Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill

I move, That the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill be now read a third time. Can I begin by thanking members for their work on this bill. It has been given a thorough examination with considerable consultation with industry and stakeholders, and the subsequent amendments have made a good bill better. The fundamental reason that I have sought to introduce this bill is to safeguard New Zealand public safety and security. This will be done by ensuring that it is technically and practically possible for surveillance agencies to intercept communications where there is a warrant or other lawful authority to do so, and by introducing a formal framework to ensure the security of our telecommunications networks.

Interception of telecommunications plays a vital role in investigating, disrupting, and prosecuting serious crime; detecting and prosecuting international and domestic cyber-crime; combating threats to national security; and responding to emergencies. As the Police Association has said in its support of this bill, the “lawful interception of telecommunications … is a crucial aspect of police investigations.” In fact, the Police Association said itself that “There are very few serious crime investigations where telecommunications interception data is not important.” The information “can be used to prove a motive, to prove an association between people, to track movements related to other persons or evidence, or otherwise to build a picture of a suspect’s movements or activities. … Police use of interception capability, however, also extends beyond crime investigations to missing persons investigations, [for example] where every minute counts. Successfully locating a missing person … relies on telecommunications data being obtained in an efficient fashion.”

In New Zealand we are changing the way we use our telecommunications. We are increasingly online, chatting, texting, and sending emails rather than calling on our home phones. It is critical that our legislation keeps pace with these changes and allows surveillance agencies the ability to help keep New Zealanders safe. We are also in the process of building greater internet and mobile connectivity. Initiatives like the Ultra-fast Broadband Initiative, the Rural Broadband Initiative, and the allocation of radio spectrum for fourth-generation mobile networks will have a dramatic impact on New Zealand’s connectivity. Not only is the technology faster, smarter, and globally reaching but our industry has fragmented and we have seen a proliferation of new entrants in the market.

The first part of the bill, therefore, modernises the existing interception capability regime and ensures that obligations on the telecommunications industry are targeted, futureproof, and flexible. It reduces the obligations for many network operators, making their obligations more in-line with actual operational need. A number of network operators will face substantially reduced compliance costs as a result. Industry members told me that the current Act is inflexible and cumbersome. To address this, the bill allows for a faster and broader exemption process for interception obligations, which includes the ability to grant class exemptions.

The bill also provides the ability to specify standards relating to how network operators format the information to be given to surveillance agencies, which industry has told me will save it considerable expense. Given comments from some groups about the interception obligations, I want to clarify the following points. The bill does not change the authority of agencies to intercept telecommunications, and it does not change existing privacy protections. This bill relates only to real-time interception. It does not require data to be stored nor stored data to be disclosed.

The second aspect of the bill puts in place a formal network security framework to help keep New Zealanders safe from unwelcome intrusions on our telecommunications networks where those intrusions can seriously affect our national security. Individuals are increasingly reliant on the internet and information and communications technology. Many of our critical infrastructure providers, including our electricity, gas, and finance providers, are reliant on the security of their telecommunications networks. Our increasing reliance on these networks means that we are evermore vulnerable to cyber-attacks, and it increases the potential scale of loss and damage that they can cause. A network security regime is an important part of a wider, multi-pronged approach to managing cyber-threats. The regime in the bill is necessary to ensure that our networks are kept safe from unauthorised access or the unauthorised copying, altering, or diverting of data. Until now, New Zealand has not had a formal scheme in place to effectively manage and address potential national security risks associated with our public telecommunications networks. Instead, the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) currently works in partnership with a number of network operators to ensure proportionate and appropriate measures are in place to protect the security of the networks.

This bill will formalise and build on these existing partnerships to ensure that all network operators engage with the Government, and give certainty and clarity to network operators about when, how, and on what to approach the Government. Network operators are facing new and ever-increasing threats that are advanced, persistent, and sophisticated. In this area the GCSB has access to specialised information about potential vulnerabilities and threats. Network operators simply do not have access to this level of information, which can make it difficult for them to make informed decisions about the design, build, and operation of their networks. I want to be clear about the scope of this framework. This is not about the GCSB getting involved in the day-to-day management of the network, nor is it about it having open access to a network. It has no power to dictate what may go in or be used in a network. Instead, it is about building partnerships to keep networks safe, thereby reducing risks posed to national security. The network security framework will give network operators and the GCSB the ability to work together in a structured and consistent way, and it will show that New Zealand is taking network security seriously, making it a more attractive place to do business.

The compliance framework that underpins the bill builds on the framework in the current Act but makes it more flexible and appropriate. A two-tiered enforcement system will see minor breaches of compliance dealt with by way of breach notice, while serious non-compliance will still be dealt with in the courts. This is a welcome change to the current regime, in which all non-compliance must go straight to the High Court. In the rare event that court proceedings arise from matters in the bill, protections have been put in place to protect any classified security information so that it will not disadvantage the non-Crown party. Provision has also been made to appoint a special advocate to assist the non-Crown party by accessing the classified information on their behalf. These provisions were strengthened during the select committee process to provide additional protection to network operators and service providers in court proceedings.

There has been much talk about the definitions in this bill and to whom they actually apply, so let me be clear: the definition of “network operator” has not changed from the current Act. This definition has been sensibly applied since 2004 and has not caused problems in practice. If a company does not have obligations today as a network operator, it will not have obligations arising from this bill as a network operator. The bill puts beyond doubt that the definition of “service provider” includes companies domiciled both within New Zealand and overseas if they make their telecommunication services available in New Zealand. Service providers already have a duty to assist when they are served with an interception warrant, and this duty remains.

The Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill is an important piece of legislation. It modernises the current framework, provides clarity and flexibility for the industry in relation to interception obligations, and will allow us to keep pace with future changes in the telecommunications sector. Maintaining law and order and national security is crucial to a well-functioning society, and keeping our networks secure is the first line of defence against adversaries. I commend this bill to the House.

The Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill is a shoddy, badly drafted, badly constructed, undemocratic piece of law that degrades the privacy of New Zealand citizens and New Zealand businesses. We will not and do not support it. The Minister for Communications and Information Technology should be ashamed to have put this legislation before this House in this form. When Labour wins Government next year, this law and its accompanying legislation, the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) legislation, which has turned into law, will be gone. A comprehensive and independent review of our surveillance organisations, in particular the GCSB, followed by new security legislation with checks and balances, and new legislation that ensures that the privacy of New Zealand citizens and business is protected, particularly in the digital environment, will be implemented. Twin pillars—that is what we require; twin pillars of legislation and of democracy for both privacy and security. It is not an either/or; it is both.

I would like to refer to a third reading speech on the GCSB legislation—the speech by David Shearer, where he said: “We will act on day one in office to commission the full review that we have promised. We will seek agreement across this Parliament for terms of reference … We will replace this law”—and that is the GCSB law, and today I am saying the same about the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill—“with a world-leading one that is based on the findings of that comprehensive inquiry, because the only way we will ever win back people’s trust, which has been so sadly lost right across this country, is to get an enduring solution that works in the best interest of this country.” That is the Labour Party’s unequivocal position on this piece of shoddy legislation.

This legislation provides enormous powers—enormous powers—to the GCSB, to other agencies, and to Ministers, including the Minister for Communications and Information Technology, who spoke just before me. There has been no case made during the passage of this legislation for the enormous powers that it is providing to the GCSB and to Ministers—enormous powers, particularly in the definitions and in Part 3 of the bill. There are no appropriate checks and balances and no independent scrutiny accompanying them. The only independent remedy open to people who have disagreed with what is happening behind closed doors, in private, is to seek a judicial review. That is at the very end of the process. The economic impact on networks as a result of this bill could be very serious. That is why I have introduced a member’s bill that amends this bill in the interim, before Labour wins Government. It would create a technical advisory board to act as a buffer against the GCSB and against a Government Minister exercising surveillance powers with no independent scrutiny or accountability. At least that would provide some measure of checks and balances that would go some way towards mitigating the effects of this bill.

This bill enables the GCSB to go into our telecommunications networks to control the means through which we send and receive communication. It enables the GCSB to recommend to the Minister that the Minister gives it extraordinary and secret powers over a service provider—over any one of these networks, such as Gmail, such as Facebook, such as websites, and such as Skype. Services caught up in the definitions in the bill could include any website or interactive piece of software. Organisations that could get caught up include schools, universities, and libraries. That may not be the Government’s intention, but it is the result of this badly drafted law. It is the result of a Minister who has refused to listen to submitters and has refused to listen to the public who have questioned what the widespread implications are of this piece of legislation. When the Minister said that nothing has changed in the definitions—well, the technology has changed. The technology has changed, and that is where the problems arise in this piece of legislation.

This piece of legislation will create a chilling effect on New Zealand business. The Minister has been warned over and over again and New Zealand businesses have pleaded that this bill creates ambiguity around the definitions of what constitutes a network, and provides powers that are too broad and without checks and balances to the GCSB and to individual Ministers, including herself.

The potential costs, which have not been properly debated in this House, of this legislation are enormous. I want to refer to some of them today, because there was a set of supplementary submissions provided to the Law and Order Committee that was not allowed to be taken into account during discussions in the select committee. The submissions were not allowed to be discussed, officials were not allowed to comment on them, and we were not allowed to seek any extra advice on the implications of those costs. I want to refer to what some of those costs are. For instance, 2degrees, which is one of the telecommunications companies, produced a submission saying that the likely impact would be many millions of dollars “from lost revenue, damage to brand and customer satisfactions, and lost sales opportunities.” This was in regard to just one part of the law. It said that many millions of dollars could be added if there is added delay restoring customer service, and major delays could result in severely dented customer confidence and revenues that, it added in its submission, could be fatal to the business.

Even Chorus put in a supplementary submission on this piece of legislation. It said that there was potential to impose significant costs on network operators. It said that it could not provide exact costs without knowing what concerns the GCSB or the Minister may raise or want remedied, but there was potentially very wide scope and, therefore, considerable uncertainty as to the cost implications. Vodafone also gave a submission on the costs. It said that the bill could result in a reduced level of competition from vendors, with consultation introducing delays in network projects, and that these could be very significant. Finally, Enable Networks, which is rolling out ultra-fast broadband around the Christchurch and Canterbury region—the Minister’s own region—gave more specific costs. It said that there could be $150,000 per annum just for operational changes to change its business. It said that there could be a $400,000 per year difference as a result for its annual operating expenditure. If there was a requirement for it to change a vendor within its business, then that could cost in excess of $50 million—$50 million. That is extraordinary. Another thing that has to be mentioned is whether or not there is the capacity for the GCSB to undertake these new powers in their current state without a proper review taking place.

This is a very poor piece of legislation. The context in which it is being debated is ill-thought-out and rushed. It is in the context of widespread spying allegations across the world to which New Zealand should be paying attention. There should have been a widespread public conversation about what the justification was for this law, where the evidence was that this law was needed to provide those powers, and what the privacy implications were for New Zealanders.

The Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill has two key elements in it: it modernises the existing requirements for telecommunications companies to assist with interception, and it introduces a formal framework to protect network security. These two elements are reinforced by a robust framework to ensure compliance with them—and that is it. The bill replaces the existing Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Act, which was passed 9 years ago by the then Labour Government. The bill under consideration—in its third reading today—updates the legislation to reflect the changing structure of our telecommunications industry, and to ensure that our interception regime stays current with technological changes. Providing telecommunications providers with greater certainty and transparency about their security obligations helps to minimise compliance costs and ensures a flexible, workable telecommunications security system. The telecommunications industry as a whole benefits from each operator having certainty about their security obligations.

I will now say just a few words about what this bill does not do. This bill does not change the existing safeguards to protect people’s privacy. This bill does not change in any way the authority of agencies to intercept telecommunications. This bill does not require data to be stored or stored data to be disclosed. This bill relates only to real time, live interception, as does the current Act, which was brought to the House and passed 9 years ago by the then Labour Government. Under the existing Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Act, network operators already carry out interception, when this is required by a warrant or other lawful authority, to assist the police in solving crime, or the Security Intelligence Service, or the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB). That all happens under the existing Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Act, which was brought in 9 years ago by the then Labour Government.

