Oranga Tamariki Amendment Bill

Members, we come now to the Oranga Tamariki Amendment Bill. When we were last debating this bill, we were debating Part 1, which is the debate on clauses 4 to 43, “Amendments to the principal Act”. The question is that Part 1 stand part.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’m now turning to Part 1 of the bill, and the critical clause of concern is clause 6, which is to replace new section 18B, which is the partial repeal of section 18B of the Oranga Tamariki Act, and that is in relation to “A person described in this section is a person who—(a) has been convicted under the Crimes Act of the murder, manslaughter, or infanticide of a child or young person who was in the person’s care or custody at the time of the child’s or young person’s death: (b) has been—(i) convicted under any of sections 188 to 204 of the Crimes Act of an offence involving the assault or injury of a child or young person who was in the person’s care or custody at the time of the offence;”. Now, I’m speaking to Supplementary Order Paper 275, which has been tabled in the name of ACT MP Karen Chhour. The SOP proposes to replace clause 6 and the partial repeal of section 18B.

So to put it into context, Madam Chair and Minister Kelvin Davis seated beside you, when we were last debating this issue in the committee, this Supplementary Order Paper was to appeal to the Minister and appeal to this Government that the partial repeal factor in the importance, the relevance, the timeliness, and the significance related to the most serious child abuse case leading to the death of Malachi Subecz—so this Supplementary Order Paper has been very much driven and motivated by the tragic death of this little one. It states that the partial repeal of section 18B is to not only factor in that a person described who should be accountable and held under the spotlight and the magnification, or the lens, of Oranga Tamariki, but that when it comes to investigating a subsequent child—which means a child who was born after a previous child has been taken into the care of Oranga Tamariki—the partial repeal focus, importantly, on a person who has been convicted of serious abuse against a child and also another person. So Karen Chhour’s Supplementary Order Paper 275 is appealing to the Minister, is appealing to the Government, and is appealing to parliamentarians that the partial repeal of section 18B is amended to note that a conviction of a person who has caused a grievous assault or abuse on another is on record as a person who should come to the attention of Oranga Tamariki in relation to any subsequent child in their care automatically.

I say to Madam Chair and to the Minister seated beside you that the timing is so critical. I have repeated in this House and I have repeated before the select committee that in relation to a child and in relation to any notification and subsequent follow-up of an investigation into a report of child abuse, a report of concern about a child in care, the timing of that is so relevant, significant, and important. In this House today, the timing is relevant, significant, and important, because the Government and the Minister are in receipt of findings of a review from Dame Karen Poutasi in relation to an investigation and finding that Malachi Subecz became a child invisible to the system. This Supplementary Order Paper will magnify, will highlight, and will intensify the importance that any subsequent child who comes to the notice of Oranga Tamariki and is in the care of a person convicted of assault should, as a result, automatically come into the care of Oranga Tamariki.

Thank you, Madam Chair. The member Harete Hipango is quite wrong. Malachi Subecz’s situation has nothing to do with a subsequent child, as the person who harmed him was not the child’s mother.

But I’d like to talk to Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 311 in my name. I’ve tabled this. It seeks to address a technical error that has been identified in the current drafting of section 198 of the Oranga Tamariki Act 1989. Section 198 applies when the Family Court is asked to make a care or protection order on the grounds that a child’s offending behaviour is significant enough to cause serious concern for their wellbeing. The current drafting of section 198 means that before any care and protection order can be made on the ground of the child’s offending, the court needs to be satisfied of the guilt of the child, beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the child knew that their actions were wrong, against the law. This means that section 198 applies to all care or protection orders, including interim orders, where children are placed in the interim custody of the chief executive of Oranga Tamariki. This does not reflect the original intention of the section, which was that it applied substantive care and protection orders—or declarations, under the old terminology—rather than interim orders.

