Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Amendment Bill

I move, That the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Amendment Bill be now read a first time. I nominate the Government Administration Committee to consider the bill. The year 2013 was a tumultuous year for New Zealanders, as we faced the realisation that the interception and electronic surveillance capacities of our secret service agencies had expanded enormously. It was the year that Edward Snowden revealed to the world just what the US was capable of and was actually doing, and it was the year that the “Five Eyes” relationship came under intense scrutiny. It was the year that this Government introduced two pieces of law to give the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) and Ministers expanded powers, and it was the year that civil society, including the Human Rights Commission, spoke up loudly about the importance of privacy and balance in our security laws. Labour strongly opposed both those laws; we did so for many reasons.

During the debate around the introduction of the Government Communications Security Bureau Amendment Bill and the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill, otherwise known as “TICS”, in 2013, there were numerous submissions from civil society, the legal profession, and the telecommunications and internet sectors calling for there to be greater independent oversight of the new powers being provided for in both pieces of legislation. During the debate on the “TICS” bill, a number of submitters urged the Government to include a technical advisory board to act as an accountability buffer for the GCSB and the Government Minister exercising powers over the commercial decisions by our telecommunications networks with no independent oversight. In clause 48 of the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill, which is now an Act, these powers include any decisions by a network to buy or acquire “any equipment, system, or service that falls within an area of specified security interest; or (b) any change—(i) to the architecture”—or design, ownership, control, oversight, or supervision—“of any equipment, system, or service that falls within an area of specified security interest;”. These are enormous powers. If the GCSB decides to intervene and the network challenges that decision, the issue goes to the Minister responsible for the GCSB. There is no other check or balance in the system.

After the Act was passed without the inclusion of any independent oversight mechanism, I placed a bill into the members’ ballot to rectify this. After more than 2 years, my bill has been drawn. This proposed amendment to the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act establishes a technical advisory board to which matters must be referred in instances where the Minister will be required to exercise his or her discretion or to prescribe an additional area of specified security interest. One of the serious concerns around “TICS” is that it will create a chilling effect on New Zealand technology companies, as the powers for surveillance agencies to interfere in business decisions are too broad and the compliance regime too rigid and secretive—it created broad, sweeping powers likely to result in an increased risk of invasive surveillance on a mass scale—and that it failed to provide sufficient oversight or checks and balances on the new powers granted to Ministers. We considered that the bill was poorly drafted, with the Law and Order Committee finding that the powers were not clear or were too broad.

My bill cannot and will not address all of those issues, but what it does is establish a mechanism for there to be expertise to assist the Minister and to assure New Zealanders that relevant information is being considered when critical decisions are being made about network security and consideration of proposed mitigations. The bill will require that any matter—any matter—where a Minister exercises their discretion or recommends prescribing an additional area of specified security interest be first referred to the technical advisory board for analysis and recommendations. That board will comprise equal representation from Government and the industry, with an independent chair. Why is it needed? Because there are things that the network or telecommunications companies get asked to do by the GCSB that are either technically unfeasible or expensive. The GCSB does not have the capacity to understand the rapidly changing technology and the impact on wider industry. If it is delaying decisions being made by our industry to become more agile and responsive to the needs of customers and businesses, then this has an economic impact.

I want to refer specifically to the submission to the 2013 bill, made by the Telecommunications Carriers Forum, otherwise known as the “TCF”, which is a respected body that represents most of the telecommunications networks in New Zealand. It said that it recommended “that additional protections are put in place, relating to the issuing of Directives. We consider that an additional step in the process between the security agency and the Minister should be inserted into the consideration process, to appropriately address these concerns.” They considered that the UK approach, on which their submission was based, achieves this well. They went on to say that an independent expert panel should consider any directive proposal from a security agency and submissions from impacted parties before providing its recommendation to the Minister. That panel would be balanced by an equal number of security-cleared security specialists from telecommunications providers and representatives from security agencies, with an independent chair. All participants would have secret-level, Government-sponsored security clearance. This is eminently sensible. It is measured. It was supported in the select committee by all of the other major telecommunications companies in New Zealand, including Chorus; Enable Networks, which is rolling out our ultra-fast broadband networks; Telecom, as it was then, which has now been divided into Chorus and Spark; Ultrafast Fibre, another infrastructure company rolling out fibre; Vodafone; and also Google.

