SPECIAL DEBATES — Briefing on Disarmament—Report of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee

I’ll just ask members who are exiting to do so quietly and quickly as possible, which means taking your conversations outside. Thank you.

Mālō ni, Mr Speaker, and happy Tokelau Language Week. I move, That the House take note of the report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on its briefing on disarmament, which was initiated on 20 May 2021.

We invited the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, the Hon Phil Twyford, to brief us on this issue, and I would like to thank the Minister and his officials from the International Security and Disarmament Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, as well as the clerks and officers that assisted in finalising this report.

As members of this House will be aware, the current global security environment is becoming more fractured, increasingly fraught, and challenging to navigate. The relative sense of peace and stability that Europe and the rest of the world have enjoyed since World War II has been shattered by Russia’s unprovoked, unjustified, and illegal invasion of Ukraine. Aotearoa New Zealand’s approach has not been to despair at the current state of the international security environment, and, instead, the view has been a call to action. Our Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern, has made clear New Zealand’s strong view that the legacy of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine must not be an arms race to a more polarised and dangerous world. What is needed is an equal commitment to international institutions, to multilateral forums, and to disarmament.

This timely briefing on disarmament covered a range of matters in which New Zealand is involved or is taking an interest. This includes multilateral agreements and treaties; progress on nuclear disarmament, including our perspective on the 2022 conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and future steps; and emerging disarmament issues, autonomous weapons, and the militarisation of space and Antarctica.

New Zealand is an active participant in multilateral agreements that are aimed at reducing or controlling the use of both nuclear and conventional weapons. This is significant in terms of New Zealand’s foreign policy engagement, especially in an increasingly charged security environment which includes increased superpower rivalry and the threat by Russia to use nuclear weapons in the war against Ukraine.

New Zealand is a signatory to two international treaties concerning nuclear weapons. The first is the 52-year-old Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which commits the nuclear weapon States—the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France—to disarmament and return for other countries foregoing the right to acquire nuclear weapons. Aotearoa New Zealand was one of the first signatories to the NPT, which entered into force in 1970, and we participated in the recent 10th review conference of the NPT, which was held in New York in August of this year. There was a delegation from Aotearoa New Zealand led by the Minister the Hon Phil Twyford; myself as well as the Hon Todd McClay from the National Party were also part of that delegation.

The second treaty is the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which came into force on 21 January 2021, and 50 countries ratified it, committing to making nuclear weapons illegal within their territories. I’ve got to say that New Zealand is one of the strong leaders of this particular treaty. New Zealand participated in the first meeting of the State parties to this treaty, which was held in Vienna in June of this year, and our Minister, the Hon Phil Twyford, was the person that represented Aotearoa New Zealand.

With regard, however, to the review conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons, members of our select committee asked the Minister when he came to present what had been New Zealand’s aims in going to this conference in New York. The Minister said that the bottom lines were the following: a specific new commitment on disarmament from nuclear weapons States; increased accountability and transparency, including a structure for monitoring and reporting on progress between sessions; language recognising the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons; and a specific mention within the NPT of the prohibition treaty, TPNW. Unfortunately, however, this was not achieved. The draft outcome was actually not signed—Russia did not agree to this treaty.

Our committee expressed the view that for progress to be made on the NPT, the leaders of the five nuclear States that are party to the NPT must be prepared to meet together with the others and to directly negotiate on disarmament issues. Our Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee also asked about the size, the age, and the state of the nuclear weapons stockpile held by nuclear weapons States, and the Minister replied that, overall, the numbers of nuclear warheads have reduced from the 63,000 that used to be held at the height of the Cold War. However, there are still about 14,000 nuclear warheads held by NPT nuclear weapons States. Of these, 90 percent, roughly, are evenly split between the United States and Russia, with China holding several hundred and the United Kingdom and France holding 200 to 300 each. Experts suggest that we are closer to the use of nuclear weapons than at any other time since the height of the Cold War. Therefore, there has never been a greater need for progress on nuclear disarmament.

I would like at this point to reflect on the effects of nuclear weapons, especially on the Pacific Islands. Nuclear weapons effects on Pacific people have been unimaginable. From radioactive contamination, there have been devastating effects on human health, environmental degradation, and social cohesion has also been affected. In 2020, the UN Special Rapporteur on toxics called the legacy on nuclear testing on the Pacific—and I quote—“one of the cruellest examples of environmental injustice [ever] witnessed”. From the years 1946 to 1996, 300 nuclear tests have been conducted—300 nuclear tests—in the Pacific. So the impact this testing has had on ecology and the environment, and especially on the physical and mental health of Pacific people, has indeed been profound.

