Oranga Tamariki Amendment Bill

Members, the House is in committee on the Oranga Tamariki Amendment Bill. We come first to Part 1.

Thank you, Mr Chair, and good evening to everyone. Look, I’m pleased to be here today—

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O’Connor): Just before you do—I’m sorry. This is the debate on clauses 4 to 43, “Amendments to [the] principal Act”. The question is that Part 1 stand part. Now, I’ll give you the call, Minister.

Thank you, Mr Chair. So I’m pleased to be here for the committee stage of this bill, the Oranga Tamariki Amendment Bill. It has been going through the House process for some time. It started under the previous Minister, Tracey Martin. This bill amends the Oranga Tamariki Act 1989 by partially repealing the subsequent child provision so that the subsequent child provisions will only apply in respect to parents with a conviction relating to the murder, manslaughter, or infanticide of a child in their care; by repealing a redundant provision relating to data sets; and by making a number of minor and technical amendments aimed at improving clarity and addressing omissions and ambiguity in the Act—tidying up an Act that is over 30 years old.

I’d like to take this opportunity to thank the Social Services and Community Committee for their examination of the bill during the select committee stage, and all the submitters for their time and contribution to the bill.

So the main change proposed in this bill is the partial repeal of the subsequent child provisions. The subsequent child provisions were enacted by the previous Government and currently apply where a parent has previously had a child permanently removed from their care or has a murder, manslaughter, or infanticide conviction for the death of a child in their care.

The bill proposes to partially repeal those provisions as they apply to subsequent children, where a parent has had the care of a previous child removed and it has been determined that there is no realistic prospect of return to the parents. The proposed change reflects a first principles review of the subsequent child provisions, which found that the provisions were not promoting the best interests of children and, rather, the provisions were causing harm, particularly for children with an older sibling already in care.

The court is required to determine that there is no realistic prospect that an older sibling would be returned to their parents’ care, and this results in additional, and potentially traumatic, court proceedings for the tamariki and the whānau. Additionally, these provisions predetermine risk in a manner that is contrary to modern social work practices. This is clause 6. There is a presumption that any parent who may have ever had a child removed from care is therefore unable to care for any subsequent children, regardless of any changes that may have occurred in that parent’s life.

So if I can talk through a hypothetical example, just so people understand exactly what’s happening here. So if a young woman, say, at the age of 18, becomes a parent and, as a result of circumstances at that time, the child is removed from their care, this may have been because of safety concerns or there’s been an assessment that the child needs care and protection. But, then, if the same woman turns her life around—they pursue further education, get a full-time job, and sort their living situation out—but later she falls pregnant again 15 years after the first child was removed from her care, under the current legislation there is no way for a subsequent child to remain with the parent or caregiver, despite all the positive changes in that mum’s life, unless it’s decided by the courts.

And this is where the courts get to interfere in the lives of the family. If the subsequent child provisions apply, then the Family Court must consider the matter, even when Oranga Tamariki has no care or protection concerns for that subsequent child. So of course if an assessment is made and there are care and protection concerns or that it is unsafe or unsuitable for the child to be in the parent’s care, then there are still options for alternate care. It would be entirely inappropriate for social workers to consider if that person is going to be a safe and suitable parent.

The partial repeals mean that the assessment can be made rather than be considered a foregone conclusion. The partial repeal of the subsequent child provisions will also strengthen the ability of Oranga Tamariki to work in partnership with the whānau, hapū, and iwi to look for solutions that address the collective and longer-term wellbeing of the child and the whānau. The ability for this to happen is currently limited by the provisions that are in the Act.

Also, the subsequent child provisions have significantly damaged the relationship between Oranga Tamariki and Māori. The Waitangi Tribunal itself found that the provisions caused prejudice to Māori and would be a continuing breach of the Treaty until they are partially repealed. Partial repeal, therefore, supports the rebuilding of relationships with Māori.

