India Free Trade Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill

Thank you, Mr Chair. I know we put aside the committee for the valedictory; I think we all enjoyed that.

Just going back to this quite critical area of this piece of legislation that relates to amendments to the Overseas Investment Act and the investment regulations, I was asking the Minister in clause 18 around definitions of Indian companies and branches and individuals. The question was whether he is sure that the door is not left open for, I guess, individuals or companies or multinationals from other places around the world coming in through some kind of Indian re-export regime. I know that they have left a door open for us when it comes to dairy if we’re re-exporting. India has an interest in developing its own export capability; how do we know that the definitions in this piece of legislation, in clause 18, actually mean that we will have genuine investment from genuine Indian nationals? Maybe the Minister can take a call on that one.

I’m very happy to. There are two differences here. The member maybe is confusing them—not purposely.

One is around export of products. The member is right—dairy products can be exported to India from New Zealand at a zero tariff rate and they can be re-exported with value added or something else, and therefore that’s why there’s a zero tariff rate. This is about investment into New Zealand, and I can give him the assurance that I am very sure that other nationalities will not be able to take advantage of this, because it is identical language to that in the New Zealand – European Union Free Trade Agreement and the New Zealand – United Kingdom Free Trade Agreement. All it actually is doing is applying a threshold of investment and different types of screening that will be required, lining up will all of our other free-trade agreements. All of our free-trade agreements, bar one, are at the same level as what this will be. The one that’s not is the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement, of course, a large amount of which is historically for very, very different reasons. So it doesn’t change anything around investment screening or anything else, other than saying that this is the investment threshold, and it lines it up with all other trade agreements.

I just want to carry on—I thank the Minister for that; I appreciate that India has a relationship with Russia, for example, and so I appreciate that it’s not the threshold, and that we’re moving from $100 million to $200 million. But the issue is: how do we know? Are we relying on the Indians to then ensure that the money has not come from Russia, through India, into New Zealand? I think most Kiwis would object to that backdoor way of inappropriate investment.

In the very same way that this is dealt with under the New Zealand – European Union Free Trade Agreement and the New Zealand – United Kingdom Free Trade Agreement, both of which that member, at the time he was a Minister, was involved in negotiating. It doesn’t alter how New Zealand makes a decision around whether or not they get access under it; that is set out elsewhere. This is merely saying the threshold is moved to this level.

There is a concept called “denial of benefits”, though. In the case that somebody has tried to use it and they haven’t established themselves in such a way that they have a legal entitlement, New Zealand has the ability to deny those benefits. But it doesn’t alter the screening or ability or what needs to be done for a company or someone else from India. It is the same as all other previous agreements, and it really is merely only moving the threshold up to be equal to those.

And in every one of our free-trade agreements, it is the same threshold—it’s a $200 million threshold—except for the CER with Australia, which is higher. This is the same as China, the UK, the European Union, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership countries, the UAE—which this Parliament has signed off during this term of Parliament—and the EU one.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Just on that, in terms of “India branch”, I understand that particularly for Part 2, we’re looking at the Overseas Investment Act and investment regulations, but this idea of what an India branch is as located in the India territory, and I feel like this is something that potentially will come up both in this part in terms of overseas investment into Aotearoa New Zealand but also later on, when we’re looking at Part 4.

I would be interested to know, for example, who then determines what is considered Indian territory. For example, there are a lot of contentions around where the boundary of India is, particularly in northern India, around the Kashmiri region. There are obviously a lot of—this is more, kind of, looking at international relations and international diplomacy. But, for example, if something that is within that particular region that is kind of very grey in terms of jurisdiction boundaries between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, what then determines what that would be? Who then determines what we consider Indian territory? I think that’s my question for this part, if the Minister wouldn’t mind giving a response to that.

This is a trade agreement. It’s not foreign affairs. It’s not determining territories of countries. But I can give the member Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan an absolute assurance that this part of the bill is identical to that which was done in the European Union Free Trade Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill that that member’s party voted for. I accept you’re not supporting this, but it is the same. All it is doing is lining the threshold up, which is a commitment we’ve made, which in all of our free-trade agreements is the same amount. It doesn’t alter anything else other than that. Some of the things he’s talking about are dealt with in legislation or policy elsewhere, but they are not within the scope of this bill.

Just following up on that. The difference is that there are, as far as I know—and please correct me if I’m wrong—no border disputes within the EU. For example, there is nothing between France and the UK that determines what is part of France and what is part of the UK—it doesn’t apply to things like Jersey, Guernsey, etc.—but when it comes to jurisdictions or regions like India, there is a very clear border dispute. My question, then, would be: are we going by what Aotearoa New Zealand would consider to be the boundary for this to be considered India territory? Are we going with the Indians’ interpretation of what is going to be the India territory? I just want to know which side we’re going with.

Well, it’s an interesting debating point, but that’s a discussion that should have taken place during treaty examination. This legislation—any part of it, but to this part—doesn’t deal with that. What the member’s talking about is outside of scope. One is to do with the remit overall and how you might decide this. This is merely changing a threshold around investment.

One final tiny question. All I’m asking for from the Minister is how the Minister would define paragraph (a) in clause 18(1) of this bill.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’m also on clause 18, but a slightly different question relating to the definition of “India individual”. I think the interesting thing about India is, of course, that it doesn’t allow dual citizenship but the Citizenship Act does have a term that is “overseas citizen of India”. It’s quite a unique category, because in many ways that individual has very similar rights as a citizen except they don’t get the right to vote and they aren’t entitled to hold particular positions of office either. But for all other effects and purposes—they can come into the country without needing a visa and there’s no notification that’s required in terms of advising police of one’s whereabouts or travel. And so it’s just a question as to whether those individuals would be covered within that definition.

Well, the simple answer is that a definition of citizenship comes with a passport. If you think about, in New Zealand, you can have residents and permanent residents that have similar status to that of a citizen. They don’t have the passport; they’re not citizens. In this case, an Indian national citizen would have to have a passport. Anything else is an arrangement India has; it’s not to do with New Zealand.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’m going to move on to a new clause. I’m moving on to clause 20, “Regulation 88 amended”. Now, this specifically looks at the Overseas Investment Regulations 2005, and after regulation 88(2)(i), inserts paragraph (j), which is article 8.2.