When we were at the conference over in New York, there was a presentation from the Marshall Islands, and some of us actually—she was really quite emotional, describing how the people in the Marshall Islands have been affected. They’ve suffered radiation poisoning. Birth defects, leukaemia, thyroid, and many other cancers, to name a few, are still prevalent among their people that have been exposed to nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands. She also described that four of the islands were partially or completely vaporised and some have become the subjects of medical research and atomic refugees.

Unfortunately, as I said earlier on, in the closing hours of that treaty review, Russia blocked the adoption of the document and so the treaty was not signed. We in New Zealand were deeply disappointed at this result, but Aotearoa New Zealand remains committed to disarmament and to global advocacy on the use of weapons.

We must continue to remain engaged with our commitments to international institutions, to multilateral forums, and to disarmament. As our Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern, has put it at the 2022 NATO Summit—and I quote—we must “put a halt in the production of weapons that create our mutually assured destruction, because the alternative is unfathomable.” I commend our select committee’s report on disarmament to this House. Mālō ‘aupito.

The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Mr Speaker, thank you so much. I think you will find near if not complete unanimity in the House when it comes to this issue, and it’s a very important thing to underline. When we had the opportunity to have the Minister before us at the committee and discuss this, it was constructive, it was useful, and I think we would say it was foresighted in as far as the desire from all members to understand the challenges the world has faced and continues to face because of atomic and nuclear weapons, and New Zealand’s role or what we can do most constructively about this.

Can I start by thanking the Minister Phil Twyford for reaching across the House and deciding to take a bipartisan delegation to the 10th review meeting in New York on the non-proliferation treaty. I think there are many areas of policy on the international stage where a more bipartisan approach would work well for New Zealand and for this House. It perhaps hasn’t happened as often as one might like—graciously, let’s say it was COVID. But I say to Minister Twyford that it was constructive, it was useful, and I think it was completely worthwhile.

I had the good fortune of going on that delegation visit to New York and I can confirm how exceptional the New Zealand officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) are when it comes to disarmament, not only in terms of their advice to the Government and to us but also in terms of the regard in which they are held internationally by their peers from other countries and by the media. They are men and women—well, it’s women and men, actually, because it’s led more by women than men in this area, which in part perhaps is the reason we make so much progress. But the point here is that to a man, to a woman, they are experts and they are dedicated and they understand this very, very technical and challenging piece of international diplomacy and policy and the nuances extremely well.

It was deeply disappointing and concerning but not at all surprising that Russia at the very last moment showed their hand in a way that derailed all progress that had been made by officials, by Ministers at previous meetings, and by that month-long discussion in New York. It was no surprise at all because they sat very, very quietly as others were constructive and positive and talked about what needed to happen and talked diplomatically about their concerns with what Russia and others are doing in the world, with the US President reaching out and saying that whilst the majority of the international agreements between nuclear States, particularly Russia, China, and the US, are extinguished, have expired or are about to, they, the US administration, commits to negotiating directly, bilaterally, and multilaterally for a new agreement to continue work and to speed that work up—and Russia decided for reasons that are so obvious to us not to go forward.

We need not be disheartened in that. We need to be resolute and continue to focus on what needs to be achieved, and New Zealand along with a small group of other nations has a very, very important role to play, as we often do as an honest broker, not one that will scream from the rooftops of this building or the Beehive or speak to a domestic audience but do so constructively and respectfully from the point of view of an independent foreign policy but at the same time be very clear about what is needed and what we want and what the world needs, but, at the same time, what is not acceptable to us as a small nation or to our Pacific neighbours and to others.

If there was a single message that I think was very clear from the meeting in New York that we attended, from almost every delegation that spoke loudly, forcefully, or with a more gentle voice, it was the need for progress to continue towards complete disarmament and for Russia to be a responsible international citizen and stop threatening the use of weapons of horrific destruction and to get around a table with others and talk about not only the harm that’s being done in the Ukraine and a way to solve that peacefully—a ceasefire, to solve that peacefully—but also to work internationally and recommit to the giving up of their weapons, as China, as the US, and as the nine—only nine—small nuclear States that remain in the world.

