Referendums Framework Bill

Clause 3 of this bill exposes the rort that is behind this bill. I want to reflect on what the Minister in the chair, Andrew Little, said in introducing this bill when it first came into the House. He said, “This has nothing to do with the particular coalition issues the Government has.” He said, “We need a framework, a framework for referendum so that when we have issues that are required to go to a referendum, we can then manage them.” Except clause 3 says that this is a power that’s only going to be given to the current Government. That is, what the Government is saying is, “We’re going to grab the powers off the Parliament to set the topics and the wording of referendum, but we’re only going to do it for us; it’s not a power that we ever want to give to a future Government.” That, in my view, just exposes how shallow and opportunistic this bill is.

This bill is not about providing a sound framework for referendum to be held at general elections. We know from the Legislation Advisory Committee—in their submission, they made the point very strongly that this bill compromises free and fair elections, that this bill is a fundamental shift of power from the Parliament to the executive, and they argued that by having a termination clause that this bill only applies to the current Government really does undermine it being a genuine electoral reform for advancing and improving New Zealand’s democracy. This is a crude, dirty deal to be able to hold the Government together with the diametrically opposed views between the Green Party and New Zealand First on cannabis. So “Let’s break the conventions around every one of New Zealand’s 20 referendum held at general elections being authorised by the Parliament. Let’s take Parliament out of the picture, but let’s just do it for us.”

Here’s a question I’ve got for members opposite. If a future National Government wanted legislation of this sort and give the power to Cabinet so that a future National Cabinet could just decide to have a referendum on getting rid of the Māori seats—let’s have a referendum on capping the amount of tax, capping the amount of debt, any of those issues—would members opposite agree that that’s appropriate? Absolute silence. Every Labour member in the Chamber has got their head down. They know that if National did that, they would object. We know from their own track record they would object. When we had the flag referendum, they argued very strongly that there should be a full parliamentary process about the issue of the flag.

So can some Labour member please put the case as to why Labour’s position on referendum is that they should go through a full parliamentary process when it comes to flags when National’s the Government, but when Labour’s the Government they can have a different set of rules. Can some Labour member explain to me why this only applies—if the Minister in the chair is correct and this is a sensible long-term reform so that Governments can have referendum, why does clause 3 say it only applies to 2020? It’s because it’s a rort. It’s because it’s against New Zealand’s democratic traditions. It’s because this is the power that they want, but they don’t want any future National Government to have.

Well, actually, the National Party has high values around electoral law, and that’s why every—

💬 Hon Andrew Little: Ha, ha!

The member in the chair laughs. Let me put the case. Every single electoral law introduced by Amy Adams, Judith Collins, and Simon Power was consulted on with the Opposition. What consultation was there with the National Opposition on this bill or the other two? Zero—zero! Not one Government electoral law reform bill was passed by the previous Government without multiparty support. This has none. This provision, clause 3 of this bill, does expose the fact that this is a bill of political convenience. This is a bill that, as the Legislation Design and Advisory Committee says, the moment one Government pulls this dirty trick, it has changed the convention of 165 years and it gives licence to any future Government in New Zealand to use the same. That’s sad for New Zealand’s democracy. The right to call a referendum at a general election and the right to determine the wording should rest with Parliament.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Clause 3 relates to the repeal of the Referendums Framework Bill and it’s my submission, if I can put it like that, that, actually, this clause is completely unnecessary because one of a few different scenarios will apply after the next election. And the reason I’m talking about the next election, of course, the next general election even, is that that’s exactly what the bill sets up: a regime to apply only up to and including that date.

So the reasons that there’s no need to have this provision repealing the Act on 1 July 2022 are that the Labour members, Minister Little and perhaps others, have indicated that if they are returned to Government, then they will look to replace this regime with a more root and branch reform, a more thoroughgoing review and reform—I think was the expression—of the electoral law. So in that case, it would be perfectly open to them, in that unfortunate situation that they are returned to power, to simply repeal the Act at this time. So we don’t need a specific provision in there at the moment for it.

The other possibility following the election, is that National would be—I won’t say “returned to Government”—“returned” in the sense of coming back to the Treasury benches, having had a three-year interregnum, three years of neglect. So in that scenario, I am reasonably confident that National would repeal this particular piece of legislation and so we don’t need particularly to have that set out as an automatic mechanism. In fact, I think that we’d all on this side of the House—when we’re on that side of the House; the other side of the House—take great pleasure in doing so. So it would be a shame to deny us that great opportunity. And so I suppose we’d have the opportunity to try and beat the clock and repeal it before 1 July 2022.

