Government Communications Security Bureau Bill

, on behalf of the Minister in charge of the NZ Security Intelligence Service: I move, That the Government Communications Security Bureau Bill be now read a third time. The bill defines the functions of the Government Communications Security Bureau and provides for its administration and the conduct of its operational activities. Its primary objectives are, firstly, to formalise in statute the existing executive arrangements that establish the Government Communications Security Bureau and authorise its activities; secondly, to fill a gap in the existing legal structure, which currently prevents the Government Communications Security Bureau’s intelligence collection operations from evolving to keep pace with the rapidly changing communications environment; and, thirdly, to recognise formally the key role that the bureau plays in the protection of the nation’s communications and computer systems.

This bill puts the position of the Government Communications Security Bureau beyond doubt as a legitimate agency of Government. It emphasises that the bureau’s functions are to be focused on meeting the Government’s foreign intelligence and information security needs, and provides for robust protection for the legitimate privacy interests of New Zealanders ourselves. In defining the functions for the Government Communications Security Bureau, this bill establishes clear parameters of the bureau’s operational activities at a time when the need for an effective intelligence and security response in the national interest has perhaps never been more compelling. I commend the bill to the House.

It is perhaps timely that today we are debating the third reading of the Government Communications Security Bureau Bill, because clause 7 states that the objectives of the bureau are to protect and advance the security or defence of New Zealand, or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand. Today, the international relations of the Government of New Zealand are perhaps more under question than they have been since 1985—and as much as at any time in my 19 years in this Parliament—when Labour last threw a bomb into New Zealand’s international relations. I will come back to that in a moment.

This bill puts the structure of the Government Communications Security Bureau on a proper footing. It sets out its objectives much more clearly. It sets out the regulation of its activities, and particularly its interception activities. These things could not be more critically important than they are right now. If we just think back over the last few months, there was the 11 September terrorist attack in the United States, which was the first time in a long, long time that the United States mainland had been attacked. Since then, of course, there have been the Bali bombings. Today, for the first time in 100 years and more, New Zealand is not supporting our English-speaking family in a major conflict affecting the security of the world. That is certainly relevant to clause 7 and the international relations of the Government of New Zealand. The question is whether New Zealand is obtaining the security information it requires to guarantee the security of our people. That is not at all clear. If we go back over evidence put before this Parliament in recent times, following the Bali bombings when New Zealanders were killed in those terrorist attacks, it becomes quite clear that there was a question about whether New Zealand was getting the security information it required from other Governments voluntarily. If we are not, then clearly the activities of the Government Communications Security Bureau, which intercepts the communications of foreign Governments, need to be stepped up.

We depend hugely on voluntary access to, or the voluntary provision of, security information to us by our friends and allies. Following the Bali bombings it was pretty clear that we may not be receiving the information from our friends and allies that we might expect. For example, it became clear that New Zealand did not receive a key CIA warning that specifically listed Bali as a terrorist target, before it was attacked. We would have expected to receive that.

It is interesting that in Australia, Prime Minister John Howard admitted that they had received some information that pointed to that bombing. When the New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade was asked whether he could confirm that we had received the same information as Australia, the parliamentary select committee was told that it could not be confirmed, because Prime Minister Howard had not disclosed to New Zealand the information he had. Quite clearly, if our friends and allies are not disclosing to New Zealand the information they have, we need to be able to intercept the communications of foreign Governments even more than we have in the past, and that is a shocking admission to have to make. In clause 7, “Objective of Bureau”, we see that one of those objectives—I am referring to clause 7(1)(a)(ii)—is the advancement of the international relations of the Government of New Zealand. I want to focus today on the state to which those international relations have declined. Today at the United Nations this Labour-led Government made a statement that totally ignores the facts about our family of English-speaking nations, our friends and allies whom we have stood and died with through successive conflicts last century—one of whom saved our people from an imperial invasion during the Second World War—and treats that family of friends no differently from a vicious dictator, Saddam Hussein.

