Inspector-General of Defence Bill

I present a legislative statement on the Inspector-General of Defence Bill.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Hon Jenny Salesa): That legislative statement is published under the authority of the House and can be found on the Parliament website.

I move, That the Inspector-General of Defence Bill be now read a first time. I nominate the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee to consider the bill.

This Government is committed to implementing the recommendations of the Inquiry into Operation Burnham. That is why I endorse the establishment of an Inspector-General of Defence (IGD) to provide independent oversight for the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). In undertaking their inquiry into the August 2010 Operation Burnham in Afghanistan and related matters, Sir Terence Arnold and Sir Geoffrey Palmer identified that the actions of the New Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS) on the ground were professional and lawful but there were shortcomings, and they identified those and that the NZDF needed these matters to be dealt with. Having an office which has the necessary powers and authority to look into such matters in future is essential. It is essential not only to ensure additional independent scrutiny is available but also to provide an independent avenue for the dedicated men and women who are asked to protect Aotearoa and our interests. The Operation Burnham inquiry found there was a failure to provide full, timely, and accurate information to Ministers.

The Inspector-General of Defence will have powers to examine any gaps in the NZDF systems so steps can be taken to make necessary improvements. As the Attorney-General, the Hon David Parker, has previously stated on the matter, the establishment of an Inspector-General of Defence goes to the heart of two of the fundamentals of democracy: civilian control of the military and ministerial accountability to Parliament. This bill clarifies the scope and the direction of the work of the Inspector-General of Defence, and the Inspector-General of Defence will be able to look at and define operational activities of the New Zealand Defence Force on its own initiative. The Minister of Defence, Chief of Defence, and Secretary of Defence will also be able to refer matters for their attention.

The Inspector-General of Defence will support myself and my successors in facilitating crucial democratic oversight of the NZDF, providing independent scrutiny. Essentially, anyone will be able to raise concerns of potential wrongdoing with them, and they will have full discretion over whether to act on those allegations. This will be an office which has the ability to investigate and assess, to scrutinise and respond, to look across systems and processes, and to ask the important questions.

This bill also provides clear guidance on how the inspector-general’s work will complement rather than duplicate existing oversight mechanisms. All parts of the system must be able to interact appropriately as part of the wider ecosystem of oversight to minimise duplication. That is why this bill allows the inspector-general to consult and share information with a small number of bodies who have existing oversight of the NZDF’s activities that may overlap or that have oversight of agencies that work closely with the NZDF on operational activities.

The Operation Burnham inquiry began in 2018 and concluded in 2020. It was a thorough investigation, and we accepted the recommendations in principle that same year. As members will recall, we then moved swiftly to develop an overarching intent for the Inspector-General of Defence. We asked for feedback on the scope, functions, power, and form of the inspector-general late last year. We then refined the details. We sought funding from Budget 2022 and began drafting the bill this year. We moved at pace to introduce this bill today, because trust in our military is important. The people we deploy at a moment’s notice need to be assured that those making those decisions are getting the right information at the right time and have the necessary oversight so that they can focus on the job at hand. The New Zealand Defence Force is nothing without those brave, selfless, and dedicated individuals. Our job is to protect them and their interests while they protect ours.

The establishment of the Inspector-General of Defence speaks to the heart of this Government’s priority of laying the foundations for a better future. Once appointed, this role will work to strengthen public confidence and support New Zealand’s international reputation by providing independent assurance that the NZDF’s activities in a rapidly changing geostrategic environment are subject to dedicated independent oversight. It also supports one of the three priorities I have set for Defence, and that is the priority of people. The increased transparency and accountability resulting from the establishment of the Inspector-General of Defence will ensure the reputation and credibility of the NZDF’s people is maintained. The bill is also compatible with the tikanga of pono and kaitiakitanga. Once appointed, I will be asking the Inspector-General of Defence to consider further how to incorporate tikanga values when determining how it acts and operates.

As an independent statutory officer associated with the defence portfolio, the Inspector-General of Defence will be appointed for a period of five years with a possible extension of another three years. They will be supported by a deputy who will be appointed for an initial three-year term. Both roles would be appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the House of Representatives. The IGD will be able to employ staff, appoint an advisory panel, and procure external specialists’ advice as it sees fit.

There is no doubt this small but vital office will need to be nimble as it sets out its future work programme. It will be an office with appropriate accountability, and New Zealand should expect that. It will produce a work programme which sets out its priorities and activities for the year ahead. It will also publish an annual report which will include details on the number of investigations, assessments, and inquiries undertaken, as well as a brief description and outcome of each.

The Inspector-General of Defence will also be subject to judicial review. As well as the Ombudsman and Privacy Commissioner oversight, it will be subject to the Public Records Act and monitored by Archives New Zealand. This level of public accountability is proportionate to the Inspector-General of Defence’s proposed scope and small size. It offers the lowest cost while providing the required independence. In keeping with the work the Inspector-General of Defence will be tasked to undertake, there are some exceptions. While it will be subject to the Official Information and Privacy Acts, there are provisions to ensure it can seek and receive information in confidence.

