination on what they find intimidating. Again, different people, like the Minister said and like my colleague Tamatha Paul said and Camilla Belich said, might perceive that differently, so we’re just simply asking for clarity.

When we’re looking at new sections 8A(1)(c) and (f)—actually, no, I’ll go to (1)(f) when it comes to rough sleeping—it specifically states “a public place”. Now, if we’re looking at, let’s say, Auckland CBD and if you look at the place where I used to work on K Road, we had a tall building with a massive eave in the front. We had homeless whānau sleeping underneath that because it’s sheltered from the wind. They set up their own little corner. They have dogs and they have pot plants. It’s very pretty. They decorate it very well. That’s not a public place, even though it is open air. That is the property of my building. So, as the property manager of that building, I would not appreciate if the police then come and move someone on, because they’re not in a public place; they are in a private place. In those instances—can I just check?—do constables have jurisdiction to move someone on from a private property? By extension, if we’re looking at places, such as shops, leaving a place where there’s lawful trade or business, a little alcove where there might be the entrance to a cafe—those are all private properties. In those cases, would the constable or the police be given explicit guidance that, in those areas, they actually have no jurisdiction then to move people on? I think that is an important clarification we’re seeking from the Minister.

Now, moving on to the Amendment Paper.

💬 Hon Member: Moving on.

Yeah, moving on to Amendment Paper 804, I understand where the Minister’s coming from. What we are looking at is the removal of new section 8A(1B), in this case. What is being deleted in (1B)—I just want to check because I think I heard the Minister correctly that that is now going to be built in as a part of the general guidelines for the police when it comes to the duration of begging and all of those.

I do want to check, because we have kind of asked this question before—we’re looking at new section 8A(2). In there, it does specify 24 hours, but, again, it doesn’t specify—and this is the question we’ve been asking since the beginning of the debate, and we haven’t really got any clarity on—what the distance is and how far they are expected to be moved on before they are considered to be in violation of that move-on order? Is that going to be regionally dependent? Is that going to be a by-law that’s expected? Is that going to depend on the individual constable? Would the order itself specify that you need to be further than 500 metres from this particular location? Again, this is a clarifying question, I think, that we haven’t really got any sort of response to from the Minister. I will leave it at those questions.

Committee of the whole House

Well, I can provide some clarification for the member. These move-on orders will only apply in public places. If someone is in a private place, then that is a matter for the owner of that property. If they were of a mind to, they could apply trespass legislation in that place, but if you’re at a private place, that’s over to the owner of the property to deal with it.

That is why we’re doing this, of course, so that if you’re trying to operate a business and people are lined up on the public pavement in front of the office, yelling at people as they’re trying to sort of go about their business and potentially come in and buy a cup of coffee or do whatever they needed to do, then that would be an appropriate thing for a move-on order. But if it’s in private property, not so.

💬 Hon Members: Madam Chair! Madam Chair!

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Crikey! Let me get settled!

Committee of the whole House

Thank you. In the spirit of what should happen here, which is a little bit of conversation about this, I would like to just take the point that the Minister the Hon Paul Goldsmith made. Isn’t it a likely unintended consequence of this piece of legislation that people will move—particularly we’re talking about rough sleeping. I don’t want to blend in the issue of behaviour which is noisy, etc., but with rough sleeping, aren’t they likely to move from public spaces into private ones? So, for example, I have several places in my area where people can break in and they can go and sleep because they are buildings that are unused. Aren’t they likely to move into buildings, etc., rather than being in those spaces? Haven’t we just moved the problem somewhere else?

Now, we’ve heard discussions about that—about the problem moving from one place to another—that simply by moving people on, that’s exactly what you’re doing. But should people be concerned that, in fact, what is now going to happen is that people are going to rough sleep in derelict buildings, etc., rather than in open spaces? It’s a really genuine question, because if it happens, I’d like to be able to hold this Government to account for that. Because that wouldn’t necessarily be something that the community was expecting. We’ve seen it with other things where crimes have been moved, etc., and disorder moved, but particularly rough sleeping, because rough sleeping is not subject to the rationale that the Minister just gave, which was about making a lot of noise—it’s not; it’s people sleeping. So could you answer that question, please? Thank you.

Committee of the whole House

Well, just in reply to that question: yes, a lot of thought has been given to the implications of where people are to be moved on to and whether that will lead to a different outcome. Of course, the primary outcome that we want to see is people not rough sleeping in public places and overall creating a sense of disorder in our main streets. As I’ve said, and I’m repeating myself again and again in this debate, which is to say that this legislation has never been designed to be our full Government response to the issue of homelessness. There are many, many other things that we do as a Government on behalf of New Zealanders who have a deep concern about those who are struggling in our society. That is why we invest billions of dollars in housing support in many, many respects. So, yes, it’s an ongoing task to deal with those behaviours, but this legislation is not designed to solve all those problems, it is to provide the police with an extra tool to be able to deal with a real and practical problem that we face.

Committee of the whole House

Point of order, Madam Chair.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Sorry?

Point of order. I won’t be doing cartwheels, just to remind the Chair.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): You won’t be doing what, sorry?

Cartwheels, as we discussed before, because it’s hard to—I’m sorry, my bad, Madam Chair. I just want to check, the Minister has kind of opened the discussion for the debate because he’s talking about investment of billions of dollars into other things. Can I seek your clarification, Madam Chair, if we can now start wrapping some of those investments into the discussion of this bill, since the Minister has broadened the scope?

