New Zealand Intelligence and Security Bill

on behalf of the Minister for National Security and Intelligence: I move, That the New Zealand Intelligence and Security Bill be now read a second time. The bill is the most significant reform of the Intelligence and Security Agency’s legislation for many years and it is the Government’s response to the first independent review of intelligence and security in New Zealand, led by Sir Michael Cullen and Dame Patsy Reddy. The bill explicitly sets out the agency’s powers and activities more clearly than ever before, and I emphasise this does not mean they are new. We are being just as comprehensive as possible to improve the transparency and accountability of the agencies.

I want to thank submitters for their time and efforts, and I also want to thank the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee for its careful consideration of the bill. The committee has recommended a number of changes that, in my view, are going to strengthen and improve the bill. I acknowledge particularly the helpful contributions in the committee by other political parties, particularly Labour and New Zealand First. The report back reflects their constructive approach.

Can I also express my thanks to Mr Dunne. Throughout this process he has raised a number of concerns with me. He has been particularly concerned about ensuring that the scope of the agency’s powers is not greatly expanded, that the approach to national security provides appropriate protection for New Zealanders, and that the right mechanisms are in place to hold the agencies accountable for their actions. Those are very valid issues and I think the new warranting regime, the robust oversight in the bill, and the changes recommended by the select committee have addressed them.

The most significant recommendation made by the select committee relates to the approach to the definition of “national security”. That definition plays a critical role in the bill by determining when agencies can obtain a warrant to target New Zealanders. The bill as introduced contained the definition proposed by the reviewers. However, as advised by officials and parliamentary counsel at the time, the definition, with respect, had a number of shortcomings. Its scope was unclear. It seemed to be unnecessarily complex, and, as a result, there were some concerns about its workability.

Because of those issues the Government put forward an alternative definition to allow submitters to consider it alongside the bill. That definition would require the proposed activity to be necessary to contribute to the protection of national security and be directed at one or more specified activities of national security concern—for example, terrorism or violent extremism. We specifically asked the committee to look closely at how national security would be dealt with in the legislation. After careful consideration and listening to the submissions, the committee agreed to replace the reviewers’ definition with the officials’ definition, but, importantly, they narrowed it to ensure that only those activities of legitimate national security concern for New Zealand are included in the list.

So, for example, the committee limited the espionage and other foreign intelligence activity limb to those activities directed at New Zealand interests in New Zealand or carried out by New Zealanders. It also limited the threats to the international security limb to those threats that have the potential to impact adversely on New Zealand’s interest, and significantly narrowed the serious crime limb. It also removed the threats to the life and safety of New Zealanders limb since such threats would be captured by other limbs of the definition, as well as a few other changes to ensure that the test is appropriately targeted, and we can look more closely at that during the Committee stage. I think the new definition is going to ensure that the agencies can continue to deliver on priorities for the Government while guaranteeing that New Zealanders are the subject of surveillance only when absolutely necessary.

Another significant change is the removal of purpose-based warrants. Some submitters, including the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, were concerned that the objectives sought to be achieved by purpose-based warrants could already be achieved through the class-based warrant. After testing a range of operational examples, officials agreed and so those provisions have been removed.

The committee also recommends improvements on how practice or training warrants are dealt with in the legislation. As originally drafted, such warrants were included in part of the general warranting regime. In response to concerns from submitters, they have been separated out. This has enabled the powers available under them to be narrowed so that only those necessary for training and testing are available. There are also additional safeguards such as the addition of the triple-lock protection for all practice warrants, and requirements to report to the Minister and the inspector-general after carrying out activity under a practice warrant.

Some drafting changes have also been made in Part 4 of the bill to ensure that New Zealand citizens and permanent residents will have the benefit of the triple-lock protection in situations where activities authorised by a warrant will likely lead to the collection of information about them. This was always the intention, and the constructive changes made by the committee puts this beyond doubt.

A new development is the creation of a scheme for mandatory disclosure of certain information held by telecommunications network operators and financial service providers, termed business records. This information includes, for example, phone records, customer subscriber details, bank statements—some of which are often critical in the early stages of an intelligence investigation. It does not include the contents of information. This information is currently provided on a voluntary basis and the new legislation will provide a statutory authority for this work.

A major focus for both the reviewers and the Government has been to ensure robust and independent oversight of these agencies. Given their intrusive capabilities and the secret nature of their work, this is absolutely essential. As introduced, the bill already provided for very extensive oversight. The focus since has been to strengthen oversight by adding practical hooks to make it easier for the inspector-general and the relevant Ministers to perform their functions.

The number of mandatory ministerial policy statements has been substantially increased to cover a range of matters, including a number of areas of the agency’s work where their activities involve a degree of deception or intrusion into the private lives of individuals. Ministerial policy statements regulate lawful activity, so failure to act in a manner consistent with a ministerial policy statement will not of itself make an act unlawful. The bill, however, makes it clear that directors-general and employees must have regard to any relevant ministerial policy statement when making decisions or taking action.

The final point I wish to address is the issue of the committee, the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), and the wider representation enabled by the bill. The bill increases the maximum size of this committee from five to seven members. This was recommended by the reviewers, and the select committee has not recommended any changes. The ISC is not a select committee; it is a statutory committee. And I believe that a membership of seven enables a broader political representation than is currently possible. It is up to the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister each to nominate a certain number of members of Parliament to the committee and, in my opinion, I do not think the bill should be any more prescriptive than this, although I know that there is a different view on the other side, and Mr Parker and I are continuing discussions on that. But I do think it is important that the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister in future Parliaments have the flexibility to appoint the members they think most appropriate to serve on this committee. I simply add that, in my opinion, seven is the appropriate maximum membership for the committee for it to remain an effective working committee on intelligence matters.

I would also say, of course, that this bill is subject to a mandatory review clause. The Intelligence and Security Committee has evolved over the years since the concept was first introduced in 1996 and there could well be changes that future Parliaments may wish to introduce. But for the moment, as we develop this committee, I think we have made a very good start. So, once again, I thank the committee for their tremendous work and commend the bill to the House.

The task that we are undergoing is trying to balance the powers that the intelligence agencies need to do their work—and I think every party now acknowledges there is a role for an SIS and a Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) in our country. We need legislation that enables them to do what they need to do, but prescribes their powers in a way that appropriately balances the privacy and the civil liberties of New Zealanders, in particular, against excessive intrusion by agencies of the State. I want to give you four examples of why we need to update these laws and why I think this change to the law is necessary.

