Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill

Members, when we were last considering the bill, we were debating the question that clause 4 stand part. However, before I give the call, I wish to advise the committee that I have now received several tabled amendments to this clause. First, I will advise the committee of an amendment that is out of order. The Hon Dr Nick Smith’s tabled amendment to delete clause 4 is ruled out of order as a direct negation of the question.

The Hon Gerry Brownlee was speaking, and he has four minutes and seven seconds remaining should he wish.

In the spirit of the Treaty settlement that this House has proudly just acknowledged, I want to acknowledge an area where myself and the Minister in the chair, Andrew Little, are in total agreement, and that is that the evolution of political parties is actually a really important part of the democratic process. The way in which the Labour Party evolved in the 19th Parliament and the National Party evolved in the 1930s was actually, in my view, good for New Zealand, and both those major parties have made significant contributions to the good governance of this country. The reason the evolution of those political parties is so important is because, actually, parties do not exist for their purpose in themselves but actually to serve the democratic will of countries, and as issues change, as values change, this institution and the parties that work within it also need to change.

But here’s the bit where we strongly disagree, and the Minister in the chair, in respect of the new resignation section that we are debating—new section 55FA says that if a member ceases to be a member of the political party in which they were elected, then they cease to be a member of Parliament. The Minister’s argument that he’s put to the House is, well, actually, what we could do is have that provision on the law books but the leaders will not initiate the procedure that we’re going to debate further down the track. So we’re going to have this sort of legal anomaly, and that is where the Minister hasn’t triggered the mechanism, even though the law says that that member should cease to be a member of Parliament. I think that’s a really dodgy way for us to legislate. That view is not just mine; that view was actually expressed by a number of significant submitters at the Justice Committee.

Here’s the other flaw in the Minister’s speech: that can only occur—that evolution and that change of political parties—if it has the consent of the leader. So I want to challenge the Minister in the chair, with respect—and this issue is absolutely politically critical to the evolution of the Green Party. I put the practical question to the Minister in the chair: when Jeanette Fitzsimons and Rod Donald left The Alliance to form the Greens, would Jim Anderton have given his consent? Well, not on your nelly! I have to tell you, the fury that we experienced in the House at that time was enormous. The reality of this provision—so ironically, given the Green Party’s support for this provision—is there is absolutely no legal question that the formation of the Green Party would have been a stillbirth if this provision was the law at that time. The Green Party would never have been able to get started, and that is very significant, and that is a real anomaly that members of the Green Party need to address. Why are they voting for a bill that would prohibit the establishment of their very political party that they are so proud to have had in this Parliament for the last six terms?

The Minister did not mention the second point that I raised in my first contribution, and I’m going to raise it again and challenge him to address it. I assert that in pretty much the whole world this clause would be unconstitutional and illegal. I know that’s the case in Germany—the first country that had MMP. It’s very explicit in their constitution. I know from the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights that they have ruled it out. I’ve been advised that in the United States, in Australia—and I remind the member who wanted to interject that in Australia they don’t have MMP that, actually, in the Senate, their members are elected off a party list. So I ask the Minister this question: would the democracy of Australia allow this clause that he’s proposing? My advice is no. Does he have contrary advice? Absolutely. I was talking to a representative in both the French and the American—and I’ll tell you why they are significant: many of our liberal democratic values were established with the French Revolution and the American Revolution. In both those countries, they would almost have a riot and a revolution if a Government proposed what is proposed in this clause. So I challenge the Minister to address that issue of constitutionality, because it is certainly my view and the advice that we received at the select committee that the very provision in this bill would be unlawful in any of the countries with which we would want to be associated.

Then the further point I want to raise about this provision is around its compliance with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. Let me just outline what’s occurred around this specific clause and its compliance with the New Zealand Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights in New Zealand—put in place, actually, by Sir Geoffrey Palmer—contains a very important provision: freedom of association. By saying that you can only be a member of one political party to retain your seat within the Parliament is acknowledged, by all of the advice, as a contravention of the New Zealand Bill of Rights. So the process that’s gone on around the New Zealand Bill of Rights with this provision is significant.

Now, what the Attorney-General has advised the House is that this provision will have a chilling effect on free speech—or the “expression of dissenting views” are his exact words—in his opinion. But here’s the part that should really make fellow parliamentarians nervous: when there is a New Zealand Bill of Rights assessment, the justice officials produce a report. Every single bill that comes before the Parliament is required, under our New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, to have that New Zealand Bill of Rights assessment. The only bill, in all the years since that has passed, which the Government has refused to release the justice ministry’s advice on is this one. Now, doesn’t that raise suspicions? Why would it be?

I’ll tell you why. The only reasonable conclusion that we can draw is that this part breaches the New Zealand Bill of Rights. Why do I assert that? I’ll tell you why. The select committee heard from 21 constitutional experts from the University of Auckland, from Victoria University of Wellington, from the University of Otago, and from the University of Canterbury. Every single one of them said that this provision breaches the New Zealand Bill of Rights. When I challenged the Minister and said, “Well, OK, I’ve got 21 experts that say it does; tell me who says it does not breach the New Zealand Bill of Rights—tell me anybody.”, he admitted he could name nobody except David Parker.

