Electronic Identity Verification Bill

We seem to have got to this bill, the Electronic Identity Verification Bill, with extraordinary speed this afternoon. I was actually thinking that we might not get to this bill until after the dinner break, but I am delighted that we have.

This is a bill that I was very pleased to have at our select committee, the Government Administration Committee, and one that, although it did not provoke a lot of debate and discussion in terms of the number of submissions we had, was certainly of great interest. It posed to our committee the tension that people have—perhaps not so much the younger generation; you know, people of the age of my colleague Kris Faafoi would not be as concerned as perhaps older people of my generation and even older than me—that is, the anxiety that some people feel about the use of their personal identity in an electronic form. That really was at the heart of our discussions. That tension exists because there is that anxiety, but at the same time the use of electronic procedures for people to access information—to have data or information shared for people to gain information for themselves, which may be dependent on them providing their personal identification—has huge advantages.

The balancing trick, if you like, for our committee was to consider that anxiety: that the improper use of people’s identity information—identity fraud, as we are very familiar with in this House—that the possible abuse of people’s identification, or that, by giving their personal information, some other individual being able to access information about them or others by using it could be possible. This is quite a big deal. It is an important thing. We know, for example, that there are a very large number of scams where people’s credit cards are used inappropriately—about 2,000 each day—where there is credit card fraud or identify theft, or some spam, some virus, that is given, and people have not been asked.

Of course, we have had very recent examples raised in this House of privacy breaches. We have seen a large number in Government departments, and, actually, I think we should consider ourselves fortunate that the committee considered this bill prior to the most recent major breaches of Work and Income through its kiosks, where just a regular person off the street, more or less, was able to gain access to totally inappropriate information without doing anything illegally. I think that the committee may have had a large number more submissions had it been considering this legislation at the time that the Work and Income kiosk fiasco was being undertaken.

💬 Dr David Clark: 6,300 people affected in the IRD breach.

My colleague Dr David Clark from Dunedin North has just told me there were 6,300 people identified in an Inland Revenue Department breach. So, as I say, the fact that our committee considered this bill some time ago, and it is now just getting to this Committee stage, is hugely advantageous, I think, because otherwise we may have been considering it in quite a different environment.

The principles that are outlined in Part 1 of this bill were agreed to. This had cross-party agreement. They were not difficult issues. We wanted to make sure that people were not obliged to give out their personal details in order to access information, but we knew that, as people became more confident with the system, it would certainly evolve. We had also the absolute understanding of what information was able to be shared between different agencies, obviously not for a different purpose than a person who gave that authority agreed to. Also there are other matters that people might not have considered, such as the principle of people being able to access their own history: what has their own history been used for in terms of this electronic identity credential?

There was no debate or division at all in the committee about the principles that were set up. What we were primarily concerned about was the issues I referred to earlier—that tension that exists between people electronically giving authority to access information or to share information, against the advantages that are clearly of most benefit to the Government departments and agencies in terms of convenience, in terms of lower transaction costs, but also just in terms of basic efficiency. But, actually, it is hugely advantageous to the person themselves. We all know that as things like phone banking and internet banking have evolved, no matter how much we said we actually really like the face-to-face exchanges, it is also—although face-to-face exchanges are really pleasant—very convenient for people to be able to have electronic access to a wide number of services.

I omitted earlier in this debate to acknowledge the Minister. Minister Chris Tremain is responsible for this legislation, and I just want to put on the record a note of acknowledgment to him for guiding it through to this Committee stage. I also want to acknowledge that the bill was introduced by his predecessor, the Hon Nathan Guy, and during previous discussions on this bill both have been very helpful in terms of listening to members who have spoken. I also want to acknowledge the members of the Government Administration Committee. I think over the coming weeks we will look back on this legislation with a considerable amount of fondness, because it received only a couple of submissions. To my recollection there were only 12—was it? I thought it was nine, perhaps 12. It was not very many, anyway, compared with legislation that is before our committee at the moment. The Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill is likely to exceed 12 submitters on that particular legislation, I would imagine, as we hear that bill.