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): No, we’re sticking to clause 5 of this bill.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. Just for your information, which I know that you will know, but perhaps some colleagues on the other side of the Chamber don’t, that we’ve got several parts to clause 5 that we have not yet discussed at all—several pages we haven’t covered: page 4, page 5, page 6.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): I can read, yeah.

Yes, no, that was mainly for your colleagues’ benefit, Madam Chair.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): You’re addressing me, though.

Yes, yes. Thank you.

So I do have some further questions, was my point, and some further issues to raise, which haven’t been touched on. The first thing that I wanted to raise, just in respect of the rough sleeping, before I move on from that particular part in new section 8F inserted by clause 5. Now, I did have a question for the Minister of Justice around types of situations, because we don’t have a definition of rough sleeping in this bill. This has been raised by the Law Society and it was raised in the definition section. But the reason that we’re asking about this now in new section 8F is because it’s not clear exactly what it covers.

So my question was: would it cover a situation where you might have people who were setting up for a festival or we have freedom camping excluded, but we don’t have generalised camping? I do think it’s important for the Hansard and for the record for the Minister to clarify exactly what he means in this bill when it comes to rough sleeping. I think that’s really important, and I don’t think we’ve had a clear answer to that yet. We do have setting up possessions and makeshift shelters. I think there’s an amendment that my colleague the Hon Dr Duncan Webb has around specifically excluding things like tents and camping and that kind of thing. I think that’s important, I won’t ask further questions on it, but it’d be nice to have a response from the Minister.

Then I do want to move over now to the part that is entitled “Requirement to leave specified area” in new section 8A(2), inserted by clause 5. Now, this is when a move-on order is issued and it specifies to leave a public place, but one of the changes that we made at the Justice Committee was to make it a “reasonable distance away”. So we’ve taken “specified distance”, we’ve made it “reasonable distance”, and we’ve also added that into subsection (2)(b)(ii). I wanted to ask the Minister—and, obviously, this is a question that he may be able to get some guidance from officials—if they’re going to be any constraints in relation to “reasonable”, because that is a new part of this section, and what exactly is meant by that?

Then, I wondered if it is OK now to come to what was quite a big issue in the discussion of the bill but hasn’t yet been touched on in its substantive section, and that is that there’s been a change from the bill as it was originally introduced to exclude those aged 14 to 17 years old. That’s under section—scared to use language now, in case someone criticises me. But the heading is, “Who move-on order may be issued to”. It states that it may only be up to 18-year-olds. The issue here was that we had quite a lot of information in select committee that there was a discrepancy and a contradiction between the ability of police to utilise move-on orders for children and the Oranga Tamariki Act. We also had a reluctance from police to utilise a move-on order when dealing with children, which I think is absolutely fair enough.

I want to understand, this is a significant back-down by this Government. It’s a significant change in policy. I’ve asked the Minister a number of times why he included children originally. Every time I’ve asked him about it, he’s said he believes that children should be covered that are of the criminal age, which is the definition which is included in here—criminal age of responsibility. He’s backed down on this. I want to understand why he’s decided to do that and the reasoning—whether it was the Oranga Tamariki Act, whether it was a reflection that he was wrong. I think it’s important to know why there has been this quite significant policy change, which I think is the right decision and I’m supportive of it, but it’d be good to know the Minister’s reasoning.

Committee of the whole House

I’ll just say to the member that, quite often, members will try and persuade members from the other side of the House as to their arguments, and they’ll make a case, and other people will make a case in submissions; in this case, around young people, that there were very good reasons for not including them in the legislation. We, as a Government, listened to those submissions, and we decided, on balance, that, yes, they made more sense.

Now, to describe that in a pejorative term such as “back-down” I don’t think is necessarily helpful to the overall business of Parliament. The process was that we started out with some legislation where, yes, we went firm because we were determined to reclaim our town squares for the benefit of people who live there and work there and visit, but we heard the submissions on this matter and we thought, on balance, that it made sense, and so we’ve made the change. I wouldn’t describe that as a back-down; I would describe that as democracy in action—and I think that was all.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. I do wish to move on a little bit, noting that my colleagues may have questions, but it’s clear from some of the responses that we are not going to get a straightforward clarification from the Minister.

I want to check with the Minister around new section 8B in clause 5, and so I am moving to new section 8B at this stage, which is on page 4 of this bill. This is to do with when we’re looking at the service of a move-on order. I want to check: in that instance, yes, we have a list of possible methods that the constable is able to use to serve a move-on order under new section 8B(2)(a), (b), and (c), but can I just check that if the constable said “Here is a move-on order.” and they serve it to the person, but the person is already leaving the area, would the move-on order still be in effect?

One would assume that when you are being moved on, or when a person leaves, you are going from one specific location in a public place to another specific location in a public place, but what happens if the person moves from a public place to a private place? How, then, would that move-on order take effect?

Following on from that particular scenario, if a constable is approaching someone or has a discussion with someone with the intention to issue a move-on order, but the person moves to a private space, then you can no longer issue a move-on order, and instead you would be expecting whoever is the resident of that private place to then either call the constable or issue a trespass order. Based on what the Minister said before that this is only applicable to public places and if you are in private places, you have the option of issuing a trespass order, I’m just thinking, again, how many people would then move between the liminal spaces of public and private places? That’s my question to the Minister around new section 8B.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’ll also move to a separate section that we haven’t discussed yet.