This bill we debate today is all about advancing New Zealand’s international relations, and we are debating it on the very day that this Labour-led Government has kicked in the guts our family, whom we have to depend on for foreign intelligence. The Government has kicked them in the guts. How can Government members think that Washington, London, and Canberra have not dissected today’s statement at the UN and have not looked at those words, which said that our common objective must be to end the hostilities as quickly as possible? There was no mention of wishing our family in that conflict Godspeed in ousting a vicious dictator. People do not have to agree with what members of their family do, but when the chips are down, decency expects that they will support their family. But, no, New Zealand today, for the first time in my lifetime—maybe with the exception of 1985 when we last had a Labour Government—for the first time for a long time the Government of New Zealand, a Labour-led Government, has treated our friends Australia, Britain, and the United States as though they are no different from Saddam Hussein, one of the more vicious dictators in the world today.

I commend this bill to the Labour Government. I urge Government members to read their own bill. I urge them to read clause 7 and see what the objectives of the Government Communications Security Bureau are, and think about it. I ask them to think about their friends who keep them in power, the Greens and the Progressive Coalition, who think this stuff is all wrong. I want the Labour members in this House to reflect for a moment on what our friends, on whom we depend so much for security information, think of what the Government has done at the United Nations today. These things are not forgotten. They are not forgotten lightly. They reverberate on. New Zealand was done a huge disservice at the United Nations in New York today by, this Labour-led Government, and we will regret it for some time to come. National supports this bill because we need it, given the damage that the Labour-led Government has done today to New Zealand’s future.

I would have thought that the member who has just resumed his seat would not want his speech to be interpreted the way it will be, which is simply that this bill was necessary because of the Government’s current foreign policy. This bill is necessary, full stop. This bill is necessary because in today’s environment, regardless of the particular foreign policy that the Government of the day may follow, international relations have become so much more volatile that every single State, whatever its size, needs to have adequate security intelligence services to gather information about what is going on and to enable that information to be processed in the best interests of that country. That is exactly what this bill seeks to do in both clauses 7 and 8, which set out the objectives and the functions of the Government Communications Security Bureau. The bureau is being set up as a Government department to make it more accountable in effect, and also to ensure that its role is more tightly specified.

As I look around the walls of this Chamber I see a succession of plaques commemorating the occasions when New Zealand has joined international conflict, and New Zealand blood has been spilt in the pursuit of freedom. I do not think anyone should detract from that memory. The situation in Iraq at the moment is extraordinarily unfortunate. I doubt that in my lifetime there has been a more savage, more brutal, more reprehensible dictator than Saddam Hussein. I certainly want to see him removed from power as quickly as possible, and I want to see those associated with him removed from power as quickly as possible. That is one of the big issues confronting the country today, but it is not of itself an issue that explains why we need to pass this bill.

If there had been no Saddam Hussein, no Bali, no September 11, and no Taliban or other threat, I would say that we still need to have legislation of this type. The greatest protection that we can have in a very diverse and uncertain world is to ensure that our resources are best placed to enable us to have the information we need to do the job that is required.

Often, it is not just a matter of foreign policy. We see threats being made around the world all the time. There are threats of an economic nature and there are threats of a biosecurity nature. They are threats that may be small “p” political, but all of those things are matters that we, as a decent society, require adequate intelligence upon. We also need to have a mechanism, which is the other part of this bill, by which those who gather that material can be properly held to account for the role they perform, and that is what this bill establishes. I deplore the fact that a relatively non-contentious matter that, with the exception of one segment of the House, has widespread support, is being turned into something that it is not. This is a measure that we ought to have passed some considerable time ago, because the change in technology, the improvement in communications, and the sophistication in the way in which people do their business, mean that the Government Communications Security Bureau and the other intelligence agencies that go alongside it—the External Assessments Bureau and the Security Intelligence Service—need to have their role constantly upskilled and updated, to ensure that they are able to protect us. And that says nothing about particular situations that arise from time to time. I think it is an unfortunate association to try to say that this measure becomes more important because of certain circumstances in the world at the present time.

