Judicial Matters Bill

I move, That the Judicial Matters Bill be now read a second time. This bill has been closely examined by the Justice and Electoral Committee over the past 7 months. I congratulate the committee on its careful consideration of both the bill and the detailed submissions. The committee received submissions from the judiciary, the legal profession, members of the public, and community groups. These submissions represented a range of views about the judiciary, its role, and the requirements of judicial independence and accountability. The chief executive of the Judicial Commission of New South Wales told the committee that the bill was well drafted and incorporates the positive aspects of the New South Wales Judicial Officers Act, while avoiding provisions that New South Wales had found problematic.

This is a significant bill for New Zealand, as it forms an integral part of the reform package this Government is committed to achieving. Along with the establishment of the Supreme Court and the continuing work on judicial appointments, this bill will make important changes in a number of areas affecting the judiciary and its relationship with the wider New Zealand public. The bill is consistent with the United Nations basic principles on the independence of the judiciary, and confirms New Zealand’s commitment to those principles.

The bill was introduced in 2003 to address a range of judicial administration and resources issues. A number of its proposals relate to judicial conduct and judicial independence. Part 1 establishes a Judicial Conduct Commissioner and a Judicial Conduct Panel. I understand that submissions received by the committee expressed opposing views on how complaints about judges should be dealt with, and whether sanctions should be imposed on judges. The Government is committed to the goal of maintaining and enhancing public confidence in the judiciary, while adhering to the principle of judicial independence. This bill strikes, we believe, the correct balance between those goals. It establishes a transparent and an accessible process for people to make complaints against judges, and allows for proper investigation of matters that may lead to the removal of a judge. At the same time, the bill avoids measures that would have an adverse effect on judicial independence. I support the decision of the majority of the committee that the bill will not provide for sanctions, short of removal, or burden the heads of bench with statutory functions for discipline.

I turn now to the amendments to Part 1. Although most of the changes proposed by the committee are minor and serve to clarify the provisions, there are some significant amendments. The committee has recommended that the Judicial Conduct Commissioner be given the power to deal with complaints together, where appropriate, to prevent the commissioner and the panel from having to conduct separate investigations into each complaint received about the same matter. The committee has also recommended, with the support of the judges of the High Court and the Court of Appeal, that the panel’s function be more clearly articulated. The changes clarify that the panel is not inquiring into the complaint, but is determining whether there is a serious matter of conduct justifying consideration being given to the removal of a judge. The panel will have the power to extend its inquiry into matters that may come to its attention during the course of its investigation. That change was recommended by the chief executive of the Judicial Commission of New South Wales, and we benefit from the Australian experience. The committee has also included a diagram in the bill, outlining the judicial conduct process. The diagram is a valuable addition, because it will make the process accessible and understandable to all New Zealanders.

The committee has also recommended minor changes to Part 2. I understand that submitters had differing views on the issue of extending immunity from suit to all judges. Some submitters were of the view that extending immunity would make judges less accountable. Most submissions from the legal profession supported the extension as a necessary protection for judicial independence. I am pleased, also, to support the committee’s recommendation that there be no change to the clauses extending immunity from suit to all judges. That allows all judges to discharge their duties fearlessly and ensures that New Zealand adheres to the United Nations basic principles on the independence of the judiciary. I also support the committee’s recommendations that the affirmative resolution procedure be removed, and the maximum number of judges in the High Court and the District Court be increased. That change will ensure the judiciary has adequate resources to administer justice for all New Zealanders. The affirmative resolution procedure may be reconsidered at a later date, once the Regulations Review Committee has completed its review.

I note that some members of the committee thought the bill would address the appointment of judges. On 29 April I released a consultation paper on the judicial appointments process, to see whether there is support for changes to our system for appointing judges.

The proposed amendments to the bill are important improvements. I thank all members of the Justice and Electoral Committee for their valuable contribution. This bill will enhance public confidence in our judicial system, and protect the independence and integrity of our judges. I commend the bill to the House.

National is opposed to this legislation. The Associate Minister of Justice has given a very fair summary of the principal matters that occupied the time of the Justice and Electoral Committee, which heard submissions on the bill. I agree with her also when she said that the diagram in the bill is, to use her phrase, “a valuable addition”, but from that point on I fear we part company. I see nothing of merit in this legislation, at all.

I would like to pick up some of the primary concerns that troubled National members as we heard submissions on this bill. I am bound to say that we had concerns right from the outset. A good starting point, I suggest, and I am sure most members of the House would agree, is that legislation should be remedial in its purpose. That means that there must be some mischief that needs to be remedied, otherwise why are we here? Surely it is not simply to pass laws. We should be passing laws that advance a cause, and advance it for the good. That is a primary concern that National has with this legislation.

The primary focus of the bill is a more formal structure for the removal of judges, so the assumption, of course, is that the current procedures are not working well. The reality is that we have never removed a judge, and never really come close to it. The closest we came was many years ago, in 1913, and it involved Justice Edwards. He was a member of the Supreme Court and became the resident judge in Auckland in 1903. By 1913 his courtroom behaviour had become intolerable to the legal profession and was the subject of widespread comments. Newspapers carried reports of his attacks on counsel, and there was a cartoon in the New Zealand Observer that suggested that the judge was biased towards a female respondent in a 1913 divorce trial.

The lawyers of the Auckland District Law Society gathered. They recorded in a resolution that the administration of justice had been imperilled, and that the judge had shaken public confidence in the then Supreme Court. He was transferred to Wellington and never sat in Auckland again. In 1919 there was a resurgence of opposition to the judge, with the result that he resigned in 1921 on a full pension, with £1,000 compensation. That is as close as we ever got to the removal of a judge, so we do not need a formal process to deal with what is really a non-issue.

I resent the loss of a right that I and other members in this Parliament had to move our own motion if events showed that it was necessary to take action against a particular judge who had crossed the line, and whose conduct called for the highest form of sanction and removal for judicial misbehaviour. But this Government has decided that that right should be taken away. Instead, this costly and complex statutory process has now been set up for the removal of judges. It must be complex, because it needs a detailed diagram to explain it, and we see that in schedule 1AA, under the heading, “Overview of process for Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel”.

That is the first objection that National takes to this legislation. There is no need for it, so why do it? There is already a perfectly adequate existing pathway. The Justice and Electoral Committee did not really hear any evidence of substance relating to the removal of judges. What we were treated to was instance after instance where the behaviour of the judge fell short of the standard that the particular complainant required. This legislation does not deal with that, at all. If a mischief was to be remedied, it was a mischief that was concerned with the circumstance that a judge was intemperate with counsel, intemperate with witnesses, or failed to get on with the job—the sorts of complaints that fall short of removal. This Government has decided that it will not deal with that issue. It could have, but it has not.

