Maori Fisheries Bill

This includes debate on schedules 2, 3, 3A, 4, 5, and 6.

Mr Chairperson, you can see how eager Opposition members are to make a contribution to this debate, and I refer you again to the points I made before. Part 1 is about the preliminary provisions, key concepts, and key iwi organisations. It is a very large part of the bill, and it should take the Committee quite some time to deal with it. As the Chairperson has already said, we are dealing with several schedules as we go through it.

What is very evident in this part is just what hopelessly patronising legislation this is. I wonder how many New Zealanders out there would be happy if they were told that they were being given some assets, but that they could never ever get their hands on them—if they were told the assets were theirs as of right, but that they would never get their hands on them or be given the opportunity to determine how they would be used and who was to have the say over them. That is the trouble with this legislation. I do not have too much of a concern about who might have been involved with this legislation before Mr Benson-Pope became the Minister. He is the Minister who will go down in history as the paternalistic old grandfather who treated Māori in the appalling way that they have been treated for so many generations in the past. I can see future generations of young Māori coming to the Crown again, and asking why that was done to them. Māori will ask why the Crown gave them assets but then did not let them get their hands on them—did not let them directly determine how the assets were to be used and what sort of return they would get off them but, rather, combined Māori into a very, very convoluted and bureaucratic structure that saw them take only what they were given.

The irony, of course, is that this legislation will hand over in a fairly substantial way control of all those assets to Māori—but to a very, very exclusive group of Māori. It will be interesting, will it not, in the time of future generations, when people come back to the Crown and say that it made a mistake and they want redress for that. I have no doubt that that will be the result of this legislation—and it may not be very long before people come back to the Crown, quite frankly. Then, we will see the extraordinary situation of the Crown having to sort out a mess for Māori, created by Māori. That is one of the concerns the National Party has about this legislation. The purpose clause states that the bill is to “provide for the development of the collective and individual interests of iwi in fisheries, fishing, and fisheries-related activities in a manner that is ultimately for the benefit of all Maori.” But Māori can never hold the assets. The assets will be locked up by a very elite group, which will be able to choose the directors for the various companies that may operate a good chunk of the quota that will go into those assets, and other Māori will simply have to take whatever they can get.

I remind people who may be interested that very recently the Māori fishing assets must have been under some peril, as Sealord’s itself was a company that for a moment or two seemed less than viable. Would it not be awful for the country if, in the future, Māori quota is somehow lost—or if the value of it is lost, which is probably the real point? The value of it could be stripped away through bad management, and the asset given to Māori could become worth very little. If one or two people had had their way with regard to the Sealord’s arrangement, about 55 percent of the country’s fishing assets would have ended up in one place. If one big company has 55 percent of the assets and a whole lot of small companies have various little bits, who sets the value? The big player does. I think that is the real tragedy in this bill. From my perspective, I am reluctant to support it. The rest of my concerns will become evident as we go further through the bill.

I would like to point out an issue that came to us in the Fisheries and Other Sea-related Legislation Committee that probably best typifies the absurdity of some of the bureaucracy and the patronising approach evident in the bill originally tabled by the Minister of Fisheries. Some iwi came to us—Ngāi Tahu and Tainui, in particular—and said that they had already been recognised in other Crown settlements as having structures in place to deal with settlements, as having a mandate on behalf of their people to negotiate or work through a settlement, and as having systems in place whereby they are accountable to their shareholders. Those iwi asked why they could not just pick up their assets and put them to work for their people almost immediately. They asked why they had to go back to the Crown and prove that they had some mandate, that they had some sort of trust or company set-up that could handle the assets, and that they could be accountable for their actions.

That seemed sensible to the select committee, so we went back and made amendments to clause 14 so that such iwi organisations can, if they want it, be given automatic recognition as iwi groups. I find it quite absurd that we in Parliament are deciding for Māori that they are iwi. Māori know they are iwi, and their ancestors knew they were an iwi group. They know about their whānau and hapū, and where they came from. The future generations will know about their whānau, hapū, and iwi group, and where they came from. Why is Parliament doing this? Anyway, the select committee decided it would make amendments to that clause so that iwi organisations such as Ngāi Tahu and Tainui can, if they want, have automatic recognition. All that they have to do is demonstrate that they are formally structured and are accountable to their members, which they are; that they have already established an asset-holding company that can take those fisheries assets on board and put them into action straight away, which they have; and that they have already been accepted by the Crown as having a mandate for Treaty of Waitangi settlement purposes, which they have.

