Border Security Bill

I move, That the Border Security Bill be now read a first time. At the appropriate time, I intend to move that this bill be referred to the Government Administration Committee for consideration. To consider this bill, one has to go back to a long day 21 months ago. We in New Zealand woke to the news of September 11 2001, seeing images of hijacked passenger planes crashing into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon, and into a field in Pennsylvania. More than 3,000 people lost their lives. On that tumultuous day, we all knew that something fundamental had changed in our world. We knew there would be fall-out from these acts of terrorism. We did not know the nature or shape of this changed new world, but we knew we would come to understand it.

The recent bombings in Bali also brought terrorism home to our region. Terrorism is no longer remote; it is in our neighbourhood. Within the last month we have seen renewed terrorist activity in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, both linked to international terrorist organisations. Here in New Zealand we cannot continue to believe that the world’s largest moat will protect us, nor can we ignore our responsibilities as good international citizens. We too must respond to this changing world, to ensure our own safety, to ensure the safety of our fellow citizens around the world, and to ensure the continued flow of trade—the future of our economy depends on it.

That brings me to the detail of the Border Security Bill, which will enhance our border security against terrorism. This bill sits alongside the Counter-Terrorism Bill in strengthening the legislation protecting New Zealanders and New Zealand’s interests. The Counter-Terrorism Bill is already before a select committee. Since September 11, 2001, international bodies have been advocating tighter border control measures and agreed standards. A key aspect of these standards is early and timely access to information for the purposes of managing the risk that people, planes, ships, boats, and goods may pose as a terrorist risk. Early access to information is critical. We are now focused on preventing risk, and to do that we need to do our homework. That means we need good information in advance about people, craft, and goods that are heading our way. We need enough time to analyse this information and, if need be, determine an appropriate response. Currently this information is either not supplied or is supplied manually, which does not allow for adequate checking in a timely manner.

The Border Security Bill amends the Customs and Excise Act and the Immigration Act as they affect border security. In summary, the changes will improve the security of global travel and trading environments, enhance closer security relationships within the trade supply chain and travel network, strengthen the gathering of and sharing of intelligence, and ensure better use of information to assess risk.

I will now detail how this new security enhancement will affect travellers. There are two elements to the travel information sharing provided for in this legislation. Firstly, airlines and cruise ship operators will be required to use electronic means to submit passport details for passengers, in-transit passengers, and crews in advance of their arrival or departure from New Zealand. Many are already providing much of this information voluntarily. The full implementation of the legislation will mean that passport and visa details will be checked automatically against electronic records held by the New Zealand Immigration Service. Any matches will trigger an advisory back to the airline about whether a person should be allowed to embark for New Zealand. This form of data screening is the best way to reduce New Zealand’s exposure to risk from people travelling here while, at the same time, maintaining the high flows of arrivals into New Zealand at any one time.

The number still staggers me—almost 1.9 million people visited New Zealand in 2001-02, and the number is still increasing. The vast majority of those people are genuine travellers who deserve a warm welcome and speedy processing. However, we must be able to identify those who are not welcome. Waiting until those travellers actually arrive here to check them out is just not good enough. It is better to deal with the problem before it gets here.

The second and equally important aspect of travel - information gathering analysis in this legislation is the provision for the Customs Service to electronically access the computerised passenger booking systems of travel operators and their agents. These provisions have been carefully developed to enable the New Zealand authorities to have access to information that gives us vital clues to identifying those persons who pose a risk, without jeopardising the privacy of legitimate travellers. These measures will affect some 20 international airlines, all cruise ship operators providing services into and out of New Zealand, and other travel operators.

This bill is not a bolt out of the blue for those it will affect, as there has been considerable consultation. Airlines around the world are responding to similar legislation from other countries. Here in New Zealand, Air New Zealand has led the voluntary compliance, and all the airlines are now providing the information voluntarily. I want to put on record my appreciation to the airlines for their excellent cooperation in protecting New Zealand.

I now refer to security as it affects cargo. It is vital to New Zealand’s economy to keep trade flowing smoothly, and in the new international environment our trading partners expect New Zealand exports to be not only of high quality and on time but also safe from terrorist infiltration. Again, information is key to achieving this. The legislation enables the Customs Service to electronically access the computerised cargo management systems of operators in the supply chain, such as freight forwarders and consolidators. The bill also establishes a legislative environment for an innovative new partnership approach to providing assurance over export security.

The Customs Service is developing a secure export partnership scheme whereby the Government and business work together to protect New Zealand’s interests. This will enable the Customs Service to assure trading partners that goods exported under the scheme are packed securely and with no other goods. The goods will then be placed, without interference, under a customs security seal and conveyed to a customs-controlled area for export. The intention is that the goods with the New Zealand Customs Service security seal will then be regarded by overseas customs administrations as low-risk, therefore minimising inspection, disruption, or delay. Central to the scheme is the authority to allow an exporter to apply a customs-approved seal to that company’s shipping container.

There is also a separate provision for an approved person, such as a customs officer, to apply a seal in circumstances where the goods have been packed under supervision, or inspected by the officer. It will also show that when the cargo is sealed, it is secure—that is, the cargo contains only what is declared and secured in an approved way. It will also assist in identifying any interference or tampering with secured cargo. Goods shipped with these seals will be legally regarded as being under customs control, therefore making it an offence to tamper with them. It would be up to individual exporters as to whether they participate in the secure exports partnership, and I know that many would find it in their best interests to do so.

There are other issues at risk for us, as well. In this legislation the Customs Service is looking to have increased powers to detain people at remote locations. There have been a number of occasions when customs officers and others have come across situations in which these powers are appropriate and indeed highly desirable. New Zealand wants to be sure that the people entering New Zealand are doing so entirely legitimately.