The bill does not propose to alter the test of misbehaviour or incapacity. It fails to deal with conduct that falls short of those standards. There was an opportunity to address those issues, which are quite clearly of concern to the public. We have just heard the Associate Minister of Justice saying that she did not want the head of bench to be burdened with those sorts of things at any particular level of the court system. Things could have been done—censure, public apology, required counselling, but this Government did not have the appetite to take that step.

The second point is that the bill does not deal with the appointment of judges, and if there are problems in the legal system, they are more about the process of appointment and issues of transparency of process than the removal of judges. The committee was very much aware that a discussion document was coming from the Government on judicial appointments. We signalled that in the commentary on the bill, where we noted that the Associate Minister of Justice was releasing a public discussion document to canvass views on the introduction of an independent body with a role in judicial appointments. Of course, that discussion document came almost at the same time as we reported to Parliament on this bill.

I would like to deal with two further matters that I think are important in the context of the House’s consideration of this legislation. We should, I assert, be very cautious about the appointment of part-time judges. Judging is a full-time business; there is no doubt about that. It is not for part-timers. It is not for people who are convalescing. It is not for people who can give only a small part of their time to the process.

That proposition can be simply tested. It is not uncommon for criminal trials to run for, let us say, 4 days, so we will have to confront the situation of the judge who says: “If this is a 4-day case, I can’t start on it, because on Wednesdays and Thursdays I can’t be available to sit.” It is not practicable to have jurors hang around for 2 days waiting for the judge’s pleasure, so that the case can be resumed. This is an example where it is foreshadowed in advance that a case will take 4 days, but there is another class of case that I know of—from my experience working day in and day out in the courts—that is not uncommon. That is where a case is scheduled for 2 days and it runs on. It starts Monday and it goes through Tuesday. The expectation of the counsel at the beginning is that it will take only 2 days, but it trickles into Wednesday, and then, next thing, it goes on until Thursday.

How is this part-time judging system going to work? I invite members of the House who might have colleagues, friends, acquaintances, or relatives who are judges to sound them out on what they think about it. They will think it the load of rubbish I think it is. There may be a case for judges to take unpaid leave in particular cases— for example, the pregnancy of a judge, but that is a matter that should be managed within the judicial process.

The final point I would like to make is on this whole issue of judicial numbers, because this bill substantially increases the ability for more judges to be appointed. There are amendments to clauses 41 and 51 that increase the number of District Court judges from 123 to 140, and the number of High Court judges from 37 to 55. We have enough judges at the moment. The issues do not lie in more judges; they lie in more money, better resourcing, and improved case management.

I rise in support of the second reading of this bill, and I do so as a member of Parliament’s powerful Justice and Electoral Committee, of which we have just heard a member from the Opposition side. I am sure we will hear from my esteemed colleagues on that committee.

One of the good things about considering this bill was a reminder of how safe and sound our constitutional foundations in this country are. We have not had a judge removed from office. We heard submissions from people from the international legal community who commented favourably on New Zealand’s judiciary. So we are not doing this bill out of a sense of panic, but to ensure that there is transparency, and to reaffirm the strong faith we can have in our judiciary in terms of independence, which is fundamental to a democracy.

The committee has made some helpful changes, and I believe the bill will be very good from the public’s point of view in keeping the faith that we must have in our judiciary. I support the second reading.

New Zealand First will oppose this legislation. It is very rare for the New Zealand Law Society to disagree with legislation that is brought before Parliament. Usually, the society takes the view that it will be critical of legislation and make suggestions to make it better, and not make any comment on policy. In fact, even on the Supreme Court Bill, which abolished appeals to the Privy Council, the Law Society was very circumspect. However, on this issue the society was very clear. Its primary submission stated that the society opposed the proposals in Part 1 to establish the office of Judicial Conduct Commissioner. Its essential reasons were that the proposals are constitutionally unacceptable because they undermine the independence of the judiciary, and that there is no evidence of a problem that requires legislation of this nature. That goes entirely against the comment made by the Associate Minister of Justice when introducing this bill for the second reading. She said that the judiciary would retain its independence and integrity. Clearly, the Minister did not read the Law Society’s submission, because that totally contradicts the Minister’s viewpoint.

The Law Society was not the only group to oppose the legislation. David A R Williams QC opposed considering a complaints process without at the same time introducing a similar statutory process for the appointment of judges, and recommended the incorporation of enabling legislation for a recommendatory-type Judicial Appointments Commission. He expressed concern about the bill’s approach to part-time judicial appointments. Another submission, from the New Zealand Council for Civil Liberties, opposed Part 1 regarding the Judicial Conduct Commissioner and the Judicial Conduct Panel, terming it “an unnecessary complication to Parliament’s current right to impeach a judge”. That should be enough for any Government to think twice about continuing with legislation.

New Zealand First supported the bill going to the Justice and Electoral Committee. I made the point during the first reading that that was as far as we would support it, and I indicated my concern about even the appointment of a Judicial Conduct Commissioner. It is yet another example of where the Labour Party Government would have the opportunity to provide jobs for the boys—or for the girls, as the case might be. It is very good at providing jobs for the boys and the girls—perhaps even for a girl who might be leaving her present form of employment; this might be a very interesting job for that person to take up. It would be interesting to know whether one can pass legislation in this House to ensure one’s future career after one leaves it within a short time.

Clearly, this bill does not have any support. The Law Society said: “Judicial independence is not something that has evolved out of judicial self-interest. It is a cornerstone of democratic, constitutional government. It exists as an essential safeguard of the rights of every person in New Zealand.” This bill is another example of how this Government is willing to turn New Zealand upside down to suit its own purposes. We saw that with the Supreme Court Bill, where the Government abolished appeal rights to the Privy Council. It must be regretting deeply that it did not continue those appeal rights, in so far as lodging an appeal on the foreshore and seabed case, and the Ngāti Apa case, is concerned. How would that have, possibly, changed things as they stand today—especially, the results of the opinion polls? But that is another story.

I make just one point in passing, at this stage. I actually do support the provision in the bill regarding part-time work, and I disagree with the National Party member in this respect. I indicated in the first reading of the bill that I thought that was one of the better aspects of it. The National Party may not be interested in the many intelligent women with great skills, and such like, who could make a contribution on a part-time basis to our society. I gave the instance in the first reading of my own wife, who job-shared with another teacher at a school, which helped her to return to the teaching profession after having ensured the continuation of the Jones-Miller line. Every opportunity should be given to women to go back into the workforce on a gradual basis, especially those who have had tremendous training in the law and the like, and who, after having worked even harder as mothers and housewives, go back to the teaching, judicial, or medical professions, as the case might be. Their contribution by way of part-time work is to be commended. Again, as I understand it, in England a Recorder does work on a part-time basis. Judges in England often start as part-time Recorders, so that they can make up their own minds whether they would like a judicial job in the future. But that is another story.

