Counter-Terrorism Bill

I want to speak on this part because I have some amendments to it, relating particularly to clauses 7 and 8. Clause 7 is about threatening to do harm. One of the problems is that the definition—it is a bit like the definition in the Terrorism Suppression Act, although this is not specifically about terrorism—is very broad, because all one has to do to qualify under this particular clause is to threaten to do something that is going to cause significant disruption to a commercial activity or a civil administration in a way that causes a risk to health, major property damage, major economic loss, or major damage to the national economy of New Zealand. They are very broad terms. People do not actually need to do the act; they can just, even as of now, threaten to do something. For instance, some of the Māori involved in the battle for the foreshore and seabed are getting quite upset about their property rights, as they see them. They are worried about the aquaculture. If they took some action against an aquaculture facility somewhere and caused major economic loss to one or more persons—in fact, they do not need to do it; right now they need just to threaten to do it—then, under this clause, they could be up for quite an extensive period in jail. The terms are so broad that they could be misinterpreted.

I turn to genetic engineering. Of course, most people do not want the release of genetically engineered foods into crops and into the New Zealand environment, but there are people even now who are threatening perhaps to take some sort of non-violent civil disobedience - type direct action in a way that could affect genetically engineered crops, and that action could qualify under the definition in this clause. So just the threat of it now—or when and if this legislation passes, through Order in Council or whatever it is—could mean that people are subject to quite a big penalty.

New section 307A(2), inserted by clause 7—and one of my amendments relates to it—states that any strike, lockout, or other industrial action is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for inferring that a person has committed an offence. This is what is known as a comfort clause. There is a similar clause in the Terrorism Suppression Act. People can be a bit misled and say: “I can be a good protester and I won’t be covered by this clause because of those two words—‘by itself’.” But I have interrogated the officials and the legal people in this respect, and they all say that the clause, in both the Terrorism Suppression Act and in this bill, is just a comfort clause. If someone who is involved in protest action does actually cause the effects I have just described, he or she is still covered, despite this comfort clause. But I have put forward an amendment. If people think that strikes, lockouts, and legitimate protests are protected under this clause, then I have moved an amendment to cut out the two words “by itself” so it would be clear that people involved in strikes, lockouts, industrial action, and other protest action will not be covered by that. But the Green Party is opposed to that whole clause, because, as I said, it is quite dangerous.

The other clause I have an amendment to is clause 8. Clause 8—and this also comes up in Part 3—enables the police to engage in fishing expeditions involving interception devices. There is already a provision for interception devices in the criminal law, in order to try to get drug offenders under warrant, and also in the Crimes Act, in order to get serious offenders. The two amendments to this bill, in Parts 1 and 3, mean that the police can say they want an interception warrant because of a particular offence that they think a person may have committed. Under these amendments, once the police have the interception warrant they can then look for information on all kinds of crimes across the board, basically. If there was a situation of the police misusing their powers a little bit, they could use this measure.

Why is Mr Locke wrong? Because he is wrong. His error starts when he ignores how this section is constructed. People would have to do two things, in fact, not one. Their actions have to intend the effect of one of these offences: they have to affect the civilian population of New Zealand, not just one person but the entire population or a large chunk thereof; and, they have to do something that would threaten an infrastructure facility—something pretty fundamental. The next thing mentioned in the section is the civil administration of the country, and, finally, the commercial activity. These are global concepts—actions cannot be narrowly focused.

Sitting suspended from 6 p.m. to 7.30 p.m.

Prior to the dinner break I was explaining why I believe that Mr Locke is wrong, and I have taken this call because the meaning of new section 307A, inserted by clause 7, is an important point.

In essence, two things are required. Firstly, one has to have an “effect”, and, prior to the dinner break, I listed the effects. They are things of widespread significance to New Zealand—that is, affecting our civilian population, the infrastructure facility, civil administration, or commercial activity. These are not individual activities, in my view. They are something of general effect. That is how the words will be interpreted. That is the first test that has to be satisfied—namely, an effect. In addition, a “result” has to be intended. They are: creating a risk to the health of one or more people—admittedly that is narrower, in the sense of numbers; causing major property damage; causing major economic loss to one or more persons; and causing major damage to the national economy of New Zealand. The fact is that those are accumulative requirements—the widespread effect, leading to the result—both of which must be in the contemplation of the person. It is those two things together that would cause the activity to be caught by section 307A.

