Planning Bill

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Mr Chair. Of course, the committee stage is that stage where any member—no matter how ignorant—can I ask some questions on bills, so I intend to take advantage of that. This isn’t a specialist area of mine, but I do appreciate the importance of the bill. I’m keen to interrogate some of the aspects, and this “Planning consents” part is a part that is of particular interest to me. I haven’t been in the Chamber for all of the debate, but it’s traditional to go through it fairly methodically, so I thought I’d start with clause 107.

I was just interested if the member would be able to explain the rationale in having two types of consent—a land use consent and a subdivision consent. Now, I can see that they’re distinct things, but it just strikes me that if you’re trying to streamline the consenting procedure, there’s a risk here—I may have this wrong—where, as under the existing regime, one consent would do but, now, you’ve actually got to get two consents, and that would seem to be quite duplicative. Of course, if you’ve got these two overlapping consents—perhaps they’re not overlapping; perhaps they’re entirely distinct—essentially, for one piece of land, which is both being subdivided and also having a particular use put to it. I don’t know what it might be, but you can imagine a large rural subdivision, a lifestyle block, and also having to ensure that the use to which that’s going to be put—perhaps there’s going to be a quarry over in the corner; I don’t know. Previously, it strikes me, that would’ve been able to be done with one consent, so the question is if he could explain how this regime will prevent duplication where a land use consent and a subdivision consent are needed.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Mr Chair. Well, for the member’s benefit, it’s always been that way, including under the Resource Management Act. The reason there’s two different types of consents—there’s a land use consent that is required for the activities that are required to have a consent on a piece of land; the subdivision consent is required when creating new titles.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Mr Chair. I, too, have a question around clause 107, and this is to do with the Minister’s Amendment Paper 709 and the new addition in here where, in clause 107(a), it has inserted the land use consent. I do thank the under-secretary for the explanation around the two types of consent. That’s very helpful. Over here, “or to carry out an activity in, on, under, or over the coastal marine area” has been added, and I want to check why that particular part has been added. Now, of course, we’re not going to go backwards looking at the details of sections 17 and 17A, but, obviously, 17A relates to our coastal marine areas, and it does have specific provisions for the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act. But I want to check, over here, what happens in the circumstances when it comes, specifically, to land use consent and when you have an area that was not settled under the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act? That’s my first question.

My second question is: in here, it does specify “in, on, under, or over”, and those are very specific prepositions that are being used there, so I wonder if the Minister in some ways wouldn’t mind elucidating on, for example, what is the difference—“in” and “under” and “on” all make sense—between “on” and “over” coastal marine areas? Those are my two questions for the time being.

Committee of the whole House

Thanks for giving me the call, Mr Chair. This is a technical amendment that reflects the fact that clause 17(a) provides for activities in the coastal marine area, and it allows for consents to be obtained for uses like ports or wharfs, which are on the land or attached to the land but also stick out into the sea.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Mr Chair. Just a brief follow-up on that. The member the chair, Simon Court, knows that I have an interest in wharves and those are mostly dealt with in the next bill, but I want to ask him about this. This is a slightly different way of recognising those existing use rights in the Resource Management Act (RMA). It does look like a much more permissive power, which might be useful, but I don’t think it’s what he said. The way that it’s drafted here looks like it’s possible to give a consent for a marine and coastal area as if it were a land-based consent, which wasn’t the old system. Does that also apply not only to aquaculture but also to uses of that marine and sea area which haven’t been contemplated in our planning system in that way before—like, say, a consent for a tunnel to be built in Auckland under the harbour? That would have been a different sort of consent under the old system than it, I think, will be under the new system.

Committee of the whole House

I’m not going to go into hypotheticals about this consent. Just to be clear, the reason that we have provided for activities in the coastal marine area is because activities such as port operations or cargo handling on wharves have effects that are in scope of the Planning Bill, such as noise. It’s very specifically targeted to those kinds of effects. There are environmental effects which need to be managed under the Natural Environment Bill as it’s envisaged, which are separate to the effects that are intended to be managed under the Planning Bill.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Mr Chair. I know the section mentioning Schedule 6 comes up a little later, but there’s a couple of questions I’d be keen to ask the Minister in respect of that—in fact, it’s Schedule 7, because this is the schedule that deals with the consenting process itself and what has to go into some of the material there.

The first question I have is about Schedule 7, clause 3, which talks about allotments. There’s just one—and this might be a bit arcane. It tells you what an allotment is, which is a section of land, and it has carve-outs and so on, but it has one which is quite hard to understand, which is “(d) any parcel of land that is not subject to the Land Transfer Act 2017”. I’d be keen for the Minister to explain if there is any land which isn’t subject to the Land Transfer Act 2017 and where that is and how that is managed in terms of consenting.

Then, in clause 6 of Schedule 7, it’s about conditions and just about natural hazards. It’s about when a consenting authority determines that a natural hazard exists, and it says that the consent—“A subdivision consent may include a condition requiring that provision be made, to the satisfaction of the consent authority … to protect land”, and so on. I’m just curious as to whether the Minister considered a “must” in there, because we’re talking about some pretty significant natural hazards, and I’ve heard other members talking about flooding risk, coastal inundation, and so on. It does seem to give a mere discretion. There have been instances where steps clearly should have been taken but weren’t, and that’s had real consequences down the road.

I’ll put three questions in one here, and my third question is about clause 10 of Schedule 7, and it’s actually where the consenting authority has required an easement to be granted or reserved. I can understand that if you’ve got this easement to cross or to carry water or whatever it might be, you don’t want it to be extinguished, but one of the extinguishments which is prohibited is automatic, so it’s a really difficult one, right? “(2) After the easement is granted or reserved, it must not, except with the written consent of the territorial authority … (b) be merged by transfer to the owner of the benefited land or the burdened land;”. That’s when you’ve got two pieces of land, one which gets the benefit and one which gets the burden of the easement. If those two pieces of land are merged into one ownership, there is no benefit-burden relationship; you have both the benefit and burden, and what the law of easements says is at that point, the easement is extinguished by operation of law. If you’ve got something that happens if you just happen to purchase that adjacent parcel of land, I’m not sure how you can be prohibited from the law operating.