In summary, what this bill does is set up a technical advisory board. It will improve relationships between the security agencies and the telecommunications companies. It will ensure that businesses are not burdened with unnecessary costs. It will reduce the likelihood of mistakes by all of those involved parties such as the GCSB, the Minister, and the telecommunications companies. It is not going to impede security. All of the panel must have top-level security clearance, and they are advisory only—they do not have ultimate decision-making power; the Minister would still make the final decision if necessary. There is no harm in ensuring that the Minister making these decisions is as fully informed as possible before they make a decision, and this has an overseas precedent. It is based on an existing UK model that has had no issues.

The underlying principle is that New Zealanders must be reassured that measures to ensure the security of our public and our private sector entities are balanced by measures to protect their privacy. The creation of this independent board with technical knowledge and expertise is widely supported by the industry and internet and civil-society organisations. Since 2013, I have been advised that this existing Act has caused significant costs and delays for companies making business changes and entering into new contractual arrangements. Surely, if there is a low-cost, simple, and effective measure that can be put in place to mitigate this, why not do it? It is a sensible bill. It is aimed at making our surveillance laws more efficient and effective. It has got a wider set of principles around mitigation against the economic impact of tightening our security laws, while ensuring the best possible advice is being given to the decision makers, whether that is the GCSB or a Minister. I ask the House to support this bill to the select committee.

I rise in opposition to this bill, the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Amendment Bill 2015. As we have heard from the member opposite, the sponsor of this bill, Ms Clare Curran, this bill seeks to set up a technical advisory board to advise the Minister of increasing expertise in network security and to consider proposed mitigations. What she did not mention, or failed to mention, was that on the back of the chronology of events that she had mentioned, the parent Act, the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act 2013, went through a robust consideration process here in this House including at the Law and Order Committee and that advisory board was denied. As part of that parent Act, it set up a new framework for the Government Communications Security Bureau, for network operators and Government to work together in respect of matters of network security, where it has bearing on national security and the country’s economic well-being. But also, as part of that, it set up a comprehensive enforcement and compliance regime—one that we believe, on this side of the House, has sufficient checks and balances in respect of governing the Minister’s duties in relation to his or her decision making.

What this bill seeks to do is add in another level of bureaucracy; that any time when the Minister wishes to use his or her discretion in respect of interception obligations this process would need to be put to the so-called technical board. I see that the board, under this bill, would comprise equal representatives from Government and from industry with an independent chair, but it is hard to see how a board could necessarily have all of the expertise under that umbrella when we are talking about a technology that is advancing at a rapid rate, innovation, competition, and, of course, looking at compliance costs. As part of those mechanisms, when the Minister and the Government talk to network operators the Minister is required to consult with affected parties as to the effect of any decision made with them. Again I note that that includes the implementation, the cost of that implementation, innovation, and competition. Those affected parties have the opportunity to speak directly to that decision maker.

I have worked in law, I have worked in business, and I have worked for the Government. When you have policy that affects people, when you make decisions that affect people, they wish to speak to the decision maker. They do not want to speak to some middleman who would sit there in the middle and muddy the waters. They want to make sure that they have a fair hearing and that they speak to the decision maker to have their case heard. That is the appropriate mechanism for that. As part of this Act, the 2013 Act, all processes are still subject to judicial review and that is the same for any other legislation. It is working well. We have not heard of any complaints so far. All this does is add another level of complexity and it would also add to the cost of the process.

So look—to end with—our way of life here in New Zealand does not happen by accident. We have a range of various agencies that look after us. We have liberties and freedoms here that we enjoy, which other people round the world do not enjoy, but again that does not happen by accident. What come with freedom and liberties are obligation and responsibility. With some of the threats out there such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and the way that these terror groups are evolving, we need to keep ahead of them to protect our way of life. The 2013 Act does that. There are appropriate checks and balances, but we do need to protect our freedoms. As such I think the 2013 Act is working well and I oppose this bill.

I do not know what it is about this Government. All it does is oppose, oppose, oppose. You would think it would come up with some constructive debate about an idea that is a very good idea. Sometimes I get very tired with the negativism of this Government.

