Intelligence and Security Bill

I am going to be very brief, because I want members to have an opportunity to debate an important matter of principle that I know there are different views on in the Committee, and I respect those different views. It relates to the size of the Intelligence and Security Committee. All I want to say about the membership of the committee are the following points. First, the bill is going to increase the membership of the committee from five to between five and seven members. The second point is that a maximum committee of seven is aimed at enabling broader representation. I actually agree very much with Mr Robertson that in a multi-party Parliament you have to be able to have a diversity of views. If you look at the intelligence committee in the United Kingdom, there is a Scottish National Party member on it, a Liberal Democrat, some Tories, and Labour people. So a broader representation is desirable.

Allowing a committee of seven will enable that broader representation, but also will allow the committee to remain an effective oversight committee. It is going to be up to the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister to nominate a certain number of members, and both the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister are going to retain the discretion to appoint to the committee the members of the House whom they think are most appropriate. We have seen an example of that in recent times: because of his huge experience as a member of Parliament, as a person who has held some of the great offices of State, as a leader of a political party, then, with respect, it made a lot of sense to nominate the Rt Hon Winston Peters to the committee.

This was an issue that was recommended by the independent review. The Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee has had an opportunity to consider the issue, and I just want to emphasise that the Intelligence and Security Committee is a statutory committee—it is not a select committee—and, as stated by the independent reviewers, “because the ISC frequently deals with highly sensitive and secret information, we recognise there needs to be some restrictions on how it conducts its business and on its members that are not characteristic of normal committees”.

I think that in all the circumstances, seven is the appropriate number. This is not going to be set in stone—and I refer honourable members to clause 193 of the bill, which provides for periodic review. My view is that in this particular reform, we have gone from five to seven members. There will be a mandatory review of the legislation in a couple of years’ time—clause 193—very much like the review provision in the Evidence Act, and there will be an opportunity for members to revisit this issue, if they wish, in a couple of years’ time. The general principle—broader representation—is highly desirable. The general principle about a review is going to happen. So I think that we have got the right mix here. I know there are divergent views in the Committee, and that is why I think it is important that we tease this issue out in debate.

There are a couple of other changes to Part 6. The changes in Subpart 2 of Part 6 were recommended by the select committee in response to the submission of the Clerk, and they produce a greater alignment between the bill and the House’s procedures, and that is fine. Then clause 126 was also amended on the recommendation of the select committee so that the inspector-general may recommend the destruction of information obtained under a Part 4 authorisation in the event that there is a finding of irregularity in relation to that authorisation or any activities conducted under it.

So they are the only points I want to make on Part 6, but I am conscious there is that important debate of principle about the size of the Intelligence and Security Committee and I know that members will want to have their say.

Our thanks to Minister Finlayson for his lucid and constructive input from the very beginning on this particular issue and, if I may say so, on his whole handling of the bill. We do admire that.

The Green Party simply wishes to put forward two proposed amendments to Part 6. The second one pertains to the issue of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which the Minister addressed, and we will get to that in a minute. The first amendment, however, pertains to clause 155, which has to do with the selection of the Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants. Our proposal is that after the word “report” in clause 155(1)(g) we insert a new paragraph, which would read: “(h) to consider recommendations from the Prime Minister for candidates for the role of Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants.” The purpose of that particular proposal is intended to provide further transparency and oversight to the key positions in the new framework, particularly the Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants. So the idea would be that there would be more than one candidate—for lack of a better word—and certainly more than one nomination, for the role of Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants and that that would broaden the representation, ultimately, of that role.

Now I want to move to the second issue, which also pertains to the question of the committee. It is its number and its composition and, indeed, the principles that underpin the composition and the process of selection. Our proposals are already set out there in Supplementary Order Paper 268. They are composed of two components. One is to delete clause 155(2)—I will not read out the subclause, but it is necessary to delete it to move on to clause 156—and replace clauses 156(1) and (2), which have to do with the membership of the committee, with the following: “(1) The size of the Committee should reflect the average number of members for other select committees, with a minimum of six members.” The purpose there is to reflect our belief that the Intelligence and Security Committee, in full recognition that it is not a select committee but is a statutory body, should reflect more closely other select committees on questions of transparency, accountability, and membership.

