Tariff (Free Trade Agreement between New Zealand and the Republic of Korea) Amendment Bill

I move, That the Tariff (Free Trade Agreement between New Zealand and the Republic of Korea) Amendment Bill be now read a third time. Before I start to make a few comments on the bill, I would like to congratulate, on behalf of, I hope, all the members who supported this bill, the two chief negotiators of this agreement and, through them, their extensive inter-agency teams. I thank Alison Mann, who led the negotiation from its inception in 2009 through to 2011, and Martin Harvey, who took over her responsibilities. I know it was an extremely difficult negotiation, and I want to commend them, and through them, their teams for their very professional and very consistent effort to bring this agreement home.

This is, obviously, going to play a very important role in strengthening our relationship with the Republic of Korea. I suppose, like many, many people who have watched the development of Korea over the past 70 years, I am enormously impressed by what they have been able to achieve for their people. If you reflect on the fact that culturally they are identical to North Korea and that as recently as 1970 North Korea had a higher per capita income than South Korea—because when the terrible war occurred in 1950 most of the industrial capacity of the country, which was then one country, was in the north, not the south—the fact that they have been able to achieve what they have achieved has been, I think, one of the most remarkable stories of economic development.

Of course, what it has done for us, and for many countries other than us, is it has created huge opportunities for New Zealand exporters.

💬 David Seymour: Are you saying free trade is actually good for people?

It is a very disturbing notion—indeed it is—that trade is actually good for everybody. But there are a few oddballs like us who believe in this theory, and clearly 46 million Koreans believe in it. About 18 million in North Korea do not, and we can see quite clearly the consequence of that choice. In fact, the member who has made this important—although, I think, rather ideological—point has probably, like me, seen those photographs taken from space at night that show a complete black space between the 53rd or the 51st parallel—I have forgotten the number of it—and the start of the Chinese border, indicating what a wonderful result you get from insisting on your sovereignty and not doing anything with anyone else.

Now, back to the knitting. We are looking at this bill through the prism of general policy, which is under strong debate in this country—quite legitimately, of course. I want to acknowledge just how important trade policy has been to securing advantages for New Zealand exporters, and no more so than in this very vibrant and exciting market of Korea. If we look back in our history, basically in the 1950s we were not trading at all with Korea. So the opportunities we are seeing in the Asia-Pacific region are basically the conjunction of two things. One is a process of economic development to which we may in some cases have made a tiny contribution through our education system, which links in with theirs, and through our development assistance in earlier days. But, fundamentally, it is the result of these countries’ efforts and their adoption of pro-growth, pro-market policies, and then, of course, the negotiations with those emerging economies, to give us access into their markets. The process of economic development, while it is transforming the opportunities for our small economy completely for the better, is an essential precondition to this shift in trading structures. We still need access to the middle-income consumers, and you do not get that automatically.

I have often argued in the past that the process of diversification for New Zealand—which started, essentially, in the 1970s—in a strict economic sense needed not to have happened had we had access to the middle-income consumers of Europe and North America. Therefore, the role of trade policy is absolutely central to our own economic future and to maintaining a vibrant economy that can support a First World health system, a First World education system, and can create opportunities for young, ambitious New Zealanders to base their lives and their families’ future in our country and not in a third country. This agreement will absolutely contribute to these broader objectives.

On the subject of free-trade areas generally, I have been using more recently a statistic that I think is extremely interesting. It is not a rigorous proof, because we would need to factor in other considerations that produce this stunning result. If we look back at New Zealand exports in the last 10 years—no, sorry, between 2008 and 2014, so it is 6 years. What we see is that our exports to countries with which we do not currently have a preferential agreement—let us call it, loosely, a free-trade - type agreement—have declined every year by an average of 2.6 percent, so round it down to 2.5 percent. Every year our exports to countries that we do not have these preferential access agreements with have declined by 2.5 percent. But, to contrast this, the countries that we do have agreements with, and I believe that the figure with Korea, when the agreement with Korea comes into force, becomes something like 53, 54 percent. The export growth of our exports to those countries has increased every year by an average of 10.4 percent.

This is the conjunction of a highly successful trade negotiating strategy pursued both by this Government and the preceding Government. I made, at the Committee stage, I think completely justifiably strong words of thanks to the Opposition—well, the Labour Party—for its very constructive approach throughout this negotiation, and I stand strongly behind those comments. It has been essential for us to target these emerging markets and create these platforms. I think this is a major opportunity for New Zealand. I will repeat another thing that I often say, and I am sure others do too, and that is that at the end of the day this agreement does not put a new dollar on the table; it creates an opportunity. It will be up to New Zealand business people—and we will strongly support them—to exploit the opportunities of this landmark agreement.

The final thing I would say is that in a technical sense what we are doing here is not voting, in a technical sense, on the free-trade agreement but on the legislation that is necessary for New Zealand to be able to ratify the agreement. It is a proxy for exactly the same thing. In the light of a discussion that I hope this Parliament will have in the not-too-distant future on a certain other, rather larger and more controversial trade agreement, it will be exactly the same. So although Parliament will not be asked, in effect, to debate a trade agreement per se, unless Parliament passes the necessary legislation to allow a New Zealand Government to ratify it, it will not happen. In a very real sense, when the moment comes—if it does come—this Parliament will be deciding through proxy whether it wants to advance New Zealand’s interests through this giant free-trade agreement that is still now at a very mature stage.

I want to thank all of the people who have worked so hard on this agreement. I want to thank the political parties that have supported its passage through the House. I was speaking, I guess, only about a week ago to the Korean Minister of Trade, and he assured me that the passage of this agreement through their own national assembly is proceeding, and although there is a lot of controversy in Seoul around the free-trade agreement with China, this looked reasonably promising on the New Zealand front. When we have the passage of this bill through the New Zealand Parliament and, we hope, in the very near future the corresponding actions through the Korean national assembly, we will be able to, at that stage, I think, open a bottle of champagne. Thank you.

The Labour Party supports this legislation, which is necessary to bring into effect the free-trade agreement between New Zealand and the Republic of Korea. Labour is a free-trade party. In fact, you would have to be stupid as an agricultural exporting country not to be free-traders, because the whole of the international trading system discriminates against agriculture. For decades our exporters have had to face enormous tariff barriers, including in Korea, in order to get our product into those markets. Our country, by comparison, has had low tariffs since the 1980s. We trade freely and we have benefited from that.

