Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill

on behalf of the Minister for National Security and Intelligence: I move, That the Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill be now read a second time. This is an omnibus bill that responds to the rapid evolution of the threat posed by those who want to commit terrorist acts, both overseas and in New Zealand. I want immediately to thank the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee and the officials for the very good job they have done. I particularly acknowledge the work of the chair, Mr Mark Mitchell, and the extremely helpful contributions of Messrs Shearer and Goff.

Members of the committee who speak this afternoon—[Interruption]

💬 Mr SPEAKER: Order! This is a serious debate, and I want the level—[Interruption] Order! I do not expect an Opposition whip to interrupt when I am on my feet.

Members of the committee who speak this afternoon will address the individual changes that the committee has recommended be made to the legislation. I think these changes greatly improve the bill. It was always intended to contain a targeted set of measures, and I believe those measures are even more targeted now than they were before the committee considered them.

What I want to do is use this second reading speech to address a couple of issues that still appear to concern some people. First, the question has been raised about whether the term “foreign fighter” requires a definition. The Government’s view is that the term does not need a specific definition in the bill. The bill does not create a stand-alone piece of legislation, and the definition of “terrorist act” in section 5 of the Terrorism Suppression Act already provides the definition required. That definition is the core concept on which this legislation relies; adding a definition of “foreign fighter” would be superfluous.

We are targeting people by behaviour or intended behaviour, not by a label. The bill targets people who want to carry out a terrorist act either here in New Zealand—whether one calls them foreign terrorist fighters, as the UN did, or other violent extremists, or something else. The actions of the people popularly referred to as foreign terrorist fighters—i.e., people who want to go and fight for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—are just the latest manifestation of the terrorist acts already envisaged by, and defined in, the Terrorism Suppression Act.

The second question that has arisen—and I think the Greens and others have asked it—is whether environmental activists could be caught by this legislation. The answer to that is no. Once again, I refer to the definition of a “terrorist act” in section 5 of the Terrorism Suppression Act. An action by an activist would have to fall within the definition of one of the specified terrorist acts, and I particularly refer members to section 5(5) of that legislation, which is an “avoid doubt” clause and states: “the fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy, or dissent … is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for inferring that …” the person’s behaviour falls under the Act. On top of that, the layers of oversight we now have, not least the significant powers—the greatly strengthened powers—of the inspector-general, ensure this could not be the case.

The third issue—and I think this is Mr Shearer’s—is whether the changes proposed in the bill still allow a person to go home to Kurdistan, for example, to defend his or her home. The first point I would make is that this legislation does not change the existing legal situation of a person in that position. Section 8A of the Passports Act 1992, which was inserted into the Act in 2005 by the previous Labour Government, already allows the cancellation of a passport on the grounds that a person is a danger to the security of New Zealand because he or she “intends to engage in, or facilitate,— … a terrorist act within the meaning of section 5 of the Terrorism Suppression Act”. That section defines a terrorist act as an act that occurs “in any 1 or more countries,”—and I emphasise that phrase. So this bill really is a clarification of the existing situation. In fact, the only new procedure introduced by this bill is the ability to suspend New Zealand travel documents temporarily for up to 10 working days.

The second point is that any person whose passport was to be cancelled would need to be intending to carry out, or assist in, one of the terrorist acts specified in section 5 in line with the purposes outlined in that section. As I said on the weekend, the same principle applies to anyone who is planning to go overseas to engage in, or facilitate, a terrorist act as defined by section 5.

The third point is that this bill does not go anywhere near as far as the Australian legislation, which seeks to ban Australian citizens from even travelling to certain areas unless they have lawful excuse. This legislation does not prevent New Zealanders from travelling to these areas, although obviously we would strongly advise against it. As I said, in order to have a passport cancellation occur, the Minister must be satisfied that the person intends to engage in, or facilitate, a terrorist act. That is the core concept to which all these provisions apply.

There are a number of difficulties posed by any suggestion that we amend the definition of “terrorist act” to exempt, for example, a person returning to Kurdistan to fight ISIL. Firstly, as I have said, the bill targets terrorist acts. We do not want to equivocate on that matter. We do not want New Zealanders getting caught up in this conflict in general, and we would not want any New Zealander committing any terrorist act on any side.

Secondly, the passport cancellation system is a system under ministerial control. It requires ministerial discretion. The Minister will have to take a number of factors into account when making a decision. Thirdly, amending the definition of “terrorist act” in the way proposed could put the Minister making a decision regarding a passport cancellation in the difficult position of having to assess who is fighting for whom. That may be a more straightforward task when one considers ISIL and the Kurds, but this is a chaotic and fast-developing situation. The distinction may not be so clear when considering individual areas of Syria.

I do not think we want a Minister having to decide whether an intended terrorist act may be excusable or not given the circumstances, making specific legislative carve-outs in the Terrorism Suppression Act. I think that would undermine the purpose of the legislation, but it could also create a dangerous precedent. The main point is we do not want New Zealanders getting involved.

They were the three issues that I wanted to address. As I said, I am sure members of the committee who are speaking this afternoon will address particular matters that arose in the course of the hearings. The final point I want to emphasise is that this is temporary legislation—there is a sunset clause. We have a comprehensive review coming up of all security legislation, and this must begin no later than June 2015. Any changes recommended in that review and passed into law will supersede what we are debating today. If new legislation is not enforced by the time the sunset clause comes into operation, the provisions we are debating are going to lapse. The legislative product of that review will have a full select committee hearing, and I am sure that some of the issues we have debated over the past few weeks will get another airing then. Once again, I thank the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee for its excellent work, and I commend the bill to the House.

I acknowledge the contribution of the Minister in charge of the NZ Security Intelligence Service to this debate on the Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill. I acknowledge from the outset that the Labour Party will support the legislation, but I want to take a moment to explain the basis on which we do so.

The Minister acknowledged that this bill is about meeting a UN mandate for nation States to take measures to restrict the movements of people travelling to become foreign terrorist fighters, as the UN describes them. The original bill provided for greater and more intrusive powers for the Security Intelligence Service—and, specifically, surveillance on private properties, in the original bill, for up to 48 hours—and also access to Customs Service information that hitherto the SIS had not had. The original bill also provided for longer cancellation of passports of persons suspected of being a danger to security, and also the suspension of passports even while such a person was overseas.

In considering its stance on a bill of this nature—that is, one dealing with the safety and security of New Zealanders and also providing for greater powers of intrusion—the Labour Party has considered a number of factors. Firstly, is there a safety and security threat or risk that this legislation meaningfully addresses? If not, we would not support it. Secondly, if there is a legitimate threat or risk, what is the minimum level of additional intrusive powers necessary to deal with the threat or the risk?