We appreciate the points the Minister has made. We appreciate the fact that his proposal goes a small but significant way towards that. Our view is that the step we could take in this legislation could be larger, so we suggest that the committee should reflect the average number of members for other select committees, with a minimum of six members.

On to the critical point, you might say, of the membership, and the process by which the membership is constructed would be new clause 156(2): “The membership of the committee must comprise—(a) the Prime Minister; and (b) the Leader of the Opposition; and (c) no fewer than 4 members of the House of Representatives, nominated by the leader or a co-leader of any other party represented in the House of Representatives in any parliamentary term.”

It will not be lost on colleagues that the purpose of that is to ensure that, you might say it reduces—I appreciate increasing the number to seven goes some way towards greater proportionality in the committee. It does not guarantee that that proportionality is strictly observed in the context of every political party being represented. We heard the Minister say in the case of the UK that those parties or most of the other parties were represented. We could do one or two things today and this coming week: we can increase the number to seven, and then rely on the two senior members of the House of Representatives to ensure that proportionality is observed, through their judgment, on the basis of an increase in number, or, alternatively, we can simply require in the legislation that proportionality is strictly observed and respected, through enabling each party represented in Parliament to nominate one person. Whether it is the leader oneself or somebody else, to that extent there is a degree of discretion, but the requirement is imposed through the law on the House to ensure that each political party has at least one representative.

We put it forward in good faith. We think that every party—New Zealand First, the Green Party, United Future—in this Parliament, by definition of having been voted by the people into this Parliament, is justified in being represented on the Intelligence and Security Committee. We can have sufficient faith in the personal competence of every one our 121 members, on a collegial basis, to be reassured that the personal input on behalf of that party will be adequate and sufficient.

So we can take a half step today, or we can take the full step today and next week. We are in favour of a full step. I assure the Chairman, I assure the Minister, and I assure colleagues it is not pure self-interest on behalf of the Green Party that promotes this. It is a belief—a genuine, sincere, and deeply held belief—that proportionality should be strictly reflected in this statutory committee.

So that is our proposal. We put it to the Committee with respect to the Minister and colleagues that we should proceed along those lines.

I agree with the sentiments expressed by Kennedy Graham, but I do not go quite to the extent that he does. I do not think a party of one person can expect to have representation on committees such as this. You know, in the last Parliament we had three parties of one—we had the ACT Party, United Future, and Mana—and if you were to give each of them representation on a committee and still have that committee representing the proportionality of Parliament, in order for you to achieve your second objective of proportionality, you would need a committee of 120 people. It would not work; it is actually called Parliament. So you actually do, when you have committees that are drawn from the members of Parliament, have to have regard to proportionality but you cannot go down to having representation of individual parties of one.

Andrew Little has got Supplementary Order Paper 270 here, and where I do agree with Kennedy Graham is that proportionality is important and that extends to all parties that have what I would say is moderate representation or above. The reason that Andrew Little has brought his Supplementary Order Paper forward is due to the circumstance that we have in this very Parliament. If the Intelligence and Security Committee is limited to seven people and the Government wants, with its coalition partners, to have a majority—which is four of those seven—then that leaves three people between the Opposition, and the current votes are, roughly, with Labour a little bit more than 30, and Greens and New Zealand First with 14 or 15 votes each.

To have proportionality in respect of the Opposition you, effectively, need four seats: two votes for the Labour Party or two representatives from the Labour Party, one from New Zealand First, and one from the Green Party. So you would need four from the Opposition to achieve a fair level of proportionality in representation. So it is for that reason that Andrew Little, I think quite forcefully, makes the point that a committee of nine maximum is preferable so that in this sort of eventuality, which is not unusual, I do not think, under MMP, you can have genuine recognition of the rough proportionality of Parliament.