The bill also has provisions that will give the Customs Service the lawful right to detain and hold cash or other funds that would be crossing the border for what appears to be no immediate legitimate purpose. Criminals and terrorists need to fund their activities with money, and we have adequate checks in the banking system but we have inadequate checks at this time about money coming across the border. Under this legislation, customs officers will be able to detain people or the cash for a period of up to 12 hours, or longer where it is warranted, to ensure that there is no security risk.

In conclusion, I note that currently with the United States, one of our major trading partners, we have $4 billion of exports. For the United States it is now important for us to make sure that we meet its security requirements, and that the US feels comfortable about those security requirements. The Customs Service is moving rapidly to meet those demands. It is worth noting that Auckland is our largest port with the US—it is No. 78 on its list—and we have many other smaller ports. So if we are to be able to ensure that trade flows easily from all our ports in New Zealand to the United States, we need to have this legislation to ensure that we are able to give to the US customs service the sorts of guarantees and notices of comfort that it needs to enable our goods to travel across the border unimpeded.

New Zealanders living overseas have come home to New Zealand in great numbers because they feel safe and secure in New Zealand, and this legislation will help underline that secure feeling that New Zealanders have when they live here in this country.

I signal at the outset the intention of National members to vote for this bill so that it is read a first time and referred to a select committee for further consideration. I also thank the Minister for providing me with some detailed briefing material, and also for giving me a personal briefing this morning.

💬 Hon Tony Ryall: That’s the way it should be.

I think, as Mr Ryall observes, that perhaps the Minister’s colleague the Minister of Immigration would benefit from some tutoring by the Minister of Customs, Mr Barker, who does understand that Opposition parties here on matters of national importance are happy to provide their cooperation and support. I appreciated the written briefing and the courteous personal briefing the Minister provided to me about the contents of the legislation.

The Border Security Bill makes significant amendments to the Customs and Excise Act. That is legislation that I have had some passing association with. I was for 5 years the Minister of Customs, and indeed the Minister when a major revamp of that bill was passed. I can say from my own background understanding of this matter that this bill will benefit from some select committee study. The amendments to the Customs Act contained in the bill are, indeed, in parts quite complex, and I would be surprised if, on close scrutiny, there were not some improvements made. That is not a criticism of the bill, it is simply an observation about the huge complexity of the parent Act, and the great difficulty and sensitivity of dealing with some of the matters that this bill purports to address.

I want to turn to the various component parts of the legislation before making some more general observations. The travel security provisions of the bill are, indeed, significant because they put in place a mandatory provision of advanced electronic information. Some members of the public who are listening in, and certainly some members of the House, will be asking themselves just what the “API”—the advanced passenger information system—is all about. It is, in fact, not a new feature of the Customs Service at all. This is a regime that has operated on a voluntary basis now for some years. It involves the airlines cooperating fully with the Customs Service, giving the ability for pre-clearance, and giving the ability to identify areas of risk, and in that way ensuring that there is minimal disruption to the travel plans of law-abiding members of the public. It is a very important tool for avoiding major queues at airport gateways like Auckland.

The New Zealand Customs Service to my knowledge has been a very efficient promoter of this type of facility in the past, and will be well placed to deal with the mandatory regime that is proposed in this bill. I say to members here that I personally can see no reason that the requirement for a mandatory advanced passenger information system would cause offence to anyone. I am sure the airlines are well equipped to deal with it, and have as much to gain as the members of the travelling public and the agencies of the New Zealand Government.

There will be some provisions that relate to accessing the databases of travel operators and airlines that will no doubt raise important issues of privacy and sensitivity. I sense from some of the briefing material that there have been some New Zealand Bill of Rights Act discussions, potentially some of the fairly vigorous kind around the preparation of this bill, and I particularly draw the attention of the select committee to those areas. Again it is a consequence of dealing with legislation of this sort that those kinds of issues arise—initially in the officials interaction and then in the Cabinet committee process. It is important that the Parliament, separately in the select committee, and then in the Committee of the whole House, tests that sort of area because there are conflicting rights at issue and at play in that regard. Although we might benefit from the view of the Ministry of Justice and Crown Law Office officials, it is important that Parliament makes its own call about the extent to which the rights of individuals or organisations to privacy need to be balanced against the greater need for security purposes for agencies of the Crown to have access to certain information.

I offer no steer to the House or to the select committee on that matter today. I simply say that this smells to me very much of there having been some interaction between officials on New Zealand Bill of Rights Act issues, and I simply hope that parliamentarians will separately give their attention to this important area of scrutiny.

The supply chain security provisions, which the Minister referred to, are critical. I would go so far as to say that if these provisions were not to be passed with some expedition, then New Zealand exporters to the United States market would pay a heavy price indeed. Again the select committee, I am sure, will want to give some thought to the detail contained in the bill. But here we are driven by the expectations, and indeed requirements, of the American authorities that in the post - September 11 environment, which the Minister referred to, require those who want to do business with the United States to jump a pretty high security hurdle. I for one do not blame them for that. It will no doubt cause New Zealand exporters and others who trade or deal with the United States some ongoing inconvenience. But the United States has good reason for making these requirements of us, and I think that the initiative contained in this part of the bill is a good attempt to put in place something that the United States authorities should find very reassuring indeed.

I observe in passing at this point that members of the New Zealand public would probably have little understanding to the extent to which the Customs Service has over the years invested massively in the construction of close working relationships with its partner organisations in other jurisdictions. I venture to suggest that at a time like this, in a climate of suspicion and in a climate of high security fear, the New Zealand Customs Service relationships with many of those services in other jurisdictions will leave New Zealand significantly better placed to deal with those challenges than most other nations. So I suggest that the provisions in that part of the bill are very important to New Zealand as a trading nation, and I suspect that it will benefit from the close working relationships that the Customs Service has built up over the years.