The first and what I think is the most disgraceful episode is one that occurred in 2011 when Warren Tucker, the then head of the GCSB, colluded with the Prime Minister’s department and used or misused information and misrepresented advice in relation to the Hon Phil Goff during the election campaign. The GCSB colluded in that effort. The Hon Phil Goff was besmirched, he was accused of being wrong, he was accused of misleading, and I think some people accused him of lying. It turned out that none of those things were true and that the GCSB was part of a political attack against the Leader of the Opposition at the time during an election. It was an absolutely disgraceful episode in the history of New Zealand’s intelligence agencies and, of course, it did not all come out. The truth did not all come out until the Nicky Hager book, which disclosed various emails, and it became clear through that process that the arms of State, including the new head of the GCSB, Rebecca Kitteridge—

💬 Hon Christopher Finlayson: SIS.

The SIS, sorry. It was the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, was it not? The Inspector-General, Cheryl Gwyn, got on top of it. There was an apology made to Phil Goff, and Warren Tucker went into his retirement with a serious stain upon his reputation. That is the first example.

The second example was the Dotcom fiasco, really, which, under the pressure of litigation by Dotcom, it was made clear that some of the actions of the State, including via the GCSB, were illegal. That led to a conclusion both that some of its actions were illegal and that it was ambiguous as to whether some of its other actions were legal as well, which created problems for the GCSB to do the work that it needed to do. That showed that there was a need for a legislative upgrade.

There was some interim legislation that came before the House. There was notoriety around the country—I think there were big protest meetings. I went to one of them in Auckland, along with David Shearer and others, where Dame Anne Salmond was speaking, and they brought to light that the legislation that was then proposed did go further than was being portrayed by the Prime Minister in terms of rights of surveillance against New Zealanders. The Prime Minister, at the last minute—I think in just about the third reading of the bill—acknowledged that there were rights of surveillance against New Zealanders that went further than metadata, and he promised that in a substantive sense he would not allow those theoretical rights to be used in practice by the organisation. That was better than nothing, but the legislation should have covered that, rather than it being a ministerial promise.

The third example is in respect of an example that was given to us by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Cheryl Gwyn. When she submitted to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, she gave us a copy of a decision by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in the United Kingdom last year that considered what had been happening with their agencies. I was shocked—and I think other members of the committee were shocked as well—to find that in the United Kingdom their spy agencies had been gathering data, including locational data, about the whereabouts of people using cellphones, including the residents of Great Britain, without warrant and without the knowledge of Parliament, and without the knowledge of the security agency oversight committee. The only person who knew was the Minister and, effectively, the decision said, there had been active hiding of this fact from the various arms of Government—not just for 1 year, but for many, many years. It showed that you really do need good oversight rules in order to protect and to get this balance right.

After that history that I have outlined, the Prime Minister wisely appointed Chris Finlayson to sort it out. There was a report prepared by Sir Michael Cullen and Dame Patsy Reddy, which laid out the foundations for the approach that has been taken. I would have to say that Chris Finlayson has overseen a process in respect of the development of this legislation and the use of the select committee and the listening to of the concerns of civil society, and I have never seen a better approach in my 15 years in Parliament. I think that the Attorney-General and his officials at DPMC have done an absolutely splendid job.

They let the select committee do its job as well. We had some fantastic submissions, not just from the inspector-general but also from the Privacy Commissioner, from the Law Society, and from civil liberty groups. All of those groups were listened to, and I think the serious concerns, or the serious matters that were being raised, were well addressed by the select committee with the cooperation of officials and the Minister. It was so pleasing to see an example of when the select committee’s skills and the select committee process was allowed to run and do its job. That happens best with competent Ministers who do not see the directive—or the approval—that they have had from the draft bill from Cabinet as meaning that there are no further decisions to be taken, and who are willing to see to improvements in the bill.

In the short time that I have got available, I am going to address some of the important changes. I agree with the changes made to the definition of “national security”. National security is left undefined, as it is in the UK, but then to get a warrant against a New Zealander it has to fall within a series of categories, all of which are serious, like espionage. I have a question as to whether the example relating to serious crime is set at too low a threshold, at 2 years, and that is an issue that the Labour Party is in discussion with National over. Purpose warrants—it is good that they are gone. They were a back-door way of doing things in a more simple, less rigorous fashion than is required, in respect of other warranting routes.

Business records—it is good that we have a regulated route for the obtaining of the records from banks and telecommunications companies (TELCOs). The now very public experience of Nicky Hager, in respect of Westpac, has meant that banks and TELCOs are becoming nervous about doing these things voluntarily, and they want to have a regulated route that prescribes what it is that they should do. We now have that, but we also have a requirement for records and ministerial policy statements, which enables the inspector-general to keep an eye on that as well. As the Minister has said, we have got ministerial oversight statements in a number of other areas that were not provided for in the bill as it came to select committee.

There are a couple of other matters. The Minister has referred to the size of the committee; perhaps another of my colleagues could come back to that, because I do not have time for that. We agree proportionality is important. We hear the argument that the Minister makes as to having a size of committee that is not unwieldy, but we would quite like some further discussion around that. We put in protections to prevent the services being used for political purposes, and there is some express recognition given to that in the form of the bill that is reported back.

There are some other changes, which I am sure will be detailed by other members of the committee. One of the primary concerns that was expressed by the Cullen-Reddy report is that you ought not go too far giving rights in respect of things called economic interests. These really ought to be matters relating to national security rather than economic interests, because it is so hard to define and would, effectively, give too broad powers to the SIS or the GCSB to use their powers against New Zealanders. So the powers in respect of the economic issues are prescribed in this bill in a way that I think is appropriate and meets the concerns expressed by the reviewers.

The Labour Party thinks this means that we have among the best oversight legislation of our spy agencies in the world, and this legislation has our support. We think that it is very important that the main parties show that support, so that we maintain public confidence that we have got this balance right.

It is a privilege to speak on this fundamentally important bill, the New Zealand Intelligence and Security Bill, in its second reading. Can I join with the Hon David Parker in noting the very detailed, diligent approach of the Minister, the Hon Chris Finlayson, and I also note on this particular occasion the collegiality across the House that he has had on it. That is very important, indeed.