We are deeply disappointed that they haven’t done that and continue to fire weapons that demonstrate their ability to use these weapons of mass, mass, great destruction at their will. But at the same time, there is another process that must continue with all nations of the world, a process that was started in 1970 and has had 10 meetings to discuss and measure progress and now needs renegotiation to find the way forward.

In our notes that we were given at the committee, we heard that little progress has been made since 1970 when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed. That is not the case—there has been significant progress from almost 60,000 nuclear weapons stockpiled around the world to now just 14,000 or 16,000. That’s 14,000 too many—one would be too many. But we should take some solace that it is possible when nations come together and are constructive and discuss things respectfully, rather than guarding their national position, for there to be great progress.

I suppose we could imagine or think that that the first 40,000-odd weapons were the easy ones to get. It’s always the last ones that are challenging. But I want to reiterate the National Party Opposition’s support of any party in this Parliament that’s constructively playing the role on the world stage to ensure that progress, albeit slow from time to time, towards nuclear non-proliferation and getting rid of these weapons must continue.

Finally, I want to mention, as you did, Madam Speaker, when you spoke as the chair of the committee just now, the importance of this issue historically for our Pacific neighbours. Prime Minister Bainimarama spoke on behalf of the forum island nations and gave a very strong and moving speech about the harm that is being done to so many nationals and Pacific Island nations from the nuclear testing decades ago in the Pacific by France and how that lingers in the memory of those countries—the harm that was done to people at the time and that, through generations, remains there. They asked for help, for more studies, for more support, for more assistance to understand the ongoing ramifications of nuclear testing in the Pacific for Pacific Islanders, and that’s something that should be done. We’re playing a part, and France has, but we cannot ignore our Pacific neighbours in that plea.

It’s something that happened when the world was a different place, but they are left with ongoing problems as a result of that—primarily health problems but many others. It is for all nations of the world, those that were directly involved—France and many others that supported it at the time—to look to the Pacific Islands, these small island nations that struggle when it comes to climate change. But this is something else that we must and we can help them with.

There are also New Zealand servicemen who were there on ships monitoring at the time when France was setting off nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and their health has directly suffered. The New Zealand Government has recognised that, but all of us, I am sure in this House—those who have been here for a period of time and have had family members that talked about ongoing health concerns on the future generations; grandchildren now—believe we have a duty not to make a decision in this House as to what should happen and to ask our experts and others to look at that and to listen with open ears. The reason for this is that one day we will live in a world where there are not nuclear weapons, but that does not mean we do not have an obligation to those who suffered because of the testing and the use of nuclear weapons in the past, and that is something that can be done right now.

If ever there was a time of caution needed in the world, it is at the moment. The world is a very unusually unstable place compared with the last decade or more. Most of us are not used to times like these. Most of us are used to peace and times when people get together and work out their issues. We must return to that and send a very clear call to the Russian regime and the President of Russia to stop threatening, get around the table, and stop killing innocent people.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. It’s a pleasure to rise to speak in this debate on disarmament—on peace—and I do that as someone who has lived in a war, as a child, and as an international human rights lawyer. Both of those experiences make me very nervous about the world that we are living in currently. I do want to commend the Minister, the Hon Phil Twyford, for his leadership on disarmament issues.

This debate is about the report on our nuclear disarmament, but I also want to note that we have become leaders when it comes to banning autonomous weapons and to looking at peace in space, so we are starting to become leaders again. And it is important because there has never been a time, I don’t think, in the past decade or two, when the human rights - based system, the international rule of law, and that multilateral system, which small island nations like ours really rely on, has been under threat in the way that it is now.

I want to—in the way that others have done also—mihi to our Pacific neighbours because they are still suffering. They’re suffering not because of attacks by Russia, which, you know, obviously, is the main concern right now, rightly so, but by some of our friends and neighbours, like France—the only nation State who has ever committed an act of terror on New Zealand soil, which was related to protests against its nuclear testing in the Pacific, and that was the Rainbow Warrior bombing. And I know and I’ve had the privilege—and others have in this House—of meeting some of the activists that continue to work in the Pacific for their communities, who are still facing incredible ongoing generational injury as a result of that testing. So I join members across the House in saying that, actually, it is our obligation as a Pacific nation to stand with them and to stand against nuclear proliferation.