When I announced my priorities and principles for Defence last year, I made it clear that the principles of mana and pono were vital for Defence. That means that trust and integrity are the characteristics of our Defence Force and for their valuable assets, which are people. The increased transparency and accountability resulting from the establishment of the Inspector-General of Defence will support this by ensuring the reputation and credibility of our Defence personnel is supported and maintained. I believe this bill will put in place a robust, credible, independent oversight body that will ensure all New Zealanders can continue to place their trust in the integrity of our defence forces, a trust those who choose to serve so richly deserve. I commend this bill to the House.

Kia ora. The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. It’s a pleasure to rise and take a call on the first reading of the Inspector-General of Defence Bill.

Can I start by saying that on this side of the House, we absolutely value, support, and acknowledge the magnificent work undertaken by our defence personnel. And can I personally thank all of those currently serving for the amazing work they do, and indeed for those who have finished their service, thank them for what they did as well.

Now, the Minister’s outlined the details of what he’s proposing here in the Inspector-General of Defence Bill, and ultimately it comes back to an incident some 12-odd years ago that was the subject of a book five-odd years ago, which then led to this Government commencing an inquiry in 2018. I think, for me, the biggest thing to note here is that the inquiry found no illegal behaviour from our SAS. They are professional, disciplined, and widely respected, and I think it was quite clear to see that throughout their actions on Operation Burnham, they demonstrated their core values—3CI, as it’s called: courage, commitment, comradeship, and integrity—throughout the conduct of their operations. Indeed, the inspector-general, the Hon David Parker, said that New Zealanders should have confidence in the fact that the New Zealand SAS on the ground did the right thing, acted completely lawfully, did nothing that was a revenge attack, acted in accordance with international law, and did nothing wrong on the night. So I think that is an absolutely critical aspect to keep in mind as we consider the importance, or the need, for an Inspector-General of Defence Bill.

Now, part of the recommendations that came out of the inquiry noted that one of the issues was that, indeed, there had been some problems with the process of communicating the risk or the perception or the possibility of civilian casualties through the chain of command up to the Minister of the day. Indeed, that is a concern, but what we have seen since that inquiry came out is that, in my mind, NZDF have moved quite quickly to implement a new series of processes to look at ensuring that there can be no issues arising. Obviously, minimising the risk of any impropriety is incredibly important, but, of course, any time we’re on operations, our NZDF personnel are operating by the laws of armed conflict, and indeed the rules of engagement for the particular operation or theatre they may be in.

I think that’s one of the critical aspects here as well. We have safeguards already in place. Off the back of this inquiry that found no wrongdoing from our personnel on the ground but some issues within the senior leadership of NZDF—and I will acknowledge that—there have been subsequent changes made. I think the Defence Force Order put out by the Chief of Defence, DFO 35, the NZDF response to civilian harm outlining a very detailed and standardised procedure for responding to any reports of civilian casualties, which in the first instance requires notification to joint forces headquarters—basically irrespective of whether there’s any substance to the claims—to at least get that reported and acknowledged and noticed. Because of course this is a concern, and to the Minister’s comments, maintaining the integrity of our defence force is absolutely critical. Our personnel should—and in my mind do—have the trust of the New Zealand public. They are supported. They have consistently demonstrated their ability to operate professionally regardless of the challenges they may face, wherever they may be deployed.

On that basis, we have decided—in the National Party—not to support this bill, because, actually, we don’t see that there is a strong enough need for an Inspector-General of Defence at a time like we are facing right now. I touch on that particular aspect because in defence, we are currently seeing some massive challenges, particularly around the attrition rates. The Minister made the comment that they were able to work through and have been working on this and were able to secure a budget bid to secure that additional funding, of course, to implement this. Actually, personally, I would have much rather seen additional funding secured for any number of other priorities within Defence. Because at the moment, as I said, attrition is through the roof and you can look across a whole variety of trades and ranks and units, and they are really struggling with attrition rates—in some cases, at some ranks, hitting 100 percent.

Now, that speaks to some fundamental challenges within our defence force. For me, it is disappointing to see—at a time of such substantial challenges in defence—that the biggest priority is implementing more cost and bureaucracy via an Inspector-General of Defence. Indeed, what we’re seeing here is that it seems to be the default mechanism for this Government, where they fall back on the continual approach of adding more cost, adding more bureaucrats, and more oversight will presumably provide a better outcome. And that is not always the case; that does not necessarily logically flow. Our very clear view is that in this instance, this is an unnecessary piece of legislation that does not provide a meaningful improvement for the defence force, and, actually, that money—that $5.6 million-odd that’s been spent on this—could far better be allocated in any number of areas; perhaps around trying to recruit additional personnel or, better yet, retaining those we have so that the defence force is able to be effective when called upon by the Government of the day.