This drafting error is an unintended consequence of changes made through the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Oranga Tamariki) Legislation Act 2017. Prior to that Act, there were different processes for declarations and interim orders. However, that 2017 Act repealed the declaration process and made consequential amendments to provisions that mentioned that process, such as section 198. This has had the unintended consequence in relation the scope of section 198, because now care or protection orders under the Oranga Tamariki Act 1989 include interim orders. The SOP seeks to address this issue by clarifying that section 198 should not apply to interim orders.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’ll address Supplementary Order Paper 311, which Minister Kelvin Davis, has just spoken to, but for purposes of clarification, the Minister has taken out of context the point that I was making about timeliness in terms of child notifications. My point in relation to the tragic death of Malachi Subecz and the report and finding from Dame Karen Poutasi is that there is the importance and recognition that Malachi became deemed and viewed as an invisible child. The point that I was making was the importance of timeliness of responsiveness to that, and that relates to the Supplementary Order Paper that I was speaking about in terms of the importance of timeliness of response from this Government and from the Government’s child welfare, care, and protection agency, Oranga Tamariki, to address the issue relating to subsequent children.

The partial repeal that’s being addressed before the committee, which is of section 18B of the Oranga Tamariki Act, which is addressed under Supplementary Order Paper 275 from Karen Chhour, was recognising the importance that there needs to be an amendment to the partial repeal to factor in and take account of a person who has been convicted of a previous assault on a child or young person. I address this House also on the importance of recognising convictions for domestic violence. It’s about the timeliness of a response from this Government, to take heed and to address the Supplementary Order Paper, and the importance of this repeal to get it right, with the recognition that any subsequent child of a former child who has been taken into the custody, the oversight of care and protection of Oranga Tamariki—that that subsequent child, in a timely way, is addressed as being a child who is in need of that oversight and lens of Oranga Tamariki to ensure their wellbeing, their safety, and their care and protection. So that’s the context.

Now, I’m turning my eye to Supplementary Order Paper 311, which the Minister has put and proposed. I will need to consider that—it has just been tabled—and I will refer that as it correlates to the Oranga Tamariki Amendment Bill.

But, in closing, the importance of these amendments must be focused on the children—first, front, foremost—and section 4A of the Oranga Tamariki Act is the paramountcy provision. It is so important that the Government, in this debate, does not lose sight of the child-centric approach that must be taken in this debate, and an important element of child centricity is the timeliness of action and response.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Minister Davis, I am going to speak to Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 275 from my colleague Karen Chhour. I just want to speak a little bit to this, Minister, because what we’ve seen over the last few years, especially with our children, is a lot of hurt, a lot of harm, and a lot of abuse. When I read through our current legislation, which talks about the subsequent child policy, and I hear your argument for wanting to change it, I feel that we need to find a balance here, because what the Government is looking to do is to align the current legislation so that the subsequent child policy will not have any effect if a person is not convicted of either murdering a child or manslaughter of a child. But it doesn’t speak to a person or family member beating a child—beating a child to a point where they end up in hospital and could potentially be beaten over and over again.

When we look at what’s happening in our communities with ram raids and with youth crime, while we can say that part of youth crime is on the downside, we have this massive, 500 percent increase in ram raids, and what we all hear across this House is how we have to, together, unite to find the way to ensure that our children aren’t put into a situation where they do go out there and commit crime. One of the salient points that we always hear, even from the children themselves that are in police custody, is that they come from homes where they have been beaten and where they have been abused, and what concerns us, Minister, is that this particular clause does not protect the children in that sense, whereas my colleague Karen Chhour’s Supplementary Order Paper 275 does merely this. All it does is say that if anybody is convicted of a crime under the Crimes Act, between sections 188 and 204, and is imprisoned for three months or more, then they should fall under what is currently the subsequent child policy. That is a way that we feel will help to protect these kids that are then going on to perform the ram raids and some of the more serious crime.

Minister, I’ve heard you speak of somebody who may have been 18 years old and they’ve been convicted of a crime, and then, some time on, they should not have to go through the subsequent child policy. We totally get that—you know, when somebody is young, they should be given a second chance. But that is one example when there are many, many more examples of our kids being beaten and abused, and this policy does not protect them, but Karen Chhour’s SOP will go some way to helping that.

