Brokering (Weapons and Related Items) Controls Bill

Madam Chair, we got to Part 3 a little bit quicker than I was hoping, and I’m slightly disappointed I didn’t get to address Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 24. I know that’s now Part 2, but the additions of and the reasons for it in clauses 16 and 25 would have been useful to have discussed, I have to say, before we, effectively, voted on a SOP which we didn’t get to raise.

Look, Part 3 is “Miscellaneous provisions” but is actually dealing with a whole range of, effectively, consequential elements. The first is around the extraterritorial application. It was one of the elements—and the Minister Ron Mark will probably appreciate this—of an ongoing discussion in the committee which, yes, did conclude in terms of the report back, but is an ongoing discussion around how this bill and this Act, by the sound of where the voting’s going, applies to those outside New Zealand.

So much of this comes down to someone having to be a New Zealander, or, importantly, ordinarily resident in New Zealand, so we’re dealing here with Part 3, clause 33(1)(a). Subparagraph (iii) has been removed here and it’d be interesting to understand more fully why. Why is it that that person who “has been found in New Zealand and has not been extradited;” has been removed? So we can certainly understand the situation which is the intent of the bill and is developed in Part 3, that if someone is not of New Zealand—so they’re not a citizen, they’re not a permanent resident, so let’s say they are Iranian; that seems popular at the moment—if they are found to be in this country brokering weapons why would they not have been extradited? I’m sure we must have a variety of extradition treaties. Is that going to be therefore part of the arms treaty, which is being discussed? Is that part of the inter-collegiality between our countries?

So I mean fundamentally it’s coming down to how we are in this country going to be dealing with people who are not New Zealanders who have been found to be brokering weapons and, in their case, have not been extradited. That’s been removed. I would have thought there could be occasions where someone cannot be extradited, probably because it’s sub judice and so we won’t go there, but we can think of a few cases in general where people are arguing that they should be able to stay in New Zealand and have not been extradited. So some clarity would be useful. So again that’s clause 33(1)(a)(iii).

I think the clarity is sufficient around clause 33(1)(b) and I do want to thank the officials for this, for getting very specific—that if these acts or omissions have occurred aboard ships that are registered, ships of the New Zealand Defence Force obviously, aircraft, and so forth. A little bit of clarity would be useful though, because it comes up from time to time that it could be a New Zealand ship but it can be flagged to another country, or of course the flipside to that, and we’re very familiar with a whole lot of other jurisdictions. We were actually doing the briefing recently on the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources down in the Antarctic where a ship may be under the flag of another country. What happens then? So it’s highly, highly unlikely—in fact, I would be completely stunned—that the situation would be that someone is brokering weapons from a ship with the North Korean flag. What are our options then? I’m sure the Minister in the chair will take this very seriously, seeing that could jeopardise the current peace process, but it would be good to understand that a little bit more fully.

Subclauses (2) and (3), I think, for me make a lot more sense. Look, in terms of the Attorney-General’s consent being required, clause 33—why this, I think, becomes relevant and clarity would be useful we’ve partly discussed in Part 2. I’m still hurting a little bit, but we partly discussed in Part 2 that the secretary is going to have all the powers required. It becomes a question then of why the Attorney-General’s consent is required. I do get the feeling it’s probably around if action is taken against a person. It’s probably, I’m guessing, that the secretary will require the Attorney-General’s consent to move forward on a prosecution, but that’s not at this point abundantly clear to me. So look, some clarity around that would be useful.

But the fundamental question is the status of someone who is to be or is not being extradited. Then I suppose the second question is just that clarity, that if brokering is to have happened by a New Zealand citizen on a vessel flagged to another country, or in fact a non - New Zealand citizen flagged to a New Zealand ship, what exactly is going to happen there. If, for good measure, the Minister wants to address the New Zealand Defence Force assets as well, if brokering was to happen on one of Her Majesty’s vessels, that would be useful too.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I’m as grateful as Mr McAnulty for the opportunity to address the committee further on this excellent piece of legislation, specifically Part 3 now.