But the other reason—and it’s more structural and relating to the bill itself and not merely my reflections on the politics of the day—that this clause is actually unnecessary is because it sets out very clearly elsewhere that it will be applying only to the next general election after the bill is passed into law. In other words, there’s no need to repeal it following the general election of 2020, because it will be ineffective albeit still in force from that time onwards. So actually, there’s no need for that provision, as I’ve said now, and I think I have provided three pretty decent reasons.

The question then becomes: why are we repealing it on 1 July 2022? If there’s some particular significance to that date—for example, the end of the world—then that would be worth knowing. Although in that situation, as well, I suppose there’s not much point in needing to repeal the Act. It would probably be the least of our concerns at that time. But actually, logically speaking, if we were to set up a regime whereby the Act would be automatically repealed, then—I just remind you, Madam Chair. Excuse me, I miscalculated my time. I was going to give you a two-minute warning for the benefit of all concerned, but, in fact, it’s a five-minute call; it just feels longer.

The logical thing to do would be to have the Act automatically repealed the day after the next general election, because what we’ve got is some sort of funny arrangement where we’ve got, roughly speaking, two years—maybe a bit less, maybe a bit more than that—following the next election until the point at which it’s repealed. So we’ll sort of be in a no man’s land, if you’ll excuse the gender-specific expression—I probably shouldn’t use that—a no person’s land, if you’ll excuse the species-specific description.

In any case, I’m just going to sort of move on and I think at that point, with the bell ringing, I think that’s probably regarded as being saved by the bell. And in any case, I’d like to see the Act repealed a lot sooner; in fact, probably preferable still to all those different scenarios I’ve outlined, not to pass the wretched thing in the first place.

Thank you, Madam Chair, and I very much appreciate the opportunity to begin my contribution to this debate. This is one of these debates that you can sit and listen to, as I have been; in fact, I’ve been listening up in my office as it has unfolded. In fact, it’s one of those unique environments where you can have the volume down and still hear my colleague.

💬 Hon Dr Nick Smith: Nobody ever doubts what I’m thinking.

This is true, but there is a point here of integrity. When you actually cut to the core of the debate that we’re having, this is one of integrity and whether the proposition of, essentially, this Minister, the Minister of Justice, and the Government that sits in support of this passes the sniff test. And what it is to me is we have a Minister who prides himself on holding himself and his ministry and his contributions to a high level of integrity. Yet when I look and read on this, where it is, essentially, saying that the convention that we have always had, that it is this Parliament that, ultimately, debates and discusses and designs and signs off on particular points of referendums, which have a high threshold in and of themselves—we have a history that it is issues of moment that we take to the country and we debate them here and how the question should be framed and it is Parliament that, ultimately, signs that off.

That is a principle, and I think it’s a principle that when you cut the politics, all of us in this House understand to have power and be enduring. And now we have a Minister in the chair who has not answered the specific question that my colleagues have put time and time again. Why would you deviate from that convention? Why would you deviate from that point of principle that this Parliament is best placed to debate and, finally, come to a considered view as to what the questions should be that we ask the nation to reflect on? That question has been put to him directly and there is silence, and I do not think it does him a service, for on so many other aspects of his contribution, whilst I am not aligned to his politics, I respect his perspective. But on this, on this bill, on this clause where the convention is broken, and rather than Parliament being the place where we finally land the wording of a national referendum, it is now to be taken to Cabinet. And I look across—

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Anne Tolley): In fairness, I say to the member, actually, it isn’t this clause. This clause repeals this piece of legislation.

Yes, and this clause says that once we have landed that position, it only applies for this Parliament and this election and then it returns back to normal convention. So why is that? Why do it in the first place when you have a convention that we all accept is the appropriate way to manage? Imbedded in this clause is an assumption that is what it should return to as a convention in the future, but this Minister is silent on why. What is the justification for the deviation from that convention that this Parliament is best placed to finally sign off on the design of questions that go to the country?

There are people, looking across, who actually understand. Actually, if you have a quiet conversation, probably, out there, they’d agree, but they’re not saying in here, and the fact that the Minister is silent I find unusual.

I look across to others who have high standing in terms of a position of integrity on some matters of constitutional issues—potentially even the Green Party. And I look and see the co-leader of the Green Party James Shaw, who is silent, has not made a contribution to this, and I ask him, as someone who is part of this Government: how comfortable is he that you have a convention that this Parliament is the place where we sign off and debate the wording of referendums that we take to the country, yet here we have a bill which says, “No—we’re going to take it to the purview of Cabinet just for this election, and then we’ll return it back to the convention.”? To the Minister: why the deviation? Can you please stand up and answer not only my question but also the country’s question: why the deviation?