The subsequent child provisions will be retained where they relate to parents who have been convicted for the death of a child in their care. This does reflect the seriousness of those offences. The partial repeal of the subsequent child provisions will not diminish the ability of Oranga Tamariki to respond when there are concerns about the safety and wellbeing of a subsequent child.

So I look forward to the views of others as we debate the bill and the Supplementary Order Papers that have been submitted. I believe that this bill is an important step to improving outcomes for tamariki, rangatahi, parents, and whānau, and I’m very happy to answer questions on this bill.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Thank you, Minister, for the explanation on the bill. As we’ve heard in previous readings on this, there weren’t very many submissions because of the timing of this bill and there’s just a couple of questions throughout this bill that I just wanted to clarify the intent and the meaning behind some of the things here.

But I’d just like to, first of all, speak to the Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) in my name, on clauses 5 and 6, and just explain the rationale behind what I was trying to do with these two changes within this SOP. So the first one, I was quite concerned to see the language change by taking the words “ill treatment” and “neglect” out and putting in the words “concerns about safety or wellbeing”.

It’s very clear what the words “ill treatment” and “neglect” mean. It’s very defined and people understand those words. But the words “concerns about safety or wellbeing”, not so much; they’re a little bit open to interpretation. They haven’t really been defined of what that actually means.

Maybe we didn’t have time or enough submissions to talk about that, but I was very concerned about that. So I thought of coming to a compromise—instead of removing the words “ill treatment” and “neglect”, just adding them in so that both of those definitions are in there. So you’re not losing the “concerns about safety and wellbeing”; we’re just adding to it. So that’s the first proposed amendment.

The second one is around the subsequent child. And I agree: the way it is right now is not fair. Natural justice is not done well, the way it is currently written. Parents should have an opportunity to be able to turn their life around and have a second chance, but there are some circumstances where I feel we’re not really reflecting the seriousness of the offending when it comes to how our young people are being treated in some homes.

And I’ve wanted to add into the definition of the person described in this section, “somebody who has been convicted under the Crimes Act of assault or injury of a child or a young person who was in the person’s care or custody at the time.” An example that I could use is an article last month about a young four-year-old boy that was injured so badly by his caregivers that he was left permanently disabled, with so many injuries that his life will never be the same again. Now, I mean, are we reflecting the seriousness of that by not including that under this provision? Because I feel manslaughter, infanticide, and murder, yes, are very serious. But so is abusing a child to the point where they are disabled or they are left with permanent injuries that affect them for the rest of their life. So that was the purpose of that change to this bill. It would include anyone that is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least three months in relation to that offence, so that’s not for minor injuries, but this is lifetime injuries on a child; this is enough for a person to be sent to jail for their crimes. This is a person that would have attacked a child—a defenceless, innocent child—that cannot defend themselves. In my mind, a person who could do that should have to prove that they are capable of looking after another child that comes along. So thank you.

Thank you, Mr Chair. This evening, in speaking to the committee, in this committee of the whole House stage, again, just an acknowledgment to Sir Wira Gardiner. There were a few members in this House this afternoon who were at his commemoration service, I was one of those. I knew Sir Wira, or Wira, both personally and professionally over the course of my younger days when I worked with Wira in the Department of Māori Affairs and then latterly, although not directly—indirectly—here, as a member of Parliament, with Sir Wira being the chief executive of Oranga Tamariki. So my mihi to his whānau, my acknowledgment to Wira this evening.

I now turn to business before the committee of the whole House. Minister, thank you for your contribution and openings this evening. As is known, the National Party is opposed to this Oranga Tamariki Amendment Bill. The more controversial provision is the partial repeal of section 18B. My Parliamentary colleague Karen Chhour has talked to the Supplementary Order Paper that has been submitted, and there will be further debate in relation to that. I will touch on that briefly before getting into the detail, Minister, around the section 18B partial repeal and the associated concerns with that.

