Standards and Accreditation Bill

Thank you for allowing me to take some calls on Part 2 of this Standards and Accreditation Bill. I would like to focus on clause 40, which is the “Disestablishment of the Standards Council”. It is only a two-line clause, but the Standards Council, continued under section 3 of the Standards Act 1988, is disestablished.

That sets up the ability for this Government to set up a new body that is housed within the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, and this is the NZ Standards Executive. This is the body that will be replacing the Standards Council, and it is that lack of independence because of its housing within the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment that we have a problem with. Just as I was saying on Part 1, there is massive concern that we are losing the Standards Council and we are having a new entity within the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, the NZ Standards Executive.

I just wanted to continue with some concerns from the Building Industry Federation around losing the Standards Council. In its submission, again, and quoting from it—and I want to say that it is a very brave submission from the Building Industry Federation—it says that this bill, to the extent that it “breaks with this historic global practice the Building and Construction sector was, and is, concerned that the position of Executive is now to be filled by an executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Development (MBIE) appointed by the Chief Executive of that Ministry.”

The Building Industry Federation in its submission to the select committee, which is the public’s opportunity to come and have its say, says: “The industry does not question the integrity of the Chief Executive of MBIE but is concerned that the appointment process and the subsequent administrative tenor of the appointee will be influenced significantly and dominated by public sector and government requirements at the expense of industry requirements and needs.”

Why has this Government, which always claims it is close to industry and in touch with industry, completely and utterly ignored the many voices of industry when it came to this bill at the Commerce Committee and completely and utterly ignored their concerns around independence and around whether or not the new structure affords itself to cover costs? It has completely and utterly ignored it, because it has made no amendments to this piece of legislation—or no substantive amendments to this piece of legislation—at all after it left the select committee. They have been ignored, and I think that that is a mistake and a missed opportunity from this Government to make sure that this piece of legislation was as good as it could have been. It is a missed opportunity and one that the Government should have seen coming at the select committee consideration.

Clause 40, again, is around the disestablishment of the Standards Council. The main aim in doing this was to deal with the lack of financial viability of the New Zealand Standards Council. Again, in the select committee process we heard from a number of submitters who questioned whether the new structure within the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment would actually solve that problem. A number of my colleagues have raised this issue. I think Dr David Clark did, and my colleague Stuart Nash certainly did.

Also, this issue was raised by Diane Baguley, and I have quoted her submission extensively through this debate. She is someone with around 20 years’ experience in this area, and she has grave concerns not just about the financial sustainability of the standards process but also concerns around the independence, which we share. Ms Baguley sent her submission to the Commerce Committee on 1 January; so concerned was she about this piece of legislation that on New Year’s Day she thought she would send her submission in. She said in her submission: “There is no guarantee that the new structure will, in the long run, save public money rather than merely shift it from one part of the budget to another. The effect on overall expenditure will be difficult to determine, given that there will be practical limitations to the specificity of financial reporting within MBIE.”

There is another clear reason there why this Government should have taken heed of a number of the recommendations from the submitters at the select committee. Clause 40 does provide for disestablishing the New Zealand Standards Council. A number of submitters said we should not have been doing this. The arrogance of the Government to not see that and to push on through—

💬 Chris Bishop: Ha!

Mr Bishop can laugh, but his members sat around that table and listened to the industry submitters come along, and for them it was an important chance to have their say. It is an important part of the democratic process—scrutiny of legislation by the people who are going to be most affected—but this Government did nothing. It pushed on and did not listen to people with decades more experience of this sector than the people sitting around that select committee table. I am glad to say that we, on this side of the Chamber, did listen to those concerns. We hoped that the Government was going to make changes through a Supplementary Order Paper that the Government may have brought through, but to this date we have seen nothing and to this date we will probably continue to vote against this piece of legislation.

This is a missed opportunity for this Government. I think that earlier on the Minister in the chair, Paul Goldsmith, said that the Standards Council, which is being disestablished under clause 40, was not visible at all, and that was one the problems that the Government was trying to solve. As I said in relation to Part 1, the solution that the Government had to that problem was a novel one. It was not to continue to keep it independent. It was not to give it more funding to ensure that it was financially sustainable. It was to morph it into a department that is probably the biggest department in the country—the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. It has taken in five or six other Government departments: immigration, labour, building, housing, and economic development. The problem was visibility, so this Government said: “Well, if it’s not visible, let’s put it in MBIE where it will be even more invisible.” I do not think that those organisations that came to submit and were concerned about the disestablishment of the Standards Council will be impressed. They were not impressed, certainly, at the select committee hearing. I think they left hopeful that the Government would listen, but it did not. There is nothing in this piece of legislation that in any way goes to meet the concerns that they had at the select committee, and those have been well traversed.