With the international environment in a state of flux, a state of uncertainty, it is important to have legislation that empowers our intelligence and security agencies to protect New Zealand’s national security, international relations, and economic well-being, while also ensuring, of course, that these powers are clear and are subject to appropriate oversight. New Zealand’s cyber-security, for which I have some responsibility, as Minister for Communications, with other Ministers, has become an increasingly critical element of our national security and our economic well-being. Our national security depends on securing and protecting our most significant national assets. Strong cyber-security practices will also help build a fundamentally more competitive and productive economy. Using information technologies to their full potential will help drive innovation and improve productivity. In short, there are opportunities in this area if we do things very well.

New Zealanders and New Zealand businesses are affected by a range of cyber-enabled threats every day. The number of people affected by cyber-incidents increases every year, and, increasingly, the attacks are becoming evermore sophisticated. The National Cyber Security Centre within the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) logged 338 cyber-incidents in the 2015-16 year—an average of 28 each month. In this period, 38 Government agencies and 44 private sector firms sought advice or assistance from the National Cyber Security Centre in handling cyber-incidents.

Cyber-security incidents are increasingly making it into the headlines all over the world, and the nature of the threat is also very much changing. More devices, including everyday items like even refrigerators and household appliances, are connected to the internet, creating evermore opportunity, as I say, for malicious actors.

Ransomware—that is, malicious software that blocks access to a computer system or files until the victim makes a payment—has become more common. The number of ransomware attacks worldwide increased threefold over 2016. New Zealand is ranked fourth as a target for ransomware in the Asia-Pacific region, with an average of 108 ransomware attacks a day. This is an issue that extends across my portfolios, from economic development to communications policy. This bill is one of a range of actions that the Government is taking to improve our cyber-security outcomes and to achieve a secure, prosperous, and resilient online New Zealand.

A wide range of work, as I say, in addition to this bill—this very important bill—is under way to address the cyber-security threat. New Zealand’s Computer Emergency Response Team, situated in the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, will open its doors in the first half of this year. I am also expecting a report back from the Cyber Security Skills Taskforce, with a road map to improve cyber-security skills, to help with, as I say, both the very clear threats involved in this area but also the opportunities from doing this very well. I will also soon release the first annual report on New Zealand’s Cyber Security Strategy for 2015. The report marks really good progress in addressing the cyber-security challenges facing New Zealand, but we need to remain focused across a range of actions to improve New Zealand’s resilience to cyber-threats, to build the capability of New Zealanders, businesses, and Government agencies to protect themselves online, to address cyber-crime, and to ensure that international engagement helps us in all these areas of cyber-security.

This bill is intended to preserve the GCSB’s information assurance and cyber-security role while maintaining strong oversight of its activities. I consider it achieves this balance and that it will allow the GCSB to work closely with the other agencies and organisations striving to improve New Zealand’s cyber-security.

I think, really, as I have said now—but in summary—we are in uncertain times internationally. We are in a flux. It is important that we have the best possible law in place in this area. Cyber-security is, within this important law, an incredibly important part of the story and the context. The number of incidents is ever-increasing. The ransomware—that is, the malicious software, and so on—is ever-increasing, and that is, rightly, making its way into our headlines and into popular consciousness, if you like, given the threats and the incidence of ransomware. This bill—but also, as I have emphasised, a range of other actions—ensures that our response as a country is, I think, fit for purpose and strikes the right balance. I commend the bill to the House.

It is a pleasure to take a call on this bill today. I did not, however, have the pleasure of being on the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee during its deliberations, but from what my colleague the Hon David Parker has said, and, indeed, what other members have said, it was quite clearly a process that went, I guess, a bit above and beyond what some other select committees have done, in terms of ensuring that there was a thorough examination and that alternative ideas were listened to. That is very important, so I congratulate the committee and obviously the Minister, Chris Finlayson, who had to leave the Chamber. He was so overexcited by the support that he received from David Parker.

💬 Hon Simon Bridges: He’s not used to it.

He is certainly not used to it from Simon Bridges. David Parker was certainly expressing, I think, what a lot of people here believe—that Mr Finlayson has done a very good job of ensuring that all voices have been heard on this legislation.

In terms of the wider context of this bill, I just want to take the time to talk about why we have ended up in this position, with this legislation. The first thing is that the Labour Party certainly accepts that this legislation needed to happen. The time had come, with a series of incredibly unfortunate incidents that highlighted the discrepancies in our legislation, the weaknesses in the operation of the GCSB in particular, but also the SIS, the contradictions, and the gaps. Something needed to be done, and this legislation, built as it is off the review done by Dame Patsy Reddy and by Michael Cullen, was important and was necessary.

But I think we have also got to talk about where New Zealanders are today, in terms of their view of the security agencies, what went on in New Zealand, and what was revealed in New Zealand in the 2011, 2012, and 2013 periods. My colleague David Parker outlined some of the concerns about that, including the Phil Goff and Warren Tucker situation, which he mentioned; the complete shambles around the Dotcom case; and the really quite “outside of norms” appointment of Ian Fletcher as the head of the GCSB, and all that followed from that. That contributed to quite a significant reduction in the confidence of New Zealanders in our security agencies.

That is a very serious development. What these security agencies are responsible for are activities that make New Zealanders uncomfortable. They are necessary activities, but they make New Zealanders uncomfortable because they infringe upon our privacy. They infringe upon values that New Zealanders hold dear about our privacy. The agencies that have it in their power to spy on people, to intrude into people’s lives, must have the confidence of the New Zealand public. The issue that the country got itself to, by the end of 2013, was that they did not trust the GCSB and the SIS; they certainly did not trust the then Prime Minister on that issue. We really did need to rebuild that. That is why this bill mattered and that is why this exercise needed to be done in the way it was.

These agencies are necessary. I put myself in the category of New Zealanders who would rather we did not need them. They would rather that we did not have them. But the truth is that in the world we live in, we do need these agencies. It is that balance, in the minds of New Zealanders, that I think this bill has sought to strike.

Globally, as we moved through that period in 2011 and 2012, greater concerns were being expressed about the intrusion of security agencies into private lives. I think what had happened was a form of mission creep—that over the years the powers that had been given to security and intelligence agencies around the world had been expanded a little and a little more and a little more, but always under the cloak of secrecy. Therefore, when it was finally exposed in New Zealand, as a result of those shambolic actions I mentioned before, many New Zealanders were appalled at the state of the security intelligence apparatus—just how far it could go and just how weak the oversight of it was. We have to acknowledge that position and that view in the minds of many New Zealanders.