Now, that’s interesting, because here’s the point: is David Parker neutral in this? The honest truth is that David Parker depends on this bill for his job, because David Parker is not a neutral legal opinion on this provision. He, the Minister in the chair, and the Speaker are actually dependent on this bill for their jobs, because it was at the foundation of the formation of the coalition of this Government. So I say again: this provision breaches the freedom of speech and freedom of association provisions of our New Zealand Bill of Rights, and that should give the willies to every member of Parliament in this House.

The final point I wish to make is this: there are two very important international conventions. Those are the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In the departmental disclosure statement, it says that these provisions breach those two conventions. And here’s my challenge for the Green Party: how can you possibly tour to the far corners of the world—

CHAIRPERSON (Poto Williams): Order! Don’t bring me in, thank you.

Indeed. How can the Green Party go to the far corners of the world—they go to Palestine, they go to Africa, they go to South America, they go to Asia—lecturing on those two important conventions on human rights and democracy, and when the issue comes up in this Parliament, what do they have to say? Absolutely zip—absolutely nothing. I say that that is a sell out. I say to the Green Party, you cannot credibly go to any other place in the world advancing the cause of the UN human rights conventions if you do not have the courage of your convictions to stand up in this Chamber and defend those rights.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I’d like to use an actual example, and I notice that we’re lucky enough to have in the Chamber this evening our Minister of Defence, the Hon Ron Mark, who is also a past deputy leader of the New Zealand First Party and a man that I’m sure is not afraid to get to his feet and actually take a call on this. But I’m really addressing my remarks—I’m going to ask Minister Andrew Little to stand and give me an answer to the real example in our last Parliament that I’m going to give.

It’s an example of when I was a member of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. We had a petition brought to the committee that was extremely serious, and it related to the repatriation of our veterans, of our service people, in Malaysia. This is something that previous Governments—both National, Labour, and Labour and New Zealand First Governments—had failed to act on. The committee made sure that we allowed the families to come and make submissions. I actually travelled around the country and met with families and listened to their stories, and by the end of that, as the chair of the committee, I felt very strongly that, actually, we had to make a change.

There had to be a change in policy, and we should have been repatriating our defence personnel, particularly those in Malaysia—particularly those buried in a gravesite where we couldn’t guarantee that that gravesite at some time in the future, whether it be 50 years or 100 years, might not be disturbed. I thought it was important to bring them home, but that was in direct contravention to my own party’s policy on it.

The policy and the Minister of Veterans’ Affairs at the time, the Hon Craig Foss—who was very good—was very clear, and I was told very clearly that “That is not Government policy. That will not be happening.” So I was put in a quandary, because of my own integrity—my own feelings on the matter—and that of the committee, so we had cross-party agreement on this. The Labour members of the committee, the National members of the committee, the sole New Zealand First member of the committee, and, I want to acknowledge, Dr Kennedy Graham, the Greens’ member of the committee—we all agreed that the right thing to do was to have a change of policy. Yep, it was going to be tough. Yep, we were going to have to try and work it out. But it was time to bring our veterans home.

So we wrote a report. The report took a position against the Government, which put me in a fairly precarious position because I was the chair of the committee and I was a National MP and I was taking a position against my own Minister. Believe me, I was called up to the Minister’s office. We had a discussion around it, and, actually, at the end of the day, the National Government decided, “Do you know what? Although we’ve got some conflicting advice on this and although it is going to be difficult, it is actually the right thing to do and we are going to do it.”

Now, my question is this: while we’ve got the Minister of Defence in the House, it is for him—or the Minister of Justice himself—to stand and take a call and tell me whether or not this bill is going to have a chilling effect on how members of Parliament are able to come to decisions like the one that was taken by the select committee. I can tell you now that although I’m very proud to be a member of a party that does not support this, would never support it, and will never implement it, the fact of the matter is that if this bill had been passed, then I’d be reflecting a lot more on the decisions that I was making, because I’d be put at risk of actually being expelled from this Parliament and not being able to carry—well, the Minister has a quizzical look on his face. Do you not understand the bill? Do you not understand, Mr Mark, what this bill is trying to do?

This bill has put in place—your leader has got—

CHAIRPERSON (Poto Williams): Order! Order!

Sorry, Madam Chair. The Rt Hon Winston Peters—you are handing all the power to him—

💬 Hon Ruth Dyson: Stop saying “you”.

—to decide to—sorry, what was that?

💬 Hon Ruth Dyson: Stop saying “you”.

Excuse me, Madam Chair. Are you the person in the Chair, or is it the Hon Ruth Dyson, because she seems to think that she’s able to take on your role.

But the reality of this—

💬 Hon Ruth Dyson: I’m helping you.

CHAIRPERSON (Poto Williams): She does have a point.

Yeah. I just don’t think you need the assistance, that’s all, Madam Chair.

CHAIRPERSON (Poto Williams): No, I certainly don’t. However, I would like the member to acknowledge that you are bringing me into the debate.

