Succession (Homicide) Bill

In rising to support the third reading of the Succession (Homicide) Bill, which is intended to codify the law that precludes a person who unlawfully kills another person from benefiting from the death of that person, I want to mention just a couple of cautions. I had mentioned these in the Committee stage of the bill and I would have to admit that they were brushed aside somewhat carelessly and indeed, in my mind, recklessly. My concern, as raised initially not only by me but by some of the submissions, concerns the fact that this bill does not take any account of differing degrees of moral culpability. The bill itself defines “homicide” as “the killing of a person … intentionally or recklessly by any means that would be an offence under New Zealand law, … but does not include (a) a killing caused by negligent act or omission; or (b) infanticide … or (c) a killing of a person by another in pursuance of a suicide pact; or (d) an assisted suicide”.

This code, this bill, has a degree of inflexibility. Bearing in mind that flexibility of laws must always be balanced with certainty, I note that with any inflexible law there is always the danger of unintended consequences of harsh and perhaps even unreasonable results. To illustrate this, I repeat some of the examples I gave in earlier addresses on the bill. There may be domestic killings that, on compassionate grounds, do not have the same moral abhorrence as a cold-blooded murder. A battered woman, abused over a long period of time, may suddenly snap and kill the abuser with whom she may have shared and owned a house. Under this bill, she would not inherit her share of that family house. Is it fair that she is treated exactly the same as a cold-blooded serial killer? Or is it fair that the judge be given discretion and, although not condoning such a situation, at least give some understanding and compassion to the issue? Why should the judge not be able to determine that in such a circumstance, extraordinary though it may be—and extraordinary it would have to be—the abused woman would be subject to punishment but would not also lose her family home, to which she would have been entitled?

In the case of a person convicted of failing to provide the necessities of life for some reason—again, in very extraordinary circumstances—is there any reason why a judge could not exercise a discretion if he or she finds that the moral culpability is at the lower end of the scale, and therefore enable any inheritance to stand?

My last example was that of the reckless driver. Let us suppose he has a car accident, recklessly but not necessarily negligently—recklessness has a higher threshold than negligence—and kills his loving wife. He is punished enough by losing his wife. He is punished enough by being convicted of recklessness. Does he really need to be punished again by being deprived of the ability to inherit his share of the family home—something his deceased wife would have wanted in any event? These situations could so easily have been provided for by inserting a simple proviso for the judge to have discretion in exceptional circumstances. That would not go so far as to condone any killing, because any killing, whatever the circumstances, should not be so condoned, but it would merely provide that, after taking into account all the evidence and all the circumstances, there may be exceptional enough circumstances whereby it is right that the killer should be able to inherit.

I raise these matters again now because when I raised them initially the answers I received came in two somewhat surprising versions. Firstly, we were told that “given the wide-ranging definition of homicide in the legislation, there is probably sufficient flexibility for a judge to do justice in individual cases with the flexibility afforded.” I do not agree that there is that much flexibility in the definition, and, more important, I am not convinced that it is usual for a judge to look first at the penalty and then decide the offence. That, I would have to suggest, is totally the wrong way round. The penalty should fit the crime, not the crime fit the penalty.

The other reason or justification that was suggested by the Government in earlier debates to my example of the reckless driver was that “Recklessness is included because it involves an element of intention.” Actually, no; it does not. Being reckless is not caring whether something happens. There is no intention component to recklessness. A reckless driver does not intend to kill. His actions are such that he is reckless whether or not death results. In fact, the Crimes Act definition of murder or culpable homicide is: “if the offender means to cause to the person killed any bodily injury that is known by the offender to be likely to cause death, and is reckless whether death ensues or not:”. There is not an intention component to recklessness. In fact, if we look at the actual offence of reckless driving, we see that there is no intent to kill by driving. It is driving in a manner that is or might be dangerous but in which the driver gives no thought to whether it is dangerous. In other words, he is reckless as to the consequences, but there is not intent. So to exclude “recklessness” in the definition of homicide in this bill because someone erroneously thought recklessness involves intent is misguided at best, reckless at worst, but certainly careless as to the consequences.

