Fair Pay Agreements Bill

Members, we come now to Part 5. This is the debate on clauses 92 to 113, which is on bargaining. The question is that Part 5 stand part.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to talk on Part 5 of this bill. I want to look at clause 92F, in particular, which is around entitlement and the obligation to represent covered employers. So what happens—and I just want to remind people who are just tuning into this debate—with what we think is a grossly undemocratic initiating process is that a fair pay agreement process gets under way. It might have only taken a thousand employees out of 200,000 in a sector or an industry. That tiny little minority has decided they want it; therefore, it’s happened and it’s under way. And then regardless of whether they want to or not, the two sides, the employee side, which is the union that started the whole process, and the employers—the employers have to try and get together and decide on who to represent the employers. They may not, in which case it goes straight off to the Employment Relations Authority for them to decide.

But if they do decide, then I suppose a couple of questions arise then. How on earth does any employer group represent the views? Because there is an obligation in here, in clause 92F, for the firms to represent—well, let’s just read it. The employer bargaining side is entitled to represent and must use its “best endeavours” to represent the collective interests of all covered employers, whether or not each employer is a member of the association. OK, all right. So it’s got to do its best endeavours. Well, that’s not the highest hurdle in the world.

💬 Dr Duncan Webb: Well, actually, it is quite high.

Well, yeah, well, let’s just see. So you’re up, and again, if we take the example of the cleaner down in Haast—a two-person operation. Do we really think that the large cleaning operations that dominate the market, who presumably will have the most say when it comes to the organisation that emerges on the employers’ side—how practically are they going to engage and understand the interests of that little operation down in Haast?

Or, if we were to take another example—if we were to take the example of the superette owner in Hokianga, for example, who I have referred to. So if the fair pay agreement was on checkout operators, for example, and a group was set up to represent the employers, I just have this worry or this concern that it will be the big operators that dominate the employers’ group. It’s natural and they will do it.

And it’s interesting because we have, on the one hand, the Government, this same Government who spends a great deal of time going on and beating its chest, saying “We’re going to get tough on the supermarket duopoly, for example, and we’ve got the Commerce Commission focused on that and we’re going to do all sorts of stuff that are going to make life difficult for them and we’re going to show them what’s what, and we’re going to be tough because we’re on the side of the consumers.” OK, well, that’s all very well and good. And then at the same time, it’s bringing in regulations and rules such as this, which I have no doubt whatsoever will help the same big players vis à vis the little ones that they’re supposedly trying to help, on the other.

Because if you think for a moment that regulations, which are costly, time consuming, and require an enormous amount of management effort to get your head around—what on earth is all this about, what’s going on, what do we want to have in terms of conditions, how are we going to organise this—do you really think that the small little operator in the Hokianga with two employees and a superette is going to be focused on that and contributing, and that his or her voice is going to be paramount in how this is all shaped up and developed? Or do you think it will be the vast team of people in Progressive Enterprises or Countdown—how do you think that distinction will work?

So what you’ll have, which is typical of all regulation, is that mostly regulation supports the big players. It’s in the interest of the big players and usually makes it more difficult for small businesses to compete, because the more cumbersome they are, the more difficult it is to deal with. The more management expertise that is required to handle it, the bigger the systems that are required to manage it. The more regulation there is, the more the big organisations do well and they manage it—they complain about it; it doesn’t mean they don’t complain about it. They’ll always complain about it, but actually it suits them vis-à-vis the small person, the small operator who is just scrambling, trying to figure out who’s going to be on the checkout because so-and-so is sick today and the other one’s not available, and they’re scrambling around trying to just keep the business going and they’re trying to sort of come up with and deal with these regulations.

Then secondly, it’s not only just dealing with the regulations; it’s also who shapes them and for whose benefit, because it doesn’t, again, take very much imagination to think that an organisation that has 10,000 employees may well be able to cope with—we’ll come later to all the mandatory things that have to be included in the fair pay agreement. And, you know, it’s all around our penal rates. It’s around this, that, and the other thing: leave entitlements and health and safety requirements—all sorts of things that an organisation with 10,000 employees might be able to cope with. It might be all sorts of rules around tea breaks and how often you have to do this and how often you have to do that. If you’ve got 10,000 employees you might be able to cope with it well; if you’ve got two employees, it would be an absolute total nightmare and very difficult to deal with.

