Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Economic Objective) Amendment Bill

Members, we come now to our final debate. This is the debate on clauses 1 to 3: “Title”, “Commencement”, and “Principal Act”.

Thank you very much. I am going to speak to a couple of amendments that I have on the commencement clause, and this comes to a very important point that has been underlying the entire debate in the committee of the whole House stage, and that is the question of whether there is any evidence to support the contention of the Minister that underpins the entire bill: that somehow or other the Reserve Bank of New Zealand having a dual mandate meant that it took its eye off the ball of inflation.

Now, to recap matters that the Minister didn’t respond to, over the course of this debate we have heard that there was the potential or the possibility of a conflict between the two objectives. However, we were not presented with any evidence that that was true. In fact, the only evidence we have is to the contrary, which is the statements of the Reserve Bank Governor that, in fact, they did focus on inflation during that period and were not impacted. Therefore, that is why I am proposing to amend the commencement date, for the Act to come into force upon the conclusion of an independent expert review on the impacts of the Reserve Bank’s maximum sustainable objective on inflation, employment, and growth outcomes in New Zealand, and the establishment of evidence that the maximum sustainable employment objective has had undesirable consequences for the New Zealand economy.

This Act should not come into force until such time as we have evidence that it is actually needed. So we’ve reached this point in the debate—we’ve been through Part 1; we’ve been through Part 2. We have not been able to convince the Government, in those two parts, that they should take on board amendments that acknowledge the question that was being raised in this amendment, so now we come to the commencement clause as the only opportunity left for us to say, “Let’s not go down a path we don’t need to and that is not good for the New Zealand economy if we don’t have to. Let’s actually have independent experts come in and review it.” That’s actually a very important notion because we never got to hear from independent experts during the process of this piece of legislation. That stands, I might say, in stark contrast to when the dual mandate provision was put in, when we did an independent expert review, with public consultation, and then a piece of legislation that went to select committee and was open for further public submissions. We haven’t had any of that, and that’s why I believe the commencement clause—clause 2—needs to change so that the Act will come into force only upon that particular day.

So I would like to hear from the member in charge of the bill whether or not she believes that this is something that would be sensible. I have for her an alternative, which is a further amendment to clause 2, which would say that it comes into force, rather than on the day after Royal assent, actually on 1 December 2026, provided evidence is found that the maximum sustainable employment objective has had undesirable consequences for the New Zealand economy. Now, I offer up this alternative for a commencement date in the interests of providing clarity and certainty, which appear to be two concepts close to the heart of the Minister. I know that we were criticised in an earlier part of the bill for providing options—well, in this case, we’re providing options, and that is either “1 December 2026” or “at the conclusion of an independent expert review”. I’m not sure that the Government is that keen on the views of experts, but this is an opportunity for them to take it up.

In all seriousness, when we are passing legislation in this House, we should have evidence presented to us. This is a Government that has told us they believe in evidence-based policy. Well, here’s the chance to make that real. Support these amendments in my name so that actually we hear from the experts before we let this bill come into force; otherwise, it really does show what has been suggested earlier in this debate: that this is all symbolism; it’s not substance; it actually isn’t going to do the things that the Government has said it’s going to do; and they’re merely filling up the fact that they don’t have any actual positive legislation.

To save members their time, we will not be changing the commencement date. This is a Government that is getting on with it. After six years of dithering, delay, working groups, task forces, hot air, talk, good intentions, and no delivery, New Zealanders have elected a Government with a mandate to get the cost of living under control, to put price stability back as the core objective for the Reserve Bank. This bill does it, and we’re getting on with it.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’m disappointed to hear from the Minister that she won’t be considering the amendments in the name of Grant Robertson to the commencement date. However, I have proposed in my name an amendment to the commencement date for a completely different reason, and I hope she’ll consider it. Sorry, it’s not in my name; it’s in the name of the Hon Damien O’Connor, and his thinking there, with the suggestion that 18 months should be the appropriate time for this, is that there is a lag between the decisions of the monetary policy committee (MPC) and the effect of those on the real economy. I know the Minister is very serious about the effect of monetary policy on our real economy. So that would allow time for the decisions that the monetary policy has made in the last year to be felt within the economy and to test whether there is in fact a need for a further focus on fighting inflation, as the Minister has contended.

