Government Communications Security Bureau Bill

To pick up on one of the last points that Simon Power made, it would be extremely helpful if there was a member of the committee in the Chamber who could give some clarification as to why the committee added the words “whether in New Zealand or abroad” to clause 8(1)(d). Our difficulty here is that most of us were not on the Intelligence and Security Committee. Indeed, unlike any normal select committee, if we had wanted to attend a meeting of that committee when it was considering this bill we would not have been allowed to, because it is not a select committee, it is a statutory committee. It would be good if a Government member, or even one of the Opposition members who is on the committee, could take a call on that.

Simon Power made another point that I would like to respond to. He is right to say that clause 7(2) limits international well-being and economic well-being as being relevant only to the extent that they are affected by the actions or intentions of foreign organisations or foreign persons. But that does not stop the Government Communications Security Bureau from spying on New Zealand citizens. We are told that the Government Communications Security Bureau will not spy on New Zealand citizens or permanent residents for the purpose of intercepting their communications, but, clearly, if the bureau is eavesdropping on communications between foreign individuals and organisations and New Zealanders, then it must be gathering information on those New Zealanders as part of that purpose. One cannot tell me that the Waihopai spy station turns on the tape when a foreign voice is talking, and then immediately turns it off when a New Zealand voice is talking. In fact, the Inspector-General has clarified in one of his numerous reports that the Waihopai spy station does collect information or intelligence on what New Zealanders are saying, insofar as it is needed to make sense of the foreign information it is collecting. So we know that it is collecting information about New Zealanders, even though clause 7 is meant to qualify the scope relating to the interception of communications involving foreign organisations and foreign persons.

We now come to what we see as the most ridiculous aspect of clause 7(2), and that is the inclusion of New Zealand’s international or economic well-being, which mirrors what was in the Security Intelligence Service legislation. As we see it, that clause is really part of the Government’s attempt to keep both those intelligence agencies relevant in the modern era. It was desperate to move beyond security or defence, because the cold war was over, and, of course, it can now thank George Bush for opening up a new front in terms of persecuting people of other religions. However, at the time that provision was added to the bill it was very difficult to see any justification for it. Indeed, we cannot see any justification for it now. It goes beyond the core purposes of the agency, which are about the security and defence of New Zealand. If there is to be an organisation doing that work—and we believe there should be such a unit within the police force—then its role is about security and defence, and terrorism and espionage. Its role is not about international or economic well-being. The bill we were debating before tea, which was the Industry New Zealand and Trade New Zealand Integration Bill, is about one organisation, among others, that should be looking after our economic well-being, and we have the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to look after our international well-being. We do not need a body called the Government Communications Security Bureau being able to trawl across our communications—whether they are made by phone, fax, or email—looking for anything that might be an issue in relation to our international or economic well-being.

The bureau has been given a brief that is far too wide, and justification for it that is far too broad, especially in the context of there not being any proper parliamentary scrutiny of what the agency does. I know there is an Intelligence and Security Committee, but it does not provide parliamentary scrutiny. We do not know the extent to which the Government Communications Security Bureau is using its Echelon dictionary systems supplied by the National Security Agency in the United States to spy on political parties from overseas that happen to have a relationship with parties in New Zealand or internationally.

I want to make some comments about clause 8, with particular reference to those of the member who has just sat down. He said that the functions set out for the bureau in clause 8 were too broad, and that New Zealand should have the agency as part of the police force—

💬 Rod Donald: Clause 7.

OK, clauses 7 and 8. He said that the agency should be part of the police force designed to gather intelligence that was relevant to the interest of New Zealanders. I am paraphrasing a little bit, but that was the gist of what he said.

💬 Rod Donald: Security in defence only.

Security in defence only. Then he talked a bit about terrorism and the international situation. The point he misses is that in today’s environment those old definitions of what were security and defence matters are far more blurred than ever before. The whole march of international terrorism shows us that we cannot put things into the neat little boxes that once used to be the case. Consequently, if a Government is looking at an effective way to measure the potential impact on its own country of the sorts of activities it regards as unacceptable, it needs to have more breadth and strength in the way it approaches it.