I am frightened of what the Judicial Conduct Commissioner, in this particular case, might have to do. What sorts of complaints would come before him or her? I was reading the submission of David Williams QC, in which he talks about outspoken judges, judicial activism, and some of the things that modern judges get up to. I asked myself whether those sorts of things would end up before the Judicial Conduct Commissioner. In his submission he said: “Mr Justice Meagher of the New South Wales Court of Appeal complained about [various] judges in a famous after-dinner speech given some years ago to the Sydney bar. He said:”—and members should think of what people might say about these judges—“Nor do judges leave their professional sentiments on the bench.”—speaking about Australian judges—“They will address any meeting, seminar, eisteddfod, jamboree or corroboree on land rights, the evils of fluoride, the dangers of the New Right, the assimilation of ethnics, penal reform, the trial of Lindy Chamberlain, or any other subject of uplifting importance. Mr Justice Kirby has written an article in The Australian Law Journal to prove the proposition that soap-and-water is a powerful antidote to AIDS; (without telling us how or when it is to be applied, or even where); the same judge writes in Vogue to tell us how he discovered the music of Mahler when he was aged 40; soon, who knows, Mr Justice Enderby will write in the Women’s Weekly on how he has discovered Shakespeare. Mr Justice ‘Gumnut’ Cripps,”—

💬 Richard Worth: I raise a point of order, Mr Speaker. It is an issue of relevance. This is a debate on the Judicial Matters Bill. It is not a recitation of after-dinner speeches given by judges on wide-ranging topics wholly unrelated to the law.

Speaking to the point of order, I point out that under this bill the public is entitled to complain about judges and their behaviour. So I think there will be many people who complain—

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (H V Ross Robertson): The member will come to the point.

I think there will be many people who complain about Justice Kirby, Justice “Gumnut” Cripps, and the like, making speeches in this way, so I believe I am relevant to the point contained in this bill, especially as we are referring to the report back of the select committee, and this quote is in a submission on the bill.

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (H V Ross Robertson): OK, the member will continue.

I am only too pleased to help the National Party, yet again. As I was saying: “Mr Justice ‘Gumnut’ Cripps, from the Parks and Gardens Court, tells us we must all become tree-huggers and prairie fairies … Mr Justice O’Brien will soon emerge from his well deserved obscurity to tell us that the death penalty should be reintroduced for people who plead not guilty …”. Those are some of the things that Justice Meagher points out might be raised in the future.

People would, of course, be entitled to complain about judges who behave in that way, as a result of the passing of this bill. Obviously, one cannot do that today—at least, not to the same extent. In New Zealand there is the discreet way of writing to the Attorney-General or the Chief Justice, and saying: “Judge so-and-so did such-and-such, and would someone please have a look into it.” The present system we have is perfectly satisfactory.

When the Law Society comes out and openly opposes Government legislation, we should all take note because it is a very, very conservative body that rarely comes out in the open and expresses a point of view. It submitted that the bill will undermine the independence of the jury, and stated that there is no need for legislation of this nature, except in instances where a judge may be removed from office. We already have a process for removal of a judge from office. The society suggests that the bill seems to be “based on impressionistic opinion, not hard evidence”.

This bill is just another example of Labour Party Government politically correct nonsense. It is politically correct nonsense from Labour, which is trying to give every little moaner, groaner, and complainer something to write to somebody about and moan and groan. And, most important from the Labour viewpoint, it is trying to set up another job for the boys, or for the girls, to keep them happy—to shell out more public money to someone who really would not know how to be a lawyer in the first place, and ends up in a nice, safe government job.

The Green Party very strongly supports the intentions of this bill. In particular, we support the move to develop a more transparent and robust way of investigating complaints against judges. Up until now the process has been extremely confused and inadequate. In fact, the Justice and Electoral Committee found it difficult to discover even how many complaints had been made against judges. The confused and overlapping nature of the different routes for such complaints is itself indicative of how overdue these changes are and how much we need them.

We do not hold to the view that judicial independence means a licence to behave without restraint. That cannot be what it means. Judicial independence is about judges being fearless in making findings without regard to political favour. That does not mean there should be no sanction for misbehaviour or licentious behaviour.

This bill establishes a new office of Judicial Conduct Commissioner to receive complaints and to undertake preliminary investigations. Those complaints are either dismissed, or referred to the head of bench if they are of a minor nature, or a recommendation will be made to the Attorney-General to establish a Judicial Conduct Panel, which would conduct an inquiry, usually publicly, into the conduct. If the panel then decides that removal of the judge should be considered, the Attorney-General would determine whether to initiate removal directly by communicating with the Governor-General, or by a motion of this House for an address to the Governor-General.

The National Party in its minority report and in the speech of Mr Richard Worth—and Dail Jones echoed some of those comments—made the point that because no judge has been dismissed in New Zealand the system is working fine. Mr Worth made the point that legislation should be remedial in nature and should seek to deal with a mischief. Mr Worth then pointed out the case of Justice Edwards in 1913, who clearly should have been removed from office because of his outrageous behaviour. He never was removed from office. The point is the system did not work. That was a perfect example of a man who should have been removed from office. In fact, not only was he not removed from office but he ended up resigning on full pension, with ₤1,000 compensation. That is a perfect demonstration of how inadequate the present process is for dealing with those issues. Just because we face no similar scandal today in the newspapers, those members say the legislation is unnecessary. Clearly, the current procedure of a motion in the House does not work, and we would be quite wrong to wait for a crisis in the judiciary before a transparent and formal process was implemented. That would be extremely short-sighted and an example of the kind of crisis thinking that pervades the National Party.

The problem is that Parliament is naturally—and rightly—hesitant to question the judiciary. That is a convention, and it is quite right. One noticeable exception is Mr Stephen Franks, who makes personal and hostile attacks against the judiciary whenever he disagrees with their judgments. He even attacked the Chief Justice because she does not defer to what he considers to be his superior legal intellect and learning. But, generally, we have a convention that this Parliament does not attack the judiciary. Parliament is naturally hesitant to interfere with the judiciary, and that is right. Therefore, it would take an extremely blatant example of misbehaviour to precipitate a motion in this House to remove a judge.

This legislation introduces a process that is much better. It depoliticises the process. It removes it from the hands of politicians in the first instance, and it allows a formal and transparent process for genuine and serious complaints to be investigated properly, if necessary, and for action to be taken, if necessary.