If the Minister could explain those three questions—so that was the merger of easements, whether there should be a “must include a condition requiring the addressing of natural hazards risk”, and land which is not subject to the Land Transfer Act.

Committee of the whole House

To the member Duncan Webb, the provisions he’s speaking about will carry over directly from the Resource Management Act. Officials have advised that no submissions were received by the select committee on these matters because they’re non-contentious and they carry over existing provisions relating to easements.

Hon Dr Duncan Webb: Well, this was your big chance to fix it.

SIMON COURT: Mr Webb suggests this is our big chance to fix it; we do not believe anything needs to be fixed.

Committee of the whole House

I’m not sure that I understand the tone there. Anyway, I would like to go to clause 146 of Part 4, and this is “Land use consent may be refused or granted with conditions if risk from natural hazards”. This is a good clause, but then what happens at subclause (4) is that there is an exception. It says, “This section does not apply to a land use consent for—(a) constructing, upgrading, maintaining, or operating infrastructure, except to the extent that national standards provide that this section applies; or (b) a primary production activity, except to the extent that national standards provide that this section applies.”

That’s quite convoluted language anyway for an exceptions clause, but what that means is that the “no” that would be said to a consent application because there’s a natural hazard—that “no” doesn’t apply for constructing infrastructure and for primary production. We’ve discussed earlier that the definition of “infrastructure” is very wide, and by my interpretation could include a shop, because that definition only requires one of the criteria to be met for infrastructure, and one of those criteria is economic—hence the shop.

What is the point of having this good clause 146 that says you can say no if there’s a natural hazard when there are so many exceptions to it, given that everything is now infrastructure, and if it’s not infrastructure, then it’s likely to be primary production? Given that definition of “infrastructure”, all primary production is infrastructure anyway. But if the member in the chair, Simon Court, could comment on the breadth of this exception to 146 and if he can explain how it doesn’t undermine that whole point of 146 and the rhetoric that this Government has given time and time again about responding to hazards—we hear the Prime Minister say there’s not going to be building in flood plains. I know the member in the chair has a different because he’s an engineer, but that is what we have heard from the Government time and time again. [Interruption] I can’t hear what’s being said there.

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): You’re not missing anything.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING: Right. The point is: why are they undermining this exception and what will that do, given the wide definition of “infrastructure” and that it includes construction—so it’s not just upgrading and maintaining infrastructure that is already there; it’s putting in new infrastructure to a hazard area. Is that not going to cause a whole lot of problems that are going to have to be undone and cost everyone a whole lot of money and be very inefficient?

Committee of the whole House

Look, I think it’s really important that we address this thoroughly, so if the Chair would give me some leniency to explain this in detail.

The member raises a very, very important question: given how important it is that we recognise the risks of natural hazards, why is it that infrastructure should be allowed in areas exposed to natural hazards, and why are primary production activities allowed in areas exposed to natural hazards? I’m going to give the member a fulsome answer, and I trust that this will help progress the discussion.

Infrastructure activities have been excluded from the natural hazards consenting and permitting provision because they are often needed to be located in areas exposed to natural hazards, for functional or operational reasons. A port needs to be on the coast; a stormwater outfall needs to be on the coast. They are exposed to natural hazards. As the member rightly pointed out, I spent nearly 25 years as a civil engineer designing and constructing infrastructure so that it could be resistant or resilient against natural hazards. It is possible, and this legislation provides for it.

This exclusion does not mean that infrastructure can be developed without consideration of risk or that consents and permits cannot be refused or conditioned on natural hazards grounds. Consent authorities can still consider risk and decline or condition applications where the relevant plan provides for those matters to be considered. Infrastructure providers are also generally well placed because many of them include engineers in their staff to identify managed natural hazards risks through site selection, design, and mitigation measures, and have strong incentives to do so to avoid service disruption and costly damage. National standards can still provide for the provision to apply to particular infrastructure activities where that is justified.

On the matter of primary production: in many cases, risks associated with primary production activities can be managed by mitigation measures and by locating activities appropriately. The potential consequences for people and property are also generally lower than in a more densely developed urban area. For example, a paddock with a fence in it that might be occasionally flooded might still be an appropriate place to carry out primary production activity, like letting the sheep eat grass when it’s not flooded. The exclusion doesn’t mean that primary production activities can be developed without consideration of risk or that consents permits cannot be refused or conditioned on natural hazards grounds, as for infrastructure.

Again, as for infrastructure, authorities can still consider risks, decline or condition applications where the relevant plan provisions allow for it, and the bills will allow national standards to apply the provision to particular primary production activities where that is justified. I hope that satisfies the member about this very important matter.

Committee of the whole House

Absolutely not. The member Simon Court doesn’t address the wide definition of infrastructure, and the member also said, “Well, there are functional and operational reasons for putting some infrastructure in some places.” I do not disagree with that. In fact, I agree with the member in the chair, but why, then, does it not say “if there is a functional and operational need for it to be in that area.” It does not include that caveat, and that would be a very useful caveat to have here, noting that the infrastructure here goes far beyond the type of engineering work that the member has been doing for the past 25 years—which is what most people would consider infrastructure—but it’s not how it is defined in this bill.

Secondly, we did not get—and I note that Government members shut down the debate on two schedules that we did not have an opportunity to ask questions to before the dinner break. I think that is appalling when there has been some promise to go through the process here properly, and we have been trying to very diligently go through it piece by piece. Then we got shut off, and shame on those members across there who shut down that debate; it’s appalling.