New Zealanders know about the Ngāi Tahu settlement and the Tainui settlement. Those Māori groups have already been through all the hoops that a Government bureaucracy can throw at them. They have been through all the paperwork and all the court cases. They have answered all the patronising questions. They have dealt with all the accountability that the white man would throw at them—plus some, for some reason, just because they are Māori. They have been through all of that, and this Government wanted them to go through it all again in order to get these fisheries assets—which, incidentally, have already belonged to them for 12 years now, anyway.

National is delighted to support the changes to clause 14 to make sure that iwi groups such as Ngāi Tahu and Tainui that are proven in those areas—that are formally structured and accountable, have already established an asset-holding company, and have already been accepted by the Crown as having a mandate for treaty negotiations—can just pick up a large bulk of their settlement assets and get on with the job of running a fishing business. Sadly, that is only to do with the inshore quota. National wants to see that extended, to a degree—Wayne Mapp will address it in his amendments—to offshore quota.

We see in the Chamber this evening a level of arrogance and a patronising attitude from this Government that are truly extraordinary. We have a bill of 281 pages and a Supplementary Order Paper of 30 pages, and not one Government member has taken a call—not one.

💬 Hon Rick Barker: Who believes this member?

I want to know from Rick Barker why not a single Māori Labour member is participating in this debate. I say to Mr Barker that it is no wonder the last opinion poll showed that Labour will lose every single one of the Māori seats. It is no wonder at all, because those Māori members are not prepared to participate in this debate, which is of vital importance to Māori and to all New Zealanders. Why have they not been down in the Chamber to debate this bill, so that we can have a proper debate?

Mr Barker is propping it up, as is the Minister in the chair, David Benson-Pope. Neither of them is prepared to take a call, but both chip in. The Minister in the chair said we should support this bill because Māori support it. I say to the Minister that Māori are no more homogenous, in terms of having a single point of view, than any other group. They have a range of views.

What is paternalistic about this bill is that it is Parliament telling Māori how they are to manage their assets. That is what we are doing with this bill. If the responsibility is passed over to Māori, and they want these structures—[Interruption] We would not complain about that, but that is not what the bill says. The bill says Māori must do it this way, and do it this way forever. That is a nonsense. I challenge Mr Barker to tell me where in the 1992 settlement it says the fishing resource will be managed centrally. Clause 3 states that the Māori quota is to be managed centrally. I have to say that in 1992—and I participated in the debate at the time of that settlement—that was never part of the agenda. [Interruption] Mr Barker and Mr Benson-Pope want to get personal and raise irrelevancies because they do not have the substance to be able to argue the points in as simple a form as this. I ask Mr Barker where in the Māori fisheries settlement it supports the contention that the assets are to be managed centrally. Where? The silence is deafening. I will ask Mr Chris Carter; he might be able to answer the important question. Where in the Māori fisheries settlement does it say the fisheries assets will be managed centrally?

Those members do not know. They have no idea. Here we are talking about $800 million worth of assets—a key issue for Parliament—and Ministers in the Chamber have no damn idea of what their bill even does, and no idea whether it will serve the interest of Māori and other New Zealanders. And it will not. I want to know from the next speaker on the Government side—but I have to note that we have not heard a single speaker from that side of the Chamber. [Interruption] It is all very well for Chris Carter to make personal attacks, but will he have the courage to get to his feet—

The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson): I am sorry to interrupt the honourable member. Challenging someone’s courage is a personal reflection and is out of order.

💬 Gerry Brownlee: I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. Let us make it very clear: if your ears are closed to what we who sitting further away from that man than you are can hear, and if you do not deal with it, we will. If there is a question to be raised about someone’s courage, then those people over there making those comments are putting their hands up for the allegation to be laid at their doorstep.

The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson): I thank Mr Brownlee for that contribution. I call the Hon Dr Nick Smith.

I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. I want to know what your ruling is. You get all upset when I say that Chris Carter does not have the courage—

The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson): The member will please be seated; I am on my feet. The member is a longstanding member. He has been in this House for a long time, and he knows that to challenge someone’s courage is to make a personal reflection. It has been ruled out of order by a number of Speakers in the past. I recognise that there have been interjections from the other side. The member is making a hard-hitting speech and some interjections can be expected. When the interjecting is to the extent that the member cannot be heard, then it is out of order, and I will take note of that and rule accordingly.