The bill reduces the obligations on some network operators, mainly at the wholesale level, the infrastructure level, and network operators with fewer than 4,000 customers, to have the capability—and by that is meant the expertise and equipment—to intercept the telecommunications on their network and their telecommunications services. Again, this is already the case under the current legislation. Network operators will continue to have a duty to assist, when presented with a warrant or other lawful authority to intercept. The House should remember exactly why the police might want to intercept communications. Quite simply, that might be to solve a crime. Further, the bill makes clear that the existing requirement for service providers to assist with an interception operation, when presented with a warrant or other lawful authority to intercept, applies to companies, whether they are based in New Zealand or overseas, where their services are available in New Zealand.

The bill will require the GCSB and network operators to work cooperatively with each other in identifying and addressing network security risks, and that is to happen as early as possible. This will mean that network operators will be required to engage with the director of the GCSB on the design, build, and operation of their networks, where this may pose a risk to New Zealand’s national security. The process for network operators to follow after a risk is identified by the GCSB is set out in a specific risk identification and response process. Network security is important to ensure that networks are kept safe from unauthorised access or the unauthorised copying, altering, or diverting of data. The network security framework is a preventative regime built on a partnership approach. The bill does not give the GCSB the power to direct, approve, or veto network security decisions. Its role is to identify risks and to advise the network operator. Where the GCSB believes a significant risk to national security is raised, it can recommend to the Minister responsible for the GCSB that they issue a direction.

Finally, I want to commend the officials who worked on this bill. I did not get a chance in the Committee stage, which is normally the process in the House, but I do want to commend the officials, who gave good service to the Law and Order Committee, for their utter professionalism. They answered every question that was posed to them from every member. They were incredibly patient in what is quite a technical field, and, again, I want to just thank them for their expertise and for their professionalism. This is a good bill and I recommend it to the House.

Members of the public listening to that contribution from the National Party member Jacqui Dean—if they are still awake—would be forgiven for thinking that this Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill was just a small, technical bill, for which they should switch off, get up, and go make a cup of tea. Well, nothing could be further from the truth.

💬 Shane Ardern: They’ve certainly done that now.

I am sure Mr Ardern will take a call and give us the benefit of his wisdom and insights into telecommunications.

What I can say is that members of the public need to see this bill in the context of its companion legislation, the Government Communications Security Bureau Amendment Act. It is all very well for Government members to talk about the technical amendments, and how this definition has not changed or that definition has not changed. The context for this piece of legislation was the passing of the Government Communications Security Bureau Amendment Act. That Act widely expanded the powers of the Government Communications Security Bureau (GSCB) and fundamentally changed its purpose from being an agency focused on looking at the activities of foreign nationals to being one that can look into the activities of New Zealand citizens.

The moment that change was made, the fundamental nature of the GCSB’s work changed and the implicit contract that New Zealanders have had with our security agencies changed. This bill is the legislation that operationalises those changes. They are fundamental changes to the way our security agencies work, and they should be given far greater attention by the National Party.

I want to say two or three introductory things about the context in which this legislation is being passed. We are in an environment where not only is technology changing rapidly but the way in which people use technology is changing. Alongside that are daily revelations from around the world about the extent of surveillance, the extent of the work of intelligence agencies, and the level of technological sophistication that those agencies are able to employ.

That is what has changed—I say for Jacqui Dean’s benefit—in the 9 years since the legislation was passed. The world has changed. In Europe right now we have governments hugely concerned at the activities of the United States, but this Government wants to bury its head in the sand. We have got congressional inquiries in America that are heading towards tightening up what intelligence agencies can do. President Obama wants to tighten up what intelligence agencies can do. The response of the National Party to that is to broaden the powers of intelligence agencies, making it easier for the agencies to involve themselves, as Clare Curran has pointed out, in anything from the design of a network in a school library all the way through to the operations of companies in New Zealand. The National Party has buried its head in the sand to what is happening in the world. New Zealanders know that the world has changed when it comes to security, but the National Government has not done that.

The world has also changed in the way in which people look at privacy. The question in this digital age is what privacy means and how we balance privacy with security, because both are vitally important when it comes to a democratic society. We cannot have a democratic society without privacy. We cannot have a democratic society without security. But it is not, as Clare Curran said in her speech today, one or the other. It is a false dichotomy that the National Party has pushed through that either you believe in security or you do not—that is it. Well, it is not that simple. What New Zealanders expect is a balance between privacy and security; that our basic rights and freedoms to communicate with one another without the State interfering will be upheld alongside keeping an eye on those people who will undermine our society. It is possible to do those things and to balance those two things together, but the National Party has failed to do that.

This bill tips that balance. This bill pushes more power into the hands of Ministers and more power into the hands of the GCSB, and takes away from New Zealanders fundamental rights and freedoms that they should be able to expect. That is the tragedy of this bill. I would have thought that the National Party would want to increase confidence in our security and intelligence agencies, because the very time at which it has chosen to expand these powers is the time at which public confidence in the GCSB, which plays the critical role in the implementation of this bill, is at an all-time low. In the GCSB legislation we were asked by the Prime Minister to accept that the limits on surveillance of New Zealanders would come as a result of the way he would go about implementing the law—the limits would result not from putting it in the law but from his promise to the House about how he would issue warrants. Well, that is not good enough.

What New Zealanders need to know is that the intelligence agencies of this country are acting in a way that is in accordance with our values as New Zealanders. That is why the Labour Party has been calling for some time for an inquiry into our intelligence agencies. It is not just about the GCSB; it is also about the SIS. In the context of this bill, we are seeing hugely extended powers given to agencies that the public no longer trust. The Government should have slowed down, it should have listened to the concerns of New Zealanders, and it should have undertaken a review and brought back to this House legislation that has the support not only of a wide range of parties in this House but of New Zealanders in general and of civil society.

The Government has failed. It is out of touch with the concerns of New Zealanders on this bill. The problem specifically with this bill is that it does create broad, sweeping powers. All the groups that came to the Law and Order Committee said “Don’t do this. Don’t do this, for the sake of the privacy of New Zealanders. Don’t do this, for the sake of innovative businesses in New Zealand being able to get on with their jobs.” Company after company came to the select committee and said “Don’t pass this legislation, because it will stifle innovation.” The Government, supposedly the friend of business, ignores them and ploughs on no matter what, saying “No, we’re going to do this.”, with that kind of arrogance, that kind of being so out of touch that it will not listen to even the people whom traditionally it has told us it supports.