In the Supplementary Order Paper that’s been tabled—quite appropriately and correctly—my colleague has identified that the person described in section 18B is a person who is qualified as being under the spotlight, the magnification of concern of Oranga Tamariki, of a parent who has had a child previously in care and then with a subsequent child who has come to notice. This partial repeal should go further than the person described as one “who has been convicted under the Crimes Act 1961 of the murder, manslaughter, or infanticide of a child or young person who was in the person’s care or custody at the time of the child’s or young person’s death.” We have the most horrendous record of child abuse in this country. How many more children need to die as a result of the lack of scrutiny and the lack of intense supervision and assessment from our State welfare, care and protection agency, Oranga Tamariki?

So I acknowledge my colleague because the purpose of the Supplementary Order paper is identifying that there are, sadly, parents who have abused their children and who have been convicted of this horrendous abuse. There are parents who have abused their spouses, who are victims of the most horrendous domestic violence. And, Minister, when I practised as a child welfare advocate, as a court appointed lawyer, Family Court judges repeatedly stated that the past is an indicator of the future, and past behaviours of parents’ treatment of their children was, regrettably and sadly, an indicator of more to come. That was the experience that many of us working in that space had, and judges as well.

So the purpose of the Supplementary Order Paper of my colleague is recognising the importance that those persons who are parents and who do have a conviction for a serious offence—either domestic violence, aggravated assaults, or violence of a serious form—where a sentence of imprisonment has been imposed, that that really must be factored in under this child welfare care and protection law. Oranga Tamariki has an obligation, a duty, and a responsibility to ensure that the law and the social work practice puts in place, implements, and adheres to the necessity to have processes, procedures, and laws that will protect our children.

So, Minister, I invite comment to the Supplementary Order Paper about consideration of previous convictions of parents who have had a child taken out of their care into permanent placement in custody elsewhere, and that with any subsequent child, where there is a conviction, it be factored in. Thank you, Mr Chair.

Thank you, Mr Chair. My question is to the Minister. I’m particularly interested in the discussion that we have had in the past about the process of how the subsequent child is removed from the parent and the process that occurs around that. So, first and foremost, if the Minister can talk to us how the status quo operates currently and then speak to us how this change assists or alters the way that things are done, with particular reference and speaking to the Supplementary Order Paper—whether in fact the assessment for safety of children will still occur, whether or not a subsequent child is present or not.

Look, just to respond to a couple of the points raised. First of all, I think we’ll all agree with the member Harete Hipango: New Zealand has a terrible record of not looking after our children and not loving our children like we should do. I don’t think there’s any argument across the committee. We’ve all heard of the instances, the cases of abuse. Not all of them mean that a child passes away, but regardless, no abuse is acceptable, no form of pain inflicted on a child is acceptable.

So I’ve got no problems whatsoever with the subsequent child provisions applying to a child for parents whose previous child has been murdered, manslaughter, or infanticide. But when it comes down to a parent—such as the hypothetical situation that I explained in my opening remarks—a mother, through whatever circumstances, maybe as a teen parent, her life is not flash, something happens, a child is removed, but 15 years later, after education, after maybe getting into a new relationship, after drug and alcohol counselling, after making all these improvements to her life with the help and support of whānau, all of these things do happen. We can’t just assume because something happened when a person basically was a child themselves, a young person themselves, that, as a 30-something-year-old, the behaviour is going to still carry on. So with the support of Oranga Tamariki, with the support of agencies and services, if they don’t see that there is still ongoing concern, the question is: why should somebody have to go through the Family Court to prove that they’re OK? If there are all these support people, all these agencies working with them, why should that happen?

