Private International Law (Choice of Law in Tort) Bill

I move, That the Private International Law (Choice of Law in Tort) Bill be now read a first time. I nominate the Justice and Electoral Committee to consider the bill.

It is great to see you here, Mr Speaker, for this very important piece of legislation. I know that you have made time in your busy schedule to be here, and we respect that you have come along to be part of this bill.

Many members of this House will take some time to digest this bill and to look at the complexities of it, but those members who do take that time will actually enjoy understanding more about this bill and what it adds to the New Zealand legal system. I would like to pay tribute, initially, to Minister Chris Finlayson, who has had an important role in making this bill come through the House. I also want to pay tribute to Chapman Tripp as well, which has written an excellent article on this bill. If anybody wishes to get a very brief summary that is easy to understand, that is probably your best avenue at this time, apart from, of course, the speeches here tonight, which may be brief, by some members of the House, but should be understandable as well to those who are listening.

Basically, this bill clarifies a very important part of tort law. The law of tort is one of the most exciting areas of law. I remember when I studied it at university, at law school at Victoria University here, I enjoyed the law of tort as one of my favourite subjects. We actually had a French professor, who taught us the French law of tort, which was very interesting as well. One of the issues in tort law—

💬 Kris Faafoi: What did you learn?

I learnt a lot. The law of tort covers many areas, from defamation to other forms of loss that may be incurred. It is a very important part of our legal system and something that has a very strong common law basis.

There are some issues, though, in the law of tort. One of those issues is which jurisdiction would actually apply to a situation that may arise. If there is a certain set of facts that has multiple jurisdictions involved, then the question is which jurisdiction would actually apply. This bill seeks to clarify this in a way that will provide a mechanism so that the New Zealand legal system will be up to date with other common law legal systems that have made similar changes but also will give some clarity to those in this field of practice.

The bill, essentially, does a couple of things, and the first is to abolish a rule called the double actionability rule.

💬 Paul Foster-Bell: What rule?

The double actionability rule. It is very old, in the sense that it comes from our common law heritage in the UK. Basically, under that rule, when a tort claim is brought in New Zealand for an action committed in another jurisdiction, the New Zealand court can hear the claim only if the tort is actionable in both jurisdictions, and then it must apply the New Zealand law, unless the other country has the more significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties. That is clause 6 of the bill. If members go to clause 6, they will see “Abolition of certain common law rules”. Well, that is abolishing that double actionability rule.

We have abolished that rule, so now, in clause 7, we create the general rule, which will be the rule that should apply in those circumstances. Basically, clause 7(1) establishes the place-of-wrong rule, in which “the applicable law is the law of the jurisdiction in which the events constituting the tort in question occur.” Under clause 7(1): “The general rule is that the applicable law is the law of the jurisdiction in which the events constituting the tort in question occur.” That is sensible and reflects what people would naturally expect.

Clause 7(2) provides certain rules to determine where a tort can be said to have occurred when the events occurred in more than one jurisdiction. I will go through some examples of how that could actually happen, but, basically, the rule in clause 7(2) says that “Where elements for those events occur in different jurisdictions, the applicable law under the general rule is taken as being—(a) for a cause of action in respect of damage to property,”—so this is in regard to property damage—“the law of the jurisdiction where the property was when it was damaged;”. The second part of that is: “(b) in any other case, the law of the jurisdiction in which the most significant element or elements of those events occurred.” Basically, the applicable rule where there are different jurisdictions has two limbs to the test. One is in respect to damaged property and the other is for other cases, and the rule gives some clarity around which jurisdiction would apply in the case.

So, first of all, we have started off with abolishing that common law rule, and then we have created the new general rule. That has two tests, and the second test has two limbs to it, one being around damages to property and the other one being for other cases.

Now we come to the next part of the legislation, which provides an exemption to the place-of-wrong rule, allowing a court to apply the law of another jurisdiction where it is substantially more appropriate to do so. Effectively, that gives the court the ability to look at those circumstances that we have got in the general rule and determine that another jurisdiction may be more appropriate in that case.