The issue as to whether that becomes an unworkable size of committee—I did give some consideration to that and, you know, I am not in favour of overly large committees. But then I reflected upon the fact that, actually, nine is very normal for our select committees. Indeed, the committee that heard this very piece of legislation, the New Zealand Intelligence and Security Bill, was a committee of nine people. It did a very good job, and it was not unwieldy by virtue of having nine people. So, with respect to the Attorney-General, we do disagree with him on this occasion and we do think that the maximum should be nine rather than seven. We do not go so far as Kennedy Graham in saying that any party that is represented in Parliament should have a right to sit on this statutory committee. We think that is going too far.

The second part of Andrew Little’s Supplementary Order Paper is the reference to proportionality requirements, which he achieves through making a slight amendment to clause 156(5). I did, I think, hear that Kennedy Graham was going to put a Supplementary Order Paper on that proportionality point in itself, but if that goes so far as to parties of one having a right of representation, sadly, we cannot support that, because we think that goes too far. The Labour Party is proposing through Andrew Little’s Supplementary Order Paper a reference to proportionality: a maximum of nine, which, in the current configuration of Parliament would enable the Leader of the Opposition to, effectively, have two representatives from Labour and have one from the Greens and one from New Zealand First, which would fairly reflect the wishes of the New Zealand population who vote for the representatives who appear in this Parliament.

I know it is not a select committee; it is a statutory committee, but I still think that the Committee should support the Supplementary Order Paper that is in the name of Andrew Little.

I think it is important that I give New Zealand First’s perspective on this, but I do want to begin by thanking Kennedy Graham for putting up Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 268, because in it there are certainly issues that deserve to be debated here at this stage of the bill. Unfortunately, I do not think that New Zealand First will be able to support any of the amendments, and I want to begin with the suggested amendment to clause 155(1) by adding a new paragraph (h): “to consider recommendations from the Prime Minister for candidates for the role of Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants.” I do not really think that is practicable or necessary, and it is not the way that Parliament usually proceeds with these things. It is worth thinking about, but I do not think, in the end, that New Zealand First should support that.

With regard to the deletion of clause 155(2), I did not really hear from Dr Graham a comprehensive justification for that, but, in any event, I do not think that New Zealand First could support that. It is very important that the bill contain a provision like clause 155(2) to prevent the role of the committee from being extended into operational matters that are sensitive and that it should not be doing, I think, or conducting inquiries into complaints when there are other ways of dealing with them. I think the restrictions contained in that clause are very appropriate and I would not like to see them deleted, for those reasons.

I want to go on, finally, to this issue of the number of members of the committee and the question of whether there should be proportionality followed with regard to that. I want to say straight away that I do not think you could go very far with proportionality as far as the composition of this committee is concerned, and I agree with what David Parker said about that. If you look at the whole question of proportionality in the House, you would then have to think about how you would represent, either individually or collectively, the one-person parties that we have in the House. And, thinking about the future, there may be more of those, and it would be almost impossible to do in practice. There does need to be some regard to proportionality, and I think the bill already does that. The number of seven will allow that to be done. I think that is the appropriate number, provided there is a review—and there is, in the bill. I tend to think that nine is too many.

This is not a select committee; it is a special purpose committee. It does not need a large number of people and it does not need full proportionality. I tend to agree with what Minister Finlayson has said about this, and that seven is enough given that there will be review, and I do not think that we should try to go too far down this path of seeing that there should be full proportionality; just some degree of proportionality, which is already being achieved. For those reasons, New Zealand First will not be supporting the balance of SOP 268—nor, I think, the provisions in Andrew Little’s SOP 270, for those reasons.

I think that with respect to Mr O’Rourke, he has hit the nail on the head, because there is the representation principle, and he covered that, but there is also the expertise principle. This is not a select committee; this is a statutory committee with particular functions.