Now, regulation 88(2) specifically refers to exclusions—I think the term is apply “subject to the exclusions contained in the following provisions”, and in this case, specifically reference article 8.2 of the India free-trade agreement (FTA). Now, looking at article 2 of the India FTA, some of these do, I guess, in some ways, make sense, when it says that the chapter, in terms of scope, should not apply to measures affecting Government procurement, etc. But what I don’t understand is, for example, how would paragraph 3(e) of article 8.2 in the agreement be excluded or is needing to be excluded in this particular regulation. So when it comes to air transport services affecting traffic rights, would the Minister just clarify on, in this case, it says just article 8.2, but rather than specifically certain parts of 8.2, is there any part in article 8.2 that, for example, should not be excluded as a part of the regulation?

When agreements are negotiated, you can have a general clause around investment. If the member looks at some of the detail of what this does, it increases the threshold to $200 million, it provides transitional provisions for how this might work; but equally, at the same time, there’ll be areas that countries reserve. So increasing a threshold to allow $200 million to be invested, whereas some other countries that don’t have a trade agreement with New Zealand, it will be a much lower amount—for instance, World Trade Organization members that we don’t have a bilateral or collective agreement with have $10 million only. So this is a significant benefit to those that we have negotiated a free trade agreement with.

But there are always things that you will reserve and have different abilities too. An example in many trade agreements: the ability for us to create conditions around screening is the way that a previous Government has looked at how we might create some guardrails around who might invest in types of property in New Zealand. We reserve the right to do it and it’s for New Zealand to make those changes. The example the member’s just given around aviation: there are separate aviation agreements that give people rights to come and fly in and out of New Zealand—to have a right automatically to have access to New Zealand. I’m speaking hypothetically now. I know it would be a separate arrangement not covered by the free trade agreement.

So this clause merely lines up for an Indian group of New Zealand trading partners for which an increase of monetary threshold to $200 million applies to investments in New Zealand by non-Government investors in significant business assets for the purposes of providing services in New Zealand, but there are always a range of things that we have reserved or there is more conditionality around or other bits of legislation or policy will govern.

Look, thank you very much, Mr Chair. This is in clause 18 again, and it’s relating to “India territory means the territory of India as defined by Article 1.2(q)(i) of the India FTA”. Relating to the marine territorial areas of India, the Minister will be familiar with the World Trade Organization Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, where India played quite a substantive, if not disruptive, part in blocking or assisting or disrupting the agreement.

So the question for the Minister is: if there are Indian fisheries companies working in India territory, and they may or may not be involved in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, then does the agreement allow us an ability to block or intervene or, indeed, take produce—as fish, it would be, or some kind of marine product—from the area, given the importance of this issue in trying to reduce fish subsidies around the world? The Minister himself—and I acknowledge that—has been involved in trying to progress this agreement.

The question for him is: would this agreement allow operators fishing in Indian territorial waters, who might or might not be conducting IUU fishing, to then be blocked from an investment into New Zealand? Because we have seen, as the Indian economy grows, the huge investments out of India into all sorts of industries, and into fishing would be a possible one that we might have down here. So I leave that question with the Minister as to whether there’s any ability to intervene.

Thank you. Two separate issues again. One is the sale of product into New Zealand—in this case fish products, I suppose. That’s governed differently because this part is about investment in New Zealand, not where goods may come from; that’s governed elsewhere in the free trade agreement, including around the rules of origin. But in as far as the hypothetical example the member’s given—somebody’s ability to invest in New Zealand—there is a good conduct or good character test anyway that sits there, separate from this, not in this agreement, but we have reserved the right in all of our trade agreements for that to apply.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’m going to move ahead to the final clause of this part, which is clause 24, specifically looking at Schedule 2 of this bill. Now, this Schedule 2, New Part 15 inserted into Schedule 1AA of Overseas Investment Regulations 2005, regulation 33 makes sense in terms of duplication. Nothing in terms of acquisition of rights or interests in securities or of other properties will take effect until after commencement of this Act—that makes sense.

Regulation 34 in terms of no refund—I do remember seeing comparable clauses in other comparable bills, but I don’t remember asking it previously. I think, now, looking at things from a different lens, what has jumped out to me is that there’s been no refund of any fees on the grounds that the matter, for example, is no longer relevant—i.e. that the consent that has been applied for is no longer required. I want to check with the Minister: is that something that, for example, is retrospective, being my first question.

I think my second question is: if a consent is in the process of being granted or denied and this bill comes into effect and they no longer need the consent, it’s automatically granted, I get that. But what happens if, for example, a consent is still required and a person is in the process of doing that, but the bill changes the nature of the criteria of that consent? Would, then, a person be entitled to a refund of any fees during that period or will their consent application simply be judged under the new system?

This is an easy one to deal with. If somebody has put in a fee before entry into force, they don’t get a refund; after entry into force, they don’t have to pay a fee.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Really it’s an opportunity for the Minister, Hon Todd McClay, to explain the difference between type 2, type 3, and type 5 investors, as explained in the bill here, because I think anyone reading this might be somewhat confused, as it makes reference to the UAE individual, an India individual or, indeed, as one here, to Hong Kong. While this is amending legislation, some who go through this bill here might be somewhat confused. I’d really be interested in having the Minister’s explanation of those different types of investors and the relationship with the UAE, as pointed out and referred to in this legislation.

Well, again, this is really lining things up with elsewhere. The types are actually defined elsewhere in the Overseas Investment Act, and this is the same provision that is in those previous agreements. My understanding of advice is it’s the same as the UAE as well as the EU and the UK—the last three that we’ve done. The description of the definition sits outside of this somewhere else—it’s merely borrowing it. There are, from time to time, updates to line things up—not from the point of view of changing it, but if you think about that you’re going to extend something to India, rather than amendments that are hard to see, they will from time to time just reproduce with it put in there so that when someone else looks at it, they see it flows clearly, rather than an amendment to an Act somewhere else that you’ve got to find how it fits together. So it’s merely to be more functional.