So, Minister, my question to you is: what is your plan for these kids that are being beaten and abused by parents who have lost a child to Oranga Tamariki for doing that exact same thing, because if we continue to allow this to happen, what we are breeding, effectively, is more crime—potential crime—from our youth, and it doesn’t help them or the next generation. So what is the Government’s plan there? Is it to let the kids be abused and be beaten, because if they’re not dead, that’s OK—because we don’t think that’s right, Minister. So “What is your plan?”, is my question. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Minister, I’d also like to speak on behalf of my colleague Karen Chhour with regard to Supplementary Order Paper 276. It probably just needs clarifying for me and maybe an explanation.

New section 214A(2) in clause 29(2) reads, “If a child or young person appears before a court and the court considers the child’s or young person’s bail, no breach of a bail condition that occurred before the appearance may be used to support a subsequent arrest under this section.” Now, I’m reading that as saying that no previous breaches of bail can be used against the child or young person. That would seem to me to be really counter-productive in having young people have any sort of consequences for their actions, and in this case, it’s a consequence for breaching bail. Bail is set by a judge in a court. It’s often a Youth Court judge, who understands how young people work and has a lot of experience and, often, will know the family background of the young person. Really, we hear police, parents, and everyone in the community say that young people just have no consequences today, and I’m just wondering whether, if that is the case—I don’t know whether I’m reading it wrong—you’d consider this Supplementary Order Paper to delete that clause 29(2) and confirm with me that it’s not that the clock starts again after each recording of a breach of bail. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I implore the Minister to stand and answer some questions around how this Government can say it’s OK under the Crimes Act, under “Assaults and injuries to the person”. Wounding with intent, injuring with intent, strangling or suffocation, injuring by unlawful act, aggravated wounding or injury, aggravated assault—these are just a few offences. It goes from section 188 to section 204. How, Minister, can we allow this to occur without having some consequence to the parents who will do this to a subsequent child?

This is really detailed criminal effect here, and while I do understand that we need to have that balance where—as you have said, and as I’ve mentioned before—an 18-year-old has been prosecuted, and then maybe in their thirties, with their having grown up a bit, there’s other legislation which also has to deal with people growing up. But taking away wounding with intent, assault, strangulation, and suffocation as being a consequence, or even a way of being able to look at whether a person is suitable to continue to have their child in their care—Minister, what is the answer to why we would get rid of this? But, more importantly, Minister, what is the answer to why we would not include it, as suggested by Karen Chhour’s Supplementary Order Paper 275?

Thank you, Madam Chair. Before the Minister does stand to respond to the probing questions and submissions—quite properly, and quite timely also—Minister, I pick up and I carry on in relation to that, having practised in the area of child welfare and also in the criminal courts, labouring the point, if it needs to be laboured, that we will do that because our children and their safety is critical.

Supplementary Order Paper 275: my colleague Nicole McKee has outlined in detail those specific offences where a parent of a child has been convicted. I implore this Government, and labour the point with the Labour Government, on the necessity and importance that where any subsequent child has a parent or a caregiver convicted of these serious criminal offences, it must be a criteria and a factor under law for a subsequent child of a previous sibling taken into the custody, care, and protection of Oranga Tamariki for that subsequent child to automatically—automatically—and mandatorily be uplifted and taken into care.

I talked about timeliness. The timeliness of this follows on, and I labour the point again that Dame Karen Poutasi was talking about Malachi as not being seen as visible—named an invisible child—and, as a result of that, being lost in the system. So the relevance of this is that Dame Karen Poutasi’s recommendation, one of 14, is for mandatory reporting by professional organisations.

