Annual Review Debate — External Sector

Thank you very much, Madam Chair—

💬 Hon Member: Oh, this’ll be great.

Well, no, it probably won’t be great, actually, because as the chair of the committee, I have to be relatively neutral, so I’ve got to actually behave myself for the next five minutes, which is rather disappointing, but anyway, we’ll give it a crack. Look, in all seriousness, can I start by thanking all the members of the select committee from across the House who have worked through these reports. I think it’s fair to say that the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee works robustly but collegially. But can I also record at the start my thanks to all of those who work within the various sectors, be it defence, Antarctica New Zealand, customs, foreign affairs, overseas development—they are the ones who make a difference day by day.

I thought I’d just go through several of the reports noting various elements which I thought were important, and I’ll leave the politicking to others who will follow in my wake. Look, importantly—and I’m sure others in this debate have noted—we’ve been dealing with the 2017-2018 Budget. So, actually, some elements of what we’re discussing were coming through the then National Government and then moving into the Labour Government side of things.

When we start with—if I was just going through the order in the book—defence, we know that a substantial spend there of something like $20 million or so into defence—actually not a large spend when one considers other countries. I’m not trying to compare New Zealand to the likes of America, but not a substantial spend. But what’s really important is just what our defence forces are able to achieve with those moneys. Look, obviously, the committee took a lot of time talking with both NZDF, the New Zealand Defence Force, and the Ministry of Defence. They are two actual separate groups that come together when presenting to us. Great interest in the various deployments that New Zealand has—and I suppose it’s important at this time to, quite rightly, acknowledge our men and women serving overseas. A particular focus in the select committee around how the defence forces are working not only around climate change—working there on some really interesting insights, I would suggest—but also some discussion around how defence is working around drug trafficking. We did talk a little bit around the location of bases. In fact, there was a bit of discussion too around why Singapore has not continued an idea to bring down some of its fighter jets. It’s perhaps timely to note that we had some discussion of banning foreigners and those from overseas purchasing land. It’s my understanding that that’s something which has contributed to Singapore’s decision not to come here and to set up a base at Ōhākea.

Customs—I’ll get to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) at the end; they’re the big one—quite a substantial spend of about $204 million, but I thought quite interesting, perhaps, for the House to note that they intercepted over $345 million of illicit drugs, and if I was to be somewhat tongue in cheek, the current Government wanting to basically decriminalise the lot of it—are we going to lose $345 million of illicit drug interception moneys? We’ll soon find out.

There were a number of questions around the Joint Border Management System in the committee. We’re just interested in how that has integrated in, and, by and large, it sounds positive but some work still to be done. It was quite interesting as well to hear from customs of the work they’re trying to do in anticipation of Brexit.

The New Zealand Antarctic Institute, obviously, has Antarctica New Zealand. They do a remarkable job. I’m somewhat biased in saying that, in that a few days after I’d actually returned from Antarctica itself, we had the team come in front of us. Look, they are looking to do a base upgrade—it’ll be interesting to see what comes up in the Budget this year—and what they saw as relatively positive is a new science platform, some funding now ring-fenced quite particularly to be able to give to scientists to do this science. Antarctica New Zealand provides the support to scientists at the moment; now they get to actually provide some funding.

Look, with MFAT, a substantial spend—look, we were really interested, obviously, in the relationship with China. We’re noting, obviously, the words that were in the defence statement which have upset China. We were very conscious at the time—very few ministerial visits, concerns around the free-trade agreement, and concerns around the Middle East certainly came up in the committee; concerns that New Zealand was not playing a solid role speaking out against terrorist groups such as Hamas but readily quick to slam the likes of Israel, and we think that’s all a bit mixed up.

But I want to conclude by acknowledging Brook Barrington—he was the chief executive of MFAT; he stood down—and to use this opportunity in the final seconds to acknowledge his service to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to welcome Chris Seed as the new chief executive, and, if I might, an encouragement to members to read Brook Barrington’s two-page contribution.

Just before I called the honourable member, I just want to remind members that these are five-minute calls. If you go over the five minutes, I could regard them as a second call, and I don’t think your whips will be entirely happy about that. So you must sit down as soon as the bell is rung.

Madam Chair, thank you very much. I’m very pleased to speak on this part of the debate on the foreign affairs and trade annual review that came before our committee. I want to start where my colleague left off in recognising the work of Brook Barrington, who, since 2015, was the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Brook, who is a very able diplomat, led the ministry through a number of changes and challenges and, most interestingly, led it in a direction where it was more engaged both within New Zealand and in other parts around the world.