The other issue I have with this bill is in relation to the burden of proof. Currently, for a person to be convicted of murder, the burden of proof is the criminal burden, namely “beyond reasonable doubt”. Yet under this bill, for the purposes of benefiting from the murderer’s estate, one need only to prove murder on the balance of probabilities—in other words, the civil burden of proof. I find that these mixtures of the burdens of proof are somewhat concerning, and we certainly have a similar issue with the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Bill. A murderer, for example, could be acquitted of murder on the basis of beyond reasonable doubt, but, for the purposes of this bill, could be deemed guilty on the balance of probabilities. I am not convinced that this is good law or good justice. On the lesser burden of proof, an innocent person could be deprived of his or her rightful inheritance.

On top of that, there is the issue of the time delays that it may take to even get the matter to court. We constantly hear of the court logjams, of median waiting times of 200, 300, or 400 days. For the administration of an estate to be delayed or deferred for a year or more may certainly be unconscionable and unreasonable and lead to harsh effects, especially in relation to the beneficiaries of that estate.

I will repeat what the New Zealand Law Society submitted on the bill, which was that the society “acknowledges the need for legislation to regulate the common law principle that precludes a killer from benefiting financially from the death of his or her victim” but it “opposes the proposed codification in its present form, because it takes insufficient account of differing degrees of moral culpability … it is concerned that an inflexible code will lead to harsh results in certain circumstances.” At this stage I point out that the code does differ from other approaches in the UK and in some Australian states, which do in fact give the courts a discretion to modify the rules except in cases where the moral culpability of the killer did not warrant the application of the rules. In other words, if the circumstances are extraordinary enough, then the judge has a suitable discretion.

So although we support the bill, there are still fishhooks in it. But the intent of the bill is right. A person should not benefit from his or her own unlawful action or from the death of the very person he or she is responsible for killing. The bill is supported.

Kia ora, Mr Deputy Speaker. Kia ora tātou katoa i te Whare. I thank the previous speaker, Kate Wilkinson, for some of the points she raised. There were some very good points there.

The Māori Party will also be supporting the Succession (Homicide) Bill, which aims to tidy up the law around killers not being able to inherit from their victims’ estates. We do so because, like others, we believe that those who commit crimes should not benefit from the outcomes of those crimes. But we are also interested to note that such an important issue as the law on succession has been treated with rather a careless disregard for its significance and for the significance of the advisory bodies that provide the Government with much of its guidance. I am talking here about the Law Commission, which investigates and reports back to Parliament on how laws can be improved, including the laws and processes constituting succession law. The Waitangi Tribunal, whose role is laid out in the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, is similar to the Law Commission in that it is also charged with inquiring into and making recommendations on claims, and examining and reporting on proposed legislation.

We see, when we look at the commission and the tribunal, how sometimes Government can be fickle in dealing with the authority of these bodies. With the Waitangi Tribunal, for instance, we see recommendations ignored, urgent directives treated with disdain, and findings denied. In fact, members of this House may recall the comment of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination that recommendations made by the Waitangi Tribunal are generally not binding, and that only a small percentage of those recommendations are followed by the Government. The committee also stated outright that such arrangements deprived claimants of a right to an effective remedy and weakened their position when entering into negotiations with the Crown. It went so far as to recommend that Government consider granting the Waitangi Tribunal legally binding powers to deal with Treaty matters and providing the tribunal with increased financial resources.

As it has been with the tribunal, so too we see that the Law Commission is poorly treated in its role of enhancing and improving legislation, such that its recommendations can take up to 10 years to see the light of day, as it was with its July 1977 report Succession Law: Homicidal Heirs. The Law Commission had responded to a request from the Minister and in 1997 recommended that Parliament codify our homicidal heirs laws in one plain-language statute through the legislation we are considering today. The commission did its job; it was the Government that dragged the chain.

In much the same way, a major report produced by Pat Hōhepa and David Williams called The Taking into Account of Te Ao Māori in Relation to Reform of the Law of Succession: A Working Paper, published by the Law Commission in 1996, was also ignored by the Government in considering this bill. Specifically ignored was one of the report’s key recommendations that Government engage in specific consultation with Māori.

I was present, too, at the Justice and Electoral Committee to speak on the issue of Māori land succession. Under Te Ture Whenua Maori Act, Māori landowners can will their land to people in their whānau. I note where the select committee stated: “We are satisfied that Māori land succession under that Act would not be unduly affected by this bill.” The House is aware of the importance of using correct terminology. I cite again a recent Waitangi Tribunal report on Tāmaki-makau-rau as a case for using the correct language to convey accurate meaning. In that report, the tribunal warned against using loaded language such as referring to claimants as overlapping or cross-claimants rather than properly referring to them as other tangata whenua groups in Tāmaki-makau-rau.