The point of this Supplementary Order Paper is that if there is a conviction of a caregiver or of a parent of a subsequent child of a former child in care, that is not just for a conviction for murder, manslaughter, or infanticide, but is for a conviction detailed under sections 188 to section 204 of the Crimes Act. My colleague has gone and detailed what those convictions are. The seriousness and the severity of those assaults on a child must be factored in by this Government in this law. I labour the point with the Labour Government to do so.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Just to address some of the points that have been raised: first of all, those crimes that have been read out from the Crimes Act are abhorrent crimes, and we need to make sure that we protect our children. But the point that is being made is that—and it was the example I gave when we previously debated this in the House. If there is a person—a young parent, say, in their late teens—who has had a child and has hurt their child in such a way that the child is removed from them, what the Supplementary Order Paper from the ACT Party does is it actually gives that parent no hope that they can ever have a child or start a family again, regardless of the changes that they have made in their lives. So that is exactly what they’re doing, and it, basically, removes the point of this bill, because we believe that people, given the right support, given the right opportunities, and given the right education, can make changes, and even though they’ve made terrible mistakes as a younger person, a younger adult, at some stage in their lives, they should be allowed to have another chance.

Nicole McKee did say—she used the words “Why would we do this so that a parent who will go on to hurt a subsequent child?” Well, who’s to say the person will go on to hurt a subsequent child? The point is nobody is saying that somebody who has an ongoing history of violence should be allowed to look after a subsequent child, but if there are people who have made those changes in their lives, why should they not be given a chance?

In terms of the comments about Malachi Subecz being an invisible child—yeah, I agree. No child should be invisible, and their needs should be—it is outside the scope of this bill to an extent, Madam Chair, but I thought I would address it anyway. The member Harete Hipango, who asked the question, needs to also realise that a member of her former profession—i.e., lawyers and lawyers for child—was one of the people who met with Malachi and the caregiver a couple of weeks after being informed that there were concerns, and failed to recognise that there was some harm caused. So there were a number of people, and Dame Karen Poutasi’s report was about making sure that if one group, one agency, one person missed the signs of abuse, there were safety nets across the system, and that the system was there to meet the needs of the child if there were gaps. What happened to him was totally unacceptable.

In terms of mandatory reporting, which was also raised by Harete Hipango, the previous National Government looked at and decided not to implement mandatory reporting, based on the white paper that said that there was no evidence that legislation in Australia was effective in preventing child abuse, and everyone is probably thinking, “Well, maybe Australia has just been examining this recently.” Well, the reality is that New South Wales has had mandatory reporting since 1977. If by 2014, which is some 30-something years later, there is still no evidence that mandatory reporting is effective, we have to ask the question and look carefully at whether there’s been evidence since 2012, 2013, 2014, or whenever that white paper came out, that mandatory reporting is effective.

So we’re not saying we’re not going to do it; we’re just saying that we need to really look at the evidence and make evidence-based decisions. Why would we invest in something that hasn’t got evidence after what, by now, is over 40 years? We’ve just got to make sure we make the right decisions and don’t just have a knee-jerk reaction. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I am interested in the Minister’s response there, because I find it quite contradictory. I implore you to seek further information about the Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) that my colleague Karen Chhour has put to the House, because how the Minister has portrayed it is not what the SOP actually is. When the Minister stands and says that the crimes that have been read out by me—and I have not read them all out—are abhorrent, the fact is that the Minister is saying to this committee and to New Zealand, after we’ve had such horrid incidents occur with our children, including the deaths of our children, that it’s OK for a person to make a mistake in their youth. We get that, and we think that it is as well.

What we don’t understand is why the Government would say that it’s actually OK for a person who has had a child removed by Oranga Tamariki to then go on, potentially, and if they commit these crimes from sections 188 to 204 of the Crimes Act, some of which I’ve read out, and which include intent to injure, suffocation, using a firearm against a family member, and a whole range of really awful things that do happen in homes—that that’s OK? I don’t understand why the Government believes that it’s OK if a person has already had a child removed, and then, later on, whether it be three years or whether it be 20 years later on, they commit one of these heinous crimes against one of our children—that’s OK? That just does not make sense. When we’re trying to look after our kids and when we’re looking at the harm that is happening, it does not make sense.