Then, on top of that, as Mr Locke noted earlier, there is the avoidance provision. So those things are not caught if they are derived from a strike, lockout, industrial action, advocacy, dissent, etc. It is not a complete exemption. Mr Locke has put up a Supplementary Order Paper that would have those as a complete exemption. I believe he is also wrong there. What if the intended outcome of the protest or dissent were this widespread effect, followed with the intended result? Surely one could not be supporting that kind of dissent. After all, one might even argue that Hamas would otherwise be exempted. Yet they conduct terrorist activities on a daily basis, which have these causes, these effects, and these results. So Mr Locke, perhaps unwittingly, perhaps not, is almost advocating terrorism. It is extraordinary that he would do that, and I cannot believe that he would deliberately do that. Even he, I believe, would not deliberately do that. But that is, nevertheless, a necessary consequence of his reasoning.

Because the Government has taken only one call so far on this very important legislation, I believe it is incumbent on me to explain the purposes in detail. This legislation should have the widespread support of the House, and if the Government fails in its duty to explain the purposes in detail, not just in a second reading speech but by analysis of the critical clauses—and certainly new section 307A is in that category—then it behoves the Opposition to undertake that duty. These are important issues.

I would like to reply to some of the points that my colleague Wayne Mapp has raised. He is trying to make out, I think unsuccessfully, that the threats of action have to be on some huge scale affecting everything, in order to be covered by this provision. But when we look through the provision, it talks about a threat to cause significant disruption to things like a board of trustees of a school, or commercial activities of a particular type, etc. Obviously, we are not talking about something affecting a whole society; we are talking about threats of action that might affect just one entity, one farmer, or whatever. That is clear in section 307A(1B), in clause 7, where the results have to be of four types. One result is “causing major economic loss to one or more persons”. Therefore, causing major economic loss to one person would qualify.

Another result is “causing major damage to the national economy”. That is a very broad provision, but how does one define that? It requires subjective political determination. Some people would argue that Monsanto, even though it has declined as a company of late, would potentially cause major damage to the national economy of New Zealand with its GE foods. From another viewpoint, others would say that people who threaten to pull out GE crops are causing major damage to the national economy. It depends on where one is coming from.

The examples I gave in my speech first time around are arguments that members might say are the kinds of examples the Greens would give about GE or the Māori debate over the foreshore and how they might affect marine farming. But take the example of farmers—and this is a recent example—threatening to block roads in response to the “fart tax”. That is an action; a threat. Under this provision people need only to threaten; they do not need to carry it through. That is what farmers did; they threatened to block roads because of the “fart tax”. Their action would come under this provision.

💬 Dr Wayne Mapp: Come on! It would not.

That is real. The member may not like it, but that is the problem, because this is a very broad provision. The result could be determined by political bias.

I want to finish by explaining my amendment to omit clause 8, because that clause could allow for fishing expeditions by the police. The interception warrant under this provision can be taken out for a simple theft charge, when the police suspect a person is guilty of theft, and then a fishing expedition can take place and the person can be had up on a misuse of drugs charge or some other charge. This provision tends to undermine what has happened in the courts to date, whereby judges are a bit careful about evidence and how it is gathered. To allow interception warrants to be granted on one little thing, and then used for a whole wide range of offences, can lead to abuse if the police force did get a little bit out of control and started getting a little biased against certain people, and went on these fishing expeditions.

So it is true, as with any provision that upholds our civil liberties, that, one might say, some criminals are getting away with it because the police got this warrant out on a theft charge and then they caught somebody on this other offence, while using the interception device, and so that is good. But if we want to make sure that the police are not taking out interception warrant after interception warrant, and misusing their powers in this way, then we have to restrict what they can do, more specifically to the purposes of the warrant, and not allow for fishing expeditions.

That is how the law has operated up to date—with a balance between civil liberties, and people not being subject to excessive surveillance, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the police being able to do sufficient to catch most criminals in our society by, in some cases, using interception warrants. I think that both of these amendments are very important. I want to go back and talk about an amendment I raised at the start.