It seems to me that clause 33, entitled “Offences committed outside New Zealand”, is a really important one. The extraterritorial application, as we say, is a key feature of the bill, for reasons discussed already under the heading of Part 2, which I need not rehearse now. But some of the technical nature of that provision, I think, needs to be unpacked a bit further and stated clearly for the record, notwithstanding that some of it may have been discussed in the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. But for the purpose of providing direction to the courts if they are to interpret this clause in the future, the issues and indeed concerns that I will raise now, I think, do deserve a response and some clarification from the Minister in the chair, if indeed he is able to provide it.

So at clause 33(1)(a)(ii), it says that a person is to be charged if they are, and I quote, “ordinarily resident in New Zealand;”—then an act or omission that they have committed will be eligible for being prosecuted under this bill. Now, the meaning of “ordinarily resident” is not, in fact, defined in the legislation, so in order to understand its meaning, we either have to rely on an ordinary natural meaning of the word, or perhaps consider where else we might find some guidance. So in the New Zealand statute book, I know that in the Companies Act—excuse me, I believe it’s in the Companies Act, certainly the application of this piece of legislation in relation to directors who are required to be New Zealand residents—the standard practice is to consider “ordinarily resident” to mean something of the nature of dwelling in New Zealand for more than half of the days in the past 12 months. So if there’s any guidance that can be provided by the Minister on that point either to confirm or deny—surely he can do one or tother—that would be most helpful indeed.

In relation to clause 33, remaining with offences committed outside New Zealand, we read in clause 33(3)(a) that we are talking about “acts or omissions that occur wholly in New Zealand;”—specifically, that the clause doesn’t limit the application of other sections in relation to such acts or omissions. Now, it might seem an obvious point what is considered to be New Zealand for the purposes of the Act, but it’s worth noting that as a matter of international law, traditionally ships of Her Majesty’s navy—or indeed other nations, however they might be described, outside the Commonwealth—are considered the territory of that nation. So, for example, a Royal New Zealand Navy ship abroad is considered to be New Zealand territory for the purpose of international law. And so it seems that if we’re talking about acts that occur wholly in New Zealand, there’s a valid question to be asked there, although I do note that there is some guidance perhaps to be gained in subclause (1)(b), which does specifically talk about ships of the New Zealand Defence Force, or as I would say, perhaps in slightly parochial fashion, the Royal New Zealand Navy.

The other occasion in international law in which we might have a different view of what constitutes New Zealand is in relation to diplomatic missions. So an embassy or a high commission of New Zealand, for example, physically situated on overseas soil, is considered to be New Zealand territory. So I don’t suppose there’s a lot of weapons brokering that takes place in such embassies—perhaps in between courses of cucumber sandwiches—but if it does occur, then we’ll need to know. We’ll need to know how that would be regarded by the courts if a prosecution were to be brought under the Act.

So for those reasons—in fact, I’ve got a couple of other questions, you won’t be surprised to hear, Madam Chair, but I sense my time approaching the end of its natural life, perhaps in the hope of addressing that again immediately.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate that. And could I just point out to my good colleague the member for Helensville that he does have the opportunity to seek another call. He doesn’t have to take the full five minutes. In fact, I don’t anticipate that I’ll be taking the full five minutes for this particular call because, I have to say, I share the pain of the chair of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee that we were not able to continue asking the questions that we wished to ask on the more substantive Part 2 of the bill. But, OK, we’ll get over that. We’re now into Part 3, and I would just like to focus on two specific clauses of Part 3, which deals with the applications for registration and permits—obviously a very important provision in any measure of this type.

In clause 36, there are provisions for those who might choose to give false or misleading information in their applications for registration or for a permit. Specifically, clause 36(1) says, “A person must not, in relation to an application for registration or a permit under this Act, supply any information that the person knows or ought to know is materially false or misleading.” I don’t think anyone would argue with that. It would be quite bizarre not to have a provision of that sort. But in subclause (2), we read that “A person who breaches subsection (1) commits an offence and is liable on conviction,—(a) in the case of an individual, to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding $10,000, or both: (b) in any other case, to a fine not exceeding $20,000.” Now, the reason I want to highlight this clause is those penalties strike me as being extraordinarily light. In the context of this particularly important matter, I would have thought that that really didn’t amount to much of a deterrent at all.

The Minister in the chair commented that I and others who are speaking tonight had a part in producing the report, and that’s true. But I’d point out to the Minister, I was not actually a member of the committee when it dealt with the submissions on this bill, so I have not had the opportunity—

💬 Chris Bishop: That’s a shame.