Before we even get into these considerations, we also have to consider the process this legislation has taken. On that score, there is no other description for it: the process has been appalling, it has been shoddy, and it has deprived many New Zealanders of their legitimate right to have a say on the legislation. As the vote just now shows, the process for this bill is in the hands of the Government. The Government has the majority. It can do what it wants with this bill. But just having the required majority—having the power—is never an answer to concerns about legislation that erodes citizens’ rights and freedoms.

Our New Zealand Bill of Rights Act acknowledges that there will be times or circumstances when the long-cherished, although not yet fully protected, basic civil and human rights in that Act will be proscribed, or, to use the words of the Act, “the rights and freedoms … may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”. But when we are faced with legislation that erodes basic rights and freedoms, even in limited circumstances such as this bill sets out, it is vital as a matter of public confidence that it is exposed to the fullest possible public scrutiny. That has not happened here. I urge that Minister and, indeed, all the Government to make sure it does not happen again. Let me make it clear: Labour’s support for the substance of the legislation cannot be taken as support for a process that has shut many New Zealanders out of their basic democratic right to have a say on legislation that could affect them.

Let me turn to the substance of the bill. For our part, we accept there is a security threat today that is new. It was not present 10 years ago. That threat relates to the internationalisation of religious extremism and fanaticism. It has its expression in networks that spread throughout the world, and we accept we are not immune. Accepting there is a security threat of a nature we may not have experienced before, we turn to what is needed to deal with it, bearing in mind the solemn proviso of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. The starting point whenever there is a claim to restrict rights and freedoms is to be sceptical.

Through Labour’s representatives on the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, David Shearer and Phil Goff, to whom we all—this House and New Zealanders—owe a huge debt of gratitude, we challenged the need for the length of time for warrantless surveillance. It has been reduced to 24 hours, which is a realistic time in which to obtain a warrant under security legislation, knowing that to obtain one under that legislation is a more complex exercise than obtaining a standard police warrant for search or surveillance.

More important, I think, in the context of this legislation are the safeguards that have now been built into any approval of surveillance without a warrant. The Minister has acknowledged those. First is the fact that the exercise of the power is confined to what is necessary to deal with an actual, potential, or suspected terrorist act, knowing also that that term, “terrorist act”, is defined in the Terrorism Suppression Act, which is referred to in the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act.

Secondly, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security has close oversight of occasions on which warrantless surveillance is conducted. The present incumbent in that role, I have to say, has proven the genuine independence of the role, and that should provide some reassurance to us all. Amongst her powers and the further safeguards in this bill is the fact that warrantless surveillance must be reported to her. She has the power to investigate any exercise of the power of warrantless surveillance. Even where a warrant is subsequently successfully applied for, she has the power to investigate the circumstances in which that warrant has been given and whether or not it is justified. Then she has the responsibility to report on the occasions on which the warrantless surveillance power has been exercised.

In addition to the powers around warrantless surveillance, there is also the power to cancel passports for an extended period and to suspend passports. We are reassured that there is a proper and sufficient appeal and review process, certainly when it comes to the cancellation of passports, such that those who have been improperly deprived of their passports and therefore potentially deprived of the opportunity to travel can seek an appeal or review in a timely manner so that they are not subject to what would effectively be a 3-year arbitrary loss of that right.

We believe, on balance, that this bill strikes the right balance in these difficult circumstances. It is correct that there is a sunset clause. A further achievement of David Shearer and Phil Goff is to bring back or curtail that sunset clause to 2017 so that it expires within the life of this Parliament and is not pushed out to the next Parliament.

New Zealanders expect this House to take their safety and security seriously, and we do that. It is a difficult balancing exercise that we have to undertake, but we are satisfied, on balance, that this bill achieves that—that it strikes the right balance, and that it will ensure the greater safety and security of New Zealanders. But once again I urge the Government: please do not put this House in the position again during the life of this Parliament, when it has the numbers, of rushing through legislation that curtails the rights and freedoms of citizens and does so in a way that is hurried, that is hasty, and that deprives New Zealanders of the right to have a say. That is not the way to deal with legislation that is so important, that is so serious, when it has that impact on people. Notwithstanding that caution and that concern of ours, we will support this bill.

I want to open by just saying that I support everything the Minister in charge of the NZ Security Intelligence Service said. Of course, I want to highlight the fact that it became very clear to me during this process exactly why the Prime Minister has entrusted our security services to the hands of Minister Chris Finlayson. I want to acknowledge the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee members: my deputy chair, Shane Reti; Lindsay Tisch, David Bennett, Jian Yang, and Jami-Lee Ross; and, of course, David Shearer, Phil Goff, Kennedy Graham, and Fletcher Tabuteau. David Shearer and Phil Goff—without a doubt there was a spirit of cooperation and working together. I think everyone on the committee understood that when it comes to national security matters, we should be working together in the spirit that we are going to deliver the result that is best for the country. It was apparent as we got moving through the select committee process that everyone had agreed with and bought into that concept.

I also want to acknowledge Mr Little. I had a conversation with him during the process, and it was apparent that he too saw the need for haste, which brings me to comment on a point he made about the process being shoddy. I accept the fact that the process was truncated, and I made a statement during it saying that it may not be a perfect process but it is not a perfect world, and sometimes we have to react quickly to a changing security environment. In this case, we did have to react quickly. Our threat level was changed from very low to low, which is a good thing—it means we still are at the lower end in terms of the threat we face. However, it also meant we had to make some changes. Of course, it was also incumbent on us to recognise and make the changes in relation to the UN resolution that was passed.

We heard from the Director of Security. I personally was extremely impressed with her. I know we have a world-class director, who definitely is working in the best interests of our country. Without a doubt, I want to acknowledge her and her team. They are often subject to criticism, but they are working hard out there day and night to make sure we maintain security and are not subjected to a terrorist attack, regardless of the scale.

I just want to share a couple of my own experiences. One thing that became apparent during the select committee process was that it is very difficult for people and submitters to understand exactly what we are dealing with when we cannot speak openly about what the threat is. Obviously, some of the evidence we heard was heard in secret, so it is incumbent upon all of us that we are unable to actually talk about it in public. However—and maybe Mr Shearer may take the same opportunity to speak—in a previous life I was able to see personally some of the threats we face.

There is one story I have related previously in this House about a situation in Iraq. It is going back a few years now, but it is certainly still relevant to our situation today. A supply convoy was attacked in Iraq. During the attack, a satellite phone was taken. It was taken by al-Qaeda terrorists, and they made several calls while they had the phone. In fact, they made well over 200 various calls around the world. What was significant was that, I cannot remember the exact number now, but I think it was about 15 or 16 calls were made from Iraq by an al-Qaeda terrorist cell to New Zealand. So we would be naive to believe we are somehow inoculated or, because of our geographic location, we are insulated from these types of threats and there is no exposure.

