Autonomous Sanctions Bill

I move, That the Autonomous Sanctions Bill be now read a first time. I nominate the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee to consider the bill.

This bill establishes a framework for the implementation of autonomous sanctions by New Zealand, to further its aims of enhancing New Zealand’s diplomatic capabilities and to enhance the concept of our independent foreign policy. This is a bill that once, if it were to be, an Act, would provide a significant extra tool in the tool kit of diplomacy.

New Zealand takes great pride in our independent foreign policy stance. We’ve shown it on numerous occasions. And while that independence means that we choose our friends and support a rules-based international order, we do so autonomously. We are among the first and founding members of the United Nations. There have been many, many positives come out of that organisation. But when it comes to expressions of disapproval of rule breakers, of human rights abusers, of those who perpetrate acts of aggression or conquest of others, the United Nations falls well short of what might reasonably be expected.

New Zealand relies heavily on the United Nations’ sanction process. That process can impose sanctions on countries through the Security Council. The process, which is the only mechanism through which the United Nations can make legally binding resolutions—and, therefore, New Zealand—is subject to veto power by the permanent five members: the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and China. This undermines, in my opinion, its effectiveness, and I’ll talk more about that, immediately.

It often means that meaningful action against perpetrators of a break up of rules, of international bad behaviour, go unpunished. So if we look, for a start, at the Ukraine: following the 2014 cessation of Crimea to Russia, Russia vetoed attempts by the United Nations to declare that cessation illegal. So there was no commentary about that, and no consequence for that particular action. The resolution would have simply affirmed Ukraine’s sovereignty, its independence, its unity, and its territorial integrity. Has New Zealand ever affirmed that on its own? Not to my knowledge.

Then look at Syria. Since 2011, Russia has vetoed over 16 Security Council resolutions on the Syrian civil war and the humanitarian crisis that all too many of us have seen on the television sets, and all to protect Russia’s ally, President al-Assad’s Government. The resolutions were aimed at ending the civil war, providing diplomatic and humanitarian assistance to those who were most adversely affected by that conflict. We had nothing particular to say about that.

Then there’s Israel. Since 1972, the United States has blocked over 53 Security Council resolutions designed to get a greater degree of peace between Israel and the Palestinians. And more recently, there is Cambodia. What has ever been done for the total takeover of that country by its military?

And then, of course, the one that no one likes to talk about, and that I think the Government is most concerned about, is the situation in Xinjiang, in China. China refused to enter into talks on even the drafting of a Security Council resolution that called into question abuses against Uighur people.

In all these circumstances, it’s the citizens of the country in question that suffer from the United Nations’ inaction, and the political motivations of the permanent members will leave that always to be the case. When an autonomous sanctions regime is in place, action can be taken to assist in alleviating civilian suffering without the hamper of the interests of the five permanent members getting in the road.

So what are some examples of that? I’ll come to those in a minute. But, firstly, let me just say that if a country can’t sanction another country, then surely it can bring down some autonomous sanctions against individuals, against regimes, or against entities, where their assets might be frozen, their services dispensed with, their ability to enter this country denied, any interaction with them by citizens of this country also put into the “can’t do” list. And these are circumstances where it may be that the Minister of Foreign Affairs decides that there is a threat to the stability of the Indo-Pacific area and that there is a necessity for us to make a very tangible statement and action and bring down sanctions against some particular individual.

In recent times, the countries that do have an autonomous sanctions regime, often referred to as the Magnitsky regulation or law, can bring down sanctions. The United States, for example, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada impose some sanctions on actors alleged to be involved in human rights abuses in Xinjiang, China. The United Kingdom, in April 2021—that’s this year—sanctioned 14 Russian nationals accused of conspiring in a $230 million corruption scheme, as part of the Government’s anti - global corruption sanctions—regulations created under the UK’s version of autonomous sanctions. The United States, in June of this year, sanctioned three Bulgarian individuals and 64 countries over their involvement in facilitation of Russian interference in the Bulgarian Government. The United States, in July this year, sanctioned 22 Myanmar nationals, including Ministers, for their involvement in the country’s February military coup and anti-democratic attacks.

These are examples of what an autonomous sanctions bill can do. I said before that it’s known throughout the world as Magnitsky-type legislation. There is a great book out called Red Notice, and if anyone has an interest in how regimes that are totalitarian can operate and how much they can see lawlessness go under the radar, it’s worth a read. It’s written by a gentleman called Bill Browder. Bill Browder has been a tireless campaigner for Magnitsky-type legislation, because of the circumstances that he was put in. His Russian lawyer was a gentleman called Sergei Magnitsky. Well, Bill Browder was allowed to leave the country; Sergei was not. And, for various reasons, bad operators, bad actors, you might say, tortured Sergei Magnitsky and, ultimately, murdered him. Bill Browder went to legislators in the United States and said, “We’ve got to do something about these people. They’re thieves, they’re murderers, and they use the international system to protect their ill-gotten gains and to avoid accountability for their crimes.” And so the United States adopted Magnitsky legislation, named after Sergei because of the life that he lost.