Just before we get to new section 8B in clause 5, I just had a final question around quite an important part of this bill, which is the exclusion where there is a political purpose to the conduct—for example, I’m thinking of a sit-in or a demonstration. When I lived in London, there was a big protest outside St Paul’s Cathedral which was Occupy London, and they had a lot of tents and things.

I’m assuming that the purpose of the restriction from and exclusion of move-on orders is if there’s a point of view, a cause, or a campaign, and I just wanted to ask the Minister: does he see it as being quite a wide and loose test if there’s some kind of political or protest element to it and the move-on orders wouldn’t apply? I do think that’s an important characterisation of this bill, and it is one that I agree with. I don’t think move-on orders should apply to political protests.

Then, moving on to new section 8B—which has just been discussed a little bit by my colleague Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan—I just wanted to note that there is a provision in new section 8B(2)(c) which requires the “express consent” of an individual before providing a move-on order electronically. We haven’t mentioned it, but there was a provision earlier in the bill—which we’ve now gone past—that talks about the fact that it has to be in writing. But there is a need for an express consent for the move-on order to be sent electronically in terms of the service of it, and I wanted to know: has the Minister had any advice on what express consent would include? Is it simply verbal consent, or would it be also required in writing, or not? What would that exactly mean?

In terms of new section 8B(3), there’s a provision here that requires an explanation before sending the order, and what I wanted to know is: because this is a specific requirement and a separate limb of the bill, how will that be recorded? Will there be a requirement for a constable who is serving a move-on order electronically to record the way in which that explanation of the order has been given, because it is a specific explanation. It’s quite detailed, the process that the constable has to go through here.

Just jumping slightly back but still in new section 8B, I had a question around the word “immediately”. A constable has to “immediately” serve the person with the move-on order, and it’d be good to get an answer on that.

I can leave it there. I do have some questions, probably, moving on to new section 8C in clause 5, but I’ll just see if the Minister wishes to answer any of those questions—yes, he does.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. There are a couple of questions in there from Ms Belich, but first I’ll go to the one from Lawrence Xu-Nan. It was a question around where a person is leaving an area from public to private: once the order is served, it is in effect until the specific time expires.

Then there were questions from Camilla Belich around new section 8A(5) on protest and campaign activities and how wide this would be. You would interpret the section as widely as to protect the lawful right to protest and campaign, which are legitimate activities in a democratic society, and which this subsection (5) protects.

Then there were some further questions around what express consent includes. It can include oral consent to receive the electronic notice.

Then there was a question on what “immediately after” means in new section 8B(1). It means in the moments immediately following the issuing of a move-on order.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Minister, for those answers. We were just saying that it’s very refreshing to just have answers without all the attitude, so thank you for that.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Maybe we can just have questions without the attitude.

Touché, Madam Chair—touché. All right.

Anyway, I know we have asked a few questions about the age thing. It was a big point raised by a lot of submitters, but I will ask questions that haven’t been asked yet around the age moving up to 18 for this bill, and I just have some pretty straightforward questions. Knowing that a lot of people under 18 don’t have a form of ID that verifies their age—and I’m guessing if they are rough sleeping or begging, they definitely won’t have a passport or, potentially, a driver’s licence—I just wanted to ask: if an officer is unsure about what the age is of a young person, what tools might they use to determine the age before being able to serve a notice, if that person is over 18?

Then the other question I had in relation to the age is this. I do appreciate that we did change the age within the select committee process due, I think—to put it most simply—to the vulnerability of people aged 14 to 17.

I just wanted to know whether officials or the Minister considered other forms of vulnerability, and what people who are rough sleeping or homeless or begging might be experiencing in terms of, potentially, disabilities. They might have intellectual disabilities or physical disabilities, such as things like fetal alcohol spectrum disorder, which is a disability that does make someone incredibly vulnerable, and vulnerabilities around their safety. So I am just trying to consider vulnerability in the broader sense of the term, and, when the Minister was deciding to support that change in age due to the vulnerability of young people, whether they might have considered other ways that people might be vulnerable.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’m of the view that you earn the right to have attitude in this place, and some of that comes from longevity, and I certainly haven’t been here long enough to express any attitude. So I’ll answer the questions as straightly and succinctly as I can.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Didn’t you just do that?

Ha, ha! There’s a question around how will ID be proven or given by police. The police use their existing tools and operating procedures to interact with individuals to determine their age, as is operationally appropriate, and the police have a range of information and tools with which they can do that. Where an individual is under the age of 18, the obligations under the Oranga Tamariki Act apply, so that’s the reason for the age limit being put in place.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): We’ve got a little bit to go yet. Camilla Belich.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate that, and we’re trying to move through these new parts. My very last question on new section 8B, inserted by clause 5, was that I recalled that the Law Society had a submission to put in an amendment to this section, which was, I think, based on the experience in Western Australia. They had a suggestion to put an amendment in which was based on the Western Australian Criminal Investigation Act. In their equivalent to move-on orders, they have a provision which states that police officers need to consider, when issuing a move-on order, the person’s personal safety and their ability to access places where they usually reside. I think probably the main question I have is around personal safety, because we do have a clause which addresses some of the other aspects of their submission. So I wondered if the Minister in the chair, the Hon James Meager, would be open to the idea of having an amendment where police officers have to consider personal safety.