Well, that’s nice of you to say that, Mr Bishop. It’s one of your more helpful interjections this evening, I have to say, but that is actually not saying very much at all. But the point I want to make is I didn’t have the opportunity during the course of the hearings on the bill—that were so ably chaired by Mr Simon O’Connor—to ask this particular question, and I would like to hear from the Minister, if I may, please, why what seems to be such a light level of penalties was decided upon, because I’m not sure that it does amount to much of a deterrent at all.

In particular—and I feel sure that the answer will be yes, but I hope it will be—do those penalties mirror the penalties that are being provided for or legislated in comparable jurisdictions? We’ve heard tonight that the bill mirrors best practice internationally, and that’s very good. It reflects what’s happening in Australia. But, in particular, do the provisions of clause 36 and the penalties outlined therein represent best international practice and mirror what is happening elsewhere?

Now, the other question that I’d like to ask, if I may, relates to clause 40, in the provision for the registration of brokers. Clause 40(2) provides that “The Secretary must ensure that the register is available to the public on an Internet site maintained by or on behalf of the Secretary.” Now, again, I’m the first to concede that that’s perfectly understandable—in most respects, you have to have some reputable way of ensuring that that information is available—but I just wonder what safeguards are there for the possibly adverse consequences in providing brokers’ details so publicly.

Now, I recognise it’s not an easy question to answer, because they have to be made available to those who have a legitimate reason to access them, but I’m just wondering what protections the brokers themselves enjoy from those who might have very negative and illegal intent if they are able to access those details so publicly. In particular, what—

💬 Kieran McAnulty: Repetition.

I don’t think there’s any repetition on this point at all, Mr McAnulty. I haven’t heard anyone raise this point whatsoever, and I would like to think that you, given the position you’re occupying for the Government tonight, would also want to have an assurance that there will be appropriate monitoring of potentially illegal and inappropriate activity. I’m sure your good colleague the member for Ōhāriu, given his previous role in the police, would also want to have that assurance, because the police may well be the people who are having to monitor this provision.

So I’ll just make those two quick questions. I very much look forward to hearing the answers.

Marvellous—thank you very much. Good to be back. Part 3—I might start, if I can, with Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 24, because, again, we haven’t touched on parts of it. It really is a question around clause 33. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is suggesting that we delete clause 33(4)—I suspect they’re just inconsequential, but, as I’m often heard to be said, as a non-lawyer I’m not necessarily up to speed. So at the moment, it’s removing out of the clause about offences committed outside of New Zealand that “For the purposes of this section, ‘ordinarily resident in New Zealand’ has the same meaning as in section 4 of the Crimes Act 1961.” So, as I understand it, the Minister is seeking to remove that from the bill as part of the SOP. It would be good to get a little bit of clarity on that.

Where I want to draw my, I think, last thoughts at this point on Part 3 is around the regulation-making power—so that’s clause 38 onwards. I think, very prudently, we’ve allowed this to be done by the Governor-General through Order in Council—

💬 Hon Andrew Little: That’s the usual way you do it.

I think it’s the usual way, except we’ll come back to that on some other bills which the Government’s up do. But, actually, it’s quite prudent.

Clause 38(1)(a) talks about “prescribing fees or charges for applications”. So that’s, obviously, when someone seeks to become a broker. To go through the prescribed form, Mr McAnulty, it’s quite a process. A fee is going to be prescribed. I suppose it’s just wanting some assurance from Minister Ron Mark that there’s going to be some form of limit around this. We don’t want to see brokering stifled completely in New Zealand by sort of absurd fees. It’s one of those sort of, I don’t know, gambles or elements of trust which this House does—enabling regulatory powers to be given, so that they’ll be prescribed prudently.

💬 Hon Andrew Little: Fortunately, you’ve got the Regulations Review Committee to provide oversight.

Yes, the Hon Andrew Little does point out we have the Regulations Review Committee—a fine job that they do, the bane of every select committee chair. But, yeah, just some assurance that in clause 38(1)(a) the prescribing of fees will be limited and not too onerous.

In clause 38(1)(b), it says the “prescribing particulars of brokers that must be entered on the public register”. Two elements on that, Minister—clarity, again, that it won’t be too onerous. I suppose it’s easy for us to be captured by the fact that this is often a weapons-based piece of legislation, but, actually, they are business people, too. I’d like to have your assurance that it will be not too onerous and also that the necessary privacies are kept in mind—you don’t want someone having to publish too much of their particular selves or their businesses.

