Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill

I move, That the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill be now read a second time.

I’d like to start by thanking members of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee for their work on this important piece of legislation. The committee’s recommendation is that the bill be passed with a small number of technical amendments. Completion of consideration by the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee is a further important step in our consultation with the public on the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and on trade matters more generally.

The committee process follows on from numerous outreach meetings that it had up and down the country. I’ve been to many of them. Trade officials have been to a lot, lot more. They haven’t just been on CPTPP. We’ve been engaging on some related legislation which includes the ban on foreign buyers of existing homes, and, more recently, officials have been involved in the Trade for All outreach meetings as we endeavour to rebuild the social contract for trade.

This Government is committed to ensuring that trade delivers sustainable and inclusive economic growth for all New Zealanders, no matter who they are or where they are in the country. We’ve already shown that we’re open to finding better ways to do things, including through the changes that were made to the previous Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPP) under difficult circumstances in our first weeks in office. As a result of these changes, we were able to conclude the CPTPP. For me, the most significant change was finding a route through on controlling overseas foreign buyers of existing New Zealand homes. We support CPTPP. It will bring commercial, sustainable, and strategic benefits to New Zealand as the national interest analysis—which was released some weeks prior to signature—highlights.

On the commercial level, the CPTPP matters to New Zealand. I’ve made the point that trade agreements aren’t the be all and end all of economic and trade policy. There are other very important settings in the economy, like those affecting research and development, and tax policy that encourages investment in productive enterprises, rather than speculative investment. The productive investment, of course, helps grow new areas of comparative advantage. But I think everyone in New Zealand knows that we’re a small country that needs trade so that we can afford the things that we can’t produce efficiently—the cars, the computers, the mobile phones, and the medicines that we import, and that to pay for them we need to sell products and services that we produce competitively so that we can provide the means for all New Zealanders to enjoy a decent standard of living.

This is a very significant agreement. Of our exports, we expect a third of our goods and services—about $15 billion in goods and $6.8 billion in services—to go CPTPP partners. Economic modelling has shown, in the national interest analysis, that once this is fully into effect, the agreement is expected to increase real GDP by between $1.2 billion and $4 billion per annum. That’s additional sales every year, effectively, of exports to the rest of the world of those amounts. On the other hand, if CPTPP goes ahead without New Zealand, the modelling estimates that our GDP will decline—we’d go backwards—by a more modest $183 million, but, none the less, the relativity of those figures shows that there are clear economic benefits. Tariff reductions alone could deliver an estimated $222 million of savings annually—$95 million of this accrues as soon as the CPTPP comes into force. These are large numbers.

Early ratification also means an immediate levelling of the playing field for many New Zealand exporters in some crucial markets. I’ll give you some practical examples. For kiwifruit, New Zealand exporters incur a tariff of 6.4 percent in Japan. Chile, a key competitor in this high-value market pays a zero tariff because of its existing free trade agreement with Japan. On entry into force of the CPTPP, New Zealand will be on an equal footing with Chile, and this will represent tariff savings of more than $26 million to that industry. That will flow through to—amongst other things—higher wages in that sector and profits for the owners.

CPTPP will also immediately remove Australian beef exporters’ current tariff advantage over New Zealand in Japan. This has resulted in a very steep decline in New Zealand exports of beef to Japan. It’s one of, if not our premium value markets in the world, and there’s been a loss of $53 million to the industry per annum because of the disadvantage we currently suffer relative to Australia. On entry into force, we immediately gain duty free access to our fourth-largest wine market, Canada. Further, New Zealand wine has tariff reductions in Japan—where we currently pay 15 percent tariff, whereas Chile and Australia only pay 4.6 and 9.5 percent respectively. All of these things affect not just the amount that we sell things for but the volume of what we sell.

Importantly, it’s not just major exporters who will benefit. Many of New Zealand’s small and medium enterprises will benefit too. For example, the cost of the, quite low, 3 percent tariff to the buttercup squash producers—you might think, 3 percent, well, it’s not that much. Actually, it’s worth $50,000 each to the 30 or so producers of buttercup squash in New Zealand who sell to Japan. That’s quite a bit of money, and it will save around $19,500 in tariffs for each of the commercial growers of onions who sell into Japan. So these things make a real difference for real people.

While crucial market outcomes have been retained—and I thank the prior Minister, Todd McClay, for his negotiation of those—they are effectively a carryover from TPP that were kept alive by the prior Minister’s good efforts. What were suspended were various other provisions that were problematic for New Zealand. Of the five points that we took into the election that we wanted to see adequately dealt with, the first I’ll mention is the Treaty clause. We’ve got a fantastic Treaty clause in New Zealand. It’s been to the Waitangi Tribunal. They gave it a very good pass. They said, “Look, you could tweak it here, tweak it there, to make it even better.” But the advice that we accepted from officials was that, in practice, you can’t do that, because if you reopen it you’ll go backwards. Most other countries—in fact, no other country has a clause like that.

On Pharmac, the Pharmac model had already been protected by the prior Government. We wanted to avoid some of the increased costs, though, caused by longer patent terms for medicines—particularly, biological drugs—and to avoid some transparency costs. Those are fixed by CPTPP and don’t apply.

The right to regulate, whether it’s environment, public health, tax, education system, State-owned enterprises, or appropriate environmental or safety regulation—this is all protected. Whether it’s for plain packaging cigarettes or for climate change, we’re protected. In respect of land, as you know, we’ve protected the sovereign right of this Government and future Governments to protect New Zealand against—or to control—foreign buyers.

We think that we’ve protected the sovereignty risk. The one are we didn’t completely succeed in was investor-State dispute settlement clauses. We’ve narrowed them. We’ve got various side agreements with a number of countries that we won’t apply them bilaterally within the agreement as between those countries. So we got, effectively, letters covering 80 percent of current investment flows under CPTPP countries.

On sustainable development, it’s a fantastic agreement. It’s why it’s called “Comprehensive and Progressive”. We have the most comprehensive outcomes on sustainability of any trade agreement we’ve ever been able to get on both labour and environment. Vietnam is required to bring its labour standards up to international norms, albeit over a period of time, and it is enforceable through trade remedies after a period if they didn’t—they’re given time to adjust.

In respect of fisheries, New Zealand’s carried this torch for 20 years and we’ve never been able to get enforceable rules in our trade agreements where countries promise that they will not subsidise illegal or unreported fishing in other people’s waters, which is what happens around the world at the moment. We have trade disciplines around that, and the countries agreed not to do it.