The reason I suggest that is a really compelling argument against move-on orders, specifically for rough sleepers, was the aspect of being safe in a public place. That was especially for women, because often where there were lights and CCTV cameras and the ability to be recorded and safe and visible, the evidence that we received is they often felt more safe. While we’re looking, just before we move to new section 8C, I just wanted to know if, in section 8B, the Minister would think about having to consider that, because if you’re moving a female homeless person on and they’re not allowed to be in a brightly lit public place, that is a safety concern, and that’s the evidence that we heard. So I thought that was a really good point that they raised.

The other thing that I wanted to suggest, moving on to 8C: I do believe there probably are some on the Table, but another amendment that was suggested at the Justice Committee but didn’t end up being picked up was when we look at section 8C(1) and detaining the person for a time that’s “reasonably necessary”. We did have some submissions stating that there should be a time limit for that so it wouldn’t be as reasonably necessary, and that was an extension of time that could go on for ever as long as it was reasonable, and that maybe we had 15 minutes or an hour. So I thought those were actually really sensible suggestions, and I wanted to know whether the Minister would be open to accepting one of those amendments to have just a kind of a time period so that someone wasn’t being detained. I think there is a term, “unreasonable imprisonment”, which is a common law type of imprisonment. Helen White may remind me, but that’s, if I recall, from law school. If you don’t have a genuine reason—

💬 Hon Members: False imprisonment.

—that’s right—it could be false imprisonment. I think if we had a time period, then that would limit the chances of that being challenged. So I think that that is particularly important. That’s all I have on new section 8C, so I’ll ask the Minister.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. There’s a couple of question there. One was around public safety and whether or not we would accept an amendment to require the police to consider, I think, the safety of the individual. Public safety is already a core function under the Policing Act, and, of course, the New Zealand Police take the safety of all New Zealanders incredibly seriously. So it’s not required to have an amendment, because it’s already part of what they do as part of good policing.

The second question around whether or not we should accept an amendment to build in a time limit to help further define what is reasonable—I think that would provide some difficulties because if you accept 15 minutes, 20 minutes, 25 minutes, what is reasonable in some circumstance might take longer than that. I think it’s important to make sure that we look at the context and the situation and just take an approach where reasonableness says, “Look at the circumstances, look at the situation—what would a reasonable person think is a reasonable amount of time in that situation?” Of course, you’ve got New Zealand Bill of Rights Act considerations around arbitrary detention in considerations like that, which would help influence that. So we don’t think it’s necessary.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. Sorry, just one clarification from the Minister: was that the part around “reasonable excuse?” I missed the clause where he said “reasonable”.

💬 Hon James Meager: It’s new section 8C(1): detention for a period that’s reasonably necessary.

OK. Thank you—thank you. I just want to make sure that I’m not duplicating my question; that’s all. My question is actually on the next part, which is new section 8C(2). Again, it is good to have the Minister in the chair on record in terms of some of these aspects because I want to know what is considered a reasonable excuse for someone to be able to stay in a particular location. We have, and I can’t remember whether it is somewhere in this bill or somewhere else—I remember reading that, for example, it is now considered a reasonable excuse if they need to be in that area for things like groceries, for things like medicine, pharmacy. Can I just double-check with the Minister that those are still considered a reasonable excuse.

I do want to check one thing with the Minister, and I’m going to move a little bit further, noting that my colleagues may have other questions for section 8C. But there is something I want to ask regarding new section 8D, when it comes to the duty of the constable to explain the move-on order—but also noting that there have been members here who have not taken a call yet on any of the parts, so they may have other questions for the earlier parts.

When it comes to the duty constable explaining the move-on order, I want to draw the Minister’s attention to Amendment Paper 800, from my colleague Tamatha Paul. While it is important for a constable to explain to the person all of those effects and the duration of consequences, it is also important because we’re looking at the police here as well. There is an ability for the person to also be told of their right to complain to the Independent Police Conduct Authority. I want to check with the Minister if that is something that the Minister thinks should be an amendment to be adopted or if the Minister thinks that it’s something that is already embedded within the everyday operations of the duty of the constable—that it doesn’t need to be its own specific amendment. If that’s the case, I acknowledge that and understand why the Minister wouldn’t support the amendment, but I do want to check that with the Minister.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. Mine is a small point, but it is about section 8C, inserted by clause 5, and it is about the irony in the thrust of this section. Section 8C(2) says, “A person commits an offence [who] without reasonable excuse, fails or refuses to remain at the place where the person is detained.” This is for the purpose of giving them a move-on order. We’re telling them to stay still because we want to tell them to move on.

It seemed to me that, earlier, the Minister of Justice talked about the fact that this was to allow people to be moved on, when in fact it might be a lot simpler if the police officers simply asked them to move on in certain circumstances. We already have law that covers things like behaviour that is disorderly, and we can move them on. Now we’re getting them to stay in place so we can tell them to move on.

Then the Minister talked about how this is not a criminal act, giving a move-on order—that was not the criminal act; it was only the refusal. But then it looks, when I look at this section, as if we are assuming something that’s of quite a high threshold, because we’re getting names and addresses, we’re making people stay in situ at our constables’ express command. Those are all things that we would say are much more likely to be considered in a criminal situation, and we’re not dealing with something that is threatening in the way that we have had in other areas. For example, I was contrasting, I was thinking, “Well, you know, we do this for drug-driving and driving under the influence of drink.”, but those are actually serious safety issues for the public. We’re not talking about that here, because the Minister has talked to us about doing this because it’s something where he wants businesses to thrive. We’re not in that league.