I turn finally to enforcement provisions. These do give some new powers to customs officers. Again I hope that the select committee will look carefully at these areas. They are areas in which Parliament should extend the powers made available to Crown agencies only with great care and after very serious consideration. I am bound to say in principle that I think these extensions are required. I guess as a simple example I look at the programme run around the New Zealand coastline by the New Zealand Customs vessel, The Hawk, which ventures very far from the shore and very far from other law enforcement authorities. There will increasingly be times when, encountering terrorists, contraband smugglers, or others who are seeking to breach the law, customs officers will find themselves having to deal with this threat alone. The current law simply makes no provision for them to be able to deal with some of the threat in this area by detaining individuals. They can merely deal with goods. The proposals that the Minister has put before this House in this bill should be looked at carefully and considered carefully, but on balance I think they are needed. It is unrealistic to see customs officers doing the job that we ask of them in this environment, without providing some additional legal support for them in carrying out that work. So we will be supporting this bill to the select committee. I think there are important features of it, and I hope that much good will come from it.

I am pleased on behalf of United Future to speak to this first reading of the Border Security Bill. Sadly, since 11 September 2001, we live in a world that overall is less secure than at any time since World War II between 1939 and 1945. The shock and horror of the twin towers collapsing in New York, an aeroplane crashing into the Pentagon in Washington, and a fourth plane brought to ground before it could reach its intended destination, the White House, represented the greatest breach of border security in the history of the United States. We watched with a mixture of awe and horror as the massive towers of the World Trade Center collapsed, and in the memorable words of Mayor Guiliani of New York, “the losses were more than we can bear.”

Sadly, however, these acts of international terrorism have proved not to be isolated events. In October 2002 they also arrived in our hemisphere via the tragic bombing in Bali. In the months and years since, the nations of the world, and, in particular, the nations of Europe and the Americas—particularly the USA—have expended literally billions of dollars in an effort to tighten their border security. It has been necessary for New Zealand to follow suit; hence this Border Security Bill.

I would like to compliment the Minister, the Hon Rick Barker, and his officials on the thorough, common-sense, and relatively low-cost solutions they have come up with in relation to the export of goods from New Zealand to the USA and other countries. The cost, for example, of x-raying the more than one million containers that leave our shores each year would be a massive and further blow to our international competitiveness. After all, with perhaps the exception of Australia, we already face the greatest average distance of any nation in delivering to our many overseas markets. If we are to maintain and enhance our market share, continuing efforts must always be made to reduce costs whenever we can. Accordingly, the certification of supply-chain security for low-risk exports by an approved customs seal provides a workable and cost-efficient answer to the new requirements placed upon New Zealand and all other nations as a result of the increased terrorism security risk, which is now, unfortunately, part of our world.

Exporters and transport operators may, nevertheless, chafe and grizzle a bit about the new requirements. That is only human, but the reality is that from now on it will be a case of either complying with these arrangements, or risking kissing goodbye to the exports themselves. As time goes on, we may find some advantages in the new supply-chain security certification process, because right now we very often have no idea of what is in containers. I can see a lot of advantages flowing to society in general when it becomes known—and we have a system in place that ensures that we actually do know—what is in each and every individual container shipped throughout our country, and through our wharves to overseas destinations.

The enhanced border-secured immigration risk measures contained in this bill are also timely. New programmes have been written and electronic records developed that will enable customs and immigration officials to gain advance information on people intending to fly to New Zealand, whether they are coming as immigrants or as visitors. Of course, the way in which terrorists and other undesirables would normally reach our shores would be precisely as visitors.

I have some small concerns about the possible costs involved in providing that information. For example, the cost of that new technology could be up to $80,000 for airlines, and up to $1 million for customs. For pre-boarding checks, airlines are looking at a bill of up to $100,000, and for customs, the cost is estimated to be $21 million over a 5-year period, of which about half will be recouped from immigration fees. In that connection, I would like to ask the select committee that considers the bill to look carefully at whether the mix is right between costs lying where they fall and assistance through Vote Customs to ensure that those security measures are put in place.

I have no doubt that we must put these new measures in place. It is sobering to recall that all of the terrorists who participated in the atrocities of September 11 were legally in the USA. The reality is that New Zealand has no choice but to utilise all of the new information technologies, with the goal of preserving and enhancing the security of our borders. We can make no other choice if we claim to be delivering responsible Government to the people of New Zealand. One of the highest and first obligations of Government, after all, is the security of its own citizens.

Normally, people come to New Zealand on regularly scheduled commercial flights or ocean-going ships. Since we are an island nation, however, we are also at risk of people arriving here on small craft, fishing boats, and the like. Indeed, it is interesting to recall that the only terrorism to occur within New Zealand in recent times, which was related to the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior, involved the use of yachts and other small vessels. For small craft and other means of non-scheduled transport, the bill therefore moves towards tightening up current procedures and practices.

The United Future caucus had just one reservation about this bill. It was referred to also by the Hon Murray McCully, and it concerns the sections relating to the detention of suspected persons by customs for up to 12 hours. In that connection, I note also that the Bills Digest, issued by the Parliament Library, expresses similar reservations. Accordingly, we would specifically request that the select committee give careful consideration to those provisions, balancing the need for stronger border security, on the one hand, with the civil liberties of individuals, on the other.

United Future is happy to support this bill at its first reading, and its referral to a select committee for further examination.