So what we have is on the one hand, this Government says it’s going to get tough on the big guys and we’re going to break up the duopolies and we’re going to bring in more competition. On the other hand, they’re passing legislation every month—every month—that actually makes it easier for the big guys vis-à-vis the little ones. If you wanted another example, and I pray the indulgence of the chair for a moment, it would be how the COVID regulations worked for the supermarkets. For example, the supermarkets kept going and all their little competitors, the fruit and veggie shops, are shut down and just about go bust. And so, “Oops, there’s an issue, but anyway, we’ll come back and we’re going to get tough on the supermarkets and we’re going to be tough on competition.” So the complete muddle-headedness of their approach to regulation when it comes to competition consequences is laid bare in this.

So what I’m getting round to, is I’d like to hear from the Minister what thought, if any, he gave to the competition consequences of this, because I’m sure he would have got a lot of advice on this and he would have thought very carefully about it. How do you design a system in a disparate occupation or industry level, which, you know, again, thinking of it in those examples of checkout operators which spans from the big supermarkets, massive well-organised industry through to tiny little shops, mum and dad operations who have their little EFTPOS machine, and they’ve got a couple of casual employees. You’re trying to come up with a system that suits all of them, and you’ve got a cumbersome, expensive system with lawyers and QCs and everything like that, trying to organise how they’re going to set up the system. And you’ve got under clause 92F the obligation to do “best endeavours to represent” the collective interests of all these employees. I don’t think for a moment that the collective interests of all those little players scattered around the country are going to be represented at all by them, and the “best endeavours” will be a joke. They can’t be anything other than a joke because it’s just too hard and not practical.

So I’m keen to hear from the Minister as to how he has thought about that implication, and it would take a bit of a mind-set shift for him to think about that. But I’d be interested to know what advice he’s had and whether he’d given thought to particular ways that he can deal with that particular issue that I’m raising, in terms of entitlements and obligations and the best endeavours that need to be taken.

Part 5 very specifically deals with bargaining arrangements between the parties, in respect of the fair pay agreements regime. It doesn’t speak at all to questions, which might be useful in a different environment, around competition between large and small firms. So I’ll let those comments lie.

In amongst that 10 minutes, there was one pertinent question that relates to Part 5, and that was about the best endeavours obligations of bargaining sides to employers. I do note that those obligations are mirrored on the other bargaining side from the unions to the employees that they represent. The short answer to the member’s question is that if we move from clause 92F(1) to clause 92F(2), the best endeavours requirements are clearly described: “To comply with subsection (1), the employer bargaining side must use its best endeavours to … (a) provide regular updates … (b) give all covered employers the opportunity to provide feedback … (c) consider, during bargaining, all feedback”, and then a number of other items. So that best endeavours obligation is very clearly set out in the part that is before us.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. It’s a pleasure to take a call on this bill, but I want to talk about clause 92D, “Obligation to ensure representation of Māori employees”: “Each employee bargaining side for a proposed FPA must use its best endeavours to ensure that Māori employees are represented effectively in the bargaining process, including by (a) seeking and considering feedback from representatives of Māori employees; and (b) considering whether the bargaining side should include a member to represent the interests of Māori employees.”

Why, if this is a best interest and is a collective piece of legislation, is one group singled out in the legislation? What about other groups? Surely that flies in the face of the whole collective bargaining rationale for this bill. It doesn’t make any sense, if you’re putting one group above others in this legislation. It’s quite clear in here, and it’s quite worrying, actually. What about other groups? There are other minorities; there are actually majorities that could be disadvantaged. Why would you put that in legislation, unless there’s some rationale in there that one group is going to be given an advantage over the other?

I don’t understand the thinking process that went into that. Who did the Minister consult with before allowing that clause to go through? Did the Minister seek to have that put in the legislation, or was it put there by officials and it just merely slipped past the goalie? I don’t know; I don’t understand it. It’s not a common thing to have in legislation. I think it’s quite divisive, actually. It seems like a lot of the policies that this Government is bringing forward in what they, I would imagine, I assume, is a very good process to be all encompassing, and, in fact, all it is doing is doing actually the opposite. It is seeking to divide us. It is putting people into different groups and lining them up against one another. That’s not how you deal with relations in this country. I think it’s a very worrying trend, and it’s just outrageous.