We heard some contributions from the ACT members last night, and I see he’s here. He referred to the work of Milton Friedman. Milton Friedman also suggested that the effect of monetary policy decisions from a central reserve bank might take anywhere from four to 29 months to take into account, so I would also gladly hear from the Minister if she would consider a commencement date of 29 months for this bill, so that we can be sure that we are making policy with an evidence basis, testing those decisions as a reserve bank, and testing their effect on the real economy and on the fluctuations of unemployment particularly.

I’d also like to speak, because I really fear that I’m not going to get another call in this debate, but I would like one, on my amendments in my name. It’s clause 1 and clause 4. I’ll just speak to the one amending the name of the Act, and that’s clause 1. I propose to replace the “Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Economic Objective) Amendment Act”—that’s on page 2—with the words “The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Elevation of the MPC Remit to Primary Legislation) Amendment Act”.

Now, we usefully had the Minister make a contribution prompted by one of her advisers on the ability of primary legislation and secondary legislation to promote the Government’s intention to set economic policy. That’s something we all agree is the role of Government, to direct the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) in some way to take a position on what it should be focusing on at any given time. That is not something I’m contending with. What I am interested in, in changing the name of this Act, is to be really clear about what it is doing, because we’ve heard in the regulatory impact statement that it was Treasury’s advice that the MPC remit may be issued by the Minister of Finance already within the powers of the existing Act, and that would be the preferred method of making the sort of change that the Minister has been speaking about doing today.

What they’ve said in the regulatory impact statement is that the view of Treasury is that ensuring a new MPC remit without amending the Act would be sufficient to ensure monetary policy decision makers focus primarily on achieving and maintaining price stability—i.e., by setting out a hierarchy for dual economic objectives. None the less, they say, they’re amending the Act to signal a greater focus on price stability. But what this would do is allow a very clear signal, as Treasury has proposed, that the Monetary Policy Statement, which would usually be used by the Minister of Finance to direct the RBNZ to focus on one of the economic objectives which is in the previous Act, should be elevated to this stage. I should be really clear for anyone who is observing the passage of this Act that this was about elevating what the Minister wants right now to be the focus. So that Monetary Policy Statement was not the primary mechanism—because that is, in effect, what it is doing—because the Minister could use the Monetary Policy Statement, which is a tool within the legislation provided for already. Instead, she is choosing to amend the primary legislation and to use the House’s time on that.

So we should be really clear that this House today will pass something that could have been done by the Minister using a regulatory tool that has been available to finance Ministers since the beginning of this regime in 1989, but, instead, she is using the tool of using the House’s entire time in urgency, without a select committee process, to do so. That is a use of executive power which is unusual in our constitutional framework between the RBNZ and the Government.

So that’s why we should be really clear in this House that the Act says what it does on the tin—that this is a new tool that we are making out here, that we are setting a new precedent where finance Ministers will come to the House and order the RBNZ around with primary legislation, despite the Opposition’s calls for a select committee process, despite the Opposition’s calls for pause within the committee stage to debate those clauses which are important.

And I come back to clause 4, which was not fully debated in this Chamber, which makes those objective changes that were not fully debated. [Bell rung] Mr Chair? Thank you. I seek further time to be able to elucidate for the House why that change to clause 4 actually needs to be really made clear that this name change, which I am talking about now, is simply what it’s doing. I’m sorry.

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O’Connor): Clause 4 you’re talking about?

Yes, I’m talking about why clause 4 should have been amended, even though it wasn’t. We’re now in the situation where the name of the bill doesn’t do what it says it will do.

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O’Connor): Well, ensure that when you’re straying off the parts of the bill we’re discussing that you actually do relate them.

Thanks, Mr Chair; I’m just learning.

It brings us back to the name of the bill here because if the Minister’s intention is not to use the tools that were provided for in the previous regime but to come to the House and set everything out in primary legislation, then we get into the trouble of not being able to allow experts who have been appointed to the monetary policy committee or experts within the broader range of economic commentators and people with an interest in the way that the fluctuations of the real economy affect New Zealanders being able to contribute at all. So that’s why it would be useful to change the name of this amendment to make it really clear that finance Ministers of all colours over time may come to this House and elevate those usual tools that they would use in secondary legislation and in regulation and, indeed, communicating with the chair of the RBNZ in the letter which the Minister has been asked to table in this House and has not—

💬 Hon Nicola Willis: I have tabled.

