Law Reform (Epidemic Preparedness) Bill

on behalf of the Minister of Health: I move, That the Law Reform (Epidemic Preparedness) Bill be now read a first time. At the appropriate time I intend to move that the bill be considered by the Government Administration Committee. I also intend to instruct that the committee presents its report to the House on or before 31 July 2006.

This bill has been prepared as part of the work undertaken by this Government on developing the New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Action Plan. The principal purpose of the bill is to ensure that adequate statutory powers are available to the Crown to properly respond to and manage a major public health emergency, such as the threat or actual outbreak of a highly infectious disease, whether occurring in New Zealand or overseas. The primary amendments in the bill are to the Health Act. The amendments clarify, modernise, and, where necessary, close gaps in the law relating to public health emergencies and quarantine powers. The current provisions are old and were made in the days when ship travel was the most common way in which people arrived in New Zealand. The amendments will ensure that the Act is more responsive to current epidemic and pandemic influenza scenarios.

In particular, the bill adds pandemic influenza to the list of quarantinable diseases contained in the Health Act. This will ensure that quarantine powers can be exercised in relation to pandemic influenza as well as the existing quarantinable diseases of typhoid, yellow fever, and plague. The bill provides an Order in Council mechanism to quickly add new highly infectious diseases to the list, should they emerge.

The bill modernises the quarantine provisions for aircraft arrivals, as current provisions focus more on ship arrivals. It modernises the language used in the emergency power provisions in the Health Act from the time when, for example, billiard halls and reading rooms were common places where the public would gather. It relaxes emergency provisions to close public places, so they may remain open if certain protective and preventive measures are put in place. That could mean, for example, that essential services such as supermarkets can remain open, hence preventing pandemonium. The bill provides for the examination and testing of people arriving in New Zealand who are liable to quarantine as part of triaging based on risk. It updates medical surveillance provisions for people who may be at risk of having or spreading a quarantinable disease, and provides for surveillance at large.

The bill updates emergency requisition powers, such as widening the use of premises to accommodate sick people if hospitals are overflowing. Further it provides for the development and implementation of a policy to prioritise scarce medical supplies, such as antivirals and any future vaccines, in an emergency and to protect health workers and others following the policy. It gives the New Zealand Police enforcement powers to assist statutory medical officers of health in the exercise of their emergency powers, in the unlikely event of resistance. Further it enables statutory medical officers of health to redirect aircraft that have landed in New Zealand to another place in New Zealand if that is considered necessary in order to deal with a disease scenario more effectively. It adds a provision to relax certain statutory requirements and restrictions on enactments administered by the Ministry of Health, if authorised by an epidemic notice issued by the Prime Minister. For example, it will provide the ability to allow competent people to administer vaccinations who may not currently work in a scope of practice that allows them to do that.

The bill also amends a number of other enactments dealing with matters that may be disrupted by, or may need to deal specifically with, the consequences of an epidemic. These amendments can be triggered only if an epidemic notice is in force. They include the following: allowing nurses to sign death certificates in certain circumstances if doctors are in short supply; allowing employers to reduce the notice period when requiring employees to take annual leave; allowing overseas people to stay longer in New Zealand if they cannot return to their own countries; provisions to manage parole, community service, home detention, and remand issues; the ability to provide reasonable and necessary relief from compliance with statutory duties where impossible or impracticable to comply; and some minor administrative amendments relating to student loans, tax, and social security emergency payments.

Some of the provisions in the bill do require a lesser priority on individual rights than is appropriate in times of non-emergency. That is justified by the need to ensure that members of the community in general are protected from those who may be suffering from a highly infectious disease but who may not necessarily comply voluntarily with normal disease control mechanisms. I am sure everyone in Parliament agrees that New Zealanders should, where reasonably possible, be protected from unnecessary infection by a lethal pandemic disease and that we must collectively ensure this protection. The Government would wish to see the bill enacted by August 2006, and I commend it to the House.

The National Party in Opposition will support the progress of the bill to the Government Administration Committee. I wonder whether the Minister Clayton Cosgrove indicated a time frame for consideration.

💬 Hon Clayton Cosgrove: Yes.

We are also prepared to support that, on the understanding that if extra time is needed, then the Minister and the Business Committee will facilitate that.