In much the same way we need also to be careful about the language we use in the commentaries and debates in this House. Although the debate on the issue concluded that the use of the lazy adverb “unduly” was inappropriate, it still remains on the record from the commentary back to the House. Although we were assured that the application of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act was absolutely unaffected by this legislation, we still need to be clear in this final reading that Māori land succession under Te Ture Whenua Maori Act will not be affected by this bill.

Another issue of interpretation was the point raised by the National Council of Women in its submission about the lack of clarity around the definition of homicide in this bill. The first clause of the definition of homicide says that homicide does not include “a killing caused by negligent act or omission;”. The National Council of Women’s concern was that causing death by deliberate negligence should also be included, as in the case of a person driving recklessly and causing the deaths of passengers in the car. This was a point raised by Age Concern in respect of elder abuse and the New Zealand Police Association, as well. The committee report did not really deal adequately with these matters and there are certain grounds for further work on the issues and interpretations around neglect and acts of negligence.

A final note on the matter of interpretation, which we have raised previously, is the impact of clause 7 on our whakapapa, particularly our concern that a person’s conviction for murder not disenfranchise his or her tamariki or mokopuna from their rightful inheritance. We sincerely hope that these issues will be properly dealt with in the operational enactment of this bill to ensure all parties understand the implications of this important legislation.

The Māori Party supports the principle that no one should gain from an act of wrongdoing as an important principle of moral and social significance. Although this bill is dealing with the extreme end of wrongdoing, we will support it at its third reading. Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker.

I rise to speak in support of the Succession (Homicide) Bill at its third reading. Again, as I did in my former speech, I acknowledge the assistance from the members of the Justice and Electoral Committee and also the hard-working support team, staff, and advisers, and a number of people who assisted with this bill. It was a difficult bill because it is not the most pleasant of subjects to be dealing with in a select committee. The principle that no one should profit by being a killer is not exactly a subject that one finds the most enjoyable to discuss at a select committee. Despite that, I believe it is a very important bill, because, as the previous speaker Hone Harawira said, it is really repugnant to think that someone would go through the act of killing somebody and then profit from that action. It is certainly a settled principle in New Zealand law that that is the case, but this legislation is really to clarify those uncertainties that could often have led to quite costly and time-consuming litigation at a time when family members and friends are under considerable stress, distress, and anxiety. For those people to have to go through a process around those uncertainties at that time is not a good thing, so I am really pleased that this bill clarifies those uncertainties.

Again, the legislation is based on work that the Law Commission carried out, this time in 1997, in which it recommended clarifying and codifying the law in regard to homicide. The bill is a very clear following of the Law Commission’s recommendations. A perpetrator who intentionally or recklessly kills another person or an unborn child will now be excluded from any profit from that act. Such people will not be able to run an argument that they should be entitled to profit—that exclusion is quite absolute. Thus the property of the deceased will be distributed as if that killer had died before the victim, so the killer is in no way eligible. Those who kill by negligence, or in other ways such as suicide pacts or assisted suicide, will not necessarily be excluded from profiting. That is because they are not so morally repugnant as, I guess, a cold-blooded killer. Also, those who kill their abuser—battered women or children, for example—will also be able to profit if they are found not guilty of murder.

So those are the few instances where they are—

💬 Dr Wayne Mapp: What if they are found guilty?

That is just a silly question from a silly person over the other side of the House. At the time of quite a serious bill, that member is sitting there chattering away and calling out silly comments like that. He should just be ashamed of himself. I think it is appalling, I really do. I stood in this House before talking about women’s rights and had another inane butting-in from that member on that instance. I think that if he perhaps concentrated on trying to find out what his party’s policies were and stopped chipping in and making a fool of himself in this House, things would be a bit better for everybody.

To go back to the bill, I say that if someone is convicted of homicide, the bill uses that conviction as conclusive evidence that the killer was criminally responsible for the victim’s death. That clarifies things very well. The Wills Bill was recently passed by this House, and it was considered by the Justice and Electoral Committee. That legislation, alongside this bill, improves the framework governing succession law.