Consider this hypothetical: it may well be that there is a very small party in the House of, say, two or three members but one of those members—and they are not in Government—has particular expertise in this area by virtue of the fact that he or she has come into the House after a distinguished academic career focusing on security issues, or has been an ambassador or something like that, and both the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister, after consultation, say “Well, that person may actually be a good person to serve on the committee—reliable, trustworthy, blah, blah, blah.”, and so you put that person on the committee. So in terms of simply focusing on strict proportionality, that may not be a relevant consideration, but focusing on expertise, it becomes a relevant consideration.

So there are a number of matters in the mix, and I would not say that simply because a person was a member of a very small party, it automatically followed that they would not be able to go on the committee. I totally agree with Mr O’Rourke. We have moved to seven; there is a mandatory review. The last time this was looked at was in 1996 when we established the Intelligence and Security Committee. A lot of water has flowed under the bridge since then. We have got the guarantee of a regular, periodic review of the legislation, and it could well be that a future Parliament decides to change the matter. But, for the moment, I agree with Mr O’Rourke that we have struck the right balance here.

I am going to take only a brief call, and I will direct it to the matter at hand, which is Andrew Little’s Supplementary Order Paper 270. It was my privilege, for a short time, to sit on the Intelligence and Security Committee as a party leader, and I have a high level of respect for its function. I commend the fact that in this bill the role of the committee has been further strengthened. It has been strengthened by the range and level of oversight activities that it undertakes, and it has been strengthened by its crucial consultation role prior to the vital inspector-general being elected by the whole House. The committee is the place where that is going to be thrashed out. There can, in this system as it is designed at the moment, be few more important appointments than that. It is the place where cross-party understandings would primarily be reached and reflected in the votes of this House.

I respectfully, therefore, do differ with the Minister on this point, because representation is an essential component. Expertise is also useful. But it would be hoped that, by ensuring a large enough committee, there would be a better chance that both representation and expertise could be given effect to. Let me offer up two benchmarks. The first is the intelligence committees of the US House of Representatives and the US Senate—“committees” plural, because they each have one. Those are bipartisan and august bodies that are given the most confidential operational briefings and play a vital oversight role in the American system, as I recall from having served there. And I can see, with this legislation, this bill providing for the New Zealand committee to evolve practice in that direction. I would—to coin a phrase—warrant that, over time, the briefings given to this committee will become more substantive, more important, and, perhaps, more operational in nature, as they should be, from time to time.

The second analogy is the Regulations Review Committee. It is obviously a very different beast—buried in the minutiae of regulatory practice—but there is a tradition here that the Minister may wish to take account of if he is considering that he wants a smaller committee than the nine proposed by the Leader of the Opposition. Historically, although not at present, that committee has had an Opposition majority because it is, by definition, a watchdog on executive practice. So is the Intelligence and Security Committee. So the easy way to reach agreement on this is to allow enough Opposition members to provide reasonable proportionality across the Opposition. And, as my colleague has said, four is the minimum. And if the Government wishes to have fewer than that, well, that might be a different matter.

But I do not think that is what the Government does want, because I think the Government does see the importance of a range of parties on the Government side being represented. It is just a factor of the mathematics of an MMP Parliament and I think it is absolutely in keeping with the multipartisan way that this bill has been crafted and is being passed that all parties—perhaps bar the smallest—from time to time should be represented on that committee. That is the way the committee will have the enduring confidence of the House. It will improve the scrutiny and the buy-in by Parliament into the operation of these vital agencies, and it will, in my view, improve the quality of the committee’s work. It will truly function, if representative as well as expert, as a standing committee of the House.

The Minister himself has said it is a standing committee, not a select committee. That is absolutely right, but I would advocate, Minister—I would submit—that if it is a standing committee, then it is more, not less, important that its representative as well as its expert functions be upheld. I recognise that this would be a matter that he would need to consult on, perhaps, and it may be that it is a finely balanced judgment on the Government benches, but I would ask him to consider further in the spirit with which he has approached this whole bill. The Opposition is not playing politics with this. We do not need a headline; we are supporting the bill. It is the dying hours of a Thursday session, and we want to get the bill through, but we want to set up a process that has enduring parliamentary legitimacy. There is no better way than ensuring that everybody is inside the room. That puts an obligation on anyone inside the room to maintain the confidence of the process.