Absolutely—I acknowledge that, Madam Chair. So take a call, Mr Mark—[Time expired]

Thank you, Madam Chair. It’s always good in a difficult debate such as this to go back to the fundamentals and to the departmental disclosure statement to just really revisit, perhaps, the general policy statement and the measures that Cabinet and this Government went through in bringing forward this piece of work. My colleague Nick Smith has talked—oh, I’m sure he hasn’t finished, because he’ll have some other points to make around the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the advice around that.

But I want to start with the general policy statement. It is part one of this paper. I want to unpick what proportionality of political party representation really means, because in questions in the House, the Minister of Justice’s stock answer to any question around this bill, this waka-jumping bill, has been: “It preserves the proportionality of political party representation in Parliament as determined by electors.” That’s it—that’s the answer. That’s the only defence. That’s the only reason.

So what does he mean by “proportionality”? Well, we know—

CHAIRPERSON (Poto Williams): I apologise to the member—

—what is meant by proportionality. It means that a number of people—

CHAIRPERSON (Poto Williams): Order! Order! I just apologise to the member taking the call. Are you speaking to clause 4—

Yes.

CHAIRPERSON (Poto Williams): —which is directly about political party membership?

Yes, I am. Thank you, Madam Chair. Yes, indeed I am speaking to clause 4. Maybe I was perhaps traversing a meandering path to get there, but indeed I am speaking to clause 4: how a member ceases to be a parliamentary member of a political party for which she was elected. Perhaps I was being a little too obtuse, so I will track back from that to the proportionality aspect of that clause to say that proportionality is indeed determined by the electors. That is how the likes of me, as a constituency MP, and others who are list MPs, get to be in this House. We understand that very clearly about proportionality.

What I don’t understand is how the ability for the leader of a party, in collusion with his or her caucus, can remove a member of Parliament in the name of proportionality, because that is clearly a sham. It is a weak excuse for giving the power—to get rid of an outspoken MP from that leader’s caucus. And that’s all it is. So this argument about proportionality is nothing more than a smokescreen in order for a leader and a proportion of the caucus to get rid of a member of Parliament who has indicated—or maybe the leader even thinks that that member may be proposing to leave the party.

How that happens is very, very unclear. So is the member who is dissenting—how does the leader know that that member is planning to leave the party? Is it a Chinese whisper situation? Does that not put all of us in peril, except for those of us in the National Party? But does that put us or members of New Zealand First, New Zealand Labour, and the Green Party—does that not put all those members in peril of impure thoughts?

So is that what it’s going to come down to? Is it going to come down to a thought in the mind of a list or an elected MP which is not totally aligned with the leader of those parties, and therefore the leader can surmise or guess that that member is about to leave the caucus and so pre-empts him by going to the Speaker and saying that this member is going to distort the proportionality of Parliament? What a sham—what a sham. How can the Minister of Justice stand in this House day after day and advance that argument, because the simplest of unpicking absolutely undoes it.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I just take this opportunity to respond as briefly as I can to some of the more recent contributions. To the member who has just resumed her seat, the Hon Jacqui Dean, I’m sorry to have to be in the positon of having to assist her to understand the meaning of the bill, but it’s a common theme that she has raised, and indeed that the Hon Mark Mitchell has raised, and it goes to a fundamental misunderstanding of the full text of the substance of this bill. So it’s not just about distortion, it’s not just about proportionality, but it is about—

CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): Order! I’ve just come to the Chair and listened for the last minute of the Hon Jacqui Dean’s contribution. Can I remind members of the committee that we’re dealing with clause 4, which is amending section 55 of the principal Act—the Electoral Act—on how vacancies are created. It adds one paragraph, and members need to restrict their contribution to that. So my ruling is actually that in the last contribution the part that I heard was not in line with this clause, and now the Minister is answering those, which is also not in line with this clause. So, if there are new contributions on clause 4, I would like to hear them.

Thank you, Mr Chairman, and I totally accept that point. I was about to get to the point of representation, which is, of course, the converse of a vacancy having been created. That’s what it relates to. Look, I’ll amplify the point a little more fully in the days that we will take up on debating this bill, except to say that there are a range of words that have to be considered together, the last of which is “representation”. That’s what happens in this House.

In relation to the Hon Mark Mitchell, the issue that he raised, with the example that he gave, of course would not apply, because the question of representation in the House—the converse of a vacancy in the House—did not arise in that situation. The situation would not trigger or engage this bill.

I turn to the contribution by the Hon Nick Smith. With all due respect to the honourable member, who speaks eloquently, again he spoke about all words in the proposed new paragraph 55(1)(fa) in clause 4, apart from the very first word, which happens to be the word “if”—“if”. And it might sound silly, and there will be viewers watching the television right now, perhaps listening on the radio, and they could say, “How could it possibly be that the word ‘if’ could be so fundamental?” But it is fundamental, because it then connotes that this is conditional, that these things are dependent on other things having happened, that the vacancy being created relates to things happening under other provisions of the bill.

It is not good enough for members to sort of be selective about which parts of the provision that we’re debating, but, actually, you’ve got to talk about the whole lot. So this provision applies if under subsequent sections a vacancy arises. But it is the “if” that is important. It is the “if” that is important. So, when we’re debating it, let’s debate all words, not just the bits that we wish to sort of touch on for the sake of convenience.