I really cannot think of much more to say, except that I am really pleased to see this bill go through its third and final reading. The submission process was quite emotional at times, but everybody in this House would accept that the last thing that a family needs when it is mourning the loss of a loved one is a legal debate over the distribution of the estate, and particularly a legal argument with the very killer who was responsible for the death of their loved one. I believe that this legislation will reduce the number of disputes in these instances, and also reduce the scope of any disputes that arise. It is with pleasure that I stand in this House and commend this bill. Thank you.

I was not actually going to take a call in this third reading debate, because pretty much everything that needs to be said about the Succession (Homicide) Bill, which is an eminently sensible bill, has been said. I was caught somewhat off guard in listening to a speech from Kate Wilkinson. I swear to God I thought it was a Labour speech coming from out of her mouth, which is interesting. I will have to make sure the speech is published down in Canterbury for all those National Party farmers to read. I know that people down in the National Party heartland, or that part of the Waimakariri that one could rightly say is pro-National, will be just as curious in reading that speech in Hansard as I was in listening to it. That speech forced me to go back and read the select committee report again. I am now doing so with a great deal of emphasis, particularly because of Simon Power’s really outrageous statements as a result of the passage of the Criminal Justice Reform Bill, which was subsequently split off into a number of bills, one of which was the Bail Amendment Bill of 2007.

We in this House often say that the select committees are the engine room of Parliament. Within the select committees we sit on a cross-party basis. Although we may take opposing views on some aspects of some bills, or on some bills in their entirety, that is where we try to thrash out the bills, and through recommendations and agreements—or not—clearly identify the areas that we can change, that we can agree on, and that we can work on, and clearly mark out the parts that we do not agree on.

So with Ms Wilkinson’s speech ringing in my ears I went back and reread the select committee report, because I thought I had missed something. But I know that throughout the report it states: “We recommend”, not “The majority of us recommend”, not “Labour, the Greens, and the Māori Party recommend”; it states: “We recommend”, which includes National. I searched in vain for a minority report where National identified with passion the areas that its members disagreed with. I could not find this minority report, because it does not exist. So everything that Ms Kate Wilkinson has now stridently argued for, she had no regard for whatsoever during the select committee phase. In fact, it was of such great moment that she did not write anything about it.

💬 Hon Lianne Dalziel: She wasn’t even there!

Well, Chris Auchinvole was there, Christopher Finlayson was there, Nicky Wagner was there, and Dr Richard Worth was there. Dr Worth is an eminent lawyer who is telling people around the country that he fully expects to be the Attorney-General. But that is a bit of a problem, because Simon Power told me he was going to be the Attorney-General in the next Government.

💬 Chris Auchinvole: Richard wasn’t there.

Well, Richard was there until 6 December 2006. It is written here, and I say to Mr Auchinvole that the select committee does not lie. Mr Auchinvole was there, and I do not see National’s minority report highlighting the issues that Ms Wilkinson was talking about. So either Mr Auchinvole is going to get a slap on the ear from Ms Wilkinson later on for being tardy in his work, or she is not being at all serious. I am inclined to think she is not being serious, and that fits very perfectly with Simon Power’s outrageous claims about the Bail Amendment Bill, which he now says makes it easier for everyone to get bail.

Let us analyse the only reason Mr Power gave for voting against that bill. His reason was contained in his speech, and it said: “We do not think the Bail Amendment Bill is going to do much, at all.” End of story! It was not a case of: “We think the Bail Amendment Bill is going to make it easier for people to get bail who should not get bail. We think it is outrageous and we oppose it at every step because…”. Well, that argument—

💬 Hon Mark Burton: At the Committee stage he said he was going to support it.

At the Committee stage he said he would support the Bail Amendment Bill. This is political opportunism and convenience so hollow that one could write a book about it. One could title it—let me think—The Hollow Men. One could probably persuade someone to write a play about it, and, who knows, even a movie. Let us hope that movie will be released in election year next year, because, by crikey, we all want to see that.

I simply say that we in New Zealand First absolutely and unreservedly support this bill. We have no comments to make of any adverse nature about it. We think the select committee’s unanimous recommendations were clearly taken on board by the Government, clearly understood, and clearly accepted. Therefore, any rhetoric about reservations about battered woman’s syndrome and about poor old homicidal persons who unfortunately kill someone being sorely misrepresented and not duly considered are meaningless.