Thank you. Look, my question is in respect of clause 15—so it’s the section 61A amended of the Overseas Investment Act. I look at section 61A, and it’s got a long list of various free trade agreements. What I wanted to know was just whether those free trade agreements are all lined up. This is about inward investment, as I understand it. We’re concerned about both outward and inward investment, but this is about inward investment, OK—I understand that. But if they’re all lined up in terms of the regimes which are there, because there’s a long, long list there of trade agreements: China, Hong Kong, etc., etc., all the way through to UAE and so on.

If the amounts of money which are allowed for in each of those free-trade agreements are more or less in line with each other, or if there are any which are distinctly—if this is outside of the parameters, they’re all the same, so we’re talking about $200 million, roughly speaking. If the Minister could just explain the regime which is there, in terms of what is allowed for in terms of inward investment, the nature of those kinds of investments, and if there are any restrictions on those at all. It would be most useful to understand that. Thank you.

As far as this legislation is concerned, it merely lines it up to say that India also is at $200 million, as the others are. We’ve negotiated different amounts, so most of the investment agreements—free-trade agreements around investment—have a most favoured nation clause. As it’s gone up, it’s extended to others, we’ve put in the list, and it goes up to $200 million for all of them. As far as the list of what you can invest in, unless it is excluded, actually it is not dealt with in this legislation. It is separate, and it’s under the Overseas Investment Act. So it’s not directly in the scope of this.

Just picking up on that point, the $200 million threshold, is there any obligation—I can’t see it in here, and I assume it’s here somewhere. Is there any obligation on the Indians to actually invest any money here? The most egregious part of what is a terrible deal is the US$20 billion, which as of today is nearly NZ$35 billion that we’re expected to send into the Indian economy. It’s unbelievable that we would sign up to that—I cannot believe it. I cannot see within these clauses the inward investment—any threshold or any obligation on the Indians to reciprocate what seems to be an unbelievably generous concession that we’ve made.

We in New Zealand First obviously want to see New Zealand businesses investing in New Zealand. I’m part of the wool industry, as you know, Minister, and we’ve got a 2.5, 2.75 percent reduction in our tariff. The amount of that goes up and down every week at the auction—I mean, it’s negligible; it’s nothing. We’re trading away, potentially, the ability to—our own manufacturing base. That’s what I’m really worried about here. I want to grow the New Zealand wool industry and the New Zealand manufacturing base, but here we’ve got an obligation in the deal itself to NZ$35 billion offshore, but I can’t see where it’s in here—and I hope the Minister can put me right on this—where there’s a corresponding obligation on the Indians to actually invest in productivity and growth in New Zealand.

Surely our negotiating team looked at those two equations and said something does not add up here. We’re expecting to send $35 billion offshore—that’s money we desperately need to double our exports here; the investment needed to add value to New Zealand. The concern here is that we’re actually going to incentivise more export of raw material into India so it can be processed over there, because that’s where our companies are investing, but, correspondingly, we’ve got no obligation, as I can see within this threshold of $200 million that’s referenced in Part 2, that they’re actually going to spend a red dime here.

There is nothing there, so can the Minister please explain what the reciprocal obligations on the Indian Government or the Indian economy to actually invest in New Zealand and to our productivity and our growth, because that’s exactly what this Parliament—and the Labour Party can hang their heads in shame here as well—is looking at, extraordinarily, sending off overseas. I would like to know what the reciprocal obligation is within Part 2 that we get our fair share in this deal.

This bit of the legislation is merely about aligning a threshold for India, as that member’s party voted in favour of in the European Union free-trade agreement. They didn’t in the UK one, because they weren’t in Parliament then. They probably didn’t in the China agreement because, actually, they weren’t in favour of that. But it’s merely lining this up, so there’s no difference here to last time that member voted on a free-trade agreement in this Chamber. The clause is identical—exactly the same. The other things he’s raised are outside the scope of this.

We did canvass this very, very widely when we did the discussions around treaty examination, and that’s the time when we go into all parts of the legislation. This legislation, very, very narrowly, does a small number of things, including setting the quotas so New Zealanders can get product into India for the first time, in some cases where no one else in the world is able to, and then a few other minor changes not within scope.

I would just comment for a moment that it’s fair for members of the House to have views; they should not mislead, because that member knows good and well that any obligation the Government has taken on around investment is a commitment to promote, nothing more. I do note that when he went to India and put out a press release that he enjoyed the hospitality of Indians and he dined with them and he spoke positively about the relationship, he was very, very different than he is tonight in this Chamber. But I do like the woollen suit he’s wearing, that he bought when he was in India.

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): The Hon Mark Patterson—but just a reminder to the Minister to keep it within scope of the bill. There are issues, of course, within the agreement, but this is about the legislation, which is about amending the agreement.

I am trying desperately to keep it within scope. The Minister referenced in his answer the European free-trade deal, which we absolutely did. I don’t recall a clause in that deal where there was an outward investment clause, so that would seem to be a disparity here that is unexplained. Could he explain that, since he’s raised this, not me.

Mr Chair, thank you very much, and I’ll go back to clause 18. It does define, as I say, Indian branch companies or individuals who might be able to invest in our country, so the question for the Minister: if there was to be an Indian company that might want to—given there seems to be some concern about the export of raw materials, if we were to have investment in New Zealand in, say, a wool processing plant or a wood processing plant, would the Minister think that that’s a positive move and that this clause 18 would enable, indeed, investment from India into New Zealand that might add value to our exports out around the world in wood or wool?

This bit of the legislation doesn’t speak to whether things are good things or not; this merely sets the threshold when you come in. There’s a different Act of Parliament that makes those determinations and those decisions. That Act of Parliament is not being amended by this, other than there’s a $200 million threshold for investments in India, which does go back to being exactly the same. Although the name European Union versus India is different, the clause is virtually identical in this piece of legislation.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

A party vote was called for on the question, That debate on this question now close.

Ayes 59

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11.

Noes 63

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; New Zealand First 8; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Motion not agreed to.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Considering we’re still on Part 2, I think what the Hon Mark Patterson has raised—and, actually, the Hon Damien O’Connor raised—are both really important points. What we are not seeing in previous trade agreements are a comparable examples.