But I want to turn to the fact that France is one of our friends and allies and the fact that, actually, reparations have still not been paid for that suffering in the Pacific. There are healthcare costs, there are all sorts of humanitarian needs that need to be addressed, and I urge the Minister to look to that, too, under his mandate on nuclear non-proliferation. I think we’ve done really, really well on this, and I wasn’t privileged enough to be a part of that delegation, but I know, and as others have said, that we were strong.

But I do want to turn, then, to an area that still concerns me, because I don’t think we’re strong enough when it comes to our approach to investment and trade with companies and entities who still manufacture and profit from nuclear arms. We’re still very far from banning that when it comes to our commercial banks, when it comes to our defence procurements, and when it comes to investments by our super fund, and those are all areas that New Zealand is a live and active participant in contributing to nuclear armament. We don’t buy weapons; we don’t use these types of weapons—we’re good, there. But there are other areas that the sector has asked us to be strong in and we’re still lagging.

So we did have an inquiry, an independent inquiry, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon Nanaia Mahuta, commissioned—that was done by David Smol—into our export controls regimes. It was found—it was a damning and detailed report—that our export controls regime, the regime that looks into how we OK exports when it comes to war industries, are still falling incredibly short, to the point that the word “ad hoc” was used to describe the process by which we OK exports in the war industries. That, sitting alongside the lack of regulation of investments, is a real problem. The recommendations are there and it’s for legislation.

So I urge our very active Disarmament and Arms Control Minister to work with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and bring law to the House so we can have clarity that our commitment to peace is central to the way that we do trade, to the way that we export goods that are made here, and to the way that we interact with the world and profit from war, because I think New Zealanders wouldn’t want us to be doing that, knowingly or knowingly—that’s what peace really will look like. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. ACT acknowledges the efforts by the Government in this space, in particular New Zealand’s representation at the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, despite the outcome—which has been canvassed here today—as a result of Russia’s behaviour there.

We support New Zealand’s principled stance on nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction more broadly as an important part of our independent foreign policy. As a country, we of course have to be realistic—optimistic but realistic. Our leverage and voice is not as great as we would like, and our principles, while positive and well respected, can only get us so far, especially in such turbulent times. We’re actively hearing in the media at the moment of potential false flag events undertaken potentially by Russia, specifically the use of dirty bombs as a pretext for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

As an aside, a couple of years ago, one evening, I stood by the Atomic Bomb Dome in Hiroshima, which if you look at the mangled exhibition hall, it really is a time capsule into the hell that is brought about by nuclear weapons. The museum nearby shows plainly just how it indiscriminately targets civilians and how they bear the brunt of it and how their lives are changed for ever.

We obviously can’t ignore the elephants in the room: Russia being number one; talk of another North Korean nuclear test; the status of the Iran deal; and China’s intentions, whatever they are, on Taiwan and their general lack of transparency around their nuclear weapons programme. There are tough questions that we face; most pressing: what are the consequences if Russia actually does use a technical nuclear weapon in Ukraine? The region could spiral out of control. This is one of the risks with asymmetrical warfare: it could result in a situation where a nuclear-armed State fights a conventional war but always has the desperate option that they can turn to if it doesn’t go their way.

We should always be cautious about State actors not playing by the rules—for instance, using nuclear threats—despite being signatories, I might add—and clearly violating the Geneva conventions in their actions. Russia has continually used cluster munitions, white phosphorus, and thermobaric weapons in Ukraine, and the prospect of them using a tactical—or battlefield—nuclear weapon is extremely concerning.

Tactical nuclear weapons, sometimes called on-battlefield, as I said, while they have a smaller yield than strategic nuclear weapons would—the types that are mounted on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—they’re still nuclear and violate first use. So it’ll be an utterly disgraceful situation if it gets to that.

Speaking of which, as we’ve seen in the media, Russia has continued with its planned nuclear tests, which includes an ICBM and a submarine-launched ballistic missile, and while announced and notified, it comes at a strategically complex time and just not an overall wise thing to do.

The briefing discussed issues around transparency and accountability with China’s nuclear programme, as I mentioned. In that discussion, there was a note about the age of the warheads and the modernisation projects. The issue with stockpile stewardship is that it can be pitched as a means to ensure warheads are stored safely, but ultimately they’re going to be retrofitting warheads into newer and longer-range delivery systems. So it’s always things to worry about.