Indeed, we have seen them operate in a range of capacities. Most notably close to home here, most members of the public, I think, would appreciate Operation Protect—the managed isolation and quarantine role that the defence force carried out—which was not a core function for them but actually was an important role to play, particularly during the initial stage of COVID. In my mind, they should have been phased out of that quite promptly. Six-odd months in should have been sufficient time to have made a transition to a civilian response, because that is part of the reason why we have seen such high attrition rates. Those attrition rates are particularly, I think, important when we look at some of the signals that have been sent from the leadership within NZDF, but particularly at Government level when we are seeing this sort of legislation put forward as the biggest solution or the biggest priority for the Government of the day when, as I said, we are seeing those attrition rates so worryingly high.

I think it is particularly disappointing as we are only a couple of days away now from commemorating Armistice Day, an important day to acknowledge a significant sacrifice made by many New Zealanders through World War I—ending, of course, 104 years ago now; the 11th hour of the 11th day of the 11th month. And here we are with a Government that is prioritising cost and bureaucracy over actually enabling our defence force to prioritise its deliverable outcomes in terms of maintaining the security and defence of New Zealand, protecting its interests, and supporting our like-minded countries.

So on that basis, we do not support this bill. We do not think it is necessary at this time and certainly is not the biggest priority in defence when, alongside those attrition issues, that have also seen the cancellation more recently of a patrol vessel, some $300 million-odd commitment that was meant to have been made simply hasn’t been done. And we’re here instead with a situation where we’re putting forward a piece of legislation that’s, effectively, a solution looking for a problem, when we have seen significant change made by NZDF post that inquiry.

I think it’s important to note that inquiry was launched by the Government. The Government of the day can still do that at any point. So in the future, if there were concerns around the manner in which NZDF had conducted itself in operations, the Government of the day could again conduct an inquiry if it saw fit. Establishing an Inspector-General of Defence is not necessary to ensure the integrity of our defence force. As I say, we have a fantastic reputation internationally; it was clearly outlined through this inquiry that there was no wrongdoing by our personnel on the ground.

You can also look at Australia, for example. They have an Inspector-General of Defence over there, and members may be aware of some of the media issues they have had around some of the concerns raised in Afghanistan around how their defence force operated. Having had this inspector-general throughout that period of time, it clearly hasn’t resolved or stopped those issues from happening. This is not a preventative measure as such, and in my mind it’s clear that we need to ensure we have a strong focus on maintaining that integrity within the defence force, which can be managed in-house. We have clear processes for doing that.

So, as I said, we do not support this bill. It is unnecessary at this time and we should instead be focusing on just getting our defence force back up to an operational readiness state that it wants to be at—or was at pre-COVID—and actually supporting our personnel. Thank you, Madam Speaker.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. It’s a pleasure to take a call on the bill to establish the office of the Inspector-General of Defence. The first reading is a significant milestone towards the implementation of one of the key recommendations of the inquiry into Operation Burnham, and the Government remains committed to that course.

At the heart of this bill lies probably one of the most important democratic tenets of civilian control of the military and ministerial accountability to Parliament. It’s Government’s view that independent oversight, as recommended by the Burnham Inquiry, will support the Minister’s ability to assert elected authority over the Defence Force and mean that they can stand in this House and account for that authority. That’s how the military is meant to operate in democracies—they’re meant to be under the democratic control of the elected representatives. What the inquiry into Operation Burnham found was, while the activities of Operation Burnham were lawful, as has been quoted by the prior speaker, there were some very significant shortcomings over a period of years—they weren’t just isolated—in the way in which the Defence Force subsequently dealt with allegations of civilian casualties.

While there was no institutional strategy to cover up civilian casualties, there was a series of incorrect and misleading statements, and they came to be known to be incorrect and misleading to the military and they didn’t correct them. As a consequence, the briefings—not only of Ministers but also in public statements—were incorrect. Those inaccuracies, which were deliberate, jeopardised the democratic control of the military, which, of course, is vital in a democracy. So establishing an independent Inspector-General of Defence, as set out in the bill, will contribute to restoring public trust and confidence following the allegations of wrongdoing during Operation Burnham, and the subsequent shortcomings that were clearly identified by the inquiry. The public, in my view, should feel reassured that this bill is a product of a robust development process that only occurs in transparent and responsible democracies willing to front up and objectively learn and improve when things go wrong.

This process started with allegations that were made by investigative journalists Nicky Hager and Jon Stephenson, in their book Hit & Run. The Government decided it was in the public interest to have an inquiry, and it was the right thing to do. It was opposed at the time, the inquiry, by the military. The inquiry was undertaken by the Hon Sir Terence Arnold KC and the Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer KC—two people of the highest repute. They found that the lack of openness with Ministers and the public once information had become known about the possibility of civilian casualties was wrong, and one of their four main recommendations was the establishment of an Inspector-General of Defence. The Government accepted the recommendation and undertook work to progress it. There’s been guidance from a group of senior officials from across the Public Service. Our officials have also consulted with the journalists concerned, and we should remind ourselves that this would never have come to light were it not for those journalists. The officials have consulted with Sir Terence Arnold and Sir Geoffrey Palmer, relevant academics around the country, stakeholders, Government agencies, and, of course, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) themselves. So this legislation has been through a robust design and development process.