💬 Simon Power: I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. I would draw your attention to this fact. I point out, with the greatest of respect, that the fact that interjections and vigorous debate are occurring is not the point; the point is the nature of the interjections that are coming from the Government benches. You know, as members on this side of the Chamber definitely know, that if interjections such as those are allowed to continue, you are inviting disorder from members on this side. I ask you to think very carefully before dismissing the matters that have been raised by the deputy leader of the National Party and the Hon Nick Smith, and I invite you, with the greatest of respect, to rule accordingly if those interjections continue to occur.

The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson): I thank the honourable member. Under Speaker’s ruling 50/7 I have to take into account the context in which words are used in the House. If the member is insinuating that there was a personal reflection—I refer to Standing Order 116—and if offence has been taken, I would ask the member concerned on my right to withdraw.

💬 Jill Pettis: Yes.

The Labour Party members are not prepared to play the ball, so they play the man. The reason they will not play the ball is that their policies are patronising and arrogant towards Māori and deserve to be challenged. I ask the Labour Party again why a ministerial salary is being paid to not just a Minister of Māori Affairs but three Associate Ministers, none of whom is prepared to get to his feet and defend this important part of the bill.

The Green Party was a very strong advocate of the withdrawal provisions in Part 1, particularly clauses 14B to 14F, but we are putting forward an amendment to clause 14E. Our amendment would delete clause 14E(2) from the bill in its entirety.

In terms of the withdrawal provisions, there are two conglomerate iwi structures in the bill: Hauraki and Te Arawa. The negotiations that occurred around the establishment of those conglomerations were significant. The Greens do not want to undermine completely those negotiations, and we understand the history behind them. However, the issue remains one of whether the independence and status of iwi are entitled to be equally recognised and provided for in the legislation. We heard from iwi from both those groupings who did not necessarily want to be forced to remain included in those conglomerates if their choice at some point in the future was to exercise their right to manage their assets of their own accord. The officials, the Minister of Fisheries, and Te Ohu Kai Moana all agree that the groupings listed in the notes in schedule 3 are in fact iwi in their own right. They are entitled to assets, and they are entitled to be identified as populations and treated exactly the same, but negotiations in the past have meant they are now included in a large grouping. But they are entitled to be properly recognised, to have their entitlement made plain in the bill, and to have the choice in the future as to whether they want to remain in the conglomerate.

In our view, the legislation—any legislation—should treat like with like, if that is the right way to put it. Those who are the same should be treated the same, and there should not be discrimination in the bill. Iwi should not be given first-class, second-class, or third-class status, which is what the provisions in Part 1 do by effectively identifying three separate kinds of iwi: those listed in schedule 3; those listed in the notes in schedule 3 as being part of the conglomerates; and Rongomaiwahine and Ngāti Hine, who are given third-level status of not quite being iwi except they may be later, sometime in the future, under some other provisions. So the Greens are proposing that clause 14E(2) be deleted. That clause provides that any iwi that does withdraw from their conglomerate, whether it is Rongomaiwahine, Ngāti Hine, or any of those from Hauraki or Te Arawa, will be entitled to all of the same rights and voting rights as other iwi, except that they will not be able to vote for a member of Te Kawai Taumata, which is the board that enables full voting on other structures, and which would enable them to have some control over Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd.

Clause 14E(2) was put there specifically as a disincentive to those iwi withdrawing. The vote for members of Te Kawai Taumata is the only way that iwi have any control over Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Ltd and, therefore, Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd, the company that will actually control 50 percent of the assets that are supposed to be being allocated to iwi in the first place. The vote for members of Te Kawai Taumata might seem like a small thing, but it is in the end the only access that any iwi has to voting for the structures that control the majority of its assets. It is not appropriate, it is not fair, and it is not right that some iwi are entitled to that vote and some iwi are not because of past negotiations, when in fact those iwi are recognised by the Government, recognised by Te Ohu Kai Moana, and recognised by everyone as being the same as those other iwi who do have that vote.

The Greens sincerely hope that other members of this Committee will support the amendment to delete clause 14E(2), because it is unfair. It is discriminatory. It treats those iwi as second-class iwi, and it is completely unjustified. There is no reason why they should not have exactly the same rights once they withdraw. They have mandated iwi organisations. They have to have the same constitutional structures as every other iwi. They have to have an asset-holding company, like all other iwi. They have all the other rights and obligations of all other iwi except in this single instance. The Greens are sincerely hoping that other members of this House do support that amendment. It is right that we ensure that any legislation passed in this House treats people and iwi equally.