A note in acknowledgment to our friends in the Five Eyes: like it or not, however we want to look at it, New Zealand indirectly has a nuclear deterrent, so we have to tread carefully and be respectful and realistic when we confront our allies on this issue—especially with what the likes of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are doing. We’re confident that we can continue with New Zealand’s principled approach to non-proliferation, but we do need to commit to our nuclear-armed partners to maintain our alliances in spite of this key difference. We have to leverage our stance carefully to be an example amongst our allies that they can all look to.

Ultimately, it is difficult to imagine a world that is free of nuclear weapons when there are bad actors at present threatening to use them unilaterally. The review conference obviously didn’t produce a solid or desirable outcome, which is a reflection on the sad state of affairs of the world of late and it also just wasn’t all that unexpected. It is good that the United States has expressed a willingness to reach out to Russia and also to China in negotiating a new bilateral arms control framework to replace the New START Treaty. And, you know, hopefully we’ll see some progress there. But who knows how that’s going to evolve with the Ukraine situation?

So the door is still open for some traction, and we just encourage the Government and the Minister to keep up the good work despite all the difficulties. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I want to acknowledge the excellent contributions from colleagues across the House in this debate and underline the importance and the value of the cross-party commitment that this Parliament shows to nuclear disarmament. As colleagues have pointed out, it is one example of the important tradition that we have in this country of a cross-party commitment on elements of our foreign policy. It’s always good for New Zealand, when we’re facing outwards to the rest of the world, that we can speak with one voice. I also want to thank the Hon Todd McClay and the Hon Jenny Salesa for joining me on the Government’s delegation to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in New York.

As colleagues have pointed out, the world is in a very dangerous place right now. Many experts have said that there is a greater risk of a nuclear exchange, whether it’s deliberate or by miscalculation or error, right now than at any time since the height of the Cold War. We’ve seen the rise of authoritarian nationalism, the weakening of the institutions of multilateralism, and the atrophy of many of the systems that have been in place between the nuclear powers to reduce the risk of nuclear war. There has never been a greater need for nuclear disarmament, nor for the kind of leadership and statespersonship that we’ve seen in previous generations.

But you wouldn’t know that from the way that nuclear-weapon States behaved at the nuclear non-proliferation treaty review conference in New York. Even before Vladimir Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling—the threats that have been made by Russia in the course of their invasion and their war in Ukraine. The nuclear-weapon States have, to be brutally frank, over the last two decades collectively so badly failed to meet the commitments that they made under international law to reduce their nuclear arsenals and to disarm that they have and they bear responsibility for undermining the institutions of international law and multilateralism as far as they relate to nuclear disarmament. I stood in the UN hall in New York and looked around: it was absolutely clear to me that an overwhelming majority of the world’s countries want to see nuclear disarmament, and yet the nuclear-weapon States are champions at making excuses and they cling to the doctrine of mutually assured destruction, insisting that their right to threaten humanity with the incineration of entire cities, a nuclear exchange that could threaten the survival of our species—that somehow that doctrine makes the rest of us safer. New Zealand rejects that logic, and we have done so since David Lange smelt the uranium on the breath of nuclear deterrence back in 1985. We as a country are working harder than ever now in defence of multilateralism, of nuclear disarmament, and of the institutions of peace.

There is a bright spot on the horizon in this very grim scenario, and that is the creation of the nuclear-ban treaty—the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It now has 68 States parties and 91 signatories, and I have no doubt that in the course of the next generation a majority of the world’s countries will sign up to that treaty. The nuclear-weapon States and their financiers and their allies will become increasingly isolated, and the public tolerance of nuclear-weapon States will become less and less.

I also want to talk about the importance of tackling the legacy of nuclear testing in the Pacific. The nuclear-weapon States—the United States, France, the United Kingdom—have never owned up to the environment damage: the fact that people were driven from their lands; their waters are poisoned. Three generations later, there are still excessive cancer incidents in the populations that were affected by nuclear testing. We must tackle this, and New Zealand is working alongside Pacific countries at the Pacific Islands Forum to do this, to put in place a research programme that would create the basis for remedying that historical wrong.