But, perhaps, the Minister—I would like him to get some advice from his officials and inform the committee as to what the rationale was behind this clause in the legislation. I don’t see anything in here that says anything about women. I don’t see anything in here about Scotsmen or any other ethnic group—Pasifika, Asian groups, anything like that. It’s outrageous we’re even talking about this, but it’s here in the legislation and it needs to be addressed. The Minister has chosen what he’s got to get up on his feet about; I think this is one clause in the bill that needs to be addressed.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I just wanted to carry on from my colleague Paul Goldsmith, but in a new and different clause, 92C—so that’s the equal and opposite clause. So where my colleague Paul Goldsmith was talking about the employer side, this is the equal and opposite side for the employees.

So, basically, this section requires the employee bargaining side to represent, or to use their best endeavours, again, to represent the collective interests of all the covered employees, whether or not they are members of a union. So my question to the Minister—and he traversed through clause 92F, where it says what best endeavours means—but my question here is when you’ve got a bargaining side that is a union, they’ve got divided interests, they’ve got the interests of their members, but they’re also, under this part, supposed to give equal rights to the people who are not their members but are other employees who are part of the bargaining process. And I understand that it says here what they’re supposed to do: “provide regular updates”, “give all covered employees”—whether they’re union members or not—“the opportunity to provide feedback”; that’s great. Then it says that they have to consider all the feedback received. But where it stops is that it’s completely silent around what they need to do with that feedback.

So, clearly, here, you will have a conflict between the unions and their members and the other employees who are not covered by the union but are still subject and part of the bargaining process. So where you may have non-union employees giving their feedback as part of this, and the feedback being acknowledged and received and considered—there’s nothing in here to state that, as far as I can see, and maybe the Minister can point it out if I’ve missed it. But there’s nothing in here in between, say, subclause (2)(c) and (d) of clause 92C to actually require the union to do anything with the consideration of that feedback. So my point here is that there is quite clearly going to be, in some instances, a conflict of interest between the two types of members: the members and the non-members. If the non-members’ views and feedback and wants are different than the union members’, then what requirement does the union have, other than just to consider the feedback of the non-members, to actually act and bring those forward in the negotiations? Because it’s not laid out here, and it’s not clear to me, and it may well be the same for the employer’s side as well; I’m not looking at that at the moment, I’m just looking at clause 92C.

So my specific question to the Minister is: what happens in the case where a union has its members and non-members who have different feedback and different points of view? What is the requirement on the union, who, if they are the bargaining party, and the only bargaining party, to equally put forward both of the views of the members and the non-members when they are conflicting? Because it looks like, in the bill, all they have to do is to provide the update in clause 92C(2)(a) and, then, in (b), to give the opportunity for feedback, and, then, in (c), to consider it.

What it feels like is missing there is a new subclause 92(ca) which says, “then put forward equally the views of both the members and the non-members if those views are divergent and different”. And I suppose that the point, here, is that there is a possibility for conflict when those views are divergent and there is no provision as to what the bargaining party, if it is the union, should do in that case. I’d be interested in the Minister’s explanation as to whether or not he’s thought of that, whether there is anything in here that, potentially, I’ve missed that would address that, or what the union would be required to do if they’ve got a divided interest, in this case. Thank you.

For the member who has just resumed her seat, the two key things for the member to be aware of: firstly, the wording of “all covered employees”, in clause 92C, states in very clear terms that the obligations of 92C of the employee bargaining side apply to all employees who are covered, irrespective of their union membership or not.

The member can also read this clause in concert with the good-faith obligations as they apply to the employer bargaining side, which make no distinction in respect of the good-faith obligations of that employee bargaining side to all of the employees who are covered by the fair pay agreement, regardless of the union membership. There is no distinction that the employee bargaining side can make—under this, they have to represent, in good faith, those interests, regardless of membership.

In respect of Mr Smith’s question, I’m very sorry to hear that he considers it “outrageous” for there to be consideration of Māori interests when fair pay agreement bargaining sides are being established. The Government does not believe that that is outrageous; we believe that it is reasonable and appropriate, given the significant inequalities that new Māori employees face and the Treaty obligations that we hold, bearing in mind that fair pay agreements will be given effect via a piece of secondary legislation. I note that these provisions are facilitative; they are not required. They simply ask for the parties to give consideration to these factors, it is then up to them what they would do. I also note that this was an issue that was raised by hardly anyone—employee, employer, or any other submitter—during the select committee process. But it’s perhaps no surprise that the National Party in its current temper is attracted to the issue.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’d also like to go back to clause 92D, Minister, in relation to my Supplementary Order Paper (SOP). While I do agree with a lot of what Mr Smith said, I accept that it might have been pushing it a little bit far for this Government at the moment.