Equally in the minds of many New Zealanders are the threats they see around the world—the growth in global terrorism, and the notion, as Minister Bridges just mentioned, that terrorism can now come down the wire to you, in your computer. So New Zealanders know that there are these two competing things that they have heard about—the expansion of the powers that they were uncomfortable with, or the unaccountable powers they were uncomfortable with, and the growing threat. This bill and the Labour Party seek to find a better balance in those two things between the security that New Zealanders hold dear and the rights to privacy that they hold dear. We sought, in going into this process, to ensure that we had as our driving force that balance. I believe that at the end of this process we appear to have got largely to that place.

We did have serious concerns about the definition of national security being too broad and that it did not focus on the actual threats to security and Government. The new definition is far better. The idea of a closed list, a narrower list, actually helps New Zealanders to understand what kinds of matters are genuine threats to national security—terrorism, violent extremism, espionage, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

As my colleague David Parker said, the question of the definition of serious crime we do still have some concerns about, and there is some ongoing dialogue on that matter. But we are comfortable that we now have a definition of national security that is actually one that New Zealanders can look at and say: “Those are the threats that worry me. Those are the threats that New Zealand must take seriously, and have the apparatus in place to deal with.”

Both the Minister and David Parker have gone through a number of the other changes, particularly around the types of warrants. I do think that the purpose-based warrant was going to cause some problems for New Zealanders in terms of what those definitions of national security actually meant in practice, in terms of the way the security agencies do their work. So I am pleased that they are not going to be used, certainly in the case of New Zealanders, and that we are moving back to a class-based warrant system in that regard. The triple-lock practice is one that is starting to give people a bit more confidence.

I do think the rebuilding of confidence—and I will acknowledge this today in the House—has been helped by a much stronger Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security’s office. The slightly sad sight, before the law was changed the last time, in 2013, of the former inspector-general, the somewhat bewildered retired judge, being pursued down the road by TV cameras, having very little idea of what it was he was even meant to be doing, was sad, slightly comic, but actually very bad for New Zealand. Through Cheryl Gwyn and Ben Keith and the people involved in the inspector-general’s office, we are now starting to see the kind of robust oversight that I think New Zealanders want inside our system.

The other change, and the one that my colleague David Parker mentioned, that the Labour Party does continue to have concerns about is around the committee, the scope of the committee, and the representation in this Parliament. Of course, a committee like this needs some level of proportionality—we absolutely accept that—but to build the confidence that we want from New Zealanders in this legislation, we need to ensure that Opposition parties of a reasonable size and scale are represented. I want to say that we should not be afraid, in this House, to include in that committee parties that may not fully support all the activities of those agencies. That is actually a good thing. If those parties abide by the rules of the committee, then their voices are important voices to hear in this debate.

My view is actually a personal view—that the oversight arrangements, from a parliamentary point of view, could be even more robust than what we have in this bill. I know that Andrew Little, the Labour leader, intends to table a Supplementary Order Paper around the membership of the committee. I think it is an ongoing debate. I looked, in 2013, when we last looked at this matter, for some other examples around the world—in Australia, in Norway, where you have much wider oversight. I believe we should continue to consider that—ensuring that there are obligations upon the people who are on the committee to abide by the important secrecy provisions, as they would no doubt need to, but, equally, to hear their voice and have their voice heard. I urge the Government to consider supporting the Supplementary Order Paper when it is tabled at the Committee stage, and also to consider how we can continue to strengthen those accountability arrangements.

The Labour Party will be supporting this bill. We think it is important that there is a bipartisan approach around this new legislation. It goes a very long way towards addressing the concerns that we had at the first reading around strengthening accountability and around narrowing the definition of “national security”, and ensuring that we rebuild confidence. I look forward to the further progress of this legislation.

It is my great pleasure to take a call on this, the second reading of the New Zealand Intelligence and Security Bill. Can I just start by first of all acknowledging our officials and advisers who are in the public gallery today. Without their support throughout the select committee process, we could not have returned this legislation back to the House. So I just want to take an opportunity to first of all acknowledge you guys and the great work that you have done in supporting the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee.

Could I please acknowledge the Hon Chris Finlayson. I think that the Hon David Parker paid a very fitting tribute to him in terms of the support the committee has received in the work that it has done. Can I also acknowledge the committee, and, as the outgoing chair, can I acknowledge the incoming chair, Todd Muller, who has been a member of the committee throughout the entire process of this bill. He has heard the submissions and understands the legislation very well, and he is now continuing to guide the legislation through the House. Can I congratulate him and wish him all the best on chairing what I feel is a very good committee. Can I also acknowledge the deputy chair, Dr Shane Reti, for the support that he has given through the process, as well—Shane, I appreciate that. Can I acknowledge—

💬 Dr David Clark: I was there in moral support.

Yes, you were there in moral support; that is right, David. David Shearer actually took the lead on the Opposition side throughout the process, which started with the countering foreign fighters bill—can I acknowledge him; Phil Goff; David Parker, who has now come on to the committee; Dr Kennedy Graham, who has also been an integral part of the process; Lindsay Tisch; Jami-Lee Ross; the Hon David Bennett; and also Fletcher Tabuteau from New Zealand First. It is important for me to make those acknowledgments, because this is my chance to put them on the record.

Can I speak to one part of the bill that is very important. I am going to cut short my contribution so that Todd Muller has got more time to speak to the bill, but I want to speak about business record authorisation. Through the committee process, there was a recommendation for a new scheme for mandatory disclosure of business record information held by telecommunications network operators and financial service providers. This information includes, for example, phone records, customer subscription details, and bank statements. It does not include the contents of any communication.

Access to this type of information is crucial for the agencies to operate, especially in the early stages of an intelligence investigation, and, at the moment, this information is disclosed on a voluntary basis because of an exemption from the Privacy Act’s information privacy principles. The purpose of the new framework is to maintain the agencies’ current access to business record information, not to give them access to anything new. This is very important because before this there has not really been any real clarity around how that information exchange is going to take place. Now, inside the bill, we have captured it, and it is very clear in terms of how that process is going to work.

I want to just very quickly refer to a comment that the last speaker, Grant Robertson, mentioned, around how when we look around the world globally now, unfortunately there is a fair bit of instability. We have seen the coalition forces in Iraq being very effective in the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or Daesh, and the coalition is putting pressure on it. But one thing that that will create is that you will start to see more activity springing up around the world as the pressure comes on in Syria and Iraq. It is very important—and I am not being an alarmist at all. We are very lucky in this country in that we have got an outstanding SIS and GCSB service. It is their job to make sure that they do the best job they can to keep our country safe and to keep us all safe. This piece of legislation goes a long way to making sure that they are able to do that. Thank you very much.