All that the provision on SOP 275 does is say that if a person has lost a child to Oranga Tamariki and has then gone on at some time—and they don’t have to, Minister. That’s the thing: if they don’t commit these crimes, then they don’t come under this regime, and they can continue to have their children and keep their children, because they’re not committing these heinous crimes. But what happens, Minister, is that by not putting this in there, we’re saying it’s OK—it’s OK to go ahead and suffocate your children, to beat your children, and to threaten your children. That’s what you’re saying, because you’re not allowing this to go through as part of the bill, and I find that, personally, sad—sad for our tamariki, sad for the future, and sad for how we go about trying to fix the problem that we have with our youth of today if we cannot or if we refuse to protect them.

Karen Chhour’s SOP 275 wants to put in added protections for our children, and if parents are good parents, they won’t come under this regime, because they won’t be trying to attempt to kill their children. What the change is that the Government wants to do is to say that “Unless a child is dead”—unless they’re already dead—“we won’t take them away.” That in itself is sad, and I don’t agree with what the Minister has referred to in the way of what this SOP is trying to do. It’s not stopping any person from being a parent at any time unless they commit these heinous crimes, and I would implore the Government to support this to protect our children fully and to go about making sure that the future of New Zealand’s kids will be to grow up in a violence-free home, because the Government of the day has allowed clauses from Supplementary Order Paper 275 in to protect them. Minister, please have a read of SOP 275, because how you have portrayed it is not how it’s written on the Supplementary Order Paper.

While assault offences against children and young people are serious—and the ones that were actually read out are very serious—the inclusion of these offences within the scope of the provisions would raise similar issues to those that currently impact on the provisions. Social workers currently have the tools and powers to be able to respond if they consider that there are risks to the safety and wellbeing of any child. Social workers are able to consider prior convictions or allegations of abuse that a parent or an adult in the household may have.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’m somewhat perturbed by what I’m hearing from the Minister for Children. What I’ve been emphasising to the committee is that the children have to be front and centre, first and foremost, in relation to this debate.

I’ve heard the Minister negating the Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) that we’re talking to in recognising the subsequent child provision—in other words, the mandatory action by Oranga Tamariki to take into custody a subsequent child of an earlier child who has been put into permanent placement—should apply to more than just a person who has been convicted of murder, manslaughter, or infanticide. Those provisions under the Crimes Act, Minister, in sections 188 to 204, include being a parent who has been convicted of these serious offences of grievous assault, wounding with intent—that’s of a child or a young person—injuring with intent, and strangulation or suffocation. It’s well-known in domestic violence by those of us who have worked in that space that any attempt at suffocating and, particularly, a conviction is an indication of an untimely anticipated death. We should not be reacting to a child’s death in the way that Oranga Tamariki has that prompted the reviews and the investigations by not following through with the notification by whānau in relation to Malachi Subecz.

So Minister—I will go on to read—we are saying that where there is a conviction of a parent who has had an earlier child placed into permanent care, with regard to the subsequent child, it should automatically—it should be a mandatory requirement upon Oranga Tamariki to take oversight and action and to take the subsequent child into care where the parent has been convicted of injuring by unlawful act; aggravated wounding or injury; aggravated assault; assault with intent to injure; assault on a child or by a male on a female, and the list goes on, Minister. I understand that child welfare law and practice is complex, and I understand that the Minister does not have experience in that regard, but my expectation and the expectation of members in this House and in New Zealand should be that as Minister for Children, you are advocating for the interests of the child, the children, and the young persons, not for the parent who has had a child previously placed into permanent care. That has to be the expectation and the priority for you as the Minister for children and Oranga Tamariki.

