Abortion Legislation Bill

I stand to talk about my Supplementary Order Paper 463. I want to talk about the value of children and what they mean to all families in New Zealand—to grandparents, to aunts and uncles, to brothers and sisters—and I want to talk about the value that children have had and where this Government has been sitting over the rights of children.

My Supplementary Order Paper looks at children accessing abortion, and that is in section 38 of the Care of Children Act 2004. What my Supplementary Order Paper does is insert, after Subpart 3, Subpart 3A to seek to amend the Care of Children Act 2004—to actually have that whole section repealed so that children cannot go off and have an abortion without their parents, their caregiver, or their guardian knowing about it, and so that children and medical specialists have to gain permission from the parents or the guardians of that child to access an abortion. Currently, in the Care of Children Act 2004, in section 38, it is very clear in that children can access abortion, and that is abortion right up to the birth of a child. This is not good legislation.

If this abortion bill is to go ahead, then we need to make sure that we protect our children so that they cannot—cannot—just bowl on up to an abortion clinic and have an abortion. I also want to talk a little bit more in general about children and mothers who may access an abortion because their child has been diagnosed with Down syndrome. Our emails have been flooded with people that are very concerned that this bill will actually end the lives of those unborn children.

This Abortion Legislation Bill is a very bad bill. It is bad because it is committing the unborn child to death and the unborn child has no right of reply. This bill is also allowing children to go off and have an abortion right up to the birth date of their unborn child, without the parents’ knowing about it. How horrified I would be if I had a daughter that went off and had an abortion of my mokopuna that I didn’t even know that she was carrying. How shocking would that be to my whānau, how shocking would that be to her brothers and sisters if I had a daughter? I have sons, and they have partners and wives, and those women would not dare to access this service. So I want to ask this House, I want to ask the Government: do you really care for children? Do you really care for the unborn child? Because, with the way that this bill is written, they do not.

As I said in my first speech in Part 1, and also in the first reading, we as Māori—we love our mokopuna. They are our future. This bill, effectively, ends their life before they even get a life, and that’s why, in my SOP 463, I’m asking that people support, after Subpart 3, new clause 16A, the “Amendment of the Care of Children Act 2004”—that’s by repealing it. They, in new clause 16B, repeal section 38—consent to abortion for children. Let the parents know this. As a parent, I would be devastated, and I know there will be a number of parents out there. This is a bill that, effectively, ends the life, as I have said over and over again in this House, and I cannot say it more. And my colleagues that are against this bill, as I am, will also get up and speak around not supporting this abortion legislation. Let this particular SOP go through. Let’s protect our children.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I rise and take a call on my Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) in Part 2: SOP 470. Before I do, I want to acknowledge that it is an emotive subject that many people in our community have been emailing, talking to us—people have been saying karakias and prayers. I want to acknowledge the fact that I was gifted this: this is a model of a 20-week-old fetus. It is to remind us of what we are actually debating about.

I also want to acknowledge from Louise Kapene Green, where she gave a korowai, and this korowai is to acknowledge our pēpēs, our young babies, and the importance of what we are doing in this House. We talk about the vulnerability and the frailty of our children, so I’ve brought this into the committee on their behalf to remind us what it is that we are doing in this Chamber. On that note, this SOP is about safety and concern.

In this Chamber, many have actually talked about that the bills and the legislation we put through this House should ensure the safety and wellbeing of our community and of our people. If that is so—if that is a principle that many members of this House have followed and adhered to and claim to believe in—then I believe that this SOP is something that they should consider. I know there to be many members who have given their proxy votes over and have allowed the whim and the will of whoever that proxy’s given to. May I plead and implore those members in this committee to look at SOP 470?

“This Supplementary Order Paper amends the Abortion Legislation Bill by inserting new clauses 16A and 16B, which give the Health and Disability Commissioner a mandate to investigate contraventions of the regulations that govern the provision of abortion services under the Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977 and the Crimes Act 1961. Simply put, this ensures that health practitioners are held to account in relation to their duties under this Bill. Without a means by which infractions of regulations related to abortions can be investigated, the regulations have no power to protect women and ensure that abortion is administered in a safe and appropriate way.” Can I repeat that: “in a safe and appropriate way.” This may, for example, mean that a medical practitioner did not adhere to those restrictions imposed by the test for post - 20 week abortions.

I want to read from the Law Commission, who state this: “ ‘Without an enforcement mechanism, there may be less incentive for health practitioners to give proper consideration to the test’. For the Bill to be meaningful in practice, it must include a specific power of enforcement. This must include the power to review a health practitioner’s actions in the administration of abortion. The explanatory note of this Bill highlights that the changes to the status quo ‘will mean that abortion is, in general, provided like other health services’, and that would mean there would exist ‘avenues for health consumers to make complaints about their care and for complaints to be independently assessed by the Health and Disability Commissioner’.”—from their submission. “The Health and Disability Commissioner is already well equipped to review the actions of … health practitioner[s] for breaches of the Code of Health and Disability Services [under the] Consumers’ Rights.”

I put it to the Minister in the chair, the Hon Andrew Little: would he consider this as a precaution, again, from the Law Commission in which he commissioned the scope of the bill to ensure the safety and concern? This was purely from that perspective. Irrespective of how we vote in the Chamber, I genuinely want to put this inside the committee and to the Minister: would he consider this as a precaution to ensure that? How will we hold them to account? How will we ensure that the services that are offered to women in regards to the abortion—and we’ve talked about the trauma, at times, that they would go through. What happens in the case where there is not only a legal but a breach of that convention to provide the best care possible and, in this case, a traumatic incident?

I would say to the Minister that he should consider this SOP as being appropriate. I would say to the members of this committee, even those that are not here: again, irrespective of how you vote, will you consider this SOP for a safety reason? “The Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 is drafted in such a way that the [Commission] ‘may’ investigate, but is at no stage required to pursue an investigation. Such a distinction ensures that the Commissioner is not required to investigate spurious claims.” I believe that this is a well-considered, well-constructed, appropriate SOP that I would like to put on to the Table for the Minister to consider, but also, more importantly, for the members of the committee to consider this as an appropriate safety measure.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I wish to speak to the excellent Supplementary Order Paper 479 in the name of my colleague Melissa Lee. This Supplementary Order Paper does a number of very important things. First, let me start, however, by explaining that it relates to a person, as defined in this Supplementary Order Paper, who commits an offence if they do certain things in providing abortion services. For the sake of clarity, let me spell out for this committee: the thrust of this amendment in the name of my colleague Melissa Lee is around conduct that is unconscionable by the doctor, essentially, or other health professional, as distinct from the woman who is seeking an abortion.

It highlights the founding fiction of this proposed law change overall that it is about removing the decriminalisation of women seeking abortion services when it is understood and noted that there has never been a single criminal offence prosecuted under the Act successfully in relation to the woman seeking the services, as distinct from the doctor or the health professional conducting them. That is my first point. My second is that we are talking about a situation of disability or possible disability of the unborn child. The precautionary principle is appropriate in matters of life and death. We do not always know as a matter of factual certainty whether a child is disabled or may only possibly be disabled, and so it’s appropriate that I acknowledge the drafting by Melissa Lee in relation to the “abnormality”, as it might be described—but “disability” in the most straightforward terms—as reflecting the fact of possible disability being the basis under the law as introduced to this House without any such test at this stage.

My next point is that it relates to the status of the unborn child in a similar way that SOP 475 of Parmjeet Parmar does. Dr Parmar stated in an earlier part of the bill that in her preference it would be that sex selection, or gender selection, as it’s also known, would be a practice that was explicitly outlawed in New Zealand, namely that—and I relate it to this current proposal on a similar philosophical basis—the personal characteristics, or the demographic characteristics, if you will, of the unborn child should not be determinative of her right to continue to be able to live.

There is a symbolic element, as well. We are not only talking about the ground of disability under the Human Rights Act 1993 as a basis for discrimination but also, in the way that Ms Lee has drafted her proposal, it would be outlawed to make an offence the abortion of any unborn child—and I use that phrase as it is used in the legislation—on any of the prohibited grounds of discrimination set out in section 21 of the Human Rights Act 1993. Those would be such as would apply to the unborn child if they had become a human being. So what we see there is an acknowledgment of the humanity of the unborn child and, therefore, the appropriateness that the Human Rights Act should apply, clearly, in that case. Any members of this committee and anyone who is watching this debate should, surely, realise that the prohibition in the Human Rights Act against discrimination is precisely what this proposal and, again, that of Dr Parmar were directed to seek to avoid. It is that discrimination with which we must concern ourselves and turn our attention to.

The next point that I would like to make is that the formulation of the amendment by Ms Lee explicitly sets out the underlying tension between leaving in the Crimes Act the offence of killing an unborn child—and I use that phrase deliberately and precisely. It could be with quote marks and, indeed, it is a precise quote from a particular section of the Crimes Act. That will remain in force, unaffected by the legislation as introduced by the Minister of Justice.

The tension is this. I acknowledge the characterisation of the unborn child by Melissa Lee, and she also goes on to talk about the applicability of the Human Rights Act if that unborn child would go on to “become a human being”. So what we have here, highlighted by Melissa Lee’s SOP 479, is a situation where we’re talking about a potential scenario according to the legal fiction that seems to be holding sway in this case that we can have an unborn child who is not a human being. Indeed, we can have a child who is not a human being, which in semantic terms is an absurdity. It’s a logical absurdity that you could have a child being a subset of a human being described as not yet a human being on the basis of a legal fiction that she is not yet at that point able to be described as such.

For that reason, I feel strongly that other members of this House, whatever their views might be on the legislation overall, should acknowledge and take heed of the words of another colleague and friend, Agnes Loheni, when she said she was simply looking for a semblance of recognition of some kind of balance and acknowledgment of the status—some sort of recognition of the human rights status of the unborn child. Of course, as reflected in this SOP and in the others that she was referring to, the legal status should match the scientific reality, or the physical reality, indeed, that we have an independent entity inside an adult human being—ordinarily an adult, or at least one who is older than the unborn child, of course—who is pregnant, that person who is pregnant. We have an acknowledgment of the independent movement and the fact that in 50 percent of the time, roughly speaking, the unborn child would have the opposite gender from his or her mother and has unique DNA and so forth, not to mention a heartbeat that beats out of time with that of his or her mother, indicating clearly that with that, along with the brain development function, we have indeed what is, in fact, a human being, as quite rightly described at least in passing by the SOP. But the SOP, sadly, is forced to acknowledge the legal fiction that an unborn child is not a human being. For that reason alone, I think it is symbolically important that this committee should pass this Supplementary Order Paper.

Two more points before I relinquish this opportunity to continue speaking on this SOP: the first is that the proposal is actually, I believe, stated in very reasonable and measured terms. It includes in the section that Melissa Lee is proposing be included an acknowledgment of a scenario where an unborn child may be affected by a condition that is likely to lead to her death either before birth or within 28 days thereof. That’s an acknowledgment that the underlying intention is to preserve life. It is not proposed in a mindless fashion or oblivious to the fact that many difficult scenarios do arise, but nevertheless, that is a situation that should be taken into account in the context overall of the fact that we should not discriminate against our most vulnerable citizens most of all.