I know that we have amendments later on in this debate, but I do not think there are any Supplementary Order Papers that cover any of Part 1. I hope that is the case, because I am about to conclude my contribution. I might have to take another call if there is an amendment to Part 1. But I will just conclude by saying that Labour is very pleased to support this bill. I note that the way we have dealt with it—and I hope the Minister in the chair, the Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector, is able to answer any questions that are posed to her during the Committee stage of the bill—and considered it at the committee, and made a large number of amendments that I understand have got the support of the House, should give the rest of the House confidence that the bill can progress without further amendments other than that outlined in Supplementary Order Paper 128. Thank you.

First of all, I would like to congratulate the House and wish it a happy Diwali. Today is the actual day of Diwali, which we also celebrated last week in Parliament. The Sikhs celebrate today’s date as Bandi Chhor Divas, so I wish all the Indians all over New Zealand a happy Diwali.

I would like to acknowledge the chair of the Government Administration Committee, the Hon Ruth Dyson, and other members of the committee who have worked during the select committee process. The purpose of this bill, the Electronic Identity Verification Bill, as we have shared in the second reading, is to simplify and enhance service to ordinary New Zealanders. The bill will endeavour to do so by simplifying the interaction that an individual has with Government agencies.

The bill seeks to ensure that participating agencies achieve a higher degree of confidence in the individual’s identity. This confidence is to be achieved by providing New Zealanders with the option of verifying their identity electronically. The bill provides the necessary legislative parameters for the igovt Electronic Identity Verification Service, which provides easier and more secure access to online Government services.

Once fully implemented, the service will be able to be used by all New Zealanders for a wide range of online transactions offered by the Government and private sector agencies. Using igovt will allow people to avoid repeatedly having to provide physical documents to multiple agencies in order to use online services. Currently, for these kinds of interactions agencies usually require people to provide several documents as evidence of their identity, but the bill ensures that the process is much easier while still having appropriate control and a safeguard. The Government is committed to providing people with the facilities for this modern age, and I hope this bill will be a step further. Thank you.

I want to thank members opposite and the members of the Green Party who were involved in the Electronic Identity Verification Bill, and to compliment the Hon Ruth Dyson on her chairing of the Government Administration Committee. I think this bill and a measure that will follow are bills where there was a considerable amount of agreement amongst members as to the direction. Where there were changes that we wanted to make to the legislation, there was, I think, good consideration taken of the suggestions, and the committee ended up with the sort of unanimity that can be had if people listen to evidence, consider submissions, make some changes, and act in a way that is designed to get sustainable legislation, rather than things that are highly politicised and likely to change.

The igovt identity verification service has been in place for a couple of years now, for people wanting to authenticate their identity in their interactions with the Department of Internal Affairs in respect of the Births, Deaths and Marriages registry. But it has been something that has been very limited. What this bill does is allow the service to expand in its availability to all members of the public, and allow more agencies to use this service to identify the clients. What it does, effectively, is reduce the hassle of people having to submit documents over and over again. I might say, having recently dealt with the Department of Internal Affairs on the question of a passport renewal, that the changes that have occurred in recent years around the simplification, and not having to provide the same documentation again and again on renewal, is something that I think is real progress, if it can be continued—and if we go back to what is effectively an old-fashioned notion about the indivisibility of Government. The Crown is not meant to be divisible. You deal with the Crown. I think the way that we have developed over the last 20, 30, or 50 years has been that we have been dealing with ministries and departments in their own separate silos, and in quite different ways, and with different standards, rather than dealing with the Crown as a whole. My view is that what this bill does is allow for individuals to deal with the Crown as a whole, and I think that is something that is very useful.