The independence of the inspector-general’s office is important, and it will assure the people of New Zealand that the NZDF’s activities are subject to a level of oversight that’s appropriate for our values and our governance arrangements. The bill establishes the Inspector-General of Defence as an independent statutory authority. They have to be associated with a ministerial portfolio—in this case it will be the Ministry of Justice—and this is similar to the model used for the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. That’s actually a similar institution, and, actually, that institution—reformed in recent years—has restored public confidence in those agencies. There was some very good work done on that by the prior Minister in the prior Government; the Hon Chris Finlayson led that work on behalf of the Prime Minister of the time, John Key. This independence means the office is not part of the Public Service and it isn’t subject to ministerial direction or Government policy. Importantly, it also means that it’s external to the Defence Force. The bill requires the office to act independently, impartially, and in the public interest. Public interests, of course, include security interests; it won’t act imprudently in that regard.

Another visible layer of the office’s independence is the appointment process for the inspector-general, which requires a recommendation of this House to the Governor-General, and this should assure the public that anyone in the role has the support of the majority of our elected members. In fact, these things are generally done unanimously in this House, in my experience. I think the public will be confident they will act impartially and have appropriate experience and qualifications. The office, once appointed, employs their own staff, appoints an advisory panel, and can procure specialist advice as needed. The Inspector-General established by the bill will determine when and in what circumstances it undertakes its investigative functions. The bill sets out that they can start an investigation or assessment on their own initiative. They can also decline to investigate, and refer something to a more suitable oversight body, or defer to a request from the Defence Force or the Minister or the Secretary of Defence. This level of self-determination is in line with the inquiry’s recommendation that the office has control over its work programme.

The scope of the inspector-general’s own-initiative function is focused on operational activities which have the most potential to cause harm, undermine public confidence in the Defence Force, and carry reputational risks for New Zealand. The public should have confidence that this is the kind of activity that the inspector-general is lawfully required to focus on. It doesn’t mean to say that they’re going to be getting involved in day to day operational stuff, from the proper provenance of the power structures or the command structures within the Defence Force. But the Defence Force, the Minister, or the Secretary of Defence may, by request, expand the scope of the inspector-general’s work to include other things if they think it is wise. This will, in some ways, enable the office to keep up to date with future roles in the New Zealand Defence Force, and it also provides a useful tool to acquire an independent view, which can be currently difficult to arrange, given the nature of the Defence Force’s work. Some of that stuff can of course be done privately by the inspector-general if appropriate.

To ensure the inspector-general is able to undertake its work effectively and independently, the bill provides significant information-gathering powers that can be exercised on the initiative of the inspector-general. These would be similar to what the inquiry into Operation Burnham had but go a bit further. For example, the office would have direct access to all Defence Force - held information and would be able to examine witnesses and compel the provision of information. One of the difficulties that Operation Burnham had was that there was a real reluctance to provide some information that was clearly within the purview of that inquiry, and it was only when they got into that inquiry and forced access to some of that information that new information came to light that should have previously been given to the inquiry anyway—found in safes that no one knows how it got into or how long it had been there, but it hadn’t been publicly reported on or provided to Ministers.

The Defence Force is also required to reasonably assist the inspector-general in carrying out its work. This could mean providing information, supporting a visit to a base, an operational theatre, or making a ship or an aircraft viewable. To facilitate the flow of information, there are safeguards for people who raise concerns and cooperate with the office. The bill extends these safeguards to New Zealand Defence Force personnel. It’s important that these people can engage with the inspector-general independent of their other responsibilities when they’re doing so in good faith. The bill has independent oversights built in. I believe it will support its purpose, which is to support civilian control of the military, which in turn supports ministerial accountability to this House, and I commend the bill to the House.

Thank you very much, Madam Speaker. What to say about the Inspector-General of Defence Bill? Well, our defence forces face huge problems right now—my colleague and friend Tim van de Molen has enumerated these very well in his own contribution—personnel challenges in relation to employment conditions, huge attrition rates, and a quixotic attempt to force out and to keep forced out those personnel who have a different view about the requirement of the COVID-19 vaccination. A quixotic waste of time and resources, energy, and morale that is doing no good whatsoever to our defence forces. These are the problems of the defence force today, in addition to platform problems, hardware and software alike; training and deployment problems, including as a result of the Op Protect commitment, which, as my colleague and friend, again, Tim van de Molen, has noted very clearly in his own contribution went on for far too long. There’s a huge opportunity cost in passing this legislation and appropriating this funding and, indeed, to spending it on solving a problem that does not really exist.

So what isn’t a problem is that in the bases and defence force establishments of this country, no one is saying, “You know what would make things better? We just need another couple of extra lanyard-wearing bureaucrats to somehow contribute to making the boat go faster.”—literally, if we’re talking about the senior service, of course. Our international reputation is not harmed by the lack of someone performing this role—or roles, if we include the deputy, of course.