I did have the opportunity to hear the submissions on the original Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill back in 2013. Sarah Dowie clearly was not in the House at that time, so she did not have the benefit of listening to what the companies themselves told us. I am sure if she had listened to those companies then she would not have made the comments that she did. She said that the bill adds a level of bureaucracy, but the key point that the commercial companies made was that the directions that would be given by the Minister to them would not take into account commercial realities and would not have the level of technical understanding to ensure that the ministerial directions on the private companies made sense and were the right way to go about it. So, actually, this is not about adding a level of bureaucracy; this is about protecting commercial companies against bureaucratic decision-making when those bureaucrats do not always understand the compliance costs, the way in which their decisions will impede innovation and competition, or that what the Government might do through the ministerial directive actually has huge commercial implications for the companies.

I listened to a whole range of those companies. I listened to Vodafone, to what was then Telecom, to the Telecommunications Users Association, to InternetNZ, to Google, to Facebook, to the New Zealand Law Society, and to Microsoft. Every one of those organisations had difficulty with this legislation that was rammed through Parliament at the time. So I congratulate Clare Curran, because I think that what her legislation is doing in the House today is dealing with a problem that the companies themselves identified and the Government of the day then refused to respond to.

I would like to talk a little bit about the Vodafone submission. Here it is—an important company. It runs my telephone network and that of many of the members in this House. It actually asked specifically for what Clare Curran’s bill provides for, which is a technical advisory board. Vodafone pointed out that this idea was an idea that has been implemented successfully in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has similar legislation that imposes obligations on telecommunication companies, but it had the wisdom to say: “Before we start directing these companies in a way that goes to the heart of their commercial operations, let’s have a consultation process. Let’s have an equal number of technical representatives from the communications industry and the security agencies, with an independent chair.” If that is good enough for the Mother of Parliaments to pass through in the United Kingdom, why not adapt this idea to New Zealand?

The powers that the Government has given itself are incredibly intrusive. A private company has to notify the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) about procurement decisions. They have to engage with the GCSB on design, build, and operation of networks. They have to get the permission of the GCSB when they want procurement. So what Vodafone was saying is that in order to make sure the Government gets its decisions right, for heaven’s sake give the private sector the chance to have an input before the bureaucracy and the Minister—who may know nothing about the commercial implications of their decisions—so they do have to take into account what the private sector’s concerns might be. This is not about adding bureaucracy; this is protecting the companies against ill-informed bureaucratic decisions.

What the National Government is saying in the House tonight is that it wants to keep on ignoring the private sector. Creeping socialism by the National Government—it wants to control the private sector without giving the private sector the benefit of being listened to about the implications of Government decision-making. People are getting more and more fed up with the arrogance of a Government that says it has all of the answers and that will now tell a private company every detail about how it should run its operation without having any reciprocal obligation to listen to what that commercial entity has to say. I think this is a very good bill, and I commend it to the House.

It is a pleasure to rise in opposition to this bill. I thank the member who has just taken his seat, Phil Goff. I do not think in my life I have witnessed someone be so wrong in such an impassioned way. I am going to speak to this bill, in a moment, as a member who worked in the very telecommunications industry that he is trying to tell this House works a certain way—I can assure the House that it does not.

But let us look at what Ms Curran’s bill is looking to do. The idea has some theoretical merit—the idea is that you get some technical experts to advise so a Minister can make a better decision. That is a smart thing. However, you do not necessarily need to have a board if, instead, you have some very sound business processes that achieve the same outcome without one.

I chose to look at the process for procurement of telecommunications equipment that could have some implication for national security. There are about eight steps—eight very clear milestones and decision points in that process. Every one of them offers an opportunity for technical input, either from the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) or even, more important, from industry. So there is not a technical advisory board, but there is absolutely opportunity for technical experts, both within the bureau and from without, to have their input.

Let us look at why we did not make a board. Well, it was reflected upon by a select committee. Submitters might have said one thing, but it is the committee that decides.

The committee decided that the board would have to make decisions that would have to consider matters that involved classified information. So you are not just talking about representatives from Spark or Vodafone; you are talking about people who have to have requisite security clearance. So the committee felt that the board, even with the best intentions, would simply be ineffective in most of its decisions. This would relate to both commercially sensitive decisions it could not make and also to potentially classified information that it should not be party to.

So on the basis that the bill was considered and this particular board was seen as unnecessary, the process already permits for the technical expertise to be rendered to, first, the GCSB director, and, later, to the Minister in that decision-making process.

