New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill

I rise to take a call on Part 1 of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill. Points have already been made in earlier parts of the debate about how it was unfortunate that submissions on the bill to the Intelligence and Security Committee were heard in secret. I think the unnecessary nature of that secrecy is emphasised by the number of people who are in the gallery today. The number of people present in the gallery today indicates that the Government need not have been too worried about hearing the original submissions on the bill at the committee in public. I do not think the committee would have been overrun by unruly behaviour. In fact, there would have been a transparent process that would give some of the critics of the legislation some confidence that nothing untoward was going on through this bill.

I will focus on, and ask the Minister in the chair, the Attorney-General, to address, clause 5A of the bill. It is a matter that I referred to in my contribution on the first reading of the bill, which is the drafting relating to proposed new section 4AAA(2), inserted by clause 5A. Section 4AAA(1) was inserted into the bill at the recommendation of the committee upon the submissions of, amongst others, the Human Rights Commission. It makes it clear that in performing its functions under the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act, the Security Intelligence Service: “(a) contributes to keeping New Zealand society secure, independent, and free and democratic: (b) contributes to the participation of New Zealand in the maintenance of international security: (c)”—this is more relevant to the question I am coming to—“acts—(i) in accordance with New Zealand law and all human rights standards recognised by New Zealand law, except to the extent that they are, in relation to national security, modified by an enactment: (ii) in the discharge of its operational functions, independently and impartially: (iii) with integrity and professionalism: (iv) in a manner that facilitates effective democratic oversight.”

It is a wise addition to set out some principles that underlie the performance of the Security Intelligence Service, but I just wonder whether the wording of subsection (2) is so broad as to render nugatory subsection (1). Subsection (2) goes on to state: “Subsection (1) does not impose particular duties on, or give particular powers to, the Security Intelligence Service, the Director, any employee of the Service, or the Minister.” So my question for the Minister—and the officials whom we seem to have in the Chamber in support of the Minister seem to be rather secret at the moment—

💬 Hon Christopher Finlayson: Can’t you seem them?

I cannot see them, no.

💬 Chris Hipkins: New technology.

Well, secret service powers are obviously being used. This must be some device that has come from either KAOS or the other side. The Cone of Silence does not seem to be working today, but the invisibility cloak is.

It rests upon the Minister, then, to address this issue himself and to explain how subsection (2) does not make a complete nonsense of the very fine sentiments expressed in subsection (1). I ask the Minister to explain how subsection (1) does not impose any particular duties or give particular powers. I am not too worried about the powers; I am worried about whether it imposes particular duties on the “Security Intelligence Service, the Director, any employee of the Service, or the Minister” and what that means. If it means that there are some general duties or general obligations to comply with these laws that are referred to and that act in accordance with New Zealand—

Debate interrupted.