When we talk about the objective of the bureau being to provide intelligence on matters relating to security and defence, inevitably a Government has to look at things like international and economic well-being, because so much of the struggle today is about those matters. It is not simply a case of a full frontal attack on a country in a military sense. That certainly happens, and we have a graphic example of that at present. However, we also see economic warfare, and the application of other forms of warfare and pressure that are equally detrimental to a nation’s well-being. That is why a country needs to have objectives for its Government Communications Security Bureau that reflect the fact that the very nature of the international terrorist campaign, the international struggle—call it what one likes—and intelligence-gathering have changed. It is not simply a case of putting a little box around it and saying “This is a defence or security issue.” It has a much wider set of implications.

From examples that have been quoted from time to time, we know about the use of economic and industrial sabotage to strike at the heart of a nation’s well-being. We know that biosecurity sabotage has been threatened in this country before. I think it would be folly not to have the capacity, through our intelligence services, to monitor activities that might well be leading to the enhancement of those activities within New Zealand. That would be the case if we stuck to the very narrow definition the member who preceded me seemed to be applying. The powers and functions set out in clause 8 make it clear that this legislation is very much about protecting New Zealand’s broad interests. As I said before in relation to Part 1, it is arguable sometimes how much of a threat and a risk we are suffering from, but the reality is that we need those sorts of organisations in place, providing those sorts of functions, to ensure that we have a measure of protection.

I know that some members will say that the references to international and economic well-being are really code for being able to monitor and potentially suppress domestic dissent. I do not accept that reality. The bill sets out sufficient protections and mechanisms to ensure that that will not be the case. However, what it does do—and this is the very point, surely—is recognise that in today’s environment those sorts of issues are part and parcel of the threat we face. Terrorists do not see things neatly in terms of defence or security relationships only. Terrorists view issues from the totality of the damage they can do to a particular State or society in advancing their own objectives. They will not sit there and say that that affects just the defence or security interests of New Zealand. They will use whatever methods available to them to advance their cause. I think that everyone in this House recognises that—even the member who preceded me.

The point therefore is that in arming ourselves to the extent that it is possible to arm ourselves to protect our nation against those sorts of incursions, powers need to be crafted in this legislation of the nature of those set out in clauses 7 and 8. This is about protecting New Zealand’s interests. It is not about some sort of vast spying network that either contributes to international security, or spies on New Zealanders.

I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. I did seek the call before, and you saw fit, for whatever reason—and I do not question that—to allocate the call to a party of a lesser size than New Zealand First. You have already taken a call from a National member. You have not taken a call from New Zealand First, and before you make a decision, I would like you to consider that.

The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson): I thank the honourable member for his submission. I always take into consideration the situation of parties in the Chamber. At this particular time, I have taken the decision to call Richard Worth.

I am certainly looking forward to hearing the contribution—

💬 Hon Richard Prebble: I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. I would be interested to know how the chair is deciding to take calls. You are clearly not following party size. You are not following seniority, because you have called a member who has not been in the House as long as I have, and who represents a smaller party. You are clearly not looking at all parties, because New Zealand First wants to contribute. It is your gift, and if you want to be unfair, you can. I would like to know on what basis we are doing the calls. It is not one that I am aware of.

The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson): I thank the honourable member for his contribution. I did look to the honourable member for the next call, but he did not rise.

💬 Hon Richard Prebble: When you called Mr Dunne ahead of me, I did not rise.

The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson): The reality is that I have called Richard Worth, and I cannot take the call from him, but I will take into consideration what the honourable member has said. I thank him for drawing the matter to my attention.

💬 Ron Mark: I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson.

The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson): I have made a ruling and already called someone. Under the Standing Orders, I cannot take the call away.

💬 Ron Mark: I know that, but my point of order is this: the Hon Richard Prebble has asked for an explanation as to why you saw fit to make the decision you did. The reason I took my point of order before you made your ruling was so that you had a chance to consider what I had to say. But you have now accorded two calls to the National Party before you have heard from any other Opposition parties on this part, so it is difficult for those of us sitting here to understand your logic. You were simply asked for an explanation, and all you have said is that you have since made your call, so that is it. That is not particularly fair.

The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson): Can I thank the honourable member. I also take into account proportionality, and I will now call Richard Worth.

After that exchange, I thank you for giving me the call. I certainly look forward to the contribution that Mr Mark might make later in this debate, and I should not overlook Mr Prebble. I should also not overlook the large number of members of the Government who are in the debating Chamber. I do not doubt their willingness to take calls in the course of this debate. Before I move to the substantive part, Part 2, I would also like to observe that to date in this debate not one member of the Government has taken a call—not the Minister in the chair, Lianne Dalziel; not all the members in this packed Chamber opposite. Why have they not done that?