One of the questions I would have asked in that, which I’m now going to try and relate to this point, is: infrastructure often relates to what can be designated, and some of the list which we would have gone through for designations in the schedule, that we were not able to debate, includes things like early childhood centres. I think it may even include private early childhood centres. Given the definition of infrastructure, does the member think that there is a functional and operational need for a private early childhood educator to have a facility newly constructed in a hazard area?

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Mr Chair. I do want to hear the response from the Under-Secretary regarding that particular question. Also, in those cases, I want to further understand—if the Under-Secretary wouldn’t mind elucidating—the interaction of, for example, this particular bill when it comes to new early childhood education (ECE) centres in a hazardous zone, and that’s relating to the requirements of ECEs under the Education and Training Act, section 4(b) specifically. I do have a separate question, but keeping a note that that’s a very important question by the Hon Rachel Brooking.

I want to start with clause 110 and move on, very briefly, to clause 113, noting that others may have other questions as well. I want to check with the Under-Secretary regarding clause 110(1)(b)(i), which is also an additional change that has been added in Amendment Paper 709. In this case, land use makes sense, but it’s specifies a rule in a proposed land-use plan as opposed to previously just a proposed plan provision that is being notified. Can I check with the Under-Secretary on why the rule has been specifically defined here, in this particular amendment?

My other question, for the time being, is on clause 113(1) and (2). I just had a look in terms of Maritime New Zealand’s jurisdiction, because I was curious as to the jurisdiction of Maritime New Zealand when it comes to navigable lakes or rivers. It does look like that maritime covers all waterways, including oceans and coasts, etc. Can I check—unless another area already includes it—why, then, would an application affecting navigation in a lake or river need to have the consent authority sending a copy of the application to Maritime New Zealand, but when it comes to coastal marine areas, which will presumably also be under Maritime New Zealand’s jurisdiction, there isn’t, at least in this clause, a mention of marine coastal areas, where for any application to the consent authority, the consent authority also needs to send a copy of that application to Maritime New Zealand?

Those are my three questions: one on the interaction with the Education and Training Act; one around the changes to clause 110(1)(b)(i), and around the copy of the application to Maritime New Zealand when it involves the coastal marine area.

Committee of the whole House

Just responding, firstly, to the questions from the Hon Rachel Brooking. The caveat is around when new information is available, and there needs to be a backstop for when a plan is not yet updated but there’s new information available about natural hazards.

The member raised a number of hypotheticals. Look, it’s very clear what infrastructure means; it’s defined in the legislation. We covered that extensively in Part 1, and the member should be satisfied that councils can still make rules and plans which clarify how those two concepts are applied. I doubt very, very much whether a council is going to permit early childhood education (ECE) centres to be built in an area exposed to significant risks from natural hazards.

In response to the member Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan, clause 110 that he referred to: that’s a drafting update. The change that he referred to is a minor and technical amendment to specify the rule and the plan; it’s the rule in the plan that has changed. With respect to clause 113, “Application affecting navigation to be referred to Maritime New Zealand”, that’s a direct carry-over from the Resource Management Act. Maritime New Zealand would be interested if somebody wants to build something in the way of a ship.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Mr Chair. A brief question on clause 109 and then I’ll take the Minister very quickly through clauses 123 to 130. On clause 109, I understand that the regime at the applying for the consent stage now requires just proportionate information. That’s a key concept that we understand from the public documents on this, but one might expect that there is some safeguard that’s not in this clause—so where is it—against that proportionate information then becoming inadequate information in cases where the effects are uncertain or particularly cumulative. A second follow-up question to that is: how does he expect councils to act when they are receiving information about unknown effects, particularly for Māori, given that that has a special place in the decision-making hierarchy?

Then to clause 123 to 130. These are the provisions which are about planning consent notification and submissions. It’s a targeted notification regime, we get that, but the first question I have for the member in the chair is around this “more than minor” designation that councils are able to make. Now, given that that’s not just a sort of on/off button that the councils had under the Resource Management Act where it was either publicly notified or not, “more than minor” now has the effect that people who are adversely affected, but in a minor way, now can’t have a say. To the member: is that the right interpretation? Is the effect that somebody who has, say, been in an area—it’s very common, for instance, in Auckland for the council to decide that there is not a more than minor impact on residents when a cell tower is being consented in their area, but they still have the ability to have a say if they want to have a say. But now it reads as if they will not be able to have a say because of those targeted consultation provisions being much narrower.

I’ll also then take him specifically to clause 128, and I want to ask about the definition of the person who is affected. This is now much, much narrower. For members who have not been following on closely, the effect of this is much more similar to, say, alcohol licensing, where somebody who has a say at a hearings panel will need to be a resident in the area that is affected. That is much more restrictive, so I want to ask—sorry, was that feedback on the mic? I want to ask the Minister: what is the impact of this determination given that it’s not something that’s been tested in New Zealand law and we don’t have any regulations for standing? Standing in those sorts of cases, where people have restricted access to the panels, is often the first thing which is litigated, so who is an affected person will be probably the number one thing off the block when these types of decisions are being made. It would be really helpful if—the member in the chair doesn’t need to solve it tonight; he just needs to say what this regime is most like so that when these issues are first determined about who has standing to make an application to be heard, what kind of person that is if they’re not a resident.

Committee of the whole House

I’ll just come to the member’s first question on clause 109. It’s the Government’s intention. I see overwhelming desire of those who seek to see the resource management system reformed to make it more permissible, more responsive, and more proportionate to the risks that need to be managed. Clause 109(3) reflects that, which is: “An applicant must ensure that information required … is provided a level of detail that is proportionate to the scale and significance of the effects of the activity to which the application relates.” The member raised the point that there may be unknown information, new information—

Arena Williams: Yeah, what if it changes over time?