That legislation has been replicated by Governments of a similar type to New Zealand—Governments and countries that value freedom, Governments and countries that don’t like the idea that lawless people can go about their activities without any account. And so this bill that I’m bringing to the House tonight would enable New Zealand to bring in a similar type of legislation.

If anyone does need any convincing about exactly what drove this legislation and what drives the desire to have it throughout the world, can I recommend you go to a wonderful podcast called The Backroom of Politics, by Gerry Brownlee. In it—

💬 Hon Members: Ha, ha!

Well, you’ve got to take your advertising chances. But in it there is a there is a great podcast—Minister Mahuta, you’d love it—with Bill Browder in which he outlines the dreadful situation that’s motivated him to put so much of his life into this type of legislation.

So can I conclude by saying that this is a bill that would give life to the independent foreign policy stance long claimed by New Zealand. It is an essential but simple tool in the toolbox of democracy, and I commend it to the House and do hope that the Government is not too frightened to vote for it.

That podcast may be well worth a listen! I want to welcome the opportunity to speak on the Autonomous Sanctions Bill. While Labour won’t be supporting this bill to progress, it is important to set out our approach that we are taking and some of the shortcomings that we do see in the bill, with all respect to the sponsoring member, the Hon Gerry Brownlee.

New Zealand articulates its independent values-based foreign policy with a focus on human rights; an open and transparent democracy; upholding international rules and norms; a commitment to multilateralism; and promoting regional peace, prosperity, and stability. The world we are living in is very different, and when I consider that the genesis of this bill dates back, probably, to about 2012, so much has happened: a global pandemic, increased competition for scarce natural resources, the impact of climate change, armed conflict, economic coercion, and geostrategic positioning in our region that has caused us to reflect on the role that we might play at this time. Against this backdrop, we need to consider the place for foreign policy and diplomacy and the need for strong domestic legislation to platform what we value, who we are, and what we stand for.

I’ve said previously that the autonomous sanctions regime is a suite of tools that are used as a measure of last resort when diplomatic sanctions and diplomacy simply have not worked to the degree necessary. They are often characterised as a stronger set of measures that have economic and trade consequences. In the New Zealand context, we need to consider this element of how a sanctions regime might impact on our economy and exporting community.

We also need to consider the context of our values-based approach to foreign policy and to work collectively in the pursuit of our core interests, which include an international rules-based order which gives all countries a voice and provides frameworks that promote stability; keeping New Zealanders safe by promoting regional stability; international conditions and connections that aid our prosperity, including supply chain resilience; and global action on sustainability issues such as climate change. Aotearoa’s record on the world stage shows we are most effective when we take this approach internationally. We exhaust our diplomatic tool kit to influence and lead change. We build and strengthen our relationships that are with an independent foreign policy perspective that promotes strong relationships and acknowledges the mana of all countries. This is what we must bear in mind when considering this particular bill.

This bill was first drafted back in 2012, and while the bill has not changed too much, the international environment has. The challenges confronting us have become increasingly more complex: COVID has highlighted the impact of growing inequality; competition for scarce resources; climate change impacts; geostrategic competition; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; terrorism; human rights abuses; and the list goes on. This also reinforces the enduring importance of New Zealand’s belief in the use of multilateral avenues to be able to influence change and, over time, the international rules and norms that should be contextualised for the challenges that we are facing today. We do so because our voice is greater when we speak together with other like-minded States and because a rules-based order protects the rights and interests of smaller States.

I welcome the debate on autonomous sanctions. This is the first opportunity we have had to do so. We need to consider what is in New Zealand’s best interest. This Government is looking at how to provide greater support for human rights around the world. Since coming into Government, we have made progress on a number of fronts to strengthen our domestic legislative context, including taking action to tackle modern slavery with an all-of-Government action plan and a pre-election commitment to explore implementation of modern slavery legislation; progressing our counter-terrorism laws to protect New Zealanders and make us safer while bringing us into line with other countries; reviewing our export control regime to ensure it is fit for purpose and meets the values of this Government and our country; strengthening our maritime laws to prevent serious criminal offending and transnational organised crime. We also have our existing tool kit, including options like travel bans, redirecting aid, the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act, diplomatic representations, recourse through multilateral institutions, and the international rules and norms that we’ve so often spoken about in this House.

We are looking at the best way to utilise our tool kit and the options within. We need to understand what we have in our tool kit for responding internationally, not stand up a regime that is not fit for purpose. An autonomous sanctions regime would be an option of last resort and something to be used only after this full range of other options had been exhausted. It cannot be seen as a way of avoiding or an effective substitute for multilateral action; indeed, it should not be called upon by outsiders beyond New Zealand to strong arm our own interests.