💬 John Carter: Arrogance!

Arrogance is one of the reasons offered. I think there is a natural timidity to speak out about the merit, or otherwise, of this legislation. The Minister sits silently, scribbling with her green pen.

💬 Hon Richard Prebble: I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. The honourable member is suggesting that Government members are too timid to speak. That, of course, is out of order. It is suggesting that they lack courage. For whatever reasons Government members are not speaking, I am sure that lack of courage is not one of them. The member cannot pursue an argument of that sort.

The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson): There is a clear Speaker’s ruling that one cannot indicate in the House that members lack courage. The member will withdraw and apologise.

I withdraw. I would just like to say—not with reference to that point of order—that there is a difference between timidity and lack of courage. I, of course, apologise and withdraw, and I am standing on—

The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson): The member will now withdraw and apologise.

I withdraw and apologise.

In connection with Part 2, I would like to say, first, that all of this part, and Part 3, are in substantive terms probably the crunch parts of the bill. That is for a raft of reasons. The first issue is Part 2, which establishes as a department of State the Government Communications Security Bureau. When I was talking about Part 1, I offered an insight into the history of the events that had seen this entity operate for a number of years without the status that it is now to be given by this legislation.

The second issue that relates to Part 2 concerns the substantive provisions that deal with the objective of the bureau. Those provisions raise the very important philosophical issue that what we are about in this debate is striking a balance. It is a balance between, on the one hand, an active intelligence service necessary for national security, and on the other hand, a reluctance—a concern, perhaps—that there will be aspects of invasion of privacy, or a threat in some way to the fabric of the nation. It is a balance that the Green Party struggles to find, and we certainly heard from them in that regard. It was Jenny Shipley, I think, who on 21 March 2000 made a comment about striking that balance. She spoke about the balance between keeping matters secret that clearly deserve to be kept secret in the public and national interest, and on the other hand allowing public discussion and debate on those issues that deserve wider consideration.

The Intelligence and Security Committee was quite robust, I would suggest, in the way it dealt with a number of submissions in respect of Part 2. That was all to the good, because in this type of legislation, there is always the runaway possibility that it will be distorted by the strong views of small elements of the community about the security intelligence function. So I simply note that the committee declined to make a number of major changes that were sought. It declined, for example, to narrow the objectives of the Government Communications Security Bureau. It declined to expand the role of the Inspector-General. It declined to include details of operations in the bureau’s published annual report, on the basis that that might prejudice security. In the context of the balance that the committee had to bring to bear to the argument, those were important considerations, and the committee did consider them. That is all to the good.

In the short time remaining, I would like to focus on the functions of the bureau. I do not seek to read out the functions set out in clause 8. Members have had the benefit of hearing earlier speeches on what those functions are.

I really want to point out a couple of things, but firstly I need to bring to the attention of the Committee just how long this part has been waiting to be debated. It is quite interesting to go back through some of the Order Papers, is it not? On 10 September 2002 this bill was sitting at No. 41 on the Order Paper.

💬 Rod Donald: It came in under urgency.

It did too. On 27 February this year, it had finally worked its way to No. 12 on the Order Paper. Here we are on 25 March, and the bill has finally got to the stage where we are now debating it as item No. 5—it is actually listed as item No. 7—on the Order Paper. We have witnessed, up to this point, an absolute silence on the Government benches, and a Minister who simply is not interested in the bill. She is sitting there, not answering any questions, and not countering any points that are made by members—points that the Government clearly disagrees with, because it has voted against the amendments that those members have put up—with an absolute confidence that this bill, in its current form, is ready for passing. I draw clause 9(2) to the attention of the Minister in the chair, the Hon Lianne Dalziel. I ask her to please take an interest in the security issues that face our country. I ask her to read clause 9, and specifically subclause (2), and ask herself whether that clause is correct. If the Minister is happy for clause 9(2) to go through, then that is fine—that probably justifies why she can sit there and not make one sentence, one word, or one utterance in support, defence, or explanation of the bill. But when I look at that clause, I see a problem. I am not being paid the sort of money that Minister is getting paid. I do not have a ministerial gold card, a ministerial gold car with leather seats, and all the trappings of office around me, but someone certainly does. I see that there is a problem. There is a basic error—a simple, fundamental flaw—that this Government has not picked up on.