Protecting human health is at the crux of New Zealand’s pandemic preparedness. If we fail to protect our people’s health, we are also likely to fail in our secondary goals of maintaining social cohesion and seeking to mitigate the economic and social consequences of the pandemic. When pandemic strains emerge, they sweep through communities and nations with frightening velocity. The three pandemics we saw in the past century circled the globe, and in many communities they had spread through the human population within months.

The concentrated mortality of a pandemic can be shocking. The 1918 pandemic, for example, killed more people in 6 months than who died in the last 25 years from AIDS, and more than were killed in World War I. So the effects of a pandemic are indeed very serious for our country. The primary strategy of the Government and of Parliament has to be to protect human health by seeking to prevent the emergence of any strain of pandemic, and, if possible, to contain any human outbreak at its source, if that emergence does occur.

The National Party has taken a particular interest in pandemic planning in New Zealand since it identified that the Government had prepared a priority list for Tamiflu that the Minister of Health knew nothing about—other than the fact that he was on it. I think we have demonstrated in the last few months the perfect role of a vigorous and informed Opposition party. It has been National’s raising various issues in pandemic planning that has basically forced the Government’s hand, and actually got it to a position where the Minister of Health said on television that he lies awake at night worried about the pandemic. I suspect that it might be Tony Ryall’s questions that keep him awake at night. The Opposition has raised the issues in pandemic planning, and we have highlighted the inefficiencies and ineffectualness of the Government’s early responses, and the Government has responded to the agenda we have set. But, today, I also want to identify to the Government the new areas that its work must now move on to.

In the last 24 hours President Bush unveiled a $7.1 billion plan to prepare for a flu pandemic in the United States. It involves improving vaccines, stockpiling antiviral drugs, and changing and enforcing rules involving the United States. That is an investment that New Zealand should welcome. The President is investing $2.8 billion in what he calls a “crash program” to accelerate the development of new technology to speed up vaccine makers’ ability to produce enough vaccine to protect people in that country. The benefit of that investment will be felt here in New Zealand.

💬 Darren Hughes: Vote for President Bush!

We might have to get Judith Collins to come and deal with that member.

It is vital to recognise that protecting human health during a pandemic will require a number of things. It will require strong domestic and international surveillance, good identification testing, the rapid development and production of health interventions, targeted use of antivirals, community infection control measures, effective understanding of risk reduction strategies, and the full involvement of the public and private sectors.

The United States’ pandemic plan, which was released in the last 24 hours, addressed the most gaping hole in this Government’s pandemic preparedness. From the very beginning I have asked the Government what the plan is to get medical treatment to people who are sick in their homes. The Health Committee asked the Government the same question, because that is where most people will be during a pandemic. Most people will be at home. President Bush’s pandemic plan—the American strategy—basically addressed that issue. We have not done so in New Zealand.

The Americans are saying: “Given that most persons with pandemic influenza will experience typical influenza symptoms, most persons who seek care can be managed appropriately by [non-hospital] providers using a home-based approach. Appropriate management of … pandemic influenza cases may reduce the risk of progression to severe disease and thereby reduce demand for inpatient care. A system of effective home-based care would decrease the burden on health care providers and hospitals and lessen exposure of unaffected persons to persons with influenza. Telephone call centers should be established or augmented within affected communities to provide advice on whether to stay home or to seek care.” This is the important bit: “Home health care providers and organizations can provide follow-up for those who are managed at home, decreasing potential exposure of the public to persons who are ill and may transmit infection.” So clear thinking is going on in other countries about how to deal with a problem that this Government has not yet dealt with.

There are a number of areas that the Government still has to deal with. Many of those areas are the consequences that ordinary people will be confronted with. What happens if someone defaults on his or her contractual obligations because he or she is sick with bird flu? What happens if someone cannot go to work or earn income because that person has bird flu, and cannot meet his or her mortgage payments? The Government has not talked about how to deal with those consequences. What happens if people cannot meet their legal payment requirements because their bank is closed due to the pandemic? What will happen then? There has been no thinking on that at all here. The Government has provided some changes in this legislation to make it easier to provide special-needs grants to people who are affected by a pandemic, but how will we get money to volunteers who might need to go and buy food for people who are sick at home? None of that is covered in this legislation.