See, one of the things—and maybe just digressing a bit—is the impact that the subsequent child provisions had on the relationship of social workers with a parent. It’s really difficult for a parent to want to engage with a social worker—a parent, say, who is pregnant, has had a child removed, even if it was 15 years ago—knowing that under the current provisions, when that baby’s born, that baby’s going to be taken off that parent. Why would a parent really want to engage and how difficult is it for the social worker to engage with that parent, with that whānau, knowing that the baby’s going to be taken anyway? All of us who are parents just can’t even imagine the pain that would be caused by having your babies removed.

If after 15 years you’ve cleaned up your life, you’ve got on with things, you’ve made changes, you’re educated, and all that sort of thing, I’ve got no problems. If a parent doesn’t appear to have made those changes in their life—if Oranga Tamariki, if social workers, if community providers are saying “We still have concerns.”, I’ve got no problem. But it’s when the person has shown that they’ve made the improvements to their life, I think it’s—and particularly over a long period of time—not the fairest thing, sometime later, for their baby to still be taken off them.

That’s not to excuse any form of abuse that has occurred. I totally take the member’s point that some parents can do some horrible things. But, in particular, an extended period of time where they have proven that they can parent, that they’ve shown that they have made changes in their life, I think that there’s an opportunity to trust the services and the people and the support that’s been wrapped around them.

Thanks very much, Mr Chair. I’d like to also return to the same topic of the subsequent child, but outline it by providing the interesting data that I found when we were going through the select committee process and other readings, which was that New Zealand ranked 35th out of 41 developed countries in terms of child wellbeing outcomes.

Now, that was a shocking statistic for us to read, but when the Minister has explained his rationale for providing that opportunity for that mum sometime later, after having gone through a process of intense support—which I completely support—what is the balance that the Minister is weighing up when he talks about having to go through the Family Court process to ensure that all of that work that has been done by all those social services and support networks have been completed and signed off, that the Family Court will have the final say? Balancing that against what has happened to previous children who have not been the victim of murder, manslaughter, or infanticide, which is the bit that’s staying in the Act, but those children who have been victims of abuse and some, as Karen Chhour has pointed out, intense physical and mental abuse, who have been removed from that family situation and put in a home for life. So they’re in a home for life for 15 years while that mum finds her way back to a position where she can care for children again. What is the Minister doing to weigh up the cost to those children who we believe, on this side of the House, should be paramount in the consideration in this legislation? Not whether it’s inconvenient for the mum later to have to go through a court system to ensure that those social services, those support networks, are in place, that she has a stable home, that she has a stable income. We all wish that for her at the other end, but, Minister, how are you weighing up the inconvenience of going through a Family Court process to ensure that is intact against the wellbeing of those children who have been in a home for life? Thank you.

So if those children, say, for 15 years have been in a home for life, they’re in a home for life. It’s not their welfare that this is about; this is about a subsequent child who is yet to be born as a baby. So if for 15 years that parent or parents have made those changes, turned their lives around, and have had the support, and if Oranga Tamariki still have concerns in that house, then I’ve got no problems with them going to the Family Court. But if Oranga Tamariki has been through the process, been there on the journey, and supported, and then there’s another baby on the way, then I don’t see the point in going to the Family Court. I know what you’re saying. It is a tough decision. But I think if they’ve seen the support, they’ve seen the changes that a parent has made in their life over a period of time, then let’s trust those professionals. Let’s trust them. There is always the fall-back position if necessary. So it is about weighing things up—I take the member’s point there—but I think that with the support and the care and the wrap-around with Oranga Tamariki working with that parent or those parents, there’s an opportunity there just to make sure that they can get on with their lives. It’s not to say that the agencies disappear and just leave them to it; they’re still there. They’re still there, involved and supportive when they need the support. But in terms of saying that if the first child is in a home for life, then if they are there for 15 years, I can’t see them being impacted by this. It is another baby on the way or just being born that we’re talking about here.

The time has come to report progress on this bill.

House resumed.

The committee has considered the Oranga Tamariki Amendment Bill and reports progress. I move, That the report be adopted.

Motion agreed to.

Report adopted.

The House adjourned at 9.56 p.m.