This agreement has been a long time coming. Way back in 2007, as the Minister of Trade, I initiated a study, done by the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research and its Korean counterpart, to look into the possibilities of a free-trade agreement. That study came to the unanimous opinion—both sides agreed—that a free-trade agreement was both viable and would bring benefits to both of our countries. And it most certainly will. It will not harm New Zealand producers, because the tariffs on exports from Korea to New Zealand are both low and few—around 5 percent on things like washing machines and tyres. By contrast, when our efficient agricultural producers want to export into Korea, we face very significant barriers. If you are a wine-seller from New Zealand—it might be the best wine in the world—there is a 15 percent tariff. If you are a kiwifruit-seller, there is a 45 percent tariff. Then consider that our main competitor, Chile, because it has a free-trade agreement with Korea, gets its exports in free. If you look at something like butter, it is 89 percent; cheese, 36 percent; wood, 10 percent; and, salmon, 20 percent.

Those tariffs will be phased out and will be gone within 12 years. That, obviously, is of benefit to New Zealand. In the first year it will save us $68 million in tariffs paid by exporters alone. By the end of the process we will be saving $229 million a year. It is not just primary produce; it is things like manufacturing—for instance, aviation, medical devices, and precision and marine engineering. They will benefit from this treaty. Services—growing in importance—like education, and professional and legal services will benefit.

Is Korea an important market for New Zealand? Yes, it is. It is our fifth-biggest trading partner. There are 51 million people in Korea—I think; I stand to be corrected, Mr Groser—and it is an increasingly affluent society. It is the eighth-largest trading nation in the world and the 13th-largest economy—so, yes, there are benefits. So that is the positive side, and that is why Labour will be supporting this bill.

There is, however, a more negative side, I regret to say. Despite the best efforts of the negotiators—Tim Groser has negotiated, and in particular Martin Harvey and Alison Mann—and we are still faced with big tariff barriers in some of the areas that we could make no progress on. Out-of-quota milk powder is at a 176 percent tariff rate—176 percent. You cannot trade over that and you cannot trade around it. There are other areas that will not be happy with this agreement. Frozen deer velvet has a 15 percent tariff barrier. This is our major market for frozen deer velvet. If you look at fresh abalone or frozen squid, the tariff is 22 percent. Nothing in this agreement reduces or eliminates those tariffs, so we have got some way still to go.

I would give credit to the Minister and his negotiators for doing their very best on it, but there is one area where we have failed and there is no excuse for failure. That is in the area of failing to carve out our freedom as a sovereign nation, to limit foreign investment—Korean investment—in residential property. Ironically, we have maintained our ability to limit investment in farm land in this agreement but we did not put in our ability to limit investment in residential property.

I happen to believe that, generally, foreign direct investment is good for our country. We go out and we look for it, but it is not good in every area, and you will never persuade an Aucklander that it is good to have foreign direct investment in existing residential housing. Why not? Because there is a failure of supply of housing over demand, and why would we allow demand to be inflated further by encouraging investment in existing residential housing by people who are not resident and who never intend to be resident in New Zealand?

As a proud New Zealander, I hate to have to admit this, but the Australians got it right and we got it wrong. Australia bans foreign investment in existing housing, and other countries put a stamp duty on it. When Australia negotiated its free-trade agreement with Korea it put in protections for its right to continue to do so, but we did not. My question to the next National Party speaker is: was that a cock-up—I suspect it was a cock-up—or was it was deliberate? That would be even worse—that would be a cock-up with intent.

In Auckland we have had 25 percent housing price inflation in the last year. We have got the lowest level of homeownership in 64 years. It makes sense, when you are negotiating an agreement for investment, that you do not make it worse for Kiwis trying to achieve their dream of owning their own home. Yet, this bill will—well, this bill will not but the agreement will, unfortunately, do that. That is the one key criticism that I have of this bill. It was the wrong thing to do. What I want to say, with some degree of anger, is that John Key has not taken responsibility for this. He knows it is wrong, he knows the damage that it does, and what does he do? He says it is Labour’s fault.

I want to ask Mr Groser a question, if he is listening. I admit responsibility for initiating this free-trade negotiation; I do not accept the responsibility for the cock-up of not protecting us against inflationary foreign investment in existing housing. Do you know what Mr Key said? OK, he negotiated it—or his Minister negotiated it—but he said that it is Labour’s fault because it put a most favoured nation clause in the agreement with China. Listen to this, Mr Groser: a most favoured nation clause. Mr Groser will nod his head when he admits that we put that clause in every agreement, right? Yes, that is exactly right.

We have a most favoured nation agreement in every free-trade agreement, and if we did not put that in the New Zealand - China free-trade agreement, then that would have been regarded by the Chinese as absolutely discriminatory—and it would have been. But, because you have a most favoured nation agreement, you negotiate with care, knowing that everything that you put in new trade agreement will create a precedent and will be carried over into other free-trade agreements that you have. I do not accept the dishonesty of a Prime Minister who knows that he has got it wrong and tries to transfer the blame. He has been Prime Minister, for God’s sake, for 7 years. These things are happening under his watch, and he needs to take responsibility.

Now I want to go back to where I began. We will support this agreement. We will support this agreement because there is a net and real advantage to New Zealanders. We regret that the agreement did not go as far as we would have liked. As Russell McVeagh says, anybody expecting this agreement to deliver what was delivered by the New Zealand - China free-trade agreement, the Taiwan free-trade agreement, or the ASEAN free-trade agreement will be disappointed. And they may be. But the Government did its best in that area. It did its worst in omitting to protect New Zealand in an area where it should have—in terms of foreign investment in existing residential housing.

I just want to say one thing about the investor-State dispute settlement process. Some people have used that as a surrogate for the Trans-Pacific Partnership in saying that we will not support this agreement because it has an investor-State dispute settlement agreement in it. I put an investor-State dispute settlement agreement in the China free-trade agreement, and I put one in the ASEAN free-trade agreement. Over the years that they have been in existence, neither has caused us any problems. They are there to protect New Zealand investors in countries where there is no rule of law, and that is why we put it in. Korea does have the rule of law. We did not need it with Korea, but Korea insisted on it.

What I want to say, finally, is that what we need to do, Mr Groser, in the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement is do a lot better than we have done on dairy in this agreement. I fear, from all the reports that I am receiving, including from Mr Groser himself, that we will not get a good dairy agreement. That is our biggest single export product and we should insist on getting a deal at least as good—

I am sorry to interrupt the member, but he has been getting the signal for quite some time to sit down. He continues to discuss an agreement that is not before the House. I call—what is his name; he has been away so long—Mark Mitchell.

Ten days is all it took. I am very happy to take a call on the Tariff (Free Trade Agreement between New Zealand and the Republic of Korea) Amendment Bill. I do want to acknowledge our Minister of Trade, the Hon Tim Groser, and the negotiating team that negotiated this free-trade agreement. I know that it may be a term that is used too often, but we do punch above our weight, and we have got a very proud history in New Zealand of being able to negotiate very, very good terms in our free-trade agreements. More often than not we have to negotiate and deal with nations that are much bigger than us, with much bigger economies and much bigger populations. That does not always provide the easiest of platforms from which to negotiate and operate, and yet our Minister of Trade and our negotiators continue to negotiate very, very good terms in our free-trade agreements.