One of the major concerns the Labour Party has about this bill is the broad definitions that are contained in the bill. It is actually ridiculous to hear Amy Adams get up and tell us that there is no change around national security. Well, that is actually not true to begin with, but also, again, it is in the context of what is now defined by the GCSB as what it can do for national security. We then have the question of network providers and service providers. Both of those terms are so loosely defined that we do have the situation in which it is possible that schools, universities, hospitals, and so on end up being caught up in this. That is the kind of sloppy legislation that we have in front of us today. We also do not have adequate oversight. The Labour Party attempted to see the establishment of a technical advisory board so that at the very least there would be some kind of oversight from people outside of the Ministers’ control, but, again, that was rejected by the Government.

I want to finish my contribution on the matter with the submission of the Human Rights Commission on this bill, because that highlighted two things. The first of them was the arrogance of the Prime Minister, whose reaction to the submission was to tell the Human Rights Commission that he was going to cut its funding. Well, he should have read the submission. He should have read it and he should have understood that the Human Rights Commission, using its statutory power, which it has used only a handful of times in its existence, was crying out to the Government, saying “You’ve got this wrong. You’ve unbalanced human rights and security.” But the Government ignored the commission.

In that report from the Human Rights Commission it actually says that New Zealanders believe that they are entitled to know whether there is mass surveillance of them; that they need more clarity, information, and transparency; and that they believe that there should be a thorough investigation of all of the agencies before any law such as this is passed.

The Human Rights Commission was calling out the Government on a piece of law that tramples over the basic rights, freedoms, and values of New Zealanders. Instead, the Government has pushed through the Government Communications Security Bureau Amendment Act and it has pushed through the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill against a global tidal wave of concern. The Government needs to stop. It needs to listen. Instead, it has gone ahead, and New Zealand now has law in this area that is outside the mainstream of world opinion. It puts at risk the privacy of New Zealanders. It puts at risk the innovation of companies in New Zealand. It is a dreadful piece of legislation that should not pass.

I rise on behalf of the Green Party to speak about the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill. This is a bill that the Government has been promoting alongside the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) bill, which is its sister bill, to enhance the powers of the GCSB to engage in large-scale spying of citizens both here and, of course, abroad. Essentially, what this bill does is enable—by providing the technical ability, if you like—the GCSB to spy on New Zealanders, as well as other agencies. It also goes alongside enabling foreign spy agencies to spy on New Zealanders, using the GCSB.

I think what we probably need to say at the outset is that, essentially, signing up to this kind of legislation is part of the price that we pay for membership of the “Five Eyes” network. The “Five Eyes” network is a network between five countries that have worked together—the United States, the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—in order to engage in large-scale surveillance. The revelations about the true nature of this “Five Eyes” network, which have become almost daily now as a result of Edward Snowden, have become daily shocking news to people all around the world, as we have discovered exactly what it is that our spy agencies are doing. Of course, they never told us what they were doing, but as a result of these massive leaked documents, we now understand what they are doing. Essentially, the “Five Eyes” network has engaged in global mass surveillance. It has particularly targeted the submarine cables that go between nations, and it has taken all the data off those submarine cables in order to intercept all the communications that are going on there. So that has been able to intercept a lot of the emails, the internet traffic, and so forth going between countries.

But on top of that, the network has been monitoring the domestic communications of certainly the “Five Eyes” countries but also many other countries as well, particularly, as it has turned out, in Europe, as we found out in the last week. What that means is that it monitors the mobile phone network, it targets particular telephone numbers, such as the phone of the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, who was targeted by the NSA so that it could listen to all of her telephone calls. Of course, any other person or persons, any other corporations, or any other kinds of organisations that the “Five Eyes” network wants to target, it simply legally or illegally—it is of no concern to them—taps in and simply gets all that data about what is being talked about, the information that is being exchanged. All of this is now just a matter of fact. There was a time not so very long ago when this was a matter of conjecture, it was a matter of dispute, but now it is simply a matter of fact. We find that the European Union and the United States are now engaged in a very large dispute, as the truth has been revealed and we discover that, in fact, the United States has been systematically spying on the European Union.

On top of that, of course, we find that other members of the “Five Eyes” network have been engaged in a similar kind of spying. This bill is in order to enable that kind of activity. So, for example, the Australian equivalent of the GCSB and the SIS has been engaged in spying on Australians—not only on the telephone network of all the private conversations of Australians but also in using their embassies in Indonesia to target the Indonesians. Now the Indonesian Government, even in the last hours, is threatening to review cooperation with the Australian Government over the so-called boat people, as a result of that systematic spying by the Australian Government on the Indonesian Government and other officials.

We know also that it is not just Government officials who are being targeted. The NSA has been targeting private corporations. Petrobras in Brazil was one of the targets, and, presumably, the NSA was targeting it for economic reasons. Petrobras is a major oil producer, so the NSA was very interested to know what Petrobras has been up to, in order to communicate that to US corporations in any of their dealings with it.

The “Five Eyes” network is a global spying network, a club of which New Zealand is one of the members. There was a time when that was crowed about by many people as a great thing—that we were members of this club. However, I think what we are finding now is that being a member of the “Five Eyes” club has its downside. It is extraordinary that at the very moment that the downside of being a member of the “Five Eyes” club means that nobody trusts you, this Government is introducing laws that give more and more powers to the spy agencies, in order to spy on us and our activities, and also to spy on people in other countries and share that information among the “Five Eyes” network. The fact is that at this exact moment, when it is all being revealed as to the illegal and illicit activities of these agencies, the Government is proposing to give this network more power, and that is an extraordinary thing. We are fundamentally caught up in this international scandal as a result of the activities of this Government and previous Governments, which failed to control the GCSB and the SIS. We, just as much as the US and all other members of the “Five Eyes” network, are now being caught up in this thing, and we are all being seen as countries that cannot be trusted.