The third and perhaps most important test would be to reflect now that the legislation has been in place for 18 months. So let us count the number of complaints or issues that have been raised since this legislation has been in place.

💬 Simon O’Connor: How many?

Zero. So what we see in practice is that the model that has been adopted offers both the input from industry as well as from other experts within the bureau. It has been in place for 18 months, and there have been no issues. It was a sound decision by the House in the first place, and there is no need to change it. I oppose this bill.

The Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act was passed in 2013 alongside its sister bill, the Government Communications Security Bureau Amendment Act. Those two pieces of legislation were expressly designed to increase the powers of the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) to engage in large-scale spying on citizens of this country and other countries.

I just want to be really clear about what we are talking about here. The original legislation, which this bill before us wants to amend, was designed to increase the surveillance powers against New Zealanders and others. The original legislation gave the GCSB greater technical ability to spy on New Zealanders and to allow other foreign agencies to use the GCSB to do the same. At the time the Greens and others fought very hard, alongside thousands of New Zealanders, against increasing the powers of the spy agencies, in large part because the spy agencies could not be trusted to use those powers wisely. They could not be trusted to follow the law appropriately. Even though 2 years have passed since this original legislation was passed into law, and despite the fact that the discussion then was that these agencies could not be trusted to follow the law, and they were told to do so—and they promised to do so; that they would be much better—we have now seen subsequently that the New Zealand SIS, at least, is still failing to follow the law.

So the Green Party supports Clare Curran’s bill because, although a modest bill and a small change, it is a bill that helps provide the oversight the New Zealanders are demanding of our spy agencies because they are proving time and time again to be untrustworthy and to fail to follow the law. The New Zealand SIS example just recently where it is required by the law—and I guess this is one of the warnings, even about legislation like that before us today, that you can put these provisions in place in the law but if you have a Minister who does not understand his own legislation and you have heads of agencies who do not care for the oversight that they are required to provide, they just do not do it.

The latest example with the New Zealand SIS is classic. The SIS is required, when it issues a visual surveillance warrant, to provide that to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. The director of the SIS did not do that. The Minister who signed off the warrants did not bother to check and make sure that she had followed his new law. He did not find out that she had failed to follow the law until after the inspector-general had presented her report to the Prime Minister, a week after. You can put in place important safeguards, but if you still have a failed Government that does not understand the importance of both privacy and the necessity to uphold the law, then sometimes these things will fall through.

But none the less, despite the failure of this Government to make sure the law is followed when it comes to spy agencies, and despite the failure of, in this case, the Director of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service to undertake her legal obligations under new law, we would support any legislation, such as Clare Curran’s, to increase the oversight of the spy agencies—in this particular case the Government Communications Security Bureau. We would do so in the name of the thousands of New Zealanders who understand there may be a need for agencies like this, who recognise that there are threats that need to be dealt with and that some powers may be required, but who want to have a proper balance of proper oversight over those agencies to ensure that they follow the law, just like they are expecting other New Zealanders to do. To have these agencies of the law breaking the law because there is poor oversight over their operations is unacceptable in a modern democracy. I applaud Clare Curran’s bill. It is a modest change, but it is a step forward and the Green Party will support it. Thank you.

The idea of establishing an independent technical advisory board is not feasible, simply because the board would be ineffective in most of the decisions. Most of the decisions would relate to commercially sensitive matters. So it is not a feasible idea. Also, a technically focused board would not be able to address the broad range of issues that the decision maker needs to address.

At the moment we do have checks and balances in the current Act. All decisions to increase the interception obligations require consultation with the affected parties and also must take into account the effect on these parties. Affected parties already have the opportunity to submit advice to the Minister on the technical implementation. The current legislation is sound. We do not think it is necessary to add another clause to cover what has already been taken care of.

Also, since the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act came into effect, we now have 140 registered network operators. Prior to this, New Zealand had no record of the numbers. I oppose this particular bill. Thanks.

Kia ora, Mr Speaker. New Zealand First will be supporting the bill, not because it actually—and I choose to disagree with Metiria Turei—provides oversight. [Interruption] Minister, I am speaking and it is really interesting. You probably should listen.

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Lindsay Tisch): The Minister should sit down.