Another example I want to use is some information that was shared with me in the last week. There was actually a list that was recovered from the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant fighters. It had a lot of information on it including call signs, operation orders, and also nationalities of fighters who were expected to be or who were already on the ground fighting with them. They were from the Netherlands, the UK, and also Australia. But also on that list was New Zealand. This is information that is fresh—within about a week. So I hope it is clear we did actually have to move quickly. We did have to act quickly. We have now got another layer of protection wrapped around us a nation as we move into Christmas and our festive and holiday season. I feel very proud of the fact that as a House we have been able to move the process through the select committee.

Just very quickly, one commitment the committee made was this. Every submitter who wanted to appear and make an oral submission to the committee was given the chance to do that. The committee agreed to work long hours and into the weekend to make that happen.

Finally, I just want to acknowledge our advisers and our secretariat staff who were with us every step of the way. They provided us with great support and advice—the support we needed to actually make this happen and get this bill back into the House. Thank you.

As has been said, Labour will be supporting the second reading of this bill. The bill that is before us today is quite a bit different from what started out at the first reading, and that is a result of a pretty painstaking process that people have spoken about and a reasonable amount of cooperation across the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. The issue for us was really to attain a balance—a balance between the safety and security of New Zealanders on the one hand and the protection of their privacy and their human rights on the other. I believe, on balance, that we have attained that balance in what we are presenting back to the House today.

We were able to hear about some of the risks that New Zealand faces. We were able to have the SIS speak to us in secret, and we called it back to get further clarification as well. I do not want to over-egg the pudding on the risks to New Zealand. There has been a lot of talk—I think wrongly—about beheadings in the street and that sort of thing, but there is no doubt that the number of incidents and the threatening environment has changed. We have gone from a domestic threat level of very low to low, so let us get it in context. That is not extreme as it is in the UK or high as it is in Australia—it has gone from very low to low. Nevertheless, the risks that we heard about and the growth in those over the past few months are the underlying context in which this bill has come through.

On the basis of that, our approach in the Labour Party was very much to be narrow and conservative in terms of what we wanted to change. We did not have the luxury of a big review. We therefore had to confine ourselves to what we had heard in terms of a potential terrorist threat that may come to New Zealand. With that approach, we looked at constraining the legislation as it stood in making the changes that we needed to make.

Andrew Little has talked about the process. The process was farcical. That was one area that I do not agree with the other side on, in terms of the way those members saw the process. We accelerated this bill through in 2 days. The people who wanted to make submissions—and there were 600 people who made submissions—had to do that in the space of 2 days. We knew that this threat was emerging well before the election, and yet this Government did not do a review before the election that would have enabled the legislation to be put in place straight after the election. I think that was a mistake. Nevertheless, we heard as many people as we could. We do not know how many people would have liked to make a submission but did not hear about it or could not. But, nevertheless, we worked right through the night on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday morning in order to be able to do that.

I believe that there is an issue that still deserves a greater degree of focus, and that is the plight of our Muslim community. We have about 46,000 Muslims in New Zealand. They appeared in front of our select committee and made submissions. Their basic message was: “We are the people on the front line. We are the people within this Muslim community from which some of these threats might emerge. When we hear about these it is in our interests as New Zealanders and as New Zealand Muslims to ensure that they get picked up on.”, and I think what they were saying was: “Yet we are not listened to sufficiently.”

Sam Lotu-Iiga, the Minister for Ethnic Communities, and the Prime Minister have yet to meet the Muslim community or accept an invitation to actually meet with them. As the community said, when it comes to halal butchery and slaughtering techniques, which New Zealand earns hundreds of millions of dollars a year from, they are feted and they are accepted and they are listened to, but when it comes to something like this where their community is at possible threat, they are not. I think that we need as a matter of urgency to acknowledge and bring those people in.

It has been talked about that this is an ad hoc piece of legislation. It is on the books only from now until April 2017. I think that is appropriate. It was going to be there until 2018, but we brought that back to this term of Government. It is pending a much wider review in which we hope there will be—certainly it is envisaged and the Government has said this pretty clearly that it wants to have it—a much broader examination of the issues in front of us.

There were three or four major areas where there was change. I want to mention a couple of these. The first was warrantless surveillance. This was a step, on principle, that all of us, I think, found objectionable—that you would have surveillance without a warrant even though the warrant would be being sought in parallel with the surveillance. The argument for it was on the basis that sometimes things have to move quickly, and we were given two or three examples of where that might be used.

I believe that what we have done with enabling that to go ahead is we have brought back the warrantless surveillance period from 48 hours to 24 hours. We have ensured that the Commissioner of Security Warrants, and the Minister obviously, get told about that immediately. We have brought the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security in on every single occasion where surveillance pending a warrant happens, and even if that surveillance does not proceed through to a full warrant, that information will still be passed to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. The inspector-general will look into that and ensure that any information that was gathered is destroyed. Lastly, the SIS is obligated to publicly report every 6 months on the number of occasions that warrantless surveillance occurs so that we ensure the public knows what is going on as well.

The second issue was about visual surveillance. The police are able to conduct visual surveillance, but their threshold is much more fixed and much more contained, and it relates to very serious offences that carry a penalty of up to 16 years’ imprisonment. The SIS operates in a much, much different way.

We had a long period of debate around the ability to allow the SIS to do visual surveillance. In the end, we brought it back to what we were doing with this bill, which was to look at and counter the issue of terrorism and the threat of terrorism. We did not want this bill to be the back door by which the SIS was able to conduct surveillance more generally, so now in the bill it is confined to where there might be terrorist activities and, obviously, still on the basis of a warrant. There is the ability for the SIS to access the Customs Service database. Again, that is under very strict scrutiny. The access is to only the parts of the database that are appropriate, and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security has the ability to monitor where each of those selected individuals might be going.

On the issue of extending the cancellation of a passport from 1 year to 3 years, we disagreed with the Government. We did not understand why that needed to be extended out to 3 years. There are additional safeguards around somebody who has their passport withheld because they are believed to be a foreign fighter going off to fight in a terrorist organisation. That will give us more comfort that the bar that needs to be attained is a very high one.

Lastly, I want to thank the Minister for the clarification on the difference in definition between a freedom fighter and a terrorist. We wanted to ensure, for instance, that if you wanted to go off and fight in the Spanish Civil War, you were still entitled to do that. What we sought and got from both the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the SIS was that the bill was going to constrain only those people who were going to carry out terrorist acts or fight with a terrorist organisation, and as long as that is the case, we are pleased about that.

Lastly, can I just say that all of us, I think, were very impressed with the role of inspector-general, the powers she has, and the way that she is approaching her job. I think that is something for the review in the future—that we look at that role and even enhance that role, because I believe that that will give New Zealanders greater confidence about the way that our intelligence agencies operate and are able to be overseen.