Oh sorry, sorry, apologies to the Minister. She said she has tabled her letter to the Reserve Bank Governor, so I will look for that on the Table when I’m finished with my contribution. I am sorry and I would like to make a contribution on that letter, so I hope I get another chance.

So we are saying in this bill, if we pass it today, that it is acceptable practice for a finance Minister to use the House’s time, to use primary legislation, to do all of those things which would usually be in conversation with the Reserve Bank and in conversation with the monetary policy committee. So when we look at those experts appointed to that committee, who are experts in their fields—they are often academics, they are often practitioners of economics within our community, they have some form of expertise in this—that we’re saying they don’t need to be listened to—

💬 Hon Scott Simpson: Tell us about the commencement.

—that they don’t need to come to a select committee, the Hon Scott Simpson. And, instead, it’s generally accepted practice for the Minister of Finance to come and make those changes to what is something that is constitutionally important to New Zealand to make those changes. And I would say to those members interjecting on the other side that we have not been able to have a select committee process on this, where I would have proposed the changes that I am setting out to the name of the Act. They’re very quick to shut down debate in this discussion, which is really central to the constitutional framework of our economy. Because the RBNZ’s independence is something that we all agree with—that the RBNZ, when it can make its own decisions, is the exact point of a 1980 Act.

Tim van de Molen: Point of order.

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O’Connor): If this is about the relevance of what this member is talking about, then that is a job for the Chair. But I’ll invite you to carry on with your point of order, anyway.

Tim van de Molen: Yes, thank you. No, I notice you’re doing that, Mr Chair. I just noticed she hadn’t seen your attempts to bring her back to the bill. So I was just trying to draw her attention to your gestures there. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O’Connor): Thank you for your attention to the Chair, Mr van de Molen. But the point is, you do need to keep referring back regularly to the point, especially when you stray off these three parts of the bill we’re discussing.

Thank you, Mr Chair. The point I’m hoping to make is that the name of this bill is really important and would have been important to the select committee’s process if it were to have occurred. It did not occur, which is a change in the way that we might otherwise make, you know, amendments to the way that the Government directs the RBNZ.

So I would have proposed in select committee that the name would have changed because it’s really important that we’re clear that we are establishing a new practice for finance Ministers to make changes in this way. So we should be clear, when we’re elevating things that are usually in secondary legislation to primary legislation, that we are doing so. This might have also been something the excellent committee the Regulations Review Committee might have also considered, but we’re actually moving away now from a secondary legislation tool and into primary legislation. So the job of the select committee would have been the only check and balance of reviewing that legislation, because primary legislation only goes through those select committees. That is an opportunity that has been denied to this House and that’s why we should accept this amendment.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

Thank you very much, Mr Chair. I want in this particular call in this debate to refer to the title of the bill, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Economic Objective) Amendment Bill 2023, and to highlight my concerns as to why that title is not accurate to both what is in the bill and indeed what I believe is the intent of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act that is being amended.

The idea that there is a single objective about the economy that the Reserve Bank is looking for is completely false, in my view. Members of the House will be aware that there are many, many different definitions of what the economy is. For us on this side of the House, the economy is not an abstract thing. It is in fact very much about people. So my view is that the title of the bill should actually reflect that it is a narrowing of the objectives of the Reserve Bank beyond, or below, or whatever word you want, the economy as we understand it.

It was instructive to note that when Arena Williams was speaking about people losing their jobs and people not being able to pay their bills, there was laughing coming from the Minister in the chair during that period of time. From our perspective on this side of the House, if you’re going to title a bill about the Reserve Bank of New Zealand “Economic Objective”, it should at the very least somehow or other represent people. Ultimately, that has been what’s at stake in this debate. Our job when we are in the House is to accurately describe legislation. If I was describing this piece of legislation accurately, I would say that this is the “Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Putting At Risk People’s Jobs) Bill”, because that is, essentially, what has happened here.

Graeme Wheeler, the previous Governor of the Reserve Bank in 2013-14, took some decisions and went on a monetary policy tightening cycle when unemployment was up above 5 percent. He did that with the single mandate. So if we were thinking about his actions in relation to the title of this bill, we would be very, very concerned to make sure that it was accurately titled. It would, in fact, be something along the lines that I have suggested about the impact that it would have on people’s jobs.