This is a good bill. I do not accept the criticism of those who speak against it, that somehow it means that information about people will be gathered improperly, or that some of the provisions in the bill, particularly the reference at clause 7(1)(a)(iii) to “New Zealand’s international well-being or economic well-being” can be used as a way of suppressing internal legitimate protest and dissent. The people who raised that argument are the same people who object to the line in our national anthem, that this country be spared from dissension, envy, and hate. It is a ludicrous argument that is advanced in that respect. New Zealand is not being compromised in this regard. We are ensuring that our intelligence services are able to operate effectively and efficiently. I believe we ought to give them the support they require to do that job, because they are operating on the nation’s behalf. I am happy to support this bill. I want to see it passed as quickly as possible, and I want to see us move on and ensure that our intelligence services—whatever the international environment—operate efficiently in the public interest of this country.

I rise to signal that New Zealand First will be voting, as it has all the way through, in favour of the bill. I wish to make a couple of points. Quite clearly, the bill was needed. It is a little disappointing that it has languished on the Order Paper for so long, having been introduced into the House under urgency, and I would ask members like the member who just spoke, that before they give urgency support to this Government they really question it about its intent. To have this bill introduced as a security issue—so important that it had to come in under urgency—and then see it languish for 2 years on the Order Paper and only just coming to its third reading now, says a lot about this Government and some of the objectives it puts up on day 1 and what they really mean on day 2. Only two parties in this House are going to give urgency for next week. One is the party of the member who just spoke—

💬 Mr SPEAKER: The member will come back to this bill. Do not talk about urgency.

I will. The point is that if this bill is so important and so critical to the security and well-being of our nation, it should not have stopped, once the urgency motion had been passed. It should have been rammed through this House as quickly as possible. It should not have taken 2 years. The bill, after all, was designed to establish the bureau as a department of State, and to clarify and define the bureau’s functions and objectives. It was designed to detail the circumstances in which the bureau may intercept foreign communications, and how it may do that. They are all crucial and critical things.

I want to make a couple of points beyond this. It is, therefore, extremely disappointing to see the way in which the Labour Government, supported by the Progressive Coalition and United Future, then treated this House with utter contempt at the Committee stage, by not participating in the Committee debate. I do not think there was one speech.

💬 Hon Peter Dunne: There was.

United Future did speak? I withdraw that.

💬 Hon Peter Dunne: You should have been here.

I was here through the whole thing. Maybe the member came in briefly and disappeared. But the Labour Party sat there and did not take one speech in defence of this bill or to explain it. “Concerned about the security of this nation”—it certainly brings into question those statements. But we have the bill.

The second point is that I note the concerns of the Green Party—and to its credit, it fought hard in defence of its views of life. But I have to say to the Greens that they spend so much time worrying about the wrong things. I would put it to the Greens that if they are seriously concerned about the privacy and protection of individual rights, individual personal well-being, and individual information, they should take some time out and examine what happens to the information on an EFTPOS card or a VISA card, or maybe they should go and do some checks into Baycorp and see the influence those people have on ordinary New Zealanders’ lives. I would suggest to them that the impact of Baycorp can certainly be far more damaging to many New Zealanders in the low socioeconomic group than this bill will be.

I would comment on another thing. I have heard a lot of rhetoric, and I heard some more of it just then, about foreign policy and where we are going. I would say, in support of some of those comments, that this bill is necessary because the world has changed drastically. If September 11 was not a wake-up call to many of the pacifists and the naïve members of Parliament on that side of the House, surely Bali was. And if that was not, then surely the bombings in the Philippines after that were. This Government has to wake up to the real security issues that we face, and I will say again that the issues that are presented to us through an open-door immigration policy, coupled with international terrorism, are not issues that this Government should dismiss lightly, as simply the rantings of xenophobes or racists. There, in the immigration policies, lies a very real threat to the security of New Zealand and its friends.