I believe that the bill as it stands is unfit for purpose beyond what could be rectified through its continued consideration beyond first reading. Firstly, the bill fails to take into account the importance of any autonomous sanctions regime implemented today, facing the upholding of human rights at its centre; although much has been spoken about it in the introduction of the bill. In the case of this bill, human rights issues are not considered at all, in contrast with Australia’s recent consideration of how human rights could fit within its own autonomous sanctions regime. In addition to this, the bill’s focus on the Asia-Pacific region is likely too narrow. The effect of these oversights is that sanctions could not be levelled to respond to severe human rights abuses if they did not constitute a threat to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The bill also fails to cover some emerging risks, such as threats to cyber-security. These omissions highlight the importance of taking the time to get this issue right, also to discuss with the public what the impact of an autonomous sanction regime would have.

As mentioned earlier, as part of a values-based approach to foreign policy, it is incumbent on the Government to consider what more it can do to support the upholding of human rights around the world. This work will include what role an autonomous sanctions regime could play within this framework. So I’m not ruling it out; it is just that the bill falls short of expectations on that front. I look forward to having more of a say on this as we continue the Government’s process. However, we continue to favour multilateral collaboration and adherence to well-established rules and norms, whether this be in an economic, health, or humanitarian context; hence the particular need for security when a framework of unilateral action is proposed.

Again, while much of Mr Brownlee’s submission to propose this particular bill focuses on human rights, that premise is not as clearly stated at the heart and purpose of this particular bill. The bill falls short and fails to stand up to that level of scrutiny, and is why we won’t be supporting it to first reading.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. First of all, I rise to acknowledge, I believe, one of the participants of the aforementioned podcast, Golriz Ghahraman, who, along with Auckland-based MPs, are doing their bit to keep us safe in level 3 up in Auckland. So I’m subbing in, coming off the bench, so to speak—just like Sonny Bill Williams, except I’m slower, shorter, and have no athletic ability at all. But, nevertheless, I was excited, initially, to pick up this bill: I thought it said the “Autonomous Sanctuaries Bill”, and I thought, “Well, that’s very anarcho-syndicalist.” It gave me nostalgia for the Paris Commune of 1871. But I am still learning to get the glasses-and-face-mask combo happening and so the glasses were a bit fogged up and, actually, it was the Autonomous Sanctions Bill.

This bill seeks to introduce a legal framework in New Zealand for the direct imposition of autonomous sanctions on foreign individuals, entities, assets, and services, which creates a way for New Zealand to impose sanctions against others without action from the United Nations Security Council. We live in a world where we need more collaboration and more cooperation from the issues of climate change, biodiversity loss, solving the questions of world poverty and war and conflict resolution, and how that is increasingly connected to the obscene accumulation of capital. For every occasion there is a meme, and as I was reading through this bill, one passed my horizon, and that meme went: “If you want to go fast, go alone, but if you want to go far, go together.”—if you want to go fast, go alone, but if you want to go far, go together. So, yes, we need to go fast, but with the plethora of so many issues, we need to go far and we need to arrive together. Me is a name I call myself, but far is a long, long way to run.

Unilateral actions undermine the global rule of law. Autonomous sanctions apparently seek to remedy deadlocks in the Security Council sanction regime by setting a precedent, with each country going off and applying sanctions by their own standards and political context. This would undermine both international law and cooperation at the global level. The bill makes an approach that is counter to standing up for fair, cooperative, transparent reform of international institutions based on the rule of law. Instead, it encourages a global landscape where each nation acts alone to exert its own political and moral interests.

The bill also misses the point that the Security Council is not the only way for Aotearoa New Zealand to contribute to a global rules-based order of sanctions. For example, many sanctions go through the UN General Assembly by consensus of States working together or regional bodies that bring together closely linked neighbour States based on existing sanctions law. Allowing the application of unilateral sanctions will still protect the powerful global actors, and while the bill may appear to be about applying international human rights and humanitarian law without the impediment of the political antics of the Security Council, it creates further risk of politicisation of sanctions rather than fairness and equity.

We know that sanctions are only likely to be applied against nations of the Global South, so the power structures of the Security Council are likely to be replicated there, with the US and China, as well as the nations they seek to protect, remaining exempt. This bill will demonstrate, unfortunately, an unwillingness to engage meaningfully in reforming those power dynamics within legitimate international institutions. We should instead play a role creating a connected and compassionate world where the global community works together to address issues including climate change, human rights, and public health by upholding the international rule of law and promoting peace and shared responsibility.