This is a Government that is actually, in most areas, trying to push responsibility away, whether it be social bonds or whether it be social housing. Government members are trying to say that less Government is better. But in this instance, they are saying: “That’s an independent body. Let’s morph it into the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment.” That does not make sense to us. It means that because we are trying to solve one problem around costs, we are creating another fundamental problem around independence, and the industry wants independence to make sure that we have credibility on the international stage when it comes to our standards setting.

We have got huge credibility there—we have—and we had submissions to the select committee, and they did have concerns. I will just quote one more of those. It is from Diane Baguley again. She said: “I oppose the disestablishment of the Standards Council … I do not consider that the provisions set out for the establishment of the standards functions within MBIE can adequately control the risks associated with the new structure.”

This is a case where this Government has burned the village to save the village. We are not convinced it is going to solve the issue around costs, and we certainly know that it has created another issue around independence, one that is fundamental and one that puts our reputation in this area seriously at risk.

I want to make my first contribution focused on Part 2, clause 41: “Transitional provisions”, which are, actually, surprisingly interesting. I challenge members opposite to have a look through these transitional provisions, because there is some cracker stuff in here. There is some stuff that tells us a bit about what the Government is on about here, and it is buried in the related schedules, which are referred to in this part of the bill.

Clause 41(1) refers to schedule 2: the transitional provisions relating to the transfer of the functions, work, and employees of the Standards Council. One of the things that is immediately obvious in there is that the assets, records, liabilities, and debts of the existing Standards Council will transfer and become vested in the ministry. With that comes both opportunity and risk, of course. I am not familiar with the detail that is recorded in those records, and I do not know whether they will capture all of the intellectual property that goes with the existing members of that council or a portion thereof, and exactly what grace there will be in the handover of that, given the fact that the members on that council will be feeling a little like they have not been listened to and like their contribution has not been valued for what it was and is currently. The opportunity lies in there, though, for the Government to learn something from it.

I have already expressed concerns around international connectedness, representation in international fora, and having New Zealand represented at the table when standards are set to ensure that New Zealand industry interests are protected, as well as New Zealand interests more generally and the relationships that are built around that. I want to skip from there to clause 4 of schedule 2, which talks about determining whether each subcommittee’s work will continue or not. This is a crunch issue, and it will be in these decisions that we see where the Government’s agenda lies—which things it wants to flick on, which things it wants to continue with, and where its funding priorities lie. I suspect strongly that we will see that it will focus on those industries that are already wealthy and can afford to fund the development of standards readily, and focus less on those industries that are nascent, that are full of entrepreneurs, full of people who wish to make a mark on the world stage, the young and growing enterprises that we would want to encourage to ensure an increasing diversity in our economy.

The diversification issue is one that comes up again and again around this Parliament. We know that we are too reliant for our wealth on the primary sector. We know that we are incredibly grateful for the efforts of the primary sector, but this Government is content to blame them when it goes wrong, and it seems to have no strategy for diversifying the economy. Here we will see, in this particular handover, in these transitional arrangements, just where its priorities lie. We will see whether the Government chooses to continue on with the work that would diversify our economy, or whether it focuses instead on those industries that are already entrenched. So this is where the rubber hits the road—Part 2 is an incredibly important part of the bill, but in this part of my contribution I am focusing just on that clause, because there are other clauses I wish to speak to.

The next thing that leaps out at members here, and will outrage some, of course, is clause 5(3) of schedule 2, and I will read it out for members, who will not have read it before, I am sure: “This clause overrides Part 6A of the Employment Relations Act 2000.” It is a very short clause, and—

💬 Hon Ruth Dyson: Say that again.

It says: “This Act overrides Part 6A of the Employment Relations Act 2000.” This is the protection for vulnerable workers that is in the legislation. The Government has, in a schedule at the back of this very thick bill, shoved in a clause that overrides the protections for vulnerable workers. It is right here. Why? Why in this bill of all places? It just goes to show that the real agenda of the Government is tucked away here, and I would be very interested to hear from the Minister just why this clause is so important. How many people who work at the Standards Council are vulnerable workers? There are probably one or two cleaners, maybe, and some part-time workers.