That exemption is in clause 8, and if we go to clause 8(1) it has, basically, got two factors there. The first is “(a) the significance of the factors that connect a tort with the jurisdiction whose law would be the applicable law under the general rule;”, and the second part is “(b) the significance of any factors connecting the tort with another jurisdiction—”. Once both are satisfied, if it is “substantially more appropriate for the applicable law for determining the issues arising in the case, or any of those issues, to be the law of the other jurisdiction, the general rule is displaced …”. This is because as you go back to the general rule, we say that it is the jurisdiction in which the events occur, and so it can be displaced under that exemption and “the applicable law for determining those issues or that issue … is the law of that other jurisdiction.” Basically, we have got the ability now to displace that first general rule in circumstances where clause 8 is met.

There are four really big elements to this legislation. The first is to abolish the common law rule; the second is to establish the place of wrong, which is the jurisdiction where it occurs; the third is to provide rules around when it can be said to have occurred; and the fourth is to give an exemption from the general rule in certain circumstances. That provides a lot of clarity in the New Zealand law, and it is something that you have seen happen in recent years in Australia, Canada, and England, where they have brought into effect this place-of-wrong rule.

For those members who wish to delve a little bit further into this area of law, I would suggest they have a look at a couple of cases. There is some really interesting law around this area. One case is the Red Sea Insurance Co. case. That is a case that, basically, shows where in one jurisdiction there may not have been the ability to have the satisfaction of a tortious result, and so the parties were looking at the area of jurisdiction because in one area where the actual event or the parties may have been based, they did not have that support. The other case that is really good to look at is Boys v Chaplin. That also had a similar circumstance, in the sense that something had happened in Malta, which did not have this approach.

This legislation clarifies the law in this area. It is a great piece of legislation. It is something that I think the legal fraternity will find of much benefit, and it is our pleasure to propose it to this House.

Labour is supporting this bill at its first reading and referral to select committee. I have got to say that the area of conflict of laws between different jurisdictions is an area where I feel more ignorant than virtually any other area of law, so I hope I do not make a fool of myself in this contribution. If I do, I am sure that Mr Finlayson, the Attorney-General, will correct me in my errors. Can I thank David Bennett, the member who brought this bill to the House, for his contribution. I thought that was helpful.

I have got a number of questions that the Attorney-General might be able to answer if he is going to take a call. The first is that this applies for the purposes of private international law. One of my preliminary questions—and it might seem pretty obvious, but it is not to me—is whether that means international law to do with private dealings as opposed to public law involving States. Is that what it means? The Attorney-General nods. My alternative proposition was that it was somehow to do with private contractual relationships or disputes arising that might have a tortious element where none the less there is some underlying private agreement that in the event of a dispute, that dispute is resolved in a particular jurisdiction that is nominated in an arbitration agreement, or something like that. I suspect it is the former—that it is private rather than as between States—but it is one of the things the Attorney-General might clarify and will be checked at the select committee.

The second question I have is this. Where there is a choice of forum, I am less than perfect in my knowledge as to how it is that in New Zealand someone can sue in respect of a tortious action causing loss that arose in another country. I would have thought that normally the action would actually have to be brought in that other country rather than in New Zealand, and that if you were to issue proceedings in New Zealand, no matter which law you applied, I would have thought that the other country where the tort applied would not enforce the judgment because it would say: “Hey, that should have been determined in our courts rather than yours.” So perhaps the Attorney-General can elucidate that issue as well.

In terms of the cases that the member David Bennett referred to, I have not read either. Thank you for bringing them to our attention. You could even shoot me a copy, because I would be quite interested to read them so that I understand this area of law a bit better, because if this bill is going to proceed into law after subsequent readings, I would hope that Parliament has a better level of understanding than I have got at first reading, and those cases may assist.

I do take cognisance of the article that the member referred to that Chapman Tripp prepared. I have read that. It is very brief and it does not really take me much further into the underlying principles, although I do take solace from the fact that, as the member David Bennett said, similar changes have already been made in Australia, Canada, and England, and I presume that the drafting of this particular bill is based on those provisions that are in that amending legislation in Australia, Canada, and England. I would expect that the provisions in each of those amending Acts in Australia, Canada, and England are similar, because I would have thought that the same principles apply in those Commonwealth jurisdictions as apply in New Zealand, and if they have been trying to cure an ambiguity in their law, then presumably they have got to—I would hope that they have got to—the same place as is being proposed here. If they have not, then we are going to have to look very carefully as to whether we have got it right or wrong, if we are different from them.