At the back of at least the document I’ve got, we’ve attached the reflections or the speech or the talk that Brook Barrington gave in the committee, and it was one of the better speeches I have heard that sums up exactly our position and where we sit. If I may, I want to quote a piece of this because I think it’s very important that the Government takes note of the expert advice from the expert in foreign affairs when it considers what it should be doing currently in the days and years ahead.

Mr Barrington said—and I quote—“Mr Chair, the ministry acts in the world to make New Zealanders [safe] and more prosperous. And that world has become more complicated. It is possible to find [cause] for optimism and opportunity, of course. But the daily reality is that [the] global power is being contested and significant pressure is being placed on the existing international system and on many of the principles and rules that underpin it, to which could be added pervasive challenges like climate change, unregulated migration, and uneven access to … benefits of globalisation, which are fuelling uncertainty and nationalistic responses. As a result, predictability, one of the rivets of international affairs, is sprung. This is playing out most [dramatically] in our own hemisphere.” And I end the quote there.

The reason I wanted to read that is it actually talks to or speaks to New Zealand’s place in the world, how we see ourselves, and how, as a small nation, successive Governments and successive Ministers of Foreign Affairs have been out talking about the values that New Zealand has, promoting them on the world stage, and actually using our voice with influence greater than our size and location would suggest. If there was anything I would implore the current Government to do, it would be to spend more time with our friends and partners and those that we are yet to agree as much as we want to with internationally overseas.

They often say that foreign affairs and trade is about not what you do within your own country but the things you do externally, and it is very important for a country like New Zealand—a small country—that we are overseas as much as we practicably can be, reminding people of who we are and fighting for a better deal for Kiwis. And I do want to recognise that the Government has of late been out to different parts of the world, but I would suggest—and say I would criticise—that they have been far too slow to do so. It seems that in the foreign policy area most of the Government’s interest has been domestically—what New Zealanders think only.

It is important we take New Zealanders with us, but the challenge or concern that we have is that if we’re only here talking about foreign policy in New Zealand and not overseas persuading others as much as we need to be, then New Zealanders will miss out, New Zealand will miss out, and we will be left behind.

There is an example in this document, and we questioned quite widely in detail about this: the wording of the defence policy statement regarding China. I don’t want to rehash this and go over it, but, as we questioned and looked at that, it is clear to us that there was a difference of view of the type of wording between defence and the foreign ministry. That’s not unusual. Those sorts of things happen. Our experts will work this through.

But what is most concerning is the suggestion that at a political level, at a ministerial level, the different ministries were led in directions that those experts perhaps did not feel comfortable with. I see the Minister in the chair, Ron Mark, has an opportunity to clarify that: whether or not the Government, through the Ministers, were pushing their officials in a direction when it comes to the language of how we treated China in that defence policy document in such a way that those officials were concerned or actually were not able to give the advice that they thought that they should. If that was the case, it would be a travesty for foreign policy.

Finally, when it comes to another area, was the advice the ministry had to give over the World Trade Organization (WTO) compatibility of the Provincial Growth Fund. I think what happened here is Mr Jones had to be worked over by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, because he did say at the time he didn’t care about the WTO. Actually, a country like New Zealand must care about those rules-based approaches to things, and Mr Jones himself, as a Minister with a very large amount of money to try and spend, must adhere to international rules and law and shouldn’t be saying as a Minister he doesn’t care about our international obligations.

Thank you, Madam Chair. One of the problems with this debate, of course, is that five minutes goes all too quickly and we have a number of different entities that we had the privilege of hearing from during the course of our estimates considerations.

I’d like to start at the end just so that I can give a bit of an acknowledgement to the New Zealand Antarctic Institute because they do fine work and quite often they get overlooked in this particular debate. They’re a Crown entity established under the Act of 1996 to ensure that Antarctica and the Southern Ocean are protected, valued, and understood. I do want to acknowledge, while the Minister of Defence is in the chair, that they couldn’t do their work without the huge support that they get from the New Zealand Defence Force. They are two entities that work very well together and do an extraordinarily good job.