The Green Party wishes, first, to pay tribute to the democratic process that has resulted in the passage of this intelligence and security bill through Parliament to date. The submissions were insightful, the discussion within the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee was respectful and informative, and the officials were most professional and creative in their response to our concerns.

We welcome, moreover, the improvements in the final draft of the bill. We note, especially, a stronger obligation on the agency heads to ensure that agency activities will not promote or harm the interests of any political party or candidate; a new assurance that cooperation with foreign jurisdictions will be in accordance with New Zealand law and human rights obligations; the clear assurance that lawful acts of advocacy, protest, or dissent are secure from intelligence activity; a register of assumed identities and legal entities; due particularity in applications and additional criteria for the issue of the warrants; a closed list of elements related to national security; the requirement for a type 1 warrant to be jointly authorised by the Minister and the Chief Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants, with a review by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; the removal of purpose-based warrants; the destruction of unauthorised information; the deletion of the provision for retention of incidentally obtained intelligence; the destruction of irrelevant information; and the deletion of ministerial empowerment to amend, suspend, or override primary legislation.

The Green Party also acknowledges the increased professionalism and integrity of the New Zealand intelligence services in recent years. It views this, however, as a rectification of unacceptable shortcomings in the past, not as a justification for new and intrusive powers by the State.

Notwithstanding the legislative improvements identified above, the Green Party continues to oppose the bill because it believes that the underlying political judgment on which the bill rests is flawed. The bill rests on an erroneous view of counter-terrorism policy. The stated purpose of the bill is to protect New Zealand as a “free, open, and democratic society”. To that end, it gives our intelligence agencies adequate and appropriate powers to contribute to the protection of national security, international relations and well-being, and economic well-being. This is to be done with due regard to New Zealand law, integrity, and professionalism, and democratic oversight. In order to do that, the bill enhances the espionage capacity of the State, with the effect of eroding the freedom and openness of the society in the name of security.

It is acknowledged by both those for and against the bill that intrusive powers of espionage by the State axiomatically erode individual human rights. The argument for greater intrusive powers, advanced in the Cullen-Reddy report and in ministerial speeches, is that a balance between national security and individual rights needs to be struck. In today’s world of terrorism and radical extremism, it is argued, the responsibility of the State to undertake espionage on its own citizens as well as foreigners has increased, and this unavoidably alters the balance. This justifies, the argument goes, a single legislative framework in the interests of efficiency, and expanded intrusive powers in the interests of effectiveness.

The explanatory note does not elaborate on the bill’s purpose, but senior Ministers have done so. The former Prime Minister stated in August 2016: “it is vital our agencies operate under legislation which enables them to be effective in an increasingly complex security environment, where we are confronted by growing numbers of cyber threats and the rise of [terrorists] such as ISIL …”. The Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke to the UN Security Council along similar lines in May of that year. As a result of these political perceptions, the national terrorist threat assessment was raised in 2014 from “very low, not expected”, to “low, possible but not expected”. This, the Government concludes, justifies a single legislative framework, more intrusive State powers, and this bill.

The Green Party, with respect, views it differently. It does not agree that a threat that is not expected to occur justifies these changes. Terrorism is but one of seven harms associated with national security, most of which are not germane to that threat assessment. The Green Party views terrorism as a criminal offence rather than a national security threat. It regards national security as a political goal, not an individual inherent human right.

There are also difficulties regarding the statement of purpose. Although there is now greater provision relating to national security in the bill, the other purposes remain vague, legally undefined, and politically unfocused. New Zealand’s well-being is not defined in the bill and can mean virtually anything. Adding a subset of that, economic well-being, as a separate and discrete purpose is conceptually confusing for legislation.

There are also difficulties regarding cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies. The balance of information and opinion advanced in the select committee hearings confirms the Green Party’s view that the bill would be detrimental to the national interest. It would undermine New Zealand’s domestic integrity and diminish its international reputation. Close cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies, such as those operating under current US policy, will prove highly problematic, if not impossible, to meeting the standards of integrity, professionalism, and respect for human rights established in the bill. How are New Zealand intelligence and security agency heads to collaborate with the “Five Eyes” over the US presidential travel ban against Muslims, thereby discriminating against persons on the basis of religion? On what basis of law and political integrity does the New Zealand intelligence community collaborate with the Central Intelligence Agency in light of today’s revelations about the manner in which that agency hoovers up data from individuals’ cellphones and smart TVs?

The underlying political point is this: while terrorism has become a fact of contemporary global life, its perception is distorted among Western Governments. Most terrorist acts actually occur in non-Western countries. The phenomenon of terrorism in Western counties is correlated with the extent of their engagement in military action in crisis situations that lack a clear UN mandate.

All members in this House live and work in the real world. Green MPs know, at least as acutely as anyone else in this House, about strife and strategic scheming around the world. We know about the threat of terrorism. But there are different, more effective, and more insightful ways of plying this trade than what we have before us. We shall be continuing to oppose the bill.

New Zealand First’s objectives have always been, firstly, the protection of civil liberties, freedoms, and privacy—that first and foremost. But we also accept the need for protection from threats to our safety and to our essential interests, thus fully recognising the need for effective intelligence. So we accept the need to conduct surveillance and collect intelligence about New Zealand citizens and residents, as well as others, provided there is a robust process for authorisations through the warrant system; provided the law is clear, certain, and effective; and provided that there are comprehensive review and oversight provisions giving the public confidence that security agencies are independently supervised and fully accountable.

New Zealand First is pleased that this bill, we believe, actually achieves all of that. We think it is a good bill. It has come through a very long and very good process and we have a good result, which will allow New Zealand First to continue to vote in favour of it.

I want to go through some of the main changes the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee made to the bill. I may not get through all of them, but I will try. I want to begin with the deletion of clause 5, relating to the definition of “national security”—that was a pointless exercise. It would have only academic interest; it would have no practical use.

Instead, it is much better to rely on new clauses 55A, relating to New Zealand citizens and permanent residents, and 55B, relating to others. These clauses define the circumstances in which the intelligence and security agencies may take action. The clauses have a closed list of things that are most important to national security, and we think that is a much better approach. It achieves certainty and clarity and avoids very difficult—almost impossible, sometimes—interpretations of the law to particular circumstances, especially when there is urgency, as there so often would be.