Much of what I might say has already been said by speakers this afternoon, as we are engaged in a contribution on the topic of disarmament, which does have broad bipartisan support. I do want to acknowledge the reaching out to all parties of the Parliament by the Hon Phil Goff—sorry, my goodness; I just put a tweet out about Phil Goff; a good one, by the way—by the Hon Phil Twyford. I think the idea that New Zealand has a single position on these matters internationally, as he has just said, is extremely important. The way in which the material was made available to other parties ahead of the delegation’s going to New York will have, I think, assisted our officials there to represent us extremely well. And I’m pleased to hear those reports here this afternoon.

A person never likes to age themselves in politics; it’s a dangerous sort of thing. Perhaps I did with that little senior moment before, confusing this gentleman over here with another one, who is about to represent us overseas. But I do actually remember family members engaging in fairly interesting discussions at the time of the Bay of Pigs, and for some time after that—quite a time. It’s almost like that crisis moment blended into the very significant extent of testing in the Pacific, particularly by France in the 1960s, rolling on into the 1970s. There was a lot of discussion about what would happen to people, what the long-term consequences were going to be, and the French position always was, “Well, actually, don’t worry about it. There’s nothing there. It’s all fine.”

But I do also have the vivid memory of a French Minister going to, I think, Mururoa and being asked to take a swim in the lagoon. There was much sort of, I suppose you would say, hurrah about the fact that he was all ready to get into the water and then, at the last moment, managed to change his mind, perhaps because the wind was a bit cold, or something else, but, generally, I would suspect, knowing that there was perhaps some potential for him to become somewhat damaged by undertaking that particular swim. I also recall, at the time, there was a New Zealand diplomat who was confronted with this suggestion from the French that there was nothing wrong with what they’d done in the Pacific, there was no problem with it, it wasn’t going to hurt anybody, and his response simply was “Well, if that’s the case, why not test in France?” So we all know that that was a wrong position.

Whatever might come of the discussions about the fallout from those tests, it’s still being experienced in the Pacific. We shouldn’t let that get in the road of pushing for the disarmament that is so much needed. There will be few people in the world now, with the positioning that Russia has taken over the last few months, who would, I think, disagree that we need to do something to get away from that particular threat and the extraordinary damage that can be caused by those particular weapons. The danger, I think, won’t be countries that are, essentially, the long-term holders of nuclear weapons: France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, and China. I think it will be the rogue States that present a problem for us; those rogue States being Iran particularly, where no one quite knows what’s going on with their programme—with North Korea, where, obviously, the testing of the ballistic missiles that would be the vessels for carrying nuclear weapons is continuing, with that sort of veiled threat that “Actually, we’ve got the bomb back here and we could use it any time we like.” And then, also, I think an emerging threat that’s sort of becoming clearer as we see the, dare I say the word, development of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is the possibility of those weapons falling into private hands—private armies like the Wagner Group or some other such. That is, I think, a big concern that we should be equally worried about.

So this is a good discussion in the House today. It’s good to tell New Zealand and the world that we are bipartisan, across all parties in this House, in pursuing disarmament.

I’d like to add my thanks to the Minister, not only for the leadership he’s shown in this discussion and work but also in mentioning those famous words from our 32nd Prime Minister, the Rt Hon David Lange, when he said, “I can smell the uranium on your breath.”

It was a defining moment for New Zealand. It wasn’t just a quip from a Prime Minister that was known to be intellectual and witty, but it also put the world on notice about our nuclear-free stance. The reason that he was able to win that debate, despite attending against all the diplomatic advice and despite competing against somebody—a reverend—whose whole persona was based on moral authority was because it was the right side of the argument. New Zealand was morally correct, and we need to stay there.

As has been said today, that moment has shaped our culture. It is extremely relevant now, as we have the doomsday clock still sitting at, I believe, 100 seconds before midnight, showing the prescient danger of nuclear weapons still currently to our world.

I won’t go into why I believe the world order is under threat; I believe that has been well-canvased in the House. But I do think New Zealand also needs to step back and look at our own actions, particularly around our relationships in the Pacific, and this is under Governments of both stripes, after the Fijian coup in 2006, where we did give Fiji the cold shoulder. We may feel we have moved on, but I think that is still a present sentiment for the Fijians and has meant that since then, we’ve all had a lot of work to do. Should tensions arise in the Pacific again, it’s something we need to bear in mind: managed dialogue, in my view, is always better than completely cutting off, especially from those who are friends to us.