Does the Minister accept that these conditions in this section are much more akin to what we do in a situation where there is criminality? How did he balance that situation when it came to getting all that information off somebody who has not actually committed a criminal offence, and told them they have to stay in place, when, in fact, what the legislation’s thrust seems to be is to move them on? Could you just explain, how does that work? We are using terms like “reasonable”, so we’re not limiting the impact on that person’s freedom; we’re giving very broad scope when it comes to that. Thank you.

Committee of the whole House

In terms of taking a person’s biographical details, the previous member, Helen White, sort of made that out to be some form of inquisition or unreasonable thing, and I don’t think any reasonable person would think that. Taking one’s name, address if there is one, and date of birth, those sorts of things—biographical details—are fine.

In relation to what is a reasonable excuse for breaching a move-on order—there was a lot of questioning around that from Lawrence Xu-Nan—a “reasonable excuse” is a common feature of many criminal offences and allows for scenarios that would otherwise amount to an offence having had to their individual circumstances. It’s ultimately up to the courts to decide that. Of course, nobody needs to go anywhere near a court if they follow the move-on order, and that is the purpose of the legislation.

Committee of the whole House

Madam Chair, tēnā koe. I just want to note that this is my first call for this section. However, I want to ask the Minister of Justice a question specifically around the biographical details, which is new section 8C(5), inserted by clause 5.

The question really is—and it’s a concern about truth and honesty and who to believe and who not to believe. Really it comes down to the officer making a decision on whether or not a person deemed to be disrupting the peace or targeted for this move-on order is telling a police officer the truth. They may be telling the officer the truth, but the officer then doesn’t believe them. There’s no indication in this to ensure that when a person is asked by an officer to declare their name and their date of birth—because it doesn’t have in brackets “if any”, and I do acknowledge that paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) do allow for room to move. But with name and address, where a beggar or somebody without a stable abode is told by a police officer to declare their name and (1) they either refuse or (2) they tell the truth but they’re not believed—that’s actually something that happens quite often, especially when we’re dealing with Māori or Pasifika: they tell the truth, but they’re often not believed—that’s got to be considered seriously by the Minister in determining biographical details.

I have a tabled amendment to delete that “belief only” limb, to require “knowing falsity”, and accept a “no fixed abode”, which is here, and I do acknowledge that. But, really, the question to the Minister is: must the prosecution prove the details were actually false? That’s really important.

I have another question, and it’s moving on to section 8D, please. I note that there is a tabled amendment that has been put forward, not by me specifically, but by my colleagues, and it’s really important. It speaks to a duty of care—to enact a duty to assist. It’s so important. I have embedded that in my first member’s bill, which speaks only to preventing youth homelessness, but this is a broad subject. We’re talking about move-on orders, and there is no duty of care. When we look to who this bill largely impacts, it is people who require serious care. With duty of care, it doesn’t exist anywhere—it doesn’t exist—so nobody’s responsible. But we all in this House are responsible to ensure that everybody is safe, not just those being targeted by this bill. The duty of care ensures that no one falls through the gaps. That has been a constant for generations; people are constantly falling through the gaps.

I acknowledge that the age limit has been raised to 18. However, rangatahi that exit State care are still very much acutely suffering and don’t have the same supports as your typical 18- to 24-year-olds. Is there a duty of care to those rangatahi who exit the State system who have absolutely no support? Whether that’s by the system itself or from whānau, there is absolutely no support. There must be a duty of care—especially to rangatahi—like the people in Kick Back up in Auckland, who are constantly meeting these rangatahi who are being underserved and underprotected by the law but also by the community.

A duty of care, specifically in a tabled amendment before this committee tonight, speaks specifically to the Ministry of Social Development to ensure that healthcare access is still made available. If people are moved on, that duty of care ensures that the front-line services are still able to provide those specific people with the care that they need. It takes a very long time, as this House knows and as the Minister knows, for a service provider to, one, find a homeless person and to engage them safely—to approach them—and to build the trust. Trust is so important when you are dealing with homeless people and transient people—especially those who are known as “lifers”. Lifers continue to move around, and they end up back in the same place. A duty of care ensures that no one falls through the gaps.

I go back to the point that we have a growing issue of homelessness, and to mitigate that continuing to put pressure on every single system that is out there—including healthcare, mental health, and everything, the Ministry of Social Development should have a duty of care.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to discuss new section 8D, inserted by clause 5. That’s the duty to explain a move-on order, and it requires a constable, so far as is reasonably practical, to explain the effect of the order, its duration, and the consequences of breaching it. For begging, the constable must also explain why that behaviour was considered unreasonable.

I think most members in this House would agree that if a breach of a move-on order can ultimately result in criminal proceedings, then understanding the order becomes very important. Compliance depends not only on receiving the order but actually understanding what is actually required.

So my question to the Minister there is: what will happen if a person does not properly understand the move-on order because of a communication difficulty, a disability, or a literacy issue, or they may even be in mental distress? How will police demonstrate that the explanation requirement has been met? This is actually something that came up in submissions, in particular from the Epilepsy Waikato Charitable Trust, and they highlighted that concern as well. Any response from the Minister will be great. Cheers.

💬 Carl Bates: Madam Chair.

💬 Grant McCallum: Madam Chair.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): We are getting close, but the Minister, I think, is itching to get on his feet.