The world is going through a period of instability with the impacts of climate change, COVID-19, war, international inequality, mass displacement, pollution and biodiversity loss, among the many challenges. Lack of political resolve to combat these challenges leads to poor outcomes for people and the planet. The lack of resolve can only be countered with the politics of cooperation and collaboration. We need to position ourselves to take on an independent and principled position on global affairs by addressing current and historic global injustices, strengthening international law, and championing disarmament. We need to support a world that provides international mediation and conflict resolution and be grounded in principles of environmental protection and restoration equity, human rights, shared responsibility, and non-violence. So we will not be supporting this bill, unfortunately. Thank you, Madam Speaker.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. New Zealand is an independent nation with an independent values-based foreign policy which speaks volumes about what we stand for, what we care for, and why we want to work in our region, how we want to work in our region and beyond on issues that matter to us and to our like-minded partners.

The world is evolving, the world is changing, and we are facing considerable challenges posed by COVID-19 pandemics, geopolitical crises that are constantly shifting, and climate change, and the list goes on. To let our values-based policy go at this critical time is unwise. In fact, if we have to stick to it—this is the time to basically not to let it go but stick to it.

Since coming into Government, as the Hon Nanaia Mahuta said, we have addressed a lot of issues. One of those issues is modern slavery and counter-terrorism. We just had a bill a couple of days ago—in fact, yesterday—money-laundering, which is a big issue for all of us, and the Government has proudly dealt with this issue. So this is not the time to walk away from the way that we work traditionally and adopt a new system.

This bill disregards the human rights issue, even though the member has intended for this bill to address the human rights issue by imposing sanctions to international entities. We have seen this policy constantly causing issues and in fact, causing crisis. The United States and some other superpowers acted like an international police and it didn’t work. That is not what New Zealand stands for. It’s not like us and we don’t need it.

If we wanted to deal with international issues and the crisis, we’ve got our own tools, our diplomacy, which is effective. We have seen it in Afghanistan lately. When the crisis unfolded, we responded and things worked quite well, and our relationship with multilateral organisations works quite well. The United Nations, the Security Council, the International Criminal Court—these all work for us quite well so we don’t need this approach.

Countries that have adopted this bill, like Australia, have disregarded human rights. Then they realised that they made a mistake and now they are considering their ways, and they are working to adopt human rights back into it. This bill doesn’t include that.

To me, it’s quite simple why we oppose this bill. We oppose it because it disregards human rights abuse. It disregards and disrespects the multilateral organisations that we have a very good relationship with. It disregards our longstanding values-based approach on international politics. This bill does not provide for sanctions with respect to emerging areas of security risk such as cyber-security. This bill simply is not fit for purpose. In fact, it diminishes New Zealand’s place globally. Therefore, we cannot support this bill. On that note, I will just end it there and, because of the things that I have mentioned above, we don’t support this bill. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. It’s a pleasure to rise on behalf of the ACT Party to speak to the Autonomous Sanctions Bill and to support it at its first reading.

The ACT Party believes that our foreign policy should be to uphold the safety of all New Zealand citizens, but also to reflect our interests and our values. The ACT Party believes that the values of human rights, individual freedoms, and democratic liberties are of utmost importance. We take a lot of our liberties for granted, things like women’s rights, even being able to stand here in this Chamber; freedom of association, joining clubs and groups; being able to speak freely what is on our mind; and, importantly, to have freedom of religion, as well.

But we also recognise that we are a small trading nation, and for a lot of other countries, they don’t necessarily think of us as a big player, so it’s important for us to be part of a rules-based order. In order for us to maintain peace and security we need to work with other countries around the world to maintain rules that are fair and equal and provide peace and stability, not only for our country and our region but for the world. We do this mainly through diplomatic ties and advocating our values through those means, but also through trade liberalisation and signing free-trade agreements. We also do so through defence which, I note, is severely lacking when we’re not actually part of a new agreement with some of our strongest allies. But, mainly, we do this through the UN.

The Security Council has five main players, and, unfortunately, while it has been used in the past to maintain peace and security, we also note that, in some instances, the big players don’t seem to uphold peace and security within their own countries. Through veto powers, things don’t go as they should to have sanctions be put in place.

Now, the ACT Party is very proud that we brought a motion to Parliament earlier this year to condemn the severe human rights abuses that have occurred in the Xinjiang region of China against Uighurs and other ethnic minorities. But we also note that there was a gutless move from the Government to water down our motion, and I note, the Minister’s comments here today also sound gutless, talking about the fact that this bill doesn’t go far enough talking about human rights. Well, that’s absolutely obscene. If she has a problem with the bill, that is why you send it to select committee; if it doesn’t go far enough, send it to the select committee. Don’t go opposing this bill just because you might be scared.

We need to have a framework that sits outside what is the way that we sanction through the UN, and that is what this bill seeks to do. It puts in place a framework for us to do what is called an autonomous sanction, and I think that is really important, especially as we see today issues in Newsroom being announced about foreign interference in New Zealand’s media. It is time that New Zealand decided it was a sovereign nation. We shouldn’t shy away from the big problems; they will always be there, but we need new ways of upholding peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. Thank you, Madam Speaker.