Firstly, I would like to acknowledge the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee under the guidance of its chair, Mark Mitchell, and collaboration with colleagues from across the House. At this reading I would like to speak to the process that has been highlighted, and then the content of this bill.

The case has been made that the time frame was challenging, and we have accepted that, and we would like to sincerely thank all the submitters. But we should note that there is a precedent for the process, and against that precedent this is a good outcome. Let me explain. On this bill the committee heard 63 oral submissions. A similar bill in 2011, the Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Bill, was also seeking to balance privacy and freedoms with security, and on a similar time frame the select committee concerned heard 20 submissions. This committee heard 63. Further, a bill with much similar content, the 2012 Search and Surveillance Bill, had its first reading on 4 August 2009, and submissions to the Justice and Electoral Committee closed 1 year later, on 3 September 2010. One year later, 29 submissions had been heard; this committee heard 63. Of course, that is not everyone’s voice, and that is not the case I am making; rather, that on precedent the best was made of a challenging time frame.

I would like to speak to the safeguards in this bill, and there are at least three. The first safeguard concerns warrantless surveillance. Many submitters talked about their concerns about warrantless surveillance, and this is and always will be a legitimate concern. However, this bill does not introduce warrantless surveillance for the first time in New Zealand. This is not new functionality. Section 48(1) of the Search and Surveillance Act states: “An enforcement officer who is in any 1 or more of the situations set out in subsection (2) may use a surveillance device for a period not exceeding 48 hours from the time the surveillance device is first used without obtaining a surveillance device warrant,”. So warrantless surveillance is already in legislation. The difference is that in the Search and Surveillance Act the permission is for gathering information about a crime, and in this bill the permission for warrantless surveillance is for the gathering of intelligence.

The second safeguard is around passport cancellation. Passport cancellation already exists under the Passports Act, and we need to be clear that cancelling a passport does not cancel citizenship. These are unrelated, not linked, and not part of this bill. If people have their passports cancelled while travelling, the Passports Act states that they will receive travel documents to return to New Zealand.

The third safeguard measure is that there are, I believe, satisfactory criteria that must be met before actions in this bill can be undertaken and many independent review and reporting measures that support this bill. This includes review by the Commissioner of Security Warrants and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.

Also, the penultimate sunset clause defines the intent of this bill as temporary. Much was done in the select committee to address the legitimate issues raised by submitters and committee members in this regard.

So, much of the logistics of this bill are already in legislation, such as warrantless surveillance and passport cancellation. What this bill does, then, is extend the application, and it is my belief that this bill is a good outcome for the process and the security needs we have. I commend it to the House. Thank you.

The Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee has now reported back on the Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill. The Green Party will have something to say in the Committee stage about the drafting. Let me address the issue of substance now, to the extent that it was considered by the committee.

The Green Party had opposed the introduction of the bill, not simply its draft content. We alone voted against it in the first reading. Like all other parties we entered the committee’s work open to persuasion, but, unlike most others, we were listening for the fundamental reasons for the bill in the first place. The committee received, as has been mentioned, 588 submissions; it heard 63. The other 525 remained essentially unread by the committee during the hearing process because of the perversely truncated time it was allowed to perform its democratic function of listening to the people. The very passage of the bill impugns the democratic standards it is designed to protect. We were briefed twice by the Director of Security to gain an appreciation of the need, as claimed, for the expanded State powers. Nothing we heard persuaded us that our initial underlying concern with the bill was misplaced.

We do not deny that the world is a dangerous place. We are not oblivious to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). We are aware of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178. But the primary case for the legislation according unprecedented State powers to not just the police but the SIS has not been made, and the political foundation for the legislation is weak. UN member States have an obligation under the Charter to maintain international peace and security. This includes measures to combat international terrorism. Collective action to this end, however, is not new. As long as four decades ago, the United Nations General Assembly invited member States to take all appropriate measures at the national level with a view to the speedy and final elimination of international terrorism. Concerns over the 2015 Cricket World Cup cannot be higher than those that stemmed from the 1972 Munich Olympics, yet New Zealand had the wisdom not to overreact then. The strategic decision after September 2001 to regard terrorism as an issue of international peace and security rather than of global and domestic crime has had fateful consequences for political judgment everywhere ever since.

New Zealand, as the smallest fast follower among the “Five Eyes” espionage network, has suffered the most in loss of clarity regarding its role as a responsible global citizen. Through pure contagion it has imported a vicarious threat level from its four partners that is inappropriate to its own geostrategic position and its distinctive political culture. In calibrating its response, the Government is unduly influenced by its “Five Eyes” espionage partners, which have attracted higher threat levels, and it has not had sufficient regard for the other 188 member States.

The rise of ISIL in 2014 raises the threat level, but the change is not qualitatively different from before and does not therefore justify the expansion of State powers of the kind proposed. In making the political case for the legislation, the Prime Minister has described how our risk and threat profile is changing. Much of that, he explains, is due to the rapid rise of ISIL, which has seized substantial territory, decreed national borders between Islamic States to be invalid, and used brutal methods. The ability of ISIL to motivate Islamic radicals, as well as its ambition, resources, and methods, make it a brutal threat to stability not only in the Middle East but regionally and locally too. The rise of such a well-resourced, globally focused terrorist entity that is highly skilled in recruitment and social media is a game-changer for New Zealand, the Prime Minister says.

ISIL has successfully recruited New Zealanders to its cause, and there is a watch-list of about 40 foreign fighters plus an equivalent number in or from New Zealand who are participating in extremist behaviour. Some have been fighting in Syria. Some are attracted to carrying out domestic attacks in New Zealand of the type recently prevented in Australia and successfully carried out in Canada. Should they return to New Zealand fully radicalised and with fighting skills, they would represent a significant threat to the safety of New Zealanders.

In light of all this, the Prime Minister concludes there is “an immediate threat to national security”. This justifies, he thinks, the Government’s response: expansion of intrusive powers by the State and a resulting erosion of privacy and civil liberty, longer cancellation of passports, SIS access to Customs Service data, visual surveillance by SIS hitherto confined to the police, and 24-hour SIS surveillance without a warrant. These changes, he says, will “strengthen our national security settings”. The Prime Minister’s “immediate threat to national security” is not matched by the official change in New Zealand’s threat level, which has increased only from very low, or highly unlikely, to low, or possible but not expected. There is some cognitive dissonance between the excitable political narrative and the official judgment. The case is advanced for an unprecedented expansion of intrusive State powers in response to a possible terrorist act that is not expected. The case is not made. The bill is an overreaction to the true content of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178. That resolution requires member States to ensure that their laws are sufficient to combat the threat, leaving it to their discretion to judge what those might be, consistent with international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.