The Greens are disappointed with one aspect of the bill. It does not address one important area, which it could have done because it is an omnibus judicial bill—namely, the appointments process. One reason the Greens did not support the introduction of an affirmative resolution process for raising the cap on judge numbers is that although we believe there is some sense in having such a process so that the Government does not have to introduce legislation every time an increase in the cap is needed, such a process carries some dangers while judicial appointments are made in such an opaque manner as at present. The Green Party support for the Supreme Court Bill last year was at least partly contingent on the Government conducting a public dialogue on an independent judicial appointments commission.

The original understanding was that that debate would be in parallel with this bill. That has not happened, but we are pleased to see that that discussion document has now been released. The discussion document is now in the public domain. It is out there and people are reading it and preparing submissions on it. We are looking forward to participating in the process of evaluating the feedback on that document. The Green Party takes great pride in being instrumental to the development of that paper. That would not have happened without Green Party agitation.

We also take pride in our advocacy in this Parliament of lay participation in the judicial appointment process—an area where, I have to say, we agree with United Future, whose members are also supportive of that proposal. I have just come back from the United Kingdom, where I had discussions with various British MPs, academics, and policy people about the judicial reforms that are going on over there. One point made to me was that, to some degree, the proposals for an independent judicial appointments commission have been strongly supported by many in the judiciary, because they see it as a way to remove political interference in, or influence on, judicial appointments. The Green Party considers that such a process is necessary in this country also. We believe that it is necessary in order to maintain the confidence of the public in the judiciary.

My last point is about part-time judges, which is something the Green Party does support. We believe that it allows the judiciary to be more representative of the community in which it is situated, and that that does lead to better justice. Richard Worth raised concerns about that issue. His main argument was to do with the difficulties in scheduling cases, and things like that, and that is a fair comment, but we have to trust that judges are intelligent enough to work out their scheduling problems by themselves, and do not need 120 MPs to sit around this House to tell them how they should schedule their cases or organise their workload. They are very experienced. They know how those things work better than we do—even such experienced lawyers as Mr Worth—and I am sure that we can leave it in their capable hands.

I rise for the ACT party to oppose this bill. It is a constitutional measure that is being put through without even a consensus that could be described as more than the barest. Indeed, I venture to suggest that on matters like this, when the Labour Party has to rely on the Greens, it has admitted defeat. The Greens have utterly no concern about civil liberties or constitutional convention. The Greens’ vote is for sale to anyone who looks at them and says: “We might consider at some distant time in the future acceding to your views on GM or one of the other pet topics.”, and therefore they say “We will curry favour until we get into that position where we can hold you to ransom.”

The bill is a reflection of a memorandum the Attorney-General commissioned from Sir Geoffrey Palmer of Chen and Palmer. The memorandum is dated 1 November 2002, and its subject is judicial administration issues. The reason I say it is constitutional is that Sir Geoffrey Palmer recommended, and the bill implements, taking the power of initiation of removal of a judge, from this House. That has been there as a safeguard against judicial excess for decades—I think, 120 years.

💬 Dail Jones: 1700.

Since 1700. Sir Geoffrey Palmer says in the usual haughty manner that he shares with the Attorney-General that politicians, as elected representatives of the people, cannot be trusted to assess those things properly, and therefore we should take the power away from them in case they misuse it. It has not been misused. Indeed, as the Green MP just suggested, he is concerned that the power of removal has not been used enough. But it has not been misused; it has not been used. We have been so respectful of the necessary independence of the courts. But what this bill does—and I believe it is sinister—is take the power to initiate the removal of a judge, out of the hands of members of this House and give it, essentially, to someone called a “Judicial Conduct Commissioner”.

That Judicial Conduct Commissioner and the Judicial Conduct Panel are deceptive descriptions. They do not have a role to look into the kinds of complaints that people came to the select committee to point out. They do not look into judicial conduct. If they were being properly described they would be judicial removal commissioners, or judicial removal panels.

The only kind of complaint they can report on is a sacking offence. So none of those indiscretions, those minor discourtesies, those delays, those things that do not merit being sacking offences in a country that respects the independence of the judiciary are within the scope of the Judicial Conduct Panel. The panel is selected by the Attorney-General and appointed. It then has a veto power over the sacking of a judge. Because the bill says that without a report of that panel there may be conduct meriting dismissal, the Attorney-General cannot take it further. So we have two levels of protection for the judiciary, against the very rare event where the people should expect a sacking, because the Attorney-General can then decide, despite a recommendation or a finding by the panel, not to take it further herself.

I say this bill is sinister, because we have not been given any facts or any instance to justify it. The Attorney-General wrote to the select committee and tried to say that the case of Justice Tony Christiansen was a good example of what would be avoided by this panel. That was deception, because that judge resigned rather than force any sort of process. He had enough sense of honour to do that, and this bill makes it quite clear that, where a judge has resigned, things stop. It does not go any further.

The kinds of circumstances that have been alleged, also do not appear to fall within the description that the officials and others gave to us, of circumstances that this bill is concerned about. What this bill ought to be concerned about is the experience that New Zealand had when a pusillanimous Minister of Justice, the Hon Douglas Graham, declined to initiate the sacking of a judge. In fact, it was a District Court judge. So that failure by the Minister to initiate, which left Parliament unable to do anything, is precisely the kind of circumstance the Greens are now supporting to go into our law.

In other words, take it out of the hands of Parliament, give it to an expert to look at—in that case the Solicitor-General. The Solicitor-General delivered an extremely conservative opinion. The Hon Douglas Graham decided that that merited not taking any steps. So we are left with a judge sitting as a District Court judge, not just on a pension with $1,000, I say to Mr Tanczos, but sitting on his full salary, on light duties, despite the whole community being rightly convinced that he did not deserve to be there.

So we should have extended the position in relation to High Court judges to District Court judges. Instead this bill is going in exactly the wrong direction. This bill is taking away from parliamentarians the ability to express the clear will of the people in that case—which was to see a judge who had dishonoured his office, go.

This bill may want to protect judges. It could be that the sinister effect of it one day might go the other way—that a witch-hunt could be mounted with a hand-picked panel to get rid of judges who have been inconvenient to a body that does not want to face up to the political issues that can be avoided by sending hard problems to judges.

Let us take, for example, the so-called principles of the treaty, which were sent off to the judges to deal with and which, in my opinion, they have made a hash of. It is perfectly proper that people in a democracy should be able to get rid of judges if they step over the mark. I am not saying they have in relation to the principles; they were required to adjudicate there. But where judges do decide that they know better than the elected representatives, who go before the people every 3 years—if we do get judges, such as Judge Rose Bird in California, who a few years ago refused to carry out the provisions relating to capital punishment—then it would be perfectly proper for this House to have a debate and remove a judge or judges who had decided they were not only applying the law but they were going to make it.