Finally, I just wanted to note the context of the debate in relation to this SOP around the concept of the wanted child. We’ve heard a lot about the status of a child being either wanted or unwanted—their very life depends upon it, it seems. That much is so in the structure of the law as interpreted by the Government sponsoring the bill, stating that the significance of the 20-week threshold at which one regime applies and the other becomes non-applicable, and vice versa—it is said that at 20 weeks a decision has effectively been made that a child is wanted. It might be that a case is determined in such a bright-line fashion, but I doubt it. But the bigger point, surely, is that human life should not be determined in relation to it being wanted or not by other human beings. We have, sadly, far too many examples in this country of human life not valued by others, and therefore the law being taken into the hands of those who do not value it. For the law to perpetuate the idea that there is such a thing as a wanted child who has value and an unwanted child who does not is a very sad thing, to say the least.

My final comment is to acknowledge the wonderful correspondence that many of us have received from the group Downright Discrimination, specifically advocating for the Down syndrome community in this country. Please know that your thoughts are understood, acknowledged, and, in this Supplementary Order Paper of Melissa Lee, recognised. I very much hope we can pass this for you today.

Tēnā koe, Mr Chair. Tēnā koutou katoa. Can I also say, “Lá Fhéile Pádraig Shona Daoibh”, which means Happy Saint Patrick’s Day, everybody. It’s appropriate, in a way, that I begin there, because I actually want to speak to Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 292, in the name of Darroch Ball. That SOP essentially wants, if this bill is successful within the context of this Parliament, to force a referendum.

The reason that I say it’s appropriate that I’m dressed in green and that we’re talking about the Irish is because the fundamental question I think we all have to ask each other is: do we need a referendum to pass this bill? The answer, quite clearly, is no. The reason Ireland had to go down the referendum pathway was because they had to repeal the eighth amendment, which was part of their constitution. That was the only way that they could get abortion law reform in Ireland. We are not in that situation; so do we need a referendum to approve of this bill? The answer is no.

But what I did want to highlight was that what they repealed, in fact, in Ireland, was that the life of the unborn fetus had the same value as that of its mother. That was in the context of a woman who was pregnant who needed an abortion, and she had to endure several days in hospital. They actually didn’t help her. The fetus was unviable, but its heart was still beating and, in fact, this particular woman died. That’s what created the opportunity for abortion law reform in Ireland.

So I think, fundamentally, we have to think about that, because the pros and cons of having a referendum actually provides what the academics call an opportunity for false actors. These false actors then perpetrate misinformation and disinformation, and they misrepresent these positions to the general public. It is, in fact, like the issue that I’ve received emails about, in terms of aborting Down syndrome children up until the 40th week, and people saying, for example, that we’re going to be aborting babies that are ready to be born. That is not true.

The reality of the testing regime in New Zealand—and I’ve looked at the 2016 monitoring report on antenatal screening, which includes trisomy-21 and other conditions. Eighty-one percent of people who get pregnant in New Zealand actually choose to have these screenings. We provide them as the State from the 14th week and then the 20th week, which provides parents with information about whether or not there is something wrong with their child. Do they have these abnormalities? So we provide this tool so that parents can make an informed decision.

I use it as an example because we’ve all received this propaganda saying that we’re going to abort children with Down syndrome. But the reality is that 50 to 80 children with Down syndrome are born every year—50 to 80. So we are not aborting all children with Down syndrome. In fact, if you go online to the Health Navigator, we have the New Zealand Down Syndrome Association, we have the Health and Disability Commissioner, and we have IHC New Zealand who are there to support and provide information to parents who, in spite of the screen, want to continue to have their child, and they will support and love their children—as I mentioned last week, with Barry and Colleen Brown and their 40-year-son, Travers. So the disinformation out there that all children with Down syndrome are going to be aborted is incorrect—is absolutely incorrect. At the end of the day, it’s the choice of the parents. I would have thought, as a fundamental principle, this Parliament would reinforce that.

The other thing it does is it creates divisions. That’s what referendums do: they create divisions, create divisions between the people who are for it—well, I certainly am, as a woman—a lot of women’s groups, the National Council of Women, and those who believe in bodily autonomy as a human rights condition: that it’s my body, it’s my choice. Who are we up against in this debate? You see a lot of them have been the churches and the church leaders, and we’ve all started to receive correspondence from our churches and church leaders—[Time expired]

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’m going to have to take umbrage with a couple of things. Bodily autonomy applies to the child; what’s being aborted is a human child. I’d also want to point out, because it’s the language of progressives, something called “unconscious bias”. The speaker who I respect personally, who just took her seat, said that there’s something wrong with the child, referring to Down syndrome—that there’s something wrong. I want to say to all those Down syndrome children that I know—I’m thinking of Oscar, and hello to Pip and Dean, his parents, who were on The Project last week—there’s nothing wrong with that child; he is an absolutely celebrated gift. I’m not going to stand in this Chamber and continue to have people—and it’s more than just the last speaker—continue to dehumanise the human child. I have said it before: we have done this so many times in our history of humanity—the first step is to dehumanise, and then the terrible actions follow.

I also think that we need to point out—and why we’re dealing in Part 2 of how we deal with discrimination—is a story that was sent to me by a guy called Jeremy. His daughter, who they managed to hold alive for seven days, had chromosomal problems. His key point was that all the way up to 20 weeks, in particular, there was pressure from the doctors to abort. They had done the tests—and yes, you know, those of us who, I suppose, want to practise between naivety and ignorance, will say, “Oh, well, we’ll just make our choices.”, but here are the doctors putting pressure on Jeremy and his wife to abort the baby. His fundamental argument is that, actually, they decided—they made the choice—to allow that child to be born. It was only for seven days—only for seven days. They say they were absolutely wonderful days, and I can appreciate that. But their fundamental point is that if we don’t pass the likes of Melissa Lee’s Supplementary Order Paper (SOP), that pressure will continue. So putting it really simply to the Chamber that post - 20 weeks, the doctors who do the testing will continue—and it could be the nurses and other health practitioners—to put pressure down on those parents. It’s that naivety, again, of this choice argument—this ethical argument in a cuckoo nest, which pushes out every other ethical considerations—that human beings always act calmly and rationally with full information. We don’t, OK? We’re terribly flawed individuals who make very, very stupid decisions all the time.

So that’s a real story from Jeremy and his family. The pressure will continue. The discrimination will continue. It will continue for the simple reason, as we’ve already heard in the discussion today, there is something wrong with these people—there is nothing wrong with them. If we listen to disability advocates, they have to suffer every day in a community that, I would argue, fears them and fears their disability. I, for one, want that community to know that I don’t fear them; I celebrate them and I see them as just as human as I am.

I also want to note the importance of a number of these Supplementary Order Papers to Part 2 because they’re putting some restrictions around what’s happening. Why we need to put these restrictions in is that we get laws wrong. I would just point out that we’ve had yet another attempt today, and it’s been cocked up, to bring safe zones back into this bill. Yet another botched attempt to bring safe zones back in—stuffed up as it was last week; stuffed up again today. These things happen because of bad law and bad processes.

💬 Jan Logie: You’re making things up, mate.

So, really—and once again, I think it must be Jan Logie who’s making things up; no, it’s quite real—we’ve had another stuff-up today. Well, a stuff-up from those who want to put in safe zones, who want to attack freedom of speech, freedom of conscience. But why I’m illustrating this is that that is the reason we need to have the likes of Alfred Ngaro’s amendment and why we need the likes of Simeon Brown’s amendment: MPs make mistakes—they continually make mistakes.

Looking through the bill—particularly in Part 2—I think we just need to draw attention, and Chris Penk articulated this far, far better around, sort of, one of the false premises of this bill, in replacement section 183(2), inserted by clause 12, which says, “The woman is not guilty of an offence under this section.” Well, that’s good to know, but why it needs to be highlighted is that the current law in New Zealand has not, never has, never could, and never would criminalise women. It’s one of the great falsities. I need to point it out again that our media has been absolutely complicit in pushing these falsities.

I want to draw particular attention, if I might, to Supplementary Order Paper 463, in the name of Joanne Hayes. Hers is referring to an amendment to insert a new Subpart 3A, which is around the amendment to the Care of Children Act 2004. In support of this SOP, I want to note that it’s particularly for children—[Bell rung] Mr Chair?

CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Simon O’Connor.

Thank you very much. What Joanne Hayes is trying to do is give a little bit of surety to those who are minors that their parents need to be informed about an abortion. Now, for pro-death and pro-abortion advocates, this is verboten, we can’t go there, which is remarkable because, as a stepparent myself, basically, nobody can give even a Panadol or a piece of advice or even a hug to any of my stepkids, but they—well, not all of them; some of them are boys, just for Jan Logie’s sake there—the girls would be whipped out to an abortion clinic just like that under this current legislation; no reference to the parents, caregivers; nobody. But, as I say, if the school that my—well, no, she’s left now—stepdaughter attended wanted to give her a Panadol, there would be phone calls, there would be lines of communication; it wouldn’t end. Now, look, that’s fundamentally—fundamentally—flawed and absolutely ridiculous.

I’ve said recently, around anything like this, it’s all about consistency. One of the ways that you can always find out if a bill is flawed—and I would suggest this one is, legally, but also morally and ethically—is there is no consistency. So, again, I just find it absurd. I mean, again, a teacher can’t even give a child a hug but they can take them by the hand and lead them to an abortion clinic.

One only needs to think of the story of Hillary Kieft—I know the Abortion Legislation Committee dealt with that last year—a woman who had wondered why her daughter was so incredibly depressed and suicidal; in fact, there may have been suicide attempts. The only way she found out was after imploring her daughter and finding out that her daughter had been taken for an abortion. No one knew. The daughter was struggling with it. The mum had no idea, none of the wider whānau support crew knew until that ultimate cry for help, which is suicide. I do wonder—and it’s a pure speculation—how many of our young people end their lives and we never know the cause and the decisions that they’ve made where, actually, we as a community, and certainly as family, would have thrown love and support around that person.

I want to turn my attention now to SOP 479. I’m not going to say too much on it, because she herself is awesome: Melissa Lee, she’ll talk to it. But, of course, there should be grounds to stop discrimination. Good God, I almost get bored out of my brain at the amount of times, particularly from the progressive side of the Parliament, but, sadly, it includes some in the National Party, who wax lyrical about discrimination and tolerance and diversity—all good notions—and yet aren’t actually prepared to stop discrimination here. There are wet bus ticket words—“Oh, we really shouldn’t do sex selection.”—well, put it in firmly in the bill: this country, this Parliament does not stand for it.

We should also add that in terms of disability. Some people have, you know, again, talked about, “Well, we still might have some Down syndrome people killed.”; again, I just ask the Minister in the chair, Andrew Little, if he’s prepared to address the question that I put out last week that in the likes of Iceland, for those people who take testing, how many of those Down syndrome kids live? The answer is really, really low. [Phone vibrates] Oh, hold on! This might be Iceland calling now—I doubt it, because they know the answer’s pretty shocking, as well. So it’s really, really shocking.