I think it is fair to say that since this bill was introduced there have been some questions around the security of information held by the Crown. I am not absolutely certain that this bill would have had a clean run through the select committee process if it had been introduced 3 months or 6 months later than it was. I think that at that stage there might have been quite a lot more debate around it. But my view is that the principles that are involved in it, and the legislation itself, are OK. But I think that what has happened since—and I am sure there will be further discussion as we go through the Committee stage—will mean there will be more focus on security and proper arrangements around the legislation, and on the examples of the multiple ACC leaks, both the ones that, hopefully, might be viewed as careless, out of the ACC, and those that appear to have been deliberate, which have come from sources yet to be finally established. But I think what we are focusing on at the moment is a Crown with a series of departments and other Crown entities where there are some real questions around the security of personal information. As we head into an electronic identity verification service, people will want to know that their information is not going to be accidentally disclosed through this sort of system.

It is not as if ACC has been the only case, and it is not as if Judith Collins has been the only Minister in charge of the sorts of breaches that have occurred. There have been some in the Inland Revenue Department that I regard very seriously. I think the idea that one’s information is held by the Inland Revenue Department and that it is sacrosanct is something that is very important, as it is, frankly, with Work and Income. The fact that there have been, through the various portals, the availability of, and the fact of, massive breaches is something that we will have to consider as we work our way through the legislation. Then, of course, more recently there has been the Novopay breach that became apparent over the last 4 or 5 days—the fact that a lot of personal information of individuals has been made available. I think all of those things slowly reduce people’s trust in the ability of the Crown as a whole to hold information securely. A system like this, which is a voluntary system, is going to depend on people trusting the Crown to hold the information.

I think my colleagues know that some of my views on this information are somewhat different, and I do not necessarily have strong views, as others do, in this area, in that I think there are a lot of things that would be simpler. I think a small microchip in an earring could be something that would be quite useful for people carrying their information around and sharing it with Government departments. It would mean that you could have a consistent approach and the information could be updated, and, through that—well, Mr Chairperson Tisch, I think that as a rural member you would be aware of the advantages of eartagging and the electronic systems that are available.

I might say that in my electorate the Times-7 group has some very good systems. They are somewhat questionable as to their privacy, but they use it for conference systems that show where at a particular conference individuals are. People wear a tag, either a badge or something on a lanyard around their neck, and as they go through particular doors it shows that they are at this particular seminar or that seminar. I think, unfortunately, it has shown on a number of—[Interruption] No, it is not quite the same as the badges that we carry, because one does not have to swipe these ones; one just passes through a door and one’s identity is recorded. But unfortunately for some people recently at a real estate conference in Auckland it recorded not only the fact that they went in but the fact that they went out, and on occasions people’s long absences were noted, and sometimes grouped, and that I think led to some questions of privacy, and lack thereof.

I am sure that we are not heading towards that sort of system with this, but what I hope, and it might take 5 or 10 years, and a development of trust in the Government and its ability to hold information securely, and to respect people’s privacy—[Interruption] Well, a change of Government, obviously. There has got to be a change of Government before that happens, and a building of trust. But I hope that eventually this sort of system becomes more or less universal, and that we do have standard systems that people are all prepared to be part of. I hope that in that way we have a simpler system, and we do not end up with multiple systems, with some people bringing their paper—

I will comment only briefly on Part 1 of the Electronic Identity Verification Bill. I note that it is intended to regulate the operation of the Electronic Identity Verification Service to give individuals using the internet the option of using a secure channel to verify their identities and to access services from approved Government and non-Government agencies.

I myself, like, I guess, thousands—probably tens of thousands—of New Zealanders, use the igovt service. I find that it is a service that is secure, very efficient, very usable, and a good means of doing business on the internet, which, of course, does need to be secure and also needs to protect the privacy of individuals. That is the sort of service that we need in the country to be extended to other agencies, and that is, in fact, what the bill does and intends to do. It is, therefore, one that New Zealand First enthusiastically supports. It is the way of the world these days, and it is what is expected of the Government by the public.