I believe that behind this bill is an elitist attempt to make sure that Parliament cannot do that; to try to avoid anyone moving the motion that would start the debate about whether the judges had trashed our constitutional conventions by intruding into the area of the legislature and making law instead of applying it.

I have addressed the main constitutional issues. This bill is going to go through probably on a very fair majority without any examples of the kind of mischief it was to attack, and I have mentioned only one small part of it. We would have liked to be able to support a bill that set up a proper investigatory process where there is a complaint about a judge, but not a bill that then took away the powers of elected representatives to initiate such a process. We would like also to have had proper explanations for a whole lot of other things in this bill, such as the potential to pack the courts with part-time judges. The Minister’s officials would not even accept a minor safeguard, like putting a limit on the maximum number who could be part-time so that we did not end up with an infinite pool available for panel-packing.

We would have liked to have a proper explanation of why it is that the Judicial Conduct Panel can suppress reporting about a judge. This panel can subpoena anyone, demand documents—for example, a reporter’s notes—and if it thinks it is against the “public interest” it can permanently suppress publication. We believe that this bill is a sinister constitutional change.

Sitting suspended from 6 p.m. to 7.30 p.m.

United Future is opposed to the Judicial Matters Bill, and we will oppose its second reading tonight. United Future was the only party to oppose this bill at the first reading. I am pleased to say that most parties in the House now oppose the bill, having seen the detail and heard the Justice and Electoral Committee submissions. United Future is opposing the bill largely because of the absence of a judicial appointments commission. However, we also agree with ACT that the fettering of the right of Parliament to remove a judge is a serious constitutional step that has ramifications beyond even what ACT has addressed tonight, which I will deal with.

We disagree with National, however, that the Judicial Conduct Commissioner is not needed. We also disagree with National that there should have been sanctions in the bill, including censure, public apology, or requirement for counselling for judges, and I will also deal with that.

In terms of this bill, the Greens have been somewhat of a pushover for the Government, and in fact they have had the backbone of a jellyfish. Page 11 of the commentary to the bill states: “The United Future, National, and Green members consider that the bill should provide for a more transparent judicial appointments process. Significantly, concerns regarding the judicial appointments process were raised by submitters during our consideration of both this bill and the Supreme Court Bill.”

So the Greens, like United Future, felt that a judicial appointments commission was the bottom line in this bill. It was part of the condition of the Greens’ support of the Supreme Court Bill that a judicial appointments commission would at least be investigated, if not implemented. The Greens came to United Future and suggested we both oppose the bill unless there was a judicial appointments commission, or at least substantial progress towards one, but I note the Government has now convinced the Greens that the issuing of a discussion paper is sufficient in order to meet their objection. Although submissions are due to close on 30 July 2004, there is no commitment by the Government to go any further than simply receiving those submissions. There is no time line beyond that and no commitment, and the Greens in this respect have been pretty naive. The Government is not interested in pushing this issue along, because if it had been, it would have included it in the bill. In fact, the Greens say that the issuing of the discussion paper would not have happened without the Greens pushing for it.

💬 Dr Wayne Mapp: Oh, really!

Exactly. This demonstrates that Labour has no interest in going any further in this matter. Effectively, the issuing of the discussion paper is a fob simply to get the Greens’ support in order to pass this bill, and then I suspect that it will be forgotten.

United Future was open to Part 2 of the bill going through, but there is certainly no urgency for Part 1. That could have waited until the discussion paper had run its course—30 July is only 10 weeks away—and then we could have reached an agreement with the Government on the process from there. We might then have been able to reach some sort of accord in terms of where things are going.

This is not just a question of the fact that a judicial appointments committee was included in the bill simply as something United Future wanted to happen by itself as an independent step. We think it is important that a judicial appointments commission is part of this whole process of dealing with the judiciary. The absence of a commission to deal with appointments as well as discipline will undermine the role of the commissioner provided for in this bill, because he or she becomes a negative agent. In terms of members of the judiciary’s approach to the commissioner, they will simply see him or her as a judicial police officer, and I think that will impede the commissioner’s ability to voice any judicial concerns he or she has. Select committee members heard about the process in New South Wales, and I notice that the Attorney-General was claiming that this bill did everything New South Wales thought was a good idea, and did nothing that it did not think was a good idea. But one of the things the people from the New South Wales commission told us was that they believed the education functions as well as the discipline functions were an important balance. The fact that they could provide positive education was an important part of their role, so that they were not seen just as a negative agency.

However, what is proposed in this legislation is simply a negative agency. The judiciary was opposed to this bill, and the commissioner is not welcomed by them. In terms of getting the judiciary’s cooperation, the Government has really started off on the wrong foot. It is far less likely to get it, and the judiciary will have a negative attitude to the commissioner, whose job is to investigate complaints against them.

The ACT party talked about the fettering of the right to remove; the ability of this Parliament to remove a judge. Clause 33(2) provides that: “A Judge must not be removed from office unless a Judicial Conduct Panel has reported to the Attorney-General that it is of the opinion that consideration of the removal of the Judge is justified.” ACT members have correctly pointed to the power that this gives in terms of the Judicial Conduct Panel, and that Parliament is fettered by that provision in not being able to remove a judge unless the conduct panel has come to that conclusion.

The argument is that Parliament should not remove a judge unless there has been a proper investigation, and that natural justice issues provide that, effectively, there should be some sort of mechanism like this before Parliament entertains the removal. But what this bill fails to address is the situation of a reluctant Attorney-General. There could well be a situation where the Attorney-General fails to move. If the Attorney-General does not appoint a panel under clause 20, which the Attorney-General must do, then the matter will not procede and Parliament cannot consider it. There is no obligation on the Attorney-General to appoint a panel. Furthermore, the Attorney-General will decide who is on the panel. If the Attorney-General does not want the judge removed, it is pretty simple for him or her to appoint a conservative panel, which the Attorney-General feels confident will not reach the conclusion that removal is necessary.

So it is not just a question of the fact that it is in the hands of a panel rather than Parliament, but it is in the hands of the Attorney-General, and he or she will totally govern the issue as to whether a judge ought to be removed. That move is taking away a power of Parliament, which is entirely inappropriate.

I disagree with National, however, about whether there needs to be provision for sanctions. The separation of powers means that there is a real problem if there is a legislative provision that provides an obligation on the judiciary to do something, even if it is discretionary. The judicial review process would mean that there could be the undesirable situation of a head of bench potentially being taken to court for failure to discipline or failure to consider the discipline of a judge. I think that is an unseemly situation, which ought to be avoided as much as possible. It may be that if there were a situation where the judiciary was simply turning a blind eye to things, there may have to be a greater requirement to do that, but I think one ought to be very reluctant to move down to that step and get into a situation where the judiciary themselves are being judged.