Committee of the whole House

In terms of the duty of care—and I am repeating myself on this matter—in terms of this legislation, it’s around providing the police with a tool to deal with particular behaviours that have been blighting our CBDs. It is not a comprehensive Government response to homelessness, and there are many, many other elements in our Government response.

The member Oriini Kaipara referred to the Ministry of Social Development (MSD), and we’re not proposing changes to the way that MSD operates and that our welfare system operates. We have help which is available, but we don’t pretend that the State can look after every single person in this country perfectly. That is an impossibility, but what we can do is provide our services as best we can. It doesn’t change that broader social setting; all it does is provide the police with that extra tool to deal with particular behaviours.

In terms of the question around biographical information if proven to be true, even though the constable didn’t believe it to be true, it’s pretty easy in cases when somebody says their name is Mickey Mouse, for example, but there may be other misunderstandings. If biographical information is proven to be true, the offence of providing false details will, of course, not stand. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Getting close, getting close.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. I do want to make the comment that in Amendment Papers 805 and 806, proposed by my colleague Chlöe Swarbrick for the introduction of proposed new section 8DA, we’re not asking for there to be any changes; we’re just saying that the constable should have a requirement to direct a person to the right services that they should have access to, and it’s up to the existing systems to sort that out, but I’ll leave that with the Minister of Justice.

I actually want to pick up on the Minister’s Amendment Paper 804. Minister, you’ve also made two deletions in new sections 8D and 8E. In your Amendment Paper, again, kind of last minute, you deleted—sorry, my apologies; the Minister, in the Amendment Paper deleted, not the Chair. I used the second person pronoun. Minister, in your Amendment Paper, new sections 8D(1)(c) and 8E(fa) have been removed, which is that the constable has a duty to explain why the begging was unreasonable. Other than remove the provision, there’s actually no real explanation as to why those new sections will be removed. I want to check with the Minister why the Minister thinks that it’s not necessary for the constable to explain why such begging was unreasonable. If the person doesn’t know why and simply gets told that they’re unreasonable, wouldn’t they then just simply make the same mistake over and over again and get themselves further into trouble? I want to check with the Minister for that particular rationale.

I’m now moving on to new section 8E, “Content of move-on order”. Having dealt with a lot of the previous sections, I do thank the Minister for his engagement. In terms of that content, they must include everything from new section 8E(a) to 8E(i), but can I just check if that is an exhaustive list, or can a move-on order also include additional information? Usually, we have some cues in the first line that say “including” or “explicitly”, etc., but over here it just says it “must contain the following information:”, but it doesn’t actually say if more information could be included.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. I do want to move just slightly further on than my colleague Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan, to briefly touch on—I did mention earlier, around the Amendment Paper, that the Labour Party won’t be supporting that. The reason for this is the two deletions that my colleague Lawrence Xu-Nan has alluded to. I’d be interested to hear why those were deleted.

I can understand if there was a drafting change for clarity, and I do agree with the Minister of Justice’s deletion of the new section 8D(1)(a) “and”. That is a good correction. Thanks for picking that up. The other terminology change and the deletion of the list—I prefer the select committee’s way of drafting it, but I do think something is lost in the bill by the Minister’s deletion. I’ll refer to—because we’ve moved on to new section 8E—new section 8E(fa). That one really just means that people don’t know the reason for their move-on order and why their being there was unreasonable. That is why we won’t be voting for it, but can the Minister provide an explanation that he received some advice from officials that may assist at this stage even?

I wanted to move on from that, which I do think is quite important. There are two provisions in new section 8E. Section 8E(h) states that “it is an offence to breach the order knowingly or recklessly”. Then again, and I’m moving over to the penultimate page now, which is new section 8F(1)(b)—so moving on to the next part—that is “knowingly or recklessly, and without reasonable excuse”, and this is looking at the offence. Now, we just heard from my colleague Dan Rosewarne about knowledge and being able to have things explained to you. It’s difficult to think of a situation where it would be appropriate to convict someone of an offence, of a move-on order, when they did not knowingly breach it—it’s a test: it’s either knowingly or recklessly. I just can’t think of an example—maybe the Minister or his officials have an example of a situation where someone “recklessly” breached a move on order, but not “knowingly”. I suppose the question is: why is that “or” rather than “and”? It’s used, as I said, twice in new section 8E, which we’ve just, maybe, finished—I have, certainly, but maybe other colleagues have a final question on it—but, in new section 8F, “knowing or recklessly”, why isn’t it one or the other?

I do have some questions on new section 8F(1A), and I want to mention new section 8F(2) as well. That would be my next question, but we’ll just see if the Minister may be getting some advice on that. We’ll see—so anyway, if I move on briefly, now, while he’s receiving some advice.

I think that it’s important to note that another change that the Justice Committee made was the change of the fee. It was originally meant to be $2,000, and we’ve changed it to $1,000. I wanted to know: does the Minister agree with us, and does he have any thoughts about the change of fee? The reason the select committee decided to go with that fee was because it appeared to us to be more consistent with other offences which were similar to move-on orders. That, for our consideration, was an appropriate justification for that, but I’d be interested to know if the Minister did have a view on that change, which is quite substantial; down by 50 percent of the fine—sorry, fine not fee.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Madam Chair. Minister, you do actually have to respond. I know the Minister of Justice keeps trying to get up to answer questions. We do have questions. I am going to move on to new section 8F, in clause 5. I know that my colleague Camilla Belich has already asked some of the questions. I also note that we are almost there, but we do have a couple of final questions about sections 8H and 8I as well.