My SOP would just like to replace, where it states “Māori employees”, to “employees who have identified themselves as Māori”. I think it just makes a lot of sense. A lot of businesses, especially small businesses, don’t carry that information, and finding out whether or not—how do you do that? Do you go round and ask? It’s just fraught with issues that I don’t think employers should have to face.

Also, in relation to a similar thing, clause 92G, identifying representatives of Māori employers, we’d just like that deleted. Identifying what are undefined as Māori employers will, again, prove difficult, and potentially be used to gain an advantage in the bargaining.

While I’m here, can we look at clause 92F(2)(f): “if the proposed FPA covers employees of a private sector employer and an employer bargaining party on the bargaining side is aware that the private sector employer regularly receives [funding from either local government or central government]”. We believe that “significant funding” is more appropriate in that area, otherwise we’ll be dealing with just lots of little wee contracts that the Government departments and local bodies deal with. So, if you can consider that, it’d be appreciated. Thank you.

I want to take up the reply from the Minister, who casually dismissed the competition elements that I was raising as not relevant to Part 5 or to the bill.

Clearly there isn’t a meeting of minds and clearly the Minister and his Government don’t seem to think that there can be competition consequences from regulations that they pass. That’s what I’m asking him to think about. Because this clause, 92F, is saying that employers, in the process, are required to form one group to represent all employers as part of the bargaining process, and that clause represents the obligations on the employer bargaining side and how it relates to all the other employers who may be included in them.

What I’m arguing is, notwithstanding all the things that are listed—that they must do and that they must operate with good faith and they must provide regular updates, and they must give all covered employees this, and they must consider all this, and they must advise employers all that, and then when the information comes back, they should consider all these things—we do live in the real world.

And notwithstanding all that and they do all that, the reality is that the consequence of that is it will be dominated by the big players. Notwithstanding all the obligations and best endeavours, the smaller players will inevitably have less say in how these fair pay agreements that will control and dominate and will have obligations across all employers, large and small—that the smaller operators will inevitably have less influence over the shaping of those agreements. And the larger players will inevitably in practicality—like they have in every other state of regulation throughout the history of the universe, including here—have greater input into how they are shaped.

So what I’m asking him to consider is what competition consequences there will be for that. I’m putting it to him that they will be substantial. And I’m putting it to him that they conflict with the stated aims of a whole bunch of other Government policies, which are claiming to be focused on weakening or constraining the power of the large duopoly powers—in the context of the supermarkets, for example—using the powers of competition, law, and the Commerce Commission.

On the one hand, they’re trying to do that, but at the same time, they’re bringing in legislation that will apply to the working conditions of everybody in, say, the supermarket checkout. The checkout operators, if they were to become under a fair pay agreement, will have an impact on all those employees and all those operations, large and small. And I’m putting it to him that it will be the big operators that dominate that framework.

Notwithstanding all—you can all stand up and say, “Well, yes, under 92F(2)(e) that the employer group needs to consider whether all interest groups of covered employees are recognised and given the opportunity to provide feedback.” And, yes, they will tick that box. They and the larger operators—with all their advisers and lawyers and QCs and whatever—will tick the box and they will ensure that under 92(2)(d), they will advise all covered employees of any ratification votes and they’ll do that. But how practically they’ll find them all, I’m not sure. We still haven’t got a clear answer on how they’re going to actually find the small little operation in Haast and the other one in Balclutha and one in Chatham Islands and how they’re going to find them all and effectively communicate with them. But once they have found them and they’ve given their views and they’ve said, “Actually, we need more flexibility here. And we don’t want it that way,” they’ll consider it.

Well, what does that mean, “they’ll consider it”? I bet they’ll consider it and they’ll think, “Well, actually, no. I think we’ll prefer it to arrange things in a way that suits us. And if we’re a large organisation with 10,000 employees, there’s a whole lot of things that will suit us a lot differently to the small operators.” So what I’m asking is: has he considered the consequences for competition from this legislation?