New Zealand for years has been used as a staging post and a back door into Australia by people who have picked up cheapo New Zealand passports on loose immigration policies. We need this bill and we need more security measures to enhance our protection, because of one simple fact: we do not actually have any friends. We say we do, but since we came out of the ANZUS alliance, much of the intelligence that was always available to New Zealand is no longer available to us. It is available on a pick-and-choose basis, and on that basis we are more vulnerable. We need legislation like this, and further steps beyond this, to ensure that we have access to good information, that that access is timely, and that it is on a broad-brush, not a cherry-pick basis.

We encourage world trade. We encourage foreign companies to come in and invest here. We therefore have an obligation to protect their investments when they become part of the New Zealand economic infrastructure. By not running competent, capable, in-depth, thorough security systems that are totally networked with our allies, where our allies have such confidence in us that they can give us that information, we place in jeopardy many of those foreign corporations.

I shall take a simple example: KFC and McDonald’s, which we allow to come in here and set up business to service our needs. Imagine the effects on this nation and on the United States if we within New Zealand had bombings of KFC outlets. It is an American company and a prime target for international terrorists to make their point. In which country could that really happen? Well, look at little old New Zealand! We do not think that anything like that could ever happen to us, because we have Helen Clark as the Prime Minister, and the Labour Government, looking after us in a benign environment! I say: wake up, New Zealand; wake up, Labour Party! I compliment the Government on passing the legislation, but I give it a brickbat for taking 2 years to get it through. I tell Government members again that there is a very real need to develop stronger ties with our traditional allies. If this Government is not going to take any of those steps, then it had better get its head around this idea: if this Government wants independence of security, and independence of foreign policy, then it had better develop independence of security on its own shores and an independent Defence Force.

I put it to the Government that it will only ever do that when it starts allocating 2 percent of gross domestic product towards defence. It will only ever do that when it backs up its independent mouth with independent dollars to create a fully comprehensive security system that this country can rely on. To do anything else is to be a bludger. To do anything else is to tell the United States: “Oh, yes, when we need you we will need you, but in the meantime we don’t want to know you.” Well, that does not work, does it, and it leaves us vulnerable, and our security dependent on the goodwill of our traditional friends and allies. I am sorry, but we have a habit of stretching that goodwill far too far.

I rise in support of the bill. The Government Communications Security Bureau was formed in 1977 without specific statutory authority. The bill provides some important safeguards to privacy, but at the same time ensures that the bureau’s present ability to intercept foreign communications without warrants is retained, although some warrantable aspects are also introduced to it. In doing so, it puts the bureau on a similar footing to that of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service. I think it is good legislation and I commend it to the House.

ACT New Zealand supports this bill. We believe that it is essentially a good bill and that it is necessary, but we raise the question: is it sufficient? We suspect that possibly it is not. We recognise that it is tidying up a situation whereby, as the previous speaker has just mentioned, the Government Communications Security Bureau was established in 1977 without statutory authority. I believe that it is necessary to have that statutory authority. The bill introduces appropriate checks and balances, and I think that those checks and balances are about right. I know that most parties in the House, other than the Greens, support the bill. I take it that the Greens’ concerns are that they believe that civil liberties are at risk, presumably, but I am sure that we will hear from Mr Locke on that.

The point has also been made that the Prime Minister is quite wrong. The Prime Minister, Helen Clark, told us just a few months ago that we are very fortunate in New Zealand because we live in an extraordinarily benign environment strategically. That illusion has been well and truly shattered, and hopefully she now recognises the folly of those words and regrets having ever said them. They will haunt her for some time to come. New Zealand does not have the luxury of living in an extraordinarily benign environment as Helen Clark claimed, and the events of the past 24 months have certainly brought that home to us.