We’ve talked about the two treaties and how important they are. I’d just like to mention and add my thanks to the officials and my observation just from work I’ve done in international fora prior to this role about how good New Zealand is at working those rooms, at being an independent convener, having respectful discussions, and a lot of that has been around our independent foreign policy. I think we heard in our chair’s contribution that New Zealand is a member of several coalitions that were able to conduct negotiations and discussions at these international meetings. That is a real leadership role that we can continue to play, punching above our weight and despite our size. In order to do that, we do need to keep our independent voice. Our position is different on this issue from some of our Five Eyes partners, but it can cut through in the convening process.

The other comment I would just make is that our unequivocal stance around stockpiling, also mentioned by the ACT Party, is that as long there are nuclear weapons—any nuclear weapons—the threat remains. It is not an arena where there is a diminished threat by the number; as long as there is one weapon around, that threat remains because the devastation is so utterly impactful.

My closing remarks are really just looking at Antarctica. There is another treaty that we are a party to in Antarctica, and there are countries who have nuclear weapons that also have bases there and are doing scientific research. I think it behoves us to ensure that all the research is scientific; I’m thinking particularly here around the presence of NASA and also the Communist Party of China with its station in Kunlun, Russia in Vostok. They are hard to reach, New Zealand may not have the resources to get there, but we can influence our partners to ensure that the credibility of that treaty remains for all partners by having those independent investigations.

We also do need to consider what that Antarctic geopolitical piece of land means in terms of the region that we occupy with our Pacific friends and some of the geopolitics in this area. On that note, I’m really pleased that we’re in the process of a $306 million capital upgrade to Scott Base in order to secure the credibility that we have with our friends there.

As we’ve heard, the time for action is now. Russia’s actions may be a threat, but they also present an opportunity for us to do something in the world to really show the leadership that we did back in 1985. I’m so pleased that we have such an energetic Minister who is leading that; the bipartisan approach is the right one. I really look forward to seeing progress around nuclear States coming together to discuss what they can do as they are accountable.

Thank you, Madam Speaker. I’m going to echo mostly, I think, what people have already said. And I think it’s really important, first and foremost, to acknowledge the work that the Minister has led and, as others have rightly noted, the Minister himself, that this is bipartisan. In fact, across the House is a commitment to disarmament in principle and in reality to maintain New Zealand’s nuclear weapon - free status, to proudly stand by that and use that, if you will, as a moral authority to speak into the world and to use our voice. And I think, as well, it’s really important that we continue to do that no matter what the geopolitical situation is.

But I do want to raise a couple of other points which, for me personally, do still sit within disarmament but also the challenges that are in front of us. There’s always a Latin phrase you can whip out to help in moments just like this. So “Si vis pacem, para bellum.”, which means if you want peace, prepare for war: si vis pacem, para bellum. In a more modern context now, we talk about pray for peace but prepare for war.

I want to be really clear, for anyone listening at home and for the Minister, that I am not here advocating for the rearmament of New Zealand or anything like that, but I think it is reflective of a dangerous geo-political world that we have at the moment, and it’s my personal belief that talk alone is not going to operate. And by that, if I wanted to break this into two areas, certainly on the nuclear front we have some major, major challenges, and the Minister touched on that himself.

We have Russia speaking much more clearly, dangerously into this space, where they’re now in the last 48 hours conducting drills and simulations around nuclear tactical strikes. We know, and your report indicates this, that China is expanding its nuclear base and facilities. We are very aware of what Iran is seeking to do in its nuclear space and we see the horror of that autocratic theocratic regime on its own people at the moment, let alone once it has, or if it ever does gain, nuclear capability. And then of course there is North Korea, who’s continuing to sabre rattle in the last week. These are dangerous times.

Then beside all of that, and this is where the challenge comes in, we have these autocratic regimes who paradoxically do speak quite candidly and freely about what they’re wanting to do. Russia is a great example of this. For many months, years, no one believed what Putin was saying, that he would go into the Ukraine. I remember when various intelligence operatives got in contact with me and said, “Simon, they’re going to go in at 4 p.m. New Zealand time.”, there were still people saying, “No, it’ll never happen”, despite Putin having said this, and he has. And in recent days, a certain president of a State has got up and said that they will take back Taiwan with military force if necessary.

I suppose the little lesson I’m taking from this is when autocrats and dictators say things, we should listen. Now, that doesn’t mean we panic but we do react and we react in two ways. One is very much, as this report touches on, we talk about disarmament. We use our moral authority. We deploy diplomacy. We talk, we hope, but we also must have open eyes: si vis pacem, para bellum. We must make sure we are still able to work with our allies to respond when necessary.