The provisions of the bill will expand the service to all members of the public and will allow more agencies to use the service to identify their clients. As I have already indicated, I think privacy is an extremely important aspect of this, and one that I believe, with the safeguards that have been provided in the bill, is well catered for in the way that this bill has been put together. The Privacy Commissioner also, of course, has an appropriate role.

Later I will have some comments to make on some aspects of that—in particular, some comments to make later about penalties, but that can wait until, I think, Part 3 of the bill. For the time being I wish to record New Zealand First’s overall support for the bill—indeed, enthusiastic support for the bill—which is one that will be applauded by most members of the public, especially those who use the internet a lot.

I would like to take a call in the Committee stage of this bill, the Electronic Identity Verification Bill. Part 1 is talking about the principles that lie behind this bill, and it is important to take a minute to think about what they are. They are about security of information, they are about privacy of individuals’ information, and they are also about having confidence in the system.

As we have discussed in this House a number of times, Labour supports this bill, and we support the intent behind it. It is not a majorly controversial bill, but what is controversial is the adequacy of information management systems in Government agencies—whether the public thinks that those systems are secure, whether individuals’ information is actually kept private, and whether there is public confidence in the system. I put to you today in this Committee that I do not think we can have any confidence right now that, right across the Government agencies, there are adequate systems in place to ensure that those principles are being upheld.

The bill actually talks about secure channels of information for individuals using the internet, it talks about accessing services from approved agencies, and it talks about containing minimal personal information. I think in the current context all of those phrases should be ringing warning bells. I think one of my colleagues actually tweeted today in relation to the Government’s management of the economy and jobs and described it as an omnishambles, which I thought was a very apt term. But I thought it was just as apt, if not more apt, in relation to this issue, which is essentially about the adequacy and the security of individuals’—of citizens’—private information in Government agencies and how that is being accessed.

That is what this bill is about, so I think, in terms of providing a recipe for confidence in the ability of the Government to deliver a secure verification service of any kind, that today that is a bit of a joke. I wonder how the Government members can sit across there with straight faces and debate this bill while they have got enormous holes in IT systems—across at least four of their main agencies—that concern the privacy of New Zealanders’ information. I would also say that I think the confidence of the public in these systems has been shaken, if not lost.

In defence of the bill, this service has been in place since December 2009—so it is not as if it is a completely new service that is being introduced—so that people can authenticate their identities and their interactions with the Department of Internal Affairs, but in a very limited capacity. This bill is going to expand the availability of that service to all members of the public and allow more agencies to use the service to identify their clients, and I think that is where the warning bells should currently be ringing until—until—it can be demonstrated that the public of New Zealand can be reassured that this system is going to provide the security that is required. That is why Labour introduced a member’s bill into the ballot last week titled the Electronic Data Safety Bill, which goes to the very heart of this issue.

I know that other colleagues are going to reference some of the other agencies that have been affected, but recently, as we all know, a member of the public was able to download more than 7,000 documents from the Ministry of Social Development’s network through the Work and Income self-service kiosks. Those documents included very sensitive information, such as medical invoices about children in the care of Child, Youth and Family, personal information about people receiving benefits, the names of people being investigated for benefit fraud, the name of a person who had committed suicide, and pay rates for individual contractors employed by the Ministry of Social Development. Those things are very serious. Previous breaches have occurred in other agencies. We know they have occurred in the Inland Revenue Department, we know they have occurred in ACC, and we know they are occurring currently in the Novopay system through the Ministry of Education. Previous breaches in other agencies have highlighted the need for a systematic inquiry into the adequacy of information management systems in all Government agencies, which is what this bill seeks to address.