I want to check with the Minister—and, again, this is something we never really got clarity on during the select committee process—section 8F(2), “A person who commits an offence against this section is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or a fine not exceeding $1,000.” I know that we have comparable provisions within the Summary Offences Act. We mentioned before section 22 of the Summary Offences Act, which also has a fine of $1,000. In those instances, how successful has it been to get particularly homeless whānau to pay a fine of $1,000?

In this case, I think it’s great that the select committee has reduced that amount from $2,000 to $1,000, maybe for consistency as well. If people can’t pay that $1,000, does it automatically mean that they get the three months’ imprisonment? How would that be determined? Would it mean that, if they can’t pay, they would get prison for three months? If the court determines that it is going to be a $1,000 fine, what plans are there to ensure that the person is even able to pay that off, considering they can’t go and beg for money?

I’m going to move on to sections 8H and 8I, inserted by clause 5. I think that both these sections are important new additions to this bill, but I do want to know the Minister’s view of these particular additions, particularly when we are considering whether the review of these sections suggests that they are not working as intended or that by-laws or sections of the Summary Offences Act have been used instead. I wondered if there is a way for this section 8H, “Annual reporting by Commissioner”—the number of occasions on which a move-on order is issued—to be able to be expanded to consider some of the other comparable, I guess, orders as well. Again, we mention that in terms of section 22 of the Summary Offences Act. I think my colleague Camilla Belich mentioned the Crimes Act. There are also various by-laws. I wondered if that is something the Minister would consider incorporating into the review so we get a fuller picture. Those are my two questions.

Committee of the whole House

I was asked to explain the difference between “knowingly” and “recklessly”. “Knowingly” is when someone knew they were breaching it, and “recklessly” is when they knew there was a chance that they could breach it and decided to do it anyway. So that was that. I can’t think of anything else in particular that I wanted to—

💬 Camilla Belich: The fine—what do you think about the fine?

Oh, yes—the fine is going from $2,000 to $1,000. Yes, I did agree with that change.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): I’d like to be surprised with some very last-minute questions. I can’t see very much room for many more, but I will give Camilla Belich another go.

Committee of the whole House

Madam Chair, these last few questions are around the changes that the select committee has made, and they are important. The one that I specifically want to mention, which I didn’t get to mention before, is in section 8F(1A). Essentially, this change means that, if someone has a lawful reason which is part of a move-on order to return to a place, they may do that as long as they don’t participate in conduct that is consistent with the move-on order. This is really important because this provision, section 8F(1A), is the reason that the Attorney-General has found that, in terms of freedom of movement, the bill no longer is in breach of that right. I think that’s quite a significant change, and I thank the Minister of Justice and the Justice Committee for putting that change in. I want to know if he has any reflections on that.

I just want to note for the record that the reference to the Oranga Tamariki Act was just about a deletion because of the fact that children are no longer covered, so it’s not at all to diminish the status of that Act. The other thing I wanted to ask is a really important question—and, Madam Chair, it may my final question, because it looks like the Minister may need a move-on order himself from falling asleep in his chair in a public place! It is about a new clause that talks about the review of the operation of move-on orders. This is a really good clause.

You know, I don’t think this is a good bill. I specifically don’t agree with it in relation to rough sleeping and in relation to begging, but I do think there are a significant number of changes that are really good from the select committee, and this is one of them. It is about the review of move-on orders, which happens after three years. If he is the Minister of Justice at the time of this review, and the review shows that these move-on orders haven’t worked, as I predicted, and haven’t met the objective of reducing intimidation and creating safer environments in our city centres, and if they have impacted rough sleepers negatively, and if they have unfairly impacted people who are begging, will the Minister be open to, after the conclusion of this review which he’s agreeing to under this legislation, reconsidering his position on move-on orders? If they are not working, on the basis of evidence from this review, will he repeal them?

Committee of the whole House

That review in three years’ time will be a genuine review, and if I’m the Minister of Justice, I will undertake that genuinely. I’m very confident that this legislation will work very effectively.

Committee of the whole House

I move, That debate on this question now close.

A party vote was called for on the question, That debate on this question now close.

Ayes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 53

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Motion agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to Amendment Paper 804 deleting the amendment to clause 5 to delete new section 8A(1B) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment to the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 53

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13 Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment to the amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendments to Amendment Paper 804 deleting the amendments to clause 5 to delete new sections 8D(1)(c) and 8E(fa) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendments to the amendments be agreed to.

Ayes 53

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendments to the amendments not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that the Minister’s amendments to clause 5 set out on Amendment Paper 804 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendments be agreed to.

Ayes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 53

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Amendments agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Tamatha Paul’s amendments to clause 5 set out on Amendment Paper 778 are out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

Camilla Belich’s tabled amendment inserting a subclause (1AA) into the bill is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5, new section 8A(1), set out on Amendment Paper 780 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 53

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5, new section 8A(1), set out on Amendment Paper 798 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 53

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5, new section 8A(1), relating to the repetition of conduct be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 53

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5 deleting “or has recently engaged in” from new section 8A(1) is out of order as being the same as a previous amendment.