I am not sure, but the Minister has it in for them. He has put in a clause specifically to ensure that they are not protected in this transition. And it goes on in clause 6, where it talks about terms of employment of transferred employees being treated as continuous employment. It states: “The employment of a transferred employee by the Ministry is to be treated as continuous employment for the purposes of any enactment.” So if they are transferring people, they do not want to be giving any special privileges. They do not want to be making any redundancy payments first or carrying over, or anything. It is all in the interests of the ministry and in the interests of this particular Minister, I would suggest. It is an outrage that that can be put in the schedules, at the back, hidden away, to be discovered only when the fine print is read on this bill.

These transitional arrangements tell us a lot about the Government. They will be where the rubber hits the road, as I have said, in this bill. There are also clauses in here about the Government Superannuation Fund, and what people are entitled to. It specifies what they are not entitled to quite precisely because the Government does not want people to be better off for this shift. This is a Government that is so mean that in the subclauses of the bill it overrides the vulnerable worker protection that we have ensconced in our legislation in this Parliament. I consider that to be an outrage, and it shows just how out of touch this Government has become if it thinks it can get away with hiding these things away in the fine print and not have it noticed in the debate.

This is certainly something that was not brought up at the select committee. I think there would have been something in our minority report had we spotted that particular schedule at the time. I do not think we spent much time on the schedules at the back of the bill. But it is something that has leapt out at me right now in this debate. I would be interested to hear whether the Minister would consider making an amendment to that at the last minute, because it is certainly within his powers to do that.

But, as I said at the outset, one of the other tests will be when we see what the ministry transfers, what work it carries on with, and what work it does not carry on with. These are the things that will matter for the industries that are seeking the support of standards that are in their interests as they develop products and want to put them out on the international market. Can the New Zealand products and the New Zealand manufacturers be guaranteed that the international standards will be easy for them to reach in terms of the manufacturing techniques and varieties available here, or will they be standards that play to the interests of whoever is in the room, with an excluded New Zealand component, because it is just not a priority for this Government? The funding, as I said at the outset, has not been a priority. It will come down to this “where rubber hits road” section, and we will see that it is also not a priority, and that is signalled clearly by the fact that the vulnerable worker clause overrides existing legislation here in the schedule at the back of the bill.

Of course, Mr Faafoi has already noted the overriding of the concerns of industry members in the select committee—I suspect that those same concerns will be thrust aside in the transitional arrangements as the Government tries to give its handover and says that this is the valuable work of the Standards Council—these are the international fora that are the most important that we attend, and this is where we have got the most traction and where we have the relationships that can ensure New Zealand’s interests are protected. On the track record of what we have seen so far, this Government has blinkers on.

The Minister is dead set on doing things a certain way, of drawing more into his mega - multi-enterprise, the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment monolith, with the big sign outside. It is a power grab, and there can be no mistake about that. This is an attempt to bring more under his control, to direct officials, to skew it towards the interests that he is interested in, and as we see these transitional arrangements I am sure we will see more of the same.

So my submission to this Committee is that it would be very good if the Minister would explain why the clause in the legislation that protects vulnerable workers needs to be overridden in this schedule. Whom in particular is he trying to target here and why, and, also, why is it being so specific around any payments that are carried over and any arrangements around employment? It feels a little bit like the Government is being mean-spirited in targeting a small group of individuals who made a genuine and lasting contribution to New Zealand’s economic development, and there is a deep irony in that coming from a Government that is driving down exports as a percentage of our GDP. That is, unfortunately, making life hard for small businesses, with fewer small businesses being created under this Government than the previous Government. That is the irony, I guess, in this bill: we have a Government obsessed with controlling the transitional provisions to ensure that no one—no one—is looked after in the transition. Thank you.

I want to take only a very brief call on the Standards and Accreditation Bill because I basically have a few questions for the Minister in the chair, the Hon Paul Goldsmith, and I am sure that they are ones that he will be able to deal with relatively quickly.

Sitting here in the Chamber tonight, I picked up a copy of the bill and I read Part 2, clause 39, which is the regulation-making powers that the bill provides. There are not many people in the House who get excited about regulation-making powers in bills, but I am one of them—I am one of them. As a previous member of the Regulations Review Committee, I am one of the people who find regulation-making powers quite interesting. Clause 39 states: “The Governor-General may, by Order in Council, make regulations providing for any matter that is contemplated by this Act as necessary—(a) for giving it full effect; or (b) for its administration.” Those are incredibly wide-ranging regulation-making powers, and, although I have looked at a number of regulation-making powers in bills, I do not think that I have seen ones that are quite so broad.