I do, like Chris Penk, want to do an absolute shout-out to the likes of Downright Discrimination. You guys are awesome, continuing to voice for your community; it’s an absolute shocker and a shame how you are derided by bigoted people in this House. You have the right to put forward your information, you have the right to stand by your information, and you should not—and will never be from people like myself and others who are pro-life—be derided for having a view which is inconvenient, because, at the end of the day, we celebrate your children.

So then let’s turn our attention to Alfred Ngaro’s SOP to finish it—another awesome guy. I think it’s really great that he brought the 20-week-old image out. That’s what we’re dealing with. I understand, actually, that some in the media, so scared of this topic, have actually banned—would you believe it?—images of children at different stages of development. What is so scary to this House and the media, particularly those, I believe, in The Dominion Post—let’s put that on the record again for people who subscribe: The Dominion Post—about a child? Unbelievable. It’s an absolute disgrace and borders on corruption. Anyway, Alfred Ngaro, who’s definitely not corrupt—a good man—he just wants that the commissioner may have the power to investigate the breaches. If you’re going to have a piece of legislation that things shouldn’t happen in a certain way, well, you need the power to follow them up; it’s nonsensical, I would suggest, to not have this power.

So, look, I’m going to end it there. I’m grateful for two calls. I think the Chamber might just get the sense that I’m a little passionate about this. But, as I say in a video that I released a littler earlier today—here’s a bit of self-glorification; doesn’t do one great for their humility—actually, if we’re about human rights, it applies to all, including the unborn child.

Order! Before I call the Minister, can I ask members of the public in the gallery—this debate is for members of Parliament. They are the only ones that can contribute to this debate. Applause from the gallery is not permitted, actually, and so I’m going to ask members of the public to observe that rule, and I call the Hon Andrew Little.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I take this opportunity just to respond to some of the points raised in debate so far. Again, as I have previously, I acknowledge this is an issue that is very sensitive to many members and there are members who are participating in this debate who would rather we were abolishing abortion. That is not what this bill is about, and that debate was lost and won—or, in fact, lost—in 1977. We are not having the 1977 debate again. We are talking about taking the 1977 legislation and making it relevant to New Zealand in the 21st century. That’s what this debate is about. And it doesn’t help, I think, for the reputation of this House, for those, no matter how passionate, like the member Simon O’Connor, to be making assertions and statements that are simply out of step not only with the bill but actually with the current legislation. It does help the debate when we accurately reflect what the current law is, so that we understand what the changes are that are being made, and it’s in that spirit I want to respond to some of the points made.

Now, I know that the member Joanne Hayes is deeply opposed to abortion. She made that very clear and, therefore, I’m not quite sure how helpful some of her argument was. But, in terms of repealing section 38 of the Care of Children Act and not allowing medical practitioners to make the judgment about whether the person in front of them has the capacity to consent to a procedure, that would be taking a giant step back. And here’s the problem for Mr O’Connor and Ms Hayes: that is a provision that protects a young woman, even a woman who is under age, from having to get the support of a parent, particularly if the parent, particularly the father of the daughter, is the father of the pregnancy—because that is the reality.

A young under-age woman should not be forced into the position of having to get the consent of the person who may well be the father of the child if that father of the child is also father of the young woman. That’s the situation that Mr O’Connor and Ms Hayes will be putting a young woman in. Now, I know Mr O’Connor used the dramatic language of those who support “death and murder”, but I wouldn’t want to be a member who supports incest and affords no protection to a young under-age woman for being able to get a medical procedure to protect her from that, because that’s the position that Mr O’Connor is putting himself in.

So that provision, that section 38, is absolutely vital to ensure that that young woman who has capacity can, with the help of the medical practitioner she is talking to, make that decision, and it is often a difficult decision. The reality is most young women in that position will have some sort of family or parental support, but that cannot be guaranteed and we should not be putting young people in that position, which would simply amount to further abuse of that person.

I now turn to Alfred Ngaro’s Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 470. I know Alfred Ngaro. I consider myself a political friend of Alfred Ngaro’s. He holds his political faith deeply to him and he articulates his faith well, pretty much every time he speaks in Parliament. That’s one of the things I admire about Alfred Ngaro. I understand what he wants to achieve with his SOP, which is the obvious, which is that if there is abuse by a medical practitioner of their rights and powers in terms of advice or not giving the right advice or not doing the right things to a woman seeking an abortion there should be not only an investigation but a follow-up.

But I say to Alfred Ngaro that actually is already contained in the legislation that covers the Health and Disability Commissioner. The Health and Disability Commissioner already has the power to do that, and the references that he made to the Law Commission report were about saying there needs to be an enforceability of this. Medical practitioners are governed by their professional and their ethical standards and all those rules and guidelines they are bound to as professionals, and that is why we have the Health and Disability Commissioner—not only to apply the letter of the law but to ensure that medical and health practitioners are following their professional and moral obligations as well. So that is already provided for, and I think the problem with SOP 470 is it simply replicates what is already there, and it’s for that reason that I don’t support it.

I turn to the comments by the member Chris Penk, who argued in favour of SOP 479 about criminalising abortion. The reality is the starting point for abortion is that it is a crime. It is a defence to the crime that you’ve had an abortion consistently with the Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act. That is the legal structure of abortion in New Zealand. That is why this legislation seeks to take abortion out of a criminal framework and to make it a matter for the health system, for health or medical practitioners, and the women who seek the support and assistance and consultation at a time when they are faced with making that decision. That is why that provision, the new section 183, is there. As I said, as I argued when the House was last in committee debating this, I don’t go with us legislating for health standards and putting obligations on health practitioners that are already provided for in their professional practice, in their articulated professional obligations, and the things that their various colleges put out for them and require them to abide by and comply with, because that is the basis of complaints not only to the profession themselves but to the Health and Disability Commissioner as well.

Turning to Louisa Wall’s comments, I agree with Louisa Wall that this is not legislation that, in my view, meets the test of the need for a referendum. We already have referendums in relation to end of life choice, because we don’t have any legal framework. We never have had a legal framework for that, and that is a huge step in terms of social policy to make and it is right that that should be subject to a referendum. Likewise with legalising cannabis: we haven’t had legalised cannabis—or it’s been absolutely prohibited since 1965; it’s had partial prohibition since 1927. So legalising it is a huge step in terms of social policy. It is a matter on which the electorate ought to have the opportunity to express a view, and so they will have the opportunity to do that.

We have a framework for abortions right now—have had since 1977—and although the number of abortions each year has been declining, there are roughly around 13,000 abortions carried out each year. That is already happening. What we are talking about is the framework under which women will be allowed to make that decision and seek advice and seek support and under which abortions will take place, but we already have a provision for that. This is nothing new; there is no giant leap in terms of social policy, and therefore, in my view, it does not justify a referendum.

In relation to other comments by Mr O’Connor—and I know he argues that we are dehumanising the child. We are not; abortion is not about, you know, killing children. It is about women who, early in their pregnancy, make a decision they don’t want the pregnancy and seek medical assistance accordingly. Women do not, halfway through pregnancy, decide on a whim they no longer want the pregnancy. No one can ever point to a situation where that has happened. That is not how it is, and we do great disrespect, and members in the public gallery do as well, to women in this country if they think that women in this country kind of just at random and spontaneously partway through a pregnancy—20 weeks, 30 weeks, or, as some have argued, at birth—decide they’re going to terminate the pregnancy. That doesn’t happen. It is a ridiculous assertion to make. It is an insult to the women of New Zealand, and I just hope that people might stop saying it. It doesn’t help—people can put all sorts of photos and images up. That does not reflect the reality of the issue we are dealing with. It is simply false to say so, and those images are just plainly ridiculous.

I go back to the point I made before: Simon O’Connor was concerned about doctors putting pressure on parents. Now, this might be a matter of perception, because I think—in fact, all the evidence I have, and at my age I’ve consulted a few medical practitioners—they have an obligation to be, and in my experience New Zealand health practitioners are very good at being, very realistic to people about the medical condition that they’re facing, and what might to some at a very sensitive, vulnerable moment look like pressure might actually just be some blunt advice about “This is the reality of the situation you’re facing. Your health interests are compromised.”—or it may be in some cases the health of the fetus is seriously compromised.

That is advice that a health practitioner should be giving to a pregnant woman and, where they’re involved, the pregnant woman’s partner or the father of the child. That is what a health practitioner should be doing, and it is possible that that could be seen as putting pressure on the parent. Good on those parents who went through with the pregnancy, had the birth, even though the child didn’t survive. I know many parents who’ve been through that experience. It is deeply emotional, and they are deeply vulnerable, and it doesn’t help for that to be paraded out as somehow some sort of mistake of the abortion legislation—because it’s not, and let’s be very clear about what we’re talking about in this bill.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I rise to make a contribution in this debate, Part 2 of the Abortion Legislation Bill, and I want to support Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 479 in the name of my colleague Melissa Lee. The intention of this SOP is to prevent disability discrimination by ensuring that a person who commits this offence is liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding seven years. The person does not commit an offence if the medical practitioner provides a certificate confirming the unborn child is affected by a condition that is likely to lead to the death of the unborn child either before or within 28 days of the birth. It’s also important to note that the woman is not guilty of an offence under this section.

This SOP is important because, as I have alluded to prior in this Chamber, section 11 of this bill—and I am talking about this bill because I notice that the Minister has spoken and has said that we are trying to debate abortion. The fact that some members in this House may have a view on abortion does not discount our view on this particular bill, which is liberalising the current laws. And I noticed the Minister has tried a number of times to say, “You members, you don’t like abortion. Actually, that’s what it’s about.” That is not what it’s about. I have been very clear in this committee, in talking about section 11, specifically the criteria, which is very broad, very vague, very loose. Because of that, it makes those pre-born babies, unborn babies, and I will say that—I will absolutely say that: they are unborn babies. I had six of them inside of me. I know what they are. That makes unborn babies with disabilities or other defects very, very vulnerable.

I noticed that the member Louisa has said that people aren’t aborting their babies with Down syndrome, and I would hope for that to be true. You were saying that under our current law, but it is now a different scenario with this bill that is in front of us, which is what we are debating, which we are saying to this House is a totally different picture now. It’s a totally different scenario. We’re kicking open that door post - 20 weeks. We are lowering the threshold, and it does make those families, those pre-born babies, very, very vulnerable.

They have reached out to us and asked us to advocate and to be their voice, and that’s what I’m here to do. So I ask this committee to consider and to support this SOP. And it is needed because of section 11. It is needed because my amendment to tighten up section 11 was not acceptable in this committee—absolutely not accepted. And yet we all want to talk about no discrimination—no discrimination for people with a disability. The disability community in New Zealand already feel vulnerable. They already feel like they are inferior. They already have challenges. And now we’re going to put in a law that makes them even less so because of how unborn babies with disabilities will be treated under this bill. They are very, very vulnerable.

