Electoral (Disqualification of Convicted Prisoners) Amendment Bill

I move, That the Electoral (Disqualification of Convicted Prisoners) Amendment Bill be now read a first time. At the appropriate time I intend to move that this bill be considered by the Law and Order Committee. The bill comes before the House because a large number of ordinary folk have asked me to introduce it. They have discussed this matter with me and believe that that should be the case. I have to say that since the bill has become public knowledge, the level of support for it has been overwhelming. I think that speaks volumes about the mood of the community in getting behind this bill. I acknowledge that there has been some muffled criticisms, but most of them have come from prisoner aid - type organisations. I am sure, should I be fortunate enough to see this bill go to the select committee, that those organisations will have the opportunity to make their presentations then.

At this stage it is quite useful to canvass the history of where we are today with regard to this particular bill. Historically, the idea of voting was considered a privilege, but through the 20th century we moved to the situation where voting became a right. Until 1975 the law was that any person detained in a penal institution pursuant to a conviction was disqualified from voting. In 1975 that law was changed, and for a period of 2 years, the law enabled some prisoners to vote. But in 1977 that law was repealed, and we went back to the old situation where prisoners could not vote.

I think it is important to pause for a moment and reflect on the concept of imprisonment and what it is about. Imprisonment was looked on as a temporary exclusion of a person from the community and from the rights associated with membership within that community. I think the nub of this discussion is that very thought. The 1986 report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System proffered a different view, with the somewhat simplified statement that “contemporary penal theory is generally opposed to the view that imprisonment entails a general suspension of the rights of citizenship.” That view was based on the 1981 Report of the Penal Policy Review Committee, which noted that the fundamental principle relating to a prisoner’s rights “must be that a prisoner retains the ordinary rights of a citizen, insofar as they are consistent with his loss of liberty and the requirements necessary for his proper containment and management in the institution.”

In my view, the royal commission demolished its own academic notion by then wanting to demonstrate the point by saying that a prisoner is entitled to be married. What it did not say, of course, is that when a prisoner goes into prison he loses his conjugal rights. The truth is that almost all of our laws impose a restriction to a greater or lesser extent on our freedoms. A classic restriction here is the right of freedom of association. We have a law that can convict people for unlawful assembly, which is defined as “an assembly of 3 or more persons who, with intent to carry out any common purpose, assemble in such a manner, or so conduct themselves when assembled, as to cause persons in the neighbourhood of the assembly to fear, on reasonable grounds, …”. The fact of the matter is that one person’s fear is another person’s pleasure, but society has made a conscious decision to say that we believe there should be some restrictions around freedom of association.

There are many other examples where we restrict people’s rights. In fact, we require people to license dogs. Here we have another restriction on people’s freedom. Fortunately the royal commission acknowledged that offending at some stage reaches such a serious nature that the community has a right to object. It then said that it believed there was a line where, if people crossed it, they should lose their vote. It then asked what would be a reasonable period. Do members know what the royal commission said? It said that when people go overseas for more than 3 years, they lose their right to vote—that is a good benchmark. That is the reason that the benchmark is 3 years. Someone who has exercised their right and privilege to go overseas for more than 3 years loses their right to vote, so they used that as the benchmark for a prisoner’s right to vote. I say that it is an absolute nonsense to compare someone has exercised their freedom of choice to someone who has committed a crime against the community. Sadly, in my view it reflects the lack of understanding of grassroots feeling about the academic notions of people who make those decisions.

I should canvass briefly the view of the Solicitor-General, who discussed this issue in respect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. He supported the same position as the royal commission.

Debate interrupted.

The House adjourned at 10 p.m.