But the clauses still preserve the necessity test and create two tests, in fact, for type 1 warrants relating to New Zealand citizens and permanent residents. The first of these is that the authorising Minister and the Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants must be satisfied of the necessity to contribute to the protection of national security generally. However, the second is that the intelligence agencies’ activity must be necessary to protect against one or more of a limited number of harms, specifically listed in clause 55A. They include terrorism or violent extremism, espionage, other foreign intelligence agency activity, sabotage, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, serious crime, interference with information or information infrastructure, and the threats listed in clause 55A(2)(g)—and I want to read those. They are “threats to—(i) international security that have the potential to impact adversely on New Zealand’s interest: (ii) the operations of the Government of New Zealand: (iii) the sovereignty of New Zealand, including New Zealand’s territorial and border integrity and its right to manage or control its natural resources.”

For those reasons, we in New Zealand First believe that the balance needed in this sort of legislation—to protect personal privacy on the one hand but also to ensure an adequate system to protect New Zealand security on the other hand—is achieved. We think that the bill does, in fact, do that and does it very well.

Part 3 of the bill would enable an employee of an intelligence and security agency to have an assumed identity, for obvious reasons. Part 3, we think, is very necessary. It provides for each of the agencies to keep a register of assumed identities, and for that to be maintained so that they can be accessed at any time by the Minister responsible and by the Inspector-General. We think that is very important—particularly for the inspector-general to be able to do that, to exercise his oversight function effectively.

The amendment to clause 53(2) and (3) is very important too. That provides for applications for type 1 intelligence warrants, which concern New Zealanders, to be made jointly to the responsible Minister and also to the Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants, instead of to the Attorney-General. For type 2 applications, which relate to non-New Zealanders, they would be made only to the responsible Minister, rather than to the Attorney-General. I think that is a very important change, because the Minister is aware of the day-to-day businesses of the agencies and knows what is happening, whereas the Attorney-General would not be in such a good position. So I think that is actually a very positive and worthwhile change.

I want to go on to the amendment to clause 51, because, as you will know, there will be many situations in which you might get a mix of people being involved—for example, in a terrorist cell some may be New Zealand citizens, some may not be. That amendment requires that where that happens, a type 1 warrant has to be obtained as though everybody in that cell was a New Zealand citizen or permanent resident, and that is just common sense.

There are also good changes made to clause 53 for warrant applications to contain adequate information. It is very important that it does so. It now requires you to specify the type of intelligence warrant applied for, the details of the activity to justify it, and, in particular, the grounds on which the application is to be made, thereby ensuring that the legal requirements, which I have already mentioned, would be satisfied. That will ensure that the Minister or the commissioner has the level of information that is necessary to make that judgment. It is very important that that information be there for that purpose, and, of course, it will also enhance the ability of the inspector-general to carry out his or her functions for oversight.

Moving on to clause 64 of the bill, as introduced, which provided for purpose-based warrants, which would allow a warrant without specifying persons or places and that sort of detail—that was clearly not needed. The other warrants, type 1 and type 2, were sufficient by themselves, so we agree with the deletion of that clause.

New Zealand First is also happy with all of the provisions relating to the destruction of information where it is no longer required, where it has become irrelevant, or where it has been obtained by regular means. Good changes have been made in that respect.

Similarly, we think that clause 109 has been properly deleted. It would have allowed the Governor-General to amend schedule 2 by Order in Council—clearly a “Henry VIII” power, as it authorised the delegation of legislation to amend, suspend, or override primary legislation.

We also agree with the new changes in Part 5 relating to business records—we think that is robust and satisfactory. We are satisfied that there would be rigorous control over access to banking and telecommunications records, as well as greater oversight and transparency.

Finally, in the last few seconds, New Zealand First is very happy with the provisions, and also with the requirement in Part 7 for a framework requiring the Minister responsible to issue policy statements. There is a list there of a number of such subjects that would be covered by policy statements—for example, providing information assurance and cyber-security activities by consents, conducting surveillance in a public place, and so on. Overall, New Zealand First is very happy with the bill, very happy with the process, and will be happy to continue to support it.

I am very pleased to be able to stand and speak in favour of the New Zealand Intelligence and Security Bill in its second reading. Can I also please begin by acknowledging the efforts of Minister Chris Finlayson. I think he has worked extremely hard alongside the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee to land legislation that balances the protection of New Zealand’s security interests, on the one hand, with, in my view, the enhancement of the integrity of the agencies’ reputations themselves on the other. Over time, significant trust in those agencies will build because of the effective oversight provisions that have been built into this legislation. It is a very good outcome.

Can I also acknowledge my predecessor, the Hon Mark Mitchell, for his very adept chairmanship and for facilitating a very collaborative and insightful process, which landed, I think, a very good result.

In particular, I would like to focus on the issues around the definition of “national security”. The initial bill had a particular definition that caused us, as a committee, some challenge. It was very unclear in terms of its scope. There were a whole lot of inherent complexities with the approach of the initial bill, and there were serious concerns around its workability. After a significant discussion amongst us—and with the particular support of the officials, who have done a tremendous job here—we have landed in this legislation a two-pronged approach to national security. Now, in order to get a warrant to target a New Zealander, the proposed activity must firstly be necessary to contribute to the protection of national security. Critically, it must also be able to identify and enable assessment of the protection against a closed list of harms. We have already heard this afternoon, in this conversation, the list of those harms and the precise specificity, if you like, about those. That, certainly from our perspective, gives us a lot of confidence.

Look, there is a lot about this that I would like to talk to, but I am very conscious of the fact that a lot has already been covered. Can I just echo the confidence that I have that we have landed something that is very fit for purpose and should give New Zealanders much comfort. Thank you.

The next call is a split call. Barry Coates—5 minutes.

Tēnā koe, Mr Assistant Speaker. I am pleased to rise to speak on this crucially important bill, the New Zealand Intelligence and Security Bill, in its second reading. I have also been pleased to participate in some of the discussions on the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, and I add my thanks to the former chair of the committee and committee members.

From my perspective, terrorism and extremism are a threat to citizens around the world, and security agencies do have an important role in averting these threats. But we also need to remember that terrorists succeed if our human rights are trampled in the process of surveillance. We lose the strength of our democracy and our freedom, and that is what we have seen happen too often in the past.