But what is covered in this legislation—and we should spend some time talking about it—is the fact that one of the biggest risks to the community will be in the area of law and order. There is potential for considerable disorder in a number of situations. For example, hospital facilities may be overwhelmed by those seeking care and treatment for their family members, and people may vie for limited doses of vaccines and antivirals. There may be difficulties due to disruption of the provision of basic necessities like food, and to individuals attempting to leave areas where outbreaks have occurred. I suspect that during a pandemic the biggest crisis the Government will face will be one of public disorder, because if people start fighting to get into hospitals, to get limited food left in supermarkets, or to get out of quarantine zones, then we will very quickly be on a road to anarchy and disorder in our communities. That is why it is so important that communities engage in pandemic planning, so that people are aware of what their responsibilities will be to themselves, their families, and others. That is one of the very real points that the National Party has been making from day one in its efforts to get the Government to focus on the important issues involved in pandemic planning.

I want the Government to know that we will be asking questions in the select committee about what it is doing about, particularly, the economic consequences to families. After the Hawke’s Bay earthquake, far-reaching regulations were passed to allow authorities to deal with all the economic issues. Regulations have been used—they were used in that situation—and they allowed authorities and agents of the State to deal with the breakdown of contractual arrangements. The Government should be dealing with that. I have raised this issue with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Health; they came back and said they would have to talk to the banks. That work should have been going on months ago, because contractual arrangements and the breakdown of people’s income will be fundamental. That is the biggest gap in this legislation.

I rise to support the introduction of the Law Reform (Epidemic Preparedness) Bill. It is about leadership, and it is about preparedness. If the law were the only vehicle available, then some of the previous speaker’s comments might be valid. But it is not the only vehicle available to prepare for a pandemic in this country. Other means and other plans are well advanced, and this legislation is but one part of that planning. It is a necessary part, but it is not the only thing that is available. So if the previous speaker has further suggestions to make about what appear to be gaps in the planning for a pandemic, then I suggest he looks beyond simply this one mechanism and contributes constructively to the whole planning process.

In the event of a bird flu or of any other pandemic or epidemic we need to be careful, we need to be responsible, and we need to be modern about our responses. This bill is all of those things; it is careful, responsible, and modern. It is about being ready to deal with some of the most serious social and economic challenges this country would have faced in over a generation, as the Minister of Health has said today. It provides not only for a flu epidemic but for future epidemics of any kind, by amending the 50-year-old Health Act and updating other legislation, such as the Parole Act and the Immigration Act. It also introduces some new powers that are only appropriate given the changes in society since the 1956 Health Act. I refer particularly to the provisions, around measures such as welfare payments and automatic visa extensions to any visitors or tourists who may be trapped in New Zealand, that provide for the restriction of face-to-face contact.

The key point in this legislation is the protection of the people of New Zealand. We need to balance an infected person’s right to freedom with the rights of an uninfected person to be protected and not to become infected. The powers given to the police in this bill may appear unusual, but it is important to remember two things. One is that the circumstances will be extreme, and the second is that the additional powers are time limited. The police will have the power to detain people for medical tests and for treatment. They will have powers to assist medical officers of health and health protection officers in the carrying out of their duties, and in the protection of the public and the restriction of any further spread of infection. But it is important to note that the notice of epidemic expires on the day 3 months after its commencement. It can be renewed, but it has a time-limited application. That should give some comfort to those who may consider that they have concerns about the increased powers.

The Government has said it invites submissions on the bill. It is open to all constructive suggestions about how the bill can be improved and how additional security and preparedness can be advanced. We welcome any constructive suggestions in that regard. This legislation is about balance. It is about responsible government, and it is about being prepared for something that we hope may never happen, but that statistically the chances of it occurring are high. It is also a chance for all parties in this House to participate in the protection and care of New Zealanders. I commend the bill to the House.

In the course of this debate we have been privileged to hear from the Hon Tony Ryall in a hard-hitting, careful, and well-constructed speech on behalf of the National Party. He indicated in his comments just some of the issues that will arise as the Law Reform (Epidemic Preparedness) Bill is considered by the Government Administration Committee. There are a number of significant issues. I would like to start from a quite different basis and talk about the experience for New Zealanders, in very practical terms, in 1918 when we were hit by a pandemic flu epidemic. Pestilence has not been one of New Zealand’s besetting problems. Even in the earliest days of settlement, when preventive and medical services were very limited, the salubrious climate, and also the austere living conditions, were guarantees of a reasonable standard of physical health.