Kia ora, Mr Chairperson. Ngā mihi nui ki a koutou, kia ora. I would like to rise to speak to Part 6 of this bill, and, in particular, the Supplementary Order Papers (SOPs) in the name of Andrew Little and Kennedy Graham. Essentially, what we are discussing today is the size and the constitution of the statutory Intelligence and Security Committee. We have seen huge debates in New Zealand regarding intelligence activities in New Zealand, where public confidence has been seriously eroded in those activities and the supervision by that parliamentary committee, and I think it is important to rise and stand to say a few brief words.

We heard just before from the member Denis O’Rourke that he does not agree with proportionality. We have heard arguments from the other side of the Chamber that a committee greater than seven would be unwieldy, but could I point to some of the members with caucuses larger than seven, members of a Cabinet with 21 members, members of a select committee with more than 10 members, and university councils, for example, where this Government actively reduced the size from 20 to 12—all are much larger than seven. Are they unwieldy? That is my question to the Committee.

The fact is that what we are seeing today, if these SOPs do not pass, is first-past-the-post thinking. I remember, back in the 1990 election, when the Green Party got 10 percent of the votes but 0 percent of the seats because of first past the post and an unfair, disproportional system, which saw a huge chunk of the New Zealand voters’ will and perspective locked out. That is why I am supporting SOP 270, to increase the committee size to nine.

The fact is that if we do not do this, what we are going to see is groupthink on that committee. Good decision-making practices include the perspectives of others, even if they are not acted on and even if they are not agreed to. It is no surprise that the Green Party has a different view on some of the matters before the committee, but I think to increase the public confidence, the confidence of the House—as the Hon David Cunliffe just pointed out—and to add a degree of legitimacy amongst the public, we need to make sure that diverse perspectives are heard around that table. Kia ora.

I have great respect for what Mr Cunliffe said. It is a finely balanced judgment. I would not compare the Intelligence and Security Committee that we have here to the United States’ intelligence committee, where there are literally hundreds of staffers. I do not know who chairs it now; it used to be Senator Dianne Feinstein of California, and she and her staffers could summon the director-general of the Central Intelligence Agency or James Clapper, who was then the director of national security. They could summon them down to the Senate every day of the week.

The Intelligence and Security Committee is not that kind of committee, because many of those functions are actually undertaken by the inspector-general here, but the point Mr Cunliffe makes—and I think it is a good point—is that this is an evolving committee, and who knows what it will be like in 5 years’ time. There is a very legitimate question, for example, about whether the Minister in charge of the agency should be on the committee, because that Minister may need to be a witness from time to time. There are those sorts of considerations, so this is an evolving area, and I respect what he has to say.

The judgment call that has been made is that in the circumstances, given what the Cullen-Reddy review said, given the fact that we are moving from five members to seven, and given that there is going to be a mandatory review of all the legislation in the next little period—when I am sure this issue is going to arise—a move from five to seven is about right. It does not mean that smaller parties, for the reasons I said, will be locked out. I just disagree with the formulation that it is first-past-the-post politics, because it could well be that the leader of a small party, by virtue of expertise and integrity, and so on, is exactly the right person to be on the committee or even chair it, and that is at least provided for in the legislation. It is a movable feast, and that is the call that has been made.

I have been listening to all the contributions on this particular point—on the nature of the committee—and I must say I am impressed. I mean, the democratic spirit is alive and well, and I think the input has been pretty insightful. I just want to see whether there is any scope for moving to some kind of common ground on this. I am looking at Mr English’s Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 264, which is where the Minister is resting, and looking at clause 156 and I am looking at Mr Little’s SOP 270 and my own SOP 268, and seeing whether there is any scope for any kind of compromise that could allow us to go just a fraction further beyond Supplementary Order Paper 264. [Interruption]

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Trevor Mallard): No, no—no. Dr Graham is speaking but I am told that you actually can ride two horses at once.

Yes. I was just taking a large breath.