That, I think, is a strong argument for an independent foreign policy. It is just like when we went nuclear-free; there were those who said that we could not possibly go nuclear-free or it would be the end of the world. Well, it turned out that it was not the end of the world when New Zealand went nuclear-free. The United States pulled the pin on the ANZUS Treaty. Well, it turned out that that was not the end of the world either. So just as small independent countries all over the world have found that they do not need to be part of the US networks, these kinds of surveillance networks, and just as we found that we did not need to be part of the US nuclear network, it is really time for New Zealand to take an independent foreign policy. It is very difficult for New Zealand to have an independent foreign policy while we are a paid-up member of the “Five Eyes” network, which means that we must exchange all this information with other countries. When foreign dignitaries come to our country, no doubt we are spying on them. When the UN Secretary-General visited New Zealand, no doubt the GCSB and the SIS targeted its communications and passed the information back to the NSA in the United States because that is the nature of the “Five Eyes” network and how it works. Anyone who saw the obsequious and embarrassing performance of Jonathan Coleman in Washington will know that it is time for New Zealand to have an independent foreign policy.

I just happen to have returned from the European Parliament, and what was amazing there was how the European right has now become very sceptical of the relationship with the United States. The European left and European Greens were sceptical of the relationship for a long period of time, but now the European right is very sceptical of that close and intimate relationship with the United States because it sees that as very damaging to it. For example, when I spoke with some members of the European Parliament—from the Christian Democratic Union, which is Angela Merkel’s right-wing party governing in Germany at the moment—they were absolutely scathing about the United States and the US mass surveillance. Of course, the reason they were particularly scathing of it is that they remember the mass surveillance society of East Germany. They remember the Stasi. They remember the Soviet-backed regimes in Eastern Europe and what it was like to live when you were constantly spied on by the State. Of course, what we find out now is that that is exactly the kind of society we live in, where the GCSB, the SIS, the NSA, and equivalent agencies overseas like the Government Communications Headquarters in the UK, are all engaged now in mass surveillance of all of us and our private communications. Legally or illegally is of no interest to them; they simply engage in it when it suits them.

What this means from the Europeans’ point of view is that they are now saying that it is time to establish a kind of separate part of the internet for the European Union. The European internal market commissioner has called for a European data cloud separated from the American data cloud, so that those kinds of communications do not pass through the “Five Eyes” jurisdictions where that information is accessible. The justice commissioner has called the new data protection laws in Europe a European declaration of independence. What they mean is that they do not want to have their data flowing through countries like New Zealand where that data will simply be handed over to the NSA. So countries like New Zealand that implement laws like this very one put in front of us today are becoming places that are considered hostile for data storage. They do not want to put data storage in places where if you base the cloud data and servers in New Zealand, or even pass it through New Zealand, it can be easily picked up and handed back to the United States. This is a major economic problem for New Zealand. New Zealand should be a place where data is secure. One of our advantages is actually around the information and communications technology sector—that we have green energy, and that if we had a second cable, we would have better connectivity to the world, and that we would have a certain level of creativity, which could make us a great base for data services in the information and communications technology sector. But that is being threatened by this bill in front of us, which will result, and companies know this, in companies having to simply hand over the data or that there will be a back door into their data storage servers so that the Government can simply grab the data at will and hand it over to the United States. That is fundamentally undermining the way that I would see we should be establishing an information and communications technology sector in New Zealand, which is based around the cloud, but it is very difficult for that to happen.

We do not know as to what level the Balkanisation of the internet like this will happen, whether it goes further, but we do know that this kind of law undermines our ability to be world leaders in the information and communications technology sector, which should be one of our growing and great sectors. That is, of course, on top of all the issues around democracy and living in a free and open society, which are fundamental to the things that we believe in and that this law threatens. The very idea that you can have a private communication is threatened by this law. So there are not only economic reasons but fundamental democratic and privacy reasons for opposing this law, which is just so backward-looking.

Our national security, fundamentally, is very, very important to all of us. It is something that should be taken seriously. I was very disappointed with the contribution made by the Opposition Leader of the House on the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill. He spent most of his speech attacking other members of the House, which probably indicates that, really, he did not have that much to contribute. One thing that I did agree with him on was the fact that threats have changed a lot over the last decade. In the last 10 years there have been significant changes to the types of threats that we have to be aware of and try to detect. Hence, we have to keep updating and changing our legislation to stay in step with those threats.

New Zealand, in terms of transparency and oversight levels, has one of the highest levels of transparency and oversight of our agencies, which are there to provide protection for us, of any country in the world. I would defy anyone to name somewhere that has a higher level of transparency.

Unfortunately, I can take only a short call on this, but I just wanted to finish by highlighting again that this bill does not change the existing safeguards to protect people’s privacy. It does not change, in any way, the authority of agencies to intercept telecommunications, and it does not require data to be stored or stored data to be disclosed. I am very happy to commend this bill to the House. Thank you.

I am pleased to rise on behalf of New Zealand First to speak to this third and final reading of the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill. I am pleased, but I have to say—and this is becoming something of a habit with too much of this Government’s legislation—that I am a little disappointed as well. New Zealand First is opposed to this bill. We began the process of this piece of lawmaking by giving it our qualified support. We supported this bill at its inception because we believed, and still believe, that it was a necessary act of legislation in so far as its stated intentions were concerned. But that we can no longer support its passage into law is the source of my disappointment. I am disappointed that yet again this Government, this National Party Government and its associated hangers-on, has managed to address a necessary and pressing issue by hitting the nail squarely on the thumb. I do not think those members lack intelligence. There are some particularly fine minds amongst the members occupying the benches opposite. Rather, I think it is but another manifestation of the old-time Tory born-to-rule mentality that sees no need to consult or to listen or to think beyond its own immediate impressions and opinions. It is incapable of being wrong, in its own view, and thus it is unable to absorb reason if such reason is applied externally, and change course in place of it. We have attempted to find a way through what has proven to be an impasse, as far as the two separate agendas of this bill are concerned.