The intent of this bill has merits, and New Zealand First will support this legislation going to the select committee. Our border security is very important, and any effort to strengthen that security will gain our support. The purpose of this bill is to amend the Customs and Excise Act and the Immigration Act, in order to enhance border security and improve the information processes of the New Zealand Customs Service and the New Zealand Immigration Service. The improvement of information available for tracking the movement of people prior to their arrival, using advanced electronic information about arrival and departure passengers, craft, and crew—provided that it is used correctly—will surely provide an additional screen against those posing a threat to our people.

New Zealand First’s major concern is that there is no record of many of the people who have already arrived in New Zealand. The Minister of Immigration has no idea how many people have arrived in the last 12 months. I refer to the previous bill just debated in this House—the Immigration Amendment Bill (No 2), and its big sister, the Immigration Amendment Bill. The immigration figures used by the Minister, Lianne Dalziel, in support of those bills bear no resemblance to the figures she has used previously to deflect New Zealand First’s argument for a reduction in the number of immigrants coming into this country. The select committee must examine the contents of all three of these bills to ensure that they are completely compatible, and to take into account the continued failure of the Minister of Immigration to account for current immigration, and the real purpose of a number of the people coming into this country. New Zealand First has serious concerns with regard to the immigration aspect of this bill, and asks that the select committee examine it very carefully.

Enabling Customs to access databases held by travel operators, in order to search for information about travel additional to that provided under advanced passenger information, might well contravene the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, but it might also result in members of the public refusing to provide operators with travel information. I refer particularly to the information provided to the travel industry and travel agents. The select committee should also look at those processes to make sure they are compatible with existing law.

I would now like to look at the amendments relating to the Customs and Excise Act—in particular, at those dealing with the security-of-supply chain. The Government’s briefing paper indicated that a key driver to this section is the ability of New Zealand to respond effectively to the United States container-security initiatives. Exporters may consent to the application of a Customs seal to export packages, including containers, or enter a Secure Exports Partnership scheme with Customs. Both of these mechanisms are voluntary on the part of the exporter, with benefits accruing, such as improved protection from pillaging.

This information is in the papers we received from the Government just prior to this reading of the bill.

The system, and this bill as it stands, do not take into account the new bioterrorism import rules of the United States. Under that country’s Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires the owner, the operator, or the agent in charge of foreign facilities to submit a registration with the FDA, including the name and address of each facility at which, and the trading name under which, the registrant conducts business, and the categories of foods handled by those facilities. This means that each New Zealand packer will have to register separately for each exporter and supplier, obtaining a unique registration number for each individually. In other words, all packing houses will have to register with the Food and Drug Administration, all the growers and suppliers they receive goods from, and they will be required to provide this information prior to shipping to the USA. They will have to have a separate registration for every exporter they use. All trucking operators carrying export goods will have to register. Customers clearing product in the USA will incur extra costs, and this can only affect growers’ returns.

The preamble to this bill already acknowledges that it will increase compliance costs for businesses, but I am certain that the Government has not considered the additional compliance cost overall, and the ultimate effect it will have on our exports as a whole. The select committee must consider the additional requirements of our trading partners, ensure that we minimise the overall effect on our exports, and work with the industries to ensure that New Zealand exports are not adversely disadvantaged. To allow our exports to be disadvantaged will result in us being uncompetitive in the marketplace, and if we are not very careful, and if this bill does not get it right, New Zealand may find itself shut out of many markets. Earlier this year, we were shut out of markets because of our actions. Let us not add to that by adding problems within this bill. I ask whoever is going to handle it in the select committee to make sure they examine these aspects, and the aspects of all our trading partners, to make sure we do have it right.

I am pleased to speak to the Border Security Bill, which is part of the whole-of-Government approach towards strengthening New Zealand’s national security and maintaining our good reputation as clean, green, safe, and secure. This bill addresses global concerns about security, and introduces four major sets of provisions, addressing travel security, supply-chain security, law enforcement, and immigration matters. This bill will be good for New Zealand, and I recommend it to the House.

I am delighted to have the opportunity to speak—rather unexpectedly, I might add—on this bill. As one of the few members from an agrarian background in this House, I believe no other issue affects this country and its farmers—the productive sector, as I will call it—as much as border security, in terms of both coming into and going out of the country. We need to ensure that our product, which is the best in the world, is not contaminated by a terrorist activity or even by an inadvertent activity, and of course we need to inspect the product coming into this country in order to make as certain as we possibly can that we have ensured it is safe. That is, though, a major problem to the Customs Service, and I am delighted to see that this real problem that the service faces is being addressed, and will, hopefully, be addressed in the select committee process.

I draw the House’s attention to a television programme that I think has captured the imagination of many people in this country. It screens on a Monday evening. Regrettably, I am on a plane at the same time, but I refer to Border Patrol. People sit and watch that documentary, which is real-life stuff, not a soap opera.

💬 Hon Tony Ryall: I thought you meant The Bachelorette.

That is the one. Border Patrol contains real-life examples of our border security actually working.

I would also add that border security is the ultimate public good, as distinct from a private good. I do not know whether too much money could be spent on ensuring the security of our country and our people. It is as much a trade issue as a personal security issue. Personal security and terrorism came to this country, as some of us with slightly longer memories will recall, with the Rainbow Warrior. That came as a huge shock to New Zealanders, at a time when that type of terrorism was not even dreamt of, and gracious me, what was the source of that terrorism? It was a country that we now seem to be snuggling up to. France is one of the old-timers, shall we say, in Europe. It is a much-respected country. But it was a huge shock to New Zealanders to see an act of terrorism take place within our coastal waters, and in our terrestrial areas, as well. So if ever there was an understanding of just how important border security is, it should have come at the time of the Rainbow Warrior bombing. But the reality is simply that it has taken the appalling events that occurred more recently in America to make people realise that even in this faraway country of New Zealand, we are under a threat equal to that facing other countries.