The question is that Scott Willis’ tabled amendment to clause 5 replacing “reasonable grounds to suspect” with “reasonable certainty” in new section 8A(1) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Francisco Hernandez’s tabled amendment to clause 5 replacing new section 8A(1)(a) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Kahurangi Carter’s tabled amendment to clause 5 deleting new section 8A(1)(e) is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5 replacing new section 8A(1)(e) is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendments to clause 5 deleting new section 8A(1)(e) and (f), (1A) and (1B), new section 8D(1)(c), new section 8E(fa) and (ha), and new section 8F(1A) are out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

The question is that Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5 deleting new section 8A(1)(f) and (1A), new section 8E(ha), and new section 8F(1A) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5 deleting new section 8A(1)(f) set out on Amendment Paper 779 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Scott Willis’ tabled amendment to clause 5 deleting new section 8A(1)(f) is out of order as being the same as a previous amendment.

Camilla Belich’s tabled amendment to clause 5 deleting new section 8A(1)(f) is out of order as being the same as a previous amendment.

The question is that Celia Wade-Brown’s tabled amendment to clause 5 replacing new section 8A(1)(f) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Camilla Belich’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(1)(g) is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

The question is that Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(1AA) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Steve Abel’s tabled amendment to clause 5 replacing new section 8A(1A) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Camilla Belich’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(1B) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Francisco Hernandez’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(1B)(e) is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(1C) set out on Amendment Paper 766 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(1C) set out on Amendment Paper 782 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(1C) set out on Amendment Paper 783 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(1C) set out on Amendment Paper 789 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(1C) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendments to clause 5, new section 8A(2), set out on Amendment Paper 795 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendments not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The Hon Dr Duncan Webb’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting text after “specified area” in new section 8A(2) is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

The question is that Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5, new sections 8A and 8E, relating to a specified reasonable distance be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Mike Davidson’s tabled amendment to clause 5 replacing “24 hours” with “12 hours” in new section 8A(2)(b) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Francisco Hernandez’s tabled amendment to clause 5 replacing “24 hours” with “6 hours” in new section 8A(2)(b) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5 replacing “24 hours” with “2 hours” in new section 8A(2)(b) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(2A) set out on Amendment Paper 767 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(2A) set out on Amendment Paper 781 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(2A) set out on Amendment Paper 799 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Francisco Hernandez’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(2A) relating to “public place” being an identifiable location be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Francisco Hernandez’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(2A) relating to orders not preventing persons from accessing certain things is out of order as being the same in substance as a previous amendment.

The question is that Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(2A) and replacing new section 8E(g) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Kahurangi Carter’s tabled amendment to clause 5 replacing new section 8A(3) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(3A) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Celia Wade-Brown’s tabled amendment to clause 5 replacing new section 8A(4) relating to orders being issued in writing be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(4A) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Francisco Hernandez’s tabled amendment to clause 5 replacing new section 8A(5) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Scott Willis’ tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(6) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(6) relating to safe emergency accommodation be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(6) relating to essential places and services be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(6) relating to excluding a person from their residence is out of order as being the same in substance as a previous amendment.

The question is that Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(6) relating to issuing move-on orders within 24 hours of each other be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8A(6) set out on Amendment Paper 765 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The Hon Dr Duncan Webb’s tabled amendment to clause 5 deleting new section 8B(2)(c) is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

The question is that Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5 replacing new section 8B(2)(c) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5 replacing new section 8C(1) set out on Amendment Paper 764 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5 new section 8C(1) set out on Amendment Paper 763 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5 replacing new section 8C(1) is out of order as being the same in substance as a previous amendment.

The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5 deleting new section 8C(3)(b) set out on Amendment Paper 762 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5 replacing new section 8C(3)(b) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5, new section 8D(1), set out on Amendment Paper 761 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendments to clause 5, new section 8D(1), be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendments be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendments not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendments to clause 5, new sections 8D and 8F, set out on Amendment Paper 800 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendments be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendments not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8D(3) set out on Amendment Paper 801 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Chlöe Swarbrick’s amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8DA set out on Amendment Paper 805 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Chlöe Swarbrick’s amendment to clause 5 inserting new sections 8DA and 8E(faaa) set out on Amendment Paper 806 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that the Hon Dr Duncan Webb’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8DA be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5 deleting new section 8F set out on Amendment Paper 760 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that the Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8F(1B) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5, new section 8F(2), set out on Amendment Paper 784 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5, new section 8F(2), set out on Amendment Paper 785 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5, new section 8F(2), set out on Amendment Paper 786 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5, new section 8F(2), set out on Amendment Paper 787 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5 replacing new section 8F(2) set out on Amendment Paper 788 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 5 replacing new section 8F(2) is out of order as being the same in substance as a previous amendment.

The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8G set out on Amendment Paper 796 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tamatha Paul’s amendment to clause 5 inserting new section 8G set out on Amendment Paper 797 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendments to clause 5, new sections 8H and 8I, be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendments be agreed to.

Ayes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendments not agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That clause 5 as amended be agreed to.

Ayes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 52

New Zealand Labour 33; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 13; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Clause 5 as amended agreed to.

Bill to be reported with amendment.

House resumed.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Madam Speaker, the committee has considered the Summary Offences (Move-on Orders) Amendment Bill and reports it with amendment. I move, That the report be adopted.

Motion agreed to.

Report adopted.

💬 DEPUTY SPEAKER: This bill is set down for third reading immediately. It’s time for the House to suspend, and we will resume at 9 a.m. tomorrow.

Sitting suspended from 11.55 p.m. to 9 a.m. (Friday)