Terrorism Suppression (Control Orders) Bill

Colleagues, that brings us to Part 2, debate on clauses 11 to 34, and I say to the Hon Mark Mitchell that that’s where his questions to the Minister properly lie. I call the honourable—

💬 Hon Andrew Little: Andrew Little.

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Anne Tolley): Andrew Little.

It’s late in the year, Madam Chair. We all understand that. This, Part 2, is the operative part and the critical part of the bill. It is the one that gives the court the power to make a control order on the application of the Commissioner of Police, and it is the Commissioner of Police who makes the application. One of the checks and balances on all this is that it is a High Court judge that issues the order. So the judge will look at all the evidence, the evidence of the risk that a particular person poses, the relevant person as defined in the Act, and that applies also the age restriction.

I know members, admittedly in the previous part, raised questions about the age, and I’ll repeat what I’ve said to some members in my office and in other conversations and here in the House as well: we know we can count, really, on the fingers of one hand the people whom this will apply to immediately, bearing in mind that this piece of legislation is for an immediate purpose, during the course of a thorough review of the entire Terrorism Suppression Act and on which this House can expect more significant changes in the future. But right now, we know the risk that is being posed. We know the people who are most likely to be affected by this legislation if they try to cross the border, and none of them are anywhere near the age of 18. At least, those who are under 18 are nowhere near the age of it; for those who are over the age of 18, of course, the legislation will apply. So I don’t think we need to trouble ourselves too much about that.

Then, clause 12 sets out the requirement to say whether it is an interim control order or a final control order. The significance there is that the whole scheme of this bill is that because we know who this is most likely going to apply to—and even if they’re not people we know now, they’re people whom we are likely to know of in advance of their coming back; in advance of their crossing the border. So this allows for the Commissioner of Police to make or to seek an order before the person is even in the country—before they return, before they cross the border. So the ability for the police to get ahead of that, make an order, persuade the judge, say that the safety of the community requires a number of constraints on this particular person—that is there.

Then, as soon as the person crosses the border, they are served with the order. The order applies immediately. They’re then given advice about how they can review it and are given access to legal aid for all that as well. All of that is in here. Then, if there is a review of it and there is then a change to it or there is an order, that becomes a final order. That approach achieves, I think, or strikes, a very important balance, knowing that this is placing constraints on the liberty of a person who won’t have been convicted of any crime, who is under suspicion, including very good suspicion, of committing terrorist acts abroad, as that is defined in the Terrorism Suppression Act, and who therefore poses a risk to the community. This strikes the right balance.

New Zealanders want to know they are safe, but they don’t want to live in a totalitarian country. They do want to know that there are appropriate safeguards, and this bill strikes the right balance in terms of those safeguards. Clause 16 sets out the range of requirements that may be imposed, and there’s a reasonably extensive list of them. They are things about constraining someone’s liberty. And I know members were somewhat cynical about anything that is about trying to rehabilitate, but if you look at international best practice—and I think of even countries like Indonesia; if you want to know a country that is seriously grappling with terrorism, both domestically and returning foreign terrorist fighters, Indonesia is not a bad place to start. What is critical to their programme of dealing with returning foreign terrorist fighters is that there is deradicalisation, there is rehabilitation, and there is reintegration—otherwise there wouldn’t be any point in having this.

The members opposite no doubt would just like to clap them in prison and with no safeguards at all. Well, actually, in a country that subscribes to the rule of law and the conventions and values that we do, we have to strike a balance between dealing with somebody who clearly poses a risk because of previous behaviour and actually upholding our basic values too. Yes, we want to put some constraints on it. We want to limit what they can do, where they can go, even to whom they can talk, but we want to give them a chance to rehabilitate and reintegrate. It’s pretty clear that if that isn’t achieved, if that’s not possible, then there are measures that can continue to be taken, and that is that the orders can continue to be applied for a period of up to six years. Any breach of the order during that time is a criminal offence and will be subject and dealt with criminally, and then, of course, the person affected by the order goes into a different regime. All of those things are accounted for and provided for in the bill, and that is as it should be.

There is provision for the service of the control order, and this takes account of the fact that the person whom it is about is unlikely to be in the country. If it is an order that applies to somebody who is in the country, then there is a process that covers that off as well. But I think we have to, in the circumstances in which this bill has been conceived, understand that both our intelligence and security agencies, and the police with their intelligence capabilities as well—we are right across the risks and the threats that are posed to New Zealand, and this bill allows us to deal with that.