Antarctica New Zealand receives 97 percent of its funding from the Vote Foreign Affairs and Trade budget, hence the fact that it’s a very important entity for us to consider. And they are doing great work, particularly with the modernisation of Scott Base, which is vital to ensure that we have the very best facilities and equipment and accommodation down there. It’s a pretty unforgiving climate, particularly in the middle of winter, and I am delighted that great work is being done there.

Can I jump back, while the Minister of Defence is in the chair, to just say how much I appreciated the privilege of joining him earlier this year in going on a trip with himself; Commander, Joint Forces New Zealand from New Zealand Defence Force; and some other personnel to visit New Zealanders who are deployed in the Middle East and South Sudan. And, of course, in South Sudan we were meeting with the United Nations mission there, which was headed by the former Labour leader David Shearer. What a superb job he is doing, and what a pleasure it was to hear how highly regarded David Shearer and his team are.

Again, it’s just not possible to do justice to everything in this short call, but I was really struck on that trip by how proud we may all be of the fine service of the New Zealand men and women in the New Zealand Defence Force. Their contribution punches well above the weight that you might expect of a small country, and in every respect they are extraordinarily highly regarded. I know the Minister is very proud of them, and with very good reason. I was too, and I think that New Zealand is doing a tremendous job in international peacekeeping missions in the Sinai and so many other theatres of huge conflict over the years.

Let me now jump, in the remaining time, to talk about the New Zealand Customs Service, because I had the privilege of being the Minister of Customs back in the dying days of the previous National Government and I am a huge supporter of New Zealand customs. They are doing tremendous work.

Let me put on the record, for those who may be listening. They have three core functions: protecting New Zealand by reducing the risks associated with international trade and travel—and most of us have the opportunity to interact with customs as we go through customs at airports in particular—they promote and facilitate trade and travel by efficiently processing imports and travellers arriving into New Zealand—not so many people are aware of those, but certainly those who are in business as importers and exporters are, and I know that they are vitally dependent on the efficiency which is at a very high standard in the New Zealand Customs Service—and also the collection of revenue including duties, excise levies, GST on imports, and fees. Most recently, the Government has moved to, I think, balance the ledger by bringing tax on to low level goods from offshore, because I know that many retailers in New Zealand had felt that they were at a competitive disadvantage, and this was an issue that was certainly on my table when I was Minister, and I acknowledge the fact that that has made some progress.

I do want to acknowledge the leadership that was provided by the Acting Comptroller of Customs Christine Stevenson, who took over in my time and was a very fine chief executive of customs. Particularly, I want to acknowledge the work that customs does in a collaborative way with other agencies such as the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI). They have the Joint Border Management System, which is a joint initiative of customs and MPI focused on modernising and aligning their computerised border systems and producing data to identify risks and future trends. This is just so important because the threats to New Zealand’s borders are becoming more and more sophisticated, and it’s so vital that those agencies are working together. Several work streams have come out of that initiative, including the establishment of a joint border analytics team and the vitally important Trade Single Window system. And I had the opportunity to celebrate that advance during my time as the Minister.

Two years ago, a joint border analytics team was set up between customs, MPI, and Immigration New Zealand with the purpose to collect joint intelligence to support the work of the various agencies. I particularly want to acknowledge a great passion of mine: the tremendous work they do in intercepting drugs. There is a huge volume of drugs that are coming to our shores all the time. Customs does a fine job in intercepting much of it. Of course, they can never stop all of it.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. It’s a pleasure to be able to contribute to the external affairs annual review. Let me start by acknowledging the Minister in the chair, Ron Mark. He’s been generous with invitations that he’s issued on behalf of the Defence Force to members of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. I, for one, welcome and acknowledge that, and, in fact, I know other members do as well.

I’d like to touch briefly on the work of the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force, mostly just to pass through the subject matters they’ve covered, really by way of acknowledging them and thanking them for the work they do on behalf of our country throughout this world of woe, at times. They do a difficult and dangerous job with professionalism, and I join, I’m sure, all members of the House in thanking them at this time, now that we have an opportunity to do so.

Briefly on defence matters that relate to my electorate somewhat—excuse the gratuitous mention of the electorate of Helensville, Madam Chair, but I’ll just touch briefly on a couple of issues. One is in relation to the Whenuapai Air Base. We asked the various officials who came before us about the prospects of Whenuapai Air Base and also Devonport Naval Base in relation to whether those defence establishments were secure in their current location. The indication was that there was no information to the contrary, albeit that issues relating to housing intensity—excuse me, density; and intensity, for that matter—in the area do complicate their operations somewhat, for example, in relation to the noise of aircrafts and the operation of ships, too, in relation to Devonport. Similarly, the firefighting foam contamination issue that has been noted throughout New Zealand is something that I’m watching carefully as a local MP in relation to Whenuapai Air Base.