I say this to the member, because he’s made a good point about political realignment, and he said one thing that I think we do agree on, and that is that political realignments happen. That is the history of this Parliament. It is the history of every political jurisdiction, which is that from time to time political realignments happen, new parties emerge, new forces emerge, and none of that will change, and here’s why. Because, just as members will make political judgments about what they do to sustain their own principles and to sustain the principles of their party, parties, caucuses, and their leaders and the rest of the party organisation will all make judgments, and there will be times when an individual party member will vote against their party and the party leadership of the day and the caucus will make a judgment: “You know what? That’s actually OK. There’s nothing wrong here.” Just as Damien O’Connor did only a few years ago when he voted against his own party and his own party whip to support a piece of legislation that the Government of the day, the National Party, had been promoting.

The honourable member talked about constitutionality. I just make this point. Every country is sovereign to itself. They make their own rules, and we make our own rules. Of course, the problem is, I would suggest to the honourable member, we don’t have a written constitution. So we are able to make our laws, and the claimed benefit of an unwritten constitution is that there is some fluidity to it. Personally, I’m in favour of a written constitution, but that would be subject to the very challenge that that member is making—that a written constitution constrains members of Parliament. But you can’t have it both ways. He kind of wants constraints to stop this sort of thing happening and us making our rules, but he doesn’t want constraints because that’s the beauty of the unwritten constitution. At some point, the National Party is going to have to reconcile its irreconcilable views.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Listening to the Minister—actually, I have to say I am deeply indebted to you, Mr Chair, because I was in here for four hours before lunch. I sought the call more than 25 times and I didn’t get it once, so I am indebted. But let me take advantage of the opportunity I’ve got now. I’ve just been listening to the Minister, frankly, tying himself up in knots on this particular clause. And you were quite right, Mr Chair. We are looking at an amendment to section 55 of the principal Act. The reasons why a member of Parliament at the moment might leave this place are pretty significant. One would, very sadly, be the death of the member. Another would be the member voluntarily making a choice to resign, and we see that quite often for very good reasons that we understand. We’ve been to many valedictories over the years for that sort of purpose. Obviously, chronic ill-health might force somebody to have to resign, but they can also be some really serious things such as the member being convicted of a corrupt practice.

Now, I mention those provisions of the principal Act because here we are being asked to consider an amendment which is, essentially, that a member may also be dismissed because he or she fell out with the leader. Now, I think it is outrageous to put that out on the same level as the other very sound reasons that are in the principal Act. I see the Minister in the chair shaking his head, as he has done frequently, and yet I make the point that the Hon Dr Nick Smith made before. The Minister sits there and continues to say that he is right and every other commentator on this bill is wrong. And now he’s nodding. He is acknowledging that he is apparently the only one who is right. All of these highly respected academic experts, some of the great commentators who have looked in detail at this bill and who are very well placed to advise this committee, are all saying the Minister is wrong, and yet he continues to sit there and argue “No, I’m the only one who’s right.” I have to say that I think it was Dr Smith who said earlier, maybe another speaker, that he had a degree of sympathy for Mr Little because Mr Little is actually having to push this bill through; he probably doesn’t firmly believe in it. In fact, it would be interesting to ask the Minister now: does the Minister genuinely believe in this bill? He’s laughing now. Does the Minister genuinely believe that amending section 55 of the principal Act with clause 4 is the right, principled thing to do? I add my sympathy to the previous speaker who felt very sorry.

I wonder if I could ask the Minister the next time he takes a call: did he agree with the late Jim Anderton when he claimed “I didn’t leave the Labour Party; the Labour Party left me.”? Because that relates directly to the clause we are being asked to consider here. If a member of Parliament says “I’m sticking to the principles that I was elected upon, I’m sticking to the principles that the party I’m a member of took to the last election.”—in the case of the Labour Party, which held for about 80 years before that when Jim Anderton was resigning—if the member is genuinely of the belief that he or she is sticking to the principles of the party but the party is the one that has moved well away, how on earth could we expect clause 4 to be allowed? What a travesty it would be to allow clause 4 to apply to that person.

Now, in the last Parliament the member Richard Prosser was becoming increasingly disillusioned as a member of New Zealand First, and he of course paid a price in that he was bumped down the list. Now, whatever you might think of that, at least that was a list that was taken to an election, but if Richard Prosser—because he was speaking out against New Zealand First on a number of occasions, and he’s certainly speaking out about them regularly now—had been in a position where he was told “Right, you have to go.”, surely he would have been entitled say “But I work incredibly hard. I believed in what New Zealand First took to the electorate, I and the activists who worked”—I think he was based down in Christchurch—“with me to get me elected in Christchurch as a list member were doing our level best to comply with and to abide by the principles of our party, and here we are in a position where the party has moved away and now I’m being told ‘You are inconvenient, we don’t like what you’re saying, you will have to go.’ ” I think that is outrageous that section 55 of the Act should be amended in that way, and I really ask all members opposite to explain how they think they can justify it.