Until this bill turned up, we had no means of doing this. We knew that returning foreign terrorist fighters was a problem but had no means of dealing with it. So now we will have a means to deal with it, and that is why all members of the House should support it, because it gives our police, our authorities, the tools to deal with a rising threat that previously our legislation didn’t allow to provide for—and no one had done anything about it. No one had done anything about it until now. It was the right thing to do, and it is the right thing to do in this.

Clause 21 provides for the information that has to be served with a control order. That also means that the person is advised on how they can challenge it or seek a review of it and how they can get access to assistance and advice to do that. Clause 22 allows the court to authorise entry to a place to serve the control order on a person who was affected by it. So the rest of the provisions there in this part deal with the mechanical aspects of that to make sure that all elements are covered off.

This is about a regime that deals with people who we cannot capture under our criminal justice system. And I know—and although it’s been disposed of—there was a provision that suggested it should apply to those who have committed a crime in New Zealand. People who commit a crime in New Zealand are already taken care of in our criminal justice system. This is to deal with people who have not been and cannot be processed under our criminal justice system, and provides a mechanism, a civil mechanism, that still allows us to place constraints on them, to put restrictions on them, so that they can change, be rehabilitated, but at the very least be kept safe from other people. That is the least we should do, and that is what we are doing, and that’s what this bill provides for.

These provisions are very important, and they all hang together. They all add up to greater safety, greater safety for the community, security around a person who poses a risk, but actually a meaningful opportunity to deal with that person in a way that means that they can be reintegrated safely into the community. We do that already. We don’t talk about it a lot, but there are people in communities who, with the benefit and the assistance and support of those communities, are undergoing deradicalisation.

Other countries are doing it because you have to do it; there’s no point in allowing people to float around with the kinds of anti-social, antithetical, dangerous ideas that some do without having a means and a mechanism to provide assistance and support to reintegrate and rehabilitate back into the community. That is just as much a part of anything as it is about the constraining measures that are about keeping people safe.

So I have explained the general purport of this part of the bill. I look forward to other members’ contributions.

Has the Minister in the chair, the Hon Andrew Little, just told us that there have been radicalised New Zealanders returning to this country after being away in some circumstance and have now been quietly pushed into the community with the agreement of some communities around New Zealand? Because I haven’t heard this; this was new today—right now.

💬 Hon Andrew Little: No. The member’s making that up.

Well, I’m just quoting what the member said. I’m asking the Minister to clarify, because the whole speech sounded to me very much like he was saying that, although we know these people are criminals, because they haven’t committed their crimes in New Zealand, we are going to have a law here that ensures that the New Zealand taxpayer makes a fair effort and goes to a reasonable cost to rehabilitate them. Well, I don’t think that’s a reasonable position at all. I don’t understand how anyone can be comfortable with that, particularly when the conditions that are put out under clause 16 here, where the examples of requirements that might be put into a control order are listed, are somewhat caveated all the way through by the relevant person—that should read “criminal terrorist”—agreeing to some of these things and having the full capacity to do so.

Particularly we look at clause 16(p), which says, “ require that the relevant person, if they have given and not withdrawn their informed consent to do so, engage with specified rehabilitative services (for example, alcohol and drug treatment services).” What does that mean? That if the person who is subject to a control order doesn’t give their consent to seek treatment for their condition—most likely it’ll be a psychological condition; most likely it will be something that needs to be washed out of their brains because they have been radicalised—if they don’t consent, then apparently it doesn’t stand. And it’s backed up in clause 19, where it says, “Limit on requiring relevant person”—the criminal terrorist—“to engage with specific rehabilitative services (1) No relevant person”—read that as “criminal terrorist”—“may be made, or may remain, subject to a requirement of the kind stated in section 16(p) unless the relevant person—(a) has been fully advised, by a person who is qualified to prescribe or provide the specified rehabilitative services, about their nature and their intended and likely effects and any known risks of engaging with them; and (b) is competent to make an informed choice and give informed consent to engaging with them”.