Our international reputation in defence terms is at serious risk at the moment, but it’s for the reasons that we’ve outlined already—again, Tim van de Molen—and to which I would add difficulties of interoperability; relationships in defence in terms of exercises, training with other defence forces, and so on; defence diplomacy—limited opportunities by a Government that does not have any vision for defence other than conducting endless reviews, making meaningless appointments, and, frankly, missing the entire point of everything that is needed and most important in the defence realm.

So this bill is a missed opportunity—an opportunity to spend those resources in a much more meaningful way. Even more importantly than that, while the principle of civilian control of the military is, of course, important and the Attorney-General was right to highlight that in his own contribution, what we have seen is a lack of trust, a divide and conquer mentality being displayed by the Government, whereas they should, of course, acknowledge that civilian control of the military exists through the Minister of Defence himself or herself, as the case may be—of course, the whole Ministry of Defence, the Secretary of Defence, and various other opportunities to exert civilian control of the military. It is not, of course, just the New Zealand Defence Force itself that is running the show.

It is right in a democracy, one that is subject to the rule of law, both internally—that is to say domestically—and also in our international relations, that we have checks and balances of a democratic nature. But to suggest that we don’t have those now and therefore we need to insert them by way of creating these particular positions just seems a fallacy and clearly a red herring in terms of the real issues faced by our defence force at the moment. I can only imagine that the average sailor, soldier, and aircraft personnel will be watching on with bemusement, not only at the fact that the current speaker doesn’t seem to have a voice to deliver his remarks but, actually, more importantly, that Parliament’s occupying its time with this piece of legislation in the first place.

Much has been made, of course, of the genesis of the idea, which was the review conducted into the activities of some decade and a bit ago. Others have rightly praised the professionalism of the report conducted by those gentlemen of great repute. We do not, of course, second guess that. We note, indeed, with gratitude, that in the activities conducted by our defence force—keeping separate from the question of the conduct of other nations’ defence forces—Operation Burnham, no New Zealand troops were found to have conducted themselves improperly in that according to international law. Indeed, the rules of engagement were internally determined by the New Zealand Defence Force so that the law of armed conflicts could be observed.

So it’s difficult to understand why the Government would think that this is the most urgent priority within the defence space unless simply to be seen to do something relatively readily. Of course the inquiry that was conducted into Operation Burnham could be replicated at any time in a number of different ways. And, again, my colleague and friend on this side of the House, our defence spokesperson, Tim van de Molen, has made that tolerably clear. Also significant, of course, is that one of the other recommendations of the review conducted by those worthy gentlemen talked about improving internal processes. And so the DFO 35—that is the Defence Force Order that indeed does lay out guidelines in better channels and processes—is already in place, as Mr van de Molen has noted, and it’s not clear at all from the legislation, or indeed the underlying concept of what’s being proposed by the Government, initially announced, and now being executed somewhat, that an Inspector-General of Defence would have made any difference at the time or subsequently in relation to that matter.

I do want to thank, before I finish my contribution—at which point we’ll all be very grateful, no doubt, and you can unmute your TV at that point. I’d do it in sign language but that would probably go badly wrong. But I do want to take the opportunity before I conclude—for all those who do take an active concern and interest in what is really needed for our Defence Force. I actually want to acknowledge the former Minister of Defence in the current Government the Hon Ron Mark. I do acknowledge the current Minister, Peeni Henare, as well. I’ve enjoyed having the opportunity to interact with defence matters through the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee in my time in this Parliament, and I watch the matters that are discussed in this place with interest. I acknowledge Mr Rosewarne across the House, as well as my colleagues Tim van de Molen and other speakers on this bill, Joseph Mooney, Penny Simmonds, and not that they’re speaking on this bill, Dr Shane Reti and Andrew Bayly, who have a background in defence also.

Most importantly, though, of course, I thank our current troops and also those who’ve served in the past. Thank you for the service you have provided. Thank you for your courage, comradeship, commitment, and, indeed, integrity. We do not question your integrity. We think that—within the existing parameters, of course—it is always possible and, indeed, necessary to embark on a process of continuous improvement. Things can and should always be done better where that is possible. But to impose upon the defence force one thing among the many things that they do desperately need right now—those tangible improvements in relation to personnel, equipment, and so on, but, most importantly, leadership, greater leadership than merely conducting a review into the parlous state of the defence force, as we saw announced recently. We actually need some action. There won’t be much of a defence force left to review, to inspect, or to otherwise scrutinise. The problems are urgent. This is not a solution. And so I join others on this side of the House, at least speaking for the National Party, in saying we do not support this bill or indeed the concept that underlies it.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I appreciate the opportunity to speak on the Inspector-General of Defence Bill. The sole aim of this bill is to establish the office of the inspector-general, as well as the deputy inspector-general, of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)—nothing more, nothing less. The rest is just details. Our Defence Force is a critical institution, so therefore its activities and operations must be subject to independent scrutiny. Therefore, establishing this office of an inspector-general outside of the NZDF organisational structure is important and also speaks to the reality of the Government’s ambitions to lay a foundation for a better institution.