I rise for the ACT party, to take the unusual step of supporting Mr Keith Locke’s warnings about these provisions in Part 1. I believe that this has been drafted hastily. It is drafted as a response to this Government’s desire to subordinate New Zealand to the United Nations, and to look respectable. When we renege on defence and other contracts we have to do something to suck up to the Australians and to the Americans. In this case, sadly, it is by using the worthy cause of counter-terrorism to stick new provisions into our law that may well, one day, be misused for purposes that the people in this Parliament would never have dreamt of.

Look at new section 307A, to be inserted by clause 7, which is the new offence of threat of harm to people or property. This amendment has been further amended by recommendation of the select committee, which I am sure thought it was doing the job that was necessary of making sure this law did not overreach. These kinds of provisions often come from countries that have none of our respect for law and order, indeed, and for the rights of individuals, and for the importance of making sure that people are guilty before they are convicted. In this clause there is a 7-year sentence for threatening to do something that might have a result of creating a risk to the health of one or more people.

💬 Dr Wayne Mapp: No, there are two stages.

Hang on. There are two stages, as Mr Mapp quite correctly points out, but taking it bit by bit—

💬 Dianne Yates: Dr Mapp.

Sorry Dr Mapp—yes, Dr Professor Mapp! A threat—“creating a risk to the health of one or more people”. Think about that risk. A risk to the health of one person comes through promoting smoking. It comes through a myriad of activities that might be much better intentioned than promoting smoking. There is a risk to the health of one person if, for example, someone is opposed to a particular kind of therapy that he or she thinks harms many, but helps one or a few people.

Then we look at the other element required for this offence. It causes “a significant disruption of one or more of the following things … commercial activity in New Zealand.” I say to Dr Mapp, let us think about, for example, those who oppose genetic modification. It could easily be that they are hostile to a drug firm that uses or produces a medicine with GM, and want that medicine withdrawn because of their fears about the effect of the technology on a whole range of values in New Zealand. It could be Māori objecting to it because they believe that it is a fundamental problem simply to interfere with the foetus. The result could well be harm to one or more people. This provision does not have an exception for proper purpose, or good faith, or political debate.

💬 Dr Wayne Mapp: Yes it does.

Where is it?

💬 Dr Wayne Mapp: Section 5(2)

That relates only to strikes and lockouts. Typically, this Labour Government has said that if one is in protest, advocacy, or dissent, that does not, by itself, imply the offence. The main provision simply says that there are three elements: a threat, adverse effect to the health of one or more people, and disruption to someone’s commercial activity or a sector’s commercial activity. All of those could be caused in the scenario I have pictured. I would say, coming to it cold, with no more than an hour or two to look at it, if we can think of one scenario in that situation it should be telling this Parliament that this Committee stage in the House should be used to take a much greater care about the potential misuse of this provision. This could well be misused in private prosecutions. This could cause a great deal of misery to New Zealanders who are acting in perfect good faith.

I mention also in Part 1 the provisions relating to causing disease or sickness in animals. I mentioned that the new section 298A would be capable of being used by antagonists to the introduction of a possum disease, if they feared that that possum disease might also spread, for example, to commercial rabbits or poultry. It is perfectly capable of that use.

Listening to the debate, whilst I do recognise and understand the concerns that have been expressed by the various members, this is one area of debate that was given considerable airtime in the select committee process. Many of the concerns that Mr Locke is consistently raising—I give him full credit for the consistency of his views, and for championing of those views—I am perfectly satisfied they have been well canvassed.

Whilst I can accept and understand fully how he might feel that a particular Government’s propensity to carpet-bomb our entire country with 1080 poison might well be construed by some to be an act that is adverse and likely to cause grave economic damage to our economy, if it were to become public knowledge throughout the rest of the world, and might, in some people’s interpretation, be covered by this bill, it would be interesting to know from the Minister himself how this Government would respond to charges brought against it by people on the West Coast and down south who believed that carpet-bombing the Blue Mountains with 1080 poison is, in fact, an act of economic terrorism. Consider the implications to our international markets, to our meat industry, if the world in general found out that we were dumping hundreds of tonnes of 1080 poison—a product that has been specifically banned and outlawed in the United States. Indeed, in the United States they pay bounties of up to $20,000 to individuals who catch other people in the act of distributing 1080 poison. I can understand that, but I was given absolute assurance in the select committee that the way these subclauses have been couched is only to capture people who genuinely, it is believed by the judges responsible for giving such warrants, do pose a threat to the country, the citizens of New Zealand, and its economic stability.