So my question for the Minister in the chair, really, is what the justification is for there being such a wide regulation-making power in this legislation. We have established over a long period of time the primacy—the sovereignty—of Parliament when it comes to establishing the laws of the land. The Regulations Review Committee has typically taken a very dim view of legislation that creates uncertainty by giving overwhelming regulation-making power to the executive, which this very, very broad clause seems, on the face of it, to do. The current approach to regulation making tightened up significantly after the Muldoon Government because, back then, Rob Muldoon would frequently pass laws through the House that basically gave him regulation-making power to, effectively, make new laws without reference back to the Parliament.

💬 Chris Bishop: The Economic Stabilisation Act.

Chris Bishop is very excited about that. He works for Steven Joyce—or he used to work for Steven Joyce. I think that is a regulation-making power they would have loved to have, and he would have loved to have when Chris Bishop was working for him.

The reality is we frown upon those, and we frown upon those because we have an established principle that it is the Parliament that should be making laws, not the executive. While the executive proposes laws to the legislature, it is not solely responsible for their passage. The House has that prerogative. We put them through a select committee process and we make sure that they are robustly tested, and yet this clause here—clause 39—seems to give the executive the power to make any nature of regulations under this bill. That does seem incredibly broad.

So I guess the question that I have for the Minister in the chair is: why such a broad regulation-making power? Have I misinterpreted that? But I do not think I have, because I have looked at many regulation-making powers provided for in bills and in legislation, and I have never yet seen one that is as broad as this one. So I think it is important that where the House is giving such wide regulation-making powers to the executive, that is tested.

I note the Regulations Review Committee has provided feedback on another part of the bill, which is clause 2, the commencement clause. I am sure the debate on that will tease out the concerns of the Regulations Review Committee on that, but I notice that it has not provided feedback on that particular clause. It may well be that there is a good explanation for why such a broad power is being allowed, but I would very much like to hear it. I hope that the Minister in the chair will give the Committee the benefit of that argument and that information before we vote on Part 2, clause 39. Thank you.

May I begin my contribution by picking up where our chief whip has left off? As chair of the Regulations Review Committee, I too would seek an explanation from the Minister about why the Government has introduced a part as sweeping as clause 39.

Let me read it again: “The Governor-General may, by Order in Council,”—which, of course, is dictated by Cabinet—“make regulations providing for any matter that is contemplated by this Act as necessary—(a) for giving it full effect; or (b) for its administration.” So the regulation-making power is very, very broad. It allows, essentially, the Governor-General, on advice from Cabinet, to make regulations. That means basically that the Minister is ordering up regulations, as the Chair knows, on any matter that the Minister sees fit.

I turn then to a partner provision under clause 7 of schedule 1 of the bill, entitled “Removal of Board members”, which provides that “The Minister may at any time remove a member of the Board from office.”, by written notice and publishing in the Gazette. Once again, it is an almost unfettered power by the Minister to remove any member of the independent standards board. How very interesting.

Then I turn to the regulatory impact statement prepared by the Government—by Treasury and the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment—and what I was curious about, as a non-member of the Commerce Committee that considered the bill, was the fact that the Labour Party had supported the bill’s referral to the select committee, but on the weight of submissions received by the select committee we are changing our vote and are now opposing the bill. This, I say for the benefit of people listening, is quite unusual. Sometimes an Opposition will oppose a bill’s referral to a select committee and then be reassured on the points that are of concern and vote for a bill thereafter. It is more unusual for us to vote against a bill on the weight of submissions, having got it to a select committee in the first place.

So what is it that is the core problem with this? Well, let us start with what the problem is that the legislative process is designed to solve, because this reform programme has been under way since the current Government canned the previous Government’s 2008 reforms in 2012. That is a 3-year ride to get to the point where we are today. So the problem definition is, at No. 1, that the current arrangements of an independent statutory board are too unwieldy and too expensive, and one reading between the lines might add the phrase “too independent”.

A range of options was considered for different aspects of this, but the key conclusion is in paragraph 30 on page 6 of the regulatory impact statement, which says: “One of the key issues identified was the sustainability”—they mean the financial stability—“of [Standards New Zealand]. MBIE”—that is, the Government Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment reporting to Minister Joyce—“have considered the current funding model and consider that it remains appropriate,”—here is the punch line—“where regulators and industry … are able to exercise choices about the use of Standards and … their development …”.