Tēnā koe, Madam Speaker. Thank you. I rise to take a call on the Autonomous Sanctions Bill. Can I firstly congratulate the member. It seems to be today that it’s customary to acknowledge members who’ve had their bill drawn from the ballot, whether you’ve been here for a short time or something longer—

💬 Hon Gerry Brownlee: Leave it—just give me your vote.

—but I’ll acknowledge that it’s been drawn, none the less, to the member Mr Brownlee. What I would say is that Minister Mahuta has outlined a good position, and I intend to come back to that, but fundamentally this is an issue that is at the heart of our country’s foreign policy arrangements. And just in reflection on the comments and contributions from the ACT member who has just resumed her seat, Brooke van Velden, this is not a situation of being scared. It’s about what’s the right thing to do in a context that is always evolving.

The context really is around whether or not it’s appropriate to step outside or back from what are the current arrangements that are in place, and I guess it’s important, then, to take a look at what that current framework looks like. Fundamentally, it’s one that is significantly based on a United Nations one, and, actually, it reminds me of my days as a teacher. Perhaps, Mr Brownlee, as a former teacher, you’ll indulge me just a moment. I know that Mr—

💬 Hon Stuart Nash: He was a woodwork teacher.

Well, a teacher none the less—practical in nature, I guess, Mr Nash, and I know that Mr Tuiono always enjoys a commentary of history from me from time to time, as well. But it takes me back to where the option of choice was one of New Zealand’s search for security, 1945 through to 1985. A key part of that unit of work is really around the longstanding nature of New Zealand’s ties with the United Nations.

Members already this evening have commented on the different organs, whether it is around the Security Council, whether it’s the International Court of Justice, whether it’s around other UN roles in the Human Rights Council or the like. We have historically had a really strong connection to that organ. Actually, the member himself referred to us as a founding member. That indicates the strength there. And I guess it’s really that strength of connection that forces us to think about what actually would permit us to step outside of that current arrangement. I guess we could, but the question is, undoubtedly, should we, and, if so, what for?

The bill clearly has a focus on the Asia-Pacific region, and that is something that is important to all New Zealanders. The focus on Asia—the focus, for me, particularly on the Pacific region—is significant, and historically, we have had arrangements—whether it be a treaty of friendship with our Pacific neighbour, whether it’s around, you know, self-governing and free association, there are still options there, as well. What this bill seeks to do is indicate some amendments to the United Nations Act of 1946. Now, that is a significant piece of legislation in time. I’m not suggesting that we should not seek to amend legislation that is historical, but what I am suggesting is that there needs to be a really good reason as to why we would seek to do that.

I want to reflect on the contribution of my colleague Ibrahim Omer, because he makes a good point, actually: the fact that other countries that have explored this as an option or an approach have found somewhat the situation that there are some failures with it. As my colleague the Hon Nanaia Mahuta indicated, it’s about considering time and place, and also what the current context is all about. And so I do want to reflect on her comments, because it is about considerations in developing and maintaining an independent sense of a foreign policy outlook and what that looks like. This evening she talked about, as a nation, our focus, and as a Government, our focus on behalf of the people of New Zealand is on supporting that international rules-based order that gives all countries a voice—all countries, including ours.

And within that, we have a role to play. It’s around ensuring that there is stability, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, but beyond, as well, and, again, we have a role to play in that. It is, as she has said, about the safety of New Zealanders and what that looks like in an ever-changing context, currently and into the future. And, of course, it is about sustainability and the real pressures around climate change. So, as a country, New Zealand does exhaust our diplomatic tools in our tool kit, and at this stage, the view of members on this side of the House is that it’s not one to progress the member’s bill. And so on that basis, I won’t be supportive of it.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I rise today to take a call on the Autonomous Sanctions Bill before the House today. I want to start by acknowledging Mr Brownlee and for his bill, you know, being chosen from the ballot. I guess the most significant contribution from Mr Brownlee today was the conversation around his podcast, which I noticed is not in the top 100 political podcasts of New Zealand, but I have subscribed to it now.

Mr Brownlee, your bill proposes to establish a framework for implementation of international sanctions by New Zealand outside of the United Nations Security Council Chapter 7 framework. It is important to note, however, that—Mr Brownlee—it is wrong to assert that without this bill, New Zealand has absolutely no international control. Governments do have a significant area of tools that they can use to respond to security and human rights abuses, including diplomatic relations, statements, travel bans, as well as export controls and restrictions. But I do note that this Government and our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nanaia Mahuta, continue to work in this space as they consider what more they can do to support human rights around the world. Part of that work, as I understand, is to consider what role an autonomous sanction bill like this could play. But to me, there are three key differences or issues currently proposed by your bill. These three issues include a lack of in-depth consideration of human rights issues, a lack of consideration of emerging risks, and, more importantly, a lack of playing as a team member with other members of the United Nations.