I suspect the real threat comes not from planes crashing into buildings, or from bombs, but in the form of bioterrorism. In this country the impact of foot-and-mouth, bluetongue, or another exotic disease on our economy, our people, and our well-being would be far greater than bombs or any amount of TNT, dynamite, or whatever those appalling people who detonate bombs use these days. We are delighted to see that the Government is recognising that border security is, and should be, right up at the top of the list. I sincerely hope the select committee, in considering this bill, will ensure that every resource that is needed is available, and will make certain that the Minister in charge of the bill recognises the importance that all New Zealanders place on this legislation.

I see in the preamble to the bill the words “voluntary agreements”. I think that really sums up how we can achieve first-rate results. If, by imposing requirements, we create resentment in exporters, then we will have real problems. But I do not know of any meat or dairy company, for example, or any other company in the agricultural sector, that would not agree that voluntary agreements with the Customs Service and the officials who guarantee—and who effectively do have to guarantee—the security of our product, are the appropriate way to go forward. We need to ensure, of course, that customs officers are able to exercise their authority from time to time when that is needed.

I return to the problem of bioterrorism and the potential impact of the introduction of viruses such as foot-and-mouth into this country, as I mentioned earlier. We saw the devastating effect on the British economy of that disease. It has had an absolutely huge impact. I am not altogether certain, after looking through this bill, whether enough emphasis is being placed on the detection of those viruses—knowing, of course, that that is an extraordinarily difficult thing to do. We have to look, then, at the individuals coming into this country, at where they are from, and at their reasons for coming here. I am also delighted to be able to say that I fully support individuals’ electronic records being made freely and instantly available to the authorities concerned with this very, very vital part of our existence in this little country of ours.

Another thing that does, again, concern me enormously is the fact that I do not see very much about extra staffing, training, and resourcing going in to ensure that the outcomes that we require from our border security are obtainable. It is no good just to have a piece of paper or a bill stating the requirements and the sorts of outcomes that we would really like to achieve, and then to say we are sorry, but we do not have the resources to put into that ultimate public good. Therefore, it is essential that the Minister and the Minister of Finance understand that whatever is required must be made available. If one goes through the rural sector, as I have done in recent times—and continue to do—and asks farmers and the rural community what the most important aspect of our life in New Zealand is, they will say that security and our border controls are the single most important aspect, without question.

The aspect that makes life very, very difficult for our customs people is the fact that we have a huge coastline. It is one of the biggest in the world, as I understand it. The opportunity for small craft to come in to one of the outlying islands or other places and conduct illicit acts is obviously quite substantial. I wonder whether aerial surveillance should not be part of our border security. Do we have the capacity, in terms of our Air Force, to be able to ensure that if any ships—whether they be major tankers or just fishing trawlers—come in laden with illegal immigrants, or whatever else, they can be detected appropriately? Therefore, border security is not just about the Customs Service but also about the Air Force, and about having an adequate Navy. All those aspects are totally interrelated, so we cannot just look at upping the number of customs officers in order to ensure that our security is adequate. We also have to address the ongoing problem of the resourcing of our armed forces—our Navy, our Air Force, and our Army—if necessary. Of course, recent events to ensure border security in places like the Solomons also highlight the need to upskill and increase the availability of our armed forces.

I have been waiting in anticipation to speak in support of this bill. It provides the New Zealand Customs Service with greater powers over people, and their property, who cross our borders illegally and undeclared. It also allows early and timely access to information for managing the risk that people, planes, ships, boats, and goods may pose as a terrorist threat. I commend Rick Barker for this bill. It comes from a Minister who cares, and a Government that cares, about the security of our country.

This bill causes the Greens serious concern, but we will support its referral to the select committee. For a start, we should be upfront about why this bill is before us. It is because the United States has demanded that we pass such legislation. The United States Customs and Border Protection Commissioner, Robert Bonner, was in New Zealand recently, and was quoted in the June issue of the New Zealand Customs Service magazine Contraband as stating that progress on security arrangements with the US in the customs area relied on two things: “Part is contingent on legislation”—the Border Security Bill—“and part is making sure that there is participation on a whole-of-Government basis.” The problem that New Zealand and other countries face is that the United States is so powerful, as a trading partner and politically, that countries are being blackmailed into abiding by American-dictated freight security and immigration systems. For example, the measures laid down in this bill are dictated by the US Container Security Initiative launched in January 2002 as a response to September 11. The Container Security Initiative allows for US customs personnel to be stationed in foreign ports to ensure compliance with US dictates.

The US-driven container monitoring measures in this bill do have certain advantages in terms of monitoring for safety purposes, including monitoring for biosecurity internationally. The Greens are very keen on biosecurity, and say we have to follow that up, as a nation, with a better monitoring system and by searching any containers arriving here that are identified as presenting a biosecurity threat. In the freight area, there is also a potential human rights problem with the bill’s provisions for security checks on people who work in the areas of packing containers, trucking them, and loading them on to ships. It would be worrying if that led to subtle discrimination in a way that would be hard to prove. For example, employers in companies subject to security checks may start to act on the safe side when hiring people, so that people from, say, Islamic countries do not get to the top of the queue.

The greatest concern for the Greens is in the area of the civil liberties implications of the immigration provisions in this bill. Stopping potential terrorists from getting on and off planes flying in and out of New Zealand can all sound very nice, but how many innocent people will be caught up and prevented from travelling, without any right of appeal? The fact is that the United States, whose databases will be used to identify many of the people to be stopped, has a very broad definition of who constitutes a risk. After September 11, for example, the United States detained up to 2,000 people and held them for long periods, on the basis that they may have something to do with terrorism. In fact, virtually none of them had, and only one court case has ensued.