There were, of course, outbreaks between 1910 and 1920. The incidence of smallpox warranted preventive measures on a national scale. Similar widespread immunisation and precautionary methods were found necessary in respect of diphtheria. Infantile paralysis—or as it later came to be called, poliomyelitis—was also responsible for varying death rolls. From the 1920s onwards, it developed on occasion to the point where restrictions on school attendance and public assembly were necessary. However, the overall death roll was not high by epidemic standards.

All of that changed in 1918 when two waves of influenza spread across the country, the first being followed by a virile wave that swept through the country from October through to December in that year. Everyone was personally affected in one way or another, and special restrictive measures were imposed as the death rate rose sharply. People became depressed. It was not just a matter of months but, rather, years before the adverse effects of the epidemic were overcome.

Many people, in a way that might be appropriate for Mr Hughes on occasions, were treated for the flu by being wrapped in cotton wadding and flannel. At the time, there was a lot of discussion and disagreement about the correct way to treat influenza patients. Families were left isolated in their houses for days, only collecting bread and milk after it had been delivered, and people became too afraid to visit others, for fear of catching the disease.

The disease was in fact carried from the sick soldiers and crew returning home from World War I on the steamship Niagara, which arrived in Auckland on 12 October. By the middle of November, the influenza epidemic in Auckland had peaked, with Auckland having approximately 2,000 deaths alone. So it started in Auckland and it then spread rapidly south, causing an alarming death rate of 1,860 people throughout the country in only 8 weeks. By the 13th week it had begun to decline. The total number of deaths from the disease or its complications was believed to be more than 6,500 people.

There were particular challenges in Auckland. On 31 October the Mayor of Auckland, Sir James Gunson, held a special meeting in the council chambers to form a committee to take appropriate action to help sufferers, and also to cope with the epidemic. [Interruption] I can tell Mr Hughes that the city was divided into 22 blocks, with each doctor being allocated a special area, and six temporary hospitals were set up in schools and halls. Houses, hotels, and boarding houses assumed the aspect of hospitals as so many of the guests and members of staff were affected.

I speak of these things because if a pandemic does come, these are the sorts of situations that our citizens and our residents will have to confront and deal with. There were particular problems in dealing with the dead, and that is an issue that I will come to in a moment when I look at specific provisions in the bill before us. But in the result, with a huge pile up of corpses in the Auckland Domain, an order was made requiring all bodies of persons who had died from influenza or its complications to be buried, and special trains were provided from that place of death to the Waikumete Cemetery for burial.

It is all very well, and it is appropriate, that we support this bill going to a select committee, but we need to realise that all it does is construct the statutory frameworks for dealing with a limited number of situations, and there have to be sitting behind this statutory work the physical measures that need to be taken to engage in pandemic planning and the implementation of remedial work.

So what does this legislation do? Well, it makes pandemic influenza a quarantinable disease. It enables quarantine powers at the border, it clarifies the emergency powers available to medical officers of health, it provides powers for the New Zealand police to assist medical officers of health, and it supports action to prevent or manage a health emergency. I am not myself convinced that this epidemic notice technique will actually be very satisfactory, but that, as the bill describes, is a “trigger provision”, and it enables the Prime Minister to issue a Gazette notice declaring that she—it will be “he” by then—is satisfied that the effects of the outbreak of an infectious disease are likely to disrupt essential governmental and business activity in New Zealand. The Gazette notice then triggers a range of possible actions. However, just on the face of it, they seem to me to be quite limited.

The Resource Management Act will be amended so that resource consent is not necessary to establish community treatment centres, mass graves, and so on for 24 months if there is an epidemic. Other Acts will be amended to provide for temporary relief from use-of-money interest and penalties for taxpayers, and the relaxation of immigration provisions, parole provisions, probation conditions, and then the relaxation of benefit provisions and the providing of emergency benefits for people who would not usually be entitled.

A further plan is to amend the Births, Deaths, and Marriages Registration Act so that doctors and appropriately qualified nurses can issue death certificates without having necessarily attended the person before death. [Interruption] The clapping by Darren Hughes on the other side of the Chamber reminds me of the strength of the proposition I initially advanced that there are in this community, as there were in 1918, a number of people who might well be treated by being wrapped in cotton wadding and flannel. It seems to me that Mr Hughes would certainly lend himself to such a treatment.

As we look around the world we see in what is going on in countries like Viet Nam the high probability that this pandemic might break out in a country like that, despite the very best efforts by authorities in particular countries. For example, in Viet Nam in the Ninh Binh province a mass vaccination programme has been initiated by the Viet Namese Government. It has been a huge project staffed by 80,000 workers, and I understand that by January 2006 more than 240 million poultry had been inoculated against bird flu.