I want to bring in, in my remaining time, one of the submissions. Again, I remind the House: there were 25,000 submissions in Opposition to this bill. Over 91 percent oppose this bill. This is just one of the many stories that came through, and this particular one is very relevant to this part. Philippa Barlow: her son, when she was pregnant, was diagnosed with hypoplastic left heart syndrome. She made a very powerful submission, and when she was in the surgery with her husband, there was intense pressure on her from the specialist to have an abortion. Even though they had made their case very strongly to specialists that abortion was not an option, there was immense pressure. And in fact, because it was post - 20 weeks, they suggested that she could fly to Australia to have an abortion. If that was the pressure for those families now, you can imagine the pressure there would be under this new bill. On a positive note, that baby, their son, is 13 years old today, and he is well adjusted. There are some things that he can’t do in terms of sport. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr Chair, and thank you for an opportunity to speak on the Abortion Legislation Bill in the committee stage. I do just want to start by acknowledging Louisa Wall for her consistency in regards to the issue of referendums, because she is consistent in her advocacy that issues like this should not be put out to a vote, and I acknowledge the fact that she also voted against our referendum on the End of Life Choice Bill. So I do just want to acknowledge you, Louisa Wall, and your contribution on that issue, and I do, in acknowledging her position, also acknowledge the inconsistency of many other colleagues in this House who view this issue and decided that they do not wish to put this to a referendum because they do not feel that this is the type of issue, for whatever reason—whereas the issue of a referendum on the End of Life Choice Bill was, of course, for political convenience.

CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Sorry to interrupt the member, but I should have pointed out when Louisa Wall was speaking—

Point of order.

CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): —I’m just making a ruling—that we will debate the referendum under clauses 1 and 2.

I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. Yes, I’m speaking to points not only raised by Louisa Wall but also by the Minister in the chair, the Hon Andrew Little, who actually spoke on that very topic. So I’m simply entering the debate, which I believe has already been opened.

CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): You can have a debating point under clauses 1 and 2, but not under Part 2. So you can mention that, but you need to make it relevant to Part 2, and so far you haven’t.

Right, OK. Well, I’ll continue if that’s all right, Mr Chair?

CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Yes; Simeon Brown.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Well, I’d like to move on to some of the points raised by the Minister in the chair, Andrew Little, where he spoke in response to questions around Down syndrome and whether there was pressure being applied to women in these situations. He said that there was no pressure, but there could be perceived to be pressure. I do just want to acknowledge the submission which was raised by my colleague Agnes Loheni, where there is a clear case of someone who came to the committee, who put in a submission, and said, “This is the pressure that I am having. This is the pressure which is being applied by the medical professionals.”—and the concern raised by that submitter as to what would happen if this bill is passed.

I challenge Andrew Little, the Minister in the chair, on that point: how can he stand in this Chamber and say no pressure is applied? How can he stand in this Chamber and say that medical professionals are simply just doing their job? The select committee listened to only a very few submitters—160 submitters out of 25,000. The select committee didn’t take the time to actually go through the submitters and listen to what is a substantial number of New Zealanders who brought forward concerns, who brought forward their views and their experiences to this issue, and were denied the opportunity to come to Parliament and to be able to speak to those submissions in front of the select committee. So I challenge the Minister on that point where he says that, and I challenge him to provide evidence as to what he bases his claim upon.

I’d like to speak in support of the Supplementary Order Papers (SOPs) put forward by my colleague Melissa Lee, which are SOPs 478 and 479, and in doing so I acknowledge the number of emails that I’ve received from people across my electorate of Pakuranga, from the Downright Discrimination campaign, and acknowledge their concerns which they are raising over how this bill will operate and discriminate against their community. I know many people in my community who have a very big passion for ensuring that we as Parliament and parliamentarians, and me as their member of Parliament, have a society that is free of discrimination. I implore Parliament to consider these Supplementary Order Papers, which will go somewhat towards being able to make a positive difference in that space.

I find it deeply offensive when language is used such as “Mothers make decisions in spite of what the medical professionals might say.” when they talk about a diagnosis around Down syndrome. That language is the discriminatory language which then gets applied in our community against those mothers and those fathers who do have children who are Down syndrome and who pour their hearts and their souls and their lives into raising them. I just say to members in this House to be careful with the language they choose. Choosing language like “in spite of”—“in spite of what the doctor said”, “in spite of what the scan said”—I find deeply offensive. I know that the family which Louisa Wall mentioned—and I think that’s offensive language to them as well in terms of what she says and the language that she chose when she talked about Down syndrome children and the choices that parents have to make. I implore Parliament to consider these Supplementary Order Papers, which seek to put in place provisions on the issue of not just discrimination on the basis of disability but also discrimination on the basis of sex. I know my colleague Dr Parmjeet Parmar brought an SOP on this issue, which was voted down, and I just want to acknowledge Melissa Lee for continuing the advocacy on this issue of sex selection. We know that this is an issue which is seen around the world.

In this bill, the Minister gets up and he says, “Well, we’ve put a declaration”—and the select committee says, “We’ve put a declaration”—“in there that Parliament doesn’t see this as being something which we approve of.” I say good on you. Good on Parliament for putting a declaration into this bill. Then Parliament says, “And we’re going to ask the director-general, after five years, to issue a report.” Well, there’s no ability under this legislation and the sections which have been put in place for the actual data to be collected. I put a Supplementary Order Paper forward when we debated this last week, whereby we would actually be able to look at that issue and actually have the data collected so the Director-General could actually be able to make an assessment as to whether this is something which is taking place in New Zealand. Otherwise, if we don’t have the data collection, all we’ve got is a toothless statement making a declaration—more virtue signalling.

This Parliament’s simply virtue signalling its virtues without actually being prepared to put legislation in place which says this is a practice that we will not condone and actually allowing there to be tools to ensure that it doesn’t happen. That’s what Melissa Lee is trying to do with her Supplementary Order Paper, and I will be supporting it because it’s something which needs to be in this legislation, because we should not be condoning discrimination on the basis of the unborn child’s sex. We should not be discriminating, and we shouldn’t be just happy with simply making a declaration, which is what the Parliament is currently looking to do.

I do just want to say that this is something which the Parliament should take very seriously, because we talk a lot about discrimination, we talk a lot about these issues of equality, and we aren’t prepared to take it seriously here in this bill. So I ask the Minister in the chair, Andrew Little, to please tell me how, under this legislation, he will ensure that that declaration is actually given effect to, and how, under this legislation, the Director-General will actually have the information and the knowledge and the evidence to be able to issue a report to say, after five years, whether or not this is an issue which should be brought to this House’s attention. Currently, those tools aren’t there. I challenge the Minister in the chair to be able to take a call and to explain to the Parliament, explain to New Zealanders, how there will actually be teeth applied to this declaration which has been put into this bill.

In my last couple of minutes, I’d like to touch on the Supplementary Order Paper in the name of Joanne Hayes in relation to the amendment of the Care of Children Act. I find it deeply ironic that on one level, we’ve got a situation where the legislation says that if my daughter goes to school and requires a Panadol, I have to go through a process to give my consent for a Panadol, but if my daughter had an abortion, I as her father wouldn’t be told anything. Now, I can understand there may be cases where there should be a court process. I know there’s been legislation and proposals brought to this House around the small number of circumstances where there may need to be a process where the parents are not involved, but I don’t understand how as a Parliament we can have such a huge inconsistency between a Panadol and abortion when it comes to this issue.

So I ask the Minister in the chair to explain what other options were considered. Was this even considered as an issue to be addressed, or was he simply just satisfied with the status quo when it comes to this substantial issue? I know that it’s an issue which many, many parents across New Zealand are very passionate about. Many people want to see the law changed in this regard, but I understand also the circumstances, and the difficult circumstances, where there may need to be some level of other process, whether that’s a court process or some other tribunal which can intervene in those exceptional circumstances where there is an issue, as the Minister did, rightly, raise in his contribution. So I look forward to the Minister taking a call and answering my questions, and I do find it deeply ironic, that issue, in terms of where this bill is so inconsistent.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’d like to start off by thanking my colleagues who have actually spoken to and in support of my Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 479 and also 478. I have actually split my earlier SOP, I think—which was 459, if my memory serves me right—because it actually had two issues joined together in terms of discrimination. But I have actually since separated the issue of gender discrimination and disability discrimination, so that members can actually vote on them separately.

I’d like to start off with the Minister Andrew Little’s comments when he actually said that people who oppose this bill are, generally, opposed to abortion, and that we have a particular religious view and hence we are opposed. I find that extremely offensive. I’m a woman, I’m a mother, and he suggests that I can’t deal with facts. The fact is we have 13,000 abortions in this country—fact.

When children are raped or are victims of incest, most of us in this House would probably support the idea that she has an abortion. I don’t think there’s anyone in this room who actually would suggest that “Oh no, that child should not have an abortion.” or that it should be made more difficult for that child to deal with that impact of having gone through the process of being raped or the incest that she’s actually suffered at the hands of—the example that the Minister actually gave was the father. That is apparently the very reason why the father or the parents are not supposed to have anything to do with the decision of a young child who decides to have an abortion. Parents are not supposed to actually be notified, even though they are not allowed to give Panadol or any kind of medication at school without the parents’ consent.

Earlier, when one of my colleagues was actually speaking—I think it was Simon O’Connor—Louisa Wall yelled out certain things about facts: that we need to deal with facts. Yes, facts. In this country, we talk about gender discrimination, pay parity. We talk about all kinds of things that supposedly—we apparently don’t like discrimination, and yet in this particular bill, we discriminate. We do not protect people from deciding that they can have an abortion based on gender.

The Minister in the chair, the Hon Andrew Little, earlier said that women are not stupid; they do not actually, all of a sudden, after 20 weeks, go to have an abortion—that they actually decide that earlier. Then why does this bill not restrict abortion to earlier times of pregnancy, rather than making it open slather? There’s no limitations, after 20 weeks, when a woman could not have an abortion. That is where misinformation happens. It’s not us who are spurring the misinformation; it is the bill that is problematic.

The issue is that, when people discover that they’re having a particular gender child, they can make a decision whether to abort or not. When a parent finds out that there is an issue with the child in utero—that they might have Down syndrome, they might have spina bifida, they might have any kind of a disability—it is an opportunity for that parent to make that decision to abort. What I am actually saying is that we should not allow that discrimination. I have fought discrimination all my life. As an Asian New Zealander, discrimination is rife out there against people who are of different ethnicities, and yet this bill is allowing people to discriminate on gender and disability in utero. After 20 weeks, when the sex is actually known, they should not be allowed to abort. This is ridiculous.

I would like to read a couple of the emails that I’ve actually received from people. Chantel Mitchell says—and I quote—“This is becoming more about us making sure we have perfect babies, the gender we want, the baby without a disability, etc., than merely a healthcare issue.” And I totally agree with her. Another one, from Evan Clulee, who says—and I quote—“As a person with spina bifida, we literally are a dying breed. Parents now may face extra pressures, and babies diagnosed with spina bifida in utero will be at even greater risk, prevented from even beginning our lives if these proposed abortion reform laws go through.” Another one, from Sorbhanya Kim, who actually says—I quote—“We shouldn’t be allowed to kill someone weaker than ourselves because they are an inconvenience. We shouldn’t be allowed to kill someone weaker than ourselves because they might have a disability. People with disabilities are just as valued as anyone else. They can live a loving and fulfilling life.” And I agree with them all.