This bill stems from the recommendation of the Operation Burnham inquiry, which identified serious shortcomings in the way that the Defence Force dealt with the accusations that came through and, subsequently, the way that it briefed Ministers as well. The expert panel made a number of recommendations, which were all accepted by the Minister of Defence as well.

Having an Inspector-General of Defence who has the necessary power and authority to provide oversight of NZDF activities is essential support dedicated to men and women who are sacrificing a lot to protect New Zealand and the interests of New Zealand overseas. As like-minded countries also have this, it’s not exclusive to New Zealand, and it’s very surprising to see that the Opposition is actually pushing back on this—and, pushing back, they’re not making any sense. They’re not making any critical points; it’s rather they’re just opposing. One thing that I hear them saying is that it’s additional bureaucrats, and that’s the only thing that I’ve heard. So it’s disappointing to see that. Yet the Defence Force has both sides as well; it should be off politics, off limits. But, yet again, there’s nothing surprising about this Opposition.

Just to repeat what both Ministers Henare and Parker said: our Defence Force must be democratic, accountable, and functional. This can only be ensured through an independent body, and this bill ensures that. I’ve been just talking to Dan Rosewarne, who’s got very extensive experience on this—and he has two overseas deployments in his pocket. He’s just been telling me how surprised he is with the Opposition pushing back on this and that it shows the lack of critical understanding of this institution.

This bill is a good bill. I thank Minister Henare for his hard work. It’s going to change a lot of things. I commend it to the House.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I want to begin by noticing, acknowledging, and remembering that there are victims that we’re talking about here and that this bill comes before this House of Representatives because there were victims of harm. They lived in Afghanistan and they experienced some grave, grave harm, to the extent of torture and death, at the hand of militaries that we were allies with, and perhaps our military. We never quite got to the bottom of that, but that’s the kind of harm that we hope—

💬 Joseph Mooney: Come on.

—to avoid. There are members of the Opposition yelling, “Oh, come on.” So to the people of Afghanistan I say to ignore them, because we do care. We do care that your babies and that your civilian men and women experienced harm. We do care, and we do want our military to be held to account.

To the people of Aotearoa New Zealand, I say that we care. We’re not here to hide things, because we know that you deserve trust and respect in your military, and, actually, our New Zealand defence forces deserve to be trusted and respected by our people. So to have our House of Representatives with members willing to hide that harm is doing harm to our people and our Defence Force (NZDF), and it is cutting deep within the international community, especially those communities with which our Defence Force interacts.

As a child who lived in war in the Middle East, I tell you that this bill matters. To have Western powers—and we have so much power—say that we will have independent oversight mechanisms and that we will have transparency and accountability because we have the privilege of democracy matters. It’s shameful to say that we will exercise that power and that we will use our freedom in a way that’s undemocratic and that’s not transparent, and that we will skirt accountability for our pride’s sake.

So this is a good bill. It’s good to see a Minister respond to a report like that that came out of the Operation Burnham inquiry with actual legislation with a systems shift by way of the creation of the role of the Inspector-General of Defence and also the deputy inspector-general. It’s inspiring to see that we will have oversight—including full access to information that’s held by the defence forces—and that we say that the defence forces, even in war, are accountable to the people of New Zealand and that they will be responsible and will not act with impunity if things do go wrong. In fact, this incentivises respect for the rule of law—the rule of law in the international arena by way of humanitarian law and the laws of war, and also our own domestic human rights obligations. Those are important.

Now, we do also know that in terms of Operation Burnham, there were systems in place already that were breached. We know that under three different heads of the New Zealand Defence Force, information was hidden from successive Ministers, so we know that there also needs to be a systems shift by way of the culture of our New Zealand defence forces. We know that more junior members of the NZDF were reporting things from on the ground and we know that sometimes intermediate-level members of the Defence Force were also recording these things but that they weren’t making it all the way up to the existing oversight mechanism that we have by way of our civilian Ministers of Defence as elected by the people of New Zealand, and that was the really scary thing that came out of the Operation Burnham report.

So that culture shift is something that the New Zealand Defence Force is responsible for and the hope is that the creation of an independent body like this will create that culture shift, but that’s not guaranteed. It’s sending a signal that we don’t want our military to act with impunity. It’s sending a signal that we will hold them to account. But that doesn’t always work and we learnt that with Operation Burnham. We needed investigative journalists to get in there and investigate and make these reports. That shouldn’t be the way that it works. That isn’t the kind of democracy in which our defence forces operate.