Finally, we’ve got some various side agreements to pursue with our partners Canada and Chile—a progressive and inclusive trade agenda, including issues relating to gender, Māori, and small to medium enterprises.

Finally, I want to mention the strategic importance of CPTPP post the global financial crisis. There have been over 3,200 new trade restrictive measures introduced and only 850 dismantled. We’ve seen trade escalation in recent months—

I apologise to the Minister. Your time has expired.

Thank you, Madam Assistant Speaker. I’m pleased to speak in support of this agreement and in support of this bill. Can I acknowledge the Minister that has taken a seat, David Parker, for the work that he has led here and, too, who he actually called the Prime Minister. I think he was the then—he’s very flattered.

💬 Hon David Parker: Prior Minister.

Oh, prior—my hearing. On this side of the House we began to think it was the Prime Minister. It was quite the promotion. But, returning to seriousness, to acknowledge the Minister in his work and the prior Minister, Todd McClay.

I’ll leave it up to other colleagues to discuss how much this agreement, the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), has changed from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It hasn’t been substantial, but I will myself not get so much into that, as the chair of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, and, instead, will focus on a little bit about the process.

First and foremost, it was a good engagement with the public. We had over 500 people who wrote in to us and around 30 who wished to be heard. The committee was very keen to progress that through, and I want to thank all those submitters for their time. Many were familiar to us—they had also engaged in our prior treaty analysis some weeks and months prior. I think it was quite good for the committee to hear once again their core concerns.

Can I thank too the committee—the members there, who worked through this. There were very robust discussions, as often—and always, actually—happens in the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee.

💬 Brett Hudson: Can you detail the contributions of each member?

I’m being asked if the contributions of each member are discussed here. No. You can come and join the committee sometime, Brett Hudson. But, actually the committee worked quite hard on this.

I think it’s quite important to note we have returned this bill to the House early but not in any rushed fashion. I have been asked questions of “Wasn’t this meant to be coming back some time in December?” That’s, strictly, when we could—or rather the amount of time that we did have, but the committee felt that we were able to deal with the discussions, engage the public appropriately, hear their views, and report back swiftly, first and foremost, because we didn’t need to prolong the process, and, secondly, I think, because most members of the House—and certainly on this side of the House—see the benefit of New Zealand depositing the CPTPP as soon as possible. Being one of the key countries, some of the key negotiators, being a great champion of this free-trade agreement, New Zealand wants to symbolically show that by being one of the early adopters. So, again, the committee has been happy to report back to the House.

Really importantly, it was a little bit like other treaties that we’ve had. What we were dealing with is a piece of legislation. It’s only a few pages—important as they are. But one of the elements we had to engage with was some submitters and the general public was the understanding that we were no longer really discussing the treaty as a whole. What we were discussing in the select committee was a very particular piece of legislation, which in effect takes this treaty, which sits within the realm of the executive to decide to sign or not. We were looking at a piece of legislation—which, effectively, takes an international treaty; in this case a trade treaty—and gives it domestic effect.

Why I mention that is a number of people were, understandably, coming to express once again their concerns, as they had done when we looked at the national interest analysis and looked at the treaty as a whole. We’ve attempted, in our select committee report, to reflect those arguments; though strictly speaking they didn’t actually relate to the bill. Again, the bill is quite a technical set of clauses to bring about, in New Zealand’s domestic legislation, the powers which are needed to bring that international treaty into effect.

So we tried to balance that. As the Minister noted, we made a few suggested minor changes there, and I think it’s in particular thanks to his and other officials who have helped guide us through that. It’s a good piece of legislation and I believe, overall, a very good trade agreement.

I would just finish by acknowledging one thing. There was and always has been a bit of debate in the trade space around—we heard gender was mentioned, indigenous rights, and so forth. There’s sort of a wider discussion going on in the committee at the moment as to what degree, if any, trade agreements should be used to further much, much wider causes. In other words, one side says, actually, a trade agreement is a great opportunity to talk gender and indigenous rights, to put forward climate targets, and so forth—it should be very, very broad and using trade as a lever. On the other side, there’s some debate that says, actually, keep the trade agreement a trade agreement, and one should not be using that economic leverage to push other philosophies and agendas. I’m obviously not going to answer that today. I’m only one member of the committee. But I just wanted to signal there’s a wider discussion. So I’m pleased, as the chair of the committee, to speak in the second reading, and we’ll leave the more political side to other colleagues in their contributions.

It is a real pleasure to take a call on this bill. Labour Governments through the ages have supported trade agreements on the basis that they improve the wealth of a country. What we regard as incredibly important in the Labour Party, and I know across the coalition Government, is making sure that the benefits of trade are shared across the whole population, so that we have an inclusive economy that looks to support all of its members from the economic gains that come from trade. In fact, the first Labour Government, of course, fought for agricultural access into the UK, and Labour Governments since then have done that.

This Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is one that includes suspensions from the original Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) text to ensure that New Zealand’s interests are better protected. I do want to acknowledge, at the outset, the trade Minister, David Parker, for his significant contribution, both in terms of intellectual leadership when in Opposition and fighting many of these battles about what could be improved in the TPP deal in order for it to be acceptable for this side of the House; and also in Government as he negotiated things like ensuring that we do have the right, as a sovereign Government, to ban non-resident buyers from our housing market—speculators from overseas wanting to push up house prices here. So I want to really acknowledge, in my short contribution, David Parker’s significant personal contribution to this piece of legislation.

I also want to acknowledge Simon O’Connor, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee chair, for the process that he ran in the select committee. I’m informed that it was both a very thorough process but also a prompt process that went the full course but came back to the House in time to ensure New Zealand would be one of the first six countries to ratify the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, meaning that New Zealand gains the benefits immediately—immediately the treaty comes into force. That will mean tariff reductions, for example, on kiwifruit, which will be eliminated straight away. It means also the elimination of New Zealand sheep meat tariffs, including locking in preferential rates to Canada, which is New Zealand’s seventh-largest sheep meat market. It also means that tariffs on forestry products will be eliminated over time. So there are a range of very valuable gains for New Zealand that will come into force, some of them immediately, because there was a very constructive process in bringing this back to the House. So I do acknowledge the select committee chair, Simon O’Connor, for his contribution to this.

I don’t wish to say much more, other than to reinforce that for us on this side of the House, it is very important that the benefits of trade are shared across the population, that all New Zealanders should gain from the benefits of trade from a wealthier economy. We will be making sure, as a Government, that we support low and modest income families, as well as those who trade directly and benefit directly from the trade access. Thank you, Madam Assistant Speaker.