For the remainder of my short time, I’d like to touch on a couple of matters in relation to the foreign affairs portfolio more so, taking my lead from colleagues senior to me on our side of the aisle and our side of the select committee, if I can put it like that. A couple of these issues were raised by the chair of the select committee, Simon O’Connor. In that role he wasn’t able to be particularly political, so I’ll take the liberty of doing that somewhat, not really so much from a party perspective, given that a bipartisan approach to foreign affairs tends to characterise all parties’ approach—traditionally, at least.

So, really, on the themes of consistency, clarity, and cooperation, I’d like to note a couple of issues, including as they’ve been handled in less than ideal fashion in a couple of instances by the Government of the day, of course, within the period of this annual review.

In relation to consistency, I’d like to note that it is important that the New Zealand Government act in a consistent manner when it comes to condemning acts of violence and, indeed, terror throughout the world. Sometimes it’s a length of time that a response takes to have a condemnation of a violent and perhaps a disproportionate response. That’s unfortunate, to say the least. Simon O’Connor mentioned in relation to the resolution on Hamas behaviour that a procedural resolution was voted against by New Zealand at the United Nations to condemn them. Ultimately, the substantive motion was voted upon by New Zealand the correct way, in my view, but that was a rather sad episode.

Second, on the nature of clarity, our ideals aren’t always reflected in the way that we accept at United Nations the presence of some nations on bodies that would lecture nations about human rights, some of which have a far from perfect record on human rights themselves. So that’s unfortunate to the extent that we accept that as a sovereign nation with a seat at the United Nations General Assembly.

Third, on the subject of cooperation, I note that it’s important we continue to work with other nations who are like-minded in terms of ideals and interests—for example, when some months ago now the behaviour of Russia and “attitudes towards the rules-based international system”—and I read from the annual review report—was such that there were some eyebrows raised, if I can use that metaphor, internationally. It’s important that New Zealand has a robust attitude towards such incidents or possible incidents and acts with our friends quickly, in a manner that is appropriate to such situations.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Can I begin by, actually, commending Simon O’Connor, the chair of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, for the collegial nature in which members work across that select committee. I had joined the select committee only, sort of, halfway through last year, so this is the first opportunity that I get to speak to some of the work that we learnt through the annual review process. I want to also begin by noting that the select committee thanked Dr Brook Barrington, who was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the chief executive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) who was appointed to the role in 2015. When he presented to the select committee, he was leaving very soon after his presentation to us.

I do, however, want to begin by addressing a point that was raised by the Hon Todd McClay, who talked about some of the concerns that some members—namely, Opposition members—on the select committee raised with regard to perceived concern, from their point of view, regarding the difference in language that was used with regards specifically to China by the different departments that were involved in it. Well, actually, what came out through the annual review process was that there was no concern on Dr Barrington’s part at all, and although members opposite were trying to rather pointedly lead discussion and conversation to get to a point where perhaps they thought some concern would be expressed, none was expressed whatsoever.

That was the same outcome, I guess, when members opposite tried to talk about—oh, I’ve just found the bit that I was looking for: the wording of the defence policy statement regarding China. I quote, “The Secretary said he did not believe there was any tension between [the] departments regarding their view[s] on China.”, and he in fact went on to outline quite a robust process that happens between departments, and there was no need for concern that officials were being pushed in a certain direction, as the Hon Todd McClay alleges.

That also goes into some of the ministerial visits that were brought up as areas of concern by members opposite on the select committee with regard to China, and again I quote from the select committee report: “The Secretary added that the Chinese would make it clear if they did not want a meeting. He indicated that there have been no ‘alarming signals’ about the state of the relationship with China.” So I believe that was put to rest very effectively by the Secretary during the annual review process.

I do also want to go on to some of the fine work that Dr Barrington talked about in terms of the Government’s focus on the Pacific, for example, with the Pacific reset. There was a reset in terms of regional relationships that has been characterised, really, by greater engagement with countries in the South Pacific, the focus of which, of course, is to do our bit to ensure that we build prosperity, stability, and resilience amongst some of our closest neighbours, our Pacific nations that we work very closely with; also to grow and magnify our influence and impact in the region that, of course, we are also part of; and to conduct relations in a manner that is more respectful and in partnership and actually led by the Pacific nations that we work with. That came out quite strongly during the annual review process as well.