Now, that’s not to say that we have something to be suspicious of all the time. We do respect our defence forces. They’re actually responsible for monitoring a fifth of the world’s oceans. They mostly do environmental monitoring and disaster relief—incredibly important work for the gravest of security risks in the modern age, which is the climate crisis. But we do want them, sometimes, to also be deployed, with the full trust of the New Zealand public, into war zones where things go wrong, where things get mixed up, and where they interact with and are influenced by the culture of other defence forces. Whether that’s in this case the US defence force and the UK who were responsible for an illegal war in the Middle East and where impunity is rife—we know that, and we want them to lead with the kind for respect for the rule of law for international human rights law for the dignity of the people in whose nations they are deployed that New Zealanders should always be able to expect from our people when they’re deployed elsewhere in the world. We want them to act with mana and with integrity.

So this is the point of this bill and we do support it. I do say that this is a system shift, that this is a real change in the way that we treat the work of our defence forces and bring them into our democracy. But it’s also just one step and it’s that culture shift, that respect for democracy, that’s maybe a two-way street that we need to instil in our defence forces so that we do avoid what we saw come out of the Operation Burnham inquiry that might be scary for some people to read.

Before I finish, I do just want to bring us back to the people in those faraway lands who are already suffering in war, where our people are deployed, where there is fear and there is need and then there’s that harm. They are the people that we need to protect, because, actually, that is what international human rights, that is what the rule of law, and that’s what New Zealand’s values stand for.

So I commend this bill and I commend the Minister for bringing it in. I look forward to seeing the next steps of the Operation Burnham inquiry recommendations come into effect under this Government.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I’m afraid I’ll have to keep my remarks short this evening. From our perspective, with regards to the position of my friends and colleagues in the National Party, look, I don’t disagree with any of their sentiments and comments—certainly a lot of valid points—and quite clearly issues such as attrition and morale and recruitment are major problems for the Defence Force; things that we’ve been talking about. And I’d also say, yes, it would be nice to be here this evening talking about something bigger and bolder for the Defence Force, something that would actually contribute more than what we are doing. But, nevertheless, this bill does stand on its own, and I’m afraid I can’t quite go along with the red herring argument this evening, but nice try!

I would say this bill doesn’t negate those issues. It is a mechanism for accountability, as has been well canvassed. I think one good way to look at this bill is that it’s an eye to the future. It’s not about a witch hunt. It’s not about going back to the origins and finding blame and relitigating issues. It’s a view to the future, particularly in a very complex world which is unfolding in unpredictable ways. I would also make the comment that I put faith and trust in our Defence Force personnel—incredible people doing incredible work—and I think, particularly in respect to the previous speaker, Golriz Ghahraman, look, just compare our armed forces with that of the likes of Russia and what they’re getting up to in terms of human rights. So I think we’re doing pretty well.

Nevertheless, from our perspective this evening, we see this working both ways. Systems can be improved, conditions for personnel can be improved, issues can be highlighted, and we do commend the bill to the House. Thank you.

It’s my privilege to be talking to this particular bill. It does concern me—with the Opposition not supporting this bill, it just highlights a lack of understanding how democratic civil military operations actually work and a fundamental misunderstanding of what the bill is actually trying to achieve. It fills a critical gap in the New Zealand democratic civil relations construct. That is because it allows objective civilian control through allowing the military to carry out operations, either here at home or abroad as part of a coalition without undermining the system of Government. Having served in these areas of operations which gave birth to the Burnham inquiry, it’s very easy for things to wrong. It’s very essential that we have that civilian oversight of our operations when we are deployed overseas. I just also want to point out that the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) did actually ask for this, and they wanted that transparency.

This bill establishes the offices of the Inspector-General of Defence and the Deputy Inspector-General of Defence to assist the Minister of Defence to oversee the defence force and account accurately to the House of Representatives for its activities and to assure the public that activities of the defence force are subject to independent scrutiny. This bill is a result of the Inquiry into Operation Burnham. I won’t go into the details of Op Burnham other than to say that in chapter 12 of the inquiry, it recommended the establishment by legislation of an office of the independent Inspector-General of Defence to be located outside of that NZDF organisational structure. The purpose is to facilitate independent oversight of the NZDF and enhance its democratic accountability. The functions of the inspector-general would include investigating either his or her own motion by way of a reference and reporting of particular NZDF operational activities to ascertain whether they were conducted lawfully; investigating and reporting on such other matters requiring that independent scrutiny, as are referred to by the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Defence Force, or the Secretary of Defence or the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee; and also providing an annual report to the Minister of Defence and to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee.

So people have been asking about why we need an Inspector-General of Defence. Well, in short, it’s about social licence. It’s essential that there is social licence between the NZDF and those it serves. Social licence gives the NZDF permission to operate and is critical in establishing and maintaining the trust and confidence of Ministers, Parliament, and, by extension, the New Zealand public. Strengthening that ministerial and public trust and confidence in the NZDF is a key focus for this Government in the aftermath of Operation Burnham. So there is a strong link between social licence and democratic oversight of the military, which is exercised by the Government of the day, principally through the Minister of Defence. So while processes are in place for transferring operational knowledge of public and political interest through multiple layers of command to the Minister of Defence, knowledge flows ultimately depend on individuals making the right decisions based on the guidance and instructions provided to them and to mitigate risk that important information could be lost or misinterpreted, as we have seen. There needs to be a formal top-down accountability for the end-to-end fidelity and flow of this type of defence knowledge as it moves through the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of decision making.

