India Export Quotas (Apples, Kiwifruit, and Mānuka Honey) Bill

I move, That the India Free Trade Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill and the India Export Quotas (Apples, Kiwifruit, and Mānuka Honey) Bill be now read a third time.

This is the culmination of a journey that began more than 16 years ago when first discussions were held with India around starting free-trade agreement (FTA) negotiations. The Government made it a priority, recommitted to negotiations, and worked at pace with India to secure an agreement that delivers for New Zealand exporters, workers, growers, farmers, businesses, consumers, and all New Zealanders.

India is the world’s fastest growing economy. It is home to 1.4 billion people and is on track to become one of the world’s largest consumer markets. For too long, New Zealand exporters have faced significant barriers in India while competitors benefited from preferential access. This agreement changes that. It will open up significant new opportunities for New Zealand businesses already trading in India and will also help level the playing field with our competitors. The FTA will reduce or eliminate tariffs on 95 percent of current exports to India, and with the FTA our exporters will get the boost they need to sell competitively in India. The benefits are substantial, and they are immediate.

New Zealand apple exporters will be able to export 32,500 tonnes next season, increasing to 35,000 tonnes if we can get the agreement ratified this year. The current 50 percent tariff will be cut in half to 25 percent, within the quota. Industry estimates tariff savings of up to $25 million per year—money directly into the pockets of New Zealand apple growers.

Kiwifruit will receive tariff-free access for a quota that grows to 15,000 tonnes over the next six years—four times more than we’ve ever sold India in a year—plus a 50 percent tariff reduction for any out-of-quota trade exports to India.

Our exporters of sheep meat, wool, coal, and almost all forest goods will see tariffs immediately drop to zero from entry into force.

Fish and seafood exporters will see the current 33 percent tariff eliminated on most goods over seven years. Mānuka honey tariffs will reduce from a whopping 66 percent to 16.5 percent over five years.

These are real commercial gains for New Zealanders. They mean more exports, more sales, more jobs, and more income flowing back into the New Zealand economy and into New Zealand communities. They mean greater returns at the farm gate, pack-houses, processing plants, ports, and businesses across the whole of New Zealand. This agreement positions New Zealand for the future. It will boost the businesses of those who are already selling in India and open up new opportunities for those interested in expanding into the Indian market and having access to 1.4 billion people.

The FTA references several international instruments, including the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which was first included in the New Zealand - UK FTA and then the New Zealand - EU FTA. However, the inclusion of reference to UNDRIP in the India free-trade agreement does not impose and is not intended to impose any obligation on New Zealand law or Government policy, and we reaffirm the reservations that were made by the New Zealand Government to the United Nations in 2010.

The strong support we have seen for the bills from across Parliament demonstrates our shared understanding of the importance of expanding New Zealand’s international opportunities. It has enabled us to progress quickly through our ratification process. This means that we’re able to bring the agreements into force this year, bringing the benefits to our exporters as fast as possible. Of course, because it is entering into force this year, the second round of tariff reduction or quota increases will take place on 1 January, rather than our exporters having to wait an additional year. It’s a great result for New Zealand businesses and New Zealand consumers more generally. From here, we will continue to engage with the business community to make sure they are poised to take full advantage of the agreement and all the benefits that it brings.

The India FTA is a significant achievement that advances New Zealand’s interests; it strengthens our international connections, and it supports the people and businesses who drive our economy. New Zealand is a trading nation; one in four jobs depends on our exports. Our future prosperity depends on our ability to compete, grow, and succeed in international markets. This agreement achieves exactly that. I will deliver real opportunities for our exporters to compete on a more level playing field, create new opportunities for growth, and lift incomes and living standards for New Zealand.

Today, we demonstrate our ambition and determination to pursue opportunities that will benefit New Zealanders for decades to come. This landmark agreement is good for our economy, good for our exporters, and good for New Zealand. I thank all those who have contributed to bringing us to this point, I thank the Labour Party for their support, and I commend the bill to the House.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Teanau Tuiono): The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Thank you very much, Mr Speaker. This is not the agreement that Labour would have negotiated, but it is an agreement and a big step forward for our country in terms of our connection with the world’s most populous country.

We unfortunately have to acknowledge “Liberation Day” and President Trump for tipping the world of trade on its ear and making countries like New Zealand and India appreciate the value of trade agreements and formal connections. Can I acknowledge the Government that picked up the opportunity—a relationship that had been built, as the Minister for Trade and Investment said, over 16 or many more long years with the Indian people and with that country.

We had certainly visited, while in Government, on a number of occasions—as had the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon Winston Peters—to build the partnerships that India indicated were the way forward. Not a free-trade agreement (FTA); at that time, they saw that as a risk to their economy—an economy that they were trying to build as an export nation, not one that wanted to import. We in New Zealand, as a dairy-exporting nation, were seen as a threat to India.

It is unfortunate that we don’t have many opportunities for the dairy industry in this trade agreement; albumins, which are water-soluble proteins that go into infant formula and other high-value products, have got through the door, but it’s a very, very small part of our total dairy export portfolio. While there may be potential to build that over time, if I was in the dairy industry, I wouldn’t be holding my breath for massive opportunities. Nonetheless, what has been negotiation—quotas for kiwifruit, for mānuka honey, and for apples—is certainly valuable. Along with the services through tourism and through education, there is potential to a strong trading relationship with India.

There are, of course, some risks. It has been pointed out in the House by New Zealand First, and I’m right to say that the commitment to promote US$20 billion of investment into India is indeed ambitious—very, very ambitious. I’m not sure that we will come anywhere close to achieving that target, but if the Indian Government is convinced that we are promoting that, then maybe we will meet their expectations. Prime Minister Modi certainly indicated, on a number of occasions, that that’s what they’re looking for from this trade agreement, and we accept that. Exporters moving into this market, building greater export volumes and opportunities, must be mindful of that risk, which is the point we make as the Labour Party about this being a unique trade agreement. There’s not one that I can recall that actually has a growing risk over time rather than declining risks or removal of barriers.