Thank you, Mr Chair. In response to Mr Baillie’s contributions, the Government does not agree to those Supplementary Order Papers for the reasons that I’ve outlined in respect of Māori representation within the process.

In terms of 92F(2)(f), which he also raises, this clause is about ensuring that in situations, particularly in the funded sector where it might be an NGO or private sector employer, but it is ultimately Crown funding, that there is a clear link between the bargaining process and the funder to ensure that there is a rational discussion and an ability to actually meet any expectations or commitments that are made within the bargaining process. So we think that retaining that clause is important. And I think, by definition and just through reasonable practice, there will be a significant threshold there. It’s not going to become a big issue if there is only a small amount of funding at stake.

In respect of Mr Goldsmith’s coming back again to his concerns around big and small employers, I do note that at many points over the course of this debate, he has spoken—and his colleagues—glowingly about the role of employer associations and representing the legitimate interests and concerns of employers. Yet in this part of the debate, he seems to have no faith and confidence that they will be willing or able to represent the interests of small employers.

I believe that they will, and I also note that there is a clear obligation in this legislation, in this part, whereby they have to represent the interests of all employers. And there was a clear good faith obligation and those obligations, ultimately, are things that can be tested if anyone does not believe that they have been followed.

Look, I just wanted to pick on the comments that the Minister made there with relation to the representation for Māori employees, and particularly around clause 92C, which talks to the entitlement and obligation to represent covered employees: “When bargaining for a proposed FPA, an employee bargaining side for the proposed FPA is entitled to represent, and must use its best endeavours to represent, the collective interests of all covered employees, whether or not each employee is a member of a union.” So I’m interested to hear from the Minister which part of the collective interests of all covered employees, whether or not each employee is a member of the union, excludes Māori from representation? Because quite clearly, to me, that includes everyone, because it specifically states “all”, and so there would, of course, then, be no need for a separate clause, and it just simply presents the opportunity for conflicts of interest, which has been raised by other contributors.

I also want to come to, then, contrary to that, on the employer side, clause 92G, which was picked up by other contributors. But the aspect that I want to focus on here is the ambiguity around what are considered Māori employers. So clause 92G, “Obligation to ensure representation of Māori employers”, is that employers who are themselves Māori or employers who employ Māori employees? It’s ambiguous, and is not necessarily the same. So I’m interested to understand which of those it is and, indeed, what classifies a Māori employer in the context of the scale of a potential business. So some definition around that, given that they’ve gone to the effort to make it a specific stand-alone clause—indeed, the only carve-out for any ethnicity or special group based on gender or any other aspect. So why have they done that? And on what basis, then, is that definition decided?

But actually, I also want to pick up on and expand on the comments that Mr Goldsmith made around fair representation, and particularly with the knowledge that—and this may be news for the Minister, but most businesses in New Zealand are small businesses, and those small businesses operate in many different ways and all have quite unique, often, considerations within their business. They have different staffing arrangements, different competencies within their teams, and, indeed, would be able to therefore respond under this Act in different mechanisms. Under clause 92(2)(d)—so this is talking about during bargaining, if one side requests information—if, for example, the employee side requested information, getting that information could be much more challenging for those small employers who do not necessarily have the depth of resource within their management team, if, indeed, they have a management team to be able to find and supply that information in a timely manner without interrupting normal business operations. So clause 92(2)(d) specifies a reasonable time, but my point here is that is highly subjective and varies based on the size of the business. So I’m interested in the Minister’s consideration of “reasonable time” in that context and the implications for small versus large businesses and their ability to respond.

Moving forward also to clause 92A(4), the information requested, if it’s considered confidential, then having an independent reviewer come in to make a determination on that, I’d like to understand how that independent reviewer is chosen—and, indeed, how they are defined—what is considered independent, and how the Minister will have confidence that they then, as an independent reviewer, have the competence to understand and determine whether or not a particular piece of information supplied should or should not be considered confidential, and the process of the fair pay agreement bargaining agreement.

So those are probably the key aspects that I wanted to touch on, particularly from the small business perspective, just reiterating that for the Minister: the variation of size and ability to respond, the nature of the independent reviewer, and, indeed, the classification of what is or isn’t a Māori business, given that they have gone to the efforts of specifying that in legislation. Thank you.