I think it was Louisa Wall who actually mentioned, I think, in earlier debates that lots of members have actually talked about the right of a woman to control what happens to her body. I am a woman. I have had a child. But the DNA of a child in utero is not part of a woman’s body; it is 50 percent the father’s. So does the father have a say in this issue? What happens if the abortion is forced upon a woman by an abusive husband? In section—I have actually folded the part—182 of the Crimes Act it contains an offence of killing an unborn child and provides a prison term of up to 14 years. They were particularly concerned if a pregnant woman is abused—let’s say kicked—and the child in utero is killed. The abuser can actually go to prison. What is the difference between an unborn child that has been kicked and dies and an unborn child of the same age that is being aborted by a woman who makes a decision to abort based on the gender or the disability of the child?

Sure, I understand, as a mother who has actually gone through the process when I was pregnant, me and my now ex-husband. When we were pregnant—and it was the best thing that happened to us; we were so joyous—at six weeks, before that, you go through the process with the doctor. The doctor actually says—oh, apparently I was a geriatric pregnancy because I had my baby in my thirties.

💬 Simon O’Connor: Oh!

Yes, a geriatric pregnancy! I was given an option to have an amniocentesis, and I wanted to know what kind of danger that might actually put my child in. The reason why that amnio was actually provided, or was offered to me, so easily was because, apparently, as a geriatric mother to a child, in a geriatric pregnancy, they wanted to actually make sure that I didn’t have a Down syndrome child, and that I could be provided an abortion. That offer came so quick and so fast.

As a first-time pregnant woman, I just wanted to gather the information and actually sort of read all about it and consider all options. At six weeks, I heard the heartbeat of my child. There was no way—there was no way—regardless of gender, regardless of disability, that I could abort a child that was growing in my body. The DNA—

💬 Marja Lubeck: Then don’t have it!

She says, “Don’t have it.” Well, that’s the problem: some people use it as a method of contraception, and I oppose that. The problem with this bill is that we are liberalising abortion in this country—the very fact that we are allowing people, after 20 weeks of pregnancy, to abort—and I want to provide some parameters, I guess, through my Supplementary Order Paper to make sure that we do not discriminate against people on the basis of gender, nor do we discriminate against people on the basis of disability. I think this bill is abhorrent. I do not support it. I hope it doesn’t actually go through. But, if we have to, we want to make sure that there are some—some—protections in this bill. That is why I move my Supplementary Order Papers 478 and 479. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr Chair, while I accidentally throw my glasses away! I do just want to acknowledge the sense of emotion in the room and, again, just how personal and heartfelt this is for everyone engaged in this discussion, because these are deeply human discussions. And I want to also really support the calls around anti-discrimination, around getting rid of sexism in our country. That is something that I spend a lot of my time and effort involved in trying to do, as well as stamping out discrimination against people with disabilities in this country. I want to acknowledge that we have more work to do as a country to do that. I do not believe, however, that this piece of legislation is the place where we can be effective doing that work; except I will note that this piece of legislation enables us to get rid of some really discriminatory concepts and language as it refers to people with disabilities that’s in the legislation at the moment.

This is our chance to take off our law books the ability to have an abortion on the grounds of fetal abnormality, which is in our current legislation. This is our chance to change that. So, for people who really care about these issues—which I do; the Green Party has put a huge amount of our political effort around fighting discrimination—this piece of legislation in front of us today is a step forwards towards challenging discrimination on the basis of disability as well as gender. Because we know that control of women’s bodies is one of the main tools that’s used to oppress women, and that this legislation we have on our books now was founded on a fundamental mistrust of women. For me, one of the really telling examples of that in the debate at the time, that happened forty years ago, in the initial draft legislation then they had rape as a ground for abortion. That was taken out by members of this Parliament, during that debate, because the mostly men in the House at that time said that women would just lie and say they’d been raped to access abortions. We have to start trusting women to make the right decisions for them and their families, and trust them and challenge discrimination in our society—yes—and I hope every single person who’s raised their voice in the Chamber tonight will step into every single other initiative that we put up to challenge disablism in our society, as well as supporting this legislation.

I will note people’s fears. I want to just give them something in terms of our test about is this increase—changing our threshold at 20 weeks—likely to increase abortions based on any fetal diagnosis. The international evidence is no—that there has not been, when there’s been liberalisation, an increase in the proportion of terminations that happen after that time frame. I would also say that some of the statistics that we’ve been given around Iceland are really misleading and inaccurate. The information I have on that—and remember, Iceland is a bit smaller than Wellington; so when you’re hearing that there hasn’t been, in a year, anybody born with Down syndrome, that’s actually possible in a town the size of Wellington, and when you compare the Icelandic statistics with the European statistics, there is no significant statistical difference. And that is over a 10-year period across jurisdictions. So this legislation is not going to—we have no evidence whatsoever—make that difference.

To speak briefly to the parental notification, I’ve worked with young people in youth health and I want people to know that, if you do that, young people will not go to the doctor and they will not have the conversation with their parents, which usually happens after they’ve been to the doctor because they’ve had the confidence to go.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Before I begin, I just want to say that the disrespect that was shown to my colleague here, Melissa Lee, by Marja Lubeck really was uncalled for. She was emotive, she was just sharing from her heart, and I just felt that it was a bit disrespectful in the committee. When people have shared from their hearts, we’ve just respected their views. We may have been opposite their view, but we’ve just respected—so I just felt that a bit of respect could have been shown.

I want to stand up and speak to the current Minister in the chair, the Hon Willie Jackson, and hope that he’ll take note, especially with the officials. When the Minister the Hon Andrew Little was making some remarks, especially in relation to the Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) by Joanne Hayes—SOP 463—he used the scenario in regards to the fact of those who had been raped or of incest. I noticed that they often used the most extreme scenario as a way of justifying the position that they had. I want to put on record—and if the Minister had read through the proposed amendments, particularly in the explanatory note on the opposite page, on page 2—it was clearly highlighted by my colleague Joanne Hayes that, in circumstances where there is concern that a minor could be at risk if her parents were notified, the law already provides alternative solutions. Those solutions were in the Oranga Tamariki Act 1989; section 31 of the Care of Children Act. Those provisions are already there. So what this Act was actually speaking to—and I’m sure the current Minister in the chair, the Hon Willie Jackson, will acknowledge the fact—is that there are circumstances, especially with our Māori and our Pacific whānau, in which the cultural construct is actually the importance to engage with the whānau and the family, and the importance of that. That’s the reason for the intent of this SOP: that, where there are circumstances where it’s quite clear that there isn’t a situation of threat or of risk, have they considered that?

I particularly want to say that because, actually, in one of the submissions that came through—this is from the Pasifika Health Alliance—it talked about the number of Māori, Pacific, and Asian births through abortion. From 1998 to 2018, Māori in particular had 76,067 aborted deaths, in comparison to all other causes of death for Māori babies—61,641. That is a significant amount. For Pasifika, it’s 39,957. That’s the reason why, in regards to this SOP, it’s actually giving some due consideration. I don’t believe that the example that the Minister gave was actually considerate, when it was quite clear that the member Joanne Hayes had clearly stated, in her explanatory note, there are circumstances where there are actually risk factors that are there, that they can be considered under two particular Acts which provide care and responsibility, discretion that is available to them, and I think that’s important.

I want to speak about SOP 470. The Minister talked about the fact that there are already safety measures in place for the Health and Disability Commissioner—that’s there. I’ve looked through these regulations, and the officials may like to give that information through to the Minister, who could then stand up later on tonight and be able to provide that. Because, while he said they were already there, again, I point to the Law Commission, who are quite clear: there is no enforcement mechanism that’s currently in place; there’s nothing there in the provision to ensure that there’s an enforcement. And, again, the safety aspect of what the Minister concerned was sharing about isn’t there. I’ve looked through the regulations. They’re very broad, they’re not specific, there’s nothing there in particular. If the Minister is quite clear that this is important, then what harm is there to include this Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) in the legislation? It just makes it clear, it makes it precise, that if there are issues where there is a breach of convention in regards to the practices of abortion—I don’t think that’s too hard to ask for.

I want to talk about SOP 479 in my colleague’s name, Melissa Lee. And the reason I do so—and I’m hoping to take an extension to this, Mr Chair—is because I am the current spokesperson for disability for the National Party. So I have a particular interest in this; I’ve been engaging in the community, and I want to share some of their thoughts and their concerns that they have raised around this. Many have turned around and said, “Well, there’s nothing to be found here.” I know that Louisa Wall has talked about different people that she’s talked about, but I want to state that there have been 1,300 people with Down syndrome and families calling on the Prime Minister to not introduce abortion up to birth. That’s part of the 25,000 submissions—out of those submissions, 91 percent opposed this bill. This is more than just one or two people in the sector; this is a significant number of people who have shared their concerns.

I want to highlight some of those concerns that they have shared with me, in particular in regards to the current proposed changes of the law. Currently, in the current law, there is a 20 week gestational time limit for disability selective abortion. The proposed law—the 20 week gestational time limit for disability sex selective abortion would be removed. We’re already considerate of the fact that there shall be no discrimination around sex, and particularly—I’m not sure—around a gender. But, in this case, again, how difficult is it for us to ensure the safety—but, more importantly, the concerns raised by the disability community: 1,300 signed a submission, a letter straight to the Prime Minister. Why? Because of their concerns.

And here’s how they highlight their concerns. People in the House have talked about facts; here are some of the facts. I know that Jan Logie talked about Finland and other places. Let’s talk about a bit closer to home; let’s take an example from Victoria, in Australia, where there is a similar clause allowing for abortion up to birth. There is a reliable data collection of abortions that have taken place between 20 weeks and birth, which is reported by the Council of Obstetric and Paediatric Mortality and Morbidity’s annual reports.

💬 Jan Logie: That’s inaccurate.

This is from the report. The member Jan Logie can read it. This data shows that there have been 1,685 abortions of babies with disability between 20 weeks and birth since the law has changed there in 2008. These are concerns that are being raised by this community. And again, if it is, within this community, the safety and wellbeing of our community, if our disability sector are now—and if parents are—showing their concern, then why is it that this House and this current Government are not listening to their concerns?

In the UK, abortion is available through to birth for disabilities, including Down syndrome, and, in February, the BBC reported that a woman had been offered an abortion at 38 weeks gestation. There is now a large movement among the disability community in the UK to get the law changed. Polling shows that a majority of people in the UK feel that disability should not be grounds for abortion at all, with only one in three people thinking it is acceptable. Our role and responsibility in this House is to ensure that the laws of this land will ensure that in this House we protect the weak and the vulnerable.