I do not propose to expose my ignorance by pretending to properly understand the complexity of the existing double actionability rule. I have never studied it. I understand that the basic principle is that presently New Zealand can hear the claim only if the tort is actionable in both jurisdictions and that that is being changed in the way that David Bennett has described, which is set out in clause 7 of the bill. I understand that in deciding which law to apply in the dispute that is being determined in the New Zealand law, if it is a tort in respect of a cause of action for the damage of property, then the laws to be applied by the New Zealand court are the laws of the jurisdiction where the property was damaged. I understand that; I just do not understand how it comes to be litigated in the New Zealand courts. I also understand the logic that if it is another cause of action, then it is the law of the jurisdiction in which the most significant element or elements of those events occurred.

I can understand the possibility that there are torts that cross jurisdictions and, therefore, part of the cause of action may arise in one country and part may arise in another country. My analysis of that might be wrong. There might be two separate torts—one in each country. I understand that with the displacement rule we are again conferring upon the court a discretion to say that the general rule, which has been changed—so the old general rule is being repealed and we are putting in place a new general rule, which I have described—can be displaced if in all the circumstances the court thinks that it is substantially more appropriate for the applicable law for determining the issues to be the law of the other jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the general law rule that is set out in clause 7 would have had a different effect.

I would be interested to understand from the Attorney-General, who I think may have had a hand in this bill—as Mr Bennett alluded to—why in practice this is necessary, and I ask for him to give us some examples of how this would have either changed outcomes or made the rights of people who have suffered, or are alleged to have suffered, a tort. I would like him to explain why this is necessary.

I am really pleased to take a call on this bill, because it is actually a practically important bill. Let me say immediately, we are not talking about anything to do with public international law—the sorts of disputes that often occur between States as to boundaries and so on—that needs to be determined in the International Court of Justice. No, we are talking about private international law, or what was often called, when Mr Denis O’Rourke and I were at university, the conflict of laws—what happens when legal systems collide.

A couple may have been married in England, they come back to New Zealand, and they seek to divorce, or maybe they got married in Saudi Arabia and they come back and seek a divorce in New Zealand. Is it possible to seek a divorce in New Zealand? What is the law that would govern the determination of that particular relationship? So they are the sorts of issues that arise in the conflict of laws. Custody disputes where children are taken out of the jurisdiction, and family disputes are very common in the conflict of laws. I recall when I first studied the subject there were about eight students in the class, but now, because of growing interactions between States and the frequency of these sorts of problems, more and more students are studying this area and it is very important. This is a hugely significant and practical question, therefore. It is not some airy-fairy, academic subject, and, as Mr David Bennett said in his excellent speech, it is something that has engaged a number of foreign jurisdictions, including Canada and, more recently, Australia.

Basically, when there is a clash between legal systems, if there is litigation with a foreign component, two questions arise. The first question is: where should the case be litigated? Take my example of a cause of action that may have arisen partly in New Zealand and partly in Saudi Arabia. The issue would be, well, should the case be determined in Saudi Arabia or should it be heard in New Zealand? If it is heard in New Zealand, the New Zealand party will be very much happier than if it is heard in Saudi Arabia, because the New Zealand party will understand the court system and the way in which you go about preparing a case in New Zealand in those sorts of matters. So that is what is called the forum conveniens to determine the dispute.

The second issue that arises is: what is the law to be applied in those circumstances? Take my hypothetical—is it going to be the law of Saudi Arabia or the law of New Zealand? If it is litigated in New Zealand but the law is that of Saudi Arabia, then it gets rather complex because the person who seeks to rely on Saudi Arabian law has to prove Saudi Arabian law as a fact. So you can see there are all sorts of complexities that begin to creep into the litigation, and often this area of the law suffers from what could be called satellite litigation, where, instead of getting on with the substance of the dispute, people are spending all their time in court determining these sorts of matters.