I move, That the question be now put.

Well, I’ve been listening here tonight and taking the odd call on this Referendums Framework Bill. Here we are talking about clause 3. I had to do a double take. I could not believe that this bill is only for the next election and, in fact, is repealed after that in 2022. So while we have been debating the substance of the bill and whether Parliament should retain the authority to decide the question and the options for referendum, now we come to the piece of the bill which talks about repealing the law so that it’s only available for the next election.

Now, I have been thinking to myself: why is it that this only relates to 2020? If a bill is good enough for one election, why is it not good enough for other elections?

💬 Kieran McAnulty: Have a go, Yule.

Take a call, Kieran McAnulty. Please tell me why this law is only relevant for the next election and therefore will be repealed. To me, there can be only one reason, and one reason alone, why this bill is only applicable to the next election, and that is because it is a rort. It is rort, and this Government wants the ability to control the question and the options for the cannabis referendum, and that will only be decided by Cabinet, of which Labour and New Zealand First are party to.

I really would like someone on the other side to take a call and to explain. Otherwise, the public of New Zealand and members on this side of the House can only draw one conclusion: that this law is designed to game the system in a way that determines the question and the options only for the next Government in the next election.

This is clause 3 that we’re debating. I have yet to hear anyone from the other side—I have been in here since dinner time, and I have heard no one from the opposite side explain to me very clearly why it is that this bill relates to only 2020. If it is good enough for the House to consider at the next election, then surely it’s good enough for proceeding elections after that. So I would appreciate it if somebody, even the Minister in the chair, who’s gotten a bit comfy—he hasn’t gotten up in some time—could please explain to me and the public of New Zealand why this Act is applicable only in the next election—

💬 Raymond Huo: It’s all in the departmental report.

Well, take a call—take a call—and explain to the public of New Zealand why it is. Take a call, Raymond—take a call. All you have to do is take a call and you can explain the departmental report for the public of New Zealand and for members on this side of the Chamber who may not have read the departmental report.

So what we’re talking about here is very simple—why it is that this law applies to only one election—and we can draw only one conclusion from that, and that is that it is a rort to game the system, and members on that side of the Chamber, all they can do is laugh about it. All they can do is laugh. For them, this is a game. This is unbelievable that they are talking about taking the powers away from Parliament and putting them in the hands of a select few, and all they can do is laugh about it.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Look, I wish to talk about clause 3 specifically because this typifies the cynicism of this bill. It typifies exactly why we shouldn’t be supporting this bill. At the end of the day, we have a piece of legislation put before this House at the convenience of the Greens in some backroom deal that said, “We want to have a referendum on legalising cannabis.” That’s what this bill is about, and I notice the co-leader of the Green Party sits there quietly listening to the Leader of the House yet, at the end of the day, in any normal environment, he would be outraged—outraged—that this was happening, because for 165 years the Parliament of New Zealand has decided what the wording of a referendum would be, when it’s going to be done, and how it’s going to apply.

This specific clause says that, after this election, after we’ve had a referendum on legalising cannabis—and now, we know, on end of life choice—this provision vanishes. So 165 years, a coalition agreement comes along, the Greens do a deal in the back room—because legalising cannabis in New Zealand is so really important to the future of this country!—they do a deal and everybody on the other side laughs. They jest at what’s happening here, but this is a piece of legislation of convenience—no other reason, no integrity, no commonality with the history of the importance and the sanctity of this decision making. We can’t even debate in this House what the question is, and, at the end of the day, this House should be paramount. What we are doing here is allowing the executive of New Zealand to determine by Order in Council the wording of the referendum.

We’ve heard from the Minister tonight that, at some stage next year, we will see a clear draft of the wording of the legislation. We don’t actually know yet whether the referendum is going to be binding, and here we are at nearly 10 p.m. deciding as part of this that, after 2020, this will vanish off the radar.

💬 Hon Scott Simpson: Into the ether.

Into the ether. In the meantime, there is nothing whatsoever to stop Cabinet, by Order in Council, from promoting other referenda at the 2020 election. Now, the Minister has shaken his head tonight when other people have suggested that, but so far I haven’t heard him stand up and say there is not going to be another topic discussed at a referendum. So we could have, through the rest of this Parliament, a decision made by Cabinet to simply put another issue before us.

I’m sorry to interrupt the member, but the time has come for us to report progress.

House resumed.

The Chairperson reported progress on the Referendums Framework Bill.

Report adopted.

The House adjourned at 9.55 p.m.