Also in terms of the title is the concern I have around the idea that a single objective actually reflects the role the Reserve Bank Act provides for. When you’re amending a piece of legislation, the title needs to ensure that in some way or other it reflects the primary legislation that is being amended. It is quite clear—and this point is one that I did make in a different part, so I am acknowledging that to the Chair, but it is quite clear to me that the purposes of this Act and the objectives of the Act as it has now been amended are out of sync. So, again, the title should probably reflect that as well by saying the “Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Economic Objectives—Counter to Purposes) Amendment Bill”, because that’s now what’s been done.

Because when we made the change in 2019, we made a change not just to the objective, to add the objective of maximum and sustainable employment, but also to the purposes of the bill, to add in the concepts of sustainability and wellbeing. This brings us right back to my first point. The Reserve Bank’s job, yes, is to set monetary policy, but it doesn’t do that in a vacuum; it does that when it’s focused on the impacts of those decisions on the whole economy. That’s what the Reserve Bank Act actually does right now, today, because the purpose clause still has it in. Yet this bill, titled “Economic Objective”, runs directly counter to that. It’s actually not what the purposes of the Act say.

The Minister was asked a couple of times in earlier debates whether or not she could reconcile those two things and just kept saying that she was going to change the remit. Well, that may well be the case as to what she’s doing. It doesn’t stop the fact that we now have legislation that is inconsistent. So that could be another title for this bill: the “Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Economic Objective—Creating Inconsistency) Amendment Bill”, because that is precisely what this piece of legislation now does.

The Minister in the chair may well laugh, but she needs to take a look at the legislation that she’s amending and see that the purposes of it very clearly take the Reserve Bank to a place where it has a job to promote the wellbeing of these Zealanders. The title of this bill no longer reflects the rest of the legislation.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

Thank you, Mr Chair, for giving me the opportunity to speak directly to the amendments proposed by both the Hon Grant Robertson and the Hon Damien O’Connor in relation to the commencement date of this bill.

The reason I seek the call is because, as the Minister has already said, the Minister has advised that she does not want to change the commencement date and she still wants the commencement date to be the day after the bill receives the Royal assent. Commencement dates are incredibly important—incredibly important—and no more so if you are taking a bill through under urgency. You are, effectively, changing primary legislation and then you’re saying to the public “and do it straight away”. Under urgency, we haven’t had a select committee hearing. We haven’t had an ability to call for submissions.

There are a number of mechanisms within the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act which allow for reviews over the years. In particular, there is one around having, I think, a remit review within a five-year period. My concern is that because we went through Part 2 so fast, I was unable to table an amendment to look at what we could do in terms of a statutory review. When you have new regimes or you have such significant policy decisions, this affects our macroeconomic outlook. This affects how the Reserve Bank Governor changes the official cash rate and what they take into account for that.

So without the ability to have a select committee hearing, because we’re doing this under urgency, there is an inability for me to table an amendment for a statutory review, which is sometimes the safety net that parliaments across time use time and time again—when there is piece of legislation like this, they put in a statutory review.

I urge this committee to approve a delay in the commencement date, because we’ve heard from the Minister, from officials, from the regulatory impact statement, from a number of speeches in the Chamber, and from the Reserve Bank Governor himself that there is still a priority on price stability and that there is clear evidence that the maximum sustainable employment is actually almost like a hierarchy; it’s secondary.

But one of the main things—and, again, I thank the Treasury officials for that regulatory impact statement. And this is something where the Hon Shane Jones said in the House the other day, “Details, details, details.” Well, I’m a details person, and I’m a person that reads regulatory impact statements, and I want to put that on the record for the Prime Minister, who said that nobody reads them. I read them. And one of the footnotes in the regulatory impact statement—footnote 2—references a Treasury report drafted in 2023. It’s Reserve Bank’s 2023 monetary policy committee Remit Review - 27 April 2023 - Treasury Advice on the 2023 monetary policy committee Remit Review Information Release - The Treasury.