So they have to give, stated in two places, informed consent to the condition that’s applied by the courts. Now, if anyone was wondering whether or not this was a weak bill, this has to be the absolute convincing point. So the criminal terrorist turns up here; in four hours, there’s a control order put on them, and one of those control orders states that they’ve got to go through some sort of, what would you say, deradicalisation process—apparently that’s happening informally in the community at the moment; something new we learned tonight—and they can’t give their informed consent, then that’s it. What sort of a protection is that for the New Zealand public? And as for the time it’s taken for this bill to get here, let’s be very clear: the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria was in full swing up until about 18 months ago, when there was such an activity in the fight against them that they began to collapse. They began to run and they began to scatter. They began to hide themselves in refugee camps, and they began to do what Mark Taylor has done: present themselves as being victims of some horrible regime that they never really wanted to be a part of. But we know full well that, if it hadn’t been for their defeat, they would have been out there today still participating in those sorts of terrorist activities.

So there was a necessity, certainly, to make sure that New Zealand’s borders were protected, but this Minister has been in office for two years. Two years and it’s suddenly dropped in the House under urgency, rushed through a select committee process, and put in front of us. I’d like to know: is that Minister in receipt of information that suggests that there are people waiting at the borders right now to come on in? Can he answer that question? Why is it that someone who has a control order on them has to give their informed consent to its effect?

Thank you, Madam Chair. I might pick up, actually, on the informed consent element that the Hon Gerry Brownlee just touched on. The potential nature of these New Zealand terrorists returning is that either they will be of such—well, I referenced it in Part 1: that they may not present, actually, as psychopathically or sociopathically wrong. They may be smart enough to, if you will, not give their informed consent, or you are going to be dealing with people who are so damaged, not just because of their fundamentalist viewpoints but actually a psychologist or a psychiatrist will be able to say that they cannot present their informed consent—and that leads to a whole series of problems out of clause 16 where, actually, those conditions which have to be imposed with the informed consent of the terrorist doesn’t fly. It’d be good to have that commented on, but it’s just another illustration of the potential weaknesses.

I return to that theme of these things which are low probability—and the Minister has raised that there is a low probability, say, of young people coming back—but I repeat again: while it’s low probability, the risks are incredibly high. It’s been one of the great debates, right through the select committee, of making sure that we understand that we are dealing with a very different group of people here. This is not the person who steals your bike or breaks into your home; this is a person who is more than willing to absolutely destroy you because they don’t believe in any of the values that we hold dear. I suppose that’s been one of the fundamental points when we’re dealing particularly with the Greens and those left aligned: they don’t hold our values in any way, shape, or form. The idea that we could sit down and have a cup of tea and talk about the wonderful, progressive values in being a modern, diverse society—they will laugh and then cut your head off and then continue drinking the cup of tea and think that they are right. We’re dealing with a very different class of people here.

I want to try and focus, depending on my time, on the question of the renewal—so that’s clause 25—and I want to draw attention to my Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 424, which is, basically, saying that we need to scrap that clause. New Zealand will be in a very strange situation if this bill passes: that these control orders will only apply for a maximum of six years. And, predictably enough that I’ve put forward this SOP, I’m indicating that we need to not limit the amount of time. If you want to take it on a positive step, it’s infinitely possible that someone returning to this country is a committed, zealous jihadist, transforms themselves in two years—and we’ll just use that for the sake of example—and can go back out into the community and the control order lapses. We all say, “Hooray!” and we live happily ever after. But it’s equally as logical that, after six years, a person has not changed, and I reject the Minister’s assertion at the start that this side of the House does not believe in rehabilitation. That is certainly not the case. I certainly hold that we want to do all we can. If we have to have these people back, I certainly want them to be well controlled and well monitored, but I do want to see them helped, to try and change them.

But I’m not naive enough to think that we will be able to change everyone, and I would like to see that this House enables this piece of legislation, by adopting SOP 424, that the control orders can continue. They’re not an infinite control order; this is not as if you are a terrorist and you return home and we’re going to slap the control order on you until you’re 105, and therefore it’s there year after year, decade after decade. It’s that, let’s say, every two years the court relooks at it and continues to apply the control order if required. That’s what other countries do, and I think it is prudent. As I say, I think there is a naivety if we think that, in six years, this is all done.