I have decided, listening to some of the commentary and listening to the Hon Mark Mitchell, that I would take a minute—[Members applaud]. They might not be applauding in a moment, Mr Chairman. I have to say I agree with Minister Little, who said that the example that the Hon Mark Mitchell gave was not applicable. It’s not applicable for a very simple reason. It’s not applicable because there’s never been an occasion when I have disagreed with my party’s defence policy or its veterans’ affairs policy. But it does raise an interesting question, and that is for Mr Mitchell himself to answer, as to how far he would have gone. How far would he have gone if he had not gotten his party to change them? I didn’t have a problem, because my party always had that stance. It was Mr Mitchell’s party that flip-flopped around like a little leaf in the breeze. The question is actually for Mr Mitchell, and, on the back of the rumours and speculation and his own admissions publicly recently: does he raise this point at this point in time, Minister Little, to actually lay the ground for what he is intending to do and maybe give some justification as to what his own intentions are, and to send the message to his own party? Maybe that’s why the former Minister has raised that point.

💬 Hon Mark Mitchell: I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. I know that the speaker is deeply disappointed at no longer being a deputy leader of a party, but trying to suggest that I am going to start a party and then he apply for the deputy leadership is ridiculousness.

CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): That is a debating point. It is not a point of order. And, while I am on my feet, the encouragement I gave earlier about talking to the clause applies to everyone in the Chamber, and the member has taken his first 1½ minutes to talk about issues that are actually not related to clause 4 of this bill, and I would like him to turn his attention to clause 4.

So thank you for that, Mr Chairman, and I would simply conclude by saying that the example was actually erroneous. And I do take note, within this, that Mr Macindoe was making the point of clause 4 and using the example of Mr Anderton. I would simply say that Mr Anderton should have followed the example, and this is a very staunchly debated point right now, that Mr Anderton, if this bill had been in place, would have been required to go back to the electorate and seek a new mandate, as he should have at that time.

Thank you, Mr Chair, for the opportunity to speak on clause 4. I’d just like to make a couple of quick comments. I find it quite ironic that the Minister earlier proudly supported and accused this side of not having very many renegade MPs. He proudly supported the reputation and the history of the Labour Party for having these guys who stood up and had a view and crossed the floor and set up new parties. I find it ironic that that won’t be happening any more under this legislation. Those members, those renegades, those revolutionaries, will not be able to be revolutionaries. They will not be able to vote against the wishes of their leader.

The Minister mentioned Damien O’Connor just in his last contribution as a way that things should occur—that that’s the right way to do things—and Nikki Kaye could be used as another example. But that was where the leader agreed to disagree. That was where the leader said, “Yeah, it is OK to cross the floor.”—or, at least, to promote their idea and vote against the Government of the day. But the point is: what if the leader did not want that to happen? Minister Mark just said earlier, “How far would you go?”, and that’s the question. How far would Damien O’Connor go or how far would Nikki Kaye go with this proposed legislation? How much would they risk to be kicked out of their party and cease to be a parliamentary member of the political party—I’m referring to clause 4, sir—to make their point? They’re both members currently in the House—members of this Parliament. When their leaders may have said, “Sorry, buddy / sorry, Nikki / sorry, Damien, that’s too far. You will not make a protest. You will not be able to exercise your conscience. You will not be able to represent those who elected you here.”—being, specifically, the West Coast’s interests or the Great Barrier Island interests—what are those MPs to do?

Are they to risk their future careers as politicians simply because, and unfortunately because, of this threat that is looming over them that says, “If you are no longer a member of a political party, your position will be made vacant. You will be tipped out of the House.” And that threat to the freedom of expression of those MPs will be a real one. We didn’t come here to be kowtowing to our leader. Remember, there are two votes that people cast. They vote for a party, and they vote for an electorate MP. Now, if we just had the proposal where we just do everything that the leader says and kowtow to a leader, let’s just have one vote. Just give the people one vote. Choose your party, and we’ll chuck in the number of people that that represents proportionally, and we’ll stick to that proportionality for ever because we don’t need individuals in Parliament, because individuals don’t matter. Individuals’ consciences don’t count. Individuals’ opinions and representations of their electorates do not count. If they do count, this would not be in this amendment bill. This clause would not be here if individuals counted.

We are all here as individuals. At least, electorate MPs are here to represent their electorate, and that is an important right and privilege that we have here as electorate MPs particularly. So how can I possibly represent my electorate to the fullest of my ability and extent when I am limited by the threat of being turfed out as being a member of my political party because the leader does not agree with what I have to say or I disagree with the leader? And, as I mentioned, the two cases I mentioned earlier are where the leaders have been compromising and have agreed to disagree and allow the situation to occur.

Thank you, Mr Chair. I hadn’t been part of this debate earlier, because I was meeting with a very important delegation—in the gallery now—our friends from South Korea. So I take this opportunity to acknowledge them in the gallery today.

It seems to me that clause 4, amending section 55 “How vacancies created” is the very operative clause of this dreadful legislation. I want you, Mr Chair, to think about your own valuable contributions that have been made to your caucus over many, many years. I have not been a member, obviously, of the Labour caucus or the New Zealand First caucus; I’m a proud member of the National caucus. I can tell you that when we have discussions every Tuesday over a wide range of issues, members feel free to give their point of view, and we discuss these issues in-depth, freely, and according to our own conscience, and then we come to a conclusion which binds us all.