So the first question, as I said, is: where should the case be heard? The second question that often arises is: what is the law to be applied? In the law of contract it is normally spelt out in the contract, so it is no big deal. Normally, the contract will say that all matters arising for dispute shall be governed by New Zealand law or English law. It becomes much harder when one is dealing with the law of tort, and, as Mr Bennett said, there are various types of torts. There are negligence and defamation—negligence and defamation would be the most common ones, I guess. But then you get into this difficult question of what the law is that governs the particular resolution of the allegation of negligence, and that is where we get to this legislation.

Mr Bennett has, rightly, pointed to a number of old cases, the most famous one being Phillips v Eyre, where the double actionability rule was propounded, if you like, and it has been most recently applied in New Zealand in a case called Baxter v RMC Group plc. The purpose of this bill is to simplify the law, abolish the double actionability rule, and introduce new rules, as Mr Bennett has spelt out in his speech.

So it is a very interesting area of the law. I am pleased the Labour Party is supporting it. It is, as Chapman Tripp said, a “no-frills” piece of legislation. Some members’ bills seek to change the world. This does not do anything other than clarify an important area of the law. It is a brilliant effort on the part of Mr Bennett, and I commend him for his hard work.

I am pleased to offer a short contribution in the first reading of this bill. I am not a lawyer, and I have never aspired to be a lawyer, I must say, but I have taken some advice on this, and I can say that, based on what I have heard, the drafter of the bill, Mr Bennett, has proven himself to be a somewhat unusual member, which may not be news to some people. I understand that to many law students, and indeed lawyers, tort law is something that encourages them to run screaming from the room, but Mr Bennett, by all accounts, enjoys this thing. So good on him. We are told it is a convoluted area of law, a difficult area of law.

The Greens are supporting this legislation because it does seem to address a real issue. It is a real opportunity to do better, which is something, again, that is a surprise in this bill—that it is a National member’s bill that is providing a substantive, useful piece of legislation. That is something that we have not seen much of in recent offerings from National Party members’ bills, and let us not talk about missing suitcases. Having said that, we are supporting this bill. The question has been raised, to ask that, arguably, a member’s bill is not a particularly good mechanism for changing tort law. Arguably, it is something that should perhaps be part of an overall review of the law, to take a broader look—that a Government bill might be more appropriate.

The point has also been made that this is a very simply drafted piece of legislation, and that in itself is often a significant virtue. It is something that cannot be said about a lot of our statute book. But, again, just a very small red flag has been raised, to ensure that the simplicity of the drafting of this bill does not cause problems further down the track, that it does not cause people to trip over.

One of the complexities, I understand, of tort law, and one of the differences perhaps, is that judgments tend to be based more on precedent decisions that have been made by other judges, rather than on statute, which in my mind at least—my non-lawyer mind—would suggest that it is something more of a moving target than something that is grounded in a piece of statute. And for that reason, arguably, it is somewhat more difficult for judges to come to grips with.

Certainly it is an area that bears some investigation. Anything that can simplify, clarify, and reduce the amount of time that judges spend on a particular case is a good thing. Our courts are, at least, busy and often overly busy. Anything we can do to progress matters through the courts more quickly, more efficiently, and to get good justice outcomes has got to be a good thing. If this bill contributes to that, then so be it.

Mr Bennett, arguably somewhat immodestly, has noted that at least one law firm has said some good things about his legislation. He notes that Australia, Canada, and England have gone down this route already, albeit in a slightly different way. The models are not entirely comparable, but they have made some effort to cut through the inevitable tangle when you are endeavouring to decide which country a particular matter should be addressed in when, clearly, you are going to have significant interests on the opposing sides. I suspect very often in these matters there would be quite a lot of money sloshing around as well, in order to fund the argument and to extend it. So it is a good thing, I argue, that it is happening.

Another law firm made commentary on this bill, and just highlighted a bit of a cautionary note, I guess, for companies that are doing business overseas, where these matters arise, where disputes arise. If the decision is that a case will be heard in another country, it would most certainly be in their interests to make sure they understand tort law in that country, because New Zealand law would have no influence.