Thank you, Madam Assistant Speaker. It gives me pleasure to rise and speak in the second reading debate on this piece of legislation, which is extremely important to every single New Zealander. The reason for that is quite simple: when it comes to trade, trade creates jobs, and jobs deliver for New Zealanders and for their families. We are a trading nation, and so the revised Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), or the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)—it’s quite a mouthful. It might even be the first time, Mr Parker, that I’ve said it in full there, the CPTPP, and it could well be the last. The point here, though, is that it is virtually identical to the original TPP.

Now, I think that what we should do in this House when it comes to trade is put the small part of politics aside so that what we can do is what’s right for New Zealand. There will always be an opportunity to say that deals can be better. Maybe there are parts of them that should change over time, but, ultimately, when it comes to the things that are important to New Zealanders—the last speaker said “Sharing in the benefits of trade.”—there isn’t any difference between this and the original TPP when it comes to sharing those benefits. When it comes to what most New Zealanders actually think of trade, which is the trade in goods and the trade in services, equally there is no difference. That’s why this is a good piece of legislation, a good bill, and a good trade deal: because the original TPP was also.

The last speaker, David Clark, who now looks after health for the Government but previously was a trade spokesman when he was in Opposition, mentioned a couple of areas that, actually, New Zealanders—exporters and producers—will benefit from straight away. He mentioned sheep meat and kiwifruit and forestry products. Equally, under the revised TPP, their treatment into these markets, the tariff rates that fall away, are identical to the original TPP deal. That’s what makes this a good deal, because the last one was good as well.

I just want to touch on forestry products for a moment and make a plea to the trade Minister, Mr Parker. It is good, when we think of the environment, that we now get to export forestry products and wood products—processed or otherwise—from New Zealand to these markets without any tariff restrictions on them. That’s a good thing for New Zealanders. It does mean that some of those barriers at the ports that hold back the adding of value to logs in New Zealand before they are exported are coming down.

Equally, there is a lot of work to do around non-tariff barriers. If we take the free-trade agreement with China—and the New Zealand wood export industry believes they don’t have a free-trade agreement with China—actually, in many cases, the products that could get to that market are not able to because of standards, because of non-tariff barriers. We need to continue to focus on those, but there is also a debate going on in the World Trade Organization (WTO) around the Environmental Goods Agreement. It’s imperative that when Mr Parker and our negotiators go back to the WTO and the debate around the Environmental Goods Agreement kicks in again, we insist that we get wood products as part of that agreement and that the tariffs fall away. The reason for that is we now have it under TPP, which is very important for our wood-processing industry—imperative for adding value in New Zealand—so that it’s not just logs going across the border.

But the Environmental Goods Agreement is much larger than just the TPP and, therefore, if we can deliver the same outcome in the Environmental Goods Agreement as was under the National Government and TPP, then actually the vast majority of the world, very large markets, including if the US is still there around the WTO, then the US market opens up to us, and that really will benefit so many parts of New Zealand and our wood processors. So, I encourage him to continue to fight that.

The one area in the original TPP where I think we would all have liked to have seen greater movement, particularly around tariffs, was around dairy. It wasn’t able to be delivered, but we took the position in Government that although it wasn’t perfect, it was better than not having the deal, given the significant size of the markets into these countries that we wanted New Zealanders to export into, and at the same time we would find other ways to come back and to improve dairy access. And I would again implore Mr Parker, as he hops on a plane next week—to head off, as good trade Ministers do, to go and talk to other countries about better access for Kiwis—and he’s on his way to Washington: actually, it’s a very short detour to go to Colombia to talk to them about the Pacific Alliance trade agreement.

The thing about the Pacific Alliance trade agreement is that it has four countries in it. Three of them we now have a trade deal with, which was the TPP and now the revised TPP. One of them we have a trade deal directly with, which is Chile. So, for those four counties under TPP, for two of them, it’s a first deal: Mexico and Peru. And the problem we have under TPP is our dairy access to Mexico—and some other product—is not perfect. It was held back because of resistance, primarily from the US, and the US has better access for dairy than New Zealand does. That needs to be fixed. Well, it hasn’t been fixed in the revised TPP because market access remained the same, but it was always going to be revised and made better in the Pacific Alliance. That’s why it’s concerning to hear Mr Parker say that some of these countries are not sure they want to do it now because they have the TPP. Well, that’s fine for them because there is no barrier around tariff for their goods to come to New Zealand for anything under TPP—over time or straight away—but for dairy into Mexico there is, and that was the reason for the Pacific Alliance deal.

The second part of the reason that the Pacific Alliance is important is that Colombia is not part of the revised TPP. It is not a large market for New Zealand, because they’ve gone through many years of guerrilla warfare and they’ve been closed off to much of the world. But we supported them and encouraged them, and they found peace last year. Last year, they agreed to take part in the Pacific Alliance trade negotiation that includes New Zealand. Their market is opening up to the world; their economy is growing quickly. It’s important we have a trade deal with them, because they were not able to come to the revised TPP. I think they want to, but Mr Parker needs to say to them on his way to Washington next week, if he’s able to stop off, that if they want to get access to these other countries that are in the revised TPP, they cannot without New Zealand’s agreement, because it takes a unanimous agreement of all of those countries, and they must remain committed to the Pacific Alliance trade negotiation. It’s the only way we’re going to get better access for dairy and other products in Mexico, it’s the only way we’re going to get a trade deal with Colombia quite quickly, and I would encourage him to do that. It’s very, very important.

It was disappointing that Columbia didn’t send negotiators to the formal trade negotiation of the Pacific Alliance trade deal in New Zealand last month, but it’s not too late. Mr Parker shouldn’t give up on the Pacific Alliance trade deal. He needs to go and see them and convince them. That’s what a hard-working trade Minister does.

The final thing I want to say is that, when it came to the TPP, we were the second country after Japan to ratify it. I remember the night it happened in this House, when everybody said it was over, it was a waste of time, that the National Government and I, as trade Minister, were wasting this Parliament’s time: the deal was dead. I want to congratulate the trade negotiators and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade for not accepting what the Opposition at that time had said to them, for getting on planes and going over and persuading everywhere. Our current ambassador to the WTO, and our current lead negotiator, Vangelis Vitalis, got on planes day after day, night after night, and went around the remaining countries of the TPP without the US, and convinced them of the importance of this deal. If those trade negotiators had listened to the Labour Party and the Green Party and the New Zealand First Party and the Māori Party at that time, this deal would not be in front of us, it would not be done, and New Zealand would be poorer for it, both through access to these other countries and also New Zealanders whose jobs depend upon those exports.