There’s been a lot of focus on the whole topic of rehabilitation, de-escalation, deradicalisation to reintegrate people into society—all good and noble things—but, actually, it doesn’t matter if we’re thinking of drugs, alcohol, or terrorism, we don’t always succeed. I’ve worked with people over many years with sort of the simpler addictions, if you will—other than the addiction of terrorism. You can do all the best of work with the best of intentions over many, many years; some change, and good for them, but many don’t.

And so, to illustrate the point, if I might, that while it’s a great intention of, I suspect again, the Green Party pulling the strings somewhat, that we’ll have these rehabilitation programmes, and I think the Hon Gerry Brownlee makes a good point that it’ll be on the taxpayers’ pocket, it may not succeed. Now, some people might say, “Well, that’s just being academic, Simon. You’re just theorising here. Of course, you know, after six wonderful years, we’ll be able to deradicalise these people. We’ll work with them. We’ll put them within their family.” They just say, “Look, you’re just being academic as you are always, Simon. You know, after six years, we’ll have sorted it out. We’ll put them out with their whānau and the wider community and it’ll be all sorted.”

Well, two weeks ago in London, a known jihadist who had been on the watch list—in fact, had been arrested over six years ago in the UK—went into Fishmongers’ Hall in London City and knifed to death two UK citizens. He then proceeded on to London Bridge with the absolute intent, from what we can see, to kill more people. He was only stopped by the bravery of those around him. So why I mentioned that is that he is a classic case—granted that of the UK, but we are not that different from the UK. He was a person who was a known terrorist, a known jihadist. As I understand things, he had been arrested, convicted, put through these rehabilitation programmes. He’d been taught how to be deradicalised. It was all tickety-boo and, to the extent that I can comment, was no longer being properly watched. It seemed that, after six years, this had all been solved. And if you extrapolate that to New Zealand, after six years of a control order it’s all now fine. As I say, six years and—it’s not serendipity, it’s the opposite of that—a terrible set of coincidences, after six years, this man, a known terrorist, went out and killed two people. I know it’s an emotional example. I know it can always be seen as playing politics. But, for me, it’s really just a simple but very real example coming out of a very similar country to New Zealand.

So I implore the Minister to consider Supplementary Order Paper 424. It’s one of my more simple SOPs. It just destroys the good work that the Parliamentary Counsel Office and others have done by removing an entire clause with one swipe. But, basically, if we just get rid of the renewal section, then the control orders can continue to be applied. Minister, I urge you to consider this. Obviously, it’s your call, but obviously I ask you to speak to why you, the Minister, believe that six years is just going to magically sort things, because, at the moment, if that person hasn’t fully gone through and been deradicalised, after six years the control orders lapse. That’s a problem and I don’t think we should presume that, in those six years, if someone is not deradicalised, they’ve gone ahead and created some problem themselves; that they’ve, in other words, gone and created some domestic crime which means we can hold them.

So I would just ask that the committee reflect on that recent, very real example out of the UK. A man, a known terrorist, a known jihadist was supposedly deradicalised after six years and goes out and kills innocent people—sadly and paradoxically—working on how to actually reintegrate people into the system. So it’s something that we need to look very, very seriously at.

And again, I just implore—and I’ll begin to wrap up here—that the Minister and the committee in general actually consider just removing clause 25. Let’s just delete it in its entirety and allow that these control orders can continue—well, continue as long as needed. As I stress, they don’t have to apply for ever. They don’t have to apply for six years. They could apply for less if for some remarkable reason a person is changed. But I don’t think, if we’re going to argue a rehabilitative mind-set—and it’s just the logic of humanity: if we can rehabilitate a person, it goes without saying, Minister, that there are those that we cannot. And I think if we’re going to pass this law in good and right proper order for the safety of the realm, then we should really consider SOP 424. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Minister Little, I’m going to address some of your opening comments and I would ask you to take a call in response to them. They are important.

The first one is around the fact that your opening comment was that, in your briefings and the information that you have, you clearly understand who the individuals are and where the threat lies. And I accept you on your word on that. I believe that, when we were in Government, we were seeing the same briefings. But you’re operating on this premise that that is the only threat, that we absolutely, 100 percent without any doubt know how many people are overseas, how many Kiwis are overseas, how many have engaged in some sort of terror activity, and when they’re likely to come back. And I can tell you absolutely, categorically, there is not one intelligence agency in this world, there is not one country in this world that can say that they know categorically who the people are—the individuals, the threat that they pose.