We believe that this bill is actually long, long overdue. There should have been an adjustment made in this House some time ago. We have only to think about a case down in Dunsandel where a man killed his wife, supposedly in a burning Land Rover, and supposedly it was an accident but he stood to gain very, very well from it. There are a range of other cases where people have stood to gain from their heinous crimes. This House should have been moving on this long before I came to this House—things should have been adjusted at that time. But this Government has moved. The select committee unanimously, without any reservation, reported back to the House that it too concurred that this legislation, as amended, should proceed. New Zealand First endorses that view. We do not expect to hear any rhetoric out on the street about the weaknesses of it, because clearly there were none. If there had been weaknesses, Mr Auchinvole, Dr Worth, and Mr Finlayson would clearly have said so in a minority report, would they not?

I express some disappointment at Ron Mark’s comments, because he stole my speech. That was exactly what I was going to say. After listening to Kate Wilkinson speak in this House so vehemently about the concerns she had about the Succession (Homicide) Bill, I thought there had to be a minority report in this select committee report. So I grabbed a copy of the bill off the Table and I searched through the report, which was not a lengthy one. I went all the way through the report and got to the appendix, and there was nothing about a minority report. Even a “minority minority report” would have been useful to explain why Ms Kate Wilkinson was somehow distanced from the people who represented her party on the Justice and Electoral Committee. Not one of them raised those concerns at the select committee, and it is a bit rich for her to stand in this House and say that nobody took any notice of her at the Committee stage, when she could not even persuade her own party to move those amendments at the select committee level.

This bill is, as the previous speaker said, well overdue. In fact, it was written as a result of a report of the Law Commission that dates back to 1997. I do not think Labour was in Government in 1997. The Law Commission actually noted that there were a significant number of culpable homicides between 1982 and 1992—over a 10-year period—and that these raised serious issues about the administering of estates, particularly when the person who had died was intestate. There were considerable uncertainties about how those issues were going to be dealt with, so they had to be dealt with on a case by case basis. The Law Commission recommended that this law be settled by our passing a statute such as the one we are addressing today.

So I think it is really important that we address this. It is well settled already in New Zealand law that a killer may not receive any benefit under his or her victim’s will or the victim’s intestacy, but we have not had settled law to guide the resolution of these particular cases, other than to have them before the courts on a case by case basis, which can cause delay and costs in the administration of estates that are often of only modest value. That was the point that the Law Commission made. So I think this bill is very timely, and it is important that this Parliament does pass it through its final reading today.

One of the things that really alarmed me, though, about what Kate Wilkinson said—and maybe I have misunderstood what she said—was that I got the impression she was saying that murdering people in a domestic situation was somehow less culpable than killing people in other than a domestic setting. She went on to use the very rare example of a female having killed her male partner as a result of being a victim of domestic violence. In fact, that is a very rare example, because of 56 domestic murder cases in this country, only three were perpetrated by women against men; the other 53 were perpetrated by men against women. This is a gender issue. Partner violence in this country is a gender issue, and it is an outrage to suggest in this House that some lower standard should be applied to people who are murdered in a domestic setting. I think that one of the problems we have had in this country is that people have not treated domestic violence as seriously as they have other forms of violence.

I want to make the point that of those homicides the Law Commission reported on—and it talked about culpable homicides and attempted homicides rising from 53 to 103 between 1982 and 1992—about half occurred in a domestic setting. So a significant number of people who die in this country do die in a domestic setting. It is appalling to try to undermine the seriousness of the type of violence we are trying to address in this country by saying that somehow a lesser standard should be applied in those cases.

I think it is important to place on record how important it is that we have law that is well settled by statute, rather than relying on judge-made rules, in terms of what the Law Commission described as homicidal heirs. It is important that we take up the recommendation of the Law Commission’s proposals, because the idea was to enable, in most cases, administrators and trustees to carry out their functions without needing to refer matters of uncertainty to the courts, and to reduce the scope of any dispute that arises. Again, I think this is straightforward stuff, and I cannot see why the Opposition members want to raise a particular question that they did not raise at the select committee.