We have some exceptional trade negotiators—the best in the world. When they turn up to these trade negotiations, they are the smallest groups there. They don’t have the hundreds of officials, but they punch above their weight. It’s them who deserve all of the credit for delivering the deal. Thank you.

Kia ora nō tatou. During the course of my speech I’m going to avoid tying my tongue with the acronym; I’m going to call it the Trans-Pacific Agreement, for fear of muddling not the vowels but the consonants.

First thing, one of the most challenging decisions that we had was to recover the territory so there was partisanship in our New Zealand political system. Now, I know that the former ambassador to Washington is the self-decreed trade expert of the world, and I know that our colleague from Rotorua, Todd McClay, was disappointed, but this is a vastly improved bill. I say that because there are very few other issues—[Interruption] Fortunately, this bill will lower the cost of bibs for young Bidois to wear, as he is the baby of this kōhanga reo backbencher society. A koe—me turituri ina tū tō rangatira a Shane Jones.

[And you—you should be quiet while your elder Shane Jones is standing to speak.]

So I would say that it was a difficult and challenging task to recover that territory, but it’s worth fighting for because it’s sovereignty. Now, where David Parker actually led us was to ensure that we had enough safeguards in the revised foreign direct investment rules, under the overseas investment legislation, so that when we sign up and we go forward as an open trading nation we’ve kept enough gunpowder of a legislative nature back home to protect the interests that define us as Kiwis. That’s worth fighting for. Now, I’m not quite in the space of Jane Kelsey and Annette Sykes and a host of other conspiracists, but they did make a good point. We should not ever have surrendered to a shadowy, vague, unelected group of self-appointed jurists to deal to our interests in a disputes resolution process in the way it was devised under the last Government. And that was a fair criticism, not necessarily because of the zest with which the Opposition pursued this but because they were unwilling to stand up to certain corporate interests. So, in that respect, we have done a great job by securing a stronger base for us as a bunch of parliamentarians and political parties to be better stewards of our sovereignty.

On the question of those other nations, I think there’s a fault line that’s emerged, and I read recently that the current President of the USA has pretty much said to Mexico and Canada that if they ever consider doing a trade deal with China, he will extinguish and cancel that trade deal that’s he’s just agreed to overnight. I presume he has similar views about the EU and Brexit, and I presume what that represents is a major challenge to what we’ve taken for granted as an open trading system—the orthodoxy of the last 30 years, and we’ve been key contributors. So whilst we are keen to defend our birthright, we have bigger battles ahead of us. The fact that we’ve hung tight, we’ve moderated, we’ve improved this legislation, and we’ve actually defended it from excesses that would have come our way in the future—now we need to continue the mission.

The one thing I do agree with Mr McClay about, not necessarily about Colombia or anything, is being a standout performer in not only joining other nations to the fray but leading the way with innovation—not only with political leadership; with executive leadership—and for those reasons we are thoroughly proud of our leader, Winston Peters, our Deputy Prime Minister, for boosting the pūtea of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. It is not inexpensive, and it is not glamorous going to all of these places, but unless we, a relatively small fish in the global sea of politics, are there—kanohi kitea—constantly affirming the importance of rules, constantly reminding our bigger players that there is greater wealth by working together whilst at the same time not selling ourselves out, we’re laying down a better platform for the next bunch of politicians that come and for the next generation of entrepreneurs.

Now, there is unfinished work in respect of refining the next stage of improvements for the China free-trade deal, and that’s in the capable hands of our colleague over here. But I would say to corporate New Zealand: we do a certain level of the heavy lifting, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not the “Ministry of Fonterra”. They too have to join the fray and constantly demonstrate to garden-variety Kiwis that the international set of rules that enables us to trade is for the benefit for all, not just the big end of town. And their unwillingness to join in that endeavour only worsens the prospects of the fault line leaving long-term damage. I’ve constantly said this, but the banks recently don’t like it. That bothers me not one iota; it only proves that I’m more provincially attuned than they are.

So we support the bill. We support the efforts of the Minister, and I do want to acknowledge Todd McClay. It just required a more mature trade Minister to refine and get it over the line, with the entirety of New Zealand behind it. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Madam Assistant Speaker, and it is a pleasure to take a call on this, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill. I’m going to refer to it as the “Trans-Pacific agreement” also. Can I acknowledge the Minister. I sat on the select committee with the Hon David Parker when we had the original Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement in front of the committee and we received hundreds of submissions—

💬 Hon David Parker: It was David Clark.

Oh, was it David Clark, was it? I stand corrected.

💬 Hon David Parker: It was Korea, you and me.

Oh, it was Korea? I stand corrected. Well, that was another very good free-trade agreement that we now see delivering great results for our country, and it just highlights the importance, as a small but proud trading nation down the bottom of the world—that these quality free-trade agreements are actually critically important for us. They add a lot of value in terms of our companies and our businesses and our products that we want to trade around the world. In fact, if you look at it—I may stand corrected, but the last time I checked—for the countries that we do have free-trade agreements with, generally speaking, our trade increases by about 10 percent annually. For countries that we don’t have free-trade agreements with, actually that trend is reversed; it drops by about 10 percent annually. So it actually highlights and shows the importance of these very good free-trade agreements.

I have to say that if we go through the history of the original Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), it did fall over, and I remember very clearly going and attending a debate in Wellington with the Hon Grant Robertson in front of a business crowd and he made it very clear to me when we were talking about the TPP. At that stage, I said, “Look, I always see the world through a glass half full, and I believe that if we work hard enough and if we’re able to get our partners back engaged in it, then I believe”—and this is when America pulled out of the TPP—“it could be revived.” I thought that we could get it back on track again. The Hon Grant Robertson took a very, very different view. He said, “Forget about it and move on. You’ll never breathe life back into it. It’s failed. It’s been an abject failure. You guys have failed on it. Move on.”

So I was very pleased when actually our trade Minister, the Hon Todd McClay, who spoke earlier, supported obviously by the Prime Minister, went out there—and actually I wanted to acknowledge the Japanese Prime Minister and the Japanese Government because, really, what they did is they stepped up and they took a real lead on this in terms of being a critical player in revitalising the TPP and getting it back on track again.

💬 Hon David Parker: They still are.

Yes, and they still are. The Minister was just saying they still are. So I just want to acknowledge them. And while I’m making acknowledgments, the Hon Todd McClay did ask me—and I agree with him entirely—to acknowledge David Walker from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), because he was, I think, the original MFAT negotiator working on the country’s behalf with his team, and I just want to say that this team was world class and they definitely did an outstanding negotiation for us, and so I want to acknowledge him and the team that worked on this. And I want to acknowledge the team that have carried that great work on, serving the current Minister and making sure we get this agreement across the line. It is critically important for the country.