The Minister made a couple of points that I would like to discuss. Having been a Kiwi growing my business overseas for a decade it became apparent to me very quickly that as a small trading nation down at the bottom of the world, there are challenges that we face that the rest of the global economy does not face. Something that we have to be focused on and take seriously as a Government is making sure that we continue to negotiate these types of free-trade agreements, that we continue to leverage organisations like New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, and that we are able to have a very good programme through our Business Growth Agenda, which was initiated by the Hon Steven Joyce and the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, to ensure that this Government does all that it can to enable the private sector and our business sector to compete with the rest of the world.

We are a small country down at the bottom of the world with a relatively small population, and if we want to continue to have a First World, world-class health system and education system and to be able to invest in our infrastructure it is very important that we are able to continue to trade and grow our trading base globally and offshore. I want to acknowledge the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, which received this bill, and I want to acknowledge Phil Goff and David Shearer, who are always excellent to work with on the committee, especially when it comes to these free-trade agreements.

The comment that the Hon Phil Goff made about them being free-traders is very, very true, and I accept that. But the comment that he made about the entire Labour Party being free-traders I cannot agree with. I look at people like David Shearer, Phil Goff, and Clayton Cosgrove, who are free-traders, but we have seen in this House recently open dissension and challenges coming from the likes of Clare Curran against Clayton Cosgrove when it comes to free trade. I get the strong feeling that guys like Phil Goff, David Shearer, and Clayton Cosgrove are often having to battle within their own caucus against people who are actually not in favour of free trade.

With regard to the Korean free-trade agreement itself, I just wanted to quickly go over some of the numbers and what they actually mean for New Zealand, and to finish off with just a couple of stakeholder comments around some of the submissions that we heard at the select committee. Some of the numbers—and I know that the House has probably already heard them in previous debates—include the fact that we are going to save $65 million worth of duties for New Zealand exporters, and that is in just the first year alone. That is a significant gain right from the get-go. New Zealand has $229 million a year currently paid by our exporters in duty, so it is a significant free-trade agreement.

The other thing that it does for us—as Australia, for example, already has a free-trade agreement with Korea—is allow us to get back on to a level playing field in terms of the trade that we are able to engage in with Korea. Korea has 50 million people, so it is a significant market. It is a big market that will continue to grow. Another interesting statistic that the Minister raised—I was not aware of this, but it is a really interesting statistic—was that in countries that we do not have free-trade agreements with and that we have historically traded with, trade appears to be going backwards and is in decline, whereas in terms of the countries that we have signed free-trade agreements with, we have grown our exports by over 10 percent. That is actually pretty significant for a country like ours. We have got $220 million worth of dairy products being exported to Korea—that was right through to the year ended June 2014—and New Zealand exporters are paying $89 million a year in duties. So, again, the reduction in tariffs on our dairy is going to be significant.

Just very quickly, I will sum up by saying that we talk about diversification in our economy outside the dairy sector, and there has been a fair bit of public debate about that in the last couple of months. I have just got a comment here from the chief executive of Zespri, Lain Jager, who made a submission to the committee: “It is hugely satisfying that the industry can focus on building sales in the South Korean market, which will benefit both New Zealand and South Korean growers, as well as South Korean consumers. With volumes of our new SunGold variety increasing to over 50 million trays by 2018, this gives us a strong platform to build sales in this market.” I will finish on that note. Thank you.

Very much in the spirit of the last contribution, Labour is supporting this agreement. Just to be very clear about it, this is a bill that enables the Korea free-trade agreement to come into operation; it is not actually the free-trade agreement itself. That has already been signed, but it does need enabling legislation, and that is what we are talking about here.

We are pleased to support this because, on balance, it is a good agreement. It is not perfect, but it is a good agreement. New Zealand depends on these agreements, as the previous speaker, Mark Mitchell, was just saying, in order to be able to grow our trade. New Zealand is a small country, and we do not have the big internal market that the United States and other countries might have. If we do not trade, then we will not be able to continue the prosperity that we enjoy today. It is worth noting that in those countries with which we do have free-trade agreements we do better in terms of our trade. We have better access, we have better returns, and we are able to prosper more.

It is worth noting that when we signed the China free-trade agreement in 2008 we had, I think, about $7 billion in two-way traffic in trade and a little over $3 billion in terms of our exports with China. That figure has now grown to around $10 billion worth of exports to China. There are some people who say that that would have grown anyway, but all of the analysis around that that I have read has shown that, actually, we would not have got those sorts of gains in China if it had not been for the free-trade agreement that we have with it. It was China’s first free-trade agreement, I should add, and it very much set the bar—it was a high-quality agreement—for other free-trade agreements since then.

So when other parties in this Parliament say that we do not need to sign on to this free-trade agreement, or that it is not good enough, or that there is some sort of problem with it they should just reflect on what that means to our exporters. If you are a kiwifruit exporter sitting there in Tauranga or up in Northland and you want to get access to a growing Korean market, it is going to be a very difficult thing to do to compete against the Chilean exporter who pays zero tariffs when we in New Zealand have to pay 45 percent. In other words, we will not be able to compete fairly on a playing ground that is not in any way level.

So we need this free-trade agreement in order to, firstly, bring down the tariffs that operate on New Zealand goods going into Korea, and, secondly, to be able to grow that market even more than we have at the moment. Currently, Korea is our fifth-largest export market, so it is very significant. It is a growing economy. It is just one step behind us in terms of its GDP per capita, and it is growing faster than New Zealand overall, so it is likely to overtake us. So it is an important market, both for what it is now and for what it could likely become. That is the reason we need to be there and have an agreement with Korea.

I want to, as Mark Mitchell and Phil Goff have mentioned as well, compliment both Tim Groser and the negotiators on getting this agreement through. It has been a tough agreement and it has been a tough agreement for a very simple reason. For us, Korea is our fifth-largest export market. For Korea, New Zealand is their 41st most important export market. In other words, it is well down the list of priorities for Korea and it is really high for us. For us, after about a 4-year period we will get $229 million in benefits from tariffs being removed. Korea will get $4.5 million. So when you add it up, what is in it for Korea? Well, actually, not a lot. If you were a Korean negotiator out there you would be saying: “We get $4.5 million worth of access into your market and you get $229 million worth of benefits into ours.” To get this agreement across the line was a very good feat, and the people who negotiated it deserve our praise. For example, $45 million worth of tariffs on beef will come off, and our ability to grow our beef exports to Korea will go up. Other examples of tariffs coming off are the 22 percent tariff on lamb, the 45 percent tariff on kiwifruit, and tariffs on logs and a number of manufactured goods. At the end of 15 years 98 percent of our exports to Korea will have no tariffs attached to them, so it is a good deal.