So by all means let us put this bill through the House, but, before we do that, let us have a bit of a look at the adequacy of information management systems across all Government agencies so that the people of New Zealand can be reassured. Let us put in place and make sure that there is an adequate system for information management across all Government agencies, that they have robust protocols, that they are resourced adequately with the correct level of skills, and that that management system has a governance that transcends the individual agencies, and then let us look at bringing this particular bill through the House.

I would say that the big issue for us to be discussing right now is the culture. This is a culture issue around privacy and security in the Government agencies. It is the responsibility of the Government to ensure that that culture is the right culture to ensure that the privacy and security of information can be assured. That is what needs to be changed within the public sector if we are going to stop these sorts of things happening.

Just going back to the Ministry of Social Development kiosk debacle, the thing is that we know that the report showed that the issue was known about back in 2009 and that people were reminded a number of times about it. The report that was commissioned was good, but we need to be assured that the ministry is actually going to take note of all the recommendations that have been made and of all the security-related issues that have been identified. The issues that were identified in 2009 were paid lip-service to, essentially. They still pressed ahead with the kiosks. They called the network issues an acceptable risk. But if there was proper IT governance and accountability, it just simply would not have happened. That accountability and governance need to happen at the highest possible levels. The project should not have progressed until it had been signed off by somebody senior who was an accountable professional and who could make damn sure there was a proper elevation structure in place that did not proceed with those issues unresolved. That is what the problem is.

If we are looking at introducing and widening another system, which is what we are debating today, then where is the accountability on it, and where is the accountability on the other side of the House around all of these issues at the highest possible level, not just in one agency but across all of those agencies? It has been put to me by the industry that as with every other profession and vocation, there is professional accountability. It is imperative that the Government is involved in ensuring that there is a minimum level of experience, education, and ethics for senior professionals who are in a position to sign off major projects, and then holds them professionally accountable for those standards in the same way as in every other field.

I would like to put it to you today that although this bill is supported by Labour, it is raising warning bells again around another system that is being put in place without the appropriate measures behind the system that is being widened. In at least four major agencies across this Government there are serious systemic problems, and they need to be addressed.

It is a pleasure and, indeed, a privilege to stand and speak in favour of this particular bill, the Electronic Identity Verification Bill. I too would like to acknowledge the chairmanship of Ruth Dyson and the contribution by, actually, all members of the Government Administration Committee. It is a neat little select committee, the Government Administration Committee. It is small. It allows for a lot of consideration and a lot of good debate. We have an interesting blend of experience. A bill like this one, in spite of the last two speakers’ contributions, is basically not really a partisan bill. It allows for open consideration. Indeed, that was the way it was handled. It was a pleasure to handle. It was particularly good to receive the carefully considered responses of officials to the points we raised, and there were a number of issues that were taken into account. So from that point of view, as I said, it has been a pleasure to be involved with this bill.

I have been listening carefully to the contributions that have been given so far, and I think there were some take-home points brought up by the Hon Trevor Mallard, who said that there is anxiety over electronic sharing. That was something that we very carefully considered in considering this bill. Listening to the last speaker, Clare Curran, she went to some extent to express her concern. Indeed, I was put in mind to some extent of H G Wells’ The First Men in the Moon and the concern about Selenites and central control. I was reminded of Nineteen Eighty-Four, George Orwell’s novel of the horrors of our future, and, indeed, of Alvin Toffler’s Future Shock. In the film of it, they had Orson Welles smoking and shrieking out: “We live in an age of anxiety. We are the victims of our own technological strengths. We are the victims of future shock.” I can remember when Future Shock came out. It gave people a little bit of concern. Life did not actually turn out that way, though. Life did not turn out that way.

Although I think the criticism that has been expressed by the previous speakers of things that have gone wrong is fair, let us remember that it is always important to view systems with great care, and with great recognition of human error, technological deficiencies, and unforeseen vulnerabilities. This is what happens when you introduce new systems. The development of trust is something that will come only, in my view, with experience. I do not make light of the seriousness of the technological errors that have occurred and have been referred to today, but it does, let us remember, take an exception to prove the rule. It is not as if the problems that have occurred have been ignored. They have been and are being attended to, and were taken very seriously.