I don’t want to make this a big discussion about our defence forces and their current capability and funding, because that goes across multiple Governments. But I think it behoves this House, when we talk disarmament, that we also respect the men and women in uniform and make sure that they have the supplies, the capabilities that they need. Because, paradoxically, as we strengthen our military forces where necessary, where we strengthen their ability to help with human aid and development, particularly into the Pacific, where we cooperate around fisheries, where we cooperate much more clearly and interoperably around intelligence and so forth—that does strengthen our ability to confront those that would wish a more harmful, violent situation on our world.

So again, to where I started from, I acknowledge the Minister and the team for what they’ve done. I think there’s a real, real moral strength that New Zealand has over many years to be able to stand on the global stage and call out the ever growing violence across the globe, to call out nuclear proliferation. I am pleased to see the work that the committee has done around autonomous weapons systems and leading the conversation there. That is really, really important. But I suppose my plea to this House and to New Zealand as well is not to be blind—and, look, I could be wrong, but not to be blind to these dictators and autocrats. When they say they will do something, they tend to do it because they are not the reasonable moral actors which we are: si vis pacem, para bellum.

Thank you, Madam Speaker, and may I add my thanks to the Minister for his leadership in this critical area of work, as well as the select committee for their work on the report.

The former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan once talked about the fraught times we’re in internationally and said we should now define ourselves not only by what we stand for but by what we stand against. Salman Rushdie then proposed the inverse: he mused that what we’re against is clear; it’s what we stand for that needs greater definition, articulation, and commitment. I believe, to solve this complex issue in front of us, we fiercely need both: we need opposition, yes, but we also need real solutions of how to deal with international disagreements and tensions.

Just a week and a half ago, I was at the Inter-Parliamentary Union assembly in Rwanda with members of the Russian Duma, the Iranian Parliament, Ukrainian colleagues, and parliamentarians from around the world in heated discussions about Russian threats of the use of nuclear weapons and the use of Iranian drones to carry out acts of terror in Ukraine. The threat is not new, but it looms larger than it has for decades.

So where to from here? First, I think we need a shift away from faith in a flawed 20-year-old doctrine of mutual destruction. Some say this has kept us from a third world war; I believe this doctrine has kept us on the edge of tension and fear. Secondly, we need an understanding of the scope of the risk. The Minister noted, when he spoke to the select committee, that there are currently around 14,000 nuclear weapons in the stockpiles of nine countries, but the existence of them isn’t the totality of the risk picture. There are misreads and mistakes in addition to the risks that States pose to States. In 1995, the Black Brant incident happened when Russians believed they saw a US missile flying towards them; it was a Norwegian craft taking data images of the lights. The Russians came within five minutes of nuclear retaliation. In 2018, the US accidentally dropped nuclear weapons on North Carolina twice. By sheer luck, neither detonated.

Nuclear weapons are also vulnerable. The stockpile is not uniformly secure, particularly in Russia, where there are sites where warheads and fissionable materials are available to be bought or stolen—they are acquirable. There’s older data that I was looking at recently, from 1993 to 2006, which had 175 documented incidents of nuclear theft, 18 of which involved key ingredients to make nuclear weapons. I think we assume that the amount of fissionable material you would need would be huge, but in today’s terms, what you would need to make a bomb akin to that used in Hiroshima is about eight cans of coke. For the bomb used in Nagasaki, you’d be looking at source material of plutonium about the size of a cabbage. The risk is very real. It’s not just States who pose this risk, but individuals and groups, some of whom are Stateless.

So, what can we do? Is all hope lost? I don’t believe so. In 1991, the Soviet Union fell and the US sent cash to the Russians to secure loose nuclear material and to employ out-of-work nuclear scientists to work with US scientists to convert weapons-grade uranium into power. It was called the Megatons to Megawatts project, and over 20 years, the two nations worked together to do this, which resulted in one in 10 US lightbulbs being fuelled by former Russian warheads. Change is possible, and I note the reports that the US has made invitations to Russia to engage in bilateral conversations.

Kennedy once said, “No problem of human destiny is beyond human beings.”, but we do need a renaissance in thinking about how we manage global disagreements and to be able to articulate both what we stand against as well as what we stand for. In my view, New Zealand must play a key leadership role in this.

Motion agreed to.