The Secretary, Dr Barrington, highlighted the existential threats that are posed by climate change to our closest neighbours in the Pacific as well and talked about some of the work-related schemes that MFAT has launched in terms of a land reclamation project; legal work to determine which State owns the continental shelf, for example, in international law; and research work with local NGOs in the Pacific to determine how women and disabled people will be affected by climate change.

Also, just very quickly in the time that I have remaining, I want to touch on the Trade for All project as well, because, again, the Hon Todd McClay talked about the fact that we shouldn’t just focus on ensuring that we talk to New Zealanders, but, actually, that’s really important when we negotiate trade agreements and trade rules. So in addition to the external work that MFAT is doing, there is a focus on ensuring there’s buy-in from New Zealanders as well, and that was brought up as something that was important. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Please excuse me if you can’t understand me; my voice is gone. I want to thank the select committee, and particularly the chair and deputy chair, for the work they have done and particularly for accompanying me on a couple of operational visits, which proved to be very valuable—in the sense that they gave us not just the opportunity to meet with our own personnel in the field and to get a first-hand glimpse of the challenges they face in performing the work they have to do in the completion of those missions but also the opportunity to engage with our strategic partners and those of the coalition force allies we’re working alongside of and the host nations in particular.

It’s been a very, very good year for the Defence Force and veterans portfolios. I’m very proud of the progress we have made. We started out very strongly by focusing on a reset of our strategic defence policy and making sure that it’s aligned with this coalition Government’s views; that we’re aligned with the Pacific Reset, as announced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs; and that we provided from that a good basis for conducting a review of the capability plan of the former Government, in accordance with the coalition agreement. I’ve got to say that the new strategic defence policy statement is something I’m very proud of. I’m very proud of my team for the hard work that they have put in there and for the quite visionary document that we’ve finally produced, which is framed in the context of community, nation, and world. The SDPS, as it’s come to be known, has put some very strong focus on some key and crucial issues, being space and cyber—very much deserved and very sensitive areas for New Zealand going forward.

I think also the other area of focus that I steered the team into was to take a good, long, hard look at what climate change was bringing us with respect to the impact on our security and the consequences of climate change in the Pacific. That has been a very, very valuable document. It was released recently, and it has been very well received, clearly within the Pacific and in Europe as well. I was a bit disappointed that I had to turn down an opportunity to speak at a Noumea conference recently, but tomorrow I will be leading the discussion on climate change and the security implications of it—I head away to Fiji tomorrow—at that conference.

Defence capability: of course, we made the big announcement that this Government has signed off on the purchase of the replacements for the P-3 Orion fleet, with the announcement of the decision to buy four P-8 Poseidon aircraft. That is—

💬 Andrew Bayly: Have you booked it in the accounts?

They are in the books—have a look—as you know when you make an announcement. That member should realise that his Government had nine long years to make a very sensitive and very important decision that affected one of our high-end capabilities and failed at every turn. So that member who wants to chip in and make a little name from himself should remind himself—

CHAIRPERSON (Poto Williams): Order!

—that his Government didn’t have the ability to actually make that decision.

CHAIRPERSON (Poto Williams): Order! Minister, return to your discussion.

The other great decision we made—and it will come to fruition on 13 May—is that if one looks out one’s office window, one will see Manawanui moored up outside there. It arrives—the new dive hydro vessel; another proud purchase. Of course, at the same time, we kicked off the frigate systems upgrade, which hadn’t been kicked off, which had blown out by $148 million, but we sorted that problem, and both Te Mana and Te Kaha are now in dock in Canada having that refit done—long overdue given that it was signed off in 2007 by a Labour - New Zealand First Government. But, hey, we’re always cleaning up messes left behind, aren’t we?

The other great things very quickly: we got the four new King Air 350-Bs; we have signed off on the NH90 simulator—it’s being built now; and we’ve completed the defence capability plan, which we’re just working on for a final release. So all I’d say, for the Opposition, is that it’s been good news—nothing but good news—in the defence space, and I’m very much looking forward to announcing and presenting the new defence capability plan, which I’m sure everyone will be very pleased and proud of.