Just seeking your guidance as well, Mr Chair: while it is true that the agreement itself has received a treaty examination process not unlike a select committee, we have actually never had the opportunity to debate, even if it’s not the agreement itself—when we’re looking at the content of the bill, a comparable regulatory impact statement, which we do often debate, is in the form of the national interest analysis. Therefore, like we would do with a normal committee stage on a bill—putting policy intent, etc., from a regulatory impact statement—we should be able to also draw on the national interest analysis as a part of the debate on this bill. I think it is important, while we’re still debating Part 2, that we are able to pull on the content of the national interest analysis as well as consider the fact that we have not had a chance to debate the agreement as part of a committee of the whole House in this Chamber—that we should be able to draw on certain elements of that.

💬 Tim Costley: But we’re not.

You can, by all means, take a closure motion. I think, with that, we do just want to elaborate on the point that—this is quite interesting, because this must be what it feels like for a members’ day when we can actually expand the scope quite broadly. I think, in this case, we do need to discuss the fact that, within the policy intent that sits behind this, we understand that we are comparatively speaking a much smaller economy—we’ve got to admit, in terms of economies of scale—compared to India and there is this idea that there is an intention to promote the investment of US$20 billion, but surely there is also, through the Overseas Investment Act, a comparable expectation. I guess my question to the Minister for Trade and Investment then is: when we’re looking at overseas investment from India here to Aotearoa New Zealand, what modelling has been done to ensure that there is some level of comparable investment also to here. Now, it might not be locked into the agreement itself, but I am assuming this is something that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has previously looked into or that the Minister would have looked into. I think we could have a little more conversation around that modelling.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’ll go back to clause 14, which is in Part 2: “This subpart amends the Overseas Investment Act 2005.”, and then Subpart 2, of course, amends the Overseas Investment Regulations 2005. Those people who are listening, or who might be reading through or following on their iPhones, possibly, will be saying that that is quite an old piece of legislation and indeed, “Has it caught up?” One of the changes that the Government announced yesterday or the day before was changes to the charging regime and the time frames for overseas investors. My question to the Minister for Trade and Investment is: do the new provisions that were announced yesterday—and I am not quite sure of the detail; many of the things announced by the Government, you take with a pinch of salt. While they have said it will be cheaper and faster, my question is: how does that relate back to the 2005 regulations which we are amending here, and will it make it easier or cheaper for Indian investors to come into New Zealand? Indeed, the question is: why?

Thank you, Mr Chair. We’re still waiting on quite a few responses, I think, from the Minister for Trade and Investment regarding our questions. When we are looking at, let’s say, clause 19—in terms of “ownership and control test”—I understand that when we are looking at Part 2, a large part of this, particularly when it comes to Subpart 2, is to do with the regulations themselves. Usually, when we’re looking at regulations, we are looking at a piece of secondary legislation. I want to check with the Minister for Trade and Investment: with the Overseas Investment Regulations 2005, surely it will require some form of Order in Council when we’re looking at this? We have asked the Minister previously. When the agreement comes into effect, what then is the timeline for the Order in Council to enact certain secondary legislation as a part of the requirements of this bill, particularly when we’re looking at overseas investment regulations?

Also, when we’re looking at “ownership and control test” in the definitions, or any other parts of this particular part of the bill—I think the Hon Damien O’Connor was asking questions about the different types of investors that we still haven’t got a clear response on from the Minister. When we’re looking at “ownership and control test”, how would this particular bill and this particular part look at the ownership and control test differently that what we have seen previously, if it does at all?

Also, when it comes to this part, is there, I guess, a comparable ownership and control test when we’re looking at India, the other party to this particular agreement? While we are enacting a particular bill in response to an agreement that has been signed between two parties, surely the Indian Government would need to do something comparable, which would then mean—or are they a monist system, in which case any agreement they sign is automatically a part of their domestic legislation? When we are looking at their comparable version of the Overseas Investment Act and overseas investment regulations, has there been any work that has been done by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade or any part of the national interest analysis that looks at that comparability between the two jurisdictions and the way that we look at overseas investment in general? Again, we’re looking at this from our side, and India will look at things from their side, but if we have fundamentally different interpretations of that, there might be mistakes or mishaps with the interpretation of that. I just want to check with the Minister how the Minister or the ministry would deal with differences in the interpretation and definition.

Well, maybe I can read something here that will help members with this. Part 2 amends the Overseas Investment Act 2005 to add the India free-trade agreement to the list of free-trade agreements in section 61A of the Overseas Investment Act 2005. It doesn’t alter anything other than adding that name—and, of course, that brings the threshold up to the same as all the others. In as far as how India meets its obligations, this bit of legislation doesn’t deal with this; this legislation doesn’t alter or amend another Act other than adding the name “India” to it. It doesn’t change the definitions of the classes of types of investors: that is dealt with elsewhere. Should the Overseas Investment Act ever be amended, and those amendments would cover some of these things, it would flow through to all of our free-trade agreements, one supposes.

To answer all of the member’s questions, this legislation doesn’t do any of the things other than adding India to the list of countries we have a free-trade agreement with, number one; and then, number two, of course, is aligning the thresholds. I’ve said previously in the debate that it lines up the threshold of $200 million investment, which is the same in every free-trade agreement we have except with Australia’s closer economic relations, CER, which is higher for historical reasons.

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): Just before I take the next calls, just to sort of give us a way that we will approach all the parts, including this part: we are debating part by part. The scope has to be within that part as well. What will also be useful for the committee is if you refer to the clauses—that will also assist the committee. I appreciate the comments that people have made about scope, but the clauses and the parts will help to guide the scope. Vanushi Walters.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’m on clause 22, which is in Part 2—let’s see if there’s a subpart—it might be Subpart 2, from what I can see—

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): Yeah.

This is a clause that amends Regulation 94 to add the India free-trade agreement (FTA) effectively to that regulation in the definition of a “type 3 investor”. As the Minister for Trade and Investment has said, that lifts the threshold from $100 million to $200 million—I understand that. My question is about the types of investment the type 3 investor includes in relation to the India FTA compared to a type 3 investor under a different FTA. As far as I can see, under the China FTA, it is an investor who is investing to establish a commercial presence in New Zealand through which they’ll supply a service, or who is investing in a commercial presence they’ve already established in New Zealand through which they’re supplying or they will supply their service, but those services have to fall within a specific area for China that are either environmental services, construction or engineering, agriculture or forestry, pure engineering, integrated engineering, computer-related services, or tourism- and travel-related services.