Minister, I was also concerned when reference was made to what the National Government did. What the National Party is doing at the moment with ACT is reiterating and reinforcing the importance that children do have that oversight and blanket of protection from the State welfare agency and organisation, and the problem, Minister, as is well-known with recent reviews and the most recent recommendations from Dame Karen Poutasi, is the mandatory action and notifications of abuse from professional organisations. This very SOP 275 is about mandatory, automatic engagement by Oranga Tamariki on any subsequent child of a previous child who’s in permanent placement care and custody, so that the subsequent child will trigger, action, activate, and motivate Oranga Tamariki to put that child’s welfare, wellbeing, and best interests front, first, foremost, and paramount before those of a parent who has a conviction, not just for murder, manslaughter, or infanticide, but for all those grievous assaults and serious assaults that are outlined in sections 188 to 204 of the Crimes Act. Minister, the expectation is for you to protect our children.

I move, That the question be now put.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Minister, I’m going to ask questions around new section 144(1) in clause 17. This clause states that “(1) No agreement may be made under section 140 with respect to a child of or over the age of 12 years or a young person unless—(a) the child or young person consents to the making of the agreement; and (b) the consent is recorded.”

I’m just going to ask for the rationale behind that, with the concern that this clause may challenge the protection necessary for the child’s care and treatment plan in the absence of a child’s consent. For example, when an appointed lawyer for child and/or statutory custodial or guardianship status act representation of the child has been made, the age, maturity, cognitive functioning, and other relevant considerations of a child are accounted for in the representation of their views versus their best interests, but there’s an inherent tension between what a 12-year-old wants and what an adult custodian, guardian, or advocate deems to be in that child’s welfare and best interests.

There is a concern here that if the child or young person is required to consent and that consent has to be recorded, how will that be reconcilable with, say, a lawyer that has been appointed in the best interests of the child to make decisions in the best interests of that child, but which the child for various reasons may not agree with? So there is a concern there, Minister, and we would appreciate the Minister expanding on what that has been made and how it is going to address that specific issue—for example, if the advocate for the child seeks to make decisions in their best interests, but is unable to do so because of clause 17.

Thank you, Madam Chair, and I thank the member for the question specific to clause 17, which is amending section 144. It’s a technical change. It is aimed at addressing issues where the framing of the section does not strengthen the rights of children and young people. In particular, the current wording of section 144 sets out that the consent from children and young people must be in writing. However, not all children are able to provide consent in writing. This clause will allow a child or a young person to give consent in ways other than in writing, so the change is aimed at improving children’s rights and their involvement in the process.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Minister, I’d really like clarification and an explanation on my last call. Does a young person’s bail start from scratch each time? Is bail just of no real significance?

Over the years, as a police officer, I’ve done hundreds and hundreds of bail checks. Each one of those bail checks that was breached was treated really seriously, and the person was dragged back to court and the judge really told them off or imposed something else on that person.

So bail breaches are regarded very seriously, and if the Minister is saying that for young people, they don’t actually matter and that there isn’t a consequence if you breach your bail, then the first time that that young person has a consequence will be when they offend as an adult—and I say “when” they offend as adult, because they will if they don’t receive any consequences for their earlier offending as a young person. I’d just really like to have clarification on the bail conditions imposed and whether the bail breaches are taken seriously. Thanks.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I should have addressed this, sorry, when the member Chris Baillie first asked. One of the first things we have to do, though, is make sure that we understand what bail breaches are. Sometimes a bail breach can be something as simple as a young person not getting home from football practice at the right time. They missed the bus or something, and so they don’t get in. They can be a couple of minutes late, and that’s a bail breach.

So the clause seeks to clarify the powers of enforcement officers under sections 214 and 214A by clarifying the relationship between the two sections. In particular, the clause clarifies two things. It clarifies when the count of bail breaches resets. When the young person has committed three bail breaches, the count will reset at their court appearance. After that, they would need to commit three more breaches to be arrested without warrant again. It clarifies when a young person can be arrested, when they are breaching the bail, or when they have recently breached bail. It does not otherwise change the powers of enforcement officers.