We have heard that we certainly did not get what we wanted on milk powder; on frozen deer velvet, which is an important market for deer farmers; or for some products of seafood. We did not get everything we wanted. We would have liked a bit more, but we did not get it. But we have done very well. We have also included in the agreement provisions on labour standards and environmental standards. Unfortunately, they are not sufficient for the Green Party to come aboard and sign up to this. That makes me sort of sad, really, because you have got to ask: what is the threshold for the Green Party to agree to a free-trade agreement? It is a pretty high bar, and when you start narrowing down the countries that would be able to meet that bar it is a very small number of countries, and if we had to rely on that smaller group of countries, then we would not be trading as we are with many countries around the world, and we certainly—certainly—would be poorer. If you are going into this saying you support free trade but you are not signing up to free-trade agreements, there is only one conclusion you can come to—that, actually, you do not support exports and you do not support free trade. There is no other conclusion to come to.

I want to just talk very briefly about one of the reservations that Phil Goff mentioned in relation to this free-trade agreement, and that is the problem around property investors coming into New Zealand and buying up residential property. I am an Aucklander, and I have seen property prices go through the roof in Auckland. We do not want our residential property to be treated like pork bellies on the New York Stock Exchange. We want our residential property to be places where people live and are able to afford to live. By allowing foreign speculators to come into our property market, we then open up our property market for speculation that will drive prices up, and that is undoubtedly driving prices up right now. This free-trade agreement that we have with Korea will enable speculators to be able to enter our market, and from what we can see, and, certainly, in the wise words of Dr Kāwharu from Auckland University, it will mean that we will not be able to stop those speculators coming in and speculating in our market. That is a source of concern. Australia, in its free-trade agreement with Korea, locked in a protection against that, but we, for some reason, did not.

Lastly, I want to mention the concerns around the investor-State dispute settlement process—the tribunals that are set up where there are disputes in agreements. It is included in this free-trade agreement with Korea. It was included at the behest, I understand, of the Korean Government. It is mainly because Korea wants to have a uniform set of agreements that include this. We did include it in our free-trade agreement with China, at our behest. And why did we do that? It was because we were uncertain and unclear about whether we would get a fair deal in a Chinese court. We do not have that same fear with Korea. I would think that a dispute would not go to an investor-State dispute settlement form of judicial recourse because it would either go to a New Zealand court or a Korean court. We would be able to settle it in those courts because we respect each other’s judiciaries.

The bar to get to an investor-State dispute settlement tribunal is incredibly high, and if you look at the case law around it you will see that the chance of New Zealand ever getting to an investor-State dispute settlement tribunal is very unlikely. We have not been taken to one before. We have not been taken to a World Trade Organization court before. There have been 350-odd cases that have been taken there, and 84 percent of those countries in the OECD that have gone before an investor-State dispute settlements tribunal have won their cases. So I think that when you put this on the ground, it is still a very good trade agreement.

I would like to echo the words of the Chamber in congratulating the Minister of Trade on this excellent agreement. I would also like to congratulate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials on the high skills that they have brought to this agreement.

We have heard the issue of investor-State dispute settlement provisions raised again today; they have been raised at several of the readings of the Tariff (Free Trade Agreement between New Zealand and the Republic of Korea) Amendment Bill as well. Quite simply, we need to back ourselves. We need to back ourselves. We have got a really good level of experience in international tribunals, as was just mentioned a moment ago. In fact, if we detail them even further, it will bring back some memories of just how good our team is. In 2007 there was the Australian apple ban, in 1999 the US lamb safeguards, in 1997 the Canadian dairy subsidies, in 1997 EU butter exports, and we are currently in a World Trade Organization dispute with Indonesia over agricultural products. We have a lot of experience in international tribunals. We need to back ourselves.

The timing here is very important, and I would like to acknowledge the Labour Opposition for assisting with the timing. You see, what happens here is that if we ratify this, the entry-into-force tariff reductions happen immediately, and then one calendar year later the next set of reductions come in. Being able to do this now means that on 1 January, or thereabouts, the year 2 tranche of tariff reductions can come in, instead of waiting potentially another whole year. This will benefit buttercup squash, methanol, food preparation, some fisheries, dairy spreads, milk albumins, racehorses, and aluminium. Those sectors of the economy will benefit from the timeliness of this agreement.

The other comment that I would like to make is around the kiwifruit industry, which, it has been noted, is clearly going to benefit from this. I have had those in the kiwifruit industry have a look at how they would carve out the Northland benefit. What does this look like for Northland? This is important because this is the cost to New Zealand First, which is opposing this. This is the cost to New Zealand First of not supporting the Northland kiwifruit industry—

💬 Todd Barclay: Not putting New Zealand first.

—not putting New Zealand first; certainly not putting Northland first. Here is how the kiwifruit figures look for Northland. There are 228 orchards, 126 growers, 420 hectares, with five pack-houses. I am reliably informed that there is one full-time equivalent per 2 hectares of kiwifruit-growing land—that is 210 full-time equivalents working with growers in the kiwifruit industry, and I am also informed that that is $25 million into the Northland economy. This is quite clearly a good thing for Northland. This agreement is quite clearly a good thing for New Zealand, and I commend it to the House.

I would like to start by acknowledging again the hard work of the public servants and negotiators who have put a lot of time and effort over the last many years into concluding this deal. Regardless of what we think of the deal, I think that they all deserve recognition for the hard work that they have done on behalf of the country. Again, I also want to acknowledge Mark Mitchell for his role as chair of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. He gave a great deal of time to Opposition concerns, most particularly, about the investor-State dispute settlement mechanisms and the concerns of the public about those and other concerns to do with that. So I do appreciate the process. For the most part, I think it has been a good process that has got us here today.

One of the things that I keep coming to is the fact that we have a series of concerns about a number of the measures that are contained—or, in fact, are not contained—in the Korean free-trade agreement that are, in the words of the Minister of Trade earlier, in the context of general trade policy and are showing up here in this agreement and also in other agreements; both those that we have already signed and ones that we are currently negotiating.

I would like to respond to Mr Shearer’s concern that the Green Party has a high bar for signing trade agreements. It is true that we have high standards for these and that so far we have not yet seen a trade agreement that meets those standards. One of the things that we have a real concern about is that, for a number of these agreements, although they have language around, for example, human rights, labour standards, and environmental standards, those conditions are non-binding and unenforceable. For example, I think somebody referred to the ASEAN agreement earlier today. That does have some language in it about environmental standards, but the commission that is supposed to meet to discuss those has never actually met in the entire time that the ASEAN agreement has been in place—but, obviously, trade has continued.