So, in conclusion, I simply say that, yes, we are somewhat surprised and, shall I say, pleased a little that a National member’s bill has come through with some substance that might effect a useful and positive change in the legislation. The only other point that was made was that there was some concern, particularly about intellectual property for Māori, that there could be situations or circumstances where this legislation could potentially shade that a little. But I am sure that is something that the very good minds on the Justice and Electoral Committee will resolve in good time, and we look forward, at this point, to supporting the bill. Thank you.

I congratulate David Bennett, first of all, on having the Private International Law (Choice of Law in Tort) Bill drawn from the ballot and in front of us for its first reading. Congratulations to him also on his introductory speech, which has set the scene for this House in its first reading this evening.

It is a bit like being given an early Christmas present, actually, because here is a whole new area of expertise that the Justice and Electoral Committee is about to become familiar with. In that spirit, I propose that we should put together a bit of a dream team. So I would like to see David Parker sub on to the Justice and Electoral Committee for this item of business, because in his speech I welcomed and appreciated his inquiring nature as he approached this piece of unfamiliar law, which I have to say is even more unfamiliar to me as I am not even a lawyer. So you will see some chairing ability from myself, but I am looking to people like David Parker to provide some of the intellectual grunt as we consider this.

Having said that, even on a little bit of study this evening already and in hearing some excellent speeches around the House, some of the fog is beginning to clear about the intent of this piece of legislation—about its intent to provide some clarity and some sanity in legislation, or tort, across jurisdictions. And I can see that Denis O’Rourke on the other side of the House also shares our delight, and I do hope that he also shares the House’s enthusiasm for supporting this bill at least to select committee, so that we can give it a thorough working over.

I have very briefly looked at several of the cases that David Bennett did raise, and yes, indeed, we occasionally hear of incidents where there is a dispute perhaps involving children, as the Attorney-General has noted, or perhaps involving some aspect of commerce where an agreement goes wrong. The question in the courts then becomes under which jurisdiction we address this concern.

If I just turn, perhaps, to the clauses in the bill, because it is a well-set-out bill, and have a look at the bill clause by clause very briefly. Of course, we have the title and commencement. As the bill’s explanatory note sets out, clause 3 “provides that the purpose of the Bill is to establish rules for choosing the law to be used for determining issues relating to tort.” Of course, clause 4 binds the Crown. Clause 5 “states the general principles relating to the applicable law for the purposes of private and international law. These are—the characterisation of issues arising in a claim as issues relating to tort is a matter for the courts; the applicable law is to be used for determining the issues arising in a claim, including the question of whether an actionable tort has occurred; and the applicable law to be used for determining the issues arising in a claim excludes any choice of law rules forming part of the law of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions.” We then go on to clause 6, which, “abolishes several common law rules that relate to the applicable law for the purposes of private international law as they apply to any claim in tort.”

There are nine clauses in this bill. Clause 7 “provides that the general rule for determining the applicable law for the purposes of private international law is the law of the jurisdiction in which the events constituting the tort in question occur.” Clause 8 “provides for situations where the general rule is displaced.”—that will be an interesting aspect of our deliberation. And, of course, clause 9 completes this rather well-set-out bill.

I do look forward to the consideration in the select committee. I sincerely mean that this is an early Christmas present, because I think we are going to find it very interesting and very practical. Thank you.

The first thing that I ask myself about this bill is why did David Bennett decide to sponsor it. Could it possibly be that he intends to go to live overseas permanently and wants to prepare the ground for that? Could that be the reason? If so, that in itself would be a very good reason for supporting the bill. Could it be that there is such huge pressure from his constituents in the Waikato that this bill be passed that he could not resist it? Could that be the case? Somehow, I doubt that very much. Could it be that Mr Bennett is looking for a legacy bill, something so that he can say to his grandchildren “This is something”—the only thing probably, but something—“that I did when I was in Parliament.” Could that be the motivation? Somehow, again, I doubt whether that would be satisfactory as a legacy bill.

