Conversion Practices Prohibition Legislation Bill

Members, we now come to Part 2, which is the debate on clauses 8 to 13, “Offences and civil liability in relation to conversion practices”. The question is that Part 2 stand part.

Thank you, Madam Chair—I’ll get it in the right order. I’m very pleased to speak to Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 126, in my name.

I firstly want to acknowledge the Minister’s correction of my error. Quite rightly, section 36(1) of the Care of Children Act does mean that a child can consent to a medical procedure independent of their parents or guardians. So my question really is, for the purposes of this discussion, had my amendment talked about a person under the age of 16, rather than under the age of 18, would the Government be inclined to support it; and if not, why not?

I hate to start this with disappointment for the member, but no, because the current framework around the Care of Children Act, and also the framework for medical treatment for those who are under 16—which I believe is quite well based on a foundation of case law—we believe is a solid foundation for this piece of legislation as well.

I’m not sure if the member was alluding to the fact that the Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) in his name, as it stands at 18, probably shouldn’t stand as it is. But we believe that the current framework around the care of children, which allows children or young people who are 16 and over to make a decision independently, again, doesn’t exclude the respectful and open conversations between a youngster and a parent from happening; it’s just that the law clearly sets out that, quite independently of the parent, they can make their own decision based on law.

Now, I think, in reality, when these conversations happen in a healthy way, there is a healthy conversation between a youngster and a parent. In fact, I know of many instances of that happening. Depending on the age and the understanding of the youngster below 16, this is a situation that is faced by the medical practice and medical sector day in, day out. In conjunction with health practitioners, parents and guardians, and the youngster involved, you can usually, nine times out of 10—or probably more than that—come to a conclusion where all parties are happy.

The fundamental right here, that we are both trying to protect and express, is that an individual has a right to their own decision and agency around their sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender orientation. So that’s why we oppose the SOP in the member’s name as it stands, because it does not match the foundation of what is currently in place with medical treatments.

I thank the Minister—in which case the next few minutes will be an academic discussion rather than a substantive one. I agree with most of what the Minister said. We don’t make law for the nine times out of 10. We are not actually making law for the times when respectful, loving conversations are held between parent and child, engaging with a medical practitioner about what’s possible; we’re talking about the exception. And I do speak with some experience here, because, as a former chief executive of a surgical hospital, we had very strict policies around the granting of consent.

The case law that the Minister references, which he describes as a solid foundation—I would say that it’s rather less solid than he portrays—does start out of the well-known case in the UK courts of Gillick, and the principle of what’s known as Gillick competency. Now Gillick was a case where the procedure went ahead against the wishes of the parents, on the basis that the courts found that the minor was mature enough to make those decisions of their own accord. Our own laws are a bit hazier than that, and the case law is—as it should be—actually situational, and I’m indebted, actually, to the commentary from YouthLaw, who says about this, “Can doctors overrule my guardians’ decision to not go ahead with medical treatment for me?” And the answer is: “If your parent, guardian or next-of-kin refuses consent, the medical professional must not go ahead with the medical treatment.”

Here’s the “but”, though: however, if you’re under 17, and the medical professional thought that the person refusing consent was deliberately trying to harm you by refusing consent, they can seek support from Oranga Tamariki, and potentially the Family Court, to make a guardianship order. That’s a very, very rare—but occasional—thing. I have to say, in my time as a surgical chief executive, we never allowed a procedure, regardless of what it was, to be undertaken on a child without the child—a mature child; so a teenager usually—you know, when we felt that it was necessary and appropriate for them to have a say about what’s going on. And that’s almost all cases, apart from babies. If the child consented and the parent consented, we’d go. If the parent consented, but the child did not consent, we didn’t proceed until we had those ducks in a row. And vice versa: if the child consented, whether it was a tonsillectomy or breast reduction or augmentation, and the parents didn’t consent, then further conversations would need to be had. That is the overwhelming clinical practice.