It is in the spirit of international human rights conventions for the right of travel to be governed by the rule of law, but the provisions in this bill undermine that. There is no effective legal redress if a person is prevented from getting on a plane. Under the provisions of the bill, people will be notified about a decision against their travel, but that notification can be “in any form he or she”—that is, the Immigration Service officer—“thinks appropriate”. There is no requirement to give a reason, nor is there any right of appeal to “any court, the Tribunal, the Minister, or any other body or person” if the Immigration Service prevents anyone from hopping on a plane to New Zealand. Of course, there is the added practical barrier to trying to address one’s effective exclusion from New Zealand if one is sitting in an airport thousands of miles away from New Zealand—or vice versa, if one is a New Zealander who is waiting in a New Zealand airport after having been stopped from getting on a plane to the United States.

Members should make no mistake about this: the international systems that are being set up here and elsewhere under US auspices will affect New Zealanders. Even if one was, say, in Los Angeles, and phoned up a lawyer in New Zealand and asked him or her to get to the bottom of one’s exclusion from a plane, that lawyer would be handicapped by a provision inserted by clause 8 stating that the evidence can be kept secret by the Immigration Service under broad provisions, such as that it might “prejudice the security or defence of New Zealand.” Evidence from overseas agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency will almost always be kept confidential, because of a clause allowing those agencies to determine its confidentiality. Under the provisions inserted by clause 8, the information is secret if the overseas agency “will not consent to the disclosure”.

Evidence from such overseas agencies is the very information that the Greens would be most suspicious about, on two grounds. One is its accuracy—and we know clearly from the current debate over the failure to discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that we cannot rely on the information provided by the US intelligence agencies. It is often inaccurate and manipulated by politicians. The second, and associated, reason for being suspicious is that the American intelligence and police agencies often serve agendas that are different to ours here in New Zealand. The US agencies would be prejudiced against anti-nuclear, anti-war, anti - genetic engineering, or anti - corporate globalisation activists travelling into and out of the United States, or moving around the world in general. The US agencies could be inclined to provide damaging information on such individuals to New Zealand immigration or customs services under the exchange arrangements. It is a very easy way for such agencies to harass such political activists, because if the activists have a tight travel schedule, then stopping them from getting on a plane for a day or two can make a speaking trip or a trip to an anti-globalisation protest unviable.

I am are not talking hypothetically here; I have an example of that from my own family. My late mother Elsie Locke was travelling as the official New Zealand representative to a children’s literature conference in Vancouver, when she was hauled off the plane at Honolulu by the US authorities, and was not allowed to continue on the plane to Vancouver, purely and simply because they disliked her radical activist political background. In that case, she did eventually get to the conference, but she was not able to come back to New Zealand from Vancouver on her scheduled route via Honolulu.

The Greens also have considerable privacy concerns about the information that the airlines are supposed to give to the customs and immigration services, the information that the customs and immigration services will share with agencies overseas, and the possible misuse of that information. Under the bill, virtually anything can be asked for. The non-exclusive list of information to be given to the Customs Service includes such things as one’s email address, and the information can include all sorts of details about one’s travel history. There has been a debate in Europe over the details that European-based airlines are providing US authorities with, which include credit card numbers if the ticket is purchased with a credit card, particularly as there are inadequate privacy protections in American law about the subsequent use of credit card numbers by the US agencies.

We do know that under the homeland security system that is being built up by the Bush administration information is freely shared across Government agencies, and there has been considerable public outrage about intrusions on privacy. For example, American librarians are currently up in arms about requirements that they hand over to the police the borrowing records of their library users. There are very few real controls on the information that New Zealand’s immigration and customs services may provide to homeland security agencies in the United States. There is provision in this bill for written agreements between New Zealand and overseas agencies about the information that we give them, but there is also a provision for the Customs Service to provide information without a written agreement, as long as a record is kept of the information that has been passed on.

Finally, the New Zealand Customs Service’s power to detain is expanded in this bill, with little legal constraint on the abuse of that provision. For example, under new section 148A(5) inserted by clause 16, a customs officer “may continue to detain a person” if the officer “is not satisfied that the person has correctly answered a question asked”. That is a pretty arbitrary and open-ended power to give to an officer. Of course, the Green Party does want the customs and immigration services to have the ability to detect serious criminals, and to stop the smuggling of arms through New Zealand. We are in favour of improving the systems in order to achieve that, but we are far from satisfied that the bill as it is now drafted really controls the possible abuses of power, and that it does not catch up innocent parties, both by the customs and immigration services in New Zealand and by the overseas agencies that we may share information with.

I am pleased to speak in support of the first reading of this bill, which has been introduced by my colleague the Hon Rick Barker. Other Labour colleagues have spoken about aspects of the bill, and the one thing I am pleased to see is that it provides a legal base for the Customs Service’s innovative secure export partnership scheme, which sees the Government and industry working together to secure goods from the point of loading to the point of export. I think that the Customs Service has taken a very innovative approach, and it deserves our congratulations. I am glad to see that this bill formalises that approach.

On behalf of the National Party, I would like to join previous members in congratulating the Minister of Customs on the work he has done to see this bill introduced to Parliament. It is no mean feat for a Minister without any legal training at all to put together a bill of this complexity, and to do such a good job. I do not doubt that, along the way, it will be discovered that the Minister has made a number of major blunders, but, certainly, in the superficial examination that we give to bills at the time of their first reading, I have only praise for the work he has done. I believe that much of that work has been done on an unaided basis, to the extent that if the Minister has made slips, then he alone will be accountable for the errors that have occurred.