SIMON COURT: —changes over time. An activity that has that level of uncertainty or lack of information is likely to be regarded as having a higher need for condition when consents are issued. But as an example, discretionary consents in the new system—I urge the member to return to clause 31(2)(c) to verify this—are required where there is significant variability in adverse effects. We have provided for some of that uncertainty that arises.

The member’s subsequent question was around notification. In the resource management system, notification is wide, and the requirements for notification are often onerous. The proposed approach in the bills departs from the Resource Management Act in the following ways: it requires targeted notification over public notification where affected persons can be identified; it raises the threshold for targeted notification from “minor” to “more than minor”; and it raises the public notification threshold for “more than minor” to “significant” in the separate Natural Environment Bill. We’ve been quite specific about those choices. It’s our intention that the number of people who are notified, and the number of people who subsequently have standing, is much reduced to those who are directly affected by applications for development and activities.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Mr Chair, and thank you, Minister. Just touching on what Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan highlighted in clause 110, and I thought you were actually going to answer my question to clause 110, but I’ll ask it again just so you can round that out a little bit better. In particular, clause 110(1)(b), and it’s “the activity classification of the activity (being restricted discretionary or discretionary)”, and it’s got “altered” crossed out and “change” underlined, which, in my mind, is a significant amendment. “Change” is a broad word for making anything different or replacing one thing with another, whereas “alter” means to make a small or partial adjustment or keeping the core identity of the object the same. As an engineer, and I wasn’t actually aware that you had an engineer background, Minister, but “change” and “alter”, in an engineering sense, are two very different words. We want to change the Government; altering the Government is not enough. They’re two very different words, and I just wanted to get your clarification on why that amendment is within clause 110.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Mr Chair. Just a couple of questions. Just the nuts and bolts of this interests me, and Schedule 6 deals with information required in applications for the planning consent. One of the things about the bill that strikes me is that it introduces a whole lot of judgments, which are essentially proportionality judgments, and if they’re made by the person seeking the consent, or even by the consenting authority, there’s a risk of a lack of consistency, because they are essentially a subjective assessment of what is required. One of those assessments is found in clause 3 of Schedule 6, which is: “if the application is affected by section 164 … an assessment of the value of the investment of the existing consent holder (for the purposes of section 139(1)(f)):”. I’m just interested—are there going to be regulations as to how we go about that? Assessments of value can be very varied, and even a valuer would say to you that there’s three or five ways you can value any particular investment depending on the cost of it, market value, best alternative use value, and off you go. I’m interested in that.

Also, clause 6 of Schedule 6, the information required in the assessment of—and it’s got “environmental” crossed out; it just says “effects”. In particular, for the information on the effects, you’ve removed from what has to go into the consenting documents, it appears—“environmental effects”—and rather you’ve just got “effects on the built environment”. Now, that seems very strange to me, because even if it is an urban setting, there are still wider environmental effects which aren’t necessarily effects on the built environment—that is to say, I’m assuming, bits of the environment that have been constructed. Then, again, you’ve got in clause 6(1)(b), “must include detail proportionate to the scale and significance”.

Again, whilst it’s buried right in the detail here, I’d be interested in the Minister’s views on who determines what is proportionate to scale and significance, because the person seeking the consent will have one view, the consenting authority will have another view, different consenting authorities may have different views, and the affected communities will have a different view again. I think that’s actually quite a significant question.

Further down again, I’m just interested in clause 6(2)(d) of Schedule 6, where it had, previously—and I’m imagining it was reported back from select committee—a description of how any adverse effects on the built environment will be avoided, and it did say “minimised”, but now it says “mitigated”. I’m interested as to why there is the weaker term of “mitigation”, which is addressing it in some way, whereas “minimised” seems to be reducing it as far as is practicable.

So there’s a handful of questions. One is about what is an assessment of value, one is around why environmental effects were removed, and one is why “minimised” was swapped out for “mitigated”.

Committee of the whole House

I start with Schedule 6 and why “environmental” was removed. It’s because environmental effects are covered under the Natural Environment Bill. Schedule 6, to be clear, is complemented by national standards or plan requirements, so there will be more detail on how these things are done in the system. If I could return to the question from Dan Rosewarne, what that clause means is that if somebody makes the consent application and, in the meantime, the council changes the plan, their consent can continue under the rules that were enforced at the time they made their consent application. Again, that’s a carryover from the Resource Management Act; it’s a natural justice - type revision.

Committee of the whole House

Moving on, I’m going to go to clause 149, which is “Consent authority may grant application with adaptive management approach”. Then there’s a whole lot about how you decide if you’re going to do an adaptive management approach. My question relates to this being in the Planning Bill rather than the Natural Environment Bill, and it might be a crossover issue. But if this is for land use, what sort of adaptive management is used for land use? The circumstances that spring to mind about adaptive management are normally things that would be happening in the ocean—you have that test in the offshore legislation. I’m just wondering if he can explain if this adaptive management approach is for land use or if there is some connection between how the two bills work, and if it is for land use, can he give some examples of how it would be used?

Another question is on 149A, and I’m just wondering how this relates, if it relates at all, to the new 10A—I think it was 10A—that’s been inserted by agreement at the start of the bill, after agreement with the Waikato iwi involved in the river management.

Then I’ll go on to a third question. This is from clause 168, and these are very important provisions and they look to be similar to the Resource Management Act as well, and that is the review of consent conditions by the consent authority. There’s a process, we have to give notice, there’s some submissions, things have to be considered, and then at clause 172, there is a decision on the review of consent conditions, and that’s at subclause (3)—172(3) and (4). Subclause (3) says, “A consent authority may cancel a planning consent”—so it’s discretionary—“if—(a) it reviews the consent under” the relevant section, and “(c) there are significant adverse effects on the built environment resulting from the use of the consent.”