Could I say next that I also have had only a little experience with what I used to call the conflict of laws, and that was in my early years as a lawyer in the Public Trust Office, when I had to deal with the conflict of laws around testamentary law. I remember very distinctly the difficulties that arose when people who lived in New Zealand still had a domicile of origin overseas. They had made a will in New Zealand and there were difficulties because English common law and New Zealand statute law are quite different to the Code Napoléon, which applied through most of Europe—that was where, I remember in one case, in particular, the deceased person had lived. They were very, very difficult situations to deal with—quite different from the law of torts, but also very difficult.

New Zealand First will not be supporting this bill, even though we accept that the current law is far from perfect. We are not doing so because we do not really think that there is any particular need to abolish the current law as it applies and as it is proposed to be abolished in this bill. We are not satisfied that change to the existing common law rules around the conflict of laws and the application of the law of torts of one jurisdiction or another is actually necessary, and we would have to be persuaded that that would be the case.

The third reason that I want to give for not supporting this—apart from the fact that it is not needed; apart from the fact that there is no requirement for this, there is no pressure for this—is that we are concerned about clause 8(1), which displaces the general rule. Mr Parker has already pointed to the fact that it introduces a new test, and I quote from the latter part of clause 8(1), where it refers to when the circumstances in which “ it is substantially more appropriate for the applicable law … to be the law of the other jurisdiction …”, and so on, apply. The concern we have about that is that we are not sure in what circumstances it would be substantially more appropriate or not. That is a discretion that the court would have to exercise. I do not know how it would exercise that discretion. I would like to hear discussion about that and how that test would work in practice.

So I think that is too general. That is not specific enough and does not actually achieve a sufficiently robust new regime to justify the abolition of the current law, which has been developed over such a long period of time.

Overall, this bill does have some merit, because it does deal with that difficult issue of double actionability, but we think in New Zealand First that the solutions that are provided for in this bill are not necessarily the best. For those reasons we will be voting against the bill, but, on the other hand, I will certainly be interested at the select committee to listen to the arguments that will no doubt be put forward to justify the bill that we have before us today. For the time being, however, New Zealand First will be voting against it.

I rise in support of the Private International Law (Choice of Law in Tort) Bill in its first reading, brought to this House by Mr David Bennett. Mr David Bennett, the dairy farmer of this House, has, I understand, completed a law degree. He is the chair of the Finance and Expenditure Committee, and now a lover of torts. I never knew this. He obviously majored in tort law in his law degree. He is an absolute lover of torts, and passionate about clarifying this rule around double actionability.

How impressed I was as I came back from Invercargill today, from the Southland Regional Development Strategy launch, where this Government has swung in behind our strategy team leaders with millions of dollars of investment. When I should have been coming back on the plane basking in that glory, here I was racking my brains back to 1995, thinking about tanks of water that had burst and run into a neighbouring property and caused nuisance, and a woman who had swallowed snails while drinking ginger beer. In other words, these cases are known as Rylands v Fletcher and Donoghue v Stevenson. I had real trouble remembering that last one, but it is Donoghue v Stevenson. That is how hard I had to work to rack my brains about torts that I studied back in 1995.

I do not feel so bad now, after Mr David Parker’s speech, because I too had real problems with torts and with this double actionability rule. I could never understand it. I think it has been described in some of the literature as difficult to understand. So I am pleased that Mr Bennett has brought this bill to the House to look to clarify and codify this law.

💬 Jacqui Dean: You can come on to the committee as well.

No, Ms Dean, I do not want to come on to the committee in respect of this bill, but I am sure I am at the mercy of the whips.

A tort, as we aware, is about a private action. It does illustrate the importance of case law. Obviously, case law develops these important laws in our legal system, but the issue remains that when an action occurs in a foreign jurisdiction, it is difficult to understand which actual jurisdiction applies. So this is a bill that clarifies which jurisdiction of law is applicable to torts and provides guidance to the courts on matters of characterisation.

One of the great things, as I mentioned before, is that it abolishes the so-called rule of double actionability, and I am going to have to refer to my notes in respect of this rule—“when a tort claim is brought in New Zealand for an action committed in another jurisdiction, the New Zealand court can hear the claim only if the tort is actionable in both jurisdictions, and then it must apply the New Zealand law, unless the other country has the more significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties.” Excellent, Mr Bennett, thank you very much for that. That will clarify things.