I have to acknowledge the Hon Shane Jones and the fact that he made reference to Professor Jane Kelsey, because Professor Jane Kelsey engaged with the committee in a very respectful way. I actually arranged some additional meetings—some private meetings—with her with the committee so that she could advance the issues and we could look at the issues that she’d raised. She was clearly against the TPP. She has her own very firm ideas and positions around what trade agreements should look like for this country, and it was very clear that she was against the TPP in that form.

I remember when we had select committee submissions and she came along. She would get a very warm welcome from the Opposition members—the Labour members and the Green members. They’d welcome her, they’d make sure that the chair was pulled out, and she’d get a cup of tea and maybe, if she was lucky, a cucumber sandwich as well. Then, it was very interesting when the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) was brought to this House, and Jane Kelsey was able to have a look at the text and to have a look at the agreement. What did she do? She came out in strong opposition to the CPTPP. She thought it was still a very poor agreement, and so what did the Labour Party do? They shunned her. They wanted nothing to do with her—no more cups of tea, no more cucumber sandwiches, and no more having the chair pulled out.

So I just find it quite ironic, actually, that the Hon Shane Jones raised Professor Jane Kelsey and said that she was opposed to the TPP. She remains opposed to the CPTPP.

💬 Hon Willie Jackson: Yeah, but not as much.

No, just as much, Willie. Don’t you worry about that. So, finally—

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Poto Williams): Order! Order! I just remind you to—

Sorry—the Hon Willie Jackson.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Poto Williams): Thank you.

No, her level of opposition remains exactly the same as it was with the TPP.

Look, finally, I’d just like to say that we do support this free-trade agreement. They are very important to New Zealand. We need to maintain a robust programme in terms of continuing to develop free-trade agreements all around the world to make sure that we continue to offer our country the ability to sell our wonderful goods. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Madam Assistant Speaker. It’s a privilege to rise to speak in opposition to this bill again, as a lone voice representing the Green Party in this House. We remain opposed to the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPPA), to the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (CPTPPA), and to any Act of this Parliament that would enable the implementation of that agreement, or those agreements that do seem to overlap eerily.

💬 Kieran McAnulty: They’re different.

Not according to Professor Kelsey.

We do support trade. New Zealand needs trade. We’re a small country and we need trade, but not much of the 6,000 pages of this particular deal seem to relate to actual trade. They do, however, lay out in minute detail the privileges of foreign multinational corporations that we’re giving up over the rights and interests of New Zealanders, of ordinary people, and of our environment.

We agree with the two-thirds—two-thirds; yeah, it was actually as high as that—of submitters who oppose this bill and who know the chilling effect that that agreement and, through it, this bill will have on New Zealand’s democracy. Most submitters—the overwhelming majority—raised concern with the remainder of the investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism in this bill through the trade agreement. That is to say that this House of Representatives, this elected body, this supreme Parliament, is about to pass into law an Act that allows a mechanism to sit above New Zealand’s law, above this House of Representatives, and above our courts in giving privileges to foreign multinational corporations, saying that this Parliament will take account of their profit margins alongside the interests of Kiwis, our workers’ rights, environmental protection, and our commitment to the founding constitutional document of this nation, Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

We say that no lawmaker, no policy maker, should be taking account of the profit margins of any private body, let alone foreign multinationals, but that’s what we’re being asked to sign up to through this bill. That’s what the submitters knew and they begged us not to do it, as they begged us not to sign on to this agreement, and as they begged us not to sign on to the TPPA, and it does remain largely unchanged. It represents an archaic form of trade, and we’ve seen that model collapse. We’ve seen the suffering that was caused by the latest global financial crisis, and we’re signing on to the same model. That’s not what New Zealanders voted for this election.

To focus back on the bill, what we’ve found most alarming in the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee—and there were questions from both sides. There were questions from the Hon Todd McClay, and he made this clear, and the officials, in answering him, made it clear that what we’re signing on to here with this bill means that the old TPPA can be reactivated through the joining of, say, the United States without further parliamentary oversight, without a select committee process, and without public input. This deal was sold to New Zealand through promises that it was changed, but we’ve found out since then that even the old TPPA can come into law without further scrutiny.

Now, some of the changes that were made are real—between the TPPA and the CPTPPA—and they came in the form of suspended provisions. Some of those were, for example, the provision that now protects Pharmac in this deal so that Pharmac can independently protect the price and quality of medicine for New Zealanders. That was one. There are provisions that protect our patent and copyright law so that New Zealanders can compete on an even playing field against these large, established multinationals. These are good things. But we also learnt through the process and the officials told us that there is nothing in this bill that says that were a new member State to join, whether it’s the US or any member State, those provisions could be lifted—those suspensions could go—without parliamentary oversight. So we are signing away our ability to oversee these changes—the very changes that the coalition parties relied upon to sell this deal as a changed, new, progressive deal. All of that could go and there’ll be no parliamentary oversight, no democratic process. That is chilling.

So the Green Party doesn’t support the bill; we support democracy for New Zealanders. And we do support It’s Our Future’s call for, essentially, changes to the bill that say that no further ISDS can be added to this agreement without Parliament coming back and having a look at it. That’s a big change but it’s also still limited. But if we could at least say that if new member States are going to join and they will be signing on to a deal with ISDS in it with that mechanism sitting above our law, at least Parliament should have a say. We should at least get to look at it again, and that’s how the bill could introduce some meaningful protection.

But what’s more, we are saying that trade should change, that trade deals—international agreements—should always come to Parliament, that those deals shouldn’t be allowed to be made with complete lack of transparency in those dark corners of the international financial markets where corporate lawyers agree to the text and it’s years before the public are allowed to look at it. It’s as a result of leaks that experts like Professor Jane Kelsey get to look at those deals and tell us what’s in them and tell us what’s been signed away. We say that it should be Parliament who decides what we sign on to in such a critical area.

Trade, and a trade agreement particularly like this one, affects everything in our lives. If our health and our environment are on the line—and we heard from so many sectors about the way they would be limited. The most chilling was hearing from the doctors. They asked what would happen if they want to introduce warnings on alcohol packaging to warn mothers against foetal alcohol syndrome. That’s a problem in New Zealand. What happens if we want to introduce a sugar tax to protect the public against toxic junk food that’s clogging up our health system and our standard of living?