But I want to challenge the comment made concerning whether a lower standard would apply. The interpretation provision, clause 4—and maybe I have got this wrong, because I did not sit on the select committee—states: “ ‘homicide’ means the killing of a person or a child who has not become a person, by another person, intentionally or recklessly by any means that would be an offence under New Zealand law,”. Well, it has to be “an offence under New Zealand law,”, so all the references to negligence and all those other matters would not arise in the context of the definition of homicide, the killing of a person, under this particular legislation.

The reality is that the law is designed to codify the law that prevents a person who kills another person—the victim—by committing homicide, from benefiting as a result of the victim’s death. So it is quite clear to me that the law is simply stating what judge-made law has made a reality, anyway. Therefore, it cannot be undermining that particular interpretation. So I really do not know why the member thinks that her proposed amendments—which, apparently, she moved at the Committee stage; I was not aware that she had moved any amendments—would somehow have made a difference to the interpretation of law that is simply clarifying the legal situation as it stands. Having it written into the law makes it much more sensible to me, because it takes a lot of the pressure off those who are having to administer those estates.

I also note from the Law Commission report that the Public Trust Office alone had identified eight estates it was dealing with at the time, involving homicidal heirs, that it had administered in the previous decade. I think, again, that that raises the serious issue as to the extent to which administrative uncertainty is creating costs on the whole system, and causing unnecessary delays to the resolution of these important matters.

I honestly believe that this is important legislation. I cannot for one minute accept that we should stand back from proceeding on this matter. I think the member was suggesting that we have a discretion applying, in the case of the courts, to undermine an established principle. In this regard, it seems to me to be counter-productive and counter-intuitive. I think it is unfortunate that the member would want to raise those issues. Certainly, in my own mind, to raise serious concerns at this stage that somehow we should treat victims of domestic violence in a different way is unacceptable for the purposes of this legislation. This legislation recognises that most of those cases—or half of the cases concerned—did involve killings in a domestic situation. I think it is important that we see these things resolved in a sensible way, and this bill certainly meets that purpose.

I rise to speak in the third reading of the Succession (Homicide) Bill. As was mentioned in the first reading, and I think in the second reading and Committee stage, there has been a certain repugnance about this bill. Earlier speakers tonight have touched on that and on the fact that the bill covers situations that are repugnant to right-thinking people.

The bill is designed to prevent a person from benefiting financially from criminal activities associated with homicide. That such situations are present in our society is an indictment on the moral standards of some members of the population. The fact that this seems to be an increasing trend is of great concern and anxiety to people throughout New Zealand. But the fact that we have a law to cope with the situation and to address and redress it is also a tribute to the fact that this Parliament does not walk away from its responsibility to citizens, even after they have become victims of an untimely death. We have an obligation, and we recognise that obligation, to look after everybody and to ensure that the perpetrators of crime are pursued and dealt to. The long arm of the law is a credit to our law enforcement agencies, and the systems of justice are, I think, special to New Zealand in terms of quality.

This bill clearly defines when an unlawful killing will prevent a killer from benefiting from his or her actions. Essentially, a person who, acting intentionally or recklessly, unlawfully kills another person or an unborn child will be prevented from benefiting economically from that person’s death. In the course of debate this evening there has been discussion on that very point. Examples have been given of, perhaps, a father driving a car who turns to correct children and crosses the centre line. His wife, a passenger in the car, is killed and he is charged with reckless driving. Does this bill kick in? These are things that, obviously, have been discussed and considered at the Justice and Electoral Committee. The bill will not answer every situation that occurs.

But this, of course, has been a general rule within law for some considerable time. It was in 1997 that the Law Commission reviewed the operation of this precedent rule handed down from judgment, as part of a wider review of succession law. The Law Commission recommended enacting legislation to codify and clarify the general rule. It needed codifying because the application of it as a precedent through individual cases can be uncertain. It can cause delays in the administration of estates and can be costly for modest estates. The fact is that these cases are more common than one would like to think. A significant proportion of homicides have been occurring in a domestic setting. I think figures were given by earlier speakers. I guess that one can reflect on the retrial that is occurring in the David Bain case. The property of his family was no doubt distributed elsewhere, rather than David Bain being a beneficiary, in the circumstances of his initial conviction.

To give cohesion to the rule of succession, the Succession (Homicide) Bill was introduced to the House at the same time as the Wills Bill and the Arbitration Amendment Bill. These three bills were designed by the Law Commission to give effect to reforms recommended by the commission. I would ask, however, why it has taken this Government quite so long to introduce them. It is 10 years since they were first raised. It is 10 years since the Law Commission reviewed the operation of this judge-made ruling. In other words, Labour has been in office without raising a finger to bring in these laws before now.