Chris Penk made a very good point and it’s salient. He said—and this is the stuff that catches Governments out all the time: it’s what you don’t know. It’s what you don’t know. When we are talking about something as serious as our national security and public safety, then we should be doing everything that we can to pass legislation in this House that deals with the stuff that we don’t know. And you, Minister, are operating completely on the premise that you believe that you know, categorically—

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Ruth Dyson): The Hon Mark Mitchell, I know the Speaker made the Mark Mitchell ruling to be more lenient on the use of “you”, but just pull back from it.

Fair enough. Thank you, Madam Chair. So the Minister has stood in this House and very clearly stated that he knows without any doubt who the individuals are, who the people are, and what the threat is. So I’d ask him to stand in this Chamber again and tell me that I’m wrong.

You’re wrong.

So who was that?

💬 Hon Member: That was Clayton Mitchell.

Well, Clayton Mitchell from New Zealand First—Clayton Mitchell from New Zealand First, a guy that purports to be part of a party that stands up for law and order, for justice issues, and national security. Stand up and take a call, Clayton Mitchell. Stand up and take a call. Actually, have you read the bill?

Yeah, I have.

Have you read our Supplementary Order Papers? I’ll tell you what, you should be embarrassed that you are part of a party that’s standing and voting for a bill that’s been led by the Green Party. I can tell you right now: go out to one of your supporters, one of your New Zealand—there’s not many now. There’s not many, I admit that; they’re gone. But go out, try and find one of your supporters, and say, “Do you trust the Green Party with our national security?” They’ll laugh at you. They’ll laugh at you. And that’s why your numbers will continue to go down.

So I come back to the Minister in the chair, the Hon Andrew Little, and I’m asking you, Minister, to stand and take a call and respond to this question as well. If the Commissioner of Police knows that someone is coming back—[Minister in chair changes] Well, that’s a shame. I don’t have much faith in this Minister in the chair, the Hon Iain Lees-Galloway. His decision making has already been shown to be very poor around our national security. But I’d ask him anyway.

💬 Hon Member: Lets fighters in.

He does, but I’d ask him anyway. How is the Commissioner of Police going to ask for a control order to be issued by the High Court of New Zealand when someone arrives at our border that we weren’t aware was actually going to arrive until they get to the border? I just want the Minister to stand and tell the committee how the process is going to work as outlined in this paper in Part 2. How is the commissioner going to be able to inform the High Court so the High Court can get a control order in place to be able to pick up someone that arrives at our border when we weren’t aware or notified of them?

And that happens. That happens around the world all the time. Are we immune to that? Do we have this cloak of invincibility? No, we don’t. And it could happen to us and we should be making sure that we put in legislation through this House that can deal with it. So if the Minister could stand and take a call and explain to this committee how we’re going to pick that person up and how the High Court is going to have time to get a control order in place so they don’t walk straight out of that airport and straight into an unsuspecting population and community here at home in New Zealand. The police have been very clear. They’ve said to this Government the amendment that we put up to allow them to detain at the border—the message to this Government was that would be a welcome tool for them to be able to keep New Zealanders safe. Please take a call, Minister.

I do want to support the Supplementary Order Paper in the name of Simon O’Connor where he’s suggesting that six years as an absolute limit on control orders is a bit of a nonsense. There should be much greater discretion; it might be that it has to last for longer, and, obviously, the provisions here would mean it can last for a lesser period of time. But let’s say you’ve got someone who regularly breaches the conditions—not necessarily to a level where it can be proved that they’re engaging in criminal activity, but they might, for example, be associating inappropriately with others who’ve got a history of similar intention. Now, that would not be a criminal thing; it would simply be a breach of the control order. So they would be taken to court and they’d be subject to a fine of up to $2,000. Now, if it’s really serious—and we know how the courts work in New Zealand, we know what sort of direction they’d be looking at from the current Minister, they’re most unlikely to impose anything like that because they’ll say, “Well, the person involved probably can’t afford it.” So they certainly won’t look at the “up to one year” that they could put them in prison.

But it’s possible that someone breaches their control orders throughout those six years, organising some opportunity for a point beyond that time, and then, at the end of the six years, that’s it—they’re free, they’re clear, they can do what they like. But, of course, that is a preposterous situation, the Government will tell us, because, actually, all of the conditions under clause 16 in this bill allow massive freedom for the person who is subject to the control order.