New Zealand First has suggested that the bill be split into two bills in order to deal separately with the two major areas that it addresses. By way of explanation I will quote from the minority view that New Zealand First submitted to the Law and Order Committee report: “New Zealand First holds the view that the issues covered by this bill are too broad and disparate to be dealt with by a single piece of legislation. Network security is a pressing issue which requires the timely attention of the House, and the expeditious passing of legislation to facilitate the protection of New Zealand’s data networks by way of the exclusion of [risk-bearing] hardware … This we regard as being a singular issue, which we support. Interception capability however is both a less urgent concern, and one which has generated a great deal of controversy. We note that an overwhelming majority of public and industry submissions are opposed to some or all of the proposed legislative changes. There are unresolved issues and unanswered questions surrounding the cost to network providers, the exclusion of smaller providers, the non-inclusion of over-the-top service providers, and the commercial implications of having OTT providers subject to requirements which may limit the availability of certain products and services to the New Zealand market. In addition, several submitters suggested that aspects of the proposed changes may limit innovation and expansion in some areas of information technology in New Zealand. Many submitters were of the opinion that the exclusion of small providers, and of OTT services, would largely negate the effectiveness of the law as proposed. While these issues remain unresolved, and while existing legislation provides for an alternative framework through which the aims of the bill may be addressed, we feel it is precipitous to [proceed] with this part of the bill. New Zealand First suggests that the bill be divided into two distinct bills, [in order] to address these separate concerns. We may yet choose to pursue this option by way of a supplementary order paper.” That did not happen. “In the event that the bill is so separated, New Zealand First will support the network security provisions as outlined. However as the bill [presently] stands, we are unable to support it in its entirety, due to our concerns as detailed here.”

Unfortunately, the Government has not seen fit to take heed of our concerns. For that reason we find ourselves in the position of having to withdraw our support for this bill. Network security is, of course, primarily concerned with the hardware that is proposed to be provided by one particular supplier based in Asia. The so-called “Five Eyes” partners, the Anglosphere nations with whom we share much in the way of intelligence, have made no secret of the fact that they do not trust the supplier, and they are equally clear in their requirement for New Zealand to not expose ourselves—and, by association, them—to the risks involved in allowing this company to conduct espionage on behalf of their Government shareholder on our systems via bugs embedded in its commercial hardware.

But there are other concerns as well. In view of recent disclosures in the Guardian and the New York Times, citing documents provided by Edward Snowden, the bill raises significant issues for New Zealand businesses and individuals conducting their business online. A primary concern is retaining privacy and confidentiality between that business and the intended recipients. It would appear from the allegations raised in those newspapers that those communications may well be intercepted in whole or in part. This raises additional serious concerns regarding confidence in undertaking business with New Zealand - based companies by businesses or entities located outside the traditional five English-speaking countries, with regard to the security and confidentiality of their communications to this country.

There is a foreseeable adverse commercial consequence from this loss of confidence, namely the substitution of New Zealand businesses with those in jurisdictions in which they may have more confidence in confidentiality of communications. This has a potential major impact, particularly on rural and remote-based businesses in New Zealand, where the ability for face-to-face meetings and the physical transfer of documents is far less practical. An apparent unintended consequence of this legislation is a potential detrimental reduction in the economic benefits that the internet and high-speed broadband had ostensibly offered, to mitigate both rural isolation and New Zealand’s geographic isolation. One must ask how rural National Party members will justify to their rural constituents their acquiescence in enabling this legislation to pass with these foreseeable adverse economic consequences for those who elected them. This bill represents the wrong approach to a serious problem. New Zealand First cannot and does not support it. Thank you.

It is a pleasure to take a brief call on the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill. I find myself disagreeing with the previous speaker, Richard Prosser, which is sad because some of the things he says from time to time I agree with. I do agree with the fact that there are some very intelligent people on this side of the House, however.

💬 Hon Phil Goff: Name them.

I certainly will not name myself. I am proud to belong to a Government that has the courage to do what is best for New Zealanders, the courage to preserve democracy in a time of great change and a time when the telecommunications industry is changing by the minute.

Grant Robertson talked about the broad powers that this bill contains. He talked about a lot of issues related to this bill that led me to believe that he did not understand the legislation. He, in my view, is arrogant in himself and in his disregard for the well-being of law-abiding and hard-working New Zealanders.

We then heard the Greens take a similar approach through their leader distorting the truth of the matter even further by linking our operations and legislation to the rest of the world in a manner that is clearly untrue. I think he must have been out there in that jungle he has created on the front lawn.

We then heard some more, I guess, scuttlebutt from the other side of the House that clearly misrepresented the intention of this bill, and in my view leads to the undermining of public confidence in our security services, which are extremely strong.

We sat through a number of submissions and a significant amount of work on this bill to get to the point we are at today. I have a great deal of pleasure in supporting this bill, and I am sure that it will create an environment and do the job that it has set out to do in protecting those New Zealanders who need protecting from the rest of the world. Thank you.

Labour is opposed to the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill. It is shoddy, it is rushed, it is inadequate to do what it sets out to do—that is, to provide protection against terrorists or international criminals; the officials told us that—and it is absolutely inadequate in terms of providing protection to ordinary New Zealanders going about their lawful business, and in terms of the ability of the State to intercept their communications without adequate scrutiny and without adequate safeguards.

What this bill does is two things. First of all, it increases the power and the ability of the State to intercept private conversations between people over the telecommunications network, and it also expands the State’s powers to actually direct the telecommunications companies to do certain things or not to do certain things. But what really worries me about this is that this bill is the bill that is required to implement the changes made a couple of months ago in this Chamber through the legislation arising out of the Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill. That legislation, which Jacqui Dean seems to have overlooked, made a fundamental change in the power of the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB). That bureau was not previously lawfully able to spy on New Zealanders. As a result of that legislation, it now can do that. You know, it is funny—we had the GCSB legislation in this House because the Government was found to have abused its powers. It unlawfully spied on Kim Dotcom, and when it set up an inquiry into that unlawful spying, Rebecca Kitteridge found that it had done it on 88 other occasions. So you find that the bureau has been abusing its power, and what is the Government’s answer to that abuse of power? It is to make the abuse of power lawful. It is not to stop the abuse of power, and that is absolute nonsense.

We live in an age when the State can exercise remarkable power over its citizens, and we are seeing that every day through the revelations of Edward Snowden, who was the United States whistleblower. What has he exposed about the National Security Agency in the United States? He has exposed that it is intercepting and looking at not tens, not hundreds, not thousands, but millions of pieces of communication. It is communication not by terrorists, not by international criminal gangs, not by those who are trying to break into the cyber security of other systems, but by ordinary Americans and by ordinary people around the world. It is even spying on its friends. It is spying on the Chancellor of Germany, an ally of the United States.