I say at the outset that I found the argument we just heard a very convincing one. I support it as a matter of principle because we are talking about property rights here, and I think it was very well put that the conglomerate iwi structures are very paternalistic. They are imposed by the State, but I believe that maximum choice should be left with the various iwi—and with hapū, for that matter—to exercise what is their property right. That is what the treaty settlement, pursuant to article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi, was all about with regard to fishing.

I was also greatly heartened by the speeches we heard from National members. I know they supported the first reading of this bill and its referral to the Fisheries and Other Sea-related Legislation Committee. The ACT party did not, but the speeches I am hearing from National members now are consistent with the arguments the ACT party has been making right from the outset. I gather that National members will now be opposing this legislation because it is paternalistic, as they say. It is imposing on Māori unnecessary layers of bureaucratic constraints that could become the biggest impediment in the defeat of the very objectives of the bill: getting Māori engaged in active participation and as full participants in the business of fishing.

Ngāi Tahu is perhaps the most advanced of the iwi groupings. It has a very successful business, and I think we all acknowledge that. Its submission is very pertinent. It does not want any of those bureaucratic structures; it has done it for itself. It just wants good commercial practices, and it says that existing commercial law is all it needs. The people of Ngāi Tahu do not want the Government telling them how they have to handle everything, and all those crazy, regulated impositions from the Government.

Ngāi Tahu actually goes a step further. They are saying that it is their asset, their property right, and they should be able to manage it, operate it, and indeed dispose of it at their will and as they see fit. The ACT party certainly supports that, because a key part of property rights is transferability. By the Government imposing restrictions on transferability, value is diminished. If one looks ahead, it could well be that in the not too distant future, some fish species may well become seriously depleted, and economically almost extinct. That is quite possible. Why force people to hang on to the bitter end to a diminishing asset that will have nil value after the expiry date if, perhaps, they want to liquidate it and decide they want to invest in aquaculture?

That would be a good, sensible thing to do—that is normal commerce—but, oh no, this bill is so paternalistic. It is really the Crown—represented by this executive Government bringing this bill to Parliament—using the numbers of the executive to impose paternalistic, restrictive, bureaucratic inconveniences and encumbrances that could well defeat the successful commercial enterprise of Māori in fishing.

We have had some wonderful success stories. Ngāi Tahu is one; there are others. We should not be surprised. Māori have proven to be very good business people over the decades, and certainly fishing is very dear to most Māori hearts. I think the whole intent was to get Māori engaged in fishing, but why does the Crown have to prescribe that? Why not give Māori the freedom, the choice, and the opportunities that anyone else would have to go about their business, with their property rights?

That is the basic reason why the ACT party is opposing this legislation—because it is an absolute nonsense! What we have with this Maori Fisheries Bill is part of a trifecta. We cannot ignore the interaction of this Māori fisheries settlement bill with the aquaculture bill and with the foreshore and seabed legislation. They are all interconnected—much more so than many people realise—but instead of it being a winning trifecta, it is actually a losing one. This Government will find that with the way it has gone about those three bills, it will be lose, lose, lose on each account, because it is not giving a proper property right. The Government is giving on the one hand, but then in a very paternalistic way, it is prescribing how that property right can be exercised and used. So the ACT party is opposing the three legs of that trifecta, mainly because of the issue of property rights and the lack of recognition for them in this bill.

Yes, National does have grave reservations about this bill. Its direction is excessively paternalistic. We believe that it is too complex and, as a consequence, we have amendments that we ask the Government to support in order to ameliorate the worst effects of the bill.

💬 Hon Ken Shirley: And if the Government turns down your amendments, will you still support the bill?

That is a serious question that has to be addressed, because in the second reading we voted for it and for the preamble. We did so reluctantly, but the problem is that we have now had a decade of litigation, negotiation, and discussion. The Government presented this inadequate bill but unfortunately it is the only bill out there that represents a compromise—a compromise that is very much the lowest common denominator.

It is our intent to improve this bill and to give iwi who are empowered—who have a proven commercial track record—the ability to manage their assets directly. After all, what the bill proposes is for the commission to have control of the offshore quota, which is at least half of all the assets it will manage. I simply cannot understand why the Government does not see the logic in our intent—that is, to provide a reasonable and fair proposal to enable iwi to do that. Our proposals will not fundamentally destroy the system proposed here, but they will provide an evolutionary pathway out.

That is our major objection to the bill. It takes us some way—it does get the assets to the iwi, at least in relation to the onshore assets. It enables a certain level of continuing commercial viability for the offshore assets, but then it stops.