I can well understand how there are many people out there who believe that the mere election of a Labour Government is a threat to the economic stability of this country, and might be construed as an act of terrorism committed upon it by some misguided New Zealanders who voted that way. It might be construed as an act of terrorism committed upon the country by United Party members, who went into one election championing the centre right’s views, and then promptly leapt into bed with Helen Clark in what some people might describe as a gross act of terrorism committed upon this nation. We do say such things with a little bit of tongue-in-cheek.

I understand the concerns expressed by the ACT party and the Green Party with respect to civil liberties, but I am on record as being one who has said on many occasions that we fail to see the wood for the trees when we are focusing on civil liberties. Mr Locke may well say that we are becoming guided by emotion, and we need to take time to pause and consider more widely the implication of clauses 7 and 8. In fact, the checks and balances are most definitely there. If the Minister would care to take a call and allay some of the fears that are raised in the various amendments, it might go a long way to cause some people to reconsider their vote in support of those amendments that have been put forward by Mr Locke.

Civil liberties are important. They are what separate democracies from dictatorships. I understand that. I understand that we have a duty and responsibility to protect the rights of people and their ability to express freely their disapproval of Government policies. But I am not one who looks upon expressions of viewpoints such as those that occurred during the Springbok tour as being a right or proper way in which those people should have been allowed to demonstrate their views. I look upon the Springbok tour demonstrations, which some people held up as an example when we discussed this bill, as acts aided and abetted by gangs, organised crime, and people who had ulterior motives. If this legislation would have seen many of those people locked up, then I, for one, would have been quite happy about that.

The provisions in this part can relate to terrorism, and in fact they are aimed at dealing with serious terrorist situations that may arise. Equally, they may relate to other outcomes where serious harm is caused that might not be terrorist inspired. It does not have to be terrorist inspired if people are doing significant property damage or harming the health of individuals, to make that sort of protest or advocacy a crime. As Ron Mark mentioned, if somebody smashed up a property in the course of a Springbok tour protest, then he or she broke the law and should face the weight of the law. I say that as a person who was a Springbok tour protester. Protest is an important right in our democracy, but it does not extend to the right to smash up other people’s property or harm other persons. That then becomes a criminal offence. It always has been that, and always will be.

Why have we put some of the measures in the bill? For example, why have we put a 10-year offence in for causing disease or sickness in animals? I thought that would have been self-evident. We had a study done jointly by Treasury and the Reserve Bank on scenarios forecasting the effects of a limited foot and mouth disease outbreak. One of the most serious forms of terrorism or advocacy in this country could be to deliberately introduce something like bovine spongiform encephalopathy or foot-and-mouth disease.

💬 Ron Mark: Or a threat of it.

Yes, I will come to the threat in a moment. The conservative estimate of the result of somebody doing that to our country would be a loss of around NZ$6 billion in the first year and a cumulative loss of $10 billion in the second year. When we consider the enormity of that, Mr Locke should propose that we have more than a 10-year maximum penalty for somebody who would deliberately cause such chaos in New Zealand.

I listened to Mr Franks’ examples. I think he was perhaps tongue-in-cheek, but the idea that destroying a mosquito population would bring somebody within the scope of this law is patently incorrect. People have to cause a serious risk to the health or safety of an animal population and cause major damage to the national economy of New Zealand. If Mr Franks can follow through on his example and explain how wiping out the mosquitoes or the possums would cause serious damage, then he might have a point.

In relation to clause 7, which is in respect of threats or communicating information about an act that would be likely to have these particular effects, clearly what we are aiming this to do is to deal with the situation that we faced in reality not so long ago with regard to the anthrax hoax. It is a very serious thing, even as a hoax, when people send white powder through the mail purporting that that might be anthrax; or there are the commercially disruptive effects of people saying that they have contaminated a food product on the shelves. Those are forms of terrorism, and crimes. They should be subject to the full weight of the law, and that is what this provision is about—with the safeguards against using those provisions simply against an action because it is advocacy, protest, a strike, or a lockout: those things are not illegal per se. I hope such acts will never be illegal in this country. They will certainly never be illegal under this Government, but when people commit acts that are designed to seriously damage our country, property, and people, then why, I ask Mr Locke, should those people not face the full force of the law?