Mr Brownlee, you gave some really good examples of human rights abuses across the world. You talked about Syria. You talked about Russia. Yet your well-meaning bill fails to mention any human rights in clause 8 of the bill, which lays out a threshold for implementing sanctions that you propose. Not only that, the human rights are considered nowhere else in this whole bill. The bill also does not provide for sanctions with respect to the emerging areas of security risk. We have recently seen, in the past few months, many cyber-attacks on some of our very important institutions in this country. This includes the NZX, the ANZ Bank, and, in my case, even our local Waikato Hospital in Hamilton. It is important that we consider these emerging risks when we are proposing a significant bill like this.

In addition to this, as a lot of my colleagues have mentioned, the problem here is that we are a member of the international community. It is important that we take into consideration our already existing diplomatic relationship within the framework of the United Nations, because to go outside it means many more countries will move away from this, and then you get to a point where nobody is following a consistent rule of law. I understand that Australia has a bill like this already in place, but it has the same issues that your bill faces. The main one it includes is around the human rights violation, which it doesn’t cover, but also some of the new security risks that I’ve mentioned, like the cyber-security issue. At the moment, the Australian Government is looking at amending their bill significantly to address these issues.

In the current form that your bill has been proposed to the House it would need to go through a significant amendment process in going through a select committee stage, which would mean that the final bill would look very different from what you are proposing. Looking at all of that, it makes more sense to restart a new bill, if you want to, which will address some of these important issues. Because if you’re talking about human rights issues in Syria, if you’re talking about human rights issues in Russia, if you’re talking about human rights issues in China, then you do need to address this in your bill. As I said, the clause 8, which specifically mentions the sanctions and the conditions required for it, doesn’t talk about human rights at all, and without it, the bill just completely fails.

So I would urge the member to consider some of these important things because of which he has obviously brought the bill to the House, including things like cyber-security, as I said, because that is the future of risk that we are talking about, which many of us will face from time to time. So I oppose the bill, just like many other members of the House, in moving forward. Thank you.

It’s a privilege to rise tonight in the House as the National Party’s associate spokesperson for defence and the member of Parliament for Southland to speak in support of the Hon Gerry Brownlee’s Autonomous Sanctions Bill. I congratulate the member for bringing this bill before the House.

There is no escaping the reality that we live in a complex geopolitical environment. It is imperative for us in this country to manage our economic and security interests in that increasingly complex environment. This bill aims to further enhance New Zealand’s diplomatic capabilities and our independent foreign policy, which the Government has very recently spoken about, by establishing a framework for the implementation of autonomous sanctions in New Zealand.

In recent days, we’ve heard a lot about New Zealand’s independent foreign policy, including from the Prime Minister, particularly in relation to our effective exclusion from the AUKUS trilateral security partnership. However, it is difficult to say that New Zealand has an independent foreign policy when we have extremely limited options in respect of placing sanctions on individuals who might be operating contrary to the best interests of this country. Currently, New Zealand must rely on the United Nations’ sanctions process, which imposes sanctions on countries through the Security Council. However, the UN, despite its strengths as a multilateral system, has some weaknesses in that it is reliant on the five permanent councils of the UN Security Council who can, and often do, exercise their veto power, and, in fact, often matters are not brought before the council because of those veto powers.

So our long history of independent foreign policy is, in effect, hampered by those veto powers. Of course, we would be very cautious in using these matters, taking care to consider the geopolitical scenario, and would only use them in extremely limited circumstances. But it’s important that we do have that tool available to us. Our Government should have the ability to make choices to sanction individuals in circumstances which are contrary to the best interests of our country and against our values and our system of Government, while minimising the consequential effect on the wider population. It is recognised that, in many cases, the practical impact of sanctions imposed by New Zealand would be limited by our comparatively small size and our geographic isolation, and the recognition of the fact that we are a small trading nation who is reliant on trade with many countries around the world.

Nevertheless, it is important that New Zealand can demonstrate its commitment to matters that are of concern to our people and our values. It’s important that New Zealand can emphasize the importance of our democracy, of commitment to human rights, the rule of law, and our fundamental freedoms. Aside from our traditional Five Eyes friends and partners who have adopted an autonomous sanctions regime, Japanese parliamentarians are also currently considering an autonomous sanctions regime of their own.

In 2017, in a regulatory impact statement on this bill, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade advised that New Zealand’s other Five Eyes partners all possessed the ability to impose sanctions outside of the United Nations regime, with a growing risk that New Zealand would be perceived as an easy target because of gaps in the range of sanction measures able to be imposed. The limited sanction type powers that are currently at the Government’s disposal are not seen either here or by like-minded partners as being sufficient to address situations of real concern, a perception which may have only increased in recent years. I note that our traditional allies—the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and Canada—all have their own regimes of this kind, and have the ability to impose targeted sanctions where appropriate.