Mostly, as a Green, I want it noted that around the world where ISDS clauses identical to this have been used, they have been used to stop environmental protection from being implemented. This bill could affect our ability, for example, to reform our mining sector and say that exploration permits won’t automatically turn into mining permits. Those are the types of progressive changes that we promised New Zealand this election and they could be at risk.

So we won’t support this bill because we support a truly progressive, transformative Government and change for New Zealand. We say that we owe it to the global order and we owe it to New Zealanders that we do trade differently from now on and we say that the vast majority against and the incredible, overwhelming opposition to this trade agreement and to this bill should mean that the Government rethinks ratifying the agreement through the bill. We say that’s the only way to honour democracy in New Zealand. Thank you.

Kia orana, Madam Assistant Speaker. I’d like to start with a number of positives because this is actually a very good moment for the House. I’ll surprise Golriz Ghahraman, the Green member who’s just resumed her seat, by praising her in the first instance, because while I disagree with her position, as do members of all the other parties in the House, I do respect the fact that it’s important to have a voice in the House for those who are opposed to this agreement. I want to both acknowledge the very courteous way in which she engaged with all members of the committee and those who made submissions and acknowledge the fact that today, she is being the voice for those who are opposed to the agreement. So in a healthy democracy that’s a good thing, and I acknowledge her for that. I also want to acknowledge the Hon David Parker and his predecessors the Hon Todd McClay and the Hon Tim Groser, because each of those three Ministers has made a very substantial contribution to this very significant development in our trading relationships, which is going to have an immensely positive benefit for our economy and for jobs in our primary production and export markets.

But I dare say that members of the public who may be watching this debate today will be having a degree of puzzlement about the fact that we are even doing this because they’ll feel that this is an argument that has been held now over a very long period of time, and they’re correct. I dare say that they’ll be experiencing a degree of déjà vu, perhaps wondering why do we need to do all of this when they have such vivid memories of all the argy-bargy and the protests that accompanied the original Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPPA) debates, and we can all remember those. I certainly remember those who were camped out—well, not camped outside my office, but who protested outside my electorate office in Hamilton, and who scribbled on the cobblestones and did all sorts of things.

The passage of the original Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement—which is an agreement simply reincarnated in this new agreement—was something that was contentious and, not least, was opposed by members opposite who are now so quick to embrace it, and yet, essentially, what we are talking about is an agreement that has two rather fancy words added: “comprehensive” and “progressive”. They sound good, but they are actually fairly meaningless. I doubt whether anybody could tell us why adding “Comprehensive and Progressive” is substantially changing an agreement that is in all other respects, apart from some very minor changes, the same. Why those two words should make such a difference is beyond me, and so I commend the Hon Shane Jones for ditching them when he stood up and said, “Well, I’m just going to call it for what it is: the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement.”

💬 Hon Member: Did he say that?

💬 Darroch Ball: He didn’t say that.

He did. That’s exactly what he said. But it was his colleagues in New Zealand First and Labour who huffed and puffed for a very long time when they were in Opposition. They expressed outrage about the enormous damage that the TPPA would do to our country, and yet now, because they’re in Government, it’s the greatest thing since sliced bread as far as trade arrangements are concerned.

💬 Kieran McAnulty: Now, it’s great.

Well, the member opposite is interjecting, but it’s worthwhile—he wasn’t on the select committee; I was—pointing out that those who came to submit to our committee on this bill essentially said “It’s the same thing.”, and particularly those who opposed it could see no significant difference at all. They put in their submissions opposing the original TPPA with great feeling and conviction, and came along and argued their point and had some support from those parties who are now in Government. Now, those parties who are now in Government have turned their backs on these same submitters, who are feeling quite dispirited and defeated by the fact that they actually feel really badly let down by those who claimed to express the views that they felt were so important.

Of course, the real substantive difference between the TPPA and the new Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is the absence of the United States, but I very much doubt that anybody in either the Labour Party or the New Zealand First Party is claiming any credit for the election of President Donald Trump and the fact that one of the first things he did on taking office was to sign his notice taking the USA out. Who are the countries who are left? Well, it is important. They’re very substantial economies in some respects. Others are small, like New Zealand. They include New Zealand, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. When—

💬 Dan Bidois: Some good countries there.

There are some very good countries, you are quite right, Mr Bidois—particularly Japan. It is particularly significant that Japan is in there, because that’s been a market New Zealand has wanted to be able to deal with—a hugely significant economy—and it’s been fiendishly difficult to have a trading relationship with Japan up until now that would maximise the benefits. Here, this agreement does that.

💬 Kieran McAnulty: Yep, we got that.

So that is, as Mr McAnulty is acknowledging—and I’m happy to agree with him. This makes a real difference.

But I remember that I was driving to Auckland—it must have been the morning of 8 March, or the next day—just after Mr Parker and other trade Ministers had signed the agreement in Chile, and I remember listening to Radio New Zealand interviewing the Minister of Foreign Affairs, because the Minister for Trade and Export Growth was, obviously, away in Chile. So the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a certain Mr Peters, was invited on to the programme. Even by his particularly cantankerous standards that he tends to adopt when he’s asked to be awake in the morning, he was extraordinarily aggressive, and the Radio New Zealand interviewer became more and more incredulous at the fact that Mr Peters was, effectively, arguing black was white. Everything that he had previously stood by he was now completely denying had ever been his view. He was trying to argue substantive differences. Nobody was taking it seriously—in particular, not the Radio New Zealand interviewer—and it was probably one of the least edifying experiences that anybody in broadcasting or those who listen to Radio New Zealand has had to endure for some time.

When we were in the select committee, we heard that there is a very good reason for New Zealand being among the first countries to ratify the domestic requirements for implementation of this agreement—and, of course, by doing what we’re doing now, we should be on target to ratify the agreement by the end of this year, and I am very pleased to be able to contribute to that process. I’ve mentioned that many of those who came along to submit expressed their considerable disappointment, but there were some very substantial submissions from leading export groups that represent our exporters who were, naturally, very strongly in favour and delighted to see that what they thought had come to an end was back on the table again.

We heard oral evidence from 33 submitters at our hearings in Wellington, out of the 577 written submissions that were received. I wasn’t on the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee in the previous Parliament when all of the consideration of the original TPPA was going through, but I hazard a guess that probably the submissions would have been at least 20 times that number, and probably took 20 times as long. I certainly remember that the committee had very long days and nights of meetings, including a lot of meetings outside of Wellington, so it was an extraordinary sort of experience to see how quietly this was all being dealt with. But, as I say, it was because those who were opposed to the agreement felt really badly let down by Labour and New Zealand First members, who had completely changed their minds on something for reasons that, really, no one who had made a submission against the bill accepted made a substantial difference at all.