However, as I said in the United Future minority comment in the bill, this places a strong obligation on the heads of benches, and on judges generally, to be, and to be seen to be, transparent and accountable for their actions when it comes to matters of discipline, and more could be done to achieve this. The judiciary, like every other public institution, is dependent on maintaining public confidence to operate relatively unfettered by statutory restrictions. At a time when the actions of judges are coming under increased scrutiny, maintaining public credibility is vital, and I think it is important that the judiciary take careful note of that. Indeed, the judiciary may well consider that the decision of the Government to enact this bill is sending a message to it concerning its handling of complaints.

As to the formal process of removal, which National and New Zealand First consider is not needed, we also disagree with them. The example that National gave as to why it was not needed in fact showed the opposite. Justice Edwards in 1913 was declared to have been behaving intolerably, yet it was not until 1921 that he finally resigned—a period of 8 years. Under this bill, in that situation, any member of the public could have instigated the complaints process that could have led to a much quicker consideration of his activities. So I think that the provision in terms of judicial conduct is something that the Government should provide for. However, what is left in this bill is a Judicial Conduct Commissioner to investigate complaints as a judicial police officer in a negative role.

💬 Dr Wayne Mapp: And that’s exactly the problem.

That will be exactly the problem, as my colleague has said.

The Judicial Conduct Panel will be seldom used—but at the whim of the Attorney-General. Then there is a miscellaneous provision in Part 2 that deals with increasing the number of part-time judges, which could have been dealt with independently of Parts 1 and 2. United Future will not hold its breath that the Government will implement the Judicial Appointments Commission. We suspect that for the commission to become a reality, United Future will have to make it a condition of our support for the next Government.

I rise to speak on the report back of the Judicial Matters Bill. Although I was not on the Justice and Electoral Committee, I am very interested in this bill, because I once had a member’s bill on this particular subject. I want to thank those people who have been involved. I thank Margaret Wilson for the work she has done on the bill; Lianne Dalziel, who also did a good deal of work on it; and all the good members of the select committee.

💬 Richard Worth: Oh yes.

I note that Richard Worth was on the committee. I also thank those people who put in submissions. I note that there were only 15 submissions, but no doubt they were very detailed and good submissions.

The intention of this bill is to give greater transparency and credibility to the judiciary. It is a very welcome bill. Considerable changes have been made to it. I note that one of the changes is a diagram in the schedules, which I think is a very interesting and, perhaps, very welcome way of presenting matters in a bill. I think schedule 1AA shows the process for judicial conduct, and shows how the Judicial Conduct Commissioner and the Judicial Conduct Panel will work. I welcome that type of layout and explanation as to how the system will work. Once again, I commend this report to the House and thank all those involved for the work they have done.

This bill breaches constitutional conventions, and I am not surprised that the previous speaker for the Government does not recognise those fundamentals. I guess that most New Zealanders who follow these kinds of issues will be well aware that we have three branches of Government—the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. The legislature is, properly—being the representative of the people—the superior branch of Government, but what this bill does is diminish the role of the judiciary. I say that because if there is judicial misconduct currently, there will be an address to the House of Representatives to remove a judge. That is to demonstrate the gravity of the issue—the fact that one branch of the Government of New Zealand is exerting a power over another branch. Properly, as one would expect, it is the superior branch—that of Parliament. This recognises the essence that the three branches of Government have governing powers, in a sense.

By having a new and dangerous procedure for the removal of judges by judicial commissioners, and by having a Judicial Conduct Panel, this bill degrades, and lowers the status of, the judiciary. The bill will harm the judiciary, because it essentially puts in place Government appointees—people who are not directly accountable to the people of New Zealand but who are political appointees. As political appointees, they will exercise power over one of the branches of Government, the judiciary. That is wrong, and it is the fundamental reason why National is opposed to this bill.

On this side of the House we are used to the Government now treating constitutional conventions with some disdain. So it is not at all surprising to find the Judicial Matters Bill being dealt with separately and entirely differently from judicial appointments. Once again, the Government wants an appointments system removed from people who are accountable to the public of New Zealand—to the electors. Nevertheless, the Government wants to do that by a series of stealthy, separate moves intended to be disconnected from one another, and intended to disguise the real intent of the Government.

Whether or not the Government likes it, the effect of that is to diminish the role of the judiciary. Members of the Government might find that hard to understand, but all their actions, not just in this matter but also in the way they created the Court of Appeal, show a scant regard for the respect of the judiciary.

💬 Richard Worth: The Supreme Court, not the Court of Appeal.

Sorry. Actually, effectively it was the Court of Appeal, because all the Government did was just promote the judges. It was a transparently cavalier approach to dealing with constitutional issues. Not once did members on the other side of the House even consider it appropriate to approach members on this side of the House—for instance, my learned colleague Mr Worth, National’s spokesperson on justice—on this hugely important issue of the appointment of our Supreme Court justices. No, it was done by secret cabal. The Prime Minister and the Attorney-General simply got together and made their own decisions. This bill is an unfortunate and dangerous repetition of that kind of approach.

If members want further proof of these assertions, they should look at the mischief this bill is purported to fix. As my colleague Mr Worth very thoughtfully noted in the minority report, this issue has not come before Parliament since 1913. There is no mischief to correct here. In any event, it is extraordinary that a correction would be made in such a disconnected way, whereby no attempt whatsoever has been made to gain any sense of a bipartisan approach. One of my real regrets about the way important constitutional issues are dealt with is that the Government has failed to understand the necessity of, firstly, gaining the support of those people affected—in the case of the Supreme Court business, the principal users—and secondly, making an effort to reach across to this side of the House to ask Opposition members how we could improve our constitution for the benefit of New Zealand. No effort was made whatsoever, because the Government shows a certain contempt for constitutional principles. That is precisely why we are faced with these kinds of bills.

The Government has introduced things like part-time judges, and it has introduced the whole idea of just increasing the number of judges without a real consideration of the need to do so. It is not surprising to find, when I set out all the adverse features of this bill and of the way the Government has conducted itself, that the Government has not gained any support from the profession. As was noted in one of the earlier speeches prior to 6 o’clock, it is extraordinary to find that the Law Society made a submission that was directly opposed to the bill. The usual practice is that the Law Society comments on particular aspects of a bill; it rarely opposes the substance of a bill in total. When it does so, that is supposed to be a real warning signal to the Government that it is going too far and is losing the confidence of people who should have faith in its institutions.

I want to conclude on this point: an arrogant Government is a Government that ignores constitutional propriety, that ignores the views of key stakeholders, and that makes no attempt whatsoever at bipartisanship. This Government has all the hallmarks of an arrogant Government, and that will prove to be its undoing.