We live in a changing world. We are in a time of global transition. The whole of last century was characterised by a philosophical debate between fascism, communism, and liberal democracy underpinned by market economies. It is very interesting that out of the ashes of the First World War came communism and fascism, and that the Second World War was all about defeating fascism, which had sprung up in Italy, Germany, Japan, and Spain. The communists and those who believed in liberal market economies with representative democracies joined together to defeat fascism in the Second World War.

The month that the Second World War finished, we went into a very long ideological war between communism, and representative democracy and open market economies. That war lasted until 1990. It was only with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the accepted failure of socialism that the predominance of open market economies and representative democracy became the prevailing world order. What we have now in our difficult transition from nation States to interdependent market States is an incredible new philosophical battle with those who object to international free trade and open market economies.

We see it in parts of the Middle East. Osama bin Laden is a total rejection of the values that we hold dear to. Regrettably, some of the loony left do not believe in free trade, either. In a strange way they are actually more aligned to international terrorists like Osama bin Laden, whose bottom line is to bring down the interdependent market economies that underpin the capitalist system that is now the predominant world order.

The regret is that New Zealand is now out of the loop. We have put ourselves out of the loop. It seems that our Prime Minister and senior Ministers get their information from CNN news, these days. This bill is all about putting us in the loop. But because of our strategic positioning it is only the mechanism; it will not, of itself, put us in the loop for international information.

We have done it to ourselves. This Labour Government, with its abandoning of our traditional allies and some of their other policy positions, has clearly alienated New Zealand from what is obviously—to me, and I think most others in this country—our strategic best well-being

Like others, I was offended by the statement of this Government delivered to the United Nations today. It was a further insult to our traditional allies. Not only was it unnecessary, it was unnecessarily provocative. It is driven by ideology. In particular, the quote that I find offensive is this quote from our United Nations statement today: “Our common objective must be to end hostilities as quickly as possible so that the risks to the Iraqi people are minimised and so that their humanitarian needs can be met.” At question time today I asked our Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade—he has an option with that statement—is he saying that the coalition of the willing should down tools now and withdraw, because he says it should be ended as quickly as possible, and leave the Saddam Hussein and his Arab socialist Baath party regime in power? Is that what he is saying, or is he saying he supports finishing the job and supports a regime change?

He would not answer that question. It was a clear choice. That is an example of how we are increasingly alienating ourselves on vital intelligence and communication information that underpins our security. At the end of the day the prime role of the State is security of the realm, and protection of its people from illegal force, whether internal or external. That is why we need legislation like this in a Government communications and security provision.

I note that there has been a call from numerous quarters in recent months for a rethink of how we organise our strategy. The Hunn report tabled yesterday raises and flags the issue of a need to better integrate and rethink our security and defence provisions. I notice that Terence O’Brien, who has represented this country at the United Nations and has led the strategic studies group, is saying that the Government needs to upgrade its thinking, and think anew in this dangerous, transitional time that we face globally.

That brings me to the point: why did this Government leave this bill—having introduced it in urgency—for 2 years, languishing on the Order Paper? It introduced it under urgency, saying that this bill is critical, we have to pass it, and then left it languishing on the Order Paper. There has to be a political reason for that. It is only in the new Parliament, where Labour has the United Future people who will support it, that Labour is prepared to bring it back to Parliament.

Was it perhaps that the Greens were blocking the passage of this bill? Let me have a guess that the Greens were actually blocking it. Labour knew that it had the support of ACT, National, and New Zealand First, but oh, no, it was not prepared to bring it back to the Parliament. It was significant enough to introduce under urgency, and then to leave languishing for 2 years on the Order Paper!

To that extent I raise the question, is it out of date already? A lot has happened in that 2 years. When we have the Hunn report, and Terence O’Brien and others, saying that we need to upgrade our thinking on strategic and defence issues, I suspect that the provisions in this bill are inadequate. It is necessary but not sufficient. In conclusion I say that ACT is happy to support this bill, but we do raise the question: is it adequate, is it sufficient?