Nonetheless, on balance, Labour—when we finally got access to the information; we weren’t included in the negotiation process, and even being updated was not part of it. We were told that an agreement had been reached and that we would get access to the information at some point. That was at the end of January; we got access to the documents; we looked over them in confidence; we went through them and asked for more information to try to clarify points, because we had the Minister of Foreign Affairs saying that this was a terrible agreement, and because it wasn’t going to be supported by a coalition partner. So we had to ask on behalf of those people who were confused. One coalition partner was saying this is the best thing since sliced bread, and the other coalition partner—New Zealand First—was saying that this is a terrible agreement for New Zealand.”

Labour took the responsible approach. We looked at the agreement. We went over it very, very carefully and weighed up the downsides. I’ll point to another one, around biosecurity: there being no disputes settlement process. If a call is made on a biosecurity risk, by either country, unfortunately we don’t have a process by which to settle that. We’ve faced one of those barriers in the past, with our log exports to India, and we had to work through the issue of methyl bromide—the alternative treatment processes—to assure the Indians that there was no biosecurity threat. Fair enough, but the absence of a disputes settlement process is one of the downsides to this agreement, which Labour would not have negotiated. None the less, it is what we have on the table.

In moving forward, we said, “Yes, on balance, we will support this agreement”, but we wanted to do a couple of things to ensure that the claims made by New Zealand First about mass migration and migrant exploitation could be addressed. The coalition Government had dumbed down and reduced resources to the labour inspectorate. That’s the organisation that runs around the country and tries to expose and prevent any migrant exploitation. Indeed, in spite of assurances by the Government that this doesn’t happen—that we don’t have abuse—it is occurring on a regular basis, and we need to ensure that the labour inspectorate is up to scratch. We negotiated with the Government and said we would support the agreement on the basis of an increased number of labour inspectors, and the Government has indicated that it is moving in that direction.

We also said that we wanted to progress the modern slavery legislation. It’s a requirement, in most OECD countries, that we have a piece of legislation in place that prevents, and indeed makes illegal, any migrant worker exploitation that might be deemed to be called “modern slavery”. Indeed, we have exposed that in our country on a semi-regular basis, so it’s no good pretending that it doesn’t occur. We said that we wanted legislation in place.

💬 Hon Mark Patterson: It does. We’re trying to stop it.

I look forward to New Zealand First supporting that legislation through the House. Indeed, the Government has again been a bit slow in moving that forward. I say, in the Chamber of this House, that the Government committed to the passage of modern slavery legislation for our support for this trade agreement. We want to see that progress, as we did with the labour inspectorate.

The other thing that we asked for was an assurance, because the Indian Government and diaspora in this country have been somewhat confused by a coalition Government that, on the one hand, says this a good trade agreement and, on the other hand, says it’s terrible. They don’t know where things might go into the future. We said to the Government: to ensure bipartisan support for this, Labour would like to be at the events that promote the opportunities from this free-trade agreement. The Government has been OK, but I have to say they have dropped the ball on occasions. I’d like to say in this House that we want to be part of those events, not just for political purposes but actually to ensure that there is support for this across the House. As the other major party, being eliminated from those is, in fact, somewhat insulting and may be not reassuring to the Indian people of this country.

On balance, Labour will support this piece of legislation that enables the free-trade agreement to be brought into place. It makes some adjustments to legislation across the dairy industry, which is quite critical—across customs and excise, to ensure that we can monitor the inward and outward flow of goods to and from India—and it brings in a quota management system for the goods that we’ve negotiated to get into India: apples, mānuka honey, and kiwifruit. Where there is potential, the volumes are still small—let’s not overplay that—but they do have the potential to grow if you’re selling into a market of 1.4 billion people. Labour has always supported trade negotiations and agreements—good quality agreements. We have negotiated many of them, going back to the India free-trade agreement that Phil Goff in Government did, and the value from that has flowed from that. There’s the EU agreement, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. These are agreements that the major parties have supported and that New Zealand has benefited from.

Can I acknowledge—and I know the Minister for Trade and Investment has—the good work of the officials. This is tough work, and the officials, I know—given, I guess, the speed of this process—did have to commit to many trips to India. It’s not always easy for them over there, but they did a great job—the best they could. Labour supports the India - New Zealand free-trade agreement, and we will work with exporters and importers to build the relationship between our two countries.

Thank you very much, Mr Speaker. The Green Party will not be supporting this free-trade agreement. I want to make it clear that the Minister for Trade and Investment likes to say we never support free-trade agreements, but, in fact, we did support the European Union free-trade agreement. There were some key components in that agreement that made it an appropriate one to support, one of the obvious ones being there being climate and environmental obligations placed on both parties to that agreement. There are no such equivalent obligations in this agreement, at but one point.

One of the most radical things this Government has done, as the most radically anti-environmental and anti-climate Government in a generation, is actually threaten the integrity of that very agreement, because it has backed down on the calibre of the stance we are taking in regard to the climate and the environment and is actually undermining the integrity of that EU trade agreement. Our ability to fulfil the agreement that is before us is going to be threatened by this absolutely preposterous—in the words of my colleague Mark Patterson: “preposterous”—commitment that we shall endeavour to invest $35 billion over 15 years in foreign direct investment (FDI).

I asked the Minister for Trade and Investment, when he was elucidating or expounding the value of the China free-trade agreement—$23 billion currently—to let us know what the foreign direct investment commitment was that New Zealand made to China in that China free-trade agreement. He refused to answer, because the answer is that there is no FDI agreement. There is no foreign direct investment component in the China free-trade agreement. This is an exceptional and novel precedent set here with India that I believe will come back to bite us, in a way that future Governments will be standing in this Parliament and lamenting, including the purple coalition that we’ve got today between Labour and National.