This bill is, as Mr Brownlee said, intending to provide a forever situation, but we know from past experience that that is wrong. We know that almost certainly we will have to come back to this whole issue and provide a new pathway for dealing with the offshore assets so there is an effective way of getting those assets to iwi. Right at the moment they are locked into Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd, and at best there is a review. Well, frankly, that is inadequate. Sure, it is better than the current situation. One would not deny that. It is at least a move along the path, and it is for that reason that National is voting for it.

But it is an interim measure at best. The Government portrays this bill as a finality, but in reality we all know, and Māori up and down the country know, that at best it is an interim measure. Māori really want control of their offshore assets. The only way they can see a pathway to ever getting that is to support this measure so that the next step can then be embarked upon.

It is disappointing that Government members have not got up to speak tonight. Where is the contribution from Māori members to this debate? It is of vital interest to Māori up and down the country, and it is at times like these that we expect the Māori members to contribute.

This Government says that the Māori seats are necessary. It should prove it by having its members debate an issue that is fundamentally affecting Māori. If there were ever a case for the Government to prove the relevance of the Māori seats, this would be it. Yet what do we have? We have silence. That, of itself, shows us why the National Party position of abolishing the Māori seats is so cogent, because on the really big issues we have a deafening silence from the Māori members.

I see Nanaia Mahuta sitting opposite. It looks as if she wants to take a call. Well, where are her colleagues?

I want to pick up on the concern that we have about the paternalistic nature of this bill. Some of the points that Mr Shirley of the ACT party made earlier are quite right. Essentially, what is happening is that Māori have been told: “Here is an asset.”, but other Māori have negotiated with the Government so that there is a series of hurdles between the asset owner, the operation of that asset, and the opportunity to ensure that that asset produces good results for the owners.

I want to know who in their right mind would accept some of the provisions that are imposed in this bill. I refer to clause 14A, “Functions and powers of asset-holding companies”. Let us be clear first. The assets, apparently, are going to be allocated to mandated iwi. There is an enormously complex formula in here for how an iwi becomes mandated. I do not know why we are doing that in the year 2004. If iwi were not established, operational, and effective prior to 1840, then how on earth do they get under way now? What is the point of having to put it in law when Māori themselves should know exactly who is iwi and who is not.

As I said before, clause 14A deals with the functions and powers of asset-holding companies. So the iwi groups will have to go out and form a company to hold the assets. That company has a duty to wholly own those assets in perpetuity. They have to have all the appropriate documentation for a company, and they are going to be a company that holds fishing assets—but guess what? They are not allowed to fish. They are not allowed to go out and acquire other fishing assets. They will just be a group of people who sit around and decide what they will do with the flow of income that might come from those other companies that are actually working their assets. So we will get viable organisations like, for example, Ngāi Tahu Fisheries, as an iwi, having to set up another company to hold the assets that are going to come through this settlement, never mind the fact that they are already successfully fishing about 5 percent of the country’s quota acquired commercially. They will have to keep that group completely separate from the other and pretend that they have nothing to do with fishing.

Then, when it comes down to determining who actually gets their hands on the asset, they will have to negotiate with a group of other iwi to get one person to go on to an electoral college, who will then be able to cast a vote for seven, as I understand it, who go on to this outfit called Te Ohu Kai Moana. Then Te Ohu Kai Moana will get together and decide who their directors will be on the company that will actually put the boats out to sea. Who in their right mind will sign up for that? The problem that we have, as a party, is that Māori up and down the country think we hate them. They kick us all the time and they say that we never give them a fair go. But what is in front of us is what Māori have served up. We have to ask: “Well, why don’t we just vote for it, and let’s see what sort of a mess it turns out.”

National has a number of Supplementary Order Papers that we will put forward during the course of the Committee stage. I say to the Government that if all those Supplementary Order Papers are rejected, then we will reject the bill. We have as much stake in making this work for the future as any other party in this Parliament. It is not appropriate that only the Minister and his officials—whom, quite frankly, one would think, after looking at this, must be completely loopy—have a say in how the bill will be altered. Here we have a Supplementary Order Paper in the name of the Minister that is pages long. It contains 20 pages of changes to the bill and it has never been before the select committee. So the committee has done its work, and our members certainly did a lot of work. They scratched their heads and got this huge bill together. The officials quickly raced through it and found 20 pages of changes. It is a mess.

The Green Party has two amendments on the floor for Part 1. The first is to delete clause 14E(2). As I explained earlier, clause 14E(2) prevents any mandated iwi organisations among withdrawing iwi from having a vote on Te Kāwai Taumata, but it also prevents them from having a vote on the committee of representatives. I want to alert the Committee to that.