With this clause there now and this legislation passed, I guarantee that every member of whatever party they belong to will think very seriously about their very contributions to caucus, because as you start to make your contribution to caucus, you will be judging how far you’re going in upsetting the leader of your party, to the extent that this clause may then force you to no longer be a member of the political party. I just ask the House to think about that.

Politics is a contest of ideas. None of us has all the answers. We develop our policies by talking about them, ruminating on the issues, and coming up with the best policy options, but what this clause does is it starts to stop that. It means that if I go into my caucus and I want to express a point of view, I’m always judging how that point of view might be taken by the leader and whether I perhaps overstepped the mark to the extent a process starts. It may not happen instantly on that particular Tuesday. It may be something that then develops over time and, ultimately, our leader, dissatisfied with the person who continually raises a point of view that he doesn’t agree with, starts to ferment in his mind a way he can get rid of that member of Parliament—how that member’s dissent can be stopped, and it becomes easy because of clause 4.

It just gives the leader the ability to suddenly make sure that we’re all clones. What’s that going to do for the democratic processes of New Zealand? That’s why, Mr Chair, as you’ve listened to this debate, you’ve heard how few countries in the world have gone with this legislation, because it’s wrong, and you can see it is wrong by looking over the other side of the Chamber—how the Government members are hanging their heads in shame. Even the Minister in the chair, who I’ve got a huge amount of respect for—one of the hardest-working Ministers in the current Government—doesn’t agree with this legislation. I’ve heard his few explanations when he is prepared to get to his feet. His heart’s not in this.

We all know why it’s here. It’s because one leader can’t control his caucus. So we’re being imposed with legislation because of the Rt Hon Winston Peters’ own skills in handling people. That’s why this legislation is here. Don’t shy away with any other excuses. That’s why I speak with some passion about this particular operative clause of this pernicious, dangerous legislation.

I note that Greg O’Connor is there. We had a meeting earlier about a forthcoming visit to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). I challenge him to go around proudly amongst those 45,000 members of the IPU, many of them in Geneva at the conference in October, and talk with pride about New Zealand entering into the same status as Zimbabwe—the same status as Zimbabwe.

So Mr Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity of speaking to this clause. I will oppose not only this clause, I will oppose every clause in this awful dreadful bill—

💬 Hon Members: Mr Chair!

—with every bone in my body. It should not be allowed to proceed.

Before I give the call, just because members can see the time clicking down, the member on his feet has the call for that time, and to start calling for a call is out of order until that member is finished.

I move, That the question be now put.

Thank you, Mr Chair. Thank you for an opportunity to speak on this clause. I do agree it’s an operative clause and that the clause itself is very clear, and no one argues with what it means, and no one argues that it is the right of this Parliament to choose to enact this and, indeed, the bill, if that is the will of Parliament. But I think it’s very important when looking at this clause that we look at it within the context of the section it amends, because there are many other conditions under which a vacancy—traditionally, under the principal Act—can be created in Parliament, and this clause is quite different to all of those.

Except for an incredibly dark period in this country’s history when our democracy suffered under the yoke of a dictatorial piece of legislation that was introduced with a bill under the same name as this bill—except for that short time, where the Rt Hon Winston Peters was also part of that coalition Government with Labour—the provision of leaving a political party never formed a criterion for the eviction or the removal from the New Zealand Parliament.

So as parliamentarians here consider whether we should adopt this particular clause, and, indeed, whether we should adopt and support this bill, I say they should reflect upon the Electoral Act history in New Zealand and ask themselves this question: do we have confidence that the New Zealand Parliament in its long history has considered the prospect of people leaving their political parties and what implications that should have on their membership in Parliament? Yes, they clearly have. They clearly have for several reasons.

One is that members in this House today have noted a number of instances where members of Parliament have left or even been expelled from their party and remained in Parliament, at least for a period of time, as an independent. Jim Anderton was one that, of course, I can remember. I am old enough to remember the deep fight between him and how he saw the Labour Party leaving him. But there’s one even closer to home for me—actually, closer to my actual home, because just down the road from me in the electorate of Ōhāriu lives the Hon Peter Dunne. We are both residents in Khandallah. Of course, Peter Dunne left the Labour Party, and, through a succession of party forms, served in this Parliament a number of years, both under the old electoral first-past-the-post system and then under MMP, and retired as leader of the United Future party.

So we look back and think, if we’ve had all of these changes in our history, I believe it is very safe for us to say that Parliament has considered over the years that parliamentarians might from time to time leave the party under which they were elected into Parliament. Parliament has considered that, because the electoral laws in this country have gone through a number of iterations. The principal Act here is the Electoral Act 1993. That big change was, of course, preparing our electoral law for MMP. I don’t think there’s any question at all whether the Parliament of the time considered the potential for people to leave their political parties under MMP, because it had already begun. Peter Dunne had left the Labour Party ahead of the MMP election. In fact, a number of people from the National Party had left and formed parties also.