A wise man once observed that New Zealand First and the Greens have something in common, which is that we are both economic nationalists. We are not racial nationalists in the Green Party, however, and we’re not militarists. Economic nationalism has a very important lineage, and I believe, as my colleague Damien O’Connor alluded to, in this new Trumpian world—where the rule of law has been abandoned, where we’re back to “might is right”—we will quickly find out that our willingness to protect our economic sovereignty, our ability to produce for ourselves and process for ourselves and manufacture for ourselves, is all the more vital. Our globalised world becomes less stable once it is back to “might is right”, once we lose the rule of law, which has been rapidly abandoned by that very dangerous man occupying the White House right now.

That’s why we should be much more cautious about these sorts of agreements. One of the consequences of us being expected to invest $35 billion in India is that we thereby weaken our own chronic current account deficit because we’re exporting such massive amounts of capital that we should be better investing right here in New Zealand. Part of the problem with our current account deficit is we’re already outflowing profits from foreign companies owned in New Zealand and we have loss of sovereignty over our own economy.

In regard to the question of food production, this is very acutely brought into stark relief by what has occurred in this term of Government. We are seeing deindustrialisation of New Zealand, in part by an energy crisis, in part driven by a unilateral attack on Iran by the United States—again, Trump—but also by the fact that the likes of Heinz-Watties and Gregg’s and McCain are owned by overseas companies that are not as committed to upholding the ability of New Zealanders to produce and process our own food as a New Zealand - owned entity would be, as a locally owned cooperative or company would be.

If we are to try and recompense for some of the supposed investment we’re going to make to India, it might be by trying to get India to invest in New Zealand, but that actually exacerbates that problem. You actually then create another situation where you get more New Zealand companies and more of the New Zealand economy owned by an overseas economy. When are we going to have that honest conversation about the fact we haven’t thought very deeply about that part of the consequence of the last 40 years of neoliberalism?

When people on the other side of the House say if you like farmers, then you’ll support this free-trade agreement, that sort of glib, shallow thinking doesn’t take account of the fact that the growers down in the Hawke’s Bay right now have no one to sell their peas to because they don’t have processing capability. It takes no account of the effect of the impact on actual growers and producers because we’ve been outcompeted by cheaper overseas products and we don’t have our local commitment to buying New Zealand - made and New Zealand - produced and we’re losing the capability to even retain that.

It is not a zero-sum game. The question of loss of ownership and economic sovereignty and our means of production and processing and manufacturing is intimately tied up with the nature of this sort of agreement.

💬 Katie Nimon: Are you finished?

I haven’t. I’m just having a little think about what I want to say next.

Tim van de Molen: Get on with it.

I could do that if you like. There’s another component to this that the Greens are not happy with—the lack of a decent Treaty commitment. This Government, we know, has gone to great lengths to undermine the Māori-Crown relationship, to both pick a fight with Māori directly but also to undermine Treaty obligations. What we see in this agreement undermines the indigenous rights of both New Zealand Māori but also the indigenous people of India, because their rights are not recognised in India either by this fair-trade agreement—free-trade agreement. I wish it was a fair-trade agreement. That is another thing that we’re not happy with.

I want to finish by pointing out that the nature of that commitment of $35 billion or $20 billion American dollars is so far from what we are currently investing in foreign direct investment (FDI) overseas. I pointed out in the first reading that our current foreign direct investment, if you add it up over the last 10 years, is well short of what this $35 billion is. I’m just trying to find the figure now. The idea that we’re somehow going to rapidly increase our FDI is not consistent with the track record we currently have. In fact, over 10 years, we’ve had an average of minus $28 million. It was a net disinvestment. Our total FDI in 2025 was $1.46 billion and we’re going to ramp that up by thirtyfold. It’s not credible—it is not credible. It is the duty of this House to sign our country up and our future generations up to deals that are actually going to be fulfilled. More than anything, I would be concerned that if we know we can’t do that, we should not have made that commitment to India. That is not a reasonable commitment for us to make.

The final component I’ll speak to is it seems extraordinary that we’re getting tariff deals on export apples and kiwifruit in return for us agreeing to develop an action plan designed to enhance India’s production and quality of those very products and hence enable them to compete with us on the products we’re trying to export to them at a tariff discount. It makes no sense, and that is why the Green Party will be voting against this particular free-trade agreement with India.

I rise in support of the India Free Trade Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill on behalf of the ACT Party. Trade has generally had a very bipartisan approach across New Zealand over many years and it has led to a hell of a lot of the success that this country has in that we approach it looking to make it fairer and better for our exporters around the world. Now, we’re getting to a point where we have done a lot of deals and we are a very open economy. We don’t put many barriers on anyone coming to it, and you’ve got to ask the question: what is in it for some of these other countries? This does mean that we do get some of the concerns we have raised here but have been answered by the Minister for Trade and Investment and by the Opposition spokesperson as well around these concerns have been raised. We are not signing ourselves up to “we must do this”; it is an ambition.

But I do want to point to the fact that, as the Minister mentioned, there are a number of benefits here in this agreement, particularly for our lamb meat exports. I believe we have faced a 33 percent tariff into India. The Australians used to be on something similar. We had good trade into there. They got a reduction. They basically cut our lunch. This enables our sheep meat exporters to get back on a level playing field with the Australians. We’re the first country ever to secure a preferential access for apples, and, as has been mentioned, kiwifruit and mānuka honey. These are important sectors in New Zealand and we will get better access from that.

As a proud dairy farmer, I do want to touch on the fact that we’re not getting a lot of dairy access, but that’s probably no surprise to anyone in the dairy industry. I recall being at the 2019 World Dairy Summit, where the chairperson of Amul Dairy, Dr Sodhi, was speaking on a topic around South Asian trade or something like that. Completely out of the blue he decided to tell all 1,000 audience members that there will never be a free-trade deal with New Zealand for dairy access. It was pretty clear. We had just beaten India in the World Test Championship; that may have played into his reason to put the boot into New Zealand at that point in time, but we’re always going to be up against it.