So the Government’s officials, and the businesses that are being regulated, are able to exercise choices about what standards are developed and how. That way they can cut out the ones they do not want and get only the ones they do want, and that will be cheaper because the body will be doing less. The way to ensure that is to insource Standards New Zealand executive and board within the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, reporting to the Minister—the same Minister who can write any regulation he or she wants and sack any board member he or she wants under this bill. It is insourced within a Government ministry. Any pretence of independence upon which New Zealand’s international reputation for effectiveness in this area was built has gone out the window. Not surprisingly, that is exactly what submitters have told the select committee.

National has chosen to go for the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment embedded option for regulation of standards against the run of the public comments supporting full operational independence. I will boil it down again. Under the guise of addressing issues of financial sustainability—i.e. can we pay for the thing on its current budget—the Government has sneaked through a Trojan horse, which is to remove the statutory independence of the chief executive and the board to bring them under a Minister within a Government department where the Minister can write any regulation he or she chooses and can sack any board member upon notice. There is a line official within the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment who has day-to-day operational responsibility for the development of standards.

Well, that has got to be a backwards step, and that is exactly what the weight of submissions has said. They go on and on and on—the negative submissions criticising the Government for this Trojan horse move. They warn us that not only will it trash New Zealand’s international reputation in the standards area but it could lead to other countries, perhaps developing countries with less robust systems of governance, adopting the New Zealand model to their detriment—adopting the New Zealand model to their detriment. These are very disheartening words to hear. Why would the Minister, why would the Government, want to have more control, direct control, over standards? Well, it is lovely to see the Minister entering the Chamber at this moment, and I hope that he will take a call and address himself to that matter.

Here is what the New Zealand Building Industry Federation—

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Chester Borrows): Come to Part 2.

—said in direct relation, Mr Chairperson, to Part 2. It said: “Standard-setting should not be subject to direct political influence by the government of the day.” Part 2 contains the schedules, which contain the ministerial regulation-making power and the “fire’em, sack’em, or back’em” power. A consumer representative on a wide variety of standards committees, Patricia Cunniffe—no relation—said that she was completely unconvinced that the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment embedded model was either viable or well functioning.

And there were many, many, many more submissions in a similar vein. Diane Baguley, a member of the joint Australia-New Zealand committee since 1995, one of the international leaders in this area, criticised it for its lack of independence and robustness. Here is a Government that is making a name for the decline of standards: the decline of broadcasting standards, the decline of expenditure efficiency standards, the decline of swamp kauri standards—the decline of standards all around the country. Maybe there is no surprise that it would want to have a tamer, more compliant, more malleable, more directable, more sackable standards body than currently exists.

Under the guise of financial stability, here is a Trojan horse by which this Government—which is always going for the short-term, high-control solution—is ebbing away our independent institutions; ebbing away, corroding away our independent institutions. This is another step along a road vested in Part 2 of this bill, which is leading to ultimately more risk, more fragility and, down the track, greater costs, because if we get standards wrong we increase our insurance premiums, we increase health and safety problems, and we may have inter-operability problems that become more pressing in an interconnected world.

I see the Minister of Health opposite. The Minister well knows that New Zealand’s 22 district health boards find it difficult to talk to each other online because they do not have and have not had a common set of inter-operability standards. That is a living, glowing example of the importance of standards. If we want to shift patient data from an operating theatre in Northland to the family GP in Southland, oftentimes it is very difficult to do it because the standards are not as robust as they should be. If we had had more standards of mining regulation, we might not have had Pike River. So there are many practical examples about why standards matter.

The gist here, in conclusion—I see you are leaning forward for your time button, Mr Chair—is this. It is a matter of regret that we are insourcing the standards independence within the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. That is a backwards step.

I move, That the question be now put.

Well, taking up from where my colleague David Clark left off, around the impact of the Standards and Accreditation Bill on vulnerable workers, and Part 2, with the clause that he referred to earlier, I say that this bill will also affect consumers and vulnerable consumers.

I want to specifically refer to a submission from the Barrier Free New Zealand Trust, which is committed to ensuring that the built environment is accessible to everyone, including people with disabilities. Its submission was quite an important submission, because what it brought home was why it is so important to have good standards. It talked about consumer confidence, and I want to broaden that out into further consumer confidence, but, for this group—it believes that independence and balance in standards committees is absolutely critical and that there has to be consumer confidence.