The political foundation for the legislation is weak. The day the bill was introduced, the independent Inspector-General of Security and Intelligence released a report with findings on actions by the SIS and the Prime Minister’s office in 2011. These included disclosure of incomplete, inaccurate, and misleading information; significant errors in considering media requests; a failure to safeguard political neutrality; a lack of trust and confidence with the Leader of the Opposition; and an insufficiently rigorous and careful approach in handling security intelligence. Separately, staff of the Prime Minister’s office had disclosed to the media for political purposes information supplied by the SIS. The report recommended that SIS staff be trained in the release of information and that published guidance be developed on their political neutrality obligations.

It is in the context of these shortcomings—corrosive of public trust in the most sensitive areas of State power—and the need for guidance and training of the SIS that the Prime Minister asks the people of New Zealand to accept an expansion of its powers. The timing of this bill could not be less opportune. There is a need for proven rectification of the shortcomings in both the SIS and the Prime Minister’s office and a consequent restoration of public trust in these institutions before any such bill could even be contemplated.

As I said, we shall speak to the drafting of the bill in the Committee stage, but our fundamental opposition to the bill is this. Under legislation designed to combat foreign terrorist fighters engaged in the Middle East, the New Zealand SIS will have the power in respect of all New Zealanders to access Customs Service data and covertly plant cameras anywhere in their homes, including without warrant. The justification for expanded State powers is ISIL terrorism in the Middle East, but those powers extend to “local extremists”—undefined—carrying out serious environmental or economic damage in New Zealand. This is wrong and unacceptable.

As has been the case since New Zealand First was created over 21 years ago, the core principle of our party is one of love for our country. We in New Zealand First are proud of New Zealand and we believe we have a duty to protect it from all enemies. We believe there is a historic obligation to protect our culture and our heritage, and this obligation requires every member of our party to advocate in the strongest possible terms for a strong defence force, for the rule of law, and for safe and secure borders. Only when these requirements are met can the country develop according to the will of the New Zealand people. We have a unique culture and heritage and we as a party believe that it must be preserved and strengthened, no matter what the cost. We believe that the primary concern of any responsible political party is national security, and we take national security seriously all of the time and on all policies.

New Zealand First opposes this bill for a number of reasons. First, we agree with the concerns on this bill raised by the New Zealand Law Commission, and we note that although improvements have been made at the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee to some areas identified by the commission, many areas leave much to be desired.

Second, this Parliament, in 2007, removed from the Crimes Act the crime of sedition. There was one party, and one party alone, that opposed this repeal and voted against it. That party was New Zealand First. The crime of sedition is still needed now. It simply must be a crime—as it was when we had sedition on our books—“To incite, procure, or encourage violence, lawlessness, or disorder; or … To incite, procure, or encourage the commission of any offence that is prejudicial to the public safety or to the maintenance of public order;”. Its repeal was ill-considered and ill-founded by the very people who stand up today and say: “Trust us. We are your sentries and guardians and protectors.” What is their record? Many of those responsible for repealing it are right here in this House. We will move in the Committee stage to reintroduce the crime of sedition.

Third, we do not have enough confidence or trust in the Security Intelligence Service, given some of its recent offences and serious shortcomings, to allow this organisation such widely increased powers of surveillance. Let us not forget the case of Rajesh Singh. Mr Singh is a former Fijian Government Minister, democratically elected by the people of Fiji. His Government was overthrown by Frank Bainimarama in the military coup of 2006, and he—Mr Singh—fled to Auckland. In 2012 his premises were raided by the SIS and police. The pretext was that he was about to engage in a foreign, offshore terrorism act. What is interesting about this case is that as he was about to be raided, he received a text message from a senior army officer in Fiji telling him that he was about to be raided. I have seen that text message. How on earth could a senior army officer in Fiji know that the New Zealand SIS was about to conduct a raid on Mr Singh, who was lawfully living in New Zealand?

The subsequent actions of the SIS and the police during the raid are cause for grave disquiet, as is the case of Mr Tony Fullman. Mr Fullman had his passport cancelled by the Department of Internal Affairs on the advice of the New Zealand SIS on 17 July 2012. Why? Because he also was alleged to be about to partake in a foreign act of terrorism. The claim was without any merit, and within a year the Government back-pedalled on its decision and wrote to Mr Fullman to say that he could now have his passport back, and said—because it has always been very charitable, this Government—that he would not have to pay for the application replacement fee. [Interruption] Does that not make you feel good?

Then, of course, there is the case of the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) and Kim Dotcom. How on earth could the GCSB not know that Dotcom was a New Zealand resident, or the Prime Minister not know that he was living in his electorate? And when exactly was the Prime Minister made aware of Dotcom and the GCSB raid? He has never admitted foreknowledge at all.

💬 Hon Dr Nick Smith: He didn’t know.

Oh, he did not know. Here he goes again—“know nothing - ism” from the expert of “know nothing - ism”, Nick Smith. There is a smell around this, but let us be frank. What this bill is really about is much wider surveillance powers, and the Prime Minister has been covert about it all the way until just after the election. In June it was no worries, no engagement, no concerns, a long election campaign—one of the longest we have seen in modern times—and he never mentioned it. But he has been running around offshore making promises to all and sundry, and now he is being deliberately evasive with the New Zealand public.

The Government and others say that they are all concerned about security. We have seen time and time again the problems that uncontrolled immigration policies create, but what was their response? To never do a thing about it. From Paris to London, and even to Stockholm, we have seen riots in the streets, honour killings, terrorist attacks, and terrorist plots.

In 2005 I asked the Minister of Immigration about the case of one Asha Ali Abdille, a Muslim refugee from Somalia. I asked the Minister: “Is he confident that Asha Ali Abdille, the refugee sickness beneficiary whom he ordered an inquiry into last year, and who has a string of criminal convictions, is not a threat to the New Zealand community; if so, why?”. He said she was not. Then, 3 years later, she tried to hijack Flight 2279 from Blenheim and attempted to get the pilots to fly to Australia. They refused and bravely fought back, along with other passengers on the plane, and eventually subdued her. But in her attempt to hijack the aircraft at knifepoint, she wounded both pilots and one passenger. She was sentenced to 9 years, at the New Zealand taxpayer’s cost.

This sort of repetitive behaviour, and the “know nothing - ism” about whom we are bringing here, we in New Zealand First are sick of, and we are not going to have those people get up in this House and all of a sudden be the new sentries and guardians of our society.

No one in this Parliament or in the media can possibly say that New Zealand First is not tough on security for our national defence.

💬 Jami-Lee Ross: Weak.

Oh, “Weak.”, he says—“Weak.”, he says. He has got no idea whom he has brought in from the Middle East. Those members encourage them to come here in their thousands, and there is Jami-Lee Ross sitting over there saying we are weak. Look, ignorance is not bliss. Ignorance, Mr Jami-Lee Ross, is not bliss, and the fact is that no one is going to believe you.