Throughout the passage of this bill, the complexities have been highlighted by a number of speakers on both sides of the House and by submissions made to the select committee. That is understandable. The bill had to clearly define when a killer will be prevented from benefiting from his or her victim’s death, and how properties should be disposed of in such cases.

Another feature of this bill is that it had bipartisan support from the very beginning. I would just like to say that again for my colleagues across the other side of the House: this bill had bipartisan support from the very beginning. I guess this reflects back through to the significance of the point made by my friend and colleague Mr Chris Finlayson, National’s shadow Attorney-General, who said that law reform matters are often seen as lawyers’ law. They do not grab headlines. So it is good to see bipartisan support for this bill, which is coming largely as a product of Law Commission recommendation. The Law Commission was consulted heavily on the provisions of the bill, and provided very useful information during the select committee process. There was little in this bill that caused partisan approaches to be taken by any of the parties attending the select committee.

Just reflecting back over the speakers in the first reading, I noticed again that Mr Ron Mark, when speaking on the bill, explained that people in New Zealand First were tolerant and would be watching the select committee do its work. I hope that when they come to this third reading Mr Mark will be satisfied with the results of his vigilance. I noticed that the Greens, too, heralded this legislation as a good indication of the MMP environment working well for law reform. I think the quote from Nandor Tanczos was “Yay for the MMP environment!”. During the second reading the Hon Ruth Dyson took the opportunity to thank the Justice and Electoral Committee for its thorough and efficient consideration of the bill. I think that is very fair and very proper, because there was very thorough and detailed consideration by the Justice and Electoral Committee. A number of sensible changes have been made, such as those brought up by Simon Power and Kate Wilkinson, whereby a killer and his or her victim own property as joint tenants—joint tenancy being a form of co-ownership of property. The amendment that came from the select committee was endorsed by speakers at the second reading, as was clause 12.

Similarly, the bill was amended to provide that a killer could claim under testamentary promises legislation for debts owed or promises made by the victim—something that was initially revoked by clause 7.

Of particular interest was a point made by the Hon Mark Gosche, who took great comfort from the fact that the bill would save people from going through agony twice. In the past these matters had to be dealt with on a case by case basis, going through the courts, and it would have been a very painful experience indeed for those involved. He stated that he thought it was good that we were passing legislation that would remove people from having to challenge these things on a case by case basis, which, as he said in his speech, must have been a painful exercise—sometimes excruciatingly painful—for the people involved, as well as being incredibly expensive.

That brings me to the concluding point I would like to make. The Succession (Homicide) Bill was well prepared, modifying earlier legislation, and giving full consideration to the possible effects. It was a bill that was introduced in a bipartisan manner—a bill that was ultimately for the betterment of New Zealanders rather than a political party. Its passage from the first reading and select committee submissions to the second reading and Committee stage has been a tribute to all involved. It is a bill that has been spoken to by both sides of the House with, I would like to say, equal strength. It is a bill that should have no difficulty in terms of being understood and applied in the most even-handed way. The question that this bill asks out loud is why the present Government could not see the sense in applying itself with the same amount of rigour when it comes to the introduction of the Electoral Finance Bill, which is already mired in controversy. Why cannot the Government get it right? Why cannot it think ahead? Why cannot it stop acting with self-interest as its prime mover?

Finally, why is the present Government behaving in an increasingly malevolent manner towards any who do not share its increasingly myopic view and practice of producing clumsy legislation to meet its own ends and purposes, thereby reducing the reputation and regard that Parliament should have from the recipient public? If the Government kills the purpose of parliamentary procedure, it will not inherit much from it. Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker.

The substance of the Succession (Homicide) Bill has already been rehearsed in detail by previous speakers—including the customarily fine contribution we have just heard from Mr Auchinvole—so I will not repeat what has already been said. Instead, because the bill comes to the House by way of a Law Commission recommendation, I would like to take this opportunity to commend the excellent record of the Minister responsible for the Law Commission, the Hon Mark Burton, in bringing such legislation before this Parliament in a prompt fashion.