I want to give an example. We have a free-trade agreement with China, and that has led to a huge increase in trade between our two nations. That has led to material benefits to New Zealand and to China, although, obviously, it is a bit of a drop in the bucket for China. In China, there is a small city called Baotou, which is in Inner Mongolia, not terribly far from the country of Mongolia. Near Baotou is a tailings lake that is 11 square kilometres. The background radiation of that lake is three times the normal background radiation, which itself is already very high. The lake contains 180 million tonnes of fine waste powder from ore processing. It includes a whole series of different ores, but notably cerium oxide and neodymium. Those are rare earth metals that are necessary for a number of things that we hold to be particularly important, including batteries, lasers, and magnets. Magnets are used for a whole series of industrial processes—in particular and notably in wind turbines, a clean, green technology, and also in electric cars, which we are hoping to see on our roads before too long. Those metals are also used in catalytic converters. One of the other things that they are used for is the covers on our iPhones—the touch screen glass on our iPhones—so it is incredibly common. Virtually everybody has some of this product in their pockets now as a result of these industrial processes.

It is an absolute ecological catastrophe in Baotou. Baotou is only one of a number of tailings lakes throughout China, but it is certainly one of the largest ones. In our agreement with China, there is some language around environmental standards and so on, and yet we are encouraging these industrial processes that cause massive ecological catastrophes and we are not holding ourselves to the standards that we say are already contained inside these agreements. So until the kind of language in these agreements becomes binding and enforceable—where there is some mechanism and where we have some recourse to say “Look, we think these are great products. We’re very grateful for this trade. Obviously, we like our iPhones. We like them cheap. We like our electric cars. We like our wind turbines, but is there a way that we can ensure that the production of the components in all of those things is a great deal cleaner?”, what we have to take responsibility for is the fact that when we buy those components in, when we buy those iPhones, and those electric cars, and so on and so forth, what we are doing is encouraging a massive ecological catastrophe in the lands that those things have come from. I am not talking about just China—I mean, it is particularly bad in China at the moment—but all throughout the world where we have trading relationships or indirect trading relationships through the global supply chains that supply all of these products that we buy in. So these are amongst our concerns, and we kind of restate these every time that one of these agreements comes up in front of the House, but they never get addressed.

One of the things that I am encouraged by is the rumour that the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement may actually include, for the first time ever, some binding and enforceable language around environmental and human rights standards. But until we see that, we cannot support it. So it is not just about what happens here but also about what happens with our trading partners as well. We completely understand that there are benefits to exporters in the Korean free-trade agreement and in other trade agreements. The problem is that the costs associated with the trade and with these deals are not necessarily borne directly by the ones who receive the benefit. I understand that those exporters who are seeing an increase in trade will be paying their taxes. They will be paying GST, and so on and so forth, and that comes to Treasury and then Treasury uses that money to do some of the clean-up of some of the environmental damage that is caused through trade and so on, but it is a very indirect relationship.

Another example is the concern that has not yet been addressed about what the fate of Pharmac will be under the Trans-Pacific Partnership. We understand that it is being protected, or that it is likely to be protected, but that the cost of medicines will still rise, because there are going to have to be some compromises made in order to get that deal over the line. From what the Prime Minister is now saying, we understand that the benefit of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, in terms of benefits to exporters, is going to be reasonably limited, but the costs will not be borne by exporters; the costs will be borne by consumers of medicines—particularly, very rare medicines that come at a high expense. So when we look at the balance of benefits and costs in these agreements, you can say that yes, there are some benefits to the country via benefits to exporters, but on the costs side, you are also saying that the people who are bearing the costs are not necessarily the same people who are receiving the benefits. So they are being borne in differing places. They are not related to each other.

We have stated those concerns a number of different times, and one of our problems is that although those concerns have been heard at the select committee and so on, we have not actually had a response other than, for example, the warm words: “Oh well, we don’t really need to worry about it, because we have never been faced with an investor-State dispute provision thing in the past.” But we know that throughout the world, there has been an exponential increase in these cases as a result of these agreements. So when Mr Shearer says that we are against trade, I reject that notion. We are not against trade; we are, as he says, for trade with standards—and high standards. But the problem that we have got is that we have not yet had an agreement that includes the standards that we are looking for and in a way that meets our satisfaction. When we look at cases like the Baotou steel group’s tailings mine in China and other numerous examples around the world, what we know is that although trade is leading to increased wealth, and so on and so forth, there are tremendous costs, and those costs are not being borne by the people who receive the benefit, and they are not being cleaned up. Until the time that agreements include some binding and enforceable standards on human rights, labour, and the environment, I am afraid that we just cannot support them. Thank you.

Kia ora, Mr Deputy Speaker. I rise to take a short call on behalf of New Zealand First and my colleague Fletcher Tabuteau. I also want to join with others in the House to acknowledge the members of the negotiating team, who have had, as all documents tell us, a very difficult task to do. I can say only that I think it has probably been made even more difficult by having a Minister of Trade such as Mr Groser who earlier today acknowledged that he has no belief that any country should protect its own sovereignty. I think that was a really interesting contribution from Mr Groser—that he does not believe that any nation should insist on, or have as a bottom line, keeping the ability to make its own laws and having a Parliament such as this to create its own future for its citizens, to decide what laws it would or would not like to put in place. Mr Groser believes that those are a tradable commodity; New Zealand First does not. So New Zealand First will stand with the Green Party in opposing this bill.

The Green Party member Mr Shaw, I think, just expressed exceptionally eloquently as to why the Green Party is not supporting this bill. Certainly, I do not believe that New Zealand First would come up with any dispute with the contribution that Mr Shaw made. However, the majority of New Zealand First’s opposition is around the investor-State dispute settlement clause. We acknowledge Mr Goff’s and Mr Shearer’s contribution. We also know that they have no alternative but to stand and support this bill, because, being part of Governments before, they have entered into trade agreements where there have been investor-State dispute settlement clauses.

I was sitting on the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee when the negotiators came to brief the select committee on the completed process. I asked the question: what had the South Koreans asked for from New Zealand? All they had asked for was the investor-State dispute settlement clause. It has been stated in this House, and I think it was Mr Shearer who stated that he believed that they asked for it only because they like to keep things consistent. That may or may not be the case, but that does not mean that New Zealand has to accept it.

I think the other thing that is important too is that when we enter into these trade agreements there is one set of criteria when you hit the border. So what we are talking about here is some tariffs. We do note that with regard to milk powder, it keeps its 176 percent tariff. So that was not a great win for that particular industry.

We do note that once you get past the border there are other barriers that could have been discussed and should have been discussed and that we have not heard anything about. For example, there is the $20 billion of subsidy that the South Korean Government gives to agriculture once you get past the border. It is one thing to negotiate a deal and negotiate away your possible sovereignty to actually have a little bit of tariff leverage at the border, but it is another thing once you get into the country—if your Government is now all hands-off and patting itself on the back because it is on this incredible race to try to go down in the history books as the Government that got the most trade agreements and not necessarily the most high quality trade agreements. That is one of the reasons why—and the predominant reason why—New Zealand First is actually opposing this bill.