I rise to take a short call in this debate, in support of this bill. This is a useful bill; it is definitely a post-September 11 bill. It does recognise the fact that the world is a difficult and dangerous place, and I recognise the support that members of the Opposition are giving to the passage of this bill. As Mr Shirley has said, the security of the realm should transcend party politics. It is a matter on which I think most parties in this House are agreed that we need to have modern systems that give us the intelligence cover that we need, in a world that is demonstrably insecure.

I do think that the Intelligence and Security Committee deserves some commendation for this bill, because it has sought to balance the need to update and modernise our communications security infrastructure legislation with the need to protect third parties from accidental eavesdropping or interception. The bill does provide a legislative basis for non-warranted, non-authorised interceptions, under specific certain circumstances that are set out in the bill. It also provides a number of protections for third parties and members of the public, particularly domestic sources, to avoid unintended interception. I commend this bill to the House, and seek its speedy passage.

This bill is about putting the Government Communications Security Bureau on a statutory foundation, after 25 years without any clear mandate from Parliament for its activities. If we are to have a Government Communications Security Bureau it is essential it be on a statutory basis—and over $23 million a year is budgeted for it. But the Green Party questions—and we have to think about this seriously—whether we do need a separate institution called the Government Communications Security Bureau. The Green Party says, on balance, that we do not.

I want to go through the pros and the cons of having the Government Communications Security Bureau. Clearly one pro in the bill, in terms of the functions outlined for the bureau, is to help to advise Government departments on protecting their communications. But that could be done by a different agency, most likely under the police. There is no need for a separate Government Communications Security Bureau to do that.

The main aim of the Government Communications Security Bureau is clearly to collect communications intelligence itself—supposedly on foreigners. The Green Party does not deny that the Government Communications Security Bureau may collect some intelligence that we all consider useful. However, we have no idea whatsoever how much useful intelligence is being collected. There has never been any explanation or elaboration of that. There is no indication, in terms of the functions of society, that we are collecting useful intelligence. Whereas we know that other agencies of State like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the various experts in the field overseas, academics, the media, and agencies like the External Assessments Bureau all collect useful intelligence information for our Government and our society, we have no proof that the Government Communications Security Bureau does so.

Also, given that other agencies, particularly the police, do already have powers to collect intelligence on criminal activities against New Zealand, including communications intelligence, why do we need a separate agency called the Government Communications Security Bureau with separate powers? The reason for that is not a practical one. The reason is that the agency originated through pressures from overseas. Lockwood Smith talked about “our family”. I presume he was talking about America, Britain, and Australia—the family that we are apparently deserting. In fact, the Government Communications Security Bureau has come into existence because daddy, the United States National Security Agency, and mummy, the Government Communications Headquarters in the United Kingdom, said we should set it up to work in collaboration with them. We then became part of the five-nation Echelon communications intelligence network, consisting of daddy, the US, and mummy, Great Britain, and also Australia and Canada alongside New Zealand, and enabling those five nations to spy on the communications of the rest of the world.

That has achieved some friendly relations with the Governments of those other four countries, but it has created antagonism, rightfully, and suspicion, rightfully, from every other nation in the world. We see that quite clearly right now, where members of this “family”—the United States Government, the British Government, and the Australian Government—are defying the United Nations and defying the world in invading Iraq. We have to be careful that we are not associated with them in collecting intelligence for their aims, which are contrary to our Government’s aims and to those of most of the rest of the world. Unfortunately, given the way that the Government Communications Security Bureau is structured, and particularly the way that its main asset, Waihopai, the satellite communications interception station near Blenheim, is structured, we cannot avoid helping the aims of those three Governments, in particular.