Again, I’m just wondering, for some colour in this, if there are some examples of what the member in the chair imagines “significant adverse effects on the built environment” might be that could result in the cancellation of a land-use consent. Again, most of the reviews that I’ve seen of consent conditions have been more around those relating to water pollution or soil contamination or those sorts of things. This refers to “significant adverse effects on the built environment”, so some colour there as well would be very useful.

So that’s three questions: one on clause 172, about what a review would be; one was on the adaptive management provision, which is back at clause 149; and then clause 149A and how it relates to new 10A.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Mr Chair, and thank you to the under-secretary for his reasons so far. I do want to focus specifically on some of the changes in this bill that have been made in Amendment Paper 709. I’m now on new clause 114A, which is the application relating to offshore renewable energy (ORE) generation infrastructure activities. Obviously, this part has been inserted since the ORE bill became an Act, quite recently. But one of the things that jumped out at me in this particular section is it talks about applying for planning consent if they have a current feasibility permit or a commercial permit. Now, under the Offshore Renewable Energy Act, this is a two-tier process. There are two permits that are referred to here. But what I’m not seeing in clause 114A is whether, if an applicant holds a feasibility permit, they got the consent, they again transitioned to a commercial permit as a result of that feasibility test—would the consent automatically transfer over to a commercial permit or would the applicant need to apply again using their commercial permit to apply for a new consent? I think that part is just a little bit unclear in how this new addition has been drafted.

I now want to move on to clause 131, and I’m just wanting to seek the under-secretary’s engagement on my colleague Lan Pham’s Amendment Paper 730, which is to replace subclause (1) to allow for any person to make a submission about the consenting authority rather than simply the qualifying people as detailed in paragraphs (a) and (b) of clause 131(1)—i.e., a qualifying person of the district or a person who is not a qualified resident but is related to the affected person under clause 128. This is to ensure that the clause is in line with the view of a number of the submitters that have been heard in the select committee process who are opposed to the narrowing of the situation for public notification and limiting public submissions just to qualifying residents. So I wanted to seek the under-secretary’s engagement on Amendment Paper 730 regarding clause 131.

My next question is on the new insertion, which is clause 131(1A). I wonder if the under-secretary wouldn’t mind also elaborating on why this particular part has been added in and how this is sufficiently different from one that requires its own particular section.

My last question at this stage is about clause 133, “Striking out submissions”. It states, “(1) A consent authority may, in the manner prescribed in regulations, strike out a submission, or part of a submission,”. We understand from the select committee there are submissions that may potentially not be relevant to the bill we’re discussing, but those submissions are never really struck out; they are returned to the submitter. I want to check with the Minister two things. Number one is whether struck out would imply returning to the applicant, or, without letting the submitter know, just simply reject it. When it comes to regulations, normally regulations make a specific reference to which clause the regulation will fall under. Can I just check that in this case, in regulations, we’re referring to secondary legislation and there’s a particular empowering clause that the secondary legislation would fall under.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Mr Chair. This point about clause 131 through to clause 133 is about who is able to make a submission. Acknowledging that the member in the chair has made a change to change “resident” to “person”—I assume that’s because the new definition now includes a body corporate. Is that right? That is the first question.

The next question I have is about the public notification requirements only applying to those qualifying persons, and this is a new insertion, and this is where the rubber really hits the road, I guess, for these applications. This is the knocking out of the Forest & Bird provision and it’s knocking out groups who have traditionally organised around these issues. I just want to ask some clarifying questions of the member in the chair, because it seems that this provision, which has been added in without any consultation on it, goes too far and further than what the policy intention is. We’re going to end up with some silly outcomes here.

I want the member to consider the examples where people do want to make submissions, and those submissions might be out of area—say, the extension of the Waitematā wharves out into the harbour, where recreational fishers have an interest in using the harbour and they would not be able to make an application, and under the old system they would have been able to make an application. Then there is the situation of the gun club where I was the general counsel working for an iwi in West Auckland, where there was a funny outcome and one that had not been anticipated but was essentially an application to build a gun club in an area for the iwi where 30 women and children had lost their lives in the Land Wars with gun violence. That would have been a silly outcome for the community, and one which offended not only the sensibilities of the iwi but the local residents and the people who bore the name of the town in the area—Helensville.

These silly outcomes will arise if we don’t have a way for people who are outside of an immediate area to be able to make representations about their interests, whether they are cultural or customary—for anyone. These are the recreational participation rights and that is why we have public participation rights at the planning consent level. Things like extensions of discharge; things like the enjoyment of a particular community in an area where the nature of the community has changed over the last 10 years, where they had a factory but now there are thousands of residents there—this is going to happen increasingly with more development. We want that more development, but we also want local residents to be able to update and change the way that planning consents in the area are given, and this is the mechanism to do it, but they may not be able to do that because of the new rule where, now, bodies corporate are allowed to make submissions, but anyone who is not in the immediate area—say, MPs or groups that are organisers of groups of submissions—are not able to apply in that way. That seems to be a problem that doesn’t reach the policy intent and just makes it very, very narrow representations from immediately affected residents who can demonstrate an adverse impact.

I do want to ask about the striking out of submissions. I read in regulations—the regulations apply to tribunals. Is that right? The alcohol tribunals operate under those rules as well. They are natural justice rules that apply to all tribunals, or do you intend to create new rules that apply to this tribunal only?

Committee of the whole House

Well, there have been quite a few questions asked from some of the members over the previous few minutes. I will attempt to respond to them individually.

The member the Hon Rachel Brooking asked questions about clause 149, which deals with adaptive management. In a land-use planning context, adaptive management could be expected to be applied, say, for an activity which might generate noise and vibration and where monitoring of that activity after it commenced would tell the applicant and the regulator whether additional improvements need to be made to mitigate any effects or whether the activity can continue based on the consent granted.