The Inspector-General of Defence will allow for improvements to systems, processes, practices, and structures, as well as to attitudes and behaviours that will help provide the Minister of Defence with sufficient visibility and understanding of the NZDF’s activities to carry out democratic oversight of the military effectively and to fulfil their accountability obligations to Parliament and, most importantly, the New Zealand public.

So, just in closing, the armed forces occupy a unique position that confers on them both significant powers and significant responsibilities. Their actions can have serious consequences for individuals, including in some circumstances death, deprivation of liberty, and also huge consequences for international relations. Accordingly, they are bound to act consistently with the rule of law and the Government’s defence policy objectives and in a way that facilitates effective civilian control. It is also critical in a democratic society that they have confidence and support of the public.

This bill keeps civilians in control. That’s why I commend the bill to the House. Thank you, Madam Speaker.

The next call is a split call. I call on Joseph Mooney for five minutes.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I rise to speak on the Inspector-General of Defence Bill. The National Party opposes this bill. I’ve heard the previous speaker just talking about how this is necessary to ensure civilian—the military is accountable to civilian control. Well, I stand here in the House of Representatives which does exercise civilian control over the military. The Minister of Defence has that role here in this House. The reason why we have a democracy is because of those who have come before us and served in the armed forces and sacrificed their lives for this country to ensure that we have a democracy. If I look to my right I see Gallipoli, where one of my great uncles was killed in the first hours of that campaign. If I look across from me I see Egypt, where my grandfather who fought in that campaign was severely injured. These people, among many, many others in our country, had great sacrifices to ensure that we are able to stand here in this House today and have civilian control over the military to exercise and protect our constitutional framework.

I myself have served in the army, in the army reserves, and I can certainly account for the very exemplary nature of that service. It was somewhat unfortunate to hear the comments from the Green Party member on this bill who made insinuations towards the military. I would just recommend to that member to just take a look at the inquiry into Operation Burnham in Afghanistan, which clearly found no wrongdoing by our SAS soldiers. That needs to be underlined and understood. That member of Parliament has a responsibility to reflect on that.

It is probably important to just outline, in the brief time I have available, the current regulatory system—“The modern approach to democratic oversight assumes that the purpose of the armed forces is to further civilian government policy. While deployment of the armed forces remains a prerogative power, in practice this is exercised on the advice of ministers (ie. Cabinet).” The Minister of Defence facilitates control of the New Zealand Defence Forces, “This reflects the constitutional principle of democratic oversight and the ordinary principles of responsible government.”, which we have seen until this point. While “The Minister is generally involved in strategic decisions rather than operational and tactical decisions”, they still retain “oversight of the operation and administration of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and remains responsible to Cabinet and Parliament.”—where we are this evening. They are also indirectly democratically accountable to the public for their decisions. The Minister can decide on their own motion or following a complaint referral to section 24 of the Defence Act 1990 assessment audit of the NZDF or can approve one or more assessments audits as part of the work programme proposed by the Secretary of Defence. Such an assessment audit is done independently of both the New Zealand Defence Force and the Secretary of Defence. The Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee in the House of Representatives has the power to inquire into any matter that it considers needs investigation in the public interest. Practice inquiries and defence matters are carried out by this. Most scrutiny is undertaken through estimates, examinations, and reviews.

The Ombudsman can also investigate any decision, recommendation, act, or omission relating to matters of administration within NZDF. The Controller and Auditor-General can audit the NZDF and provide Parliament and the public assurance that the NZDF is operating and accounting for its use of resources and performance in the way that Parliament intended. The Privacy Commissioner can investigate the NZDF’s refusal of requests for personal information, the misuse of personal information, or breaches of privacy. The Human Rights Commission can inquire generally into any matter if it appears that the matter involves or may involve the infringement of human rights. Also, the Human Rights Commission is designated as the central national preventative mechanisms for the optional protocol to the convention against torture. It does not monitor places of abstention itself, but coordinates activities of the other national preventative mechanisms.

The Registrar of the Court Martial and their role as inspector of the service penal establishments is charged with monitoring the NZDF’s detention facilities. The Human Rights Review Tribunal can hear and determine unlawful discrimination proceedings as well as interference with privacy proceedings. The Health and Disability Commissioner can look into health and disability service complaints. The Health Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal can hear and determine disciplinary proceedings against health practitioners. The professional conduct bodies can look into conduct of medical professionals and lawyers employed by the NZDF. The civilian justice system—important in civic and criminal law—is also applicable to the New Zealand Defence Force, including serious or grave breaches. WorkSafe New Zealand also has oversight—as does the military justice system, international bodies, and the media. There is already extensive oversight of the NZDF, which is accountable to civilian control.

This debate is interrupted and is set down for resumption next sitting day. The House stands adjourned until 2 p.m. tomorrow. Pō mārie.

Debate interrupted.

The House adjourned at 9.56 p.m.