Then we had the grovelling performance of the Minister of Defence, who goes over and meets the Secretary of Defense in the United States and says “We trust you not to spy on us.”, and he gives the secretary a rugby jersey. Was that not sweet?

💬 Hon Dr Nick Smith: What would the member have said?

I would have asked the obvious question. There is an agreement under “Five Eyes” that said that you do not spy on your allies. We want to know what they are doing. I want to tell you this, Mr Smith: Mr Coleman said we had no secrets. Well, apparently we do, because the Government will not tell us what it is negotiating with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but it does not mind if the Americans are eavesdropping to find out what our negotiating position is. Apparently, there are no secrets, but actually, Mr Smith, we have New Zealand companies competing with their American competitors. I do not know whether you, Mr Smith, feel comfortable about the fact that they might be spying on what New Zealand companies that are in competition with the Americans are doing in this country, but I am not comfortable with that. Dr Coleman should absolutely apologise for that fawning, grovelling interview that he did with Secretary of Defense Hagel.

We can see that there is a real ability to abuse the powers in this bill and that it happens both in New Zealand and around the world. We can see that there are inadequate protections, because our Government Communications Security Bureau has unique powers to intrude on your privacy or the privacy of any New Zealander in this country. If we are going to give security agencies those sorts of intrusive powers, then it is incumbent on this House to ensure that there are proper oversights so that we can be sure that those powers are not being abused.

When we had the Government watchdogs and New Zealand watchdogs against the abuse of State power come before the Law and Order Committee, what did they tell us? They said that this bill should not proceed. They said that there are not adequate safeguards, and that what the Government is bringing before this House is not satisfactory. Take the New Zealand Law Society, for example. It says that there needs to be “systemic checks that should be put in place to ensure the GCSB powers that are to be extended by the amendments are exercised appropriately.” What does the Law Society say? It says that those checks have not been put in place. It says that this bill is intrusive and that it “empowers the GCSB to spy on New Zealand citizens and residents, and to provide intelligence product to other government agencies in respect of those persons”. It says that this bill is inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and is inconsistent with privacy interests recognised under law in New Zealand. That is the Law Society. And what does the Attorney-General say? “What would the New Zealand Law Society know about the law and the Bill of Rights?” It is its job. That is arrogance, Mr Smith, and you know it.

Then we have the Human Rights Commission. Mr Smith, the Human Rights Commission is appointed by this Government, and what did it say? I want to quote it to you, Mr Smith. “The Commission considers that what is proposed by the GCSB Bill and the TICS Bill is too wide-reaching. It does not provide adequate oversight, and makes inadequate provision for ensuring appropriate transparency and accountability of those who administer the legislation. It does not provide for a legal regime containing sufficient safeguards against abuse of power and to facilitate a proportional approach.” The primary recommendation of the Government’s own Human Rights Commission is “that a full and independent inquiry into New Zealand’s intelligence services be undertaken”—this party’s position. What was the response of that Government to its own Human Rights Commission saying that this legislation should not be before this House? The arrogant and overbearing response of that Government was to threaten the funding of its own Human Rights Commission. Did it listen to the watchdog that it had set up that warned about this legislation? No, it threatened that watchdog and said “We’ll withdraw your funding if you’re critical of the Government.” Frankly, that is an absolute disgrace, and the Government should apologise for what it has done after it withdraws this legislation.

Then we have the Privacy Commissioner. The Privacy Commissioner is a woman who understands how our system works. She was, for more than a decade, the Secretary of the Cabinet. She knows the secrets of Government. She is a practical and wise person. She says this legislation should not proceed in this form, and that this was not the right model of oversight to guarantee that we had protections against abuse.

So I ask the next National speaker who gets up to speak on this bill to say why each of those watchdogs is wrong in what they are saying, to say why adequate oversight has not been built into this legislation, and to say why the Government is ignoring the overwhelming evidence of how these intelligence agencies quickly abuse their power and, in fact, how our own Government Communications Security Bureau has abused its power. This legislation is not adequate. It is not in the right form. We were told it would not stop the serious terrorist groups, because they know how to avoid those communication companies that are subject to interception. It will not work on them, but it will allow this Government to spy improperly on New Zealanders going about their lawful business.

New Zealanders are right to be concerned about this Government. They are right to be concerned about its arrogance. They are right to be concerned about how out of touch it has got in 5 short years. We oppose this legislation, and we will, Dr Smith, change this legislation and change the Government Communications Security Bureau legislation that is so badly drafted and so lacks safeguards.

Unfortunately, that member Mr Goff, after many distinguished years in this House, has not learnt that just because he says something loudly, it does not actually make it factually correct. The trouble is—and Mr Goff summed it up right at the end of his speech—that he is trying to somehow tie this bill, the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill, back to the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) legislation and the flaws that actually that Labour Government passed quite willingly. It swept that one under the corner of the carpet. This bill has got nothing to do with that legislation, and the member knows that. What disrupts the credibility of that party is that it keeps trying to tie back legislation to something that is all about a scandal, because it—

💬 Dr David Clark: Read the bill.

I have read the bill.

💬 Dr David Clark: You said this isn’t related to the other bill.

Well, actually, I say for that member that what this bill will deal with more is the gangsters who are out there manufacturing P and getting away with blue murder in what they do, and the means by which the powers that have warrants to intercept those communications access those communications from the agencies. It is nothing more than systems and processes. It does not in any way change any existing safeguards.

Although people on that side of the House want to whip up some sort of conspiracy, the New Zealand public have long ago woken up to the story that members on that side of the House are crying wolf, saying “Oh, please believe us; it must be a conspiracy.”, and manufacturing this, that, and the other. But it does not stick, because you do not make sense—sorry, not you, Mr Assistant Speaker. Those members do not make sense in their argument.

This bill does not change the authority. It does not change the way that those organisations have to go about getting warrants to intercept the information. There is nothing to see here. There is nothing to see but an Opposition party that is floundering around trying to whip up a crisis where there is not one to see. New Zealanders back a Government that actually gets on and protects their interests and does not dilly-dally and play politics.

I understand that the next call is a split call.