With respect to Rachel Brooking’s questions about the relevance of clause 149A, “Planning consent giving effect to Te Ture Whaimana o Te Awa o Waikato may be contrary to water services standard”, it is intended, as Mr Bishop and I have explained a number of times, to give effect to the Waikato River Treaty settlement and to acknowledge the vision strategy for the Waikato River.

The member asked a question about clause 172, “Decisions on review of consent conditions”. This is a carry-over from the Resource Management Act (RMA), and essentially it provides for, say, situations where there’s a structure, a home, in an area or an activity exposed to natural hazards. If a council has issued consent and then gets new information—where I live in Auckland, we get new information about landslide risk, and that means that consents for some sorts of activities and occupations have had to be reviewed, and in some cases the decision is that people can’t live there anymore. So, again, the legislation provides for that. It’s quite practical.

Now, there were a number of other questions that I’m going to now get to. Clause 114A—forgive me; I can’t remember which member asked that question. It was subclause 1(a) about application for offshore renewable energy. The member Lawrence Xu-Nan’s question was around if an energy applicant has either a feasibility or a commercial permit and they obtain a consent based on, say, feasibility, will they have to reconsent once they get to commercial. One of the challenges we do have in the current RMA is that when anything changes from the time that somebody produces a concept, preliminary design, detailed design to when they get a consent and they go to issue for construction drawings—I’m just drawing on my experience as an engineer—having to go back and reconsent any changes between submitting the application with a design proposal and then finalising it for construction is onerous, time-consuming, costly, and often doesn’t really do anything to manage risk.

Without wanting to cast forward or provide a legal opinion, I imagine that if the risks are dealt with at the time a feasibility permit is established, then if it’s acceptable to the consenting authority that it’s all been dealt with in the round and any changes between feasibility and commercial are minor and technical, I’m assuming that consent would carry over. Again, that is a cut and paste, essentially, from the RMA, because when this bill was being drafted, that offshore renewable energy hadn’t been passed yet, and when it did pass, it referred to the Resource Management Act. So, again, we’re just bringing in a number of matters.

Now, clause 133—striking out. Now this is an interesting question; I appreciate the question from Lawrence Xu-Nan, and also Arena Williams who raised it. Striking out—so if a consent authority strikes out a submission or part of a submission if it’s not reasonable or relevant to the case, the reason for the striking out that’s been provided to me is it means that the struck-out part cannot form part of a subsequent appeal on any matter. It does provide significant—[Bell rung] Mr Chair?

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): Simon Court.

SIMON COURT: Thank you. It does provide some significant protection to the consenting authority if there’s matters that are just not related to the activity, the application, and that could provide for appeals on matters that just aren’t relevant.

Now, we continue. I’ve run out of pages—hold on. Thank you. Regulation-making power for striking out submissions is under clause 281(1)(a). It’s not about the planning tribunal; it’s for councils. I hope that satisfies members that the questions they posed have been responded to.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you. I’ve got a question here on clause 138, although I do remember asking the member a question about why planning tribunals were being used for some things in a different part that was not answered. Now that he’s talking about planning tribunals, he might want to refer to it. But clause 138: “Matters that consent authority must disregard”. It goes to scope, section 14, that we’ve traversed; “any effect on a person who has given written approval”; and then what I’m interested in is paragraph (c), which is: “any adverse effect of the activity on the built environment if the land use plan or a national rule permits an activity with that effect.” This is the permitted baseline. That’s a concept developed by courts that has been useful for a system that focuses on consents rather than plans and national direction.

My question is: if we are reshaping the system away from by consent, why do we need to codify the permitted baseline when so much is already permitted? There shouldn’t be that many things that this would apply to, and it could add a whole lot of complexity to the decision making around the consent, because it’s supposed to be simplifying consents and it’s more binary in terms of consents. We’ve got rid of the non-complying activity status; we’ve got rid of the controlled activity status here. So why do we need that permitted baseline?

Committee of the whole House

Look, for the member’s benefit and just harking back to some of the great work she did in developing resource management law in New Zealand, I’ve been advised that the Natural and Built Environment Act—RIP, since repealed—also provided for that same function. But let’s be clear: the Government intends that common activities for which we know how to manage the risks and the impacts are provided for in national standards or rules in a plan. Therefore, we’ve acknowledged there are some activities associated with the effects of those activities, and it’s our intention that they not be litigated again during the consenting process.

Committee of the whole House

Just a little—sorry for knees and things from people who jumped up there. I just have a little question for the member. When he referred to the great Natural and Built Environment Act—that his Government cruelly repealed in December 2023 and brought back the Resource Management Act—is he saying that this legislation before us is not different from that Natural and Built Environment Act, and that this legislation isn’t far more enabling than that Natural and Built Environment Act, as he has been telling us in previous contributions?

Committee of the whole House

It’s very clear that the permitted baseline approach that the member referred to in her previous question is a good concept. It’s been carried through; it’s established, I understand, through case law, through consenting. It’s been carried through a number of iterations of resource management reform. It’s one of the good things that if activities and their effects are well understood, and a rule and a plan can specify how those effects are managed, or a national rules and a national standard, then they don’t need to be relitigated at each and every consent.

That is the Government’s intent. We want to reduce, as far as practical, the real implication of activities and effects that are well understood at consenting level. We want to lift up the difficult decisions and trade-offs to plan making, to the development of national standards—I’m going up the funnel now to national policy direction—and not have stuff relitigated. So it’s a good clause, I’m sure the member would agree, and we’re going to keep it.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Mr Chair. Thank you to the under-secretary for your responses before. That was very helpful and very fulsome, so I really appreciate that.