My question is whether the categories of service are the same for the India FTA under that type 3 investor, as compared to the China FTA and the categories that I’ve just listed, or whether those are different, and if they’re different, then what binds that category together across different FTAs? Thank you.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I want to return to clause 15, which I asked a question about before. I just wanted to make sure that I understood the requirements we’ve got here, and I’d certainly like the Minister for Trade and Investment’s response on this.

I am assuming that if we were not to pass this piece of legislation, then the free-trade agreement (FTA) itself would be unimplementable, although—and I notice that he’s taking advice at the moment—obviously, the FTA itself has been signed. The FTA has been signed—and I turn to you now, with you having taken that advice, Minister—but we need to pass this to make that FTA implementable. Presumably, that is an indivisible document, because if there was any part of this that were to fail, then the FTA would itself be compromised. That’s what I’m looking for your advice on, because I think the advice you’ve given us it that the only time that this House has actually debated the FTA itself to any degree whatsoever was in the first reading, if at all, and, therefore, we’ve never had the opportunity to debate the content of the FTA itself, other than what is here—yes?

💬 Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan: It wasn’t even called a debate; it was just a first reading speech.

Well, yeah, that’s what I thought. I think it’s very important that people understand that that’s exactly what is going on, because the kinds of concerns which we have about this piece of legislation which we’ve articulated, which are the issues about the investment externally—the requirement to put that sort of $20 billion into India—and I’ve looked at that also.

💬 Hon Mark Patterson: US dollars.

US dollars—yes, as I say, it’s in US dollars. If the Indians decide—and it’s them that decide—whether we have put sufficient effort into doing that, then they can appropriately chastise us and take us to task, and, in fact, it says that they can impose “proportionate remedial measures” and rebalance tariff concessions. There’s a lot of important detail in that which this House has not had the ability to have a look at, and we are told that it’s outside of the scope of this conversation we’ve got here.

All we’ve got in front of us—and I just want to be really, really clear; well, to make sure that I’m clear—is that we have a small set of items in this bill, but those things are also required to be passed for the FTA to be passed. If they were not to be passed, then the FTA would be compromised. Now, that’s the assumption, and the question I’m asking the Minister is that if these were not to be passed, then the FTA, I assume, would be compromised.

I’d also be really interested in the process which the FTA itself went through to be approved, because that would seem to have been done by the executive, but the executive, clearly, on this free-trade agreement, was divided, and so it would be appreciated if the Minister could respond to those questions. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I think that it is an important point that has been raised by Andy Foster, but if we are looking at this, although the Minister for Trade and Investment has said that this particular part—if you are looking at clause 15—the changes to the Overseas Investment Act are something that is standard. Yes, I do believe that when we are looking at comparable agreements, whether it’s the New Zealand - UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement or the New Zealand - European Union free-trade agreement, the New Zealand - United Kingdom free-trade agreement, or anything else, we do see comparables, and the Minister is absolutely right in terms of the $200 million threshold. That’s not been changed and that has not been adjusted. That’s true, but in none of the other agreements we have seen have we seen from the other side an expectation of, essentially, overseas investment, and I think that this is where the crux of this particular part is really important for us to unpack.

For example, if we’re looking at page 106 of the national interest analysis, it says “New Zealand is required to promote foreign direct investment from investors”, but I guess in this case, for example, when we’re looking at the definition of “Overseas Investment Act”, would the promotion of overseas investment under our Overseas Investment Act be considered overseas investment? If the promotion of overseas investment in our Overseas Investment Act is not considered overseas investment, I guess, in some ways, how then do we expect the other party to this agreement—particularly from the Indian Government’s side. When they are looking at updating their overseas investment Act, how then would they put it in their legislation—if they have to—to ensure that the word “promotion” is captured in their domestic legislation?

Again, if the Minister wouldn’t mind clarifying that promotion is not in our Overseas Investment Act—I think that that is an important part for us to tease out here. Again, none of the other agreements that we’ve seen previously contains a similar comparable clause such as chapter 9 of the New Zealand - India free-trade agreement. I do want to check that with the Minister, and my specific question then is around this: is promotion itself considered an overseas investment in the Overseas Investment Act 2005? That is specifically for when we’re looking at clauses 14 and 15 in Part 2.

Well, I can help very quickly with this. This piece of the legislation—Part 2—deals with the Overseas Investment Act, and it merely adds India to the list of free-trade agreements (FTAs), lining it up with a threshold of $200 million. It makes no other legislative commitment by this House other than putting India in around that threshold of $200 million and adding them to that list of all other free-trade agreements, as I’ve said, except for one, which is the CER Agreement, which is a different amount.

As far as the different categories are concerned—which the member from the Opposition raised earlier—in effect, what this does is it lines up India with the EU and the UK free-trade agreements. Some others have a slightly different treatment when it comes to each of the five categories, but that is based upon something that was negotiated at the time in a limited most favoured nations provision. That means that in some areas, as an example, when the threshold increases, that is extended out, but in some cases where we may agree something—as an example—with the EU FTA, it wouldn’t automatically extend out to other countries, and so this is being treated the same as those last two agreements.

I want to go back to this $200 million threshold and the national interest test levers that we would still have. That’s quite a high amount of money, and if I look at some of the examples in the bill in terms of where the tariffs are getting reduced, mānuka honey is one where tariffs are being reduced. I reckon $200 million would just about buy the whole New Zealand supply chain.

If I look at the wool industry, which is another one captured in here, we have one scourer, one company—well, we have two scourers, but they’re owned by one company. It’s a monopoly. Now, with that $200 million threshold and without the protection of a national interest test, we could lose control of a key piece of infrastructure where, essentially, if it wasn’t in New Zealand ownership, all the wool could be just sent offshore and our manufacturing base could be starved of scoured wool. We’d have to buy it back from overseas.