But I guess the point I want to make is dairy is our largest—

💬 Hon Rachel Brooking: Thank you, Donald Trump.

Blame Donald—yep. Dairy is our largest industry here in New Zealand, and yes, it’s been particularly tough. We haven’t had great access through the India free-trade agreement (FTA), and previous to that the EU FTA. Excellent access through the UK FTA—the one praise that I’ll offer to the former trade Minister. That’s sort of a benchmark that we should aspire to in the future, quite frankly. But going forward, we do need to ensure that where we can we break down barriers for our dairy industry and open up access. We’ve got to be stronger on that because it is our biggest industry. We do need to make sure we are creating more access to more markets for it. It’s very important. But I do want to say we do support this bill and I commend it to the House.

I rise on behalf of New Zealand First to oppose this free-trade agreement. Just at this particular time, I would just like to take some grace from the House to remember the Hon Jim Peters MNZM, a true gentleman and a scholar, and his beautiful wife Robyn, who have tributed so much to New Zealand First. He was very acute and very astute.

A key question, what I reflected on overnight: is this agreement in our national interest? I think this Parliament owes it to New Zealanders to actually answer that question.

The national interest test is interesting. The Hon Priyanca Radhakrishnan yesterday was eager to point out that some people here are racist and xenophobic. It’s very interesting, because the Hon Phil Twyford was part of the process that led to the national interest test because he dared to question Chinese nationals buying houses and raising the prices in Auckland, and that kicked off the agreement between our leader and David Parker to come up with a national interest test. Well, I’ve got to say it’s just as well we’ve got one, because as a new member, and there are plenty of members here who have been here a lot longer than me and have a lot of experience in this House—it seems a shame to me that the Minister has left the room, but it’s very important for New Zealand to actually consider this. The process is one that troubles me.

We had a first reading, whereby the agreement had already been decided. It then went to a select committee, whereby the agreement had already been decided. We had a second reading where, in both of those occasions, we had an opportunity to say and voice our reasons around why we disagree with this FTA. Now we’re at third reading. Where was the debate on the agreement itself? Don’t we owe it to New Zealanders to have that debate? Where and when were we, as New Zealand First, given the opportunity to contribute to shaping this FTA?

We are a nationalist economic party, as the member from the Green Party said, and we hold the line on national interest, which is why we were so keen to get it in the place for us. My reflection on this is that at this point in our journey as New Zealand, we’ve got an awfully big job ahead of us to rebuild our economy and to add value here so that we’re not stuck in a constant primary produce export nation; that we will move towards more value-added exports and employ people on higher wages, which are all things that we as New Zealand First really, really want for our country.

Let me say this about free trade. This one doesn’t seem “free” to me—this one seems more expensive to me—but, yes, absolutely: opening up the opportunity to trade with the rest of the world is fundamental to this country’s success. However, we need the ability to trade, and we don’t want to trade away our competitive advantages. What we are playing with here are three crucial competitive advantages that New Zealand has in the world through horticulture, agriculture, and, of course, honey. These things are really important to us, so there is reason for us to take some care around what we do with this free-trade agreement.

Now, the one that has come up in debate and drawn a lot of heat is this outward investment of $35 billion to India. What has not come up is the fact that that investment is made on behalf of New Zealand by this Parliament for the private sector to invest. I’d like to know where they are—I’d like to know where they are. Have we lined that up? Have we questioned them? Have we talked to them about how we’re going to achieve this? Or have we just made this agreement up as we’re going along? There are a number of things here that we are still not happy with, and we feel, as others do, that we needed the chance to actually participate in the development of this FTA.

Immigration is being traversed quite a lot here. The investment that we just talked about, the $35 billion—what about the trade imbalance? We’re dealing with a country that is 280 times our size. Do you think those two previous things add up in light of that, and the rising middle class in India? It is huge. They will swamp us if we are not sure about how we deal with this agreement. And, yes, I agree with the Minister and he has worked extremely hard and I agree with him on the Chinese FTA. That is a true reflection of us taking on one of the biggest nations in the world and coming out with a good deal, right? It’s worked for us, and we agree with that. However, this trade imbalance is really concerning for us. We know what we’re dealing with here, and there are a number of things around it.

Let me just take the albumins, for example, reflecting what I’ve just said. Albumins go into value-added products, so we’re exporting them. So, come on, why would we do that? Why would we not keep those important ingredients, along with all the others—the bioactives around mānuka honey and the bioactives, actually, and biofunctional foods around kiwifruit, for example; our apples; the list goes on. Why aren’t we investing that money in our own industry so that we can export those value-added products and take the benefit here for higher-cost, higher-wage jobs? It’s so, so important to us. The rules of origin—we didn’t cover much about that, but, essentially, those ingredients go into other products and other nations will be interested in them. How are we going to keep track of the rules of origin of our exports in that process? Good luck with that.

The agricultural cooperation quotas done through the agreements and the action plans that we have in place—now, do you think that that’s not important? Actually, I do think that’s important that we’re going to be training India how to grow apples and grow kiwifruit. I do actually think that’s a bit of an issue for us. We may have missed that article 9.10 allows India to impose proportionate remedial measures to rebalance the concessions given to New Zealand under its tariff schedule if India determines that New Zealand has not fulfilled its commitment to investing $35 billion in their economy.

There’s so much more here. I’ll jump down to financial systems. We’re jumping into bed with one of the most advanced countries in the world in terms of technology, and we are looking at sharing our cooperation on digital payments, on unified payments interface integration, fintechs, digital currencies, central bank digital currencies, data governance and sovereign data, scams, privacy, and financial sovereignty. We haven’t resolved those things ourselves, and yet here we are. It’s in the free-trade agreement. We’re just going to go right ahead and join up to what’s happening with India and see if we can manage ourselves through that process. Those are huge things. Blockchain is coming at us like there’s no tomorrow. Do you think that we need to be concerned and involved in those processes with our new partner? Why is it even here? Why is it even in this agreement?