💬 Hon Christopher Finlayson: We were talking about your SOP, actually.

Thank you, Minister. So I am putting forward a separate amendment that does not do the larger step that my SOP 268 proposed, which is that every party be empowered automatically under the legislation to be present on the committee. I would accept what would appear to be a majority view here, including from our colleagues in New Zealand First and elsewhere, that that is too big a step to take. The Minister has said that; I recognise that. I would just like to put forward a separate amendment that goes less far than my SOP 268, and it would simply pick up on the Minister’s SOP 264, clause 156(5), which says: “When nominating a person for membership of the Committee, the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister must have regard to security requirements.” That is the current wording in clause 156(5), and I would just then look to Mr Little’s—just look to Mr—

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Trevor Mallard): Sorry, but we are just trying to get the ducks in a row—

Yes.

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Trevor Mallard): —on the member’s amendment, he says as Chairman Mallard.

Yes. I would then look to Mr Little’s SOP 270 and use the wording that is in Mr Little’s SOP and add it on to the Minister’s SOP 264. It would just say “and the proportional representation of political parties in the House of Representatives”, which simply introduces the point of principle of proportionality, which we have all been talking about in this Committee—including, I think, the Minister—and it would just enshrine that principle articulated by everybody in the legislation. It would retain the degree of discretion that the Minister is insisting on. It would stop short of the automaticity and the stringency that was in my SOP 268, but it would, I think, reflect points made by the Hon David Parker, and, for that matter, by New Zealand First colleagues and others, and I think it would reflect the Minister’s own view that proportionality ought to be respected. It just brings it explicitly into the legislation. So that is a new amendment that I want to put forward, and I leave it to the Minister to give it due consideration.

I call Stuart Nash. Sorry, there was a member who was calling for some time, whom I was going to call, but that member did not call.

OK. Well, thank you very much for the opportunity. I am not going to talk about the Supplementary Order Paper, and because I was not on the select committee, there are just a couple of questions to the Minister, which I have no doubt he will be able to answer very simply. I would like to talk to clause 122, and this requires the inspector-general to prepare and publish an annual work plan. There are just a couple of things I have here. I mean, we talk about the integrity and the independence of the security services, and, you know, we guard that jealously.

I suppose a couple of things that I just have questions on—the inspector-general, of course, when he or she prepares the work plan, has to consult the Ministers on that proposed work plan, and I understand that. That is fine. But does that potentially lead to a level of political interference? I know that this Minister—Chris Finlayson—would not go down that route in any way, shape, or form, because he is scrupulously fair, but does it lead to any sort of charge of political interference?

The other thing is that clause 122(2) says: “The Inspector-General, after having regard to any comments received from the Ministers, must finalise the annual work programme.” There is no problem with having to finalise the annual work plan, but does “after having regard to” mean he can completely ignore the Ministers’ recommendation or the Ministers’ input? Or does that mean that he is under—or she, or the inspector-general; I should probably use the correct term—some sort of obligation to include the Ministers’ input? Again, I just ask whether that is open to a little bit of political interference.

We go down to clause 122(3), and it talks about “the Inspector-General—(a) must give a copy [of the work plan] to the Ministers;”. That makes absolute sense. But clause 122(3)(b) says he or she “may publish [the work plan] on an Internet site maintained by or on behalf of the Inspector-General.” I am just curious to know—because it says “may”, there is absolutely no obligation to do this—whether this Minister, for example, would give permission for the inspector-general to publish that work plan on the internet, and under what conditions would he deny the inspector-general the ability to publish the work plan on the internet? We are talking about clause 122(3)(b). There is no obligation, but it does mention it in legislation.

I know the word “may” versus the word “must”, as mentioned, provides no obligation, but the fact that it actually is in this clause in here, which says it may publish it on the internet, says to me that it is Parliament’s way of directing a Minister or an inspector-general to actually undertake a course of action unless there is a really good reason why they would not. So it is just a question there.