So we can absolutely, categorically state that Parliament, in its history, has considered what should happen to an MP if they leave the political party under which they were elected, and, except for those dark years when the Rt Hon Winston Peters has been part of a coalition with the Labour Party, this Parliament has consistently said it should not impact their right to sit, and stand, in fact, in this House as members of Parliament. Why is that? Because, first and foremost, once elected, members are elected as members of Parliament: country first, then party, then self.

That is why, when they’re not a member of the party under which they were elected, they remain in this House, because, first and foremost, they were elected to serve their country—to serve all of the people of New Zealand. Yes, they came into Parliament sharing the values of a particular party. In the past it has happened that, on occasions, they have felt that the values of the party they entered in and their own personal values have diverged, but they serve the country and they have the right to serve in this Parliament.

I rise in solemnity today to talk about clause 4 of the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Bill. I refer you back to section 55 of the Electoral Act, that this clause adds to. What are the other circumstances under which an MP would be forced to leave this Parliament? Let us think of what severe circumstances they have been to date: a death, because someone has become mentally unfit, because there has been a criminal offence, or because they are serving another country or have become an MP in another country. And add to that list of things which are very serious a new clause which says, “Actually, if you resign from your political party, you will cease to be a member of Parliament.” We need to consider how grave that is.

A very good way to provide us a sense of that gravity is to think of other countries who specifically outlaw this kind of a clause from their electoral law. We can think of Germany—the home of MMP—which specifically precludes this sort of a provision being a grounds on which a vacancy can be called. We can think of exactly why that would be. We can think of the other countries of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, of which members opposite are part: an institution that is 180 years old and that says that countries that have these kinds of provisions in their electoral law are political party dictatorships. That is a gravity of what this committee is considering in clause 4.

What the Inter-Parliamentary Union says of those countries is that they cannot be seen to uphold democracy, because it is at the very heart of democracy that we will be held to our conscience and to our thinking as individuals, not beholden to the dictatorship of a political party. This clause undoes that grave principle. It assumes that resigning from a political party is a grave offence—that it is an offence that “lacks integrity”, if we are to read the title of the bill to have any real meaning apart from its Orwellian implications.

We consider, in this Parliament today, members of Parliament past who would have been forced to vacate this House if this provision had been in law: members such as Rod Donald, Peter Dunne, Roger Douglas, Jim Anderton, Winston Peters, Tariana Turia, and Hone Harawira. We consider these members. I may not agree with their views. I may not agree with the things they said in this House or the laws that they voted for, but they were true to their own views and were not forced to leave this Parliament because they resigned from a political party. But, today, the Government would say that those people should be forced to vacate this very Parliament.

This represents a grave cultural change. In this contribution, I want to draw your attention to the comments of the Attorney-General, who said in his not - section 7 New Zealand Bill of Rights report that the effect of having a clause such as this “has the potential to discourage an MP from speaking up against the party”. These are not my words. These are not the words of the National Party. These are the words of the Attorney-General—a Labour Party member of Parliament. He said that it has the potential to cause “a chilling effect on an MP’s freedom to express themselves inside and outside [this] House.” And he notes that this “suppression of dissenting voices … is a solemn matter for any Parliament.” Because, of course, it has the potential to do this not just prima facie, but also to have a chilling effect on the other actions which they take.

So, at this point, I would point to other countries in the world which have clauses such as this in their electoral law: Zimbabwe and Pakistan. I would urge this committee to consider the threat that we are dealing with, because what are the circumstances under which those countries have drawn these laws into action? MPs have been dismissed for expressing their doubts about the corruption of their own Government, because they have been forced from their political party and therefore have been forced from Parliament. MPs have been forced from Parliament for voting differently from their leaders. They have been forced from Parliament for holding press conferences without the consent of their party leader. That is the threat that is at stake today in this Chamber when we consider this clause 4.

I move, That the question be now put.

Thank you very much, Mr Chair. I very much enjoy the opportunity to speak to this extraordinarily poor piece of legislation, and in particular, this clause 4, which is the enabler of such an extraordinary piece of legislation, which says that, despite being elected here and being asked by your constituents to give voice to their concerns, the ultimate arbiter of your value as a member of Parliament is whether you can continue to have the support and confidence of your leader. This is outrageous.

Every one of us in this House began a journey knocking on a door and looking at somebody who answered that door and said, “I would like to introduce who I am and the values that I stand for.” How many of you in this Parliament ever had a constituent who you were being introduced to for the first time and were talking to about what you would like to achieve as a politician on their behalf say, “I will judge you on your fealty to the leader?” None. None. Everyone is tested by the character test of your capacity to represent a particular community and the values that you as a politician will give voice to. No one out in the community that we all here tonight profess to represent would ask us above all else, “I ask you always to genuflect to the leader.”, and that is what this clause enables.