We understand that our coalition partners want to usher this through, and we can see the opportunity, as well—but as this is already agreed and we have had little chance to influence the outcome, were it not for the Labour Party agreeing to this FTA, it could not be called a Government bill. We’ve got a problem here right from the start, and this debate opened up yesterday, as well.

Suffice to say, we believe that New Zealanders deserve to know that our national interests are uppermost in our considerations. New Zealand First, our party and our party’s members and its constituents, are not convinced, and we believe that many of the citizens and voters that support the parties in Parliament here are also in that place supporting them, similarly concerned. So we’re going ask New Zealanders: do you believe this is a good deal?

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Maureen Pugh): The member’s time has expired. I’ll just use the opportunity to point out to members that this is a debate not on the free-trade agreement but on the enabling legislation, and, also, to the member Dr David Wilson, it is inappropriate to mention the names of people who may or may not be in the House.

Thank you so much, Madam Speaker. Seeing as this is the third reading, I just want to reflect a little bit on the debate and processes that we followed.

I think there is something to be said about the reality that, throughout history, trade has been a backbone of development of all peoples, in exchanges of cultures, goods, and ideas that have led to innovation. But as we evolve, and our societies become more connected, in my view trade deals should first and foremost benefit the working people of both nations involved in it. The legislation enabling it should work towards that as well.

When I look at the legislation enabling this free-trade agreement, and the rhetoric, I think, that has been thrown in this debate more broadly, a reflection that I wanted to make—particularly in the contributions from other speakers, including from the Government side—has been a lack of commentary on, for example, whether this legislation which enables a trade agreement, furthers or protects labour rights. In the legislation, I don’t see anything that, for example, enables binding language in relationship to labour rights. It’s not covered in the dispute settlement chapter either. I think this is something that is really amiss, because we should be concerned about the fact that our trade agreements are not enhancing labour rights amongst both nations. Or, in the legislation that we’ve seen here, and submitters touched on this in the select committee process—so reflecting on some of our supporters’ concerns on this, I do think that the non-binding language on labour rights is particularly concerning due to the fact that India does have, unfortunately, a poor track record when it comes to labour rights. There are many workers in India who unfortunately still experience very little to no labour rights.

I think our contribution, both in the process in this legislation and more broadly whenever we design trade deals, should be seeking to enhance the wellbeing of working-class people across the globe. So I think this is particularly concerning. I know that, through this debate, while not explicitly in the legislation enabling the trade agreement, immigration has nonetheless still been a component of the debate, including within this legislation because of the rhetoric that ties to it. I would encourage any members that would have raised concerns throughout this debate on the immigration components of the deal to reflect on whether their concerns are actually coming from a place of wanting to enhance labour rights across the board or whether they come from just more broadly scapegoating.

We do share, though, our concerns with New Zealand First on the ability to genuinely enact some of the obligations on foreign investment, and actually being able to meet them; and echo the risks that exist of the unilateral ability for India to call back some of the tariff cuts if these are not met. I think this is something that particularly concerns us, because we have not seen the evidence that we’ll be able to meet those commitments. Therefore, the sort of merit off this legislation which enables a trade deal should then be questioned, as a result. I particularly questioned the timing of this legislation to enable the trade agreement due to the reality that I think New Zealanders deserve a robust public debate on the merits of this trade deal. It should not be dangled as a sort of “election win” or sort of “election cycle win” by the Government members. I want to make sure that New Zealanders remain confident that the trade agreements that Governments are signing us up to genuinely are to the benefit of everyday working people. I regret that this debate, and this process, has not enabled this to be the case.

I also welcome and want to reflect on the committee of the whole House process that we underwent in this House. It was definitely unusual to see New Zealand First members blocking closure motions, and I welcome them onto scrutinising Government bills a bit more. Like, I think this actually is a good thing, where there are differences in Government parties, that we actually do enable Government parties to voice their differences and actually adequately try to scrutinise this. This is something the Green Party in the previous two terms we were in Government actually took really seriously. I would welcome this as actually a healthy part of our democratic processes. I think it’s good practice for members who may have not had the opportunity to perhaps scrutinise Government bills to partake in these.

I think the more we’re able to have legislation that follows due processes, that engages with the broader public, the committee of the whole House, they just actually will be a lot richer and will be able to reflect those contributions. I do not think this legislation or the trade deal process has actually brought the public on board with enough information and engagement.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I’m happy to take a call here on the final reading of this bill. It’s a good piece of legislation that gives effect to an agreement that will be very valuable and meaningful for New Zealand. It’s a shame the last couple of speakers have demonstrated a lack of understanding about the agreement and what is included; and, indeed, have not spent anytime focusing on the legislation itself.

We made some pretty straight forward changes around the quota management process, to ensure that it was efficient, and reduced red tape where possible. We also put in stronger oversight for the Minister around the audit process; ensured that the Ministry for Primary Industries was accountable, like other quota managers; and shortened up the appeal process time frame. So all succinct things that I am confident will deliver a better outcome for us. So I commend it to the House.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. Like my colleague, the Hon Damien O’Connor, I rise to speak in favour of the India fair-trade agreement bills—what are now two bills before us—at this third reading. As my colleague has pointed out, it isn’t the agreement that Labour would have negotiated, it’s not the legislation that precisely we would be bringing to the House, but it is a step in the right direction. One that allows us the opportunity to grow and develop the relationship between the two countries over the 15-year horizon.