There are three areas that I would like to cover in the short time that is available to me in this second reading. First, I will talk very generally about the bill. Second, I will offer some reservations in respect of a particular aspect, and I am glad the Attorney-General is here to perhaps contemplate the issues that I will seek to raise. Third, I will make some comments in conclusion.

First of all, the bill forms part of a Government package strengthening New Zealand’s anti-terrorist legal framework in the wake of September 11. It accompanies the Counter-Terrorism Bill, and the Maritime Security Bill, which is yet to be introduced. The bill has three key features. They are, first, that airlines are required to send to customs electronic information on arriving and departing passengers, craft, and crew; second, that exporters are encouraged to enter voluntary arrangements with customs whereby their goods are made secure, and are subject to customs control from the time of packing to the point of loading on to a ship; and, third, there are a number of other amendments increasing customs’ search and seizure powers.

I will start by speaking about supply chain security, because the Government is currently negotiating a nation-to-nation security deal with the US for container freight. The Americans now apparently want containers to be sealed at their point of origin, and the contents detailed, in order for the containers to be passed speedily across US ports. That is clearly an advantage in a setting where an alternative possibility might be port-to-port deals between New Zealand ports and US ports. So this bill establishes a voluntary system, whereby customs or Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials check containers as they are packed, and seal them with tamper-proof markers. Customs, obviously, hope that system will satisfy the US, so that it allows a nation-to-nation security deal. The US has many individual port agreements, and New Zealand clearly felt that, because many of our ports are small, it would be better to have one agreement for the whole country. If exporters choose not to participate in the system, then their goods will be subject to much more stringent inspection on arrival in the US, and will thus take longer to clear the wharf.

The second aspect, which members and the Minister have spoken about, is in connection with the travel security provisions, and the fact that international carriers will now be required to electronically lodge advance information on passengers and crew with customs, which, in turn, will link electronically with travel operators’ and cargo managers’ databases.

I would now like just to talk about some of the implications of this legislation, which I believe will need to be carefully considered by the select committee. What I am talking about is the oblique or indirect use of administrative power, which may well be misused. It is the sort of situation that currently confronts immigration officials at the border. A person boards a flight to come to New Zealand. He or she produces appropriate travel documentation that satisfies the authorities of the sending State. In the course of carriage to New Zealand, the person destroys his or her passport and other relevant travel materials. The person arrives at the New Zealand border and announces that he or she is seeking refugee status. That then becomes a problem for the refugee status branch of the New Zealand Immigration Service, and the case may well end up before the Refugee Status Appeals Authority for determination as to whether the claimant is properly making a claim for asylum. As I see it, the legislation, which does not really have this intended purpose, can be misused in the sense that data can be accessed on the true nature of the claimant’s origin and identity. One may say that that is a good thing, but it potentially represents an abuse of administrative power. The committee should closely look at that issue.

The second issue that I seek to deal with relates to concerns that have been expressed by the outgoing Privacy Commissioner to a number of select committees of Parliament as we have looked at a number of pieces of legislation that are security related. Whether they are bills such as the Crimes Amendment Bill (No 6), which deals with computer crime, or bills that relate to the setting up of the Government Communications Security Bureau and the vesting of powers in that entity, or bills that are concerned with terrorism in its asymmetric aspects, there is little doubt that Parliament is hugely ready to give to the security forces in this country significantly increased powers. The Privacy Commissioner makes the point, quite justifiably, I would assert, that some of these powers may not truly be required. The officials asked for them, and Parliament generally grants those wishes. But we in this Parliament should be constant in our vigilance that more is not given than is sought—proposition one—and, proposition two, that where something is sought it is not automatically given. I have some reservations as to whether, in respect of this legislation, the powers need to be as broad as Parliament is currently minded to confer.

I spoke about the travel security provisions, and, of course, they are more complex than I have indicated. It is clear that the amendments proposed, for example, will allow customs officers to carry out automated pre-boarding checks of passengers and crew intending to travel to New Zealand. The plan is for electronic alerts to be recorded against a passenger or a crew member in the event that either a discrepancy or a security concern arises. Customs officials will be able to prevent passengers from boarding a plane or ship for intended passage to New Zealand.

There are significant costs associated with this process. The Government estimates the cost of installing such an electronic system would be $21 million over 5 years. The airlines have indicated that they will incur additional costs of between $50,000 and $100,000 to implement this system for New Zealand. That said, of course, a number of countries have these same systems, and Australia is one illustration of that.

Let me conclude on the issue of increased customs search and seizure powers. I do so in the context of the comments I have made that it may be the case that we are giving too much power to the bureaucracy and to the administration. Under this legislation customs will be able to detain for investigation suspicious cash and what is called tainted property. Those issues all require the close consideration of the select committee to which this bill is referred.

It is a pleasure to follow the former National defence spokesperson, who, as referred to in his speech, is nicknamed “Major Blunder”, and to join him in praising the foresight in this bill. We do not have to go far outside New Zealand’s borders to recognise that the world is a dangerous and unstable place at the moment, and that, worldwide, the requirements for security at borders are increasing. It is a particular pleasure to note that this bill brings in a mandatory requirement for advanced electronic information on arriving and departing passengers, which, quite simply, allows our border protection personnel to know the details of people arriving before they do so, so that the officials, indeed, can interdict people before they get on an incoming flight to New Zealand. It is one example of many of how New Zealand is joining the international mainstream by tightening up its border protection, in keeping with the enhanced security needs of the world in which we live. I compliment the Minister of Customs on this fine bill.