On 11 July last year the United States Congress published a document explaining how Waihopai has been used for the war on Afghanistan. It states under New Zealand: “Intelligence support was offered, as well. New Zealand’s Waihopai monitoring station is part of the five-nation Echelon network that is providing intelligence for the war in Afghanistan.” Because that network is so integrated in its operations, how can we say that the Waihopai station is not helping those three countries in the war on Iraq? In fact, one of the section heads of the National Security Agency of America let the cat out of the bag, when he put out a memorandum stating that all parts of the National Security Agency must “mount a surge” against the members of the Security Council and get all the information on them, including what he called their “dependencies”. That is, I suppose, finding out how they could be bribed, as countries like Turkey and others have been bribed in order to try to get some support for the war effort in Iraq.

Certainly, our participation, through the Government Communications Security Bureau and its main asset, in Echelon has benefits for the United States Government, but it has disadvantages for us. In answer to a question that I put to the Prime Minister a couple of days ago that was answered by Michael Cullen, he said that the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security had said that we do have sovereign control over Waihopai and the information gathered there. However, the reality is that the technology of Waihopai is such that we cannot guarantee such sovereignty. There are two dishes at Waihopai, focused on two communications satellites over the Pacific Basin south of the equator. Millions of communications—faxes, phone calls, and emails—are drawn down through those dishes into the computers in Waihopai, and they move through to Wellington. Then key words, origin phone numbers, destination phone numbers, and email addresses are filtered through those millions of communications, and thousands of those key words are put in by the National Security Agency. There is no way, even if theoretically we could veto a key word or phone number, that in practice there would be that kind of interrogation of all those key words. Also, it is a very automated system and it functions to get the information immediately through from the satellite to the destination agency, which is mainly the US National Security Agency.

There is a huge downside for us from Echelon. When I was in New Caledonia with a parliamentary delegation, a leader of the Government there criticised New Zealand for being part of the Echelon system. The Vanuatu Government people have criticised us. The European Parliament had an investigation into that system. It was worried because there were instances where Echelon, including Waihopai as part of the integrated system, had been used to spy on European firms, like the time, for instance, that a contract with Saudi Arabia was secured for Airbus, rather than McDonnell Douglas.

In the discussion at the Committee stage on this bill I tried to move some amendments advocated by the Privacy Commissioner, particularly, to make the bill better, even though we were opposed to it. The amendments sought to make sure that warranted interceptions were not arbitrary, and that warrants were needed even when the permission of a householder was given. I put forward the suggestions of the Privacy Commissioner that the warrants be for 6 months and not a year, that there should not be unwarranted communications interceptions authorised by unspecified enactments, and that the Privacy Act should be upheld—that the principle advanced by the Privacy Commissioner that “an agency that holds personal information should not keep that information for longer than is required for the purposes for which the information may be lawfully used” should be put in the bill. But all those suggestions from the Privacy Commissioner were turned down, without any debate or discussion. The Labour contribution in the second reading, the third reading, and in the Committee stage of this bill has been almost zero, and that has been quite a disrespectful rejection of the Privacy Commissioner’s proposals. They have been rejected without any discussion or debate.

One of the problems with the whole Government Communications Security Bureau is the lack of accountability. It is very hard to know when electronic interceptions are taking place, under the reporting procedures provided in the bill. The oversight committee, the Intelligence and Security Committee, and the inspector-general are sadly wanting in providing real oversight.

National supports this bill, which has a number of objectives. The key objectives are, firstly, to set up as a department of State, the Government Communications Security Bureau, secondly, to define the objectives and functions of that new department of State, thirdly, to regulate the bureau’s functions in respect of the interception of communications, including computer traffic, and finally, to create a regime of interception warrants and computer access authorisations in relation to the activities of the bureau.

We have a reasonably sophisticated set of security intelligence entities in New Zealand. We have the Security Intelligence Service, which is the equivalent of the CIA or MI6, mostly concerned with spying on New Zealand and visitors to New Zealand. We have the Government Communications Security Bureau, which runs the spy stations at Waihopai near Blenheim and Tangimoana near Palmerston North—a critical linkage that monitors satellite and radio communications worldwide. We have the External Assessments Bureau, which is a research organisation that produces reports on overseas threats to New Zealand. We have the Domestic and External Security Secretariat, which is part of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and which reports on domestic and external security issues. Finally, we have the defence intelligence unit within the New Zealand Defence Force, which is concerned with military intelligence relating to New Zealand deployments overseas.