It seems, for the present, that that has worked, because in January the agricultural ministry in Viet Nam declared that the country had contained bird flu, with no more outbreaks reported in the previous 3 weeks in the 21 cities previously affected. I instance Viet Nam, because the risk of bird flu transferring to humans will continue there for many years. The country has a bird population of 84 million, and those birds, in small flocks, are located in backyards, with people living in close proximity. It is the perfect incubator for the H5N1 virus to mutate into one easily transmissible between humans.

New Zealand First supports the Law Reform (Epidemic Preparedness) Bill going to the Government Administration Committee. There is no doubt that in the event of an epidemic—whether it be bird flu, some other fatal influenza, or another disease we heard about from the previous speaker, Dr Richard Worth—the population at large will be looking to the Government for a speedy response and leadership for the country. They will also look for some guidance and assurance that a crisis of that kind will be managed as best as it is possible to be managed. We must commend the Government for its actions in updating this legislation in a timely manner—better before the event than after the event. This bill is all about managing a crisis, from imposing quarantine powers at borders to clarifying the emergency powers available to the medical officers of health and the police, and managing a whole range of other matters that may be disruptive, or may be needed to deal with the specific consequences of an epidemic.

It is not that a bird flu pandemic could not become a reality; a mutation in the virus could lead to a human epidemic. Statistics suggest that if that mutation were to continue with a high fatality rate—apparently 30 to 50 percent among people known to have contracted the infection—then the results would be disastrous, and we would need the legislation as outlined by Dr Richard Worth. Fortunately, at this stage, the chances of that occurring seem to be low. However, medical researchers say that an epidemic is always on the cards, as are major volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, or earthquakes. An influenza epidemic occurred in 1918, and there will almost certainly be another one in the future. Wise people always learn from the lessons of the past.

New Zealand First notes that this legislation responds to the World Health Organization advice, and it ensures there is clarity, certainty, and legislative authority so that the public health response is appropriate. That is absolutely what is required. The last thing the public wants or needs is a weak or disorganised response by the Government or the health authorities in such a crisis. It is essential to be prepared, and we know that any crisis of the magnitude outlined by the previous speaker would be absolutely disastrous.

The Health Act of 1956 did have some gaps that do affect the Government’s ability to respond to an epidemic, and it is very timely to review and update that legislation. A number of Acts will be affected by this legislation. I read from the bill that the Holidays Act of 2003, the Income Tax Act of 2004, the Parole Act of 2002, and the Sentencing Act of 2002 will be affected—it is quite an extensive list; I have mentioned only a few. Some of the legal obligations talked about by the Hon Tony Ryall are covered in this bill and, as Maryan Street said, improvements and constructive suggestions are definitely welcome.

Just last year the Health Committee had a briefing from the Ministry of Health on version 14 of the New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Action Plan, and there is no doubt whatsoever that the Ministry of Health has further refined that plan. The version number, I am sure, would be much higher now than 14. I believe that the Ministry of Health can be commended for the preparations it currently has under way. We always know that preparations can be improved, as the US has identified, and the Ministry of Health will no doubt be looking at the American plan with great interest.

New Zealand First is pleased to see all the information and the material that are now available advising the public about the necessity for family preparedness. Although many families are able to stockpile some food and other goods in the event of a pandemic, we must be very aware too that some families on fixed incomes will find this challenging, and this aspect must be prepared for and covered in legislation. We do not want to have families unnecessarily starving.

New Zealand First supports this legislation. Preparation is absolutely essential if we are to ensure that a pandemic is managed as well as it possibly can be. A pandemic threat such as bird flu, or any disease, is basically too important for petty party politics and needs leadership and measures such as are proposed and outlined in this legislation. We support this legislation going to a select committee.

The Green Party will be supporting this legislation going to a select committee but we do have some serious concerns that I will raise here and that I will seek to address at the select committee. Frankly, the predictions about what might happen in New Zealand if there is a pandemic are almost Kafkaesque. We have had predictions of hundreds of thousands of New Zealanders becoming ill and not being able to bury the dead and so on. We do agree with Tony Ryall in this regard—the key issue will be for people to manage in their own homes, so we need to have medical care that can reach people in their homes. We think that this is—along with the lack of surveillance—a key hole in the pandemic preparedness plan.