Why? Because Government members are not even participating in the debate. They have not even read the bill. It is not my job to sit here and tell the Government how to do its job, particularly when it has the biggest Cabinet that the country has ever seen since—well, since whenever. This Government has more people on ministerial salaries than anyone can recall in their time in this House. There is a fault, an error, in this bill, and the Government had better sort its act out or we will be back here, in the Chamber again, correcting it. That is all I am saying to the Minister. I can see the error; I am not responsible for the bill; someone sitting in this Chamber is responsible for it, right now; and I suggest that that someone do some work, right now, to correct that fault. If we find that we are back in the Chamber again in order to resolve stupid administrative errors, then that simply reflects poorly on the calibre and quality of Cabinet staff and the administration—the executive—of this Government. I am talking about a simple, basic, stupid little flaw that should not be in the bill, given that this bill has been hanging around on the Government Order Paper for years. I will leave it at that.

I hope the Minister has listened to what Mr Ron Mark said, because I think he is right. It does appear to me that this bill has been overtaken by another bill, which we have just passed. The Minister may not be interested, but I see that the director is here. If he wants to be paid, it would be a really good idea to make an amendment to this clause. Otherwise, the director, who does deserve to get paid, will not be paid. So I compliment Mr Ron Mark on discovering that matter, and I am sure the Minister would be rather pleased if we carried on discussing it for a while, but I turn to another point.

Some members were asking whether any members of the committee could explain why there was an amendment to clause 8(1)(d). I have had a look at that, and I think the reason is apparent on the face of it. This is the clause that states: “to provide reports on foreign intelligence to the Minister and any person or office holder,” and the addition states: “whether in New Zealand or abroad,”. If it were not for that amendment, one could say that the provision related only to foreign intelligence from overseas, but, of course, there can in fact be foreign intelligence—as within our definition; to do with foreigners—within New Zealand, and, indeed, quite often it may be. That is my memory of why that amendment is there, but if the Minister—who is now, I hope, taking an interest—would also like to look at clause 9(2), she could confirm whether the answer I am giving is correct.

I say again, when I look at this bill, that the Green Party, in my view, has a duty, when looking at legislation, to move beyond just making meaningless slogans and look at the reality. We are passing laws; those members sought to be members of Parliament. If they sought to be MPs, then they have a duty to this House to debate in an intelligent and rational way. The sorts of things that we have been hearing from the Green Party are complete nonsense. The first example of that is the suggestion this bill has been put together in order to find work for the Government Communications Security Bureau. Where have the Greens been? The idea that there are now no threats to New Zealand is as silly as the proposal, which I heard from a very senior member of this House, that we live in a benign environment. We actually face more security threats today than we have faced for many years, and they come from terrorists. If the Green Party is not prepared to use this type of intelligence to combat terrorists, how does it propose we do it? Are they just proposing that, somehow or other, we can just say that we are so supportive? I listened to a suggestion, made by Mr Donald—which I thought was greatly offensive—that terrorism against the West was the result of George Bush. He suggested Mr Bush was somehow responsible for the events of 11 September. That type of conspiracy nonsense does no credit to the Green Party whatsoever. Does Mr Donald think we are supposed to take seriously his suggestion that it is George Bush who is somehow responsible for those actions of terrorism? Are we supposed to believe that the Green Party actually believes that? The alternative is that the Greens do not believe it. Well, if they are members of this Parliament, they ought to be telling us what they really believe, rather than things they think will make good rhetoric and will persuade some flaky members of the community to give them their vote.

The reality is we all know we need the Government Communications Security Bureau. We also know there are people engaged in such things as economic espionage. We do hold commercial secrets in this country. There was a well-known example of a particular individual from China who had in his possession a number of cuttings—I think it happened in the apple industry—that had cost New Zealand millions of dollars to collect. The Green Party would have us believe we should rely purely on the police to protect us from that type of economic sabotage. That is nonsense. This legislation is the only way that we will have protection, but I say to Government members that they ought to be debating the matter. The reason Government members are not debating this legislation, is, I think, that there is a contrast between the reality of this bill—an alliance between the United States, Britain and New Zealand; that is what the Government is creating under this bill—and the Government’s public rhetoric to the opposite.

I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. I did not want to interrupt the member’s speech, but I noticed something that is rather extraordinary. I hope that what I saw was not what I think I saw, as I would hate to feel that the senior Government whip was putting some pressure on the Chair to conclude the debate. It seemed odd that the senior Government whip was tapping his watch and pointing at you as though to say: “We have had enough time on this bill.” If the senior Government whip wishes to indicate to the Chair, there are other ways in which it can be done, but if he needs to do so, he should not do it quite so obviously.