The committee of representatives is the group that establishes the terms of reference for the 11th year review of the entities established in the bill. That is a critical operation and activity in the bill, because Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Ltd and the other entities established by the bill have 4-yearly audits, but they have only this single review at the end of an 11-year period. The committee of representatives is the organisation that establishes the terms of reference for the review, that appoints the reviewer, and that then receives and distributes the report at the end of that process.

Those iwi who withdraw from the conglomerates, who have mandated iwi organisations, who have asset-holding companies, and who are then out doing their own business—having recognition and being established as iwi in their own right to do what other iwi are doing—will not be able to vote for the members of the committee of representatives if clause 14E(2) is allowed to proceed.

The Greens also have an amendment to delete clause 15 in its entirety. Clause 15 enables Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Ltd to prescribe further criteria that the mandated iwi organisations will have to meet in relation to their constitutional documents. Clause 38 sets out exactly how that happens. It enables Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Ltd to make changes to the procedures for sale, to set out the criteria that constitutional documents must meet, and to govern access to the register. Effectively, that means that for Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Ltd—which in effect controls Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd, the company that maintains 50 percent of the assets—to change the constitutional documents of the iwi who are operating companies in direct competition to Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd, it has been given a huge competitive commercial advantage that is not justifiable.

Clause 15 not only allows the trustee to make changes to criteria, but gives no time limit on those changes. They can be made at any time from the enactment of the bill. They can be made after the mandated iwi organisations have been established and after the iwi have met the constitutional requirements at the time those have to be met. Those parameters can change in the future, and iwi will then have to meet those changes, as well. Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Ltd does not have any limitations on whether the criteria that have changed will affect only one iwi or mandated iwi organisation, all iwi or mandated iwi organisations, or a range or group of them.

Therefore, Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Ltd could change the criteria for those it does not like. That is not to suggest that the trust will necessarily do that, but the bill allows for it to happen and those changes can be made. The criteria that mandated iwi organisations will have to meet can be established at any time in the future, and can affect one, a number, or all of those mandated iwi organisations. They will have no opportunity to make the decision themselves. Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Ltd will have to tell them about those changes. The trustee will then have to ask them for their submissions on the changes and take the submissions into account, but in the end it will make the final decision.

That gives the trustee an extraordinary power, in a very sensitive and vulnerable commercial industry, that cannot be justified under any circumstances whatsoever. Neither the ministry nor the ministry officials could explain why that provision is necessary, except to say that the trust might need that power some time in the future for some unknown reason. If we are to enact legislation that gives one organisation, which already has a commercial advantage, extraordinary power to alter the constitutional arrangements of other organisations with which it is in direct competition, it is extremely bad law. It is not law that this Parliament should pass. I urge members to consider the issues around clause 15 and to support the Green Party amendment.

I stand in support of the issues surrounding clause 5, and in particular the Supplementary Order Paper that I have tabled. I do so, in particular, on behalf of those iwi who have settled with the Crown. The Supplementary Order Paper seeks an amendment to give effect to those iwi who have already had their takiwā defined, in terms of their deed of settlement. I do so in order to maintain the integrity and finality of those iwi that have already entered into the deed of settlement in the belief that they had reached a binding and final settlement that would endure, not only when it was signed but also into the future.

A further compelling point I would like to make is that there is no doubt the clear intention of the parties to those settlements was that the boundary, or takiwā, was to be applied for all purposes. This has been evidenced in its practical applications by both Crown agencies and local authorities. Allowing the boundaries to be relitigated where they have been defined in an existing settlement sets an adverse precedent. It will result in each resource allocation process being subject to boundary disputes. It could give rise to different boundaries for different resources.

I want to say that, as an example, Ngāi Tahu have spent in excess of $13 million in litigation over this very issue. In all cases those competing iwi groups, hapū groups, or however members may want to describe them, have failed in their attempts. There are considerable commercial implications in permitting a situation where an iwi boundary must be revalidated before allocation of assets is to occur. Iwi have waited 15 years in the case of pre-settlement assets, and 12 years in the case of post-settlement assets, to get allocation. Further, they will impact on the ability of that iwi to develop tribal wealth and economic security. So therefore, I ask that support be given to the Supplementary Order Paper that I have tabled, particularly where we have asked for the insertion in clause 5 of definitions, so that there is a definition for defined takiwā iwi, a definition for takiwā defining deed of settlement, and finally a takiwā defining enactment. So I seek support from all parties in this Chamber for that particular Supplementary Order Paper.