It states the conditions by which you have to resign as a member of the party, not because of a choice of values, or passion, or direction of country, or representing your constituent—none of that. That’s included in part, but the critical enabling clause here, that clause 4 reference—new section 55A, you go below that—is that the parliamentary leader can write to the Speaker and say, “I’m sorry but your contribution as a member of this political party is over, so, therefore, you have to resign your seat.” That is absolutely outrageous. If a form of this was put up as a member’s bill, I know that the Minister in the chair would have railed against it. He would have added his voice to the Attorney-General’s—

💬 Hon Tim Macindoe: So would the Green Party.

—and certainly so would the Green Party.

What makes this so frustrating is that this is a place—of course, at times—of partisan debate, but one would hope that through the partisan debate there is an essence of values that underpin a conversation. Yet throughout the time that we have reflected on this bill, and particularly this conversation here about this clause—everyone knows it’s a façade on the other side. They look at the floor. They can’t look at the eyes and acknowledge the rational views that are being expressed on this side, because they know in their hearts this is absolutely wrong.

They are better than this. At their better times they are better than this. I disagree with most of the philosophical and policy implications of this coalition Government, but there are men and women of principle, but none of them have taken a call. None of them, with the exception of Ron Mark talking about the fact—

💬 Alastair Scott: For two minutes.

—for two minutes—that “defence is good and I’ve always supported the leader, and I can’t ever imagine a time that I wouldn’t support a leader.” He could have just stood up and said, “The way I run my political career is, ‘How high, Winston?’ ” I mean, I’m sorry, this is an outrageous piece of legislation and everybody on the other side knows it and it’s an absolute disgrace.

I move, That the question be now put.

Thank you, Mr Chairman. I want to make this contribution on just one word, because there is one word in new section 55(1)(fa) inserted by clause 4 that means everything and that word is this: “if … he or she ceases to be a parliamentary member of a political party…”. Can I tell you why that word “ceases” is so significant. If it said the word “resigns”—that the member of Parliament voluntarily resigned from that party, that would make a huge material difference to what this clause is all about. The word “cease”—the word “cease”—is there because this isn’t about the situation where a member of Parliament voluntarily resigns from a political party. This provision is about the plank calls. This is a provision where a member of Parliament is forced out of a party.

Now my colleagues have referred to this bill as the “Brendan Horan Bill” and let’s just put this into context. I get quite annoyed when this bill is constantly referred to as the “Waka-hopping Bill” because Brendan Horan is the only member who has switched parties in the last decade. Did Brendan Horan want to leave the New Zealand First Party? Did he resign from the New Zealand First Party? Was this some voluntary “let’s hop out of New Zealand First”? No, it wasn’t. It was quite the opposite. He was desperate to stay in New Zealand First. Members on this side of the Chamber might ask why, but he was, and fair enough. And the part that’s so significant is this bill is driven by this provision where a member can be driven out of their political party and driven out of this Parliament.

Here’s a really important distinction. The Minister and Winston Peters have, a number of times, referred to the situation of Maurice Williamson and other members. Let me be very clear: it is my view and it is the view of the Inter-Parliamentary Union that it is appropriate for caucus to have the power to push a person out of caucus—that is appropriate. Caucus is a voluntary organisation. But it is a power of difference to say that a person is not only not to be a member of caucus but is to be forced out that door and out of this parliament. That is hugely constitutionally different, and here’s what’s even more significant. Force out that door a list member who is raising concerns about Government, and—guess what—they get to bring a poodle in. They get to bring a poodle in.

I would ask this question of my colleagues: how many people have you met that have said that in New Zealand we need to give party leaders more power? How many members have heard that? I have to say, have any members opposite knocked on a door and said, “You know what’s wrong with New Zealand? We need to be more authoritarian.”? That’s right—“We need to be more authoritarian. We want more of that culture of what the leader says goes.” I have to say, I have not heard that view once. I hear quite a lot of people saying, “I wish MPs acted with more integrity. I wish MPs acted more commonly with what they said they would do.”

I wish the Green Party would take a call and explain why they are voting for this bill, because we’ve been going for six hours and they haven’t taken a single call. I’d like Gareth Hughes to answer the question: does the Green Party believe New Zealanders want to give more political power to party leaders through this clause? The honest truth? There ain’t a New Zealander out there that holds that view—not one. There isn’t an editorial, there isn’t a journalist, there isn’t a constitutional academic that says we’ve got a problem in this country—that political party leaders don’t have much power.

What’s really in this bill is about the crude grab of power by Winston Peters, and nobody—nobody opposite, in this Parliament—having the courage to say to Winston, “No, that’s not right. That’s not democracy. That’s not what this Parliament has been about for 170 years. That is not part of the culture of this liberal democracy.” I am just so disappointed in members opposite, that they do not have the courage of their convictions—[Time expired]

I move, That the question be now put.

The question is, That the question be now put. Those of that opinion will say Aye—

Tim van de Molen: Point of order.

CHAIRPERSON (Adrian Rurawhe): We are having a vote.

Mr Chairman, I do note that you are required to report progress at five minutes to six. There isn’t the opportunity remaining for a five-minute contribution—there’s only 2½ minutes before you have to do that. I seek leave for the committee stage to conclude and for the Chair to report progress.

Leave is sought for that purpose. Is there any objection? There appears to be none.

House resumed.

Progress reported.

Report adopted.

The House adjourned at 5.54 p.m.