The Minister made a comment, in his opening remarks, about my Supplementary Order Paper, around the maturity and ability and knowledge of oneself as a minor, which is slightly contradictory with the bill, and, frankly, with reality, because the bill actually has more punishments for conversion practices for people under the age of 18—accepting, as I do, that they are more vulnerable, that they are more prone to confusion and anxiety and depression, and all of the sequelae that goes along with what must be a traumatic journey to identity. But many loving parents will support the idea of “watchful waiting”, which is a term that’s used, and may well come to the conclusion that it is not appropriate to consent to procedures that could have long-lasting and, in fact, irreversible effect. The Minister talks about puberty blockers. There was a fascinating and actually quite uplifting profile of a young person going through puberty blockers some months ago, on TV, and it was a remarkable insight into what “good” looks like, actually, in this situation.

So, if the Minister is right, and if YouthLaw is right, it may be that my amendment isn’t necessary anyway. But I have to record that parents do have a say in this, and I’m not sure—I can’t remember how old the Minister’s children are. They may not quite be in those teenage years, but they are fraught even if gender expression and gender identity is not part of their adolescent journey, and I think parents do have a say, and if that determination is to pause, is to wait, then they should.

Certainly, the advice I’ve been given around the age threshold for the independence of 16-year-olds to make their own decision—but there are aspects of the member’s contribution that I do agree with, and the purpose of this bill, again, is to encourage open and respectful discussions. We’re doing that by banning the harmful and hurtful conversion practices but making sure that we carve out the space to have those open and respectful discussions. So my hope is that we can acknowledge the punitive and the criminal and civil redress system and encourage the works of the likes of the Human Rights Commission and of those other non-governmental organisations, schools, and counsellors to make sure that they know now that they don’t have to worry about—well, that there is a protection from conversion practices itself, and another facility to encourage discussions, and healthy ones, between parents and young people, as the member has suggested should happen.

And you’re right: we don’t legislate for nine out of 10; we legislate for 100 percent. As a result of this legislation, I would hope that we have protection for 100 percent of the rainbow community now, who have been vulnerable to these conversion practices and seen no ability to redress. So I’m not assuming that this is the last contribution to the Part 2 debate in this House tonight but, again, am acknowledging the pride that we have on this side of the House that this has come from a commitment at the election to make sure that the fundamental human rights of the rainbow community are protected.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’d just like to make a few observations on Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 126, from Michael Woodhouse, in regards to medical procedures without parental consent. I understand where Michael Woodhouse is coming from. As a parent of four children myself, I understand the responsibility and the burden on our shoulders as a parent to make the right decisions for our children as they’re growing up. When they’re young, those decisions are left up to us. I agree that, under the age of 16, parents should have the right to make that decision, but I think the age of 18 is going a little bit too far. This is going against other laws we have when it comes to medical practice. Our children over the age of 16 have the right to privacy with their GP, they have the right to make decisions about their body, and about what they want to do with their body.

So, whilst I agree with the intent of what Mr Woodhouse is trying to achieve here, I think just the age of 18 is going a little bit too far. If this was to state the age of 16, I would be more inclined to support the full bill, because, as I have said, parents have a huge responsibility to make sure our children are well cared for, well looked after, and make informed decisions; and children under the age of 16 are still the responsibility of us parents. I feel that this SOP has just missed the mark a little bit in regards to age.

A very brief intervention to acknowledge Ms Chhour’s contribution and just to reiterate that she’s right and, indeed, if time permitted and there was value in doing so, I would withdraw this amendment and re-table it with the age of 16, not 18. But, given the Minister’s comments and my own explanation of it, I think I’ll just leave Hansard to record that my preference now is for 16, accepting that it’ll be defeated in the vote.

The question is that Michael Woodhouse’s amendment inserting new clause 13A set out on Supplementary Order Paper 126 be agreed to.