So let me just conclude by noting, for people who might be listening, what is so important about this particular agreement. The economies included in the CPTPP account for 13.5 percent of the world’s GDP. It’s worth a total of US$10 trillion. Those 10 economies are the destination for 30 percent of New Zealand’s goods exports, worth NZ$15 billion, and 31 percent of our services exports, worth NZ$6.8 billion annually. So this is very, very significant.

As I’ve mentioned, it includes four of our top 10 trading partners: Australia, Japan, Singapore, and Malaysia. It also includes four countries with which we haven’t previously had a free-trade agreement: Japan, Canada, Mexico, and Peru. We currently export over $5.5 billion of goods and services to those four countries, but imagine where things are going to head now. This is unlocking tremendous potential and opportunity. This will be not only great for our economy but it will create jobs in the export sector. It is a very good thing that it’s happening. I’m so pleased that those parties have had a change of mind, and I strongly support this bill and this agreement.

I understand this is a split call.

In his comments earlier on in the debate, the Hon Todd McClay said that we should take the politics out of the conversation around trade, and in the brief contribution that I make today I want to refute that motion. I want to refute it very strongly, because it is my view that those of us in this House, in the political system, who want to strengthen trading relationships, who for the most part believe in free and open trade, are making a very, very bad mistake if we believe that ignoring legitimate community concerns about the world trading system, the distribution of wealth that it feeds into one way or another, and other such factors—if we ignore those concerns, all we will do is drive the rage machine and undermine the agenda for trade.

I think what is the responsibility of members in this House is to actually engage with the community through our political system. Our political system is about mediating community concerns and feeding them into our decision making. For those of us who believe in free and open trade and the benefits that it brings, benefits which are brought through the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), we will actually be doing that cause a disservice if we pretend that it is not political—if we just put in a box and say, “It’s a little technocratic project that is run by people in the political world and our diplomats, and don’t you people worry about it. We’ll take care of it. It’s not political. It doesn’t involve you.” That is what has, in fact, driven the opposition and the concern about trade and about the previous Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPPA), not just here in New Zealand, but around the world.

So I’m actually very proud of the position that the Labour Party has taken across the course of this issue, because before the TPPA was initially negotiated, every other party in this House had a position for or agin. The Labour Party was the only party which said, “We will judge the outcome of those negotiations on the basis of a series of tests based on our values—based around issues such as the Treaty, the right to regulate for health and education, the right to control our own land, the issue of investor-State dispute settlement, and the position of Pharmac.” We made our position based on whether the original agreement met those tests, and it didn’t meet enough of them. That was the position we took.

I’m then exceptionally proud that upon taking Government, the Hon David Parker and the Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern went to bat for this country—went in, worked with partners in the agreement, and managed to bridge the gaps in most of those areas. So, for example, we ensured that we have the right to control the sale of land—an issue that is incredibly important to New Zealanders. That is engaging in the democratic, the political process. That is about taking care of community concerns. And we can do that at the same time as negotiating a high-quality agreement such as this one that brings huge economic benefits to our country.

So that really is my message. If we want to rebuild the consensus around trade, which has broken down through the course of the TPPA process, we don’t do that by ignoring politics. We do it by engaging with our community and engaging in politics, listening to the concerns, and rebuilding the consensus. This is a good bill because this Government, the Labour Party, has done that, and I commend it to the House. Thank you, Madam Assistant Speaker.

Madam Assistant Speaker, it’s a pleasure to take a brief call on what is a very important bill for New Zealand. There aren’t really many bills that you can say have this much potential to make a difference to New Zealand’s economy, both now and in the future. So it’s a pleasure to take a call to support the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill.

I want to pick up on something from a contribution from the Green Party before. It was Golriz Ghahraman who mentioned that this is an archaic law—

💬 Simeon Brown: It’s not even passed yet.

Exactly—it hasn’t even been passed. She should’ve said it’s an archaic bill. But I want to rebut that a bit, because I think that this bill is, in fact, very progressive. It’s modern, and it is, really, the gold standard of new trade agreements going forward. I want to just spend a bit of time outlining how this trade agreement is, in fact, different from all the other trade agreements that New Zealand has signed and why this is unique.

The first is that it sets standards for trade throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The second is that it lowers barriers for services sectors across the region, and that includes people that want to move around and work, and it will give New Zealanders an opportunity to participate in a much larger global market. It creates a governance structure that will monitor and regulate trade across the region. It also creates channels for public-private collaboration on various trade issues. It’s a catalyst for wider economic regional integration and political cooperation. That, in fact, is how this trade agreement differs from others that we have signed.

The benefits of this trade agreement are very clear. It’s going to promote a level playing field for all of our exporters, provide greater opportunities for our businesses and also our workers, and reduce the costs for exporters, and it also provides cheaper imports for New Zealand consumers. My colleague the Hon Tim Macindoe outlined some of the economic benefits of this trade agreement: 480 million people in the area of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership with a combined GDP of well over $14 trillion, and the projections for how much economic value this trade agreement will add to New Zealand by 2040 is anywhere from $1.2 billion to $4 billion per annum, depending on the various scenarios that have been modelled. In terms of exporters, this trade agreement will provide up to $2.6 billion in economic impact in our export sector by 2040. That’s going to make a real difference to our economy and provide opportunities, advance incomes, and make us all a wealthier more prosperous country in the future.

The National Party has a far longer history of supporting free trade than other parties in this House today. We believe in a country that is open to the world, where our businesses are global and think globally, and where we have opportunities for all of our people in a global country, but I do agree with the previous contribution by Michael Wood that we must continue to ensure that we get economic value out of our existing trade agreements and that it’s not, in fact, enough that we sign an agreement and, there we go, that’s it. We must do much more to make sure that the economic value is in fact realised, and therefore this side of the House will be making sure that the Government will be in fact delivering and engaging with the public of New Zealand, whether it be businesses and private citizens, to ensure that the economic benefits are in fact delivered from this agreement.

Just to outline my final contribution there: a special thanks to all of the people and parties who have been part of this process. It’s been many years in the making, and I commend this bill to the House.

Tēnā koe e Te Māngai o Te Whare. This bill is not about whether we trade or not. I was going to do the “To trade or not to trade; that was not the question.”, which is a truism. The bill, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill, was actually about ratifying the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to ensure that we had six countries that were fit for purpose, really. It was incumbent on us to join Mexico, Japan, and Singapore, who have ratified, and with Australia, Canada, Chile, Peru, and Vietnam—we’re all in the process of ratifying.