I appreciate the Minister taking the call to explain the reasons why this is important, why it is necessary legislation, and what the intent is. There is no concern from the ACT party about the intent or the need for law in the areas stated. Our concern is about the unintended effects, Law always has unintended effects if it is not carefully drafted, and if there is not a very live concern to look for unintended effects.

Despite Mr Goff’s reference to my flippant remark about wiping out a population of mosquitoes, a far better example was provided by Mr Mark for the New Zealand First party. For example, the white-tailed deer population in the Blue Mountains, or the population in the Hokonuis, is currently under threat from a 1080 attack, through most of that area. Apparently the council that is funding it—or the Animal Health Board—is not prepared to take the precaution of potentially limiting it or using baits that will not appeal to the deer population there. Whatever one may think about the rights and wrongs of the 1080 campaign, it is wrong to leave unnecessarily in our criminal law a new offence that can be used or misused against people who have no criminal intent and who believe that what they are doing is proper.

To be fair, this particular clause states: “without lawful justification or reasonable excuse”. I suspect that a regional council or Environment Southland approval would be seen as a lawful justification or excuse. But what about the councillors themselves? It seems to me that they will face attempts from those who oppose a 1080 campaign to bring them within the boundaries of this; and I think that within the words, it will not be too hard. Taking on board the Minister’s passionate affirmation that the Labour Government would not be attempting to punish someone for a strike, a lockout, or advocacy, that is not the point. Subclause (2) of new clause 307A provides something of an indicator of Parliament’s intent that this provision should not be misused. However, it highlights the fact that there are a range of other activities that should have been similarly mentioned to signify to the courts that the elements of the offence could well be satisfied, yet there should still not be liability.

The lawful justification or reasonable excuse will, I submit, be in the eye of the beholder. When passion is aroused, when the drug company, for example, is in the gun and there is demonstrated potential harm to the health of one or more people, even though there is also demonstrated benefit to far more, this provision does not, on its face, require a balancing. For example, that might have been a sensible subclause (3), to enable the court to take into account the motives and the weighing of priorities and the balancing, so that even though a commercial activity is significantly disrupted, and even though there is a risk to the health of one or more people, it would still be justified because there is a balance.

💬 Dr Wayne Mapp: What about clause 2?

I say to Dr Mapp that clause 2 by itself is not a sufficient basis for inferring. I am talking not about inference, but actual proof. We could have all of these things. When we have a threat to do an act that is likely to disrupt commercial activity and spread anxiety about the drug companies’ activities, and we have the risk to the health of one or more people, we have satisfied the elements of the offence. I believe that if this Government had been doing its work properly it should have been more alive to the risks and should have been able to come up with better-crafted exceptions.

I move, That the question be now put.

I have been criticised a little bit in the discussion, and I would like to reply briefly. I appreciate Mr Goff getting up and making some comments. It is very good that he is explaining the position. I disagree with him, because he said that terrorists could be doing these things, but the examples we have come up with—and we could go on and on giving different examples—are from our domestic political situation. The reality is that, apart from the Rainbow Warrior bombing in 1985, there is not a lot of terrorist activity in New Zealand. This provision in the Crimes Act has a general application, including against any terrorist who might happen to threaten, but its application is overwhelmingly in relation to domestic political activity. There has not been a terrorist threat against New Zealand to date that I know of.

But there have been all kinds of threats from ordinary New Zealanders. I mentioned the threat of farmers on the so-called “fart tax”. It is good that Mr Goff brought us back to the 1981 Springbok tour protest. Certainly, if we are talking about threats and not actions—and this part is about threats—there were all sorts of threats before and during that Springbok rugby tour to get involved in disruptive process. The leadership of the anti-tour movement was saying that if the Springbok team came here, there would be disruptive activities, the blocking of motorways, etc., and that transpired. So this provision would definitely have covered the anti - Springbok tour protesters. The blocking of motorways does have a fairly significant effect, as happened at that time.

Under clause 6, one does not actually need to disrupt very much to have the result, under section 298B(b), of causing major economic loss to one person—a single, solitary New Zealander, as long as that person is part of a commercial activity of a particular type, or in a particular school, or something like that. This is just about a threat—

💬 Stephen Franks: Competition does that—causes major economic loss.