We in New Zealand First take the issue of terrorism—and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—very seriously all of the time and on all policies. We have known all year—not just after the election; we have known all year—about ISIS. Do those people not watch the international broadcasts, the media, and all the advice coming out of the Middle East? Or is the blind ignorance in the research unit all that they rely on, or is it the Prime Minister’s assurances? We have known all year about this threat, and we know that radical Islam is a growing threat as well. We have known that for a decade, so what is so new now?

The fact is that we want our immigration system tightened up. We want our border security tightened up. I do not want to hear that we have got 20,000 overstayers—give or take 2,000—here in a modern, computerised age. I do not want to hear that we do not know what is going on. I do not want to hear that I am the only guy who could find a person who was the former agrarian Minister who had come out of Iraq and that none of the lawful authorities in this country could find him—nor, for that matter, could any of these people now posing today.

The PM cannot be trusted. The SIS was caught playing dirty politics, spying on the most senior Opposition MP. The PM is still not being honest about the imminent deployment to Iraq of our armed forces. We know that our troops have already been told that by the end of February-March they will be off. He is still denying it, and the Minister of Defence is denying it in this House as well.

More seriously, the Government has put up this law at breakneck speed, with the fastest change I have ever seen in this House on a matter so serious. It has rammed it through the select committee and it thinks we are going to comply.

There may be parties in this Parliament at the moment that look alike and sound alike on this matter and that have got the same record, but it is not our record. It is not New Zealand First’s record. We know that this bill came about as a result of a review that we were never briefed on. A law review is coming next year—no doubt, we will have new law then—and in the meantime we are asked to cry havoc and let loose the dogs of Nazism when it comes to people’s homes. The surveillance—when you have got video surveillance, is it 50 metres or 500 metres? All these people are swept in, and too many people are supporting this legislation without knowing just how technically wide and unfair it could possibly be.

That was a disgusting speech from a party that should not be proud to be in this House. New Zealand is a country made up of people from different religions, different races, and different cultures, and people have come to this country at different times. They are all New Zealanders, and how dare that party over there say that it holds up New Zealand’s security when all it wants is the 1950s. New Zealand First wants to return to the 1950s—that is all that party wants to do. It does not stand for protecting New Zealanders, and let nobody in this country ever take the garbage from that party that it actually believes in New Zealanders.

We sat in the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. Members sat there and they heard from the Muslim community, and David Shearer rightly acknowledged that in his speech. Fletcher Tabuteau should have been speaking on this bill. It became just an attempt by his leader to take it over as an immigration speech, and that is disgusting from that party.

This bill is good for New Zealanders. It protects New Zealanders. We had to do it at this time. It is something that, as a Parliament, we have to deal with at this time. Dealing with the immediate, pressing concerns is not something we could leave till next year. It is something that came to New Zealand’s attention in recent times. We are not England or Australia, which have not had to go through a general election and lose that period of time when they could have made legislation. This bill does not even attempt to go as far as the English and the Australian legislation, which is already embedded in their parliaments. This gives new powers to our security agencies, but they are powers that are needed to protect all New Zealanders, and not the 1950s cliché that Mr Peters wishes to represent.

I call Catherine Delahunty—5-minute call.

Tēnā koutou e te Whare. Before I talk about some of the aspects of the bill in this second reading in terms of human rights and civil liberties, because human rights is my portfolio, I want to ask some questions. The reason why the Green Party is not supporting the bill is that the questions have not been answered to our satisfaction. I recognise there has been work done and answers given, but they are not to our satisfaction at this stage.

The first one is: is there an immediate threat? I think it is hard to argue that the world is safe, or has been safe, for a very, very long time. In fact, ever since September 11 and our participation in the Afghani issue, our country has been unsafe to some degree, but not to a very high degree, and I think it is hard to argue that we are more unsafe than we have been for quite a while. We have sided with the “Five Eyes” in various wars, either directly or indirectly, which has created a level of risk. That is a choice that has been made by Governments, not by the Green Party, and we are yet to be convinced that there is an immediate threat that means that rather than wait until June 2015 for a full security review, it is necessary to introduce this legislation under urgency, and I will talk about the process for the public in a minute.

Do we have police powers already to address serious criminal acts? Yes, we do. That is my understanding—we really do. Is the SIS neutral, and have we forgotten what happened on the very day this bill was introduced, in terms of the SIS’s relationship to an abuse of power and a lack of neutrality? Many people in the public have not forgotten, and the Green Party has not forgotten. How do we actually stop recruitment to terrorism: through more violence and surveillance, or by making an investment in communities where that risk could possibly arise? How do we support the Muslim community, for example—although this bill is much broader than that—to be treated with respect, and how do we assist it to be part of a process of de-radicalising people who might be at risk? Why can we not wait until next year? Also, what is the definition of “extremist”? There is a considerable debate about the word “extremist”, the word “terrorist”, and about what they actually mean, and where does that sit?

We would have to know what those things are before we could possibly vote for this bill, because warrantless surveillance, visual surveillance, etc., are all serious issues for people who could be categorised as terrorist or extremist and whose actions have been associated with guerrilla warfare, liberation struggles, or even non-violent action in this country. What was once a small but progressive country making a huge global contribution could now possibly be one of the most conservative in this regard, particularly in the way in which this bill has been forced through.

So I just want to talk a little bit about the 525 or more submissions not heard in person, and also the many people who could not submit because they did not even know that there were only 2 days available. I want to pay credit—total credit—to the Kiwi citizens who actually showed the Government up and made thoughtful, informed, and committed submissions on this issue. I acknowledge that the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee did a huge amount of work to hear them, and I support every word that my colleague Dr Kennedy Graham said when he talked about this process. I would like to thank the civil liberties and human rights groups. Many thanks go to those submitters who are Muslim New Zealanders for their vital reminder to the select committee about the impact of this legislation, including the increase in personal abuse that has occurred since the Prime Minister started justifying this extension of spy powers and creating more fear and more paranoia towards the Muslim community.

The modifications in this bill were predictable. There is more oversight of the SIS, which is a good thing, and the change to the time frame for video surveillance without a warrant was a predictable change. It was always built in that the Government could gain the Labour Party’s support by backing off on those issues. That was entirely to be predicted, but, actually, it does not make much difference—24 hours or 48 hours with no warrant is still an unacceptable trade-off that we cannot live with.

The biggest problem we in the Green Party have is this bill’s rationale and the barely explained urgency that is forcing it through this House. Why have we rushed to push the panic button? Who is telling us we must do this? If we are so concerned about foreign fighters, why does the bill create broad powers? From where we sit this looks like broad powers to allow for some giant fishing expeditions for some fish who may be very, very small or very, very large but who will not have the basic rights that citizens of this country ought to have and who will be subjected to surveillance. I want to quote just briefly from Amnesty—

I am sorry to interrupt the member. Her time has expired. Marama Fox—a 5-minute call.