Actually, within the context of the New Zealand economy and some of our smaller primary sectors, that $200 million is quite high, and so I want to understand what levers we have. What’s our national interest test? With scouring, it would be devastating for the industry if we lost that scouring to foreign ownership. How would we intervene in that situation? Are we powerless under this $200 million threshold, or is there at least some—at least some—protection there for our industries so that we’re not just being prepared to wave some of them away for the sake of making a commitment that the Prime Minister made in a debate speech before the last election to get this through expediently before this election? Have we really taken the time to consider the consequences? As Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan pointed out, there are substantive parts of this bill that we’re not actually, really, getting the chance to debate. This is the only chance we’ve got to ask some of these more fundamental questions. Thank you.

Where there’s an opportunity to ask questions about what is different and what is within scope, it’s for the chair to determine that. All I can really say is that the part of the discussion around the $200 million and whether that is a significant amount, an important amount, or not might well have been debated by that member when the UAE free-trade agreement went through that he voted in favour of, because it is the same amount, or the EU free-trade agreement during this term, because it is the same amount and that member’s party voted in favour of it. Outside of the scope of this bill is around thresholds, and it’s around regimes to consider investment and so on. That’s a different Act of Parliament. It’s not here. Whilst there have been changes during this term of Parliament around that under the Overseas Investment Act, that member’s party, in coalition, has supported those as well. What is unclear to me is whether this is a concern about a $200 million amount and what it might do or about the country the money is coming from.

Point of order, Mr Chair. I take offence at that last comment.

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): What’s your point of order?

I take offence to that last comment, which, essentially, said that it was because of the country, not the actual contents of the bill, which is absolutely wrong. We think this is a terrible deal. It’s nothing against India as a country. So I do take offence to that comment.

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): Yeah, sorry, that’s not actually a point of order. I take your point, but it’s not actually a point of order.

Mr Chair, thank you. I just wanted to note that the Minister hasn’t actually answered the questions that I asked earlier. The first of those questions was around the issue around the process that we’ve got to. You’re quite clearly hearing from certainly the parties here who are opposed to this bill—not the bill, but the free-trade agreement (FTA) itself. There hasn’t really been an opportunity to discuss that in this Chamber. Now, that said, I know that we need to focus on what is in front of us in terms of the bill. I take that. The question that I asked was: if this bill were not to pass, what would happen to the FTA itself? Is this legislation integral to the FTA? I’m assuming that it would be.

Now, the Minister has also said that there is nothing different between what we’re doing with the $200 million inward investment to any other—the UAE one, the EU one, and so on—so it’s exactly the same. I take that point. The question I would ask you is whether there is a corollary to this FTA in any of those arrangements that says that New Zealand has to show best endeavours to send $20 billion USD, or $35-odd billion New Zealand dollars, of investment to another country, to the UAE, or to the EU. Do we have to do that in any of those arrangements? That is the concern. It’s not the country that it is coming from, as the Minister said. That is the issue that we are concerned about. It’s our ability to do that. It’s also the one-sided bit at the end of that process, which is if India decides that it doesn’t think that we’ve given enough effort to do that and to demonstrate that we collectively, New Zealand Inc, have invested that $35 billion in India—and the wording is quite clear here—it allows them to impose “proportionate remedial measures” to rebalance tariff concessions and to continue to do so until they are satisfied that we have invested sufficiently in India. Now, if that is also reflected in the EU and UAE arrangements, fine; tell us that. That will be really useful, but if it’s not, that is the concern that we’ve got, not the country of origin.

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): Just before the Minister takes a call, we are constrained by the legislation that’s in front of us. This is a debate about Part 2, which includes those particular clauses. I have noticed that some members want to be able to talk around some of the issues around the agreement. The Government enters into agreements, but the legislation that’s in front of us is about implementing that agreement. It is possible to be able to talk about the issues that you clearly have some interest in, but I ask members to do that within the context of the clauses that are in front of us.

Point of order. Thank you, Chair. Thank you for that clarification. I agree, but also, at the same time, we understand—when it comes to the agreement or the policy intent itself and when are we going to change the agreement or change the policy intent in this case—however, that having the ministerial intent and having the Minister’s intent in the Hansard in terms of clarifying certain aspects of the agreement that pertain to a particular part of the bill is quite important, and it is a fundamental purpose of the committee stage. Yes, I do agree with you, Mr Chair, and I think the questions we have seen so far are specifically referencing a particular clause and the impact that this clause will have in the context of this bill, which is only in front of this committee because of the agreement. I think it is important for us to have some of the Minister’s intent on record.

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): Just to respond to the point of order, that is entirely possible within the context of the different clauses. I know members are very skilled across the Chamber here and will be able to ask those questions within those particular clauses and within Part 2, which is what this debate is about.

Thank you very much, Mr Chairman. I refer to clause 15, which is “Regulations regarding alternative … thresholds for overseas investments in significant business assets”. It’s in relation to the points raised by New Zealand First here, I guess. They had some concerns, and we are moving from $100 million to $200 million—that’s what this change is doing. The question to the Minister, though, is around the safeguards, if you like. Most of these applications will still be scrutinised, I guess, by the Overseas Investment Office, and unless there’s exceptional reasons why not, it will probably give approval to them. But there may be some instances where the Overseas Investment Office might say no, because most of the agreements—and I’m guessing this one; and if I’m wrong, Minister, please clarify—retain the ability for our sovereign judgment over these investments to say no, for good reason. It has to have a good reason. What we’re doing is shifting the threshold from $100 to $200 million. It’s generally easier under $200 million, but there’s still an ability to intervene.

What we have said—and I guess it’s a question relating to New Zealand First—is if the Overseas Investment Office says no and the Ministers intervene and say yes, will the Indian Government be able to challenge that? Or if the Overseas Investment Office says yes and the Ministers say no, will it be the same thing? I guess the question is for officials and the Minister, because I understand that Ministers have overridden advice from the Overseas Investment Office and these sales have gone through, endorsed by New Zealand First in Government. So I’m wanting to check whether that will continue or whether these changes to the legislation will open the door for any litigation from India or from a potential investor.