Similarly, around clause 38(1)(ba)—I keep coming back to the notion of onerous. I’m always just nervous when regulations are put in place that when we say we’re going to prescribe the form of the annual report, that doesn’t become, again, too burdensome. We actually heard it from a Government MP earlier—I think in relation to that now emotional Part 2—that they were very concerned about the nature of the report and said, you know, that we don’t want to see that we’re prescribing paper of 180 grams per square metre, double-sided, in colour, and in A4 or imperial format—so just some surety around that. I think the prescribing of the records and so forth is very prudent.

The last point that I would make in this clause 38 is around subclause (2)(b)(i), which provides that the Governor-General, through an Order in Council, may “prescribe any of the following: (i) the method by which the fees or charges are to be assessed:” and made—so just some clarity on what those particulars are going to be. I assume one could do it by a credit card or ATM. I suppose what I’m really angling for is, in the nature of weapons brokering and good behaviour, that cash is not going to be accepted. You know, it might be imprudent of me to imply that brokers could be up to some mischief—but just making it very clear that, you know, cash is not going to be one of those methods which will be prescribed there.

So look, finally, that’s—well, actually, I’ve misled somewhat. Clause 39—this is to do with the disclosure of information to overseas authority. We gave this a little bit of thought. It’s obvious that we do have allies around the world—Canada, Australia, and, obviously, those within the UK, and I’d better not forget the United States. Just around clause 39—just some surety around the mechanisms of how that information is going to be shared.

I want to be really clear, Minister, that I personally believe, and I think that, by and large, the select committee understands that the information that we may garner through the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade will be of use and of interest to our allies. I suppose it’s just some clarity that it will be to our allies that we will be handing out that information. What that nature might be—I think this clause gives relative context, but it’s probably just some verbal assurance to the committee, around clause 39, about how we will be interacting with our allies, whether or not we will be proactive or whether we will be reacting to their particular requests, and to give some surety around privacy to the committee, because this is something which often comes up.

And, again, I suppose I return to what’s been my fundamental element throughout this particular contribution: we’re dealing with New Zealand businesses and business people here. So, really, it comes back to the regulatory powers of the Governor-General. Does Minister Ron Mark have any sense around limits around the fees or the onus that’s going to be put around the nature of these registers, around these annual reports? I think some verbal assurance—if we can have it on the record that it’s not going to put too much pressure on these people. We’ve heard from other contributions that there’s 10 or 11, but, you know, these are legitimate business people.

Some surety that the methods of payment will be wide and prudent—but I suspect probably not cash—and some clarity on that would be welcome. And, finally, as I say, clause 39—how are we dealing with the disclosure of information to overseas authorities? I assume it is our allies, but, as I’ve asked, Minister, is that something we will be doing proactively, or you would imagine proactively; is it something that we will do upon request; and just some surety to the committee that our privacy provisions are where they’re at. With that I think I’ll, probably to the great relief of—[Interruption] No—did you want to stand up and say something? No? Good.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I just want to try to take a quick call just to cover off some of those questions, and, again, it’s useful that the committee of the whole House is canvassing areas that the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee report didn’t canvass. I assume that the members on the select committee did not see—bearing in mind that they were part of the Government who actually drafted up the original bill—any great need to canvass into these areas in Part 3 as deeply. It did make recommendations to amend clause 33(1)(a)(iii), recommendations which were accepted in the final draft.

But one of the questions was “Why military ships or aircraft?” A Royal New Zealand Navy ship or Royal New Zealand Air Force aircraft is under New Zealand sovereign jurisdiction. Therefore, conducting and brokering from these would constitute an offence. I would have thought that’s pretty clear. The questions around embassies and why they’re not included—embassies are not sovereign New Zealand soil, and there are issues around immunities there.

Penalties—there are penalties for providing false and misleading information. The penalties prescribed in the bill are comparable with other New Zealand legislation, so it’s a consistency argument in that space. In terms of section 4 of the Crimes Act, one of the things that I will just cover off is there are some questions around the appropriateness of the penalties, which I think the Hon Tim Macindoe raised and felt that they were not sufficiently high. I’m surprised, because the select committee report has not said that. The select committee report, clearly, is silent; therefore, I assumed it agreed with the bill. But to explain and try to be helpful, the bill contains criminal penalties and civil enforcement mechanisms for offences.