I know, Madam Speaker, as you’ve pointed out, we’re not speaking about the agreement but rather the legislation specifically. There is, of course, the important tether between the two, which is the commencement date. As the Minister spoke to in the chair earlier, the finalisation of the agreement itself is very much waiting for this legislation to pass, and then the agreement will come into force as well. So with the Speaker’s permission, I did just want to acknowledge not only the Minister who’s concluded the agreement but also my colleague the Hon Damien O’Connor, and the Hon Nanaia Mahuta—last term—for her work, which I’ll speak to briefly in a moment. But also to thank Vangelis Vitalis, our chief negotiator; Richard Griffin, who was the lead on the legal team; and the broader Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade staff, who played both a role in the agreement but also the drafting of the legislation, and who were in front of us at select committee answering many, many questions.

The agreement itself runs into 20 chapters that cover a range of issues that I won’t speak about, because I feel like, for me, the important thing in terms of what it’s doing is opening lanes. Both lanes in terms of relationships across academia and trade and people-to-people contact, and really ensuring that New Zealanders into the future are fluent in both worlds. So from an internationalist’s perspective, my view is that this is not only appropriate, but so important in changing times. Others have referenced Liberation Day in the context of a changing world. That is important for the legislation that we’re bringing to the House; it is important for timing and making sure that we’re making the most of opportunities not only for us but for the young people coming out of university who are looking for those job opportunities. The Minister mentioned that one in every four jobs are connected directly to trade. Those are direct connections. There is so much opportunity ahead that the legislation—that, hopefully, we will be passing today—will present for young people, as well.

If I could also recognise the role of the Indian community, who have rallied around the agreement, and the legislation to give effect to the agreement, including the New Zealand Indian Central Association under the president Veer Khar, who’s welcomed the agreement publicly and pushed for cross-party support. And the India New Zealand Business Council, led by the chief executive Sunil Kaushal, who called the signing of the agreement “a momentous occasion”. I know those community leaders have been watching this legislation pass through the House, and will be welcoming the passage today.

As I mentioned earlier, getting to the signing or to passage of legislation, often requires work across parties for a number of years. Certainly, that has happened in this case; beginning, in many ways, in February 2020 with Labour’s India - New Zealand 2025 plan that talked about the development of the relationship to this point.

And that focused on things like strengthening our PhD programmes with the University of Auckland, growing diplomatic relationships, and opening technical dialogue on how cyber-relationships could develop and evolve. I mention this because we had some critique from New Zealand First members about how we were going to engage in the cyber-technology space. That work has been done over the last several years and it replicates some of our agreement with the EU and the UK as well. So this isn’t a piece of legislation that has arrived in the House without that work being done in the background. I do think members ought to be confident and that there has been that cross-party support for years and for years.

Now, in terms of getting to this legislation being in the House, Labour was privy to some discussions in the lead up to the legislation being presented to the House. We were very firm on our view that there was a need for protections and the labour space to match this legislation being brought to the House. So capacity for the labour inspectorate, but also legal advice being provided to those individuals who were coming to New Zealand, to ensure that we didn’t end up with a problem where we would have an escalation in terms of individuals who were being exploited through entering New Zealand on those visas. We will continue to monitor that as this legislation passes and is enforced.

I would caution the House on the irresponsible use of language in terms of those visas. I spoke to this at the second reading of the bill yesterday in that the settings when you look at them—and you just need to read through the settings of the visas—do not stretch our commitments to India in a grandiose, new, novel way. They reflect the visas that we already have under New Zealand law. They continue to allow for the Minister’s discretion in terms of policy settings, much like the other visas that we have as well. Indeed when you look at the student visa settings, they are lower in terms of the guarantee of employment. I do think that once this legislation passes, I would just caution members of the House to be responsible with their language in regards to what this legislation does and what it does not.

Likewise, in terms of the investment commitments that multiple members have spoken about today and yesterday in the House, this is a duty to promote and it is not one where benefits in terms of tariff reduction can be clawed back retrospectively. So at the 15-year point, if a determination is made by India that we have not met that promotion obligation, the businesses, the exporters who have benefited over that 15-year period time of time cannot have those benefits removed from them. It is very much forward-looking.

Yesterday, in committee of the whole House, the Minister was questioned by New Zealand First members about the investment provisions into New Zealand, and the Minister made the very good point that those investment provisions in this legislation are a cut and paste of the provisions that are offered under other agreements as well. So there isn’t preferential treatment. There is nothing new here, and if New Zealand First members are objecting to the investment provisions internally in relation to this agreement and this legislation, then one would think that they would also object to the identical provisions in the EU agreement, which they did not disagree with. That is the point of discrimination that I spoke to earlier as well. So again, for those members, if they are validly concerned, that needs to be a line that they hold across agreements, and it is simply not, in this case.

New Zealand First members also lamented many times that they hadn’t had sufficient say in this agreement, and asked when New Zealand First had. They had it in Cabinet. They had more of a say than many parties in this House and there was certainly an opportunity if their intention was to change or alter the agreement and the legislation in any way, to do it in that scenario. As a member of the Government, in terms of committing to this legislation, what should have happened at the stage that Cabinet agreed as a whole was that there should have been a commitment from the Foreign Minister to give effect to the promotion clause of that agreement, which must now be worked on. There must be a commitment going forward.

Politics is politics, but we must remember that this is one in four jobs we’re talking about in terms of export. There is an opportunity here for New Zealand to begin a relationship that we can certainly develop and improve on in the coming decade-plus, and we would hope that members across the House can continue to work on this in the coming years ahead. I commend this bill to the House.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I’m very pleased to be a small part of this bill and to support it. For those naysayers in the House over yesterday and today, I think the mantra, with time, will become true; that success has many fathers and failure will be an orphan. And I think those orphans will become fathers very quickly. With that, I commend this bill to the House.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Maureen Pugh): This is a split call. The Hon Dr Phil Twyford—oh, sorry, the Hon Phil Twyford.

Thank you, Madam Speaker for that temporary elevation. I want to just add a few comments—actually, three key points to those that have been made by my colleagues in this debate.

As has been said a number of times, this agreement is far from perfect. It’s not the agreement that Labour believes that it would have negotiated, but on balance—and this is the important point—we believe that this agreement is in New Zealand’s national interest, and that’s why Labour is supporting it.