In my time that’s left, I want to just read a couple of comments, because there’s nothing like actually bringing the voice of our community into this House. We know that over 2,500 oral submissions were requested—only over 140. And a number of them actually shared that they would have wanted to be there to share their stories. I share a couple of these stories. Pip Smith, mum to Oscar, who has Down syndrome: “Oscar is one of four boys, along with his other brothers, he brings much joy and love to his family and is living life to the full. His life is no less worthy and is just as beautiful as those of his brothers. Our community has repeatedly called on the Government to change the law to ensure it doesn’t introduce abortion up to birth. At every stage of the process, our concerns have been ignored. The Abortion Legislation Committee made it clear in their final report, and they opted to keep this new post - 20 week provision in place in the bill so that it could be used for disability selective abortions.”

Sitting suspended from 6 p.m. to 7.30 p.m.

Madam Chair, I’d just like to complete my speech on SOP 479, that I was speaking to. It’s in the name of Melissa Lee and, in particular, it’s around clause 12, and it’s focused on any disability or possible disability of the unborn child. I just want to read from the explanatory note where it’s quite clear that the purpose and the intent of this SOP is in line with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and they note this: “Laws which explicitly allow for abortion on [the] grounds of impairment violate the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Art. 4, 5, 8). Even if the condition is considered fatal, there is still a decision made on the basis of impairment.” So that’s the intent of this clause here and, in particular, with SOP 479.

I want to finish off with the words of one of our colleagues. I respect that Greg O’Connor, in his speech last week, actually made these comments. There’s nothing like having one of our own who has their own personal experience. He states, “I’m the father of an intellectually handicapped son who’s now 27 years old, and what this post - 20 week legislation will mean is that for parents who do find out that they have a child who may not be ‘normal’, who [may be a child who] isn’t what they had hoped the child would be, all of a sudden a whole new set of pressures are going to go on as a result of this legislation.” That’s at the heart of this SOP 479. It’s to take consideration that there would be no discrimination on the grounds of disability. I commend this SOP and support it to the committee.

Tēnā koe, Madam Chair. I too want to speak to Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 479 and I’d like to acknowledge my colleague Melissa Lee for her advocacy for people with disabilities. I genuinely want to thank her for sharing her experience with us earlier tonight. I mean, this is an incredibly emotional discussion and some of us are sharing things that we probably haven’t shared before. We need to think about what we’re actually asking for, if we want this SOP to be successful, because essentially the rights of parents to choose whether or not to have a child when they know that child has a particular condition has been something that we have as a country publicly funded since 2004.

We brought in a screening programme that tests for trisomy-21, trisomy-18, and trisomy-13. But what I’ve neglected to do is actually talk about what those conditions are. And I actually think it’s really important people know what we’re talking about. So trisomy-13 was discovered by Dr Klaus Patau in 1960, and essentially it means that the fetus has extra genetic material. They have disrupted normal development, causing multiple and complex organ defects. Ninety percent of the children born with Patau syndrome die within the first year. They have intellectual disabilities, they have seizures, and they require surgical intervention. So our publicly funded screening programme at 14 weeks and 20 weeks provides information like this to parents.

Trisomy-18, which is Edwards syndrome, was discovered by John H Edwards in 1960. Again, babies are born small. They have a small head, they have heart defects, there are severe intellectual disabilities, and 90 to 95 percent die within the first year. I looked at a study that said the average length of life is 12½ days. That does speak to Melissa Lee’s Supplementary Order Paper, because she is saying that if a doctor can determine that the likely death of the child is within 28 days of birth, then that’s OK. But actually, that’s not what happens all the time.

Then trisomy-21—it was actually discovered by John Langdon Down in 1862 and it’s an interesting condition, actually, because, people have physical and growth delays. They have mild to moderate intellectual disabilities. They have a mental age—and this is just generally—of a nine to 10-year-old, but they can live for 50 to 60 years. And with good education, care, and support to the parents and to those children, they can actually live amazingly good, productive lives—20 percent of them can go on to employment. And therein lies the distinctions, I think, with some of the groups that have been advocating to us and in the committee tonight. People with Down syndrome can live full, productive lives.

That’s not the point of the testing and the screening, though. The point of the testing and the screening is to give parents information. Firstly, do they want to undergo the testing, the screening? And then, once they do know, how can we help them prepare to deliver a child that may need specialist surgical medical care? They do, necessarily, have to talk about the consideration of termination. And the other thing they have to talk about is palliative care in that newborn period, because babies may be born, but actually they’re not going to live very long. And how do we help parents prepare for a life of a child with these trisomy conditions? That’s the whole point of having a screening programme.

So if the people opposed to terminating children who have these trisomy conditions really want to get to the nub of the issue, what they’re saying is we shouldn’t have an antenatal screening programme in the first place, because fundamental to the screening programme is giving parents information so that they can make decisions that best fit with their lives. It’s not about anyone judging them. It’s about how we can care, support, and help them through what is an incredibly emotional time, which is what everyone has talked about. So I can’t support Melissa Lee’s Supplementary Order Paper. It’s way too restrictive and, also, I believe that it takes away the rights of parents to choose.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I’d, basically, like to speak to just one Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) in this discussion, but I’ll preface that, if I may, with a brief discussion of a point that I think is relevant to a number of the SOPs that we’ve covered this evening.

The first is in relation to how we divide our attention as a committee of the whole House between that which is a matter of rights—I’d argue human rights, a matter of logic—versus what it is that the general public believe in and how we should view the attitude of our fellow Kiwis to this kind of legislation; the issues that are raised particularly by the SOPs.

It’s worth noting that credible public polling conducted by Curia concluded that 90 percent of New Zealanders opposed sex-selective abortions. Now, that was the subject of an SOP in the name of Dr Parmjeet Parmar in Part 1, but I would argue that, by analogy, I would be surprised if there isn’t a similar result in relation to disability selection, which is the subject of an SOP in the name of Melissa Lee relevant to Part 2, on which I have previously spoken and on which I won’t dwell now. But suffice to say that, even on that basis, it is worth this committee of the whole House considering the fact that it is obvious to many outside this Chamber, if not to a majority within it, the rights and wrongs of that particular issue.

Similarly, in terms of parental notification—the subject of another Supplementary Order Paper, of course, tonight—some 79 percent in that same poll thought that parents should be notified if their young daughter was seeking an abortion. So I place that not as a matter of argument definitively, given that it seems to me that in this House we’ve got a responsibility in matters of life and death that is higher simply than taking the pulse of the nation, but it is worthwhile guidance, I think, to us as legislators: the fact that these issues appear in much clearer view to many outside this place than to those within, it seems, at times.

I do want to speak to the Supplementary Order Paper in the name of the Hon Ruth Dyson; it’s number 483. I think she would agree with my characterisation of it as in the freedom of conscience space, also sometimes known as conscientious objection. Of course, the word “conscience” literally means “with knowledge”, and, in this case, it seems to me appropriate that a person be allowed to exercise their freedom in a way that reflects their knowledge and understanding of what the act of abortion does entail. From that point of view, it’s not a matter of what a person can do or will do; it’s a matter of what they are prepared to do, in a sense—in the rawest sense—what they may or may not do according to their conscience. If our attitude in this Parliament remains, as it has been historically, that matters of conscience are practically irreducible, that means that we have to be pretty determined in our consideration of attempts to water that down or erode that right.

So it is that, in Supplementary Order Paper 483, Ms Dyson proposes a regime where someone who is exercising a conscientious freedom not to perform an abortion service would, nevertheless, be required to, basically, undertake research and advice about how the person seeking the abortion services should go about getting that. That seems to me a step too far. I would argue that the first stage, essentially, in the process should activate—namely, that the person would advise the seeker of the abortion services that they do have a conscientious objection, and be allowed to leave it at that, and to walk away.

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Anne Tolley): I’m just not sure what the SOP number it is.

Supplementary Order Paper 483, Madam Chair.

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Anne Tolley): OK.

Remains 483, thank you. So that’s clause 14. I should actually make it clear to those who are following along that we’re talking about amendments to the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003.

So it would be the case that someone who’s exercised their freedom of conscience would be required to make calculations not only, most obviously and easily, about physical distance between a provider who was prepared to conduct the services but also take into account considerations such as the date and time of the original request, the operating hours of the provider of the service that was requested, and so forth. That’s a burden that I don’t think it’s fair to place on a person who wishes to exercise their freedom of conscience, does so in good faith, advises accordingly, and then is required to take extra further active steps against their conscience; that seems to me too far. I will be voting against that Supplementary Order Paper

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’d like to follow on from Chris Penk and speak in support of my Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 483. But before I do, I want to point out to Mr Penk some quite important facts that he omitted to bring into his reign of consideration, and that is that this is not about an abortion service; this is about provision of emergency contraception, which avoids a pregnancy, and, if it’s an unwanted pregnancy, it will avoid an abortion. That’s what this SOP is about. So it’s about reducing unwanted pregnancies so that the option of having an abortion is not necessary for the woman involved; so that’s what this is about. When we were debating Part 1, members may recall a very similar, in fact identical, SOP that I put up to Part 1, which changed the contraception, sterilisation, and abortion legislation. This does exactly the same thing, but in the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003.

This matter wasn’t raised at the select committee, and I was quite surprised because we did spend a lot of time on details at the select committee. The reason that it wasn’t obvious to us is because, I guess, we had our faith that the system would work until it was pointed out, after we reported back, that a woman could go to a doctor or a chemist in Kaitāia under the current bill and say, “I’ve got a prescription here for emergency contraception. I need to take it within the next 48 hours for it to be effective.” and the chemist might say, “No, I’m not dispensing it. I’m a conscientious objector.” Under the current bill, as it’s drafted, they would just have to tell them the name of somebody who would, and it could be in Invercargill. That woman would be pregnant by the time she got to Invercargill. So this is trying to avoid something that we don’t want to happen and clearly the woman doesn’t want to happen. That’s why I support the change in this. It’s to make the legislation that’s outlined in Part 1 line up with the legislation that’s outlined in Part 2.

In the brief remaining time that I’ve got, I just want to further recommend that members try and stick to facts in this debate. It’s an important debate. It’s a very sensitive one. It is very contentious. I think that it better suits this sort of debate if facts are presented rather than things that somebody might have read on the internet, had emailed to them, or just made it up. One of the examples I’ve heard during this debate, and certainly in correspondence, is the fact that this will almost require—it just puts such a lot of pressure on parents of a child with Down syndrome to end that pregnancy. We heard exactly the opposite from all the practitioners in this area. We heard from parents who had been through this situation about how supported they felt, how well-informed they felt, and how they had zero pressure to make a decision other than what was right for their families.

I’ve heard in this debate that there are zero children born with Down syndrome in Iceland. That is just not true. There have been two years in the last 50 years when that has been true: 1989 and 2009. The total population of Iceland is 335,000 people. It’s a very small place. Their birth rate of children with Down syndrome is within a margin of error different than the birth rate of children with Down syndrome in the EU. There is no truth to the fact that their abortion laws mean that there are no children with Down syndrome born. Iceland is not New Zealand. We have a different culture. We have different value sets. We have different beliefs. And it is my view that this will not move parents to terminate a pregnancy when they wouldn’t in the current situation.