So with this particular bill, what does it do? Let us look at Part 1. Basically, the bill contributes to the Government’s reforms to achieve better public services—in particular, result 10 of the Better Public Services programme, which is that “New Zealanders can complete their transactions with the Government easily in a digital environment.” I remember being approached by a constituent in Motueka, who said that I could repeat his story. It is the story of his son, who is in his 20s. His son has an incurable condition, and it requires him to liaise frequently with up to six or eight Government departments. He consistently has to produce fresh identification information in hard copy—original documents, and all that sort of thing—on a very frequent basis. It is tedious. It just emphasises to the family again that he has this difficulty in which he is not going to get improvement. One of the consistent questions that he is asked is whether his condition has improved. He has a condition that will not improve. And so I think back to him, when I see that invalids who repeatedly need to supply information will be able to do so electronically using this identification system. I think of all the times when, as a rural-based JP, we had people come fair distances for me to verify copies of identification. All these things will be far better dealt with. The other parts of the debate—

It is always a pleasure to follow Mr Auchinvole. As he started with a pop culture and film reference, I would like to do the same and remind everyone of that movie in the early 2000s Enemy of the State. It is a good movie, where Will Smith, a simple US lawyer, had his identity stolen. Although that was a beaten-up Hollywood story, there is serious concern—

💬 Andrew Little: I thought it was a documentary!

—it was not a documentary, it was a Hollywood film—out in the community and tension in the community. As my colleague the Hon Ruth Dyson mentioned, now we are living in a much increased digital age, people are very concerned about the worry of identity theft. We have all received those emails from the ASB bank, or whatever bank you may be a customer of, asking for your details. We know to just delete them, but unfortunately there are some people out there who do respond to them, and find themselves having their bank accounts cleaned out.

I want to just reiterate also at the beginning a theme that a number of my colleagues have mentioned, and that is that the journey of the Electronic Identity Verification Bill would have been much different if it had happened in the context of recent events around the security of information at a number of Government departments. They have been mentioned and I will revisit them later. I would imagine that if this bill had gone through the select committee process in that context, there would have been a lot more opposition and scrutiny of the details of this bill—

💬 Andrew Little: A lot more evidence.

—a lot more evidence, and a lot more submissions than just the 12 that the Government Administration Committee received. Kudos to the select committee. Apparently it worked well to ensure that this legislation was improved, and it has arrived, as Mr Auchinvole mentioned in a non-partisan fashion, before Parliament in a much better state than when it arrived at the first reading.

Ruth Dyson did say that there was some tension between the digital age and concern around privacy, but I think there is also a fair bit of concern in the community around the digital age and frustration amongst the public at having to repeatedly physically offer up documentation around their identity. I know we have all probably had people in our electorate offices who are sick and tired of having to repeatedly supply that, whether it be their address, their birth certificate, or their marriage certificate. As Trevor Mallard mentioned, this is something that is being rolled out to make sure that we can improve efficiency, relieve some frustration in the community, and streamline the process when we are dealing with the likes of Births, Deaths and Marriages in the Department of Internal Affairs.

I want to point to the bill and to Part 1, clause 3(1)—the purpose clause—“The purpose of this Act is to facilitate secure interactions (particularly online interactions) between individuals on the one hand and participating agencies on the other.” I just want to focus in on those two words “secure interactions”, and take stock of the recent events that have happened with the Ministry of Social Development and the kiosks that Keith Ng accessed. He managed to download from those kiosks 7,000 documents, which were publicly available to anyone who walked into a Work and Income office around the country. For this igovt system to work, our public need absolute confidence that their basic details are going to be held securely within the departments concerned. Although Mr Auchinvole did have a bit of a gibe, I think it is absolutely appropriate for the Opposition to point out that the Government should take stock of what happened in those instances and look very closely as to the security of the information that is concerned here.