The key elements, I think, are significant reductions in tariffs for a list of key New Zealand exports. That will make a difference. That will create jobs and generate wealth that our country needs.

The argument about immigration and labour mobility in this agreement has been revealing in many ways. I want to echo Vanushi Walters’ comments that the immigration provisions in this bill do not open the floodgates, as some people have been arguing in this House and outside. They are actually quite constrained and quite modest and fit well within New Zealand’s existing policy settings.

The third and hotly debated issue has been the question of the commitment that New Zealand makes in this agreement to promote up to $33 billion of investment from New Zealand into India over 15 years. And we’ve raised questions about that from the beginning of this process. Questioning its credibility and how wise, how prudent it is to have that kind of commitment in this agreement. Ultimately, it is about best endeavours. It’s a commitment to promote, and the agreement does contain mechanisms for India, over time, to be able to review and assess whether or not New Zealand has met its commitment in this regard. I guess it’s our hope that New Zealand exporters will price in and will factor in any risk associated with that clause. And by the time that the Indian Government does come to assess whether or not we’ve met our commitments, that in fact so much shared value will have been created through this agreement that that particular provision will pale into insignificance.

I want to say, in relation to New Zealand First and Green Party colleagues in this debate, that it is always OK, I believe, to be debating economic policy and policy considerations around trade agreements, whether you’re coming from an economic nationalist perspective or other perspectives. And to David Wilson, I would say that I don’t believe anybody, certainly on this side of the House, has suggested that New Zealand First’s opposition to this bill or its conduct in this debate is in any way racist. I don’t think it is. But, actually, when New Zealand First’s leaders in this House routinely denigrate people on the basis of their ethnicity or country of origin in this House and in the community and use anti-immigration and anti-migrant rhetoric, that ramps up a hostile and abusive climate towards people who have come to this country as migrants at some time in the past, that is racist and is highly regrettable.

I want to make the final point that the geopolitical environment really is critically important in this, and Vanushi Walters made, I thought, some excellent comments on this. The direction of US foreign policy under the Trump administration, really, removing the United States as any kind of reliable ally, whether it’s in trade or security or anything else, has meant that under New Zealand’s independent foreign policy—which, hopefully, will become a lot more independent after the coming election—we have to look at other partners and other relationships. India is the most populous country in the world, well on the way to becoming a great power. We must develop and deepen our bilateral relationship with India and other friends in Asia, including ASEAN. This trade agreement is an important way that we can do that, and so I’m glad to commend this bill to the House.

To the doubters and the haters: the doubters that thought we wouldn’t get this done in a term, and yet here we are, and to the haters who think this is not going to make a difference, it will. It’s going to make a massive difference for the people of Hawke’s Bay and for New Zealand. With that, I commend the bill to the House.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. This legislation, as many of us in this House have said, is enabling legislation. It brings the New Zealand - India Free Trade Agreement, which has already been signed, into effect. It does a bunch of things: it amends the Tariff Act 1988, and, basically, it makes changes to allow for preferential tariff rates that have been agreed through the free-trade agreement (FTA). That is good.

As many of my colleagues on this side of the House have already said, while this is by no means a perfect FTA, and it is not one that Labour would have necessarily landed on—and I will touch upon some of that in a short while—it does for the first time give us preferential access for New Zealand honey, for example. That has a 66 percent tariff that will be cut to about three-quarters of that over a five-year period, and this amendment to the Tariff Act allows for this to happen. New Zealand wine: a 150 percent tariff going down to at least 50 percent, or perhaps a quarter—25 percent—over 10 years, and further reductions that will match improvements that are granted to future FTA partners, as well. This part of the legislation goes towards allowing for the tariff reductions.

There is also a part of this legislation that goes towards investment screening, and so it amends the Overseas Investment Act 2005 and the Overseas Investment Regulations 2005 to lift the consent threshold for non-Government Indian investors in significant business assets from $100 million to $200 million. On the point of the investment clause, though, that is a risk that Labour has repeatedly raised with the Government. It is a risk of the necessity for effort towards NZ$33 billion being invested in India, but, again, there are a number of companies that asked for bipartisan support for the FTA and they, ultimately, will have to wear the risk if, at the end of the 15-year period, India unilaterally decides that New Zealand hasn’t put enough effort into progressing that $33 billion of investment.

That is one aspect of it that we didn’t agree with. But, on balance, as many others have said, we have supported the agreement and, therefore, we support the enabling legislation that we are debating in the House today, as well.

Of course, this legislation also allows quota management systems for apples, for kiwifruit, and for mānuka honey to be established through regulation. An Amendment Paper that was already debated in the committee stage has split the bill in two, which brings me to a point around the process of this legislation, given that it is enabling the FTA off that, as well.

The Government knew that they didn’t have the numbers to pass this legislation and that they would need Labour’s support to bring the FTA into force. Astonishingly, they chose to exclude us from the negotiation phase of it, from the early briefings, and from any copy of unredacted advice at any point of this, and that is not how enduring trade policy is made. That is not how you treat the other major party in Parliament who you will need to rely on to rescue your legislation.

💬 Hon Todd McClay: What did you do when you were in Government? Not an invite, not a single shared briefing.

Well, the Minister for Trade and Investment said, “What did we do in Government?” We didn’t have a split Government that was fighting amongst themselves where one part of the Government wouldn’t support what the other part of the Government was doing, where the Foreign Minister exited the chat, and—

💬 Hon Todd McClay: What about the CPTPP?

If we’d relied on the other major party in this House, we wouldn’t have treated Parliament as an afterthought. We would have included the other major party right at the start of that process.

This is a shoddy process from the Government, and I will also then make the point that while the previous speaker Katie Nimon, who resumed her seat before I spoke, said that there were many doubters who claimed that this Government wouldn’t be able to negotiate within one term, implying that it was all down to this Government’s negotiation skills. It wasn’t.