Quite clearly, with legislation of this type it is necessary to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the need for the intelligence services to undertake an effective role and, on the other hand, the need for appropriate oversight of such intelligence services. As Mr Shirley said in his contribution in this third reading debate, the world is not a safe place. The Prime Minister, I suggest, is foolish and naive to suggest otherwise. Mr Shirley picked up a phrase—incorrectly, as it turns out—that the Prime Minister has repeatedly uttered. The accurate phrase is that she has described us as living in an exceptionally benign strategic environment. This is a quibble really, but Mr Shirley said “extraordinarily benign”. What the Prime Minister has said is that we live in an exceptionally benign strategic environment. Informed commentators have dismissed those comments, and our Australian counterparts have certainly dismissed them, because the reality is that we simply do not live in an exceptionally benign strategic environment.

One need only look at events that are occurring on the world plane at the moment to see that. But even if we look closer to where our clear strategic interests lie, we see that the arc of instability that tracks through Indonesia and some of the islands in the Pacific holds real threats and concerns for all New Zealanders. The Prime Minister has sought to distance herself from those comments, which formed core assumptions in the current defence policy, by saying that when she said that, she was talking about relationships between States. But no one accepts that. Even if that were so, her comment that we live in an exceptionally benign strategic environment is simply not correct. Not only do we face turbulence touching events within States but we face the new threat described in broad terms as asymmetric warfare. It is the issue of the rise of terrorism, with all that that entails.

In the period that most of us have been in Parliament, issues of biological and chemical warfare have not loomed large. They now represent real threats—threats that are capable of causing immense damage, that cannot be dismissed as fanciful, and that we must constantly be on guard against. It is against that background that I would like to speak very briefly about the history of the Government Communications Security Bureau and why it has become appropriate for this legislation to be passed.

There were a number of possibilities in respect of setting up the bureau and its structure. The bureau has been with us for a number of years, and the contribution that it and the Security Intelligence Service have made is undoubted. The bureau started in 1977, and since that date it has provided the New Zealand Government with intelligence information from foreign signals derived from the interception of the communications of foreign Governments and other foreign entities. It is a curious circumstance that in these days of sophisticated electronic transfer of data, the most secure way of handling information is by personal courier. In the days before this current legislation came before Parliament, the bureau operated without specific statutory authority. The director’s authority, as chief executive of the bureau, derived from an instruction issued by the Prime Minister. It was also the case that the role of the bureau was in no sense formally defined.

Before 1996, when a number of changes were made that saw parliamentary oversight of security intelligence, the activities of the bureau were basically left to the Prime Minister. There was some faint involvement from the Government Administration Committee, but it did not really have any control or power over the security intelligence agencies. That is why I say that this bill that establishes the Government Communications Security Bureau as a department of State is appropriate and timely.

In the short time that I have left, I will talk about some aspects of the Government Communications Security Bureau, with particular reference to Part 3 of the bill. Part 3 is concerned with the interception of communications and the setting of bounds for the day-to-day operations of the bureau. It sets up a system of permissible interceptions with warrants or authorisations. The bill forbids certain types of interception from taking place without a warrant or an authorisation, and divides them into four classes. The first involves interceptions where there is physical connection of the interception device to any part of a network—that is straightforward enough. The second relates to the installation of an interception device in a place without the permission of the occupier. The third relates to the installation of an interception device in a place where the purpose of the installation is to intercept communications made to or received in that place. The final situation relates to interceptions that involve accessing computer systems. National supports the bill.

Bill read a third time.

I seek the leave of the House to take that vote again. It was my intention to vote against it.

💬 Mr SPEAKER: Is there any objection to that? There is.