Yes. So I think we have to see that this is a quite dangerous provision. I think the Minister said that protests “per se” are not being outlawed or affected by this, which is a sort of synonym for the “by itself” provision in section 307A(2), in clause 7. In the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, on both this bill and the Terrorism Suppression Bill, which became an Act, it was made quite clear repeatedly by officials and submitters that “by itself” did not mean that if one was on a protest or in a strike, and personally did the things that are prescribed in the legislation, one would not be as liable as anyone else; all that that provision is trying to say is that we are not aiming to get at protests or strikes as a whole, but if strikers or protesters happened to threaten to do something that would significantly disrupt a commercial institution and cause major economic loss to one person, then they can be up for 7 years in jail.

💬 Hon Phil Goff: The court is hardly likely to rule in that way.

The Minister can say that, but it has to be based on what the law says. At the present time, sure, we have a more tolerant climate politically and judicially, but if there is a situation—and I again go back to the 1981 Springbok tour—where passions are raised and people on different sides are saying that those on the other side are bringing the country to ruin and all the rest of it, all the things that Muldoon threw around, then one might get a situation where people are given heavy sentences for just doing a political protest in a situation of great dissent and great concern. In that case, a racist rugby team was being brought to New Zealand and people felt very upset about it, not only because of what was happening in South Africa but because of the impact on race relations in New Zealand.

In the interests of ensuring that history is not rewritten according to people’s foggy memory of what happened in 1981, let me remind Mr Locke, and make it clear to the Chair, what actually happened. But, firstly, I want to thank the Minister of Transport for standing up and taking a call; it is unusual under this Government to have a Minister take a call during the Committee stage, and I really do appreciate it. Let me remind people that if this bill would catch people who protested against the Springbok tour by wearing helmets, carrying shields, and wielding batons, then that is good—it would do what it needs to do. If this bill would catch a person who threatens to fly an aircraft into a packed grandstand full of people, then that is good. That is what this bill is intended to do—to curb threats of terrorism, and to curb acts of terrorism. If this bill would stop people from peacefully protesting outside rugby grounds, holding their placards, chanting their chants, and calling for the rugby match to be cancelled, then I would not be happy, because that is people’s right—to protest, demonstrate peacefully, and exercise their democratic will.

We discussed those very problems at length during the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee meetings. I do not share the Green Party’s view that this legislation would curb peaceful protest or peaceful demonstration. But if this bill stops people from hiring the Mongrel Mob to spearhead the front-end of their protest march, which sought to knock down fences, invade pitches, knock people over, cancel a game, and cause massive economic loss, job loss, and loss of a day’s pay to ordinary citizens, then I am not fazed by that, because I do not see any of those actions as being their democratic right. People have a democratic right, fought and paid for with the blood of our forebears in places marked on the wall of this Chamber, but it is not a right to inflict their will upon people by force of arms. That is what I saw during the Springbok tour. We are all too glib at saying: “Oh, these champions, these heroes, went out there and peacefully demonstrated.” What a load of rubbish! Pull out the videos!

💬 Hon Lianne Dalziel: I did, and I was proud to be on the Springbok march.

Yes, there were people who did. That honourable member might have been one of those people who demonstrated peacefully, but there were people in the front ranks—it can be seen on the replay videos, on the old films, if members want to pull them out of the archives and look at them—who were gang members. They might well have been exercising a democratic right, but some of us believe that they were there for the punch-up, the destruction, the mayhem, and to inflict anarchy upon normal New Zealanders. Some people in this Committee might find some sort of credit or pride in being associated with people like that; well, I do not. If this bill deals with people who will not protest peacefully, then that is not necessarily a bad thing. If it deals with people who threaten to fly an aircraft into a packed grandstand so that a game would be called off, then that is a good thing. But I remain absolutely assured, from the explanations that the select committee had—from the long and lengthy discussion, and from the amendments that were made—that it does not seek to curb one’s right to protest and peacefully demonstrate against laws, Acts, or regulations that the Government may inflict upon us.

I move, That the question be now put.

Motion agreed to.

The question was put that the following amendment in the name of Keith Locke to clause 7 be agreed to:

to omit this clause.

The amendment to clause 8 in the name of Keith Locke to omit that clause is now out of order as it is inconsistent with a previous decision of the Committee.