Well, that member, Mike Sabin, would do well to take a leaf out of his own book—explaining that yelling does not make things true! I found the irony of that delicious—just delicious. I fear that that member has not read the bill, because the connection to the previous legislation that was passed, the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) legislation is not in dispute here in this House. The Law Society, acknowledging that this type of legislation is responsible for striking a balance between privacy and security, made a very full, adequate, and interesting response on the GCSB bill and on the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill—the related pieces of legislation. If I can read from their submission on this bill, the Law Society says in paragraph 2: “The Law Society notes that this bill is intimately connected with the Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill”—for that member’s benefit—“and the justification (or otherwise) of its intrusive objectives. The Law Society has expressed its concerns’’—and let me read one or two of those concerns from the GCSB submission by the Law Society. “The Bill changes the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) from being a foreign intelligence agency to a mixed foreign and domestic intelligence agency. The bill empowers the GCSB to spy on New Zealand citizens and residents, and to provide intelligence product to other government agencies in respect of those persons, in a way not previously contemplated and that is inconsistent with the rights to freedom of expression and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) and with privacy interests recognised by New Zealand law.”

The Law Society goes on to express its concerns about the urgency process, the undue haste of this Government to get this legislation through without the checks and balances that New Zealand society—indeed, most Western countries—expect of their Governments. This is a terrible process. It is a terrible piece of law, and that is coming from a body that is moderate, whose criticism aims to be fair and independent. That is coming from the Law Society, which pithily and clearly explains why the GCSB bill and its accompanying Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill are appalling for New Zealand.

The telecommunications bill imposes, on the telecommunications network operators, obligations to assist the Government on network security matters where they may raise a risk to New Zealand’s national security or economic well-being. That is what it says in the bill, and those aspects of the bill have not been defined. That is another reason why this legislation is sloppy. It is not defined what is in the national interest nor what is, in terms of New Zealand’s economic well-being, within the scope of spying activities and what falls outside them. This sloppy legislation does not define that. There is no oversight mechanism that sufficiently captures whether we should be doing these things or not. And then it goes on to give to Ministers—the Minister of Police, the Minister responsible for the SIS, the Minister responsible for the GCSB—Draconian powers to use these provisions, and we know these people do not themselves always get things perfect.

Certainly, the history to this legislation, the background, the context, was the Minister responsible for the GCSB coming under sharp criticism for spying on Kim Dotcom. That was against the murk of the appointment of Ian Fletcher, when the Prime Minister could not remember the fellow, and then he kind of could remember the fellow, and then, oh well, it turned out he was the brother of one of his friends. Then, oh, he may have actually called him to tell him to apply for the position. He had a major brain fade—what is becoming known as “a touch of the Banksies”, I think, in this House—on these issues. John Key then went on to be questioned on the Kitteridge report. He went on to be questioned on those illegal cases of spying; the Dotcom case was not the only one. And the GCSB bill and the telecommunications bill that followed, which we are debating today, went on to try to make legal those kinds of illegal spying on New Zealand citizens. That is outrageous—without any kind of checks and balances that would provide New Zealanders with the confidence that the spy agencies are acting in their interest and not in overseas’ interests.

This Government is distracted by spying on people in their homes. It should be focused on bigger issues. It should be focused on employment; on jobs; on policies like NZ Power, which will make power affordable for New Zealand homes; on KiwiBuild, which will build houses for New Zealanders; on Kiwi insurance to make sure that people can get insurance for their houses; and on the other reforms that Labour is proposing to—

Order! [Interruption] The member’s time has expired. [Interruption] Order! I am calling Steffan Browning.

Kia ora, Mr Assistant Speaker. Today the Government is ticking through what we are calling the “TICS” bill, the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill. It is ticking it through this Parliament to ensure the spying agencies’ technical ability to access right into all of our communications—all the communications networks. Of course, this bill is the partner to the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) legislation, which was passed into law in August. These bills collectively are arrogant, unjustified, and fundamentally an extension of the State to intrude into the privacy and the private lives of ordinary New Zealanders. This bill is a National Government bill and I heard just before a rather P-focused and, I will call it, a Sabin-rattler, pretending that this bill has nothing to do with getting into New Zealanders’ privacy and that it has nothing to do with the USA’s National Security Agency’s illegal and very vast spying throughout the total globe, our world that we know at this point. Day after day there are new revelations.

I will just go back a little. Australia recently had a lot of heat put on to it over its spying role in some of the earlier forms of spying that the National Security Agency was up to. One was called the ThinThread. What we found was that it was actually tested in New Zealand. What do New Zealanders think of that—their privacy being invaded in order for the National Security Agency of the USA to test in New Zealand its devices for doing vast spying? Well, the agency did that. It ran it for a bit, then that was dropped, and it went to yet another system that was tried internationally as well. What we had more recently were the revelations by Edward Snowden about the PRISM system. The PRISM system allows absolutely everything to be gathered—in the way that the National Security Agency, through agencies like the GCSB, through installations such as the Waihopai spy base out in Marlborough, just across the Cook Strait there, allows that and all that information that they can collect to be gathered.

I hear various murmurings from the front bench of the Government about this. [Interruption] Yes, actually, you are dead right, Mr Joyce. This system does allow all of that and there is absolutely no doubt anymore that the Waihopai spy base is being used as part of that total international communications grab. There is no way in hang that we should be putting through a bill, this “TICS” bill, that enables that to happen all the more easily. It is actually time to tear Waihopai down. Waihopai has had its time. We said that—groups such as the Anti-Bases Campaign. The Hollow Men was pointed out earlier on as a book, but you realise that Nicky Hager, the author of that book, also did some fantastic investigative journalism that pointed out what Waihopai was doing. All we have got recently, of course, is more confirmation of that. It is time for Waihopai to be torn down.

Although this bill ostensibly says that we will just set up the structures so that the spying that is allowed by the Government Communications Security Bureau Act, which has got warrants and whatever else all around it, can happen, this bill does more than that. It ensures that there is absolutely no network that the spy agencies want to get at that will not be accessible. One thing that has come out in the news revelations recently as well with regard to organisations such as Google, Yahoo!, and others is that the cables going throughout the world under the oceans are all able to be accessed, whether or not the organisations that operate them know. So the Green Party will be opposing this bill. We are looking for the days when we have a full, independent investigation and that we close Waihopai down.

I commend the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill to the House.