I think it is only wise and proper that if an action occurs in New Zealand, then our law should be applied, and if overseas, then that jurisdiction should apply. I think that the rules and the principles set out in this bill will actually clarify that, codify it, and make it easier for young lawyers as they come into the legal profession. As this bill has been described, it is a no-frills bill, but, look, backbenchers do not need bells and whistles when you are working for the Government. It is a no-frills bill, but it is pragmatic, it is a good bill, and it is solid, and I congratulate Mr Bennett on bringing it to the House.

Tēnā koe e Te Māngai o Te Whare. It is my pleasure, as a member of the Justice and Electoral Committee, to speak in support of this Private International Law (Choice of Law in Tort) Bill. Congratulations, David Bennett, for proposing what Chapman Tripp did say was “smart, no-frills law making, bringing New Zealand into step with comparable jurisdictions.” There is no doubt that this bill is valid and it is needed, and so I am happy to stand up in support of you, as a member of Parliament, proposing this legislation. Congratulations.

The word “tort” is derived from the French word for “wrong”—I am doing definitions here, because I do not know very much about this area either. What a tort is is: “a civil wrong that … causes someone else to suffer loss or harm resulting in legal liability for the person who commits the tortious act, called a tortfeasor.”, who, apparently, is the wrongdoer. So a civil wrong is an act against another person or their property. Obviously, what we are trying to do is to be very clear about what jurisdiction will apply.

I found another interesting blog about this bill and its relevance. It was by a guy called Timothy Lindsay from Lowndes Jordan, and he said: “New Zealand companies doing business with foreign parties and foreign companies doing business in New Zealand will be [particularly] interested in [this bill]”. I wanted to highlight that. He said the bill “aims to clarify and simplify the New Zealand law conflict of law (aka private international law) rules that apply to actions brought in tort”, and the issues that we are talking about are “negligence, tortious interference … defamation, breach of privacy”, and “the law of the jurisdiction in which the events constituting the alleged tort took place.” That is what this bill is going to be able to clarify and simplify for us all.

The other point that Timothy Lindsay made was that “it will require New Zealand companies to do their homework and understand the tort law of the land in the place they are doing business.”, so, actually, that is a good thing. People should know the laws of the land in which they are doing business, so if this piece of legislation highlights that for New Zealand companies and makes them think about it, then, actually, that is a good thing for New Zealand businesses. Or, he said: “parties can avoid … both the existing common law choice of law rules … by incorporating carefully drafted governing law provisions into their commercial contracts.” So I guess that is the other thing that this piece of legislation will do—to highlight in the contracts that New Zealand companies have with overseas companies how they are going to deal with it themselves. The merit of this piece of legislation is actually in providing the clarity that everybody needs when they conduct business.

I want to congratulate you, David. I think that we all strive in this House to make things better—to make things better for the people whom we are here to serve. This, for me, is not a flippant piece of legislation; it is actually a very relevant piece of legislation, and I am happy to be on the select committee that will be hearing submissions. I am really interested in the number of submissions that we will receive. Maybe we should run a little bit of a, you know, what do you call it, when we all put in five bucks and the closest—

💬 Hon Members: A sweep.

A sweep? Maybe a sweep would be really interesting. I am now really interested in the different areas—obviously companies, but other people whom this piece of legislation is relevant to and who are going to make submissions. We could be really surprised. We could have hundreds of submissions to our select committee. We just do not know. It will be fascinating, I think, for the House to engage in serious discussion about this piece of legislation. I will not take too much more time, other than to say that I commend this bill to the House. Kia ora.

It seems I have 40 seconds. I am not a lawyer and I have not done this before, but I am going to bush lawyer it.

It appears to me as though this bill, effectively, says that the double actionability rule is out the door. We are going to have some general rules. The general rules, basically, are, if it is damage to property—[Interruption] Mr Speaker, this is good stuff, do not interrupt me. Come on! All right, I will let you go, Mr Speaker.

Debate interrupted.

The House adjourned at 10 p.m.