When we have got a large ministry like the Ministry of Social Development having publicly available kiosks where 7,000 documents can be accessed by anyone off the street—and we are talking about the names of people who have committed suicide, invoices, medical records—you have to start questioning the capability of the Government to manage information within our Public Service. That is a fair question to ask—absolutely fair. And you put that in the context of other ministries that have come out and absolutely and utterly—and rightly so—confessed that they have had privacy breaches as well. I understand that the Ministry of Justice came to the fore and said: “Look, we’ve had a potential breach as well.” My colleague Dr David Clark has talked about the 6,300 individuals affected by a privacy breach in the Inland Revenue Department.

I think it is absolutely appropriate in the context of this bill, which we support and hope that the Government can bring in and get right, that we ask the questions as the Opposition to make sure that the security of this information is going to be appropriate. There is, as I said, massive concern out there in the community about the privacy of personal information and about identity theft. I think that the confidence of the public has been shaken by those misgivings about the Ministry of Social Development, and I think they are disappointed that this could happen to such a large extent. The nature of the information that was let out through those kiosks and the sheer number of documents that have been accessed really did shake the confidence of the public in the ability of the Government to protect this basic information.

This legislation is a sign of the times. We are going to have more and more of this type of information as we are well and truly into the digital age. As our lives change to have more online transactions, we are going to have more and more legislation in this House to govern those transactions and how we interact online, so we need to get these kinds of things right. That is why we in this Chamber, although we are standing in support of this bill, need to make sure that we ask the appropriate questions so that the public out there who are going to be interacting with the Department of Internal Affairs, and important departments like Births, Deaths and Marriages and Passports, have absolute confidence that their information is being securely looked after.

Identity theft is a major worry. We actually had a member of a former Parliament in here who many, many years ago committed what I believe was a case of identity theft. Identity theft is not new, but I think it is due to the fact that we are living in an age where information can be much more easily accessed online that it is becoming much more pervasive in our community. That is why I think this bill is certainly apt.

The ability to opt out of the system is important, because although I think about 86 percent of New Zealanders are doing something online, not everyone is confident that they want to put all their details—whether they be bank account details, birth details, or anything like that—online. So we need to make sure that there is the option, the ability for those who are not confident to transact on the internet to opt out and to be able to do things more traditionally—more old-school, as you might say—to ensure that their needs can be looked after in an age when much more is going to be done online.

We also need to think about those people who, because of their financial ability, cannot transact online. I know that there are certainly a lot of families in my community in the electorate of Mana who do not have the ability to have internet accessibility, who do not have a computer at home. We are hoping that we can make that much more accessible for them, but until then they do not have the ability to transact online with the likes of the Department of Internal Affairs, so we need to make sure that the ability is still there for them to do what they have traditionally done—some may find that frustrating—and be able to interact offline with the Department of Internal Affairs.

Also, as my colleague Ruth Dyson said as aged-care spokesperson for the Labour Party, there are a lot of older people in New Zealand who, although they may be proficient online, and they may be able to do some simple things online, would not be confident to be able to do the likes of the transactions with the Department of Internal Affairs that we are talking about here. So we need to make sure that they have the ability to do that.

Just to conclude, we do support this bill. We are very concerned in the context of recent events around the privacy breaches that have happened under this Government’s watch with Work and Income and with the Accident Compensation Corporation. One that I have not mentioned is the Ministry of Education and Novopay, which is obviously a big concern. Those members over there will know that they have got teachers in their electorates who are very upset about privacy breaches and also their inability to get paid. So in that context we hope that the Government does take heed of the warnings that this party has made in terms of making sure they get the security of information right and making sure they do that properly.

I move, That the question be now put.

Motion agreed to.

Part 1 agreed to.

Part 2 Electronic identity verification