We are pleased that we have also had a role in prodding the Government into taking greater action on this issue. At the beginning of last year the Government did not have any supplies of personal protective equipment or anything else available. Now, partly through its own initiatives and partly because of the prodding and questions of members in this House, I believe that the Government has a much greater level of preparedness, but there are still some significant gaps. Although there has been much talk about improving our surveillance, I see no evidence whatsoever of improved surveillance, so that is the greatest gap. Secondly, how will we treat people in their own homes? This fundamental question has not been answered.

But I will focus today on the issues of police powers. We certainly acknowledge that we need police powers in an emergency to be able to enforce quarantines and suchlike. We have no problem with this and we recognise that it is essential. The problem is that the police powers in this bill are completely unrestricted; we can see no restrictions on them whatsoever. What this could mean is that, for example, people could be forced to be vaccinated against their will. I think people should have an option there. They could choose to stay home rather than to be vaccinated.

Secondly, under the powers of this bill, health professionals could be forced to go to work even if they should be protected under the Health and Safety in Employment Act. This Act states that if health professionals feel that their safety and health are at risk, they do not have to turn up to work. This bill appears to override those provisions and it seems to me that nurses, doctors, and ambulance officers etc. could be forced to work under the provisions of this legislation by force—by police—even if they feel that their health is at risk and even if they feel that they are not properly protected. This appears to us to override all of the provisions in the Health and Safety in Employment Act. We think this is a real concern and that health professionals ought to be made aware of the unrestrained and unrestricted nature of these powers.

We will be seeking to amend those police powers—which we agree are necessary—to make them focused on the implementation of quarantine, such as quarantining aircraft and communities, in order to protect against specific risks. We have no problem with those police powers at all. The problem is that this completely erodes civil liberties to the point where we would have no democracy but would have a totalitarian State.

We think that what has happened is that the officials, in drafting this legislation, thought about every eventuality and every situation where they might need some powers, but the consequences are that they have ended up with completely unrestricted powers, which actually offer no protection or civil liberties to individuals or indeed to health professionals. I have spoken to many health professionals, and all of them said that because of their duties they of course would wish to go to work, but that they would have concerns if they were expected to go to work unprotected, be exposed to a virus, then take that virus home and expose their families. That could cause their families to suffer from a disease. We do not know how serious bird flu might be, but it could put their lives at risk. That is why we have the provisions of the Health and Safety in Employment Act, and we are concerned that those provisions are overridden in this bill.

Many people have referred to the 1918 influenza epidemic, but in a way we are probably far less equipped or prepared in 2006 than we were in 1918. In 1918 people knew their neighbours, they had communities—communities were not decimated as so many of our communities are today—and most people grew their own food. And they knew how to survive on their own. We have a tradition in our history—both Pākehā and Māori—of people actually surviving in conditions where they are on their own. But, today most of us could not survive for much more than about 24 hours, and I think most people would indeed panic and be completely ill-equipped to cope if there was a pandemic.

What we need to do is to focus on encouraging people to be more self-sufficient and to be able to cope on their own, and for New Zealand as a whole, as a nation, to be more self-sufficient. We learnt that during the SARS epidemic when the Government tried to order supplies of personal protective equipment and discovered that it could not get any because there was an international panic. So the SARS epidemic progressed, and, had it come to New Zealand, we would not even have had personal protective equipment. We were completely reliant on imports for that; we simply did not have stockpiles.

So the Green Party members think that we need to be much better prepared as a nation and more self-reliant in respect of medicines, equipment, and indeed of basic fundamentals like food as well as drugs. We still have huge holes in that regard. We are glad the Government has begun to develop some sort of provisions—for example, contingency supplies of antibiotics. We have a very limited supply of Tamiflu. It is not nearly enough even to protect our health workforce, and, from answers to written questions, we do not think we have nearly enough personal protective equipment to equip our health workforce. That being the case, it is all the more essential that if our health workforce are not able to be properly protected in the event of an epidemic, in terms of personal protective equipment, Tamiflu and so forth, then they should have the option—as they are given presently under the Health and Safety in Employment Act—of not turning up for work. Unfortunately, under this bill, all of those provisions are overridden, and the police powers are completely and totally unrestricted. We will certainly seek to specify those police powers.

Debate interrupted.

The House adjourned at 6 p.m.