I raise a point of order, Mr Speaker. I have become increasingly concerned in the course of this debate about the presence of strangers in the House. I would like to deal with that, if I might. It is my understanding that the Government officials who are here should not be here, and I would like to refer you, Mr Assistant Speaker, to the relevant provisions of the Standing Orders and to ask for your considered ruling, with the intent that those strangers withdraw until that ruling is available. The starting point for what I wish to say is Standing Order 7/3, which refers to strangers. I am aware that the Clerk may have taken a provisional view on what I am about to say.

💬 Darren Hughes: Speaker’s Rulings or the Standing Orders?

Speakers’ Rulings. How could it be 7/3 if it is not a Speaker’s ruling? I am being interrupted in my point of order.

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (H V Ross Robertson): I will just say two things to members. Firstly, points of order are to be heard in silence, according to Standing Order 84(3). The point of order is to be heard in silence provided that the member making the point of order is terse, to the point, and does not bring any controversy into it. That is the first thing.

The second is that there should be no interchange between members during a point of order. I want to rule on the point of order—

I would like to complete the point of order, Mr Assistant Speaker. You must surely hear the point of order.

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (H V Ross Robertson): Please continue.

I want to make just two quick points of order, but I do not really seek that the Clerk distract you while I am making these points, because I am sure he can advise you later.

I was referring to Speaker’s ruling 7/3, “Ministers are entitled to have officials present in the Chamber during questions.” That appears to be the only Speaker’s ruling that is broadly relevant. [Interruption] The issue comes back, it seems to me, to Standing Order 42—for the benefit of the Deputy Leader of the House, or whatever he is—under the heading “Speaker controls admission”, “On behalf of the House, the Speaker controls admission to the Chamber, the lobbies and the galleries, and may from time to time issue rules setting out who may be admitted to those areas and governing their conduct there.” Now I am not aware that there is, in respect of a reading of this type, any relevant ruling that would permit those officials to be here. I am concerned, because here they are recording with their crabbed hands what they are saying, when there is available to them, through the offices of Hansard, a full transcript of what may be occurring. I seek your ruling on that, Mr Assistant Speaker. I think it is not appropriate they are here.

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (H V Ross Robertson): First of all, I thank the honourable member for his contribution and point out to him that the Rt Hon Jonathan Hunt, Speaker, on 3 December 2002 issued rules for admission to the Chamber, lobbies, and galleries of the House of Representatives during sittings of the House. I quote from the rules, under the heading “Admittance of strangers to the Chamber”, “The following strangers may enter the Chamber and occupy seating to the left or right side of the Speaker’s Chair: … To the right: (1) a person invited by a Minister to advise the Government on a Government bill or other matter then before the House for which the Minister has responsibility; (2) a person invited by a member in charge of a Member’s bill, a local bill, or a private bill, to advise that member on the bill; (3) a Minister’s or Parliamentary Under-Secretary’s private secretary or executive assistant; (4) the director or head of a research unit of a party represented in the House or a person acting for such director or head.” That is seating to the right, as is the case in this particular instance. [Interruption] Can I just finish please, Mr Worth? Speaker’s ruling 7/3 is the only ruling that has been given in the House. The rules for admission are based on Standing Order 42, as issued on 3 December 2002.

I raise a point of order, Mr Speaker. I have listened very carefully to your ruling. You have identified the relevant categories, but the problem we have is that none of those categories are relevant. I invite you to indicate the relevant category. I am not aware of any invitation—and that seems to be the subject of the two most relevant categories—issued by the Minister. Who is the Minister? I am seeking that these invitations be tabled or that an undertaking be given that these invitations—

💬 Hon Mark Burton: Speaking to the point of order—

I am being interrupted by that person again.

💬 Hon Mark Burton: Speaking to the point of order—

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (H V Ross Robertson): No, no. I am hearing the member now, and can I just—

💬 Hon Mark Burton: The member sat down.

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (H V Ross Robertson): I am on my feet. I am prepared to hear out the member, but I am also indicating that I intend to call the Minister involved in this particular issue, with regard to the officials sitting to my right.

You have read from the Speaker’s ruling, Mr Assistant Speaker. You have identified a series of categories. I am saying that none of those categories is relevant because, it seemed to me as you read it out quite quickly, the key categories involved the issue of invitations. I am not aware that these strangers have relevant invitations. Of course, they may produce their invitations. I do not know.

The ruling you read out, which I thought was very helpful to the House, was very clear. It indicated that the Minister responsible could invite officials on a matter of Government business. This is a matter of Government business. There is no requirement for the Minister to convey a copy of that invitation to the House, and certainly not to that member. The fact that the member is unaware of something going on in the House is not an unusual state of affairs. The fact is, these officials are clearly here potentially within the scope of that Speaker’s ruling, and I believe that the House should now get upon its proper business.

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (H V Ross Robertson): I will rule now. I have heard the arguments put forward by both parties—

💬 Dr Wayne Mapp: Speaking to the point of order—

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (H V Ross Robertson): I am on my feet. I have heard the issue put by both parties in this particular dispute and I wish to rule on it.

I raise a point of order, Mr Speaker. It would help from the point of view of members on this side of the House if we knew whether the strangers, apparently at the invitation of the Minister, were here for this bill or for the next bill. In other words, we do not know their status and that has been precisely what has motivated this point of order.

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (H V Ross Robertson): Thank you very much. That is a matter for the Minister. The Minister does not have to communicate his invitation to the Opposition. The Speaker has to be satisfied that officials are properly here. The Speaker is satisfied.

I raise a point of order, Mr Speaker.

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (H V Ross Robertson): I have ruled. This had better be a new point of order.

It is a new point of order. It is to inquire into your ruling without challenging it, to ask whether the Opposition is correct that the relevant Minister is the Attorney-General, and to ask whether the Speaker is ruling that invitations have, in respect of this bill, been issued to the strangers.

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (H V Ross Robertson): All I can say is what I have previously said. It is a matter for the Minister involved in this case. I am satisfied that the officials are here as they should be.

I commend the second reading of the Judicial Matters Bill to the House and in doing so make a number of observations on the speech made by my colleague opposite, Dr Wayne Mapp. I am grateful for the sake of students who are still at the University of Auckland Business School that he is no longer unleashed upon them to make the number of lectures that he does in this House with regard to constitutional matters.

At the end of the day, and that member knows it more than anyone, Parliament is supreme in our constitution. Parliament today will be debating the Judicial Matters Bill in its second reading. That member knows, as does the member for Epsom—they both know—that on a number of occasions there have been judges on a range of benches who have operated imprudently and, at times, inadequately. They have been managed by court officers and court processes. That is not the right way for a judiciary to conduct itself in any robust democracy. It is important, not arrogant—and we have just heard the height of arrogance with regard to the vexatious use of the Standing Orders in questioning very good officials in respect of their contribution to this place. That is arrogance. That is trifling—

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (H V Ross Robertson): The member may not refer to points of order.