I think it is a very good example of why one should be concerned and looking at the fine print and the small details of these sorts of agreements. An excellent example I think is from—let us just talk about it—the procurement policy of Auckland City. The procurement policy of Auckland City, when it was first created back in 2011 or whenever, was rewritten. The local boards lobbied very, very hard for local contractors to be given some form of advantage under the procurement policy of Auckland City. I think that a lot of councils do that. A lot of councils and local government want to make sure that their local contractors have an opportunity to tender, and that if the tenders are balanced financially and with regard to the structure and the content of the tender, then a local contractor is given that little bit of an edge, because councils know there is local employment. It moves around the particular community.

With regard to the procurement policy of Auckland City, what was most interesting when it was finally written down after all the input from the community, local boards, and so on was that Singapore and Australia were defined as being local. So Singaporean and Australian companies were defined as local under the procurement policy of Auckland City and would be given the same advantages as any other business inside the boundaries of Auckland. Why was that? It was because they are included in trade agreements. Under the fine print in trade agreements the council could do no other. If we have a Singaporean company, an Australian company, and a New Zealand company or a company from Auckland putting in a tender for the same piece of work, and the content was the same and the pricing was similar and so on and so forth, they would have been breaking trade agreements and they would have been breaking laws to give advantage to New Zealanders. That is why New Zealand First stands against these types of agreements and we will continue to stand against them.

It is all very well for Mr Reti—and I see that the campaign for Northland has started up. I can see that—[Interruption] Is it not funny how doctors like to be called “Dr” all the time? Righty-o. It is very interesting that Dr Reti has decided that—well, obviously he is campaigning for something, although I am not quite sure what. But it is interesting that the campaign for Northland has begun already. So Northlanders should be pleased that the moment that Northland elected somebody else who was not a National Party member, they got an awful lot of attention coming from this Government. I would suggest that the best bet for the future is to continue to have a member not actually from the Government benches.

I come back to the bill. I just want to quote from Mr Tabuteau’s second reading speech: “South Africa, Germany, and France are all investigating how to remove themselves either from trade agreements entirely that have investor-State dispute settlement provisions in them, or to remove the investor-State dispute settlement provision itself from their trade agreements. They understand that this is an … attack on the democracy and the functioning of their Government within their country. They understand that. They have seen the evidence of it and they are desperately now trying to do something about it. The unfortunate reality for them is that they are beginning to discover that it is not that easy to get yourself out of these trade agreements once you have signed up to them. We are talking about 20 to 25 years’ notice in order for those countries to take themselves out of these trade agreements with the likes of the investor-State dispute settlement provisions in them.” It is too difficult to get out, and it is too easy to get in.

What we have also heard today in people’s contributions to this House—and again, interestingly enough, from the Labour benches—is that although we have had investor-State dispute settlement clauses, we have never been taken to court. We have never had a problem so far. They do, however, appear to be the thing at the moment. They do, however, appear to be the cool thing to put into trade agreements. So it is only a matter of time would be what New Zealand First is saying. Just because something has not happened does not mean it will not.

The other thing we have heard is that of the number of people who have had to go to tribunals under this, 85 percent have won their cases. Nobody has mentioned the cost to those nations to actually go and defend themselves. Nobody has mentioned the cost. Even when they have not been found to be in breach, or whatever, nobody has tallied up the figures. What we know is that there are some companies in the world that have more money than New Zealand has put together. So what we know is that there are companies out there that can take our country to the cleaners, because they have more money to throw at an issue than we have.

The question is why we would place ourselves in this situation. The relationship that New Zealand had with South Korea was strong enough—strong enough—to create a trade agreement without selling our sovereignty. Perhaps what we need is a Minister of Trade, such as the Rt Hon Winston Peters, who actually believes in the sovereignty of the nation, who has the capacity to stand his ground for his country, and who is respected by all of Asia.

This bill is an important one. It is about free trade, which we all know is important for our country going forward.

I just want to go over some of the other parties that have spoken here today. With the Green Party, at least it is consistent. It is against any free trade. It does not want us to be part of the modern world, so that is fine. We know that is the Green Party’s position. We know that it does not want trade, it does not want us to grow, and it does not want us to have that opportunity.

But the New Zealand First Party members come into this House and vote against this bill. This is the same party whose members go around New Zealand to all the regions saying “We are going to look after farmers. We are looking after the regions.”, and yet they vote against the one thing that can help those people.

The one thing that this country can do is get free trade for its farmers so that they have the opportunity to sell their products, and New Zealand First votes against it. So anytime you see Winston Peters on TV saying that he is going to be out there batting for the regions and batting for the farmers, he is lying. The reality is—

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Lindsay Tisch): Order! You cannot say that. The member will withdraw that comment.

I withdraw.

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Lindsay Tisch): Also, I would like you to come back and focus. This is a third reading. It is not the general debate. I would like the member to come back to the focus of the third reading.

💬 Denis O’Rourke: I raise a point of order, Mr Speaker. I take offence at the word used, and the member should be required to apologise as well as withdraw.

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Lindsay Tisch): I will decide the level. I have asked the member to withdraw. He withdrew, and that is the end of the matter.

When we look at the free-trade agreement, we need free trade for our regions and for our farmers. This is what this bill is about. The New Zealand First Party members are not voting for that.

Then we had the Labour Party members over there, who are voting for this bill. They are voting for this bill, but they do not believe in it. They do not believe in this, because they are not going to vote for the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement. What the Labour Party is trying to do is to say: “We’ve an open approach to free trade, but at the same time we’re saying no to the biggest free-trade agreement that possibly could come before this country and before this Parliament.”

The Labour Party members have some big issues there in respect of their approach to free trade. It shows the inconsistency of them. It was merely an attempt by members of the Labour Party to go for the mayoralty of Auckland and to talk about housing issues.

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Lindsay Tisch): Order! I want you to concentrate, as I mentioned—this is the second time—on what this is about, which is the agreement with South Korea. The Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement is not part of this, nor is the Auckland mayoralty, nor any other matter. Come back to the focus of the third reading.

The Labour Party members talked about the housing issues because they said that was one of the clauses of the agreement—that it would limit the ability of overseas buyers to come in from South Korea and buy houses.

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Lindsay Tisch): Look, I will not say it again. It does not matter what other people may have said. It is what we are saying now. Focus on the third reading.

This is a good bill for traders in New Zealand. This is something that we accept and look forward to the House passing.

I call Steffan Browning—5 minutes.