The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson): The member will also notice that the Chair took no notice.

I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. I would like to draw your attention to an issue of equity. My colleague Mr Prebble has had two calls on this part, and I—

💬 Hon Richard Prebble: I most certainly have not.

Has he not? I thought he had had a second. My apologies.

I move, That the question be now put.

I want to pick up on the point that the Hon Richard Prebble made about the vital need for Parliament to have a debate on this bill. Debate requires that there is a contribution from Government members of the Committee. We have not heard one Government member take a call to—

💬 Hon Member: Why do you think that is?

Well, we have not heard one Government member seek a call to justify this bill, which is in the name of their Prime Minister. Not one Labour member has sought to take a call to explain what is going on. I think I know why. This Government has been seeking to perpetrate a misconception on the people of New Zealand. This Government has been trying to convince the people of New Zealand that they have no involvement in what is going on in Iraq, no involvement with the Americans, and no involvement with the British or Australians. The simple fact of the matter is that, I am sure, there is a level of information sharing going on. Whether it is at a low level, I do not know, but this organisation is one of the apparatus by which our left-wing Government is able to spy on the activities of other entities in this country. We have a Prime Minister who is trying not to be involved in any of this international conflict, but the fact is the Prime Minister is promoting legislation that enshrines in the statute of this country, an organisation whose raison d’être is spying on other entities, and this Prime Minister and her party do not want to be seen to be debating that matter at a time when they are trying to distance themselves from involvement.

What I have to say to this Government is: “Accept your responsibilities and take a call in this debate.”, because we need to know what the Government thinks. I have to say that, right now, this is a country where we should be fearful for our security, because there is no doubt that the Islamic fundamentalists and ideologues who are perpetuating great violence in many parts of the world are anti-Western. This Government would like to think they are just anti-American. Well, they are actually anti-Western. The fact that so many of our cousins across the Tasman lost their lives in Bali would surely be enough of a message to the “lefties” in this Parliament that this country is involved as a potential target for those organisations. That is why we need the sorts of legislation that support the intelligence-gathering structures.

I am concerned that we have a party in Parliament—the Greens, who one day aspire to be part of a Government—who, at every opportunity, rail against the apparatus of the State being applied for the security of the State and the security of New Zealanders. Because time and time again, when we come to passing legislation to support the security infrastructure of New Zealand, there is always one party against it—namely, the Greens. But is it not interesting that the very freedoms that Mr Locke and Mr Donald have to protest against the Government and the Parliament of New Zealand, are denied to millions of people in Iraq. Millions of people in Iraq do not have the opportunity to stand up and protest against their Government. No members of Parliament in Iraq have an opportunity to stand up and protest against their Government, but we have that right in New Zealand because we use every means we have to enforce our freedoms and our right to be free. Part of that freedom means actually taking the unpleasant decisions of having to support a security infrastructure and the apparatus necessary to find out who is plotting against us.

I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. When you consider the inevitable closure motion, I would like you to take into account the alternation in the Chamber between those who support the bill and those who oppose—and we are the only ones who oppose. I further ask you to consider that, since I last spoke, the Greens have been challenged by Richard Worth, Richard Prebble, and Tony Ryall, and I believe that natural justice suggests we should have the opportunity to rebut those challenges.

The CHAIRPERSON (H V Ross Robertson): I thank the member but I do not need his assistance on this.

I move, That the question be now put.

I think it is right to have this debate as it is a very important one. The comments that Tony Ryall made were in the spirit of the seriousness of this issue, so it is good to be able to address some of them.

I want to speak to clause 12, “Annual report”, which I think is a weak provision. The way I read it, in terms of the reporting on interceptions that the Government Communications Security Bureau does, it appears weaker than what is actually the practice in the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, which not only reports on but reports the number of interceptions. Under the Security Intelligence Service legislation the organisation has to report the number of interceptions and the duration of those interceptions. Even that is not really sufficient accountability, but it is much more than is set out under the reporting procedures in clause 12.

I think that is one of the problems when one is dealing with electronic interception. Even though the targets of that interception might be legitimate, intelligence services can do the wrong thing, and, by the very nature of electronic interceptions, the targets of those interceptions do not even know it is happening. So it is important to have a proper reporting procedure, because that is an element of the accountability. If there are a lot of interceptions, and if they are going on for a long time, then hopefully the Parliament and the people will put pressure on the Government and ask what is going on, what the threat is, and what all the interceptions are about. Of course, with secret organisations one is not asking for every last detail, but one does want some accountability.