In response to Mr van de Molen’s two lines of inquiry, I do not believe that the provisions in this bill for bargaining sides to consider whether Māori interests should be represented at the table in any way conflict with the fundamental duty to represent the interests of all employers on one side and all employees on the other side. The member can think of it this way: the fact that we have Māori seats represented in this House to ensure that there is Māori representation in this House does not in any way interfere or undercut the fundamental duty that all members have to this House and to the people that we serve.

In respect of his question about information being provided in clause 92A, the key point to be aware of here is that it is an information request about bargaining sides. It is not about individual employers. It is, effectively, about one bargaining side being able to request information from the other bargaining side. It doesn’t go down the chain to individual employers. Again, I point out that this provision is, effectively, a lift from the Employment Relations Act, which covers collective bargaining, which, of course, the National Party left in place for the nine years that it was in office.

I move, That the question be now put.

Mr Chair.

Tim van de Molen: Mr Chair.

Mr Chair—please.

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O’Connor): Erica Stanford.

Thank you, Mr Chair—I asked very nicely. Mr Chair, I want to raise a new topic, and it’s something that actually relates to the whole bill, but I can make it apply to Subpart 1A in Part 4. The point of the bill is to set a floor, a wage floor—

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O’Connor): I expect that’ll be Part 5.

Sorry, Part 5, I said the wrong thing—Part 5. In clause 92C, the bargaining side, whoever they might be, if it’s a union or some other employee association, is representing everybody, and in this case they may well be representing migrant workers. There are some sectors where migrant workers hold a lot of those positions—if you think about security, retail, gas station attendants, care workers—that may be included in fair pay agreements (FPAs). The question I’ve got for the Minister is: how is it going to come, when the bargaining is happening, that we’re setting a price floor, effectively, for one group of people where another group, who are covered by clause 92C and will be represented by the union or whoever else that’s on that bargaining side, who have a completely separate wage floor—because as we now know, the new visa, the Accredited Employer Work Visa, requires that in almost all cases the migrant worker needs to be paid the median wage, which next year will be $29.66, which is relatively high. So when we are going into bargaining for, let’s say, gas station attendants or security guards who are traditionally earning much, much less than that, maybe just a little bit over the minimum wage, how is it going to be that the bargaining parties will take that information and use it?

Now, I understand that this doesn’t mean that people can’t be paid more—I get that—but you are going to have two classes of people who, effectively, have different price floors. Now, I’ve brought this up with the Minister in the chair, Michael Wood, before in select committee and he really didn’t answer the question as to how this would be dealt with, because you’ve effectively got a union or someone on the employee bargaining side that is representing both a migrant and a non-migrant who will have completely separate wage floors. How that’s going to play out is of interest, and I’d like the Minister to explain how the bargaining parties will treat that and how they will come to any floor below $29.66.

We have to remember that migrants work in almost every sector, and they do work in a lot of these low-paid sectors, and so if they’re effectively on the median wage, what happens in the bargaining? Does that then push the bargaining position up from, let’s say, just over the minimum wage to the median wage of what will next year be $29.66? It seems like a very odd position to be in when the two parties are bargaining for, effectively, two classes of people. Surely, that means in that bargaining situation that the employee side would have a very good case to say, well, actually, migrant workers make up a large section of this workforce who are, effectively, paid a much higher rate. Would that not then push up the bargaining to the median wage of $29.66, which, in a lot of these cases, if you think about the cleaner in Haast that we’ve been talking about all day, or the superette owners up in the Hokianga, may well put them out of business, if they were to pay all their employees at the median wage, which is extremely high.

So the question for the Minister is: did he consider this? How will it be the case in clause 92C that the bargaining party—a union or someone else—can represent both of these views? And how will it affect the bargaining when it comes to bargaining for those two different wages?

I’ll just, before I finish, Mr Chair, make the point that it’s very noisy in here, if you could potentially quieten it down.

Yeah, just before I give a call, can I just—appreciate that normally during committee stage, the Chamber is slightly less full than this. Could members just, in their chats, be aware that it is a little bit harder to hear, so taking that into account, please.

I move, That the question be now put.

Motion agreed to.

Chris Baillie’s amendment to delete clause 92G set out on Supplementary Order Paper 270 is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee. Chris Baillie’s amendment to Part 5 set out on Supplementary Order Paper 266 is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.