It is not because it provides oversight. New Zealand First was very, very clear when the sister legislation to this bill went through that there was a major defect in that particular legislation at the time. It was around the oversight of the regime, and the regime for the surveillance of New Zealanders. It was around the warrants that were issued. New Zealand First felt that there should have been a three-person panel to review those warrants within a certain time frame, to make sure that New Zealanders were still being protected.

But we are going to support this legislation because, unlike the National Party, we are not so arrogant as to think that we know everything. We are not so arrogant as to say—and it did not take Ms Dowie long; it certainly did not take Ms Dowie long to actually start to do the scaremongering about terrorists. What we are talking about here is a body of experts in their field being there to advise a Minister of the Crown. That is what they are there for. It did not take Mr Hudson very long either to suggest that we do not need an actual panel of experts to advise the Minister. The Minister can always ring up a mate. The Minister can always ring up somebody or a company that the Government prefers, and that is what we are seeing a lot of.

It may be why, Mr Hudson, there have been no complaints, because business knows how anti-business this Government has become. Business knows that if they get offside with this Government they will not get any more contracts. Business knows that if they get offside with this Government—Ms Dowie could not tell us how. She went on about the point that there was no middleman between the decision maker and business, that they would have full access, and that they could talk about it. But Ms Dowie did not actually answer the question as to how. Ms Dowie does not know. The reality is that if you annoy this Government, you do not get an appointment. That is why, Ms Dowie and Mr Hudson, there is a need for this legislation to go through, at least as far as the select committee, 2 years after—2 years after—to make sure that these companies are not being disadvantaged through the arrogance of this Government, which thinks that it knows best.

Ms Dowie quite clearly said, how could it be expected that all the technical knowledge required be inside a panel of experts from industry, yet the Government argues that the Minister does not require the experts’ advice. So they obviously believe that, somehow, being elected a National Party Minister makes you an expert beyond all those out there in the industry, and that you do not require their advice. That is why the Government is opposing this bill. There are only two reasons for that—either those are the notes they have been given—and they have to follow the notes they have been given—or they are delusional. One of those options is what you could pick.

From a New Zealand First perspective, what would possibly be wrong with supporting this bill to the select committee if Mr Hudson and Ms Dowie are so confident that there have been no problems in the last 2 years around the Government Communications Security Bureau being able to dictate to New Zealand businesses what they will buy, whom they will buy it from, when they will buy it, and how it will affect their balance sheets? If they believe that there is nothing wrong with that and there have been no complaints, then send it to the select committee and prove it. Send it to the select committee, support Clare Curran’s bill, and prove it.

But they will not. They will not send it to the select committee. Maybe there is a reason for that. Maybe they know that if this bill got to the select committee, the very things that they say that we should not be worrying about, the very things that they say are not a problem for industry, may just surface. They may just come forth. We all know that Mr Hudson does not get many telecommunication companies in his firm, and we all know that there is hardly any telecommunications access in Invercargill. Even though the National Government says there is a massive roll-out down there, hardly anybody can pick up a phone down there. Ms Dowie surely does not get telecommunication—

💬 Sarah Dowie: I’ve got one.

You are in Wellington right now, Ms Dowie. That is why you have got bars of signal. We know, we can be confident, that Ms Dowie and Mr Hudson actually do not see the telecommunications companies. We can be confident that this Government is denying this bill having any oxygen because it is frightened of the companies that may come forward and say: “We now have to pussyfoot around a National Government that is throwing its arrogant weight around when it comes to contracts; that only rings us if they are the ones that”—

Tēnā koe e te Mana Whakawā. Tēnā koutou katoa e ngā mema o te Whare. It is a matter that I take very seriously—speaking about a bill that has anything pertaining to the interception and securing of our country’s telecommunications network.

So in rising to speak on the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Amendment Bill in this first reading debate, I want to, initially, say that I will be opposing this bill, but it is something that I have read very closely. As we are in the Remembrance Day period, where we are mindful of the fact that people have laid down their lives that we may live in a free country, with protections of our privacy and our right to be free here, it is something that we should all take particularly seriously.

There are a couple of issues that my colleagues on this side of the House have particularly addressed. One that I want to touch on is the comparison with the United Kingdom example that I think the member is trying to make. The United Kingdom version of the technical advisory board has a very, very different scope to what is being proposed in this bill. In the United Kingdom it focuses on interception obligations, but not on the wider network security that is at risk from the hackers and the people who would seek to damage our economy by disrupting the critical infrastructure that we rely on in this country: the phone networks, online banking, and air traffic control; all of those things that are now networked.