I want to acknowledge, as a member of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, that we had 577 submissions. We heard from 33 submitters. I too want to acknowledge the amazing advice that we always receive from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and just highlight that there were actually two proposed areas of amendments that we made as a select committee to fully meet our obligations. The first was in the Copyright Act, and that was to ensure that we implemented two international treaties from the World Intellectual Property Organization related to Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty. Also, there was an amendment in the Overseas Investment Act to remove references to significant business assets.

But what I really want to focus on for a minute or two is the 22 suspensions and how relevant they are. Everyone has been saying that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the CPTPP are the same. Well, they’re not, and I’ll tell you why they’re not. There are 22 suspensions, and of those 22 suspensions, seven of them require legislative change. Seven of them also require Parliament’s examination, and what are they? So, in terms of legislation, copyright term extension: this suspension means “New Zealand will not be required to extend the term of protection for copyright from 50 years to 70”. It requires legislative change. A Parliament examination—an example: “Pharmac administrative changes: This suspension means Pharmac is no longer required to make certain administrative changes concerning the listing of new pharmaceutical products or medical devices for reimbursement purposes.” It requires Parliamentary examination.

Actually, there’s another one under a Standing Order that would require it to come back to Parliament to have the scrutiny of the House, and that’s the delay of Government procurement negotiations: “Any negotiation to expand coverage of the Government procurement chapter will be delayed until at least five years after the date of entry into force of the agreement.” So to say the TPP and the CPTPP are the same is incorrect. It’s incorrect based on us having to bring this back to the House.

The other thing I just finally want to highlight is that there are eight suspensions that do not require to be brought back to the House, because, actually, we really have the legislation, and they do not change our obligations. I’ll give one example, such as the commitment to the start date adjusted for Malaysia. So that suspension affects the obligations of Malaysia, not New Zealand. Kia ora. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Assistant Speaker, for the chance to speak on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill. I’ll follow the convention of others who have spoken before me and adopt a shorthand version of that.

I was part of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, which considered the bill, as well as the select committee that considered a number of submissions in relation to the agreement itself. In the second phase, we considered submissions that were made in relation to the legislation that would ratify the agreement, and so I’d like to focus on some of those contributions. Previous speakers, including the one who’s just resumed her seat, Louisa Wall, have mentioned changes that we did recommend. I’d actually like to focus on some changes that as a committee, the majority thereof, we did not recommend but that I think none the less deserve the credit for being intelligently proposed and made in good faith.

I think it is important that we do have a political approach, as the member Michael Wood encourages, notwithstanding that politics as opposed to politicking might be different things. I don’t wish to get into that, except to say that I do believe in an adversarial system of lawmaking, such that if we thrash out all the ideas in a way that’s passionate but none the less reasonable, then we have the best possible chance of arriving at the least dangerous laws for our land.

So I’d actually like to focus, as I say, on a change that was proposed to the select committee, albeit not recommended by it. That was by the NGO named It’s Our Future. It was supported by the Green Party in its minority view, and I think it’s worth setting out the reasoning and, indeed, the proposed amendment itself. Essentially, it’s to limit the expansion of the agreement, such that other countries, nation State parties, will not be able to join the agreement, except for a couple of conditions applying. The first of those would be that New Zealand would negotiate and sign a binding instrument with that new country proposing to join, in which such an instrument—as opposed to the agreement proper—would waive the right for investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms.

The second criterion was in relation to full parliamentary examination, as though the whole treaty and ratification process were to begin anew. I think those have a certain logic that is very reasonable from a certain constitutional perspective—namely, that Parliament should have oversight of all treaty-making. That’s certainly not the traditional case in a Westminster system, whereby it’s the executive that has the power to execute foreign policy, originally derived from the monarch. So, essentially, what is being proposed here, while it would be in favour, I suppose, of greater consultation, would actually represent a considerable constitutional change, and one that I think is more appropriate for a broader conversation about the way in which laws are made internally in this country, and with respect to international obligations. For example, if the laws that we make locally to ratify other agreements—for example, the Paris climate accord—needed to be subject to parliamentary scrutiny every time another State signed up to that or, perhaps, withdrew from that, then that would be something that, I suspect, those who are proposing this kind of change now for this agreement, with which they do not agree, would find, perhaps, unpalatable. So a consistent approach across that constitutional proposal, I think, would actually be very helpful to bear in mind.

So the rules of the game are known, as they currently stand. So, actually, what Parliament is doing now is considering a bill that will ratify a particular agreement that is known, with a particular set of parties that are known, and also other parties that may wish to join on the terms currently agreed in that agreement. On that basis, my party is very happy to maintain our original position in favour of an agreement that we think will do very good things for our country—and other countries too, incidentally—in respect of boosting trade, and do that in a responsible and safe way. Other parties have apparently changed their position on that somewhat, but I do note the principled consistency of the Greens, at least in that regard, to recognise that the things that they found objectionable before, they still find objectionable now.

So I’ll bring my contribution to a close now with that final plea. Just to encourage those who would suggest changes to the way that we make our laws in this country—that if it is good enough for this particular agreement with which they’re not enamoured, then that should be the case for others as well. That would be a broader debate that, as something of a constitutional geek, I would welcome very much indeed.

Thank you, Madam Assistant Speaker. I stand to take a very brief call on this, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) Amendment Bill. Really, the point that I wanted to make—having sat on the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee that considered this bill and listened to submitters, as well—is that so much about politics and, indeed, trade is about choices and about cost-benefit analysis.

So I challenge what the member Mr Tim Macindoe said when he made the claim that not a lot had changed with this bill in its current iteration, which is the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), because, actually, it has. Previously, in its previous shape and form, the costs to New Zealanders outweighed the benefits, and that’s why this Government went in to bat for New Zealanders. So the five bottom lines that Labour had campaigned on—the five bottom lines that we said this bill must meet so that we feel that it is then in the best interests of New Zealanders—we went in to bat for those. And we met pretty much all of them, in terms of increasing tariff reductions and increasing market access; ensuring that Pharmac is protected; ensuring that we have the ability to restrict foreigners from buying existing homes, which we have done; and upholding the Treaty of Waitangi, which is a clause that, internationally, has been recognised as being almost unheard of, in terms of regulating for the benefits of an indigenous population.

The investor-State dispute settlement clauses are ones that the Minister has himself said, look, we would have liked to have done better, but we do have side letters that mean that 80 percent of trade that goes through the CPTPP won’t be subjected to that.

The point that I want to make, really, is that we’ve gone in and we’ve batted for New Zealanders and ensured that the benefits now outweigh the costs. Therefore, this is a good bill, and I commend it to the House.