💬 Tom Rutherford: That’s right—got it done.

It wasn’t, Tom Rutherford. That’s not right, because it was very clear from the Indian side that geopolitical changes had meant that while New Zealand also had to look to diversify our trade, so did India. India has been actively negotiating 10 trade agreements in this time, whereas they had not been quite so inclined to be supportive of bilateral trade agreements prior to the US administration.

While members opposite may quibble about this, it is very clear from the Indian side that it wasn’t down to just the power of negotiation by this Government. Of course, there was a huge amount of work that was done before by the former Labour Government—by Nanaia Mahuta, by David Parker, and by Damien O’Connor—to strengthen the foreign relationship between the two countries that led to this, as well, but the major point there is the shift in geopolitical necessities, or the US administration, basically, requiring India to look differently.

The other point that I wanted to touch on in terms of what I said I would come back to previously with regard to the fact that Labour would have done this differently is our focus on our trade-for-all policy agenda. That was developed by David Parker in the previous administration to ensure that trade delivers broad, equitable benefits across communities while also upholding Te Tiriti obligations and environmental standards, none of which, of course, is taken seriously by the current Government in terms of their focus on negotiating trade agreements.

I will also quickly touch on some of Labour’s caveats. When we agreed to support the FTA—and now the enabling legislation, as well, which brings that agreement into force—we were very clear that we would also want to ensure that we strengthen protections against migrant exploitation in this country and that the Government then needs to expand the labour inspectorate to fund at least 14 additional staff that are focused on addressing migrant worker exploitation, serious and complex immigration offending, and a few other things around faster visa changes and progressing the Modern Slavery Bill, all of which the Government has agreed to in principle but must also deliver in full, including progressing the Modern Slavery Bill. Of course, the previous Government had done a fair bit of work on that, and all this Government needs to do is to progress that work.

I also want to touch briefly on the reason why certain other parties like New Zealand First have stated quite clearly that they won’t support either the FTA or this enabling legislation, and that is the narrative around immigration. I agree absolutely with what my colleague the Hon Phil Twyford has said. I know that David Wilson in his contribution specifically pointed to what I have said in the second reading.

To underscore or to highlight what Phil Twyford said in response, which is absolutely correct, I was not referring to any New Zealand First members’ contributions in the House on this legislation. What I was referring to were comments made by the leadership of New Zealand First, by senior Cabinet Ministers, who have continually subjected Indian New Zealanders to a rhetoric that paints them as a problem rather than a community to be valued, where through their claims of “unfettered migration”—I won’t repeat the supposed hyperbole by some of their senior Cabinet Ministers where they paint Indian migration to be something that is out of control, a narrative that others an entire group of New Zealanders, that has led to a barrage of vile and hateful comments online, graffiti outside an Auckland school that a number of Indian children attend, graffiti that calls for violence against Indians. That is hateful, racist, and xenophobic. We all know that online violence can translate into physical violence in real life as well, and therein lies the irresponsibility of the Foreign Minister and senior Cabinet Ministers to stoke division and hate and to make a group of people feel less safe and like they don’t belong, simply because they may have a different skin colour or have been born somewhere else. The Prime Minister, who did absolutely nothing, called it out as racist but refused to act on it. For a party that talks about being tough on consequences, there were no consequences here, and that is wrong.

Thank you. Madam Speaker. I’m thrilled to be able to take this call on the India Free Trade Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill. As the chair of the Primary Production Committee and as a farmer and grower myself, this piece of legislation is going to make a huge difference to the primary producers in New Zealand. I think it’s a disgrace that some parties are scaremongering to justify their opposition to this bill. With that, I’d just like to commend the bill to the House.

💬 Dr Hamish Campbell: Madam Speaker.

💬 Hon Rachel Brooking: Madam Speaker.

💬 DEPUTY SPEAKER: Hamish Campbell—Hamish Campbell clearly was up first.

💬 Hon Rachel Brooking: He hadn’t sat down; he hadn’t finished.

💬 DEPUTY SPEAKER: No, I’ve made the call.

💬 Hon Rachel Brooking: Point of order.

💬 DEPUTY SPEAKER: I’ve got a point of order from the Hon Rachel Brooking. I hope it’s not questioning my judgment. I have got very good peripheral vision, and if it’s a point of order about something else, I will take it.

It’s a clarification, Madam Speaker, and that is that the member who had been making this speech, Miles Anderson, had not finished when the next member was standing up next to him. He was standing up before me—I’m not disputing that question. Is the ruling now that you can stand up whilst a person is still taking their call and that that counts?

💬 DEPUTY SPEAKER: No, it’s not, but Miles Anderson had clearly suggested he was signing off, at which point Hamish Campbell stood. You both stood up really quickly, but Hamish Campbell was first.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. It’s a great honour to stand up and speak in support of the India Free Trade Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill. This is a once-in-a-generation agreement that gives our exporters amazing access to 1.4 billion customers and an economy which is soon going be the third biggest in the world. Therefore, I commend it to the House.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the India Free Trade Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill and the India Export Quotas (Apples, Kiwifruit, and Mānuka Honey) Bill be now read a third time.

Ayes 93

New Zealand National 48; New Zealand Labour 34; ACT New Zealand 11.

Noes 29

Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; New Zealand First 8; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Motion agreed to.

Bills read a third time.

💬 DEPUTY SPEAKER: I declare the House in committee for consideration of the Local Government (System Improvements) Amendment Bill.

Local Government (System Improvements) Amendment Bill

Committee of the whole House

Part 1 Amendments relating to system improvements

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Members, the House is in committee on the Local Government (System Improvements) Amendment Bill. I am aware that the Government released two Amendment Papers containing substantive new policies just a few hours before the House started sitting. This committee stage may, therefore, take longer to ensure that members have time to fully examine those new Amendment Papers. We start with Part 1, which is the debate on clauses 4 to 22, “Amendments relating to system improvements”. The question is that Part 1 stand part.