Mr Chair, thank you. That’s a good question. It was constructive. It doesn’t alter the definitions at all. They remain the same across free-trade agreements (FTAs) except where, in an FTA, it’s been negotiated differently. I gave an example earlier where, in some cases, a qualified most favoured nation provision for some areas could be liberalised in one agreement but it may not apply to another one. Sometimes they’re older; sometimes they’re newer. Equally, the safeguards are not altered by this clause of this legislation. In as far as the definitions of a “significant business” or the safeguards around an investment, those don’t change. They remain outside of the scope of this bill. They’re in the scope of the Overseas Investment Act. Where the Government has the ability to change that, they could do so. Again, I would refer the member to the previous groups I’ve talked about, because it is the same as those from the EU to the UK and some other ones. It doesn’t alter it at all; it’s merely adding the name “India” to it, the threshold goes to $200 million, and those safeguards and definitions around business and so on remain the same. That’s a different Act.

I do want to pick up on what the Minister for Trade and Investment has been consistently saying, which is about the $200 million threshold. My recollection was that the threshold was increased from $100 to $200 million for the United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill (CEPA)—now Act. That was where $100 was increased to $200 million, but I thought it was for the context of that agreement only, because in this agreement, as clause 15 stands, it’s drawing on section 61 of the Overseas Investment Act. Now, section 61 of the Overseas Investment Act is referencing section 13 of the Overseas Investment Act, and section 13 of the Overseas Investment Act, subsection (1)(a)(ii), still has the amount at $100 million. Would the Minister be able to clarify where the $200 million amount came from? It’s not added in this bill, but it’s also not in Overseas Investment Act, but it’s in the CEPA.

Within the Overseas Investment Act, the threshold is $100 million. Free-trade agreements have lifted it up. I would need to be sure, but from recollection, I think, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and then Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) agreement took the threshold to $200 million. There was then a most favoured nation (MFN) clause in some other agreements, including China, which increased their threshold to $200 million as well. The most favoured nations clause in the UK agreement was set at $200, in the EU, $200. Actually, as a result of subsequent agreements negotiated after CPTPP—whichever one it first was—and that most favoured nation clause, which looks backwards to increase it, they remain the same.

The member is correct that the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) went to $200 million because, under the Overseas Investment Act, they already had access to a $100 million threshold, even though we didn’t have an agreement. That’s what the Overseas Investment Act says. This has increased it for them. The reason we do it in this way is that a benefit of additional investment is with a partner we have a trade agreement with. Any country we don’t have a trade agreement with doesn’t get the benefit of the higher amount. They would sit at the $100 million threshold.

Finally, any country outside of that—if we take, for example, World Trade Organization (WTO) countries, a commitment that New Zealand and others have made to the WTO is for $10 million. Over time, New Zealand has put that at a $100 million threshold through legislation. Free-trade agreements have put it up in the case that, with any of those agreements, we had gone higher than $200 million. Any trade we had a most favoured nation clause would have increased to that as well, just as was the case for China, as an example.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Look, I rise again—I didn’t really want to have to do this, but, Minister McClay, you’ve been on your feet at least twice since I asked three questions and you haven’t answered any of them. If I might, do you want me to remind you what the questions were?

💬 Hon Todd McClay: No, no.

OK, thank you.

Sorry, the reason I didn’t is that they’re all out of scope.

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): Steve Abel.

💬 Andy Foster: No, one of them certainly was not so I’ll have another go.

You have, Minister McClay, been talking a lot about this threshold—$100,000, $200,000—

💬 Hon Todd McClay: Million.

$200 million. A fifth of a billion dollars.

💬 Tim Costley: Cheaper than a KiwiMart.

That’s right, but perhaps much worse for the country. The question I have, Minister, in regards to that, and notwithstanding the point that my colleague Mark Patterson made about the importance of retaining the scourger in New Zealand—the two scourgers—the risk to us, as an economy, if we lose it. Is there some component to having a higher threshold, notwithstanding that it hasn’t got precedent in free-trade agreements elsewhere, to try and clawback some of the exported capital that we are obliged to send to India as part of this agreement, which runs counter to our chronic current account deficit because we can’t afford to be exporting that capital. Is this an attempt or a rationale for trying to get some investment back so that we are not punished by the loss of those domestic funds into India in the form of, currently, $35 billion?

My question, Minister, is, surely, in the process of making a decision about these clauses, 14 and 15 in this part, there was some advice sought on your part as to the probability of there being investments that either meet that threshold—

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): Don’t use “your”, you’ll bring the Chair into the debate.

—or exceed it—pardon me, Mr Chair. Surely, the Minister undertook some advice as to what the probability or the volumes of investments that might meet that threshold or fall below that threshold were. And I wonder, if that’s the case, whether the Minister can give us some of the information and advice that he received.

Well, there’s a range of advice that we receive when getting ready to bring a bill before the House to implement a free-trade agreement. The advice that’s given in this one around clause 2 is very much identical to that under the United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, the EU, and, one assumes, the UK, because they’re very narrow in what it does; it increases the threshold for India, as it did with all these other countries, to $200 million.

The advice would also show that it doesn’t alter anything else in the Overseas Investment Act, which deals with all the other things that have been raised by members, other than inserting the name “India” into that so it fits within other free-trade agreement partners.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Just while we’re on that threshold amount, did I just hear correctly that the amount is $200? Is the amount $200 million for this bill?

💬 Hon Todd McClay: No.

No? It’s $100?

💬 Hon Todd McClay: There’s no amount in the bill.

No amount in the bill—sorry, I didn’t quite catch the Minister for Trade and Investment’s first part of that response, which is the Minister kept on referring to a $200 million threshold, which is the standard, which is not in this bill but in the Overseas Investment Act. Can I just clarify whether the Minister did say $200 or $100?

Well, I can be very clear: all of our free-trade agreements have a $200 million threshold, except for one agreement and that’s the CER with Australia, which is a higher amount. There is no amount in this bill because it is inserting the name “India Free Trade Agreement” into another Act that lines up with all other free-trade agreements.

Look, Minister McClay, you just kind of flippantly said that those three questions I asked were out of scope, but one of those questions was that if this bill were to fail—that clearly cannot be out of scope because it is about this bill—if this bill were to fail, what would it do to the free-trade agreement (FTA), which has not itself been in front of this committee, because this is the one chance that we get to debate this, in terms of what’s actually in there, and we only get to debate a small part of what’s in there. So the first question there is: if this bill were to fail, what would happen to the FTA?