I am pleased to join in the debate on this bill, which, as members will know, is part of a trifecta of legislation that the Government is looking to bring in, including the Counter-Terrorism Bill and the Maritime Security Bill. I have no doubt that the Minister of Customs, the Hon Rick Barker, will be pleased to have the support of the National Party. I say that because in the New Zealand Herald of 23 June of this year he said: “It should have been done a long time ago.” The Minister will be relieved to have our support, and he will no doubt have our wise counsel and wisdom when the bill is referred to the select committee in some days’ time.

National supports this legislation because it seeks to preserve our national security, and it seeks to preserve our $4 billion of exports to the United States. Most New Zealanders would know why this legislation has been recommended to the House—that is, because of the activities post - 11 September 2001. I want to take a moment to digress from the bill and to reflect on 11 September 2001 in a personal capacity. I spent 6 years, from 1995 to 2001, living in the United Kingdom, but spending every second week in New York. In that time I spent every second week living in the hotel that was destroyed on 11 September. That is not the reason that I raise that matter at this important time in the House; I raise it because on that day my boss, Michael Packer, died. He was giving a speech on the 108th floor, at Windows on the World. He perished with another two employees from Merrill Lynch, both of whom worked for me and whom I had recruited from the private sector. So that occasion was one of great sadness for me. The world has come to learn that terrorism has taken on a whole new face. We in New Zealand are not immune from such activities.

I want to make specific reference to the $21 million the Government has foreshadowed will be the cost of this legislation over 5 years. I want simply to make this point. Not only has the world changed in the last 2 years, but also the cost of what happened on 11 September has been incredible and monumental. I say that because just 2 weeks ago the US Senate approved the Homeland Security Bill, creating the department under Tom Ridge. It approved the spending for the Homeland Security Bill, and the sum that the Senate approved was US$29.4 billion. That is the expected cost of homeland security for the United States of America. I simply suggest that the select committee spend some time analysing whether the realistic cost of this legislation will be $21 million over 5 years. I suggest that the cost will be a great deal more. This issue is a significant one. We have seen from the terrorism activity that has taken place post - September 11 that this kind of activity will be with the world, in my opinion, for decades to come.

I want to speak for a moment on the travel security provisions. My colleague the Hon Murray McCully spoke for a moment about the issues that may arise from the provisions in the legislation that relate to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and privacy. In particular, it is worth noting that a great amount of the cost, the $21 million, is the cost of the pre-border electronic checking process that will take place not only for individual passengers but for people associated with individuals checking in. Those provisions will be very powerful and very useful if they are implemented properly. We simply have to have accurate information on who is coming to New Zealand, and whether they are appropriately entering our country.

But we should not fool ourselves, and the select committee will need to spend a bit of time examining the impact that this measure will have on passengers when they go to the airport, when they go to our borders. I suspect the delays will be pretty significant. Some months back I travelled to Los Angeles en route to Canada, and I managed to experience at first hand what this is like—my not having been back to the United States for a little bit of time.

💬 Hon David Cunliffe: A body search?

The body search, unfortunately, did not take place. I am sure it would be a very pleasurable experience in the right circumstances. It would have been a lot more exciting than what did take place, which was a 3-hour wait. It was like having to read a Labour Party manifesto—I was asleep by the time I got to the first paragraph. A 3-hour wait pained me. I said to myself that there has to be a better way—US$29.4 billion worth of homeland security!

To my right, I noticed something that I had seen in place many times as I had gone into New York, and that was the latest scanning equipment for thumbprints or fingerprints. I thought to myself that certain parties in this House would not like the concept of retina scanning or fingerprints, but I suggest that that will be absolutely necessary in the years ahead. I do not think passports, which can be forged in all sorts of dodgy countries in the world, will cut it. I think the real cost of this legislation, when it is finally put in place, will be considerably more than $21 million, but if it means that I do not have to spend 3 hours in a queue in Los Angeles, then I look forward to it.

I note the supply chain security, which comes to the issue of our preserving our $4 billion of exports to the United States. I have a little message to pass on to Labour Government members, just while they are thinking about this, and are alert and all ears. I recognise that this has been a rather slow and dull debate to this point. If they want to preserve our exports to the United States of America, here is a little tip: sign a free-trade arrangement with the US. The only way we will get one of those in place is when we have a real alliance with the US. From the way that the Government has been interacting with our great counterparts the Americans, we will not get one. A free-trade arrangement would preserve our $4 billion—in fact, grow our $4 billion—a great deal more than tamper-proofing a few canisters before they go to the US.

I would like to touch on some of the customs’ search and seizure powers, because they are quite detailed in this legislation, and quite important. Under this legislation customs will be able to detain for investigation, for up to 7 days, suspicious cash and tainted property. I wonder what “suspicious cash” actually looks like. Is it slightly different in colour, or slightly larger in denomination, or packaged in brown envelopes? I am not really sure of the definition of “suspicious”. It is something that will have to be spelt out. It may simply mean lots of cash—but plenty of people travel with lots of cash. “Tainted property”—I wonder how the Minister will define that. For instance, the Labour credit card said Labour would not put up taxes. I see that, in my personal opinion, as tainted property. We all know that the Minister of Finance has declared a jihad on the taxpayers of New Zealand by raising taxes 15 times since he promised on his credit card that he would not do that. I suggest that it is tainted property. Others may find a use for it, but we in the National Party do not.

We will be supporting this legislation going to the select committee. I look forward, as the committee will, to the great input that will come from the National members, who are well travelled and well versed in world events. We look forward to making our sparkling contribution, as we always do, in this great House.

Bill read a first time, and referred to the Government Administration Committee.