I rise to take a call on the third reading of the Tariff (Free Trade Agreement between New Zealand and the Republic of Korea) Amendment Bill. The Greens are opposing this bill. I spoke on it earlier, in the Committee stage, and said that we would like to have free trade that is fair trade. There is not fair trade in this bill. There are some advantages for some sectors, out of this bill, and they will be very, very much appreciated. But out of this bill, as well, there are people in New Zealand—workers, businesses, and sectors—who will be disadvantaged. [Interruption] Sorry, Mr Assistant Speaker—I have been affected by the interjections. I will carry on.

The completeness of this agreement for New Zealand does not come through for 15 years, when we get 97-odd percent of the different aspects that we are looking at in tariff reductions into Korea. They do not come through for 15 years—all of them come in by then. Some of them come in immediately—cherries, for example. Kiwifruit gets a fairly early run. Dairy and beef, and a number of other things, do not. They come in in stages. But Korea gets carte blanche in 7 years. What is even about that?

When I spoke about it last, I was pointing out that if we had a better track record with trade with Korea, maybe we would have got a better deal. So those on the Government benches who want to mock or consider this should think about the level of pesticide use in New Zealand, which nearly cost us our beef market in Korea. We had a ship turned right round and back because of endosulfan contamination, and we had another one where we nearly lost it, as well. Then it suited our Environmental Protection Authority to remove endosulfan from use in this country, even though people had been screaming for it to be removed because of the health risks—to the environment, but, even more, to human health for women, because of breast cancer and other things. But it suited that Government, and Labour before it, to carry on making use of that until it affected trade with Korea. That is when we got rid of endosulfan. People did not want it on their parks. They did not want their kids sliding over it. But it was trade with Korea—no wonder we are so far behind in the fairness of this trade deal, when Korea looks at us and thinks we are pesticide city.

We need to be getting those things out of that and working to our aspirational goal of a “clean, green”, “100% Pure” Aotearoa New Zealand, which is the best brand. We know that 100% Pure New Zealand is a very good brand; we won an award with that. Is it true? It is not 100 percent true, but it is aspirational, and if we woke up to that, trade deals like this would be better.

However, there is another aspect that is very concerning. There was another bill that was passed a little while ago. It was the “Anti-dumping bill”, we may call it. What it does is create an early warning system for businesses to basically shed their staff and get ready for the fact that they will not have—

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Lindsay Tisch): Order!

—a fair market. Thank you.

I am calling David Seymour—5 minutes.

Are we not a House of Representatives? I rise on behalf of the ACT Party in support of this bill. The ACT Party has a long and proud tradition of supporting free trade and free-trade agreements. Why? Because free trade—voluntary transactions between countries—is mutually beneficial.

Did we not hear today that the Green Party is still the party in this House that wants to let you buy and sell marijuana but will not let you buy and sell anything else, especially if foreigners are involved? If you could imagine that there was a policy that was capable of dragging hundreds of millions of people out of poverty around the world and as those people got wealthier they were motivated and able to clean up their environments, including the long detour we took to a tailings pond in Mongolia, then would you not think that the Green Party would be in favour of that policy that reduces poverty, increases human welfare, and gives people the means to be better environmental custodians? Would you not think that the Green Party would be in favour of that? But we see that the new, refreshed, business-friendly Green Party still has a very, very long way to go.

I thought about rebutting some of the points that New Zealand First made but, unfortunately, I do not think that its member Tracey Martin actually made any, so I will have to move along to my next point.

This bill could be ratifying—or at least approving—an agreement that could go much, much further. We still have remaining tariffs and we still have safeguard measures. If you truly believe in free trade, there is no justification for those. Unilateral free trade is what increases the welfare of New Zealanders, and, for those of us still stuck in the 1800s, mercantilism, I can tell you—

💬 Denis O’Rourke: Are you? Are you stuck there?

Eighteenth century, sorry, 17th century—the member is correct in reminding me. I can tell you that the welfare of New Zealanders is helped by being able to access goods at an affordable price, and that is one thing that has done an enormous amount for reducing poverty in New Zealand as well as overseas.

There were some interesting asides from the otherwise excellent free-trade members of the Labour Party suggesting that this bill should allow New Zealand the ability to block Koreans from buying property in Auckland. They said that Australia had this provision. I believe we should make public policy based on the evidence and ask how that is working for the Australians. The truth is that despite the restrictions on buying existing dwellings in Sydney, the housing affordability in that city is still worse than it is in Auckland. The policy simply has not worked. You just have to ask yourself why that may be. We do not see speculative bubbles from foreigners in any other area. [Interruption] All right, well, Mr Assistant Speaker, I am addressing points raised earlier by members. If that is not going to be allowed in the debate, I will have to move on to the investor-State dispute settlement provision, which was part of this free-trade agreement and was addressed by earlier members. Will it be acceptable to address that, Mr Assistant Speaker? Thank you.

We had a very wise contribution from David Shearer on the threshold that needs to be reached before investor-State dispute settlement provisions are activated. It is true that there has never been one brought against the New Zealand Government. It is very unlikely that there ever will be. But if we expect people to invest in New Zealand from overseas, then they will expect to have a mechanism by which they can protect their property rights. I just wish that David Shearer could take those very wise and eloquent words and maybe impart them to the members who sit, usually, to his left. If only they could take off their tinfoil hats and hear what he has to say.

In conclusion, free trade is a quintessentially New Zealand policy. No other jurisdiction of only 4 million or 5 million people in the world isolates itself from being able to trade with much larger markets. So it is that I am proud to support this debate and this bill, supporting the New Zealand - Korea free-trade agreement, and I look forward to the great prosperity it will bring to New Zealand, as every other free-trade agreement to date has. Thank you.

It gives me pleasure to speak in support of the Tariff (Free Trade Agreement between New Zealand and the Republic of Korea) Amendment Bill. I just wanted to address one point that fascinated me. It was made by the previous Green speaker, Steffan Browning. He said that we need to have a better track record on trade with Korea before we should do more trade. I have a couple of points. Setting aside pesticide and homeopathy, the two points are, firstly, that that is why we are putting through a free-trade agreement—so we can get better outcomes and results from trade with Korea—and, secondly, it is already our fifth-largest export market. So there are a couple of points just to think about there.

I want to acknowledge the Hon Tim Groser, our Minister of Trade, who has worked hard and tirelessly over his time in Parliament, and before he came into Parliament, signing up these deals between New Zealand and our counterparts in order to create better, more prosperous outcomes for our businesses and our individuals. Often the work that Minister Groser does overseas is unacknowledged or under-acknowledged, and I think that here is a time in the House when we can take the time to appreciate the work he does on behalf of our country.

On behalf of Southland and Otago economies and, indeed, New Zealand, we are export-driven economies, and this agreement creates new opportunities for New Zealand businesses. We are keen to help them take advantage of these opportunities and, hopefully, when this bill passes through the House, we can get on and help these businesses take advantage of the benefits that this agreement will see for them. We simply cannot get rich by buying and selling to ourselves. We are a party in favour of trade liberalisation, unlike some of the members who have spoken previously representing their parties.