Secondly, the other thing, Minister, you’ve said quite consistently is that this clause 15 is bringing the India FTA into line with all the others—and you’ve mentioned the $200 million amount—but again, I asked you that question and you said that you’ve talked about our New Zealand First position on the EU bill and the UAE bill and said that we were in favour of those, and we were, but it is not the inward side that was inconsistent there, because the inward side is the same—that’s what you’re saying to us—but it’s the outgoing side. And the question you had said—you might say it’s just out of scope and we’ll just have to take that as being read that there’s nothing there, but there is nothing that we’ve heard from you that gives us any confidence that this is not a unique outward situation in terms of the amount of investment that is required to be made by New Zealand in another country, and that that is not replicated in any other agreement. That’s our big concern.

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): Yeah, I was just trying to figure a way for the member to get his answers. I mean, look, we are talking about Part 2, so the question on whether parts of this might fail and how that would impact the agreement actually isn’t in scope with Part 2. But as I was thinking that, it is really a process question. So I’m just trying to figure out whether the clerks could answer your question. You go and have a chat with them to see whether you could get a satisfactory answer that way. That might be the best way to deal with it. But we might have a contribution here.

On that, the member might use his phone and Google, and I’m sure that would help him with the last bit, but it’s not within the scope of this part as to what happens around enactment.

I have some recommended reading for the member. It is the Overseas Investment Act 2005 and Overseas Investment Regulations 2005. It will be very clear that is New Zealand governing investment into New Zealand—very, very clear. All that this Part 2 does—the only thing that Part 2 does—is changes a law, the Overseas Investment Act, to insert the India Free Trade Agreement along with all the other free-trade agreements so they have a similar treatment. It doesn’t do anything more than that; it doesn’t do anything less than that. But I think—I’m not entirely sure, but there may be a hint in the name of the Act that it’s amending the Overseas Investment Act.

Thank you, Mr Chair, and thank you for that clarification, Minister. I did go back and have a look at it again in terms of the different types, and I did go back and check that the $200 million threshold was added as part of that UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which is a type 5 investment type. That does clarify things, so I do appreciate that.

Can I just check: when we did have the other bill, one of the arguments that was there was that type 5 investor was added as a part of the United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill, and that was something that was deemed necessary for that one. So we have a precedent where, as a part of a new trade agreement, a new investment type has been created as a part of that.

I guess my question then is, for the Minister: has there been any consideration whether, in the context of this particular agreement, that a new investor type be included as a part of this part? So, for example, in the UAE comprehensive economic partnership agreement, clause 11 added new regulations 96A and 96B, which was the type 5 investor which we’re seeing over here in clause 23, regulations 96B amended. So I wondered whether there have been any conversations or discussions between the Minister and the ministry on whether in the context of the NZ-India FTA that a type 6 investor be included or be introduced as a part of this.

For example, we could very easily include a new amendment 23A, for example, that is, let’s say, new regulations 97A and 96—

💬 Tim Costley: Speak to the bill!

Well, we are referring to the Overseas Investment Regulations 2005, and I’m checking with the Minister on whether a new investor type has been considered, considering we’re seeing changes to type 2, 3, and 5. I think my colleague the Hon Damien O’Connor or Vanushi Walters has also asked previously—and I wondered—what happened to type 4. Maybe type 4 is no longer in existence. But, yeah, has a type 6 investor been considered with potentially a $300 million threshold or even a $500 million threshold in response to that?

That’s my first question. I think the other one is, when we’re looking at the rationale for those regulations and the different types of investors in the first place—and please correct me if, you know; this is not something, in terms of the Overseas Investment Act, that is my area of expertise. But a lot of that is to do with the kind of, I guess, checks and compliance or even background check requirements of the investors in those kind of instances. And there are obviously different thresholds based on the types of investors.

One of the questions I remembered—I’m possibly checking previously with the UAE CEPA—was around how someone would do a background check in overseas jurisdiction of the potential fraud or mismanagement, etc., of a particular investor in those countries. I do want to check with the Minister, when we’re looking at the scrutiny or looking at approving a certain type of investor, the way that we’re able to communicate with the Indian Government to ensure that there is good screening and background checks.

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): Just before the Minister takes a call, just to note that there was a question over there from Andy Foster around what happens if parts are not supported. The relevant part to have that debate is on clause 1 and 2, title and commencement. So if Andy Foster wants to take it up at that point, that would be the time and place to do it.

Yes, Mr Chair. In as far as screening thresholds are concerned, that doesn’t change between agreement to agreement. It’s not dealt with under this Act; it’s the Overseas Investment Act. It remains the same.

For the UAE agreement, there was a new category created, which is why it was part of that bill. There is no new category created in this bill, which is why the member can’t find one. It doesn’t alter thresholds that go up, but that’s not the way that would be done. If a future agreement negotiated a threshold to increase, where there’s a most favoured nations clause in other free-trade agreements, it would naturally flow through, but, in this case, that is not the case.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I have a question around Part 2, clause 18(1). I’ve been following the debate in my office, so I’m pretty sure that this question hasn’t been asked. My question is around the definition around “permanent residence” around the definition of “India individual”. Is that the same threshold that we apply for reciprocal investment to India, and is that also the same investment that we apply, for example, for Hong Kong individuals and other countries that we have free-trade agreements with? Is that just permanent residence threshold sufficient, or is the requirement for the other nations to be nationals of their country for our other FTAs and for the reciprocal part of our investment into India?

Just wanting to ask that really quick question to the Minister. I think he’s looking to his officials for advice on that. I think he’s sought it now, so I’ll sit down.

No, I was just checking. We treat nationalities—in that case, we treat it the same in New Zealand domestic legislation, yes.

A party vote was called for on the question, That Part 2 be agreed to.

Ayes 93

New Zealand National 48; New Zealand Labour 34; ACT New Zealand 11.

Noes 28

Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 14; New Zealand First 8; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Part 2 agreed to.

The result corrected after originally being announced as Ayes 101, Noes 20.

Committee of the whole House

Part 3 Amendments to Tariff Act 1988, Tariff, Customs and Excise Act 2018, and Customs and Excise Regulations 1996

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): We come now to Part 3. This is the debate on clauses 25 to 36, “Amendments to Tariff Act 1988, Tariff, Customs and Excise Act 2018, and Customs and Excise Regulations 1996”. The question is that Part 3 stand part.