Again, Mr Chair, this is relevant. It will go to why I urge for a delay in the commencement date. So I go back to the advice—you know, “details, details, details.” Well, this is the detail. This is the Treasury report: Reserve Bank’s 2023 monetary policy committee Remit Review. In here is the analysis and the background that Treasury provides to the Minister of Finance, and I quote: “Monetary policy is currently operating in a challenging environment, with inflation at multi-decade highs while the labour market remains tight. The current operating context reflects both demand and supply factors, including the combined impacts of significant fiscal and monetary policy responses”—fiscal and monetary responses, I quote—“during the COVID-19 pandemic, and supply-side disruptions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In New Zealand, the monetary policy committee has raised the OCR at its fastest pace since prior to the Global Financial Crisis to contain inflation and anchor inflation expectations.” Then it goes through two particular figures which show the projected Consumers Price Index and the annual inflation figures.

Then, at paragraph 8 of this important report, it carries on, and I quote, “Monetary policy is expected to continue to face challenges in the years ahead, including uncertainty about the future trend in neutral interest rates and the related risk of reaching the effective lower bound, increased risks of supply disruptions associated with geopolitical tensions and regionalisation, and the move towards more sustainable production practices in response to practices in response to climate change”. And that refers to an earlier 2022 Treasury report.

The key thing from that particular report, which I take back to clause 2, is why I urge this committee to consider a delay and agree to one of the amendments on the Table, whether it’s the 18-month delay recommended by the Hon Damien O’Connor or whether it is the additional delay until 2026 recommended by the Hon Grant Robertson. It is for the key point that that report sets out, which is in the detail, which is in a footnote, which is in the regulatory impact statement, which, again, I read: “Monetary policy is expected to continue to face challenges in the years ahead, including uncertainty about the future trend”.

Those amendments on the Table to clause 2 ask for more time because we are in a very uncertain period, and that’s why I don’t agree with the changes, obviously, to the remit. We’ve had a lot of debate on that, even though it was shortened because we had no select committee stage. But, again, I think having a delay in the commencement date allows, in a period that we are in of high uncertainty, for there to be greater stability because you’re not changing the primary legislation.

And I understand that the Minister did say we didn’t want the Order in Council because, you know, it’s secondary legislation—that was in response to one of the other member’s comments—and that is exactly what’s in the regulatory impact statement. That’s exactly what the Treasury officials advised against—not to do that Order in Council.

However, she failed to remember that in the regulatory impact statement they also said, “Don’t change the primary legislation; do it through the remit.”, which is why I think it’s incredibly important that, you know—you don’t necessarily have to agree with Treasury all the time. I know other Ministers in various Governments didn’t always agree with Treasury. But we are in a period of uncertainty. We have a period where the country is going to be facing a number of challenges in the year ahead because of what’s happening geopolitically, both in our region and overseas.

That’s why I absolutely urge the committee to consider a delay to this primary legislation—because we are in an uncertain period. I’m not too sure whether I’ll have an ability to scrutinise—or perhaps I could do it as a member’s bill—and do a review. However, in the absence of that ability—because we had urgency and we weren’t able to table too many more amendments—I’m looking at having some time to be able to keep the primary legislation as it is, with the dual mandate. That is not to say that in 18 months’ time or in 2026—when, actually, there was going to be a review anyway; I think the last one was in 2021. It just allows the ability for there to be certainty in our markets, and then our markets know, in 2026 or in 18 months’ time, in the forecast that has been provided, we are going to see more stability. It allows there to be that opportunity for the commencement date to be then. But if you do it now, straight away, in a bill that has not been to a select committee and has just been subject, basically, to the analysis on this side of the committee by various parties—unable to provide those amendments, with no statutory review because we didn’t have the ability to table that in enough time, and because the process on Part 2 was so short. I urge the committee not to go through with it straight away, on the day after the bill receives the Royal assent. Instead, go either with the 18-month period as recommended by Damien O’Connor, or 2026, as recommended by the Hon Grant Robertson, because that allows us to be able to have some certainty over this period. And, again, monetary policy is expected to continue to face challenges in the years ahead, including uncertainty about the future trend in neutral interest rates and the related risk of reaching the effective lower bound increase of supply disruption, geopolitical tensions, regionalisation, and a move towards more sustainable production practices in response to climate change.