I would like to reiterate what Gerry Brownlee said to this Committee regarding these amendments and Supplementary Order Papers that we are putting up, particularly in relation to this part. If the Government rejects these Supplementary Order Papers and amendments that will make this bill less patronising and bureaucratic, the National Party caucus will discuss its position on supporting the bill in the final analysis. I will repeat that and make that very clear to the Committee. We will discuss it in caucus in the final analysis and decide whether we will support the bill in the third reading.

I rise in defence of Pita Paraone’s amendment, because we in the National Party support it. I have to say that during the Fisheries and Other Sea-related Legislation Committee, when we talked about the coastline agreements between iwi, we pretty much sewed it up and had it solved. The problem was simply this. Assets, upon allocation, were unable to be transferred to iwi groups until iwi had decided amongst themselves what coastline related to them, because the allocation was based on coastline. The problem was this. If iwi were secure in 95 percent of their coastline—in other words everyone agreed that that particular coastline was theirs, and any allocation related to 95 percent of it was not in dispute—and if 5 percent of it was in dispute, then all of it was held up in allocation. In other words, one could not get on with the job utilising one’s assets for one’s people over the entire coastline, just because 5 percent of it—the last few kilometres—was unresolved.

So we brought about amendments in the select committee that incentivised agreement by allowing assets relating to the undisputed coastline to be transferred and allocated so the iwi could get on with the business, and assets relating to coastline that was in dispute to be set aside pending a coastline resolution, and further providing a clear disputes resolution process—an incentive to make sure that those disputes were actually addressed in a timely manner.

However, upon reflection it is our view that where there have been previous deeds of settlement, and a coastline boundary, such as in the case of Ngāi Tahu, has been set through a previous Crown settlement, has been legitimised through legislation, has been challenged in the courts exhaustively, and never once come up wanting, in fact that coastline should be the coastline that is used for allocation in this Māori fisheries legislation.

So we support the amendments to clause 5 to ensure that defined takiwā iwi, takiwā defining deed of settlement, and takiwā defining enactment, should be included in the definition of deep water quota. The takiwā relates to that coastline that is pertinent to that particular iwi. Now these particular amendments to the clause address it where it has been considered and recognised as legitimate without doubt through the court. So there has been a settlement. It has been legitimised through legislation. It has been challenged through the court, and it has withstood all that.

Now where that has happened, there is no reason why iwi should have to go through the whole process of the courts, paying lots and lots of lawyers lots and lots of money, only to prove it again and again. That is why we support this amendment. There is no reason whatsoever why iwi groups such as Ngāi Tahu should have to go through these hoops again.

I move, That the question be now put.

When I reflect back on the debate in 1992 on this issue, there was a lot of talk about getting Māori out fishing. I want to cut to the chase and bring to the attention of the Committee just what is happening, because it very much exposes the concerns expressed by Opposition members about this bill. Only last week I was contacted by a young Māori man in my electorate who had trained as a fisherman, had been out on two substantive trips, and has just been laid off by Sealord’s, which is the company that owns the bulk of these assets that we are discussing. His job is being replaced by cheap Filipino labour. That is what is happening.

Members opposite have approved work permits so that young Māori in my electorate have been kicked off fishing-boats, they are losing their jobs, and they are being replaced by Filipinos. I shall tell members why. What is happening is that the commercial imperative is that it is cheaper to employ a Filipino than it is to employ a young, keen, Māori fisherman. It is an absolute indictment of this Labour Government that that is going on right now. If it occurred under a National Government, Labour members would be on their feet screaming blue murder. However, when the Government’s own Ministers are doing that, it is absolutely silent, and happy to simply see that taking place.

💬 Gerry Brownlee: The Minister says that it’s not true.

I challenge the Minister. Three constituents have contacted my office in the last fortnight about being displaced and being told that they will no longer have jobs with Sealord’s on those fishing-boats. The Minister knows full well that permits for 20 Filipinos working for Sealord’s have been approved by the Minister of Immigration.

The reason I make the point is that I do not think that ordinary Māori in my constituency are happy with that. Indirectly, they own Sealord’s. However, this legislation creates so many barriers between the owners of the fishing resource and those who are managing assets like Sealord’s that they will not have a bolter’s hope under what is in this legislation to ever hold accountability. They will not have a bolter’s hope at all, because basically, Labour members do not trust Māori. I said earlier that that approach will cost Labour every Māori seat at the next election. Labour needs to reflect and to change.