In closing, on behalf of the people of my electorate, I would like to, once again, congratulate the Hon Tim Groser on this agreement and also the negotiations team. I would like to offer my unreserved support for this bill.

I certainly agree with the previous speaker, Todd Barclay, on one point, and that is that we certainly cannot generate economic development by buying and selling to ourselves. Therefore, our exports and developing our own industries become such an important part—and are such an important part—of our strategy. Unfortunately, under this Government, the ratio of exports to GDP has fallen to its lowest level since 1997. This Government has failed to meet its own target. It is going backwards, and exports are at just 28 percent of GDP on an actual basis, down from 32 percent when it came to office. This is, I suppose, a framing of one of the problems that we have got in this country right now. Labour is speaking in support of this bill, because, on balance, it does meet the tests that a free-trade agreement needs to meet. It is not perfect, and I will be mentioning some of the problems that we have with it.

One of the problems is that the negotiating skills under this Government, in respect of free-trade agreements, are certainly not to the high standard of the negotiating skills for the free-trade agreement under the previous Labour Government—the China free-trade agreement being the case in point. [Interruption] Well, I rest my point. There is clearly a difference, and the difference is the Government. The difference is who is in Government. With regard to our exports, we certainly have work to do, and we have work to do if we are going to be taking advantage of these agreements and actually ensuring that we are investing in our industries and making sure that there are exports to sell. I will be talking a bit more about this in a minute.

I just want to make a few points that my colleague Phil Goff made. He was responsible for the negotiation of the China free-trade agreement under the previous Labour Government, on which the current Prime Minister waxes lyrical. Mr Goff made the point in his contribution to the Committee stage that the tariffs that apply to Korea are low, and he used the examples of washing machines and car tyres—around 5 percent was the figure that he mentioned. He said that the removal of that tariff will not make a huge impact on industry in New Zealand, and that is true. But he also described this agreement—and he would know—as not meeting the definition of being high quality and comprehensive. These words were not just his words; he was quoting Russell McVeagh, an expert, who has said that this agreement will not achieve a result that is similar to that of the China agreement. I can see that the Government has run out of steam and cannot raise an argument around that one—the loser being milk powder in particular, where the tariffs remain particularly high.

I also want to reference the comments made, also in the Committee stage, by my colleague Jenny Salesa, who is sitting next to me. She referenced her own electorate of Manukau East, and it was quite a powerful statement that she made. Manukau East in South Auckland is at the epicentre of a housing crisis of monumental proportions, with thousands of young New Zealanders in low to middle income groups, basically, tenants in their country. This is relevant to the debate—absolutely relevant—and it is relevant to the debate because it goes to one of the problems that Labour has with this bill, which is the flaw around loss of sovereignty: our concerns about the controls on the purchase of New Zealand land by overseas buyers, which Labour believes is concerning; the impact that this agreement may have on future New Zealand Governments to establish controls on the purchase of New Zealand residential land by overseas buyers; and its ability to bring in a stamp duty on purchases of land by overseas buyers.

This is important, it is relevant, and it goes to the comments made by the Minister at the beginning of the third reading about future discussions in this House on free-trade agreements and the import of those discussions. This is the only time that the Labour Party and Opposition parties get to debate the impact of free-trade agreements—when we get to have an actual piece of legislation in the House before us. Mr Groser referenced this himself, and he said that there is another agreement that is being negotiated at the moment. Of course, we all know that that is the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement. If there is legislation that comes to the House, this will be the only opportunity that the Opposition parties will have to, one, have a vote and, two, have an opportunity to have a debate.

I would say to Mr Groser that it would be useful if he could actually give an indication to Parliament and to the people of New Zealand of what kind of legislation it is going to be, how many pieces of legislation there will be, and when New Zealand—

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Lindsay Tisch): Order!

—might get the opportunity to learn what the topics are, because there has been so much secrecy around this. Mr Assistant Speaker, this does go to the bottom lines that the New Zealand Labour Party has in its consideration of free-trade agreements and what the importance of free-trade agreements—

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Lindsay Tisch): Look, we are on a third reading of a bill. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is not part of it. It can be referenced, but there are a number of Speakers’ Rulings, and let me refer you to Speaker’s Ruling 137/1: “On the third reading of a bill a member cannot discuss—(1) Any matter not included in the clauses of the bill”. So I would just ask the member, in the time provided, to actually focus on what a third reading is about.

Thank you, Mr Assistant Speaker. Given that the Minister himself did reference the future agreements—

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Lindsay Tisch): I do not want you to comment on the ruling that I have just given. I said that you could reference it, and you have. So now just focus, in the last couple of minutes, on the content of the third reading.

Thank you, Mr Assistant Speaker. Well, in regard to our concerns around the controls on the purchase of New Zealand land, Labour has said quite openly that we believe this part of the agreement was botched and that a side letter should be considered for the New Zealand free-trade agreement with the Republic of Korea in order to clarify the effects of those provisions in the free-trade agreement. That is very relevant to this debate.

We accept that this free-trade agreement does, on balance, substantially reduce the tariffs faced by New Zealand exporters. We accept the genuinely held concerns of submitters—which included the New Zealand Medical Association, the Council of Trade Unions, and academics—about loss of sovereignty and the concerns around investment rules and investor-State dispute settlement provisions. We absolutely accept that there are concerns about that, and we know that there are future trade agreements where those issues will become relevant. Our support for this trade agreement does not mean that there will be support for future agreements if they do not meet the bottom lines of the Labour Party. These are important and include the protection of Pharmac, that corporations cannot successfully sue the Government for regulation in the public interest, that New Zealand retains its right to restrict the sale of farmland and housing to non-resident foreign buyers, that the Treaty of Waitangi must be upheld, and that meaningful gains must be made for our farmers with tariff reductions and market access. So far the signs do not look that great.

In commending the Tariff (Free Trade Agreement between New Zealand and the Republic of Korea) Amendment Bill to the House, I just want to congratulate those members of the Opposition who have expressed their support for this valuable measure. It is a very important trading relationship: $4 billion of bilateral trade between Korea and New Zealand; $2 billion each way. There are immediate benefits of around $65 million that will be derived for New Zealand exporters, particularly in some of those fruit industries—kiwifruit, for instance, and wine—but also for New Zealand companies importing from Korea those technical products, be they Samsung TVs or smartphones.

This is a very positive measure and yet another triumph by our supremely sophisticated Minister of Trade, the Hon Tim Groser. In the TV series Yes Minister, KCMG meant “Kindly Call Me God”. I think that in future years Mr Groser should be knighted. “Sir Tim Groser” has a nice ring about it. He should get “Kindly Call Me Groser”. Thank you.