I have a question regarding clause 136, which is “Decision by commissioner”, noting that it was also quite helpful that there is at least a reference to the original Resource Management Act (RMA) regarding comparable clauses. But what jumped out at me for this particular section is in the original RMA, section 100A. It also allows not just simply if the applicant is asking for a hearing by commissioners, but it also allows someone who makes a submission to also ask for a hearing by commissioners. I’m just curious as to why that part, where someone who makes a submission requesting a hearing by commissioner, has been removed from this particular part.

Now I’m going to move on to clause 139 and just following on from what the Hon Rachel Brooking is asking regarding this section as well. Again, you know, I’m trying to focus on changes that Amendment Paper 709 is making, and I want to specifically focus on clause 139(1)(c) and (d). Now, clause 139 says, “The consent authority must have regard to the following: … (c) any measures proposed or agreed to by the applicant to avoid, remedy, mitigate,”—this has changed from “minimise”, and I do wonder why, because “mitigate” and “avoid” are synonyms, whereas “minimise” is not. I want to check: why is “mitigate” used in that particular section? It doesn’t look like, at a glance, it’s a carry-over from the original Act, so I think that would be helpful to seek some clarification on.

In terms of paragraph (d), we’re looking at water service standards, so presumably clause 139(1)(d)(iii), where the water services standard has now been captured—any relevant provisions of a water services standard. But would the Minister, on a second review, be able to clarify on why “(i) the land use plan or proposed land use plan:” and “(ii) a national rule in national standards:” have been removed from that particular paragraph? Those are my two questions.

Committee of the whole House

Just in response to the question about the hearings, the applicant under the Resource Management Act was required to bear the cost of the application; in the new system, they’re not. So we’re not providing for them to access a hearing as of right.

The member asked a question about “minimise” versus “mitigate”. That’s been covered off in previous parts, but, again, “mitigate” is a well-understood term, and in terms of consenting, issuing conditions to mitigate are well-understood. “Minimise” is far more onerous, and, again, it’s not a well-understood term; it’s not commonly used. It’s not part of the resource management system right now.

Committee of the whole House

I just want to have a discussion around clause 140—it’s a really important issue, and, in particular, it’s a really important issue in Canterbury—“Matters relevant to activities affecting drinking water supply source water”. I guess the global question is the degree of importance of this, and, obviously, we know we haven’t got bottom lines in this legislation, but “have regard to” seems to be a very light degree of consideration when we’re talking about drinking water. I’m interested in why stronger words weren’t used, such as “preserve the integrity of” or something along those lines.

The other really important and difficult question here is “the actual or potential effect of the proposed activity on the source of a drinking water supply”. Now, Canterbury, as you may be aware, has artesian water supply, where the water travels over time, and it can travel actually quite slowly, but one of the real challenges is that drinking water, close to Christchurch, essentially comes from the bottom of the Alps and all of the land in between. When you’re talking about the source of drinking water, it’s actually a very large area.

Obviously, there’s a question in Canterbury about consenting dairy farms, and I think it’s established that nitrates leach off dairy farms, and it is recorded—the Environment Canterbury evidence is there—that it is in the drinking-water supply. Now, we have an issue that you’ve got a “must have regard to”, but also, if you’re seeking to consent a farm in Springfield, about 50 kilometres from Christchurch, is that a farm where you need to take account of the fact that the rain that falls there is part of the source of the water that is being used in Christchurch and other areas close by? This is actually a really critical part of this piece of legislation.

I guess the other thing that strikes me is that it doesn’t seem to be backed up by further legislation which is going to provide the guidance as to exactly what this means in terms of catchments and in terms of artesian wells versus river water, and so on and so forth. I’m interested in: why just have “regard to”, and on the “source of a drinking water supply”, is that a term that you just going to leave, essentially, to, I guess, hydrologists to determine in expert reports, or does that have a particular meaning?

Committee of the whole House

The clause the member the Hon Dr Duncan Webb refers to, clause 140, is a direct carry-over from the Resource Management Act. If the member had cared to inspect the clause further, it would be clear that the source water is covered under the Water Services Act and the “source of a drinking water supply” is identified in a source water risk management plan prepared under that Act. It is right and proper that a consenting authority has regard to that. Thank you for bringing that to the committee’s attention and to the attention of all those watching and listening this evening.

I just want to come back to an answer I gave previously in response to a question from Lawrence Xu-Nan. I just want to clarify that, in relation to submitters seeking to have a hearing, it’s submitters that don’t bear the cost of an independent hearings panel; the applicant does.

Hon Rachel Brooking: OK. Thank you. I was having palpitations over here.

SIMON COURT: Also, for the member Rachel Brooking, who apparently was having palpitations at my answer, I’m clarifying it, and that is why the submitters cannot require a hearing. Apologies to members present; I just needed to clarify that.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you. I’m still alive, and thank you to the member in the chair Simon Court. I’m interested in his comments around “minimise” being an unusual term that people weren’t familiar with—and, therefore, not using it—and how that relates to the use of the term “pragmatic” that we were discussing earlier.

Anyway, I will also come to Schedule 7, and this is a very simple question for the member in the chair, and that is if he can confirm, or point to, differences in Schedule 7 from the equivalent clauses in the Resource Management Act. Is it largely the same, with some wording changes to work for this new legislation, or are there major policy deviations from the Resource Management Act in Schedule 7, which is “Subdivision and reclamation”? Thank you.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Mr Chair. I want to take the Minister responsible for RMA Reform to clause 145, which I’m very happy about.

Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan: Oh!

ARENA WILLIAMS: I’m very happy about this clause, and so is Dr Xu-Nan, and I beat him there.

Minister, I would like to talk to you about this. This was included in your regulatory impact statement as well, and officials drew attention to this because serial non-compliance is something that should be dealt with, and this clause attempts to do it. My first question is: why is the formulation of clause 145(1) a “may” and not a “must”, when it seems to be within the public interest and well supported around the Parliament—I can hear on my left—that regulators at all levels of the funnel should be able to take serial non-compliance into account?