Let’s look at just two of them—clause 16(h): “prohibit or restrict the relevant person from holding accounts, possessing certain financial instruments, or using specified financial services.” Now, that would seem reasonable. That means that this person cannot amass funds in New Zealand for the purposes of carrying out terrorist activity; perfectly reasonable. That’s something that most people would accept is not an unreasonable condition on a control order, until we step back in the bill to clause 11(3) and we see what the court has to think about when it’s imposing conditions in a control order. It is made very clear under clause 11(3)(a): “Consider how requirements [or a requirement], if imposed, will or may affect the person’s personal circumstances, for example, financial position, health, and privacy.” And that means that it’s almost impossible, in a country like New Zealand, where we do so much electronically and there is so little cash now in circulation, for a person to be denied the right to hold a bank account. Unless there is some sort of heavy surveillance over that bank account, no one will know whether it’s multiplied into others and what funds might flow through it and where they might be funnelled to, because to do that, of course, would also, under clause 11(3)(a), be a breach of privacy, which the courts cannot order. So that provision in clause 16 is rubbish. It is as much rubbish as the one I spoke about a few minutes ago.

Then we come to 16(j): “Require the relevant person to reside at a specified address agreed between the relevant person”—remember, relevant person is a criminal terrorist; agreeing with the judge, “Oh well, I’ll go and stay there, all right”—“and the Police.” The Police get to be involved as well; equal partners—the judge, the criminal terrorist, and the Police, all treated equally in this discussion. They work out where this person is going to reside for the next few years or however long it might be, and then they will say, “Well, that’s reasonable. We want to know where that person is.” Except that we then come to clause 17 in the bill, which says, “No requirement of the kind stated in section 16(j)”—so why was it even stated in the first place?—“can require the relevant person”—the criminal terrorist—“to remain at a specified address for more than 12 hours in any 24-hour period.” They can be a complete nomad, a total nomad, to go where they like in any 12 hours inside any 24 hours, and they can have a bank account, even though the court has made orders that affect both of those freedoms.

So the question we have got is: why? Why does the Government continue to insist that this is a strong bill that will deter these people from terrorist activity?

Thank you, Madam Chairperson. My contribution this evening is in support of the eight Supplementary Order Papers (SOPs) that the National Party proposes on the basis that the safety of New Zealanders is paramount to National and that we undertake our national security obligations very seriously. I would like to comment, also, on the debates that have been happening tonight, in that I see that both sides are seriously concerned about making sure that no terrorist activity again happens in New Zealand, and that is why the passions are high on both sides. We are all wanting to achieve the same level of protection for all New Zealanders, and that is why we have proposed these SOPs that only seek to strengthen the Terrorism Suppression (Control Orders) Bill.

To me, it seems unfortunate that there has been a blanket voting down of these SOPs, 418 and 419, referring to the age of potential terrorists coming into New Zealand as being youthful, which is globally supported by evidence in many countries, already, that this is happening. We are living in an increasingly complex security environment. It is vital that our legislation be effective and fit for purpose. So, again, pointing out that the SOPs are meant to do this, to make it more effective, to make it more fit for purpose; there is simply no leeway for experimentation and getting it wrong. In particular, I speak about SOP 424 as it relates to SOP 423—which is in my name—as we seek to amend clause 24 of the bill. SOP 423 proposes to require that the registrar of the High Court give notice to the Police Commissioner of all expiring final control orders that are about to expire, and that the notice must be given by the registrar to the Police at least two months before the date when that final control order is to expire.

The object is, quite clearly, just to ensure that a new application can be made and that there is sufficient time for an order to be issued. This is actually very similar to what the Hon Mark Mitchell was referring to, in that when a person arrives and we are not aware that he is a terrorist or that he is not on our record as a terrorist, there is insufficient time for the courts to be able to issue a control order, even given a minimum of four hours to be able to do so once the control orders are applied for.

So this is a similar situation where a control order is coming to its expiration date and there is a need to ensure that there is ample time to apply for a new one. It does not mean that the control order will be renewed. It still needs to be justified and considered necessary.