The time pressures that Melissa Lee’s Supplementary Order Paper (SOP)—and I do admire the value behind it—puts on parents, I think, would make for very bad outcomes. They would be pressured into making a decision while it was still theirs, before that decision is taken out of their hands, and that could lead to bad decision-making. I want those parents to be well supported, to be well-informed, and to make the choice that’s best for them.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I actually wasn’t going to take a call but I thought I’d have to respond to the member who’s taken her seat, for a couple of reasons. Firstly, I’d encourage her to go and look up the statistics of Iceland for those who get testing for Down syndrome, not just those who are born without testing. Secondly, she noted that her Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) came about because, well, it hadn’t been raised in the select committee. So I just sort of posit the argument, rhetorically if you will, that had the committee decided, which she chaired by the way, to actually hear from people who wanted to come in and speak, bar the 120 that they chose, then they might have actually got a broader understanding and would’ve done their job more fully.

But also in the aspect of facts, and, you know, I’m a great believer in facts as well—very useful. She talked about the emergency contraceptive pill (ECP). I just need to make it really clear for the committee that actually a person can get the ECP without a prescription. The member who took her seat was very quick to have a go at one of my colleagues about the whole having to go to a doctor; you actually don’t. That’s what they call a medical fact. It’s what they call truth. So I just thought I’d just put that out there.

I also might just want to point out this whole—again, it’s these faux straw arguments which are put up that the doctor in Kaitāia, or arguably, again, it’s sort of a moot point around the ECP because you don’t need to go and spend $20, $40, or $60 with the doctor; you can just go to the pharmacy. But for the sake of fact and truth for Ruth Dyson, she’ll find that if you went to the pharmacy in Kaitāia and the pharmacist chose to send you to Invercargill, you’d be able to take said pharmacist against the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act and, basically, put them in their place, because that’s right against what they are meant to do as a competent person. In other words, the pharmacist who has a conscience problem and sends them to Invercargill from Kaitāia is already doing the wrong thing.

But now we step into the whole philosophical problem with Supplementary Order Paper 483, because I believe those who are for this legislation are all about pro-choice. If you accept that, then it’s funny that there’s to be no choice for the doctor or the pharmacist to exercise their conscience right. The counter argument that often comes up: “Oh, it’s power dynamics. The person who’s asking for the ECP”—the emergency contraceptive pill in this case—“they might feel awkward or unsure.” If that’s the case—if the person’s not competent enough to go to the next pharmacy to have a discussion—then that probably begins to, and should, raise questions in members’ minds as to just how competent, calm, and rational that person is in making the decision. But, as I said, philosophically, the key point for the pro-choice is they’re pro-choice for ECP, they’re pro-choice for abortion, but, boy, there’s to be no choice for doctors, nurses, and others around these topics.

Finally, Simeon Brown: what a great SOP 480; it’s all about data. Not the sexiest topic. I could probably try to up the rhetoric and make statistics sound sexy, but I won’t. The great thing about statistics is to help us understand what’s going on. SOP 480 is, effectively, making changes to Schedule 2. When anyone looks at Schedule 2, the information that the Director-General of Health has to collect is interesting, it’s useful, but just to show why we need SOP 480—and Simeon Brown himself might choose to talk to it—is particularly, but not exclusively, around sex selection. So, as I say, we’ve got the wet bus ticket approach that we’ve said in the bill: it’s not a good idea.

At the moment, there is no direction in this legislation for data on the sex of a child to be collected. So what difference does that make? Well, if in two, three, five, 10 years we’re going to mount an argument, or otherwise, that sex selection is happening, without the info being collected we’re going to have the pro-abortion side say, “Well, there’s no evidence. There’s no evidence of sex selection.” Well, of course that’s what they’re going to say, because we haven’t collected the data. So it’s pretty simple. Again, the challenge to those who vote for this legislation is, perhaps, let this through, because I’m sure those people can be courageous enough to not be afraid of the data. Find out, as Simeon Brown’s SOP is doing, how many previous live births and how many previous abortions. I would say that the sex of the child should be noted.

This is an obligation, importantly, on the doctor or the health practitioner; this is not the woman involved. We’re not putting stress on her, but if we are going to accurately report, particularly on sex selection, then we need to have that information, otherwise it makes a mockery of any discussion of what’s occurring. So I implore members to vote for SOP 480.

I did let the member go because he had been seeking the call for a while but, actually, that’s Schedule 1, which is part of Part 1, and we’re on Part 2, Schedule 2.

💬 Simon O’Connor: I think it’s a new—is it a new Schedule 2, though, or is that still because it falls in—

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Anne Tolley): No.

💬 Simon O’Connor: Oh, then I do apologise. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Anne Tolley): It’s all right.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Before I add my support to the two Supplementary Order Papers (SOPs) in the name of Melissa Lee, could I just note that this is the first time I’ve spoken in this debate, and I want to thank all members, because I believe it’s been a very respectful debate. This is a very emotional and challenging issue for all of us, and I’m delighted that we haven’t had too much acrimony. Of course it’s been highly charged, that’s right, but I am glad that it’s been a respectful debate.

Although I haven’t taken a call, I’ve been listening carefully to what has been said by all members, and I want to thank them for those very thoughtful contributions. One of the reasons why I haven’t sought the call before now is I do believe that this is one issue where the woman’s voice should be heard first and foremost. It doesn’t mean that men don’t have a valid opinion—of course we do—but until such time as men can understand the difficulty of an unplanned, unwanted pregnancy, and agonising over a decision that might need to be made, particularly if there’s an abnormality in the pregnancy, we do need to respect the fact that our world view is very different, and I do, therefore, respect the views, particularly, of women in this debate.

But I want to turn now to the two SOPs in the name of Melissa Lee. I’m the father of two wonderful daughters. They are talented, they are funny, they’re intelligent—

💬 Hon Ruth Dyson: You’re biased!

—they’re caring, they’re motivated, and yes, Ms Dyson, I am biased, but they are the best. I remember so vividly, even though it’s quite a few years ago now, the utter delight, the joy of the night that my first daughter was born. I was the happiest father in the world. Nothing could take away from my absolute pleasure, my joy that evening. Then, just 17 months later, our second daughter was born. I’m going to confess that just for a moment—because I think all men probably do want to have a son—there was a moment of disappointment that I’d had another daughter. Well, I apologise to my second daughter because she is the most beautiful young woman and I love her dearly, and almost within a few minutes, once I’d adjusted to the fact that I was now the father of two daughters, I realised how lucky I was and she has given me nothing but pleasure and pride and joy, and my wife, since then.

So I mention this, Madam Chair, because I think it’s relevant. I can see you’re telling me to focus on the bill. We are facing the possibility of replicating a situation that we know exists in some countries around the world where sex selection is a reason for an abortion. And while I would never have contemplated that for a moment, I think it is horrific to even contemplate the circumstance where such an abomination could be contemplated. We have to be mindful of the fact that, if we have such liberal amendments to our law as seem to be being proposed under this particular measure, that could be the outcome. So I strongly endorse Ms Lee’s SOP. We must ensure that sex selection should never be contemplated as a reason or be made permissible as a reason for an abortion.

The second one, of course, that she is dealing with is the matter of disabilities. One of the great privileges of being a member of Parliament is the opportunity we have to meet with members of the disabled community—and there are so many different types of disability—in our electorates and around the country. Without exception, I have found them the most admirable, impressive, lovely people. I am motivated to speak tonight because so many of them have contacted us, as members of Parliament, urging us, pleading with us to support Melissa’s amendment and to resist any possibility that we would liberalise our abortion laws in this country so as to make it more likely that those who are going to be born disabled should be aborted.

I recognise that there are some tragic circumstances where an abortion is often the right outcome, and I say that because we don’t want to imperil the life of the mother. I also recognise that for some people, facing the challenge of raising a disabled child is incredibly difficult, and I don’t in any way undermine that. I have nothing but admiration for those who are raising disabled children, but they are beautiful people. They are equal people. As a Christian, I believe that they are, as my children are, a gift from God. I want to do everything I can to speak up for them, to protect them, to resist any move in this bill that might threaten them, because we’ve seen what happens, particularly in Nazi Germany, when that can happen. We must never allow that to happen here.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I just wanted to respond to some of the points that have been made both before the dinner break and since, and I particularly want to talk about the Supplementary Order Papers (SOPs) in Melissa Lee’s name, and also that in the name of Alfred Ngaro. Just on the issue about the concerns that have been expressed about discrimination, in particular in relation to the possibility that a pregnancy or a fetus that may lead to profound disability might be the subject of a decision by a parent to abort. Then there’s also the other discrimination, which is sex discrimination, which has been explicitly provided for in the bill in the report back from the select committee.

So, just on the issue of sex selection, there is a very clear statement in the bill that the select committee has put together that says that this is not tolerated in New Zealand. That is important when you consider the medical practitioners’ and the health practitioners’ professional and moral obligations when they’re dealing with the woman in front of them to make sure that the practitioner fulfils their professional obligations, which will include ensuring that, to the extent they discern that the decision is being made on the sex discrimination grounds, that does not happen. The bill is drafted very clearly about the grounds upon which a health practitioner must determine the issue when consulting with a woman about an abortion—certainly post - 20 weeks.

On the issue of broader disabled discrimination, one of the problems with Melissa Lee’s SOP 479 and the amendment that she’s proposing in that SOP is the fact that the medical practitioner would be required to, effectively, get into the mind of the woman to try to determine whether or not the decision she is making, or what she is consulting that medical practitioner on, is a ground of discrimination. So that’s one thing.

Then, because it is a quite broadly drafted provision that refers to all the grounds of discrimination under the Human Rights Act, which include, for example, family status—which means that if a young woman who is pregnant because of an act of incest wants to abort that pregnancy and that is disclosed to the health practitioner, under Melissa Lee’s SOP, the health practitioner would have to determine if that is an act of discrimination on the grounds of family status. That abortion, simply on the grounds that the pregnancy is the product of incest, would be discriminatory on the grounds of family status. Now, I don’t think Melissa Lee, because of the concerns she’s expressed about discrimination, would want that, but that is what her provision would allow. That is why I am opposed to it. In relation to the current right under the Care of Children Act for a young woman below the age of consent to, having consulted a medical practitioner, make a decision about an abortion and to repeal that under Alfred Ngaro’s SOP—I don’t accept that, either.

Now, I’ve spoken a bit about this before. One of the other things that the current law ensures is that that young woman is not prevailed upon by somebody else to make a decision to have an abortion when she might not want to or, conversely, to not have an abortion where she would otherwise wish to not continue the pregnancy. That provision has been around for some considerable period of time, and, in fact, it’s based on the recommendations of the royal commission of inquiry from 1977 that was about protecting the integrity of the decision of that young woman. There will be situations where a young woman is in a situation where she does not wish to disclose to her parents because of issues of her own personal safety or family relationships, and she should not be put in a position where there is a mandatory obligation to disclose when that would put her at risk. I don’t accept that, and I think that that is wrong.

This issue was also the subject of a petition in 2014 that was considered by the Justice and Electoral Committee, and they did not recommend changing the current law. So, as recently as 2014, Parliament has considered this issue and said that we do not want to change the current rights of a young person below the, otherwise, age of consent for sexual activity that is there at the moment. For those reasons, I reject both of those SOPs.