In 2006, in the Prime Minister’s statement to Parliament, it was said that the Government would give priority to law reform proposals already received from the Law Commission that update key statutes—for example, in the property law area. Accordingly, the Property Law Bill was introduced in October 2006. That is important legislation that deals with fundamental issues concerning property dealings, the protection of property rights, leases, powers of attorney, and that subject dear to almost all New Zealanders, mortgages. Although it numbers some 260 pages, there was virtually no political controversy attached to it. Yet we will have witnessed more than a 13-year delay in enacting it since the report was completed—which, again, goes to the commendation due to the Minister in seeing it through.

The Evidence Act is also legislation that arises from a very substantive and important law reform project of the commission, yet it took more than 6 years from the completion of the report to get the measure on the statute book—again, a credit to the Minister for seeing that reform through, finally. In light of the unsatisfactory rate of progress on law reform over the last 20 years, the Government asked the Law Commission last year for advice on any other reports that had been carefully worked through and consulted on but not enacted. As a result of that exercise, the Government was able to move to introduce a number of pieces of legislation, including the Wills Bill, which has rewritten the previous 1837 English legislation; the present bill, the Succession (Homicide) Bill; and the Arbitration Amendment Bill, which the House read a third time earlier this evening.

A further look was then taken at Law Commission reports on which no action had been taken for some time. As a result, a 2002 report dealing with some problems in the law of trusts is likely to be the subject of a bill soon. The Law Commission report on costs in criminal cases was completed in 2000, and, again, a bill enacting its recommendations is likely to see the light of day at some stage soon. Similarly, a bill on a 2001 report, Minority Buy-Outs, is close to introduction. A bill reforming the law relating to limitation times in civil cases is likely to be introduced this year. [Interruption] I tell Mr Mapp that this latter topic has been the subject of two previous Law Commission reports, the first in 1988—

💬 Christopher Finlayson: I raise a point of order, Mr Speaker. I can understand why the member would want to defend the Minister of Justice’s record, but I refer you to Speakers’ rulings on page 112 of Speakers’ Rulings about what a third reading speech is all about. Members should confine themselves to the general principles of the bill as it emerges from the Committee and not give a eulogy to a soon to be sacked Minister.

Speaking to the point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker, I simply point out with the greatest respect that on 22 August 2007 during the third reading of the Wills Bill Mr Finlayson gave a long and discursive address on what he said was the Government’s failure to progress Law Commission report recommendations. I am simply replying.

💬 Mr DEPUTY SPEAKER: Thank you. Would Mr Chauvel please continue his speech.

Hard work is also being undertaken to implement other Law Commission reports. A bill based on the Law Commission’s 2007 report on the law of sedition is due to come back before the House shortly. Cabinet will shortly be considering how to proceed on the commission’s customs report of 2006. Consultation with stakeholders has been occurring on a draft waka umanga bill following the Law Commission’s 2006 report on the very important issue of Māori entities, and we are likely to see a bill introduced this year. The Law Commission’s 2006 report on access to court records will be considered in the near future by a select committee. This is an excellent record of progress in implementing Law Commission reports and recommendations, and the Minister is to be commended on getting on with the job. He has addressed what had become a logjam and has got on with implementing reforms urged on us by the commission.

I was present at the Law Commission’s 20th anniversary seminar when the Hon Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of Australia pointed out that this sort of logjam was not unique to the New Zealand jurisdiction. This is what the judge said—[Interruption] Mr Mapp may not be interested in what Justice Kirby had to say, but perhaps other members will be. He said: “So what can be done about the apparent logjam that remains as much an impediment to law reform action today as it was in earlier times? What can be done to address this systemic obstacle to institutional effectiveness that is as real in Britain and Australia as it is in New Zealand? Consistently with our notions of a democratic and responsible Parliament, is it impossible to alter the means by which law reform reports secure their appropriate share of parliamentary time? This is the central question that requires and deserves our attention. Beside it all other institutional problems seem readily capable of solution.”

In conclusion, I am proud that this Government—through the Prime Minister on 24 July at an occasion at Bell Gully that launched the publication of the speeches given at the Law Commission’s 20th anniversary seminar—announced a systemic and careful procedure by which from now on all Law Commission reports will be considered and actioned by the Government through the Cabinet process. That system will lead to the logjam that once developed over Law Commission reports to truly become a thing of the past in New Zealand, and I commend the Government and the Minister on the introduction of those excellent procedures.

Bill read a third time.