The key offences of conducting brokering without being registered and/or without a permit or in breach of the conditions of the registration or permit—the maximum penalty for that is five years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to $100,000. So I think if you look in the legislation at the low end of the offences, it provides an escalatory regime which is in compliance and conformance with existing similar New Zealand legislation. If you take that first step, which Mr Macindoe felt was a little bit low—“A term of imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or a fine … [of] $10,000”—and then you bounce that up against the top end, then an escalatory regime is in place which is applied according to the level of the offence and how it occurred. I think five years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to $100,000 probably fits in the top-end zone that Mr Macindoe was thinking of, and is probably why the select committee is silent in its report on those particular clauses of Part 3.

I move, That the question be now put.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Remaining in Part 3 of the proposed legislation, under the heading of “Attorney-General’s consents” at clause 34 it’s made pretty clear that the consent of the Attorney-General is required to overturn the presumption in clause 34(1) that “No charging document may be filed against any person”, etc. But the form of the Attorney-General consent isn’t actually specified, so it’s not clear to me, although I would hope that I would know the answer instinctively, that such consent must be in writing. But I think, none the less, it’s worth canvassing for the purpose of recording for posterity that such written consent would, in fact, be required, if that’s to be relied upon.

The reason I think that that’s important is that for evidential purposes, if consent, on which so much hinges under this section, is to be given, then we need to have some sort of evidence of that fact, but also as to timing, because the timing of such consent becomes relevant under clause 34(2), where we talk about whether or not the consent of the Attorney-General has yet been obtained under subclause (1). So the timing, as well as the fact of such consent, is important, and without that we would be left, perhaps, dealing with someone accused of committing an offence under this legislation saying that they had a belief that the Attorney-General had consented, perhaps on the basis of an in-person discussion or correspondence, and then we’d be left with the thorny question of whether honest opinion was sufficient to prove the belief of such consent, or whether that person would have to be acting reasonably in holding such belief. So that was one point on which I think some clarification might be helpful. I can sense that others agree with me on that.

As for clause 34, I think there’s a little anomaly. I anticipate a rebuke from the Minister that this was not picked up by me, among others, as a member of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, but there’s a slight logical anomaly in that clause 35(3)—“The Secretary may approve a form for the purposes of section 14 or 23.” Yet, under clause 35(1), “An application under section 14 or 23 must—(a) be in the form approved by the Secretary”. So we’ve, perhaps inadvertently, ended up with a regime where the person must make an application in accordance with a form approved by the Secretary, and yet the Secretary himself or herself may have not decided to approve such a form because of the words of subclause (3), which used the word “may”, which is not obligatory, of course. So if that point could be addressed, that would be a weight off all of our minds, I’m sure.

Now, as for clause 37—I’d like to preface my remarks on this with an apology in advance to the stenographers. It simply relates to the fact that there are appeals that can be made to the District Court if certain conditions are met. They are important in themselves so I’ll state for the record that these are, under subclause (1), “(a) to refuse to register the person as a broker: (b) to impose a condition on the person’s registration: (c) to cancel the person’s registration.”

The syntax of that subclause actually has a succession of colons rather than semicolons, and there are no words to indicate whether all those conditions must be met or one of them alone. I think the answer is probably that one ground alone would be sufficient basis for an appeal, but the legislation does not say that. So logically the options are “and” or “or”, or “and” and “or”, which would be rendered as “and/or”. If either the Minister or Sir Bernard Woolley would be able to give some help with that, that would perhaps be very helpful.

Later on in that same clause we hear about the District Court having the ability to allow a further period of time for an appeal, but a set of criteria or circumstances under which such further period may be granted is not specified. So there’s a bit of a lack of clarity there that would perhaps be dangerous to the changes of someone who was prosecuted under this legislation. [Bell rung]

CHAIRPERSON (Hon Anne Tolley): Chris Penk.

Under clause 39 now—[Interruption] I’m grateful for the opportunity to continue to talk about this bill. With relation to “Disclosure of information to overseas authority”, members will of course realise that the secretary may disclose any information held by the secretary to an overseas authority for the purpose of assisting the authority to carry out its functions, etc. Again, the same potential objection might be raised in relation to the fact that it doesn’t specify whether the regulation or monitoring of brokering activity can independently exist from the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, or punishment, etc.