The other problem with clause 12 is seen in subclause (4)(a) and (b), which states that the reporting should not prejudice relations with other agencies. Of course, there is a reason for that. If one is getting intelligence from overseas, one does not necessarily want to disclose it all, but I am a bit worried that subclause (4)(a) and (b) will allow information to be kept confidential, purely on the basis that it is being provided by an overseas agency—the CIA or MI5, or whatever. In a sense that means that these agencies are dictating what is secret and what is not, because they say: “Well, we’re not going to give you any more information unless you keep all this secret.”

One of the problems with that is that one cannot necessarily trust those agencies. We have seen Colin Powell get up at the United Nations recently, and say: “On the basis of this intelligence information we have, there are links between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein.”, which proved to be completely false. There was all the other contrary information, such as: “There are all these intercepts we have with Saddam Hussein’s generals that show they are going around hiding weapons of mass destruction.” The inspectors have pooh-poohed all of that, in terms of mobile laboratories and the sorts of things that Powell came out with. One of the problems is that he could say: “This is secret intelligence information.”, and nobody could countermand what he was saying, although in this case the CIA people were so outraged they selectively leaked to the press, saying that Powell was talking a lot of rubbish.

One of the problems is that when countries have agendas—as the United States under the Bush administration have at the moment—they often use secret information through their intelligence organisations to justify what they are doing, not only in an unaccountable way but in a lying way. That was the case with Colin Powell at the United Nations. So we have to be cautious about putting provisions in here that would allow overseas organisations to dictate what we should or should not disclose.

The other material under Part 2 involves the whole question—and I think my colleague has already spoken about it—of whether what the Government Communications Security Bureau correctly interprets to be New Zealand’s international well-being or economic well-being is completely subject to a partisan interpretation.

If one is from Monsanto one might say that what we are doing in this country with GE products is completely in the interests of New Zealand. Any politician in New Zealand who supports Monsanto and GE would say: “Oh, that’s completely in our interests.”; whereas people on the other side of the political fence would say that it is not, and that companies like Monsanto are undermining our economic well-being.

I move, That the question be now put.

I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. My point of order is in connection with the concluded Part 2, and relates to clause 9(2). We know, and we think that the Government should know, that there is an error that we have sought unsuccessfully to have the Government take notice of. The error is that the remuneration of the director is determined by an entity and under a statute that no longer exists. Mr Mark started this issue off, and other members on this side of Parliament sought to draw the issue to the attention of the Minister in the chair, who would not listen to that point. National supports this bill. If we did not support it, I suppose we would be happy to leave a hopeless mess behind us. But now we have a situation where the director of the bureau will not get paid. I suggest that this is an issue that needs to be revisited on the basis of the point of order I now raise.

While I am sympathetic to the point that the member has raised, it is not actually a point of order. The Government can pass, and often does, bills that are nonsense. Mr Mark drew the matter to the Minister’s attention, and so did others. If the Government wants to pass a bill whereby the director’s pay is to be determined by an organisation that has been abolished, that is not a question of order; it is just a question of good sense.

💬 Rod Donald: The director won’t be happy.

I know the director will not be happy. For all I know the Government does not like the director. However, the matter is not a point of order, and no doubt at some point when Helen Clark comes back we will have this provision recommitted, and we will all draw it to your attention.

The CHAIRPERSON (Hon Clem Simich): I thank Mr Prebble for pointing out that the matter was not a point of order. I agree with him. It is a drafting issue, and it is something the Government will have to address.

I raise a point of order, Mr Chairperson. Can I suggest a way forward so that the time of the Committee is not wasted, and so that the Government is not made to look any more stupid than it currently looks. I brought this point clearly to the attention of the Minister and the Government whips. They consulted with officials and they proceeded to sit here and do nothing while the provision passed through. I suggest that the Government whips might like to consult quickly and approach other whips with a view to us going out of Committee, moving on to the next order of business, and taking some corrective action before the Government looks even more stupid than it currently does.

I have taken some advice on the matter. I am advised that the remuneration Act is not superseded until 1 April, and until that time the bill as it stands has to reflect what is currently the law. It cannot do otherwise. We know it will change, but we are dealing with it at this time. At some later stage when the law takes effect, the wording will simply be changed as a consequence.

Part 3 Interception of communications