This is not the time to go straight into the date being the day after the Royal assent—it is a time when we have a lot of uncertainty, as set out by officials. We have a little bit of time to be able to stabilise things that we need to do, because I understand you’ve got a laser-like focus on it. Allow for that stabilisation and then bring into force, if you still want to do it, that particular commencement date—either in 18 months or in 2026. I urge the committee to have consideration of that.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

Just a couple of things. Decisions around closure motions have been around two things. One is getting the wording exactly right to the closure motion. The other is the Minister’s participation. The other is, of course, the relevance and repetition. So all three are probably failing at the moment, so I’ll go to the Hon Grant Robertson.

Mr Chair, thank you very much for another call on this part, which is an important part—the title and commencement. I want to focus this call on a different matter that I haven’t raised before, and that is the question of Royal assent. So just to be absolutely clear here, the bill will come into force, according to clause 2, on the day after Royal assent has been granted. Now, the process of Royal assent in New Zealand is long established—it’s one that most members of the House will be aware of. And when the Governor-General, who would be giving Royal assent in their role—on behalf of the King—comes to consider this piece of legislation, they will be asking themselves the questions that we on this side of the House have been asking, and that is: is it appropriate to sign off a piece of legislation that has come forward and at no point in the debate on the legislation has there been any evidence provided as to its necessity?

Now, the Sovereign will, obviously—or the Sovereign’s representative—take very seriously the fact that this Parliament has debated the matter. But there are actually debates in Parliament in the past that have covered this question around whether or not there is an automatic requirement, essentially, that Royal assent has to be granted.

Well, I would suggest that in this particular case, we’ve got a very good example of where a bill has not had any evidence to back it up. It hasn’t gone well.

💬 Hon Members: Aww!

Well, no. Members opposite argue and interject in my speech—adding to the need for it—that perhaps evidence has been provided. On every occasion in the earlier parts of this bill, when we asked was there evidence that the Reserve Bank had taken their eye off the ball of focusing on inflation because it had a dual mandate—every time we asked for that, we didn’t get an answer. We got “it could”, “it might”, “it’s possible”—we never heard evidence. So the actual purpose and reasoning of the bill is not supported with a commencement date as currently listed in clause 2. The other matter that I believe would be given serious consideration as to whether Royal assent should be granted is the fact that this bill has gone through under urgency.

Now, I accept that bills go through under urgency on a regular basis in this House. There are a variety of reasons for that, but there are particular types of legislation that one would want to be very careful about putting through under urgency, and, therefore, if one were in the position to be granting Royal assent under clause 2 of the bill, one would want to consider. And, in particular, this legislation—the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 2021—is at the heart of the way the economy is managed in New Zealand. It’s arguably of constitutional importance, because the Reserve Bank is an independent institution, and when Parliament comes to make decisions about changing aspects of it, serious consideration needs to be given to the views of the public and the transparency. So when one is making a decision about when this bill should commence—and we have options on the table, amendments that are there that can be taken up by the Government to give some space and time in the absence of that select committee process.

When the changes were made in 2019 to move to this position, we took this piece of legislation out on the road, in draft form, for people to understand—actually, it was before the draft, but we took the concepts out on the road for people to understand. There were many submissions and a lot of discussion. A bill was then drafted, and then it went to select committee and public submissions were taken on it. So if we’re thinking about when a bill should commence, it should commence after all of that has occurred, and that is what is being offered there: the amendments on the Table that suggest either going to 1 December 2026 or taking an extra 18 months—or, indeed, having an independent expert panel come in. Those options must be the ones that the House takes up, because, actually, we owe it to New Zealanders, for a matter of this seriousness, that it does get a matter of proper public scrutiny, it does have some transparency associated with it, we do hear from experts in the field—otherwise, we are placing the person who has to give Royal assent under clause 2 of this bill in an extremely difficult position. There are alternatives to commencing this in the haste that the Government is, and I urge them to take those alternatives up.

I move, That debate on this question now close.

The question is that Arena Williams’ tabled amendment to Part 1 be agreed to.

The question is that the Hon Damien O’Connor’s tabled amendment to clause 2 be agreed to.

The Hon Grant Robertson’s tabled amendments to clause 2 are out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation. The amendment proposed is to create an uncertain commencement date.

The committee has considered the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Economic Objective) Amendment Bill and reports it without amendment. I move, That the report be adopted.

Motion agreed to.

Report adopted.

This bill is set down for third reading immediately.

Third Reading