But I think the more important point, in terms of how this might actually practically be applied, is that the secretary has the discretion to disclose that information, and that’s a lot of power to be held by one person, acting at his or her discretion. There are, it’s true to note, a number of different circumstances in which it may be disclosed. But I wonder if, given the importance of the legislation, which at its heart is to provide information to another, overseas sovereign power, is such that we should require the secretary to do so if certain conditions are met, or to say that they may accept that in certain situations they should not be required to.

So I think the importance of this really relates to the fact that the definition of “overseas authority” is so broad. Within clause 39 itself it’s said to be “an overseas agency, body, or person.” “Person”, of course, has a very broad meaning within the law generally, and within this legislation no less so, because it can mean either, of course, a natural person or a legal person—that might be a sovereign State or a body corporate, whether a company or perhaps a trust or some other mechanism as that.

So perhaps it might be said that there is some room for clarification or tightening of those criteria there. I think with those comments I, perhaps, look forward to any comments that the Minister in the chair, the Hon Ron Mark, might make on those.

I really do want to compliment that first-term member, Chris Penk, on his ability to see his arguments through and frame them in such an entertaining way. In answer to that very deliberate and in-depth question—yes. The one question I do think needs addressing—well, there’s a couple I’ll attempt to address, but one specifically on information sharing: I think this is an important matter. I know that it was discussed within the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. Whilst it wasn’t reported on, I do know it was discussed in some depth. So, for the record and for those people who are watching this evening, the question “will information be shared with overseas authorities?”—well, that’s pretty fundamental and basic, given the intent and the seriousness of the matter contained within the bill.

Disclosure of information could be proactive and reactive, or it can take place under a range of conditions: (1) mutual legal assistance to other signatories—that’s mutual legal assistance mechanisms; (2) through Interpol channels—there may be a need to share that information with other nations who themselves are prosecuting a case or are concerned; (3) under bilateral arrangements and agreements already struck between our nation and other signatories, between the governments—these arrangements being such that they govern the sharing of information in pursuance or in accordance with any treaties that New Zealand is party to, which we have signed up to. It should not be assumed that disclosure will only be to friends or allies. The Arms Trade Treaty provides that any party can request information, and thereby New Zealand is duty-bound to assist, and participate, and comply. The disclosure provisions are based on similar provisions in other existing New Zealand legislation. So I think that was an important question; it deserved an answer.

Why is the Attorney-General’s consent required? Legislation with extraterritorial jurisdiction generally requires the Attorney-General’s consent. There we are—that’s pretty standard. By nature, brokering transactions will always occur outside of New Zealand. Investigations and/or—or/and and and/or; did I get that right?—prosecutions under the bill are likely to require assistance and cooperation from overseas authorities and considerations of a number of sensitive, complex factors.

There was another question around the meaning of “ordinary resident”. For the purpose of this bill, a person shall be deemed to be an ordinary resident in New Zealand if his or her home is in New Zealand; or he or she is residing in New Zealand with the intention of residing therein indefinitely; or, having resided in New Zealand with the intention of establishing his or her home therein or with the intention of residing in New Zealand indefinitely, he or she is outside New Zealand but has an intention to return to establish his or her home therein or reside. I think that’s pretty consistent with existing legislation.

A public register of registered brokers—what are the protections for brokers? Limited details of brokers will be published on the register—that’s clause 17(b)(i), (ii), and (iii)—the broker’s full name and trading name, the date of registration, and the date of expiry, and any other particulars that may be prescribed in the regulations. So I think that’s pretty basic, and pretty much what one would expect where people are being registered, and permitted, and licensed to trade in international arms and weapons of that type.

I move, That the question be now put.

Motion agreed to.

The question was put that the amendment set out on Supplementary Order Paper 24 in the name of the Rt Hon Winston Peters to Part 3 be agreed to.

Amendment agreed to.

Part 3 as amended agreed to.

The question was put that the amendment set out on Supplementary Order Paper 24 in the name of the Rt Hon Winston Peters to Schedule 1 be agreed to.

Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 1 as amended agreed to.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clauses 1 and 2