We have seen spying on New Zealand citizens and on anti-Springbok protesters, and the attempt to prevent asylum by Ahmed Zaoui. We have seen raids on the Tūhoe people. We have seen the Dotcom arrest and spying on Nicky Hager. Some of these cases are very recent. We have also seen mass interception of communications data. We have seen New Zealand spying on our allies, including our Pacific Island neighbours. We have seen weak oversight by Parliament over these activities, and we have seen New Zealand collaborating closely in the “Five Eyes” network. The latest WikiLeaks revelations show that these surveillance threats are more pervasive than ever. This is only going to get worse under Donald Trump.

We, as a society, have participated in interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and other Middle Eastern countries that, far from extinguishing the threat of terrorism, have exacerbated that threat. We have created breeding grounds for extremism.

I pay tribute to my colleagues—to Keith Locke, to Russel Norman, and many others—for raising these issues consistently over many years. The Green Party has been a watchdog on these issues, within Parliament and beyond. These issues came to such a crisis point that they precipitated the independent review known as the Cullen-Reddy review of our intelligence services. This background says that we have had a major problem, we continue to have a major problem, and therefore we need extremely strong controls over our security and intelligence services.

I agree with my colleague Dr Kennedy Graham that there are some positive elements to this bill, and I would highlight the additional powers that have been granted to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, stronger parliamentary accountability, and controls over the purpose and approval process for warrants. These are important steps forward. But during the process, we have also heard deep concerns from across New Zealand society about these issues. We have heard concerns from InternetNZ and other organisations associated with the internet. We have seen Spark and Vodafone expressing concern, and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, the Human Rights Commission, and the Law Society. There are many, many more who have expressed concerns that we get this balance right. So the balance that we need to strike is between the necessary surveillance and the protection of our rights.

We see a problem. There is not enough protection of New Zealand citizens from spying. Under this bill, the Government Communications Security Bureau will be permitted to spy on New Zealanders. It provides the powers to target whistleblowers rather than protecting them. This bill strengthens oversight, but the Intelligence and Security Committee lacks important powers still and, as Grant Robertson said, its membership is too narrow.

The seven harms that are outlined in this bill include threats to New Zealand’s interests and threats that adversely affect the operations of the Government. These purposes and this rationale for surveillance is far too broad.

I would conclude by saying that terrorists win when our human rights, our privacy, and our freedoms as citizens are lost. Although recognising there has been progress, this bill does not sufficiently protect our human rights, our privacy, and our freedoms.

I rise to speak in support of this bill and to first of all acknowledge that the security of New Zealanders and the balance of that security with human rights and freedoms is often a hard balancing act. We often spend a lot of time debating how we get that balance right. Such is the case of this bill that we are having our second reading on today, the New Zealand Intelligence and Security Bill.

I was fortunate to be able to sit in on some of the very early—look at, if you like, the inquiry that was undertaken by Sir Michael Cullen and Dame Patsy Reddy, at the review they were doing and the issues that were coming up. During their deliberations, they did meet with Andrew Little and me to go over the sorts of issues that they could see and the changes that needed to be made. What reassured me about that review was the quality and the experience of those two people who were undertaking it.

That was the first thing that gave me some confidence—that if the Government was to listen to that review, we were likely to get some very good legislation from it. The second was that I spoke briefly with the then Prime Minister, who said that he would not proceed with such a bill unless there was consensus, particularly from the main parties, in this Parliament. So important was it to have this sort of legislation—legislation that goes to security but also to human rights and freedoms of New Zealanders—that it was important to have a majority of support for such legislation.

Then we got to the bill itself. You have heard today from my colleague David Parker, and you will hear from David Cunliffe, that we believe a fantastic job was done at the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. I want to pay tribute to David Parker but also to David Shearer, from our side, and the members of the National Government side of the committee, who put together and looked at the changes that we now feel comfortable with. We know that there are other issues that we will pursue, and we will talk about those at the Committee stage.

We believe it has been a very, very good process. I want to commend the Attorney-General and his role in this bill. Chris Finlayson has done a superb job; that is according to David Parker—I was not on the committee—and I am sure David Cunliffe will be able to affirm that. He has handled this in a very sensitive and sensible way, to get as much buy-in and agreement on a piece of legislation as you could ever get. I just want to make sure that we commend him for that.

I think that, really, when you go back to why we needed some change, you can go right back to something that David Parker talked about, and that went back to the issue of Warren Tucker. Warren Tucker, in fact, as is well-known—I will not go through the whole thing—was not truthful in what he said in a meeting with Phil Goff. Arising from that, we had no confidence in his ability to tell us what was going on. From that moment on, we never met with him unless there were two of us together with him, and I became one of those who did meet with him. We did not have the confidence that you ought to have in the main agencies that are so important in New Zealand. But with the change of leadership—when you change the leadership of the NZ Security Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Security Bureau—and with the Inspector-General, Cheryl Gwyn, we started to get confidence that those people themselves were going to ensure that any changes that were made were going to be ones that were in the best interests of New Zealand, at the same time ensuring that our human rights and freedoms were not taken away from us unnecessarily.

There are many things that I could talk about in this bill, but with only 5 minutes I am going to wait until the Committee stage. I just want to conclude by saying that we would be mad to think that New Zealand would be free of terrorist activity. We would be mad. We already know that there are people in New Zealand who would do New Zealanders harm. Our first responsibility as politicians and parliamentarians is to ensure the safety of New Zealanders, and this bill goes a long way to doing that.

It is a pleasure to speak briefly to this, the second reading of the Intelligence and Security Bill. I would also like to acknowledge the Minister Chris Finlayson; the previous Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee chair, Mark Mitchell; the current chair, Todd Muller; and other select committee members.

As is always the case, this bill has been enhanced by the public submissions process, and I want to acknowledge all those who submitted and the officials who helped us make our way through the information. I want to particularly focus on oversight provisions in the bill. At a high level, a good oversight framework would have many layers, and I want to briefly describe five domains and how this bill addresses each one.

The first is the requirement for independent or judicial approval to issue intelligence warrants. This is effected by joint-issuing by the Attorney-General and Chief Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants. No. 2 is the independent review of the execution of warrants. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security has a specific mandate to review conduct in applying for a warrant. No. 3 is the robust and independent complaints and investigative functions. This bill strengthens the role of the inspector-general, enhancing access to records and removing limitations on the scope of inquiries. Point four is the democratic oversight. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s functions are enhanced in this bill, including the ability to request investigations from the inspector-general. The fifth point is the transparent application of freedom of information and privacy laws, and this bill makes agencies accountable to more privacy principles in the Privacy Act.