One of the things about this bill that really worries us on this side of the Chamber is that what this bill is doing is moving away from a system where consumers can feel confident. I think we have raised enough issues tonight, and through other speeches about other parts of this bill, to actually really red flag what is actually being achieved through this bill. The entity is being taken away from being an independent Crown entity. It is being weakened, watered down, and absorbed into a major Government department, where there is an appearance of independence but where the extraordinary checks and balances that were in the original entity are not replicated in the new entity.

The Barrier Free New Zealand Trust says: “Our concern is that should the Standards development and approval process be manipulated in anyway by virtue of its operational requirements sitting within the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, then this could be lost.” I think its submission is actually quite important. I think that if you have got a consumer group that is vulnerable like this, it should be significantly listened to.

I want to also refer to another submission, which was from the Fire Protection Association. This is a completely different organisation. But what it said was: “We are concerned with the very poor quality in thinking and analysis and the lack of even the most rudimentary data evident … MBIE’s apparent (to our mind) obfuscation of its thinly disguised attempt to (to use its own words) ‘capture’ the Standards system—either for its own ends or in response to a very influential lobby …”. It went on to elaborate on those concerns. When you have got that kind of a body saying those kinds of things, then there should be major red flags being raised. In Part 2, with the disestablishment of the Standards Council, which is going to be replaced with the New Zealand Standards Approval Board—we do not believe that the test has been met for the independence and the probity of the new organisation that will actually ensure that it will provide consumer confidence, that will provide industry confidence, and that will alleviate the concerns that have been raised.

Another submission—I also refer to Patricia Cunniffe’s submission, where she talked about consumer confidence and consumer concerns in standardisation. She used some illustrations to raise the issue of how important it is to continue to develop certain standards. Another one of the concerns that was raised was around whether there will be a continuation of the standards being developed that need to be developed to provide that consumer confidence and that industry confidence, and also to maintain our international reputation. She uses the example of the standard currently in use for medical alert systems, which is a 20-year-old Australian one, and says that there is no willingness by any Government department to update this standard as it does not fall neatly into any particular department’s bailiwick. I ask the Minister in the chair, Paul Goldsmith, tonight: will standards like this be updated under the new regime?

The second example is from technologies being developed in isolation, with insufficient regard to their interaction. She uses the example that it is known that implanted defibrillators are adversely affected by scanning equipment. Scanning equipment is used not only in airports; it is commonplace in supermarkets, for example. The interaction between the two is dealt with by warnings, rather than by standardisation. So will we have work being done on those things, where new technologies are having impacts on people’s health and where standards need to be developed?

The third case was in the building sector, where the building code has been developed with insufficient regard for those most at risk, in that there are incompatibilities between the code and NZS 4121, the standard relating to requirements for people with disabilities—going back to that issue again. The Malatest report from June 2014, which was Access to Buildings for People with Disabilities, considers that “Lack of leadership and coordination has contributed to missed opportunities, duplication of efforts and inefficiencies, and gaps in knowledge.” I ask the Minister in the chair what he has to say about that. What confidence can he stand up and give this Committee that consumers and those sorts of standards will be looked at under this new regime?

Just to conclude, two devastating events form the backdrop to this bill and also to the health and safety reforms before Parliament: the Pike River mine explosion in 2010, which killed 29 miners; and the collapse of the CTV Building in February 2011, which killed 115 people. I would just like to remind everybody that Standards New Zealand was established after a similarly shocking tragedy, which was the 1931 Hawke’s Bay earthquake, which had a death toll of 251 people. Following that event, Standards New Zealand was tasked to ensure that future such events did not result in the same loss of life. Well, I put it to you, Mr Chair, and to the Minister in the chair, that this bill is not going to maintain that standard and maintain that level of scrutiny, of independence, and of surety for New Zealand consumers and for industry bodies that are trying to maintain their own reputations and build economic credibility and economic development. Also, our international reputation will be affected, will be watered down by the impact of this bill. Therefore we cannot support it.

I move, That the question be now put.

I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. I am just looking around a process issue. There was a late amendment tabled in my name because of something that was discovered during the debate. I am seeking the call to see whether we could take an opportunity to highlight that.

I am sorry; I have put the question.

I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. I am just clarifying whether there is going to be a vote on the amendment put in by myself.

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Chester Borrows): That comes in schedule 2, which is yet to be put.

Apologies, Mr Chair.