Kia ora e Te Mana Whakawā, ō tātou mate takitini e takoto mai rā i runga i ō tātou marae maha, i runga i ō tātou papa kāinga, i roto i tō tātou Whare, kua ūhia rātou ki ngā taumata kōrero e tika ana hei poroporoaki i a rātou.

[Thank you, Mr Speaker, and in regards to the myriads of our deaths lying there upon our many courtyards, home settlements, and in our House, fitting tributes of farewell have been accorded and cast over them.]

The Māori Party stands at the second reading to oppose the Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill.

If I was to take a walk just 5 minutes down the road to the Wellington Railway Station, I would see the impressive bronze statue of Mahatma Gandhi. At the statue’s unveiling in 2007, Mr Ernest, the Indian High Commissioner, said: “On India’s part, the gifting of the statue is an expression of our deep appreciation and acknowledgment of the commitment of the people of New Zealand for setting an example to the world of a tolerant, open and inclusive society”. How is this relevant to the bill on countering terrorism? It has everything, and nothing, to do with this legislation.

The major concern for the Māori Party is that the bill seeks to change the law to allow the New Zealand SIS to conduct surveillance activities without a warrant “in situations of emergency or urgency”. It then allows the Director of Security to authorise surveillance activities to be undertaken “in situations of emergency or urgency”. So how does this connect to Gandhi? The statue immortalises our nation for its tolerant, open, and inclusive society, yet it is noteworthy that our champion of peace Te Whiti o Rongomai is not honoured similarly with a statue of his own.

And where is the link to this legislation? Where it is explicit is that Te Whiti o Rongomai was the leader of Parihaka, a Māori village in Taranaki. Te Whiti was one of those great leaders alongside Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Nelson Mandela, and yet his story is relatively unknown in our official histories. His story dates back to 1880 and the West Coast Settlement (North Island) Act, by which any Māori in Taranaki could be arrested without a warrant and jailed for 2 years with hard labour. Te Whiti was arrested and then held under the West Coast Peace Preservation Act of 1882, without warrant, charge, or trial, and jailed for 3 months. These two Acts are a precedent for the legislation that will be passed today—a bill that will pass into law measures to introduce surveillance without warrants.

Warrantless surveillance is warrantless surveillance, whether it is for 48 hours or 24 hours. It makes no substantive difference. We have been here before. We have brought into law legislation that does away with basic human rights through the initiative of warrantless search and surveillance. Although we welcome the fact that the amended bill has cut back the time frame for the Security Intelligence Service to conduct surveillance without a warrant from 48 hours to 24 hours, it is the principle at stake. Our constituents have clearly told us they do not trust the authorities with such extraordinary powers.

Of course, we are as concerned as any party with the increased threats, and we accept the need for robust measures to be in place to ensure that spy agencies can respond rapidly to terrorist threats, hence the reason we disagree with the urgency under which this legislation is being considered. But with the shameful history of this nation and its disproportionate treatment of Māori under a questionable surveillance regime, we cannot willingly allow the rule of law to be cast aside to increase opportunities for spying on New Zealanders. Te Whiti o Rongomai and Tohu Kākahi in the 1880s, the alleged Operation Leaf in 2004—which supposedly gathered political intelligence on Māori though wire-taps and computer hacking—and, fast-forward to 2007, the people of Ruātoki and Tūhoe, and Operation Eight. Just to be clear: we do not believe that a warrantless search can be justified under any circumstances.

We appreciated the changes made by the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, and we are gravely concerned about the rapidly evolving threat of terrorism both locally and internationally, but we truly believe that the capacity and capability of our safety and security measures can be increased without compromising on basic citizen rights—compromises that, with overtones of racial profiling, may well infringe the rights of Māori, just as has happened in the past. Although there are considerable changes, the bill has not been subject to a full process of public scrutiny and still poses a number of issues. We therefore continue to oppose it.

It is common, when members on this side of the House rise to speak, to say that it is a pleasure to take a call on the bill. It is an often overused phrase that we use on this side of the House, and possibly one that is not quite appropriate on this bill. It is not a pleasure to have to be talking in the House about increasing powers for surveillance because our country is under threat. But the very fact that there are threats out there that are emerging in this world, and emerging at quite a fast pace, leads us to the situation where we do have to be talking in this House about an issue like this. Members and the public have already acknowledged that this bill is making its way through Parliament at quite a fast pace. We accept that. We also accept and understand that there is a need for this bill to be progressing at the pace that it is.

The Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee members worked very well together over the past week or so to ensure that this bill came back to the House in the best possible manner in which it could. I do wish to join my colleagues in acknowledging the select committee staff and officials who supported us. I also want to acknowledge the bipartisan approach that the committee took as well. We National members did work extremely well with the Hon Phil Goff and David Shearer. We also worked very well with Kennedy Graham, who ultimately ended up opposing the bill, and we always knew that would happen. We also worked very well with Fletcher Tabuteau. I think that if the speech from New Zealand First had been given by Fletcher Tabuteau, we would have had a far more informed speech on the bill, not one of the general rants that Mr Peters has. We would have had a very informed speech, and Mr Tabuteau did make some very good contributions in the select committee that did help to improve the bill. Those contributions from members to improve the bill came from all sides of Parliament. We did genuinely work very well together to try to improve the bill.

We heard submissions about the need to reduce the warrantless surveillance time from 48 hours to 24 hours. Some called for less; some called for that power to not be inserted at all. New Zealand actually already does have warrantless surveillance power, in extraordinary circumstances, for the police. This is simply a change to our statutes that would allow the SIS to have that warrantless surveillance power as well. It is an extreme power. It would be used very rarely, but it is going to be put in the legislation for those emergency situations that the country might find itself in. To understand the reason why the warrantless surveillance power is needed, you have to remember that to get a warrant under normal circumstances for surveillance requires the Minister and the commissioner to sign off on it. You can probably imagine quite easily circumstances where the country’s security would be at risk if those two individuals were not available in an emergency situation, and that is why this power is needed.

We also received submissions around the need to tighten the scope for which surveillance can be undertaken; we did that. We received submissions around reducing the time frame for which the bill would operate from 3 years to 2 years; we did that. We also received submissions about increasing the fine if surveillance information that was acquired is not properly destroyed when it is required to be, and we have made changes to that provision as well. The select committee members worked very well together to improve this bill as much as we possibly could. We have a much better bill now before Parliament and I hope it continues to enjoy wide support in the House.

If substantial changes had not been made to this bill by the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee I would not be standing up here, prepared to support it through its second reading and remaining stages, and nor would the Labour Party.