To briefly conclude, the oversight provisions were already significantly strengthened from previously, when this bill began the select committee process. This strengthening has continued to be fine-tuned during the submissions process. I will leave the final oversight words to the Privacy Commissioner, who, in giving oral evidence to the committee, said that if passed in its current form, the bill would be reaching “best practice” in terms of the requirements and rigour of oversight it would put in place. I commend this bill to the House.

May I join with other speakers, firstly, in acknowledging the work of the Minister for National Security and Intelligence, the two Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee chairs, Mark Mitchell and Todd Muller, and join with my colleague Annette King in recognising, in our team, the work of David Shearer, now departed, and David Parker, who played a leading role in the work on the select committee, on which I have sat for only the last few meetings and, therefore, will caveat my comments with that proviso.

I want to reaffirm Labour’s support for the bill and the quality of the process that has led us to this reading today, and, in doing so, I want to stress a number of points. Firstly is the importance of there being public confidence in the agencies, and the protections that lie around them, and, in doing so, to note briefly some exceptions in the past that gave us reason to want to look very closely at the content of the bill.

Secondly, I want to affirm the legitimate reasons why there is a need to modernise and, in some cases, with proper protections, extend the role of our intelligence oversight agencies. Thirdly, I want to emphasise the importance of proper protections of privacy and civil liberty, which, as history said, can be the first or second casualties of an improper approach to these issues. Finally, I want to note the need for ongoing vigilance in these matters as they are applied and implemented, because the intent of Parliament must of course be followed through in the practices of the agencies. In saying that, of course, I wish to acknowledge the support that was given to the select committee by officials from all the relevant agencies, including the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), whose work was of a very high standard indeed.

The intelligence and security agencies have had a good but not unblemished record in recent New Zealand history. As my colleague David Parker said, there were the Dotcom fiasco; the Tucker-Goff incident where records were released inappropriately for hostile political purposes; the issues around offshore developments that give the New Zealand public cause for concern—of course, WikiLeaks in the last week underscoring some of the reasons for that. And, indeed, in the previous form of the legislation there was the need for a personal assurance from the then Prime Minister that a potential legal loophole that could have allowed warrantless surveillance of New Zealand citizens, in respect of the need to protect information infrastructure—the importance of codifying those verbal assurances in the law as we have them.

To recall the process, it started, as others have said, with Attorney-General Finlayson being appointed the Minister in charge of the NZ Security Intelligence Services; the Cullen-Reddy review, which was widely applauded by parties around the House, and they brought a lot of experience to their analysis; the work of the DPMC and of external stakeholders such as the Law Society, civil liberties groups, the Privacy Commissioner, etc.; and the considered way in which the select committee under its various chairs has worked through submissions and the material provided to it.

With all of that, the bill crosses several important Rubicons—lines that previous legislation did not. There is no doubt that in its desire and its legitimate aim to modernise and make more efficient and effective the agencies concerned, there are a number of innovative steps that require the House’s careful consideration. The first is: this is a single legislative framework. It is integrated between the work hitherto domestically of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service and the hitherto external offshore or by specific authorisation only work of the Government Communications Security Bureau, the GCSB.

This legislation, for the first time, provides a legal mechanism for the warrantless surveillance of New Zealand citizens, and that is a significant step. I am going to come back to the ways in which the privacy issues that that raises have been dealt with. So those are some of the Rubicons that have been crossed and some of the reasons why the select committees had a very close scrutiny of the issues.

What are the reasons for that? Well, it does not make a lot of sense, on the face of it, for the two agencies to have completely separate legislative frameworks, to not be able to routinely talk to each other subject to the provisions of the legal protections, to be outside some of the important provisions of the State Sector Act, and, in other words, to have some artificial barriers that prevent them doing their legitimate work. However—and this is where the select committee has done a lot of good work, I think—that has to be balanced by a tight definition of “security”, and that has been narrowed and tightened by the select committee to imply that economic security issues, economic well-being issues, have a more proscribed and limited action within the bill.

The select committee has emphasised the importance of triple-lock mechanisms, of authorisation mechanisms, around warrants and has reaffirmed that, in all cases bar very limited exceptions, both the signature of the Minister and the Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants, who must be a former or retired High Court judge or similar, are required to authorise those warrants. Of course, it has proscribed the accessing of information on New Zealand citizens, which would otherwise be required by warrant, which is obtained from third party providers such as other friendly countries.

The bill has removed the power, as drafted in clause 109, that would allow the Government of the day by Order in Council—that is, the Minister’s signature, ratified by Cabinet, provided to the Governor-General as an executive act—to add new source databases or information resources to the list of matters that may be legitimately accessed by the agencies. In that way, any such future amendment must come back to this House and must be subject to proper public debate and scrutiny.

The information of someone around an adoption has been excluded and requires ongoing proper protection, given the sensitivity to families of that matter. Stricter restrictions have been imposed on access to business records, although I have to say the definition of “business records” in the bill remains reasonably broad.

So far we have noted the bipartisan support of the bill and the balance it achieves. We note the legitimate reasons why modernisation of the law was required. We have noted the work of the select committee in ensuring proper protections of human rights and privacy issues and that those have been tightened in the drafting of the bill. Of course, all of this requires proper vigilance in implementation. The Labour Party is much heartened by the strengthening of the powers of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security so that the inspector-general may inquire into any matter, including sensitive operational matters, and may now be tasked by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, which is expanded in this bill.

It will be important to ensure vigilance in implementation, because, at the end of the day, the effective operation of the bill according to the mutually expressed will of Parliament across both sides of the aisle—and I am sure it is the intent of those who supported the drafting—is that proper human rights, privacy rights, and the rule of law be upheld at all times, because those are things that are too precious in our democracy to trade away. They have been hard fought for, and they have been fought for by New Zealanders who are recognised in the wreaths that adorn the walls of this Chamber. We will not trade those protections away in seeking to guarantee the ongoing security of New Zealand citizens. We will uphold the proper principles of the rule of law, the protection of civil rights, and those traditions that make our democracy strong and sound.

These are important matters and MPs are always mindful of the fact that we are generalists who are brought to bear on issues that require deep specialisation, and we, therefore, approach this with a seriousness of purpose and a commitment to ongoing vigilance, which I hope will provide some further assurance to New Zealanders that a proper balance has been struck.

The question was put that the amendments recommended by the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee by majority be agreed to.