I also challenge the Minister in the chair on a further point. National is proud of its heritage in terms of the 1992 fisheries settlement. We want to have an approach, as part of nation building in New Zealand, of the major parties being able to progress substantive settlements so that we can make progress as a country. But that requires a commitment from the Government to work with others. That is why Gerry Brownlee said in the Chamber this evening that if Labour would just bend a little, even just take on the very able amendments put forward by Wayne Mapp that will see at least some of the bureaucracy reduced, then we will be happy to compromise, and maintain our support for this bill, despite the fact that there are other provisions we are unhappy about.

That is a very reasonable offer from the deputy leader of the National Party—that is, give a little ground and we could keep this ship going forward. But while there is that absolute arrogance from the Government, not taking a single call on this significant bill, dumping on the House a 20-page Supplementary Order Paper without the Minister so much as even getting to his feet to explain it, that is a disgrace. This country deserves better, Māori deserve better, and certainly the fishing industry in New Zealand deserves better.

National has made a very reasonable offer. Yes, we can keep this on a bipartisan basis; yes, we want Māori fishing to be successful, and we think that it is more likely to be successful when there is a wider consensus of this Parliament. However, the current arrogance from that Minister and this Government will not do.

I move, That the question be now put.

I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. Could I cast my vote?

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Clem Simich): Yes, the vote has not closed.

I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. The member was not in the House when the vote was called. I do not think that it is proper that a member then seeks leave to cast a vote after we have already cast our vote.

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Clem Simich): I thank the member for that. I did look at it. The member was actually at the door when her name was called. She is the last one to be called. I accept it and I allow the member to vote.

The question was put that the following amendment in the name of Pita Paraone to clause 5 be agreed to:

to insert, after the definition of subsidiary, the following definitions:

takiwa defining deed of settlement, in relation to an iwi,—

(a) means a deed signed by the Crown and the mandated representative of an iwi, that identifies an area as the takiwa of the iwi; and

(b) includes—

(i) the attachments and schedules to the deed (if any); and

(ii) any amendments from time to time to the deed or to the attachments or to the schedules.

takiwa defining enactment, in relation to an iwi, means an enactment that identifies an area as the takiwa of the iwi.

I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. I want some clarification. Is it correct that we just voted on clause 14E?

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Clem Simich): We voted on clause 14E, and we voted on that after clause 15.

Can you explain why we voted on clause 14E after clause 15?

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Clem Simich): It was an amendment to the Minister’s amendments set out on Supplementary Order Paper 255, which are just coming up.

I understood that the Minister’s amendments are put first. It has always been the process that Ministers’ amendments go ahead of members’ amendments. So I would like clarification as to why we voted on a member’s amendment prior to the Minister’s amendment being put.

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Clem Simich): I thank the member for raising that. It is the correct procedure. It is set out in Standing Order 301.

If you are quoting from—

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Clem Simich): I am just checking to see whether I have the right year for the Standing Orders.

Standing Order 301(2)(a) states: “an amendment proposed by the member in the charge of the bill is taken ahead of an amendment proposed by another member,” so in fact those amendments were out of order.

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Clem Simich): I am sorry. We are proceeding under Standing Order 301(3).

Well, can you explain to me why Standing Order 301(2)(a) states that an amendment proposed by the member in charge of a bill is taken ahead of an amendment proposed by another member? It has always been my understanding, from debates over the years, that the Minister’s amendment are put first because if they are passed, they actually rule out members’ amendments that have been proposed.

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Clem Simich): I thank Mr Tisch for that.

I may be able to help. I notice that your ruling was in terms of Standing Order 301(3), but of course that refers to paragraph (1), and Standing Order 301(1) states: “The member in charge of a bill can require that any or all amendments in that member’s name to a provision be put as one question.” In other words, it would imply that it is discretionary and not mandatory. In other words, the member in charge of the bill—in this instance it would seem to be the Minister, as it is in his name—can require that if he so chooses. It is not mandatory.

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Clem Simich): I thank the member for that. The Minister does require that they be taken as one amendment. In response to Mr Tisch’s query, I point out that these Standing Orders were changed not too long ago. Standing Order 301(2) is subject to paragraph (3) and that is why I mentioned that we are proceeding under paragraph (3). My advice is that that is the correct procedure, and the amendment to new clause 14E was correctly taken after clause 15 and before the Minister’s amendments.

The question was put that the amendments set out on Supplementary Order Paper 255 in the name of the Hon David Benson-Pope to Part 1 be agreed to.

Amendments agreed to.