We simply do not wish to place New Zealanders at risk, and I think this is a common goal for everyone. I ask members to think through towards strengthening this legislation and voting for these SOPs 423 and 424. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Going further through clause 16, which is the conditions that might be applied in a control order, one of those might be to require the person, as I said earlier, to undergo some kind of rehabilitative programme. The Minister spoke extensively about this. He’d assumed that the courts, upon understanding what the Government’s intentions are, would be inclined to suggest to a person by putting it in a control order—and I say that because it’s a nice bill and it’s really voluntary on the part of the criminal terrorist as to whether they are part of this or not, and that’s quite clear as we’ve gone through this.

If they say to them, “Look, you must undertake some kind of rehabilitative process. You might need to go through a deradicalisation programme. You need psychological treatment to straighten yourself up and to understand what it’s like to live in a free country where people can have free thought, but not to a point that their ideology starts to threaten the safety and security of others in the country.”, yes, they will be required to do that. But what if they just say, “No, I’m not going to do it.”? Well, what happens then?

I would like the Minister in the chair, the Hon Iain Lees-Galloway, to stand up and tell us what happens then, because what I can see here is that, under clause 31, there would be a potential breach of the control order and that could mean that the person is subject to up to a $2,000 fine or a one-year imprisonment. We know that no court would ever go that far—they don’t; they’re all soft, except when it comes to dealing with people they think can afford these things—and then, when we go further into this, we find that there is actually a provision in here that says that if someone chooses not to participate in that way, then they are not in breach, as they would be as stated under clause 31. They’re not subject to it. So, effectively, there is no requirement on them to participate in that anti-radicalisation service, or if it’s drugs or alcohol, or some other such that the courts have ordered, it’s very clear that if they decide that they’re not going to participate in that, it is not a breach of the control order. Now, how is this in any way in line with the concept of rehabilitation?

It just adds to the general duplicity of all the statements coming from the Government parties about what this bill can achieve. We’ve seen that there is no prohibition of any great meaningful impost on the criminal terrorist with regards to movement around the country. We’ve seen that there is no way that any court is going to take away their right to engage in financial transactions in New Zealand. It’s specified in here that they’ve got to think about what that would mean for their lives. If they suddenly said, “Well, that would mean you’d have to go to Uncle Somebody to get your pocket money.”, well, that also would be against the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, which, of course, is specifically a requirement for the courts to consider when it comes to these people. Now, we find that if they are required to go through any of these services, then if they simply say, “No, not doing it.”—it’s under clause 19(4) of the bill, in fact: “A relevant person”—a criminal terrorist—“who withholds, or withdraws, informed consent [to one of these programmes] does not breach the relevant requirement for the purposes of section 31”.

So what we’ve got in this bill is all these freedoms given to the criminal terrorist but, at the same time, the public are duped with the concept of the courts being able to apply all these controlled circumstances on the criminal terrorist who turns up here. Well, I’ve got to say that there is no way that this bill is adequate for the protection of New Zealanders against people who would come into this country, want to live here, and enjoy the freedoms that we have here, but show no will to change the way that they operate. And, remember, they are criminal terrorists—we know that.

I move, That the question be now put.

This has got quite a substantial amount in Part 2, so I’m not prepared to put that leave yet. But I would recommend to members that they speak to Part 2 and perhaps not be nearly as repetitious or, actually, boring, as some of the contributions have been. It should be fresh material. There’s plenty to choose from, so I would invite the Hon Mark Mitchell to lead in that fashion.

💬 Hon GERRY BROWNLEE: I raise a point of order, Madam Chairperson. I don’t know what you’re talking to, but I’ve raised in every speech I’ve had a new aspect of this bill, demonstrating its inadequacy—

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Ruth Dyson): Well, I admire the leadership, and the Hon Mark Mitchell can—

💬 Hon GERRY BROWNLEE: —and not one of those thoughts has been answered by the Minister.

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Ruth Dyson): The Hon Mark Mitchell can continue in that fashion.

Thank you, Madam Chair. There’s another question I have for the Minister in the chair, the Hon Iain Lees-Galloway, carrying on the theme that the Hon Gerry Brownlee was talking about. It is that when we have someone returning to New Zealand that has chosen to go and operate in a country like Syria and that has been involved—and we have the intelligence to say that they have been involved—or has been the sponsor of or has been supporting some type of terror activity, they pose a risk when they come back to New Zealand. This new definition that’s been introduced, thanks to our friends over here in the Green Party, is “real risk”. What does “real risk” mean, because, to us, all we’ve seen is a raising and making it harder for our intelligence agencies to use the intelligence and information that they have to be able to make a case or show that someone returning to New Zealand is a risk.