I conclude by stating quite clearly that this bill entrusts to the hands of Kiwis an ability, for the very first time—members should read clause 11—to raise issues of complaint against the judiciary. I say: “Bring it on. That is great.”

I have been listening with interest to the speeches in relation to this bill. National, as has been said on a number of occasions this evening, opposes the bill. That does not mean we do not recognise there are some issues regarding some very few instances of behaviour from some very few members of the judiciary that certainly need to be looked at. Having said that, National does not believe that this bill adequately addresses that need.

When I looked at the instances of complaints made about judges in each court, I saw there were remarkably few. In 2002—the latest year for which we have statistics—in the Appeal Court there were no complaints about the judiciary. In the High Court there were 11 complaints, and of those, five were about the judgment. In other words, it did not go that person’s way. So there were six about something other than the judgment. In the Employment Court there were no complaints about the judiciary. In the District Court there were 36, of which 19 were about the judgment. The District Court is a very heavily used court, and to get such a small number of complaints, I think, is a credit to its judges. The Māori Land Court had five complaints, of which one was about the judgment. The Environment Court is a court one would think might have a few complaints made about it but, no, there were only three complaints, which were all about the judgment rather than the conduct of the judges. The Family Court, a most contentious court, had 15 complaints of which five were about the judgment.

This is not a situation where there are constant complaints made about judges; there are actually very, very few. The previous speaker from the Government benches referred to the fact that there have been some quite well-publicised cases of a few judges who have got into difficulty. But this bill, unfortunately, does not adequately deal with the situation, because it requires the removal of those judges. National thinks there is a much better course of action—to be able to look at the whole issue rather than simply removing those judges. We already have the ability to remove judges—if this Parliament were ever to take that course.

National is concerned about the constitutional issues involved. We are very much concerned that Parliament, as the representative of the people of New Zealand, must be sovereign in these matters, and that has been one of our biggest complaints about the bill. It does not deal with the disciplining of judges or dealing with issues. It deals only with the removal of judges, and we already have the right to do that, anyway. Of course, most people just like to have a stab from the sidelines and do not actually want to take matters further. The bill does not deal with the appointment of judges.

💬 Dr Wayne Mapp: That’s right, ad hoc.

It is a very, very ad hoc situation. Earlier this year we had the rather embarrassing situation of a now Master of the High Court, Mr Christiansen. It turned out there was an issue regarding a complaint of harassment. That matter is, I think, before the courts, so I will not deal with that. But his appointment as a Master of the High Court is something we can deal with. He was appointed by the current Attorney-General. He had decided to resign as a District Court judge and he just walked out of court that very day, without a by your leave or any sort of resignation—other than walking out. Now, this bill does not deal with the appointment of judges. It will not lead to a better system of appointing judges. So when the Attorney-General told the media and everybody else in this Parliament that this bill would fix that problem of the appointment of judges, she was mistaken. Considering it is her bill, one would have thought that she would actually read it.

💬 Hon Murray McCully: Yes, where is she?

I am wondering why we have not heard from the Attorney-General on this bill. Clearly, she does not take it very seriously.

There is another issue we want to deal with tonight—

💬 Hon Mark Burton: What are you doing over there?

I raise a point of order, Mr Speaker. I believe that shouting across the Chamber from one member to another—nothing to do with this speech—is out of order.

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (H V Ross Robertson): Both sides could be guilty of that, but there is a Speaker’s ruling that people are not to interject when they do not have the floor.

I want to deal with the issue of part-time judges. There has been a call in this bill—and the Government is listening to it and going ahead with it—for part-time judges. Unlike many members on the Government side, some of us on this side know a lot of judges, from our years of practising as lawyers. We know that one of the biggest beefs, or annoyances, is that judges are not allowed to take unpaid leave. They would like to be able to do that. I have not yet had any judges tell me that they want to become part-timers, but they would like to take unpaid leave with regard to special things they are working on.

I ask why we cannot simply grant that wish. Why are we inflicting upon the judiciary—a body of people with the highest professional integrity, who give away a tremendous amount of freedoms to serve the public—the onus of having to carry part-time judges? That is exactly what they will have to do, because the work of judges does not start at one time and necessarily finish at another set time. Those judges often have juries they have to wait for. They often wait around in the night, until 11 or 12 o’clock, for a jury to come back into court. If we start saying that that is a part-time job, I think that part-time judges might feel they are entitled to go home at lunchtime or dinnertime. After all, those judges will have signed up to a part-time job. I think that will lead to a lack of professionalism.

If we were facing a situation where there was a tremendous lack of judges or of people wishing to be judges, then maybe we could look at it. But we do not have that situation. With regard to the appointment of women judges, I can tell members there is no shortage of very competent women lawyers, whom I know have their applications in to be judges on a full-time basis. So what particular evil is this bill correcting? It is all about lowering the standards of judges and turning them into part-time people, when they are actually highly skilled, professional people who have almost invariably worked far more than full-time jobs in their previous careers in law.

This bill is a retrograde step for the judiciary in New Zealand. It does not improve the situation of the judiciary, and it will not lead to better judgments.

The House may have lost track of the bill during the last speech. The bill does establish a statutory process for the receipt of complaints about judges, where both their conduct and the investigation of complaints raise the question of removal of a judge from office. This is an important issue. The Government is committed to the goal of maintaining and enhancing public confidence in the judiciary, while adhering to the principle of judicial independence. That is not an easy balancing act at the best of times, but I believe that this bill advances that issue in an appropriate manner.

The only other comment I want to make in passing is that during the course of the debate I was deeply disappointed to hear members opposite politicking and bringing hard-working officials, who are here to serve the interests of our Parliament, into the debate. It is most unfortunate and completely inappropriate conduct on the part of Opposition members similarly to bring into the debate the Clerk of House. There is a longstanding convention that the Clerk provides expert advice to presiding officers, as he did in the course of this debate. I regret that senior members opposite would stoop to bring him into the debate.

💬 Richard Worth: I raise a point of order, Mr Speaker. This speech is an attempt to justify a ruling that you have already made, which is a closed issue. It does not relate to this bill. It is an opportunity for the Minister to engage in pointless politicking. I invite you to draw it to a close.

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (H V Ross Robertson): I thank the honourable member for that. Under Speaker’s ruling 49/2 there is nothing to prevent severe comments about officials. It is a matter of taste, but I point out that officials have no opportunity to defend themselves or reply.

Thank you for that ruling. It is very helpful to the House. This bill strikes the correct balance between the goals I have outlined. It establishes a transparent and accessible process for people to make complaints about judges, and allows for proper investigation of matters that may lead to the removal of a judge. I am pleased to support the progress of the bill.