I go down to clause 123, and I am assuming, Minister—this is page 101—that this is part of whistleblower legislation? What we are talking about here is it says “(1) This section applies if an employee … brings any matter to the attention of the Inspector-General or Deputy Inspector-General.”, but then it goes on to say: “(2) The employee must not be subjected … to any penalty or discriminatory treatment … in relation to his or her employment …” by reason of bringing an issue to the inspector-general or to the deputy inspector-general. Is this a whistleblower clause? I am assuming it probably is.

💬 Hon Christopher Finlayson: Yes, it is.

Oh, that is good to know. The interesting thing is, though, that it says “subsection (2)”—i.e., non-discrimination—“does not apply if the Inspector-General determines that the employee did not act in good faith.” I understand good-faith provisions, but, again, I am curious—I was going to say “concerned”, but “concerned” is not right—as to who would be the arbiter of what determines good faith?

The reason I ask that is—well, the classic case, which our colleague Sue Moroney talked about, was in the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA), where a woman was stealing money. Employees went to her boss and said: “This woman is stealing money.” What happened was they were restructuring the NZTA, and the people who had gone to this woman’s boss were clearly discriminated against and ended up being made redundant. Under this sort of clause, I wonder whether they would have had any redress even after they had been made redundant and the issue of wrongdoing was proven in the future.

I know there was a chap in town just recently—I think he might even be here—who is an acknowledged expert on whistleblowing. He did it himself, and he travels the world talking about the implications for an employee of whistleblowing. So the good-faith test is good, but it is just a little bit concerning there.

Hey, there is one thing. In clause 124, the persons who are—

Before I call a member, I do want to check with the Committee on a matter of process, because we have got ourselves into a little bit of an issue as to the structure. What I want to ask, first of all, is whether Dr Graham would permit his amendment to the bill to be phrased as an amendment to the Minister’s Supplementary Order Paper 264, in order to get it in front of that and, therefore, for it not to be ruled out later on. Can I have the member’s consent for that?

Thank you, Mr Chairman. The answer, I think, would be yes, on the ironic assumption that we are not obliged to vote for it, because if it goes through, on the grounds of a majority, then that would be my personal fate, which I would relish.

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Trevor Mallard): No, there is no obligation. Can I just check that other members understand that is the process we are going to use? Can we move to the vote on this part now?

💬 Hon Members: Yes.

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Trevor Mallard): OK. The question is that Dr Kennedy Graham’s tabled amendment, which becomes an amendment to the Minister’s Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) 264, be agreed to.

💬 Hon David Parker: I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. That is the amendment to clause 156(5)?

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Trevor Mallard): That is the one. Yes. The question is that that amendment be agreed to. It seemed to have vaguely familiar writing.

The question was put that the following amendment in the name of Dr Kennedy Graham to the amendment in Supplementary Order Paper 264 to clause 156(5) be agreed to:

After “security requirements” insert “and the proportional representation of political parties in the House of Representatives”

Amendment to the amendment agreed to.

The question was put that the amendments set out on Supplementary Order Paper 264 in the name of the Rt Hon Bill English to Part 6 be agreed to.

Amendments as amended agreed to.

The question was put that the amendments set out on Supplementary Order Paper 268 in the name of Dr Kennedy Graham to clause 155 and clause 156 be agreed to.

Amendments not agreed to.

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Trevor Mallard): We now come to Andrew Little’s amendments to clause 156, set out on SOP 270—

💬 Hon David Parker: I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. I would take it then—are these going to be put separately? Clause 156(5) would now be inconsistent with an earlier resolution of the Committee. Are you able to put clauses 156(1) to 156(4) as separate questions?

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Trevor Mallard): Can I get advice from the member. Which is the one that is inconsistent?

💬 Hon David Parker: Clause 156(5) has already been passed.

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Trevor Mallard): Yes.

💬 Hon David Parker: Therefore, that is a redundant question.

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Trevor Mallard): My suggestion is that, by leave, I strike out the last subclause. Is there any objection to that? The question is that the amendments in Andrew Little’s name to clauses 156(1)(b), 156(4), and 156(4)(a) be agreed to. A party vote is called for.