I’m not willing—I’m not willing—to move those tests and make it easier for someone to come back to New Zealand and walk out through the arrival gates and out into the community. I think there has to be a real test, a robust test, that’s provided. And, by the way, please, someone take a call—maybe the Greens could do this—and explain to us what the difference is between—

Chlöe Swarbrick: Get some new material.

—the definition of a “risk” and the definition of a “real risk”. Take a call, Chlöe Swarbrick, and actually explain to us what is the difference. What’s the difference between risk and—she doesn’t know. She doesn’t know and has got absolutely no idea herself what that means.

So someone take a call and tell us, because I’ll tell you what—I’ll tell you what—I actually feel that if someone is arriving in our country that’s chosen to travel to Syria and has chosen to associate with known terrorists and comes back to New Zealand, we want to know what they’re doing. We want to know what their intent is. I don’t want them to walk out the departure gate at Auckland Airport and jump into a car and drive down to the Auckland Viaduct—and we’ve seen these low-tech attacks happen all over the world—

💬 Hon Julie Anne Genter: The only actual terrorist attack was from an Australian white supremacist.

—and go and drive into a crowded cafe and kill Kiwis, right? So take a call. The Greens now, apparently, seem to have found their voice. Stand and take a call. If you’ve got an issue to make and if you want to talk to this bill, then take a call and make your point.

The other thing that I’d raise is, quite simply, this: the Police, in the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, told us they were very clear about the fact that, if a control order couldn’t be put in place and the Customs Service could only hold the person for four hours, they couldn’t get surveillance in place in time.

So I want to know. I want the Minister—and I’ve asked this question now, Madam Chair, and this is the fourth time that I’ve asked the Minister for a response and to answer in detail—

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Ruth Dyson): Yep, that’s right—very repetitive.

Yeah, that’s right—it is. Have we had a response from the Minister? It’s a very clear—very clear—question. It’s fundamental to the purpose and the intent of this bill. It fails at the first hurdle. Not one Minister has been able to stand and give this committee a clear answer in terms of how we will get a control order in place when the police and the agencies responsible for actually using this legislation have very clearly told us, through the select committee process, that they cannot do it. So I think it is a very important matter.

I’d like the Green Party to stand and explain to us, tell us how it’s going to work. I don’t think you can. I don’t even think you’ve read the bill, either. I don’t think you’ve got any understanding at all in terms of what was said. I’ll tell you one thing. I’ll tell you one thing.

💬 Simon O’Connor: The great experience of Chlöe Swarbrick.

Yeah, that’s right. I’m sorry, but are we going to trust you with our national security? Forget about it—forget about it. The rest of the country aren’t going to trust you either, trust me on that one.

I want the Minister in the chair, the Hon Iain Lees-Galloway, to be able to stand and explain to us the difference between “risk” and “real risk”, and tell us how a control order is going to be put in place. I’m glad to see that he’s getting advice. We might actually now get an answer. Explain to me how a control order—an interim control order—is going to be in place for someone that arrives at our border that we weren’t already notified of. The High Court has to issue a control order before they leave the airport where they’re relying on shonky legislation.

The poor old Customs officials that appeared in front of the select committee tried to make the point that actually they operate under a very different piece of legislation. Tell us, Minister, how, without breaking the law, they’re actually going to hold someone for four hours. Thank you, Madam Chair.

The question was put that the amendments set out on Supplementary Order Paper 415 in the name of the Hon Andrew Little to Part 2 be agreed to.

Votes will be conducted in silence. The Hon Mark Mitchell has been here long enough to know that rule. Please comply with it.

The Hon Mark Mitchell’s amendments to clauses 16, 17, 18, and 19 set out on Supplementary Order Paper 420 are out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee in relation to Supplementary Order Paper 415.

The question was put that the amendments set out on Supplementary Order Paper 421 in the name of the Hon Mark Mitchell to clause 16 be agreed to.

The Hon Mark Mitchell’s amendment to clauses 20 and 24 set out on Supplementary Order Paper 419 are out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

The question was put that the amendment set out on Supplementary Order Paper 422 in the name of the Hon Mark Mitchell to insert new clause 21A be agreed to.