Frankly, the process by which this bill has been handled was an absolute travesty, and I say that with due respect to Jami-Lee Ross’s comments about the way that the select committee members cooperated. They did cooperate and they did get a better bill out of it. But to bring in a bill and in 2 weeks take it from first reading through to the final reading, which will happen this evening, is not good enough. It is against the democratic process of this House and against the right of New Zealanders to be properly consulted on and participate in legislation. The very worst type of process to ram through in those circumstances is a piece of legislation that gives substantial powers to a body that operates in secret because of its very nature.

What we should be doing in this House is not only going through legislation comprehensively and thoroughly and maximising the public’s right to participate but we should be building up the public’s confidence that the powers that we give to organisations are properly put in place. When you have 2 days—just 2 days—for the public to prepare and present submissions, it is not the way that a democratic process should operate.

Ironically, normally we would have advertised this bill across a range of newspapers and it would have been less high-profile than it was. It was the Government’s decision to act in this way that got it on Television One and TV3. The submissions flooded in. We got just under 600 of them, and we would have had more submissions but for the fact that that the web went down under pressure on a couple of occasions.

I have got to say that there was one thing in common amongst all the submissions that were made on this bill. Whether it was the lofty New Zealand Law Society with a submission prepared by 10 of our most eminent jurists in the country, or whether it was by the New Zealander who was making his or her first ever submission to a select committee, they all said one thing. They said: “This process is wrong. It stinks. You can’t expect us to respond in 48 hours and do the job that we need to on this legislation.”

This legislation should never have gone through in this time frame. If it were not for the fact that we worked extraordinary hours to hear everybody who was capable of getting to the committee and for the fact that the Government relented on its determination to push through things under urgency that were not justified to be pushed through under urgency, we would not be supporting it.

I have to say that one of the downsides of the way that we dealt with the legislation was the way in which the community that feels that it is the most targeted and affected by it was not engaged as thoroughly as it should have been—that is, the Muslim community. David Shearer and I met with members of the Muslim community early on, when this bill was first being talked about. They expressed their concerns to us about it and they expressed their concerns to the select committee. Their concerns were of a number of different natures. One was that they said they are New Zealanders: “We are not Muslims in New Zealand; we are Muslims from New Zealand. This is our country. Why is it that we cannot get to talk to the Prime Minister about something that we think will intimately affect the lives of our community? We cannot even get to talk to the Minister for Ethnic Communities. They did not have time.”—they did not have time. They said to us: “It is funny that when it was about halal killing of export meat, when the markets were closing and the Government desperately needed the help of the New Zealand Federation of Islamic Associations, the Ministers were over us like a rash. But when it is about us and the impact that this is having on us, they are not to be seen.”

They said—and there were a number who made this point—that because this awful organisation called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant misuses the name “Islamic”, the more the community hears the name “Islamic State”, the more it thinks that people who look different because they have a beard or wear a head shawl must be terrorists. What we were getting from the Muslim community were comments that they were being abused in the streets, and they said it did not help when the Prime Minister talked about beheadings.

I have got to say to my colleagues in New Zealand First that it does not help when your leader, Winston Peters, talks about how we should not be bringing these people in from Muslim countries—if I heard it right. I have got an electorate full of people who have come from the Middle East to escape oppression and have come here for a better life for their families. They are decent New Zealanders. They are hard-working. They are so grateful for the chance to have a decent and peaceful life in this country. I have got to tell you that when there is a problem in the Muslim community because some hothead or idiot talks about doing terrorist acts, they are the first to come down on those individuals and put them in their place. If they cannot do it themselves, they are the first to go to the authorities and report it.

If we want to know what will protect us most against terrorist acts in this country, it is not just this piece of legislation—it is mainly not this piece of legislation. It is about the fact that we have developed in New Zealand, by and large, a harmonious and an inclusive community; it is about the fact that the people in our Muslim community are decent people and moderate people; and it is about the fact that through not engaging in the Iraq war in 2003, which was built on a lie, and because we are fiercely independent about being a nuclear-free New Zealand, the world sees New Zealand as an independent country and a decent and a fair country. Those are the things that most protect us against terrorism. If we lose those things, then we are at greater danger.

There is a role for security services in New Zealand. There are people in this country who are alienated and who are personality disordered—that is the kindest way I can describe them. When they get a twisted philosophy such as the ISIS philosophy that tells them—online, all the time—that they should be out there committing terrorist acts and they will be rewarded with martyrdom and life for eternity because they do it, that is a risk to New Zealand.

I do not want to exaggerate the risk. Our threat level, set by the Government, is low. “Low” means “a terrorist attack is possible but not likely”. It is ironic, because in Australia, across the Ditch, it is at a high level. In the United Kingdom, it is at an extreme level. We are at a low level, but it could still happen. Sensible powers given to security intelligence organisations that use those powers within the law and do not abuse the powers are a sensible precaution.

I am aware that the Security Intelligence Service does not always use its powers sensibly. I am a product of a misguided effort by the Director of Security to engage in a smear campaign through the Prime Minister’s office to tell lies about me. But this is not about utu; this is about New Zealand and doing the right thing. We are doing the right thing in supporting this bill, but I want to say that the safeguards that we put in are critical. The narrowing of the scope, which would have given these intrusive powers to the SIS right across the scope of its activities, has been brought back, narrowing to the point that might possibly justify the legislation.

I want to say one final thing to the Minister because it is an important point. I am in favour of stopping people leaving New Zealand who wish to contribute to an organisation that commits crimes against humanity and war crimes. I am not in favour of stopping New Zealanders who go to fight for a cause that they believe in. It might be the Kurdish people in my electorate who want to support their family in Kobani against ISIS, or it might be the Syrian families in your electorate or my electorate who want to fight for democracy against the oppressive regime of al-Assad.

We were assured at the select committee that these people would not be affected by this legislation, so I was a little concerned when I heard the Minister on Q+A suggesting otherwise. I would like, in the Committee stage, an assurance from the Minister that people who go to fight for what is right will not have the freedoms that they are guaranteed under our New Zealand Bill of Rights taken away from them. Yes—an end to those who are going to fight for terrorist organisations committing crimes against humanity, but not an end to people who want to fight for what they believe in to protect their families and do the right thing.

I take a very short call on this Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill. I would like to thank the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee chair, Mark Mitchell, and the other committee members, including Opposition members like David Shearer, the Hon Phil Goff, and Dr Kennedy Graham, for their contribution to this bill. They made a number of constructive suggestions that have been adopted.

New Zealand is known for its peace and harmony. At the same time, we realise we are not isolated from the rest of the world, and therefore we need to react to what is happening in other parts of the world. We are a loyal supporter of the UN Security Council, and, of course, we have responsibilities in responding to or implementing UN resolutions. This bill ensures that New Zealand fulfils its obligations in relation to UN Security Council Resolution 2178, so I commend the bill to the House. Thank you.

The question was put that the amendments recommended by the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee by majority be agreed to.