I am afraid this is a bill that I, personally, cannot support, and I think for very good reason other members on this side of the House have highlighted that there are significant issues with it. I will not be supporting it further.

I rise in support of the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Amendment Bill. It is, as my co-leader Metiria Turia said earlier, a token towards getting some decent transparency around the security agencies in New Zealand.

I recall not so long ago when the original full bill went through, and we worked through it in the select committee to try to get some decent oversight into the telecommunications aspects of security. We tried to get oversight so that the community could have some confidence around what was going on. We have heard already tonight the raft of shortcomings that have happened even since then.

What is very, very concerning is how industry is forced to open the portals of communications to security agencies and into private communications in such a way that, effectively, human rights abuses could occur. People’s privacy—and industry’s privacy at times—should not be looked at. They should not be being peered at by those with interests beyond genuine—genuine—security for New Zealand. There has been a raft of shortcomings in the activities of both the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) and the SIS and when members of the community wanted to know whether they were affected—whether they were one of the ones who had been looked at illegally—that was supressed. Yet the Government came through with its “Five Eyes” bills—the “TICS Bill”, the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill as we call this one, and the GCSB bill—to align with the US and its foreign policy aims and objectives, and for their big corporates and for their major military machine.

It is absolutely critical that we get more oversight, and this bill, thanks to Labour member Clare Curran, goes some way to do that. So we congratulate her on trying to get some more oversight, some fair representation of industry—for looking at that aspect of the agencies that are working underneath the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act.

It is concerning, and the National Party members may sort of nod or be carrying on while New Zealanders’ privacy is actually threatened, and while industry has to jump through hoops for the security agencies, at its own expense, and at the same time working against its own customers. So the Greens will be supporting this bill, and we congratulate again the member who has brought it to the House. Thank you.

Clare Curran—5 minutes in reply.

Well, it is a great pity that the members on the National Party side of the House could not do their homework and read the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act to actually understand how the process works for directives and then have a look at how the UK model for a technical advisory board works in practice. It is a pity that they did not put up speakers who actually knew what they were talking about. Most of what they said was nonsense and ignorant and they should really have done their homework.

The Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Amendment Bill is a modest bill. I think Metiria Turei described it as a modest bill. It certainly is, and I do not resile from that. It certainly does not seek to address all of the issues that Labour had and continues to have with the actual Act. A technical advisory board is a mechanism and it is a practical, sensible, modest mechanism that has been and is being used successfully in the UK to enable its legislation to work more effectively. It is sensible and is supported widely by the communications industry.

One of the main points to make tonight, which is rather curious, is that it is Labour here that is sticking up for the private sector, it is Labour that is sticking up for the communications industry, and it is Labour that is trying to make our surveillance laws work more effectively and with the least cost impost on commercial activity in our own country, while ensuring that the functions for security law can be carried out effectively.

The National Party members claim that this Act is working well. They say there are no problems, that this would create a new level of bureaucracy, and that—irony upon irony—the select committee process worked well. Well, to deal with that one first, the select committee process was largely a farce. The National-dominated select committee voted to block the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) from coming and giving evidence, so therefore we could not ask the GCSB questions about its technical competence in making recommendations and decisions about decisions that networks make about procurement, about changes to the network—about all of those decisions that it now has very wide-ranging powers in. We were not able to ask the GCSB those questions, so the select committee in that sense was an absolute farce.

Labour members on the select committee asked the telecommunications companies to come back with an idea of the cost implications of setting up this new regime. They did, and they were extensive. Just to set up the mechanisms to put in place the ability for the GCSB to come in, it was more than $20 million—and that was just to establish these mechanisms. As to whether or not there have been any issues since the Act—well, it is security law. We are not exactly going to get reporting in the House on how many times the GCSB has created delays and cost implications, but I do know that there have been delays and cost implications.

What this bill, which is a simple, modest, practical and reasonable piece of legislation that can go through reasonably easily, would do would be to set up a mechanism that provides oversight—much needed oversight—that is based on a United Kingdom model and that works well now with the UK security law. It was asked for specifically by all of our communications industry. It was backed by other submitters. The only opposer of it is this Government, which ultimately used this legislation as a power grab to ensure that a Minister would have the ultimate power to make decisions about our telecommunications networks.