I move, That the question be now put.

Earlier, I spoke on my Supplementary Order Paper (SOP), and it was a rather emotional speech and I’d like to thank some members who have sent me lovely messages. Although we disagree in this Chamber and we may take different positions, we actually support each other; so thank you. We have been rather respectful, as the Hon Tim Macindoe said earlier. I’d like to, once again, thank the gentleman behind me, Mr Tim Macindoe, for supporting my Supplementary Order Papers 478 and 479, and, hopefully, there will be many more members in this Chamber who will vote for my SOPs.

Earlier, I spoke on the disability area of Supplementary Order Paper 479 a little bit more than on the other; so I’d like to focus more on the gender or sex discrimination in this part. But before I get to that, I just want to quote an email that I got from Krystal Kendon, and it says, “It creates less room for empathy, compassion, understanding, and community support for those that may look, act, or have different needs to the rest of us. The issue that needs to be addressed is how can we better support, equip, and empower those mothers and families to raise their children with disability instead of filling them with fear and providing a seemingly—yet deceptive—easy way out.” I just want to quote that for the part on the disability issue that I spoke about earlier, on Supplementary Order Paper 479.

There have been many people who have talked about the gender issue, and I think, previously, the Minister of Justice has also talked about the potential that, in this legislation, we have made it very clear, apparently, that we do not tolerate gender selection in New Zealand, and yet it is not part of the bill. We do not make it illegal for people to decide to have abortions based on gender selection. I think the Minister had also talked earlier about the very fact that he did not want people to ethnically profile if we have my SOP adopted. I’d like to ask the Minister: there is some ethnic profiling already happening in the health sector. Some ethnic communities are predisposed to certain diseases, so they actually look at that. Perhaps it is the Asian community who are predisposed to certain diseases, or the Pacific community. People are already aware of some things that are already happening; so I do not think that ethnic profiling per se is actually a negative thing, because they can prepare to provide better health services.

But, in terms of gender selection, the reason why I oppose this, I guess, is that I am an Oriental person and I know for a fact that, in some of our communities, people abort purely based on gender selection. For example, in China, there was a Government policy that allowed only one child per family, which meant the parents had to decide which gender they wanted when they got pregnant. So for the purposes of them wanting to secure their superannuation—so their children could look after them when they were older and they were aged—they wanted a boy child, because boy children were deemed to be the ones who would provide for their elderly parents, and that is the reason why they chose one gender. They wanted boy children; so when they got pregnant with a girl child, they aborted them. Now, it is no longer the policy of the Chinese Government, but 30 million Chinese men do not have wives because they cannot find a partner, because the parents aborted female children when they were deciding which gender they wanted.

I’m not suggesting that that would happen in New Zealand, but the thing is that the very fact that parents chose, often later in the pregnancy when they find out what gender, what sex, their child is—I think it is actually wrong for them to decide to have an abortion because they want children by design. I mean, the Prime Minister herself has actually said that this is a kind country and this is a country that cares about the most vulnerable. When we are allowing people to abort babies based on their gender or because of the disabilities that they have, I am not so sure what kind of message we are sending to the world. We are no longer the kind country that the Prime Minister seems to be very proud of—we’re not. This cannot happen.

Thank you, Madam Chair, and I’ll try and keep this as a brief contribution. But I did want to address the issue of parental notification and the requirement for that, because somebody raised it with me over the dinner break. I really understand from a parent’s perspective, and when you’ve got a great relationship with your kid and you love your kid, the thought about your child being in distress and going to access healthcare and, potentially, having an abortion without telling you is a really distressing concept. But I want to reassure those members that that is part of the reason why—to protect that relationship and the wellbeing of a kid is one of the reasons we should not change the law to require parental notification.

The research overseas tells us really clearly that most young people do tell a parent. Of those who are 14 or 15, it’s between 74 and 90 percent of them who tell at least one parent, and for most of those who don’t, it’s because there is a risk. The research also backs up what has been my experience of working in youth health. There are a lot of young women who would come in to the centre—and it was a confidential centre—and discuss and get a pregnancy test on the basis that they knew it was confidential. They would not have come through the door if it was not. They didn’t know how to have the conversation with their parents, who they really respected. They didn’t want their parents’ view of them to be changed. It was only through the consultation with the doctor that they had learnt how they could have that conversation to be able to tell their parents. Unless we protect their confidentiality, those young women—history tells us, research tells us, experience tells us—are not going to tell their parents, and they’re going to take it into their own hands, and lives will be lost. So this parental notification, it feels counterintuitive, but it’s the best way to actually find out if your kid needs that help at that time, and to protect your relationship.

I’d also just like to speak to some of the other points that have been raised around disability, and also echo the points that were made by the Hon Ruth Dyson, as well as the Minister of Justice previously, in particular. I also just point to the trouble of having the definition in here which is being suggested, because at the moment this is not in the legislation. We are not putting anything to do with the fetus as grounds for abortion.

We’ve heard some evidence that liberalisation in Victoria led to an increase in post - 20 weeks. That was reported, that fact, but the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology fact-checked that, and it is not the reality. What happened was after their law was liberalised in 2008, for five years there was an increase, but after that time it has gone down below pre-liberalisation levels. So actually, there has not been an increase at all. In fact, there has been a decrease.

People also need to remember that when you’re looking at the grounds and what’s recorded as the grounds, we know with our legislation the reasons that are recorded match the legislation. They don’t match the reality. In New Zealand, almost all of the grounds, the majority of grounds are on mental health reasons because that’s the legislative vehicle to be able to access a termination. That’s not the reality. We know, and we’ve heard from women again and again, that they are feeling as if they have to lie to be able to access those essential abortion care services. So do be very careful when you’re reading data that shows a change in the reasons after liberalisation, because it probably just reflects a change in the legislation, not the reality.

I think this is important to note, because there is misinformation out there. I want people to know that we’ve looked at the data that people are raising as concerns and we’ve checked it and it doesn’t hold up. We would not be supporting legislation if we had any evidence whatsoever that it would have an impact against people with disabilities or girls and the status of women.

I move, That the question be now put.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for the opportunity to take a second call on the Abortion Legislation Bill. I just want to respond to a couple of those comments which were made by my colleague Jan Logie, where she was discussing the issue around the experience in Victoria in relation to the collection of evidence around—whether it’s late-term abortions, sex selection abortion, disability. She referenced different studies, and this study said this, and this study said that. I think that points to the need to actually be collecting the information and actually having the Director-General of Health having the role to collect adequate, proper information so that it can actually be measured appropriately. So I’d just like to respond to that point.

I’d now like to discuss Supplementary Order Paper 470, in the name of my colleague the Hon Alfred Ngaro. He is making what I think is something which this committee needs to take very serious consideration about, which is putting in place a commissioner to investigate breaches of a health practitioner in relation to the provision of abortion services if the action is, or appears to be, to the commissioner, in breach of the provisions of the Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act or the Crimes Act 1961.

I’d like to ask the Minister in the chair, the Hon Andrew Little, to please give the committee some assurances under the legislation as to what actually takes place if there are breaches in this legislation. He might talk about what the responsibilities are under the Health and Disability Commissioner, but I’d like to also ask him in terms of what actual teeth there may be in the legislation to ensure that the provisions of this Act which has been put in place are actually being followed. Because I think that’s something which this committee does need to take very seriously, and something which needs to be explained here so that members of Parliament actually have that information here before we vote on this Supplementary Order Paper.

In my view, I think having a commissioner who can specifically investigate these breaches, who can specifically look at whether the legislation is being followed, is something which should be put there in place to monitor it. I think that goes alongside the previous point, which is around the collection of information. There actually needs to be, in this legislation, the bodies with the appropriate ability to make these decisions and to be able to ensure that the legislation is being followed.

So, on a final point, I do just want to say that I think there have been a number of claims made by members on the other side about misinformation and facts being misinterpreted, but I do want to point out once more that the Abortion Legislation Committee listened to only 160 of the submitters. The people who ran the process and who voted to shut people out from having their voices heard meant that there was not the ability for New Zealanders—thousands of New Zealanders who wished to be heard—to be able to come and actually put their evidence on the table, and for that evidence to be taken into consideration in this process. I think that’s something which we as a committee and as a Parliament, as we now come to vote shortly on some of these Supplementary Order Papers, are missing out on—that experience and the valuable insights that New Zealanders brought and wished to bring to this Parliament through this process. So I thank you for the contribution, and I look forward to hearing an answer from the Minister to my questions.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’m obliged to have the opportunity to respond to Simeon Brown in relation to Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 470.

Can I just, before I embark on a direct response to his question that he poses—and, really, in response to, actually, an earlier comment by Alfred Ngaro, which is when Alfred Ngaro quoted from the Law Commission’s report. The Law Commission was very clear about specifying, as an alternative, that the Parliament could consider setting up a separate, stand-alone kind of regulatory or disciplinary body or, as they said in paragraph 6.78 on page 118 of their report, “An alternative to creating a new regulatory offence would be to rely on the existing health practitioner disciplinary regime to address any failures by health practitioners to comply with the statutory requirements … The same consequences would then apply to health practitioners who fail to comply with abortion law as for other kinds of professional misconduct … The current grounds for disciplining health practitioners already appear broad enough to capture situations where a practitioner fails to apply the statutory test for abortion. A practitioner may be disciplined for an act or omission that amounts to negligence or is likely to bring discredit to the profession.” So the regime, at the moment, doesn’t just deal with strict legal issues; it deals with the professional and, you might say, ethical issues as well.

So, to answer specifically Simeon Brown’s question, “What is the Health and Disability Commissioner’s role or right?”, it is, having investigated, to order a number of possible remedies—one is an apology to a person who has been harmed in the provision of medical services; the other is to refer the matter to the director of proceedings. So that’s the director of proceedings who looks after provisions under the Human Rights Act and, indeed, under the Health Disciplinary—I’m going to get the term right in a minute—the Health Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal, or to refer to the relevant professional body. So it could be to the Medical Association; it could be to the college of “whatever” for that professional body. So all of those provisions are there. That regime is there now that Alfred Ngaro’s Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 470 would otherwise set out—and if we adopt that SOP, we’d be replicating what is already there.

What can the Health Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal do? They can do a number of things. In terms of penalties, they can cancel or suspend registration. They can impose conditions on practice. They can censure the practitioner or impose a fine. So there is a full range of responses there that the Health and Disability Commissioner can trigger, having investigated somebody who has been mistreated or poorly treated or let down by an abortion service provider. So I hope that answers the question for Mr Brown.

I move, That the question be now put.

Jan Logie’s amendment to clause 11 set out on Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 325 is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee in relation to this SOP in Part 1. Jan Logie’s amendment to clause 11 in relation to section 182(1), set out on SOP 326, is out of order as being outside the scope of the bill.

The question was put that the amendments set out on Supplementary Order Paper 326 in the name of Jan Logie to new section 182(2) in clause 11 and clause 12 be agreed to.

Amendments not agreed to.

The question was put that the amendments set out on Supplementary Order Paper 478 in the name of Melissa Lee to Part 2 be agreed to.