The Hon Nanaia Mahuta raised the point of the rules-based international order and well established international rules and norms. Those are matters of great importance. She also noted that an autonomous sanctions regime would be a matter of last resort. I largely don’t disagree, or in fact, I don’t disagree with most of what she said. However, unfortunately, the Labour Government, by voting down this, removes the ability to have that last resort. In effect, the Hon Gerry Brownlee has passed the ball to Labour, and Labour, rather than carrying the ball forward and improving gaps they have identified, as they see it, in the legislation, have rather kicked the ball to touch, and that is deeply disappointing.

It is a great pleasure to rise and to speak in support of this bill, and unfortunately it will, obviously, be voted down by the Government. Let’s hope they see sense.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. It is traditional at this stage to congratulate the member whose bill was drawn from the ballot, but I want to go a little bit further. I mean, the irony of having been a recent foreign affairs Minister and to draw a bill from the ballot which is so close to the subject and the topics of that previous ministry must have brought much joy to the member when it was brought. He must have thought there was an irony in it. It’s the same joy, perhaps, of another bill being drawn out of the ballot by Sir David Carter when he drew the Electoral (Integrity Repeal) Amendment Bill, and then subsequently passed on to his colleague—now everyone’s ex-colleague—Nick Smith. Again, the eagerness in which they will have attacked that, because obviously it was topics near and dear to their hearts.

But this bill—and there’s a lot to like about it on first reading. However, like many members’ bills that come before this House, it’s very important that they be seen in their context, because what often happens—and we all, at different stages of our lives, often on our way here, have ended up having to deal with pieces of legislation. Sometimes they come back here for a fix because the full implications of the legislation we pass here, if the proper policy work is not done, and we don’t work through the real implications of it, and it is done in isolation—which, as I say, so often members’ bills, as they are now, do—then we end up with something that is not workable.

Now, this is an important issue, and it needs to be done properly. Multilateralism is something the world is lacking currently. If we have a look at the things that are bothering the world most at the moment—we’ll just have a look at Afghanistan, which was one of the more recent. OK, it was NATO that decided to go into Afghanistan, but it wasn’t UN sanctioned. I wouldn’t say it was quite a unilateral act, but certainly it wasn’t done with the sanction of the UN, nor subsequently was the invasion of Iraq. Both those things have left the world in a heck of a mess, and that, again, is why we really do need to be looking at multilateral response.

Even COVID—as I look across the House and see my masked colleagues, I can’t help but be reminded of this ever-present problem that is COVID. How much better would our response have been if we had been truly multilateral? But no, what we’ve done is each nation going into their shell, doing what is best for them, with little consideration for other nations. We saw today, news about how bad it is in Africa, how other nations are not working to ensure that we do get the remedy into Africa. Even our own selves, bilateralism certainly has enabled us to get our own COVID response up to where it needs to be, but a multilateral approach, which is really the antithesis of what we’re talking about here, would have been so much better for the world in which we exist.

So again, I’d say to the member who drew this, he will know from his previous role as a Minister of Foreign Affairs that to actually walk on the world globe, it is the multilateralism—the power and the strength of the multilateral approach—that enables New Zealand to be able to get to the table where it needs to be. And the trend that this bill epitomises, which is moving back towards each nation making its own decisions, each nation putting in its own sanctions, just weakens the response that we need as a world if we’re going to put it in a better shape than certainly it is now or we can expect it to be.

So what I’d say to the member is well done. As I say, there is a lot to like about the bill, but it’s something that really does have to be seen in the context of a desire and a need for a multilateral approach to the type of issues that it does seek to remedy, so I can’t support this bill.

It is an honour to stand and take a call on the Autonomous Sanctions Bill. I do it very respectfully, knowing the experience that you bring this bill to the House with as a former Minister of Foreign Affairs. I appreciate you were not the Minister of Foreign Affairs—self caught, Madam Speaker. So we really appreciate—other speakers have reflected on this—the intent behind this bill: the attempt to improve our ability to respond to issues of real concern on the international stage. But, unfortunately, this is the wrong solution to the problem. We welcome the debate. We welcome the expectation that these issues should be looked at carefully and thoughtfully because they are complex in an ever-moving environment.

We are living in a world of global uncertainty, the scale and pace of which we haven’t experienced before. We need to make sure that our kete, our tool kit, is nimble and effective. So that is why we welcome this debate, because it is really important that we make sure that our tool kit is a good one. Unfortunately, this doesn’t hit the mark. It is too narrow and it is short-sighted. The idea of attending to human rights abuses outside of the Asia-Pacific region is a missed opportunity. The idea of missing emerging areas such as cyber-security—and one thing that we have learnt is that issues like cyber-security remind us that our neighbourhood is not just those in the Asia-Pacific region or in the Waikato, but, actually, it is a global community with such issues. It is because of this pace and complexity of change that we have to make sure that anything that does get enhanced in our tool kit is able to be nimble and responsive.