But the big thing we have to remember is that it’s easy to catastrophise that a bail breach means this kid has gone off on some sort of rampage. The reality is they could just be late home from a sporting thing or something—could have missed the bus. So we just have to make sure that we don’t sort of make this into something that it may not necessarily be.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Minister Davis, I just want to reflect on a statement that you made in answer to the last time that I stood to submit. With all due respect, Minister, you referred to social workers being able to look at some of the more heinous crimes that have the potential to take place under the Crimes Act, and you have made mention that social workers will be trained to ensure that they can understand, see, and identify when some of these things are happening. But, Minister, I have a lot of respect for our social workers, and they’ve been put in positions now where they’re probably seeing more violence than ever before and are trying to deal with it, but they’ve failed New Zealand in some cases. I feel that it’s our job as parliamentarians to help them, and we can help them if we ensure that people who have been convicted of these heinous crimes then have to look to the subsequent child policy to be approved.

Minister, our social workers have the ability already to look at those sections 188 to 204 in the Crimes Act and make those decisions—already they’ve had that ability—but they’ve not been able to utilise it in such a way as to protect some of our kids that have passed. So, Minister, I wonder, in reference to your comments that the social workers will be able to take care of this and be able to identify those situations where those crimes have taken place and then make their decisions, why are we not helping them with legislation so that it is black and white when the crimes mentioned are so serious and could have devastating effects not only on the children but the entire family environment?

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’d like to pick up from my colleague Joseph Mooney in terms of the debate in relation to clause 17 of the Oranga Tamariki Amendment Bill, where section 144 is to be amended so that in section 140—that’s longer-term care agreements—an extended care of children and young person’s agreement is not to be made without the consent of a 12-year-old. The amendment states that no agreement may be made under section 140 in relation to an extended-care agreement for a child of or over the age of 12 years unless that child or young person consents to the making of the agreement and the consent is recorded.

Minister, I feel as though we’re battling uphill and shovelling up hill on this with most of this, because these discussions have already been had in select committee, and here we are before the committee of the whole House. The problem with this bill in this provision is that 12-year-olds, when they are taken into care or are under the purview and the oversight of Oranga Tamariki, are dealing with enough in their own right. We talk about children’s rights—yes, to a certain extent. A 12-year-old, it’s expected, when under either the custody or intervention of Oranga Tamariki, ought to have—

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Jenny Salesa): Order! Can I just say to the member that it’s beginning to be repetitive on this particular clause. The Minister actually addressed it a little bit earlier on. So make your point, please, but do bring us some new material.

The point, Madam Chair, is that a child who comes before Oranga Tamariki ought to or will have a lawyer representing them and taking the responsibility of addressing these issues. There is a fine balance between how much a child does have a say, and that’s for an adult or a guardian, or a court-appointed representative, to carry the burden of that responsibility and to engage with a 12-year-old. To put the total burden of responsibility on to a 12-year-old child to either consent, and, if they don’t, to extended care—where does that leave Oranga Tamariki, who has and is meant to have, by way of custodial status, either temporary, interim, or longer term, the decision-making responsibilities? The concern is the psychological burden and impact that is weighted on to a 12-year-old.

So, Minister, how is that addressed in terms of the balancing of a child’s wellbeing, welfare, and best interests, because that also was an issue in terms of the court having to address social-work practice with reverse uplifts. Psychological, physical, and emotional factors need to be taken into account. To burden a 12-year-old child with the responsibility to determine whether or not an agreement for their extended care rests with them solely adds an unreasonable expectation and weight and burden of responsibility on to them. Minister, how is this to be addressed?

I move, That the question be now put.

The question is that the Minister’s amendments to clause 23 set out on Supplementary Order Paper 311 be agreed to.

The question is that Karen Chhour’s amendments to clauses 5 and 6 set out on Supplementary Order Paper 275 be agreed to.

The question is that Karen Chhour’s amendments to clause 29 set out on Supplementary Order Paper 276 be agreed to.