So sending this bill to select committee will be insufficient because the changes that would be required, the intensely intricate policy work that needs to be done, would surely require changes to the bill that would sit outside of its scope. We are really pleased with the thinking that has gone into it. What we would hope is that experience and the challenges that have been brought to us with this bill mean that everybody across the House will pitch in and help to enhance the significant tools that we already have at our disposal, the significant international controls we already can utilise. We want to have a coherent approach that makes sure that we can respond to issues of real concern as they arise across the world. We’re futureproofed. We want to make sure that we can connect and enhance the tools that we already have and bilateral arrangements and multilateral tools.

We do have to come back to the classroom occasionally, some of us do remember those days. Many times over the years we’ve had model UN and, actually, World Trade Organisation debates in our senior classrooms, because it is really important for our young people to understand the significant connections and relationships that we have globally in order for us to participate in them. And very, very quickly—because, of course, you’d have to set up a rogue nation who would go off and do things on their own—you would find the students would very quickly understand the power of collaboration. That collaboration is so important, and we’re seeing it today in our response to COVID: a whole pile of different world views attending to problems. A whole pile of different voices attending to problems means we are more likely to be able to find real and lasting solutions that mean that we can attend to our absolute need for peace and security. We are really pleased that the issue has been raised, but we do not think that it attends or answers the questions, and these are the wrong solutions to the problems, and as such, I cannot be supporting this bill.

Can I start by thanking all members of the House for their contribution on this particular bill. Some of them I don’t agree with, obviously, but others have made pretty solid points. I want to just reflect for a moment on the speech by the Hon Nanaia Mahuta, in which she said that there is the prospect of the Government itself doing something more in the future. I think some of the breadth of what she indicated needs to be dealt with in terms of sanctions and New Zealand’s autonomous ability to raise sanctions was somewhat wide of the mark, because in this case I’m simply looking at a bill that will identify mainly individuals, mainly regimes, and mainly entities who offend against the laws of New Zealand and against our view of how the international community should behave. You know, there was the suggestion that we’ve passed anti-slavery law in this last Parliament, and that’s true—we have, and it’s a good thing. But let’s be very clear: there is no capacity in any law in New Zealand to go after an individual slaver. This bill would enable that to happen. We have a list of terror organisations. They are outlawed in New Zealand—can’t operate, can’t be here—but where is the law that lets us go after an individual terrorist? They don’t exist. So I think that there is an opportunity that’s lost here.

While the members have, I think, often referred to what their research notes might’ve said—that the bill is deficient in a number of ways, it would need a whole lot of work, a select committee would take too much time—it comes back to that statement that was pointed out by my colleague Joseph Mooney, the statement from Minister Mahuta where she said that sanctions like this or provisions like this should be a last resort. Well, doesn’t that imply, as Mr Mooney said, that there is no last resort at the moment? Doesn’t it, effectively, agree that if the United Nations isn’t on board with something that we find offensive, there’s nothing—no statement from New Zealand. And I gave that list to the House of where New Zealand has been, in my opinion, ominously silent.

Then there is the interesting comment, also from the Minister, that there are economic and trade considerations. Well, I would like to see those explained. I’d like to see why New Zealand’s foreign policy, its independent foreign policy, is constrained by economic and trade concerns. What does that mean? It means that the Government has made a conscious trade-off between making statements about things that we consider important as a nation and the dollars that come into this country. Now, that might make sense, but you can’t then say that, actually, we’re very good at getting alongside countries, very good at getting alongside individuals and using our vast range of diplomatic skills to negotiate through different problems, if there is no addressing of what the problem is.

I think there’s a bit of a head in the sand approach being taken by the analysis of this bill. If it was so wrong, but, as many of the speakers over there have said, good in other parts, why not adopt it as a Government bill? Doesn’t have to be in my name—could be in the name of the Government, could be rewritten by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT). They could’ve moved a little bit in their views since 2012—although, sometimes, I wonder if that’s the case. Or it could’ve been perhaps sent to a select committee and then referred back to the House. There’s a range of things that could’ve happened. So many members over there called for debate, but then tonight this’ll be shut, and I’ll bet, Madam Chair—

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Hon Jacqui Dean): Order! Order! Madam Speaker.

—that we do not, Madam Speaker—Madam Speaker—see another bill of this type from the Government in this term of Parliament.

There’s a timidness about this Government, and if it was ever on display and demonstrated as a view held by partner countries that we have had such long associations with, it was the absolute sidelining of New Zealand through the AUKUS arrangement that’s been put in place just recently.

💬 Hon Member: Oh, come on! Come on!

Now, there they go over there. They say, “Oh, come on!” We know—we know—that directly from MFAT the Prime Minister got called an hour before the public announcement, after the Australian, UK, and US media had all been told about it.

💬 Hon Member: That member knows better than this.

That’s how good a friend we are. That’s how valuable we are. The junior Minister over there thinks he knows what’s going on at the seventh floor; he simply doesn’t. It is indicative of just how far we have slipped in international standing, and this defeat tonight won’t help it.