The second question is: you can understand the look-back provision being seven years for an ordinary person, a natural person, but why, for a body corporate, is it only seven years? That doesn’t seem to make sense or have the same justifications when a body corporate, a company, a trust, or whatever it is will have a changing round of directors and should be held to account for having a higher standard of, say, documentation and compliance over that time.

My next question is about clause 145(3)(a). I think we have got the policy wrong here: “ongoing” and “repeated” are important, but one has been excluded—one big bad one is excluded—and that is often the case of bodies corporate, say, making big errors in environmental degradation, dumping waste, and polluting ground. Those are also things that it seems relevant for the regulator to be able to consider, especially if that has happened recently and is of direct relationship to the consent that they are also applying for.

I want to ask him about, then, the policy overall. In effect, all of these provisions working together means that the non-compliance has to be significant, it has to be ongoing, and it has to also be subject to an enforcement order—so abatement notices and infringement notices seem to not be enough to trigger this position. Is that the right impact for something like a wharf? The usual way of punishing that behaviour will be abatement notices over and over and over again, and then to receive a planning consent for another extension of a wharf just seems like something which you should be able to take into account.

My final question is: does this actually solve the problem which is set out in the regulatory impact statement? In the 2018 case, where the Court of Appeal upheld imprisonment for the developer, which I think the regulatory impact statement is alluding to, there were a huge number of unauthorised dwellings. There was waste-water discharge of raw sewage into streams. It was cynical and deliberate, and the court found not only that there was a regulatory compliance culture of head in the sand but that this was behaviour which would keep going. The cost to the ratepayer to clean up the first stage of remediation was over $1 million. Eventually, they got him on the trees. They got him on the destruction of the trees at the property, not on any of those regulations.

Have we dealt with the problem so that this natural person or body corporate wouldn’t get a consent in the future? Also have we tidied up the infringements regime so that someone who has been repeatedly and deliberately breaking the rules can also be held to account and it doesn’t take them cutting down, I think, six trees at their property to finally get there?

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Mr Chair. I’m just following on from Arena Williams’ series of questions. I think they are exactly what I had in mind as well.

I think one of the things I wanted to ask the Minister responsible for RMA Reform about further, as a package of that question from clause 145, is that abatement notices, enforcement orders, infringement notices, and pecuniary penalties for convictions are very different, with a varying degree of severity. I even wondered whether the cases that Arena Williams mentioned are really important when it comes to serial offenders or repeat offenders. Convictions are quite serious, and I wondered if the convictions in particular should have been carved out from this particular section, even if the consenting authority may have regard to the rest—but “must have regard to” when it comes to convictions. I want to check with the Minister if that is something that has been considered as a part of this.

I do want to move on a little bit further to Subpart 5, noting that quite a few of the clauses may have been addressed by other members. This is to do with general requirements before conditions may be included. This is clause 150. I want to check clause 150(2), which says, “A consent authority must not include a condition unless—(aaa) the applicant has agreed to the condition;”. I want to check with the Minister: I’m assuming this particular case is when the applicant has been notified of the conditions that have been imposed, as opposed to there being some form of negotiation or compromise? I wondered if the condition was imposed as a result of certain potential or likely non-compliance within areas and that it’s not really up to whether there is any wiggle room for compromise with the applicant.

I do want to check, in that case, what does “agreed to the condition” actually mean? Does it mean that someone has signed it? I’ll leave it at that because the Minister looks like he’s ready to answer questions.

Committee of the whole House

I’ll deal with all these relatively quickly. The subdivision provisions are largely a carry-over from the Resource Management Act (RMA). In relation to Arena Williams’ points, it says “may” not “must”, which again is a carry-over from the RMA.

The seven years point: I’m advised that longer than seven years is hard to administer, and it comes from the Criminal Records (Clean Slate) Act. In relation to whether or not it solves the problem, yes, I am confident it does, particularly in relation to some of the cases that she was talking about, which I’m unfamiliar with.

In relation to Lawrence Xu-Nan’s point just now around clause 150(2)(aaa), this is just a simple statement of reality, which is that a consent authority can impose conditions if the applicant agrees. That is frequently what happens. It’s happening at the moment in fast track, for example, in which people are applying and suggesting conditions to be imposed on them that avoid remedy, mitigate offset, and will provide compensation for adverse effects. Obviously, consent authorities can impose things if they agree to it, but you also need to read it in the light of the semicolon, after which it says “or (a) the condition contains measures … or (b) the condition is directly connected …”. It’s a scheme that provides the setting of consent conditions.

Committee of the whole House

Thank you, Mr Chair. Now, I note that others may have additional questions on the clauses, but I’m just checking with what was discussed previously, I believe, by the Chair: that we are going to now move on to the schedule. I would like to move on to some part of the schedule, noting that Schedule 6 has already been covered to a certain extent. I want to move on to Schedule 7 on subdivision and reclamation, which is quite significant, with, I believe, five parts to it.

I would like to start on Part 1 of Schedule 5, relating to conditions of subdivision consent, starting with clause 6, which is on conditions requiring protection against natural hazards, and clause 7. Noting that the Hon Rachel Brooking has had some questions previously on natural hazards but none which relates to a subdivision consent, and I think, in this case, it needs to be checked that when we are looking at certain—I guess for clarity to be in the Hansard and also to understand ministerial intent—

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): Is the member on Schedule 5?

Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN: I’m on Schedule 7.

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): Oh, Schedule 7.

Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN: Schedule 7, which is clause 181.

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): Sorry, my apologies. No, that’s fine. Thank you.

Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN: This is page 398 of Amendment Paper 709.

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): That’s fine.

Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN: I want to check whether the Minister responsible for RMA Reform has any thoughts around when you are getting a land use consent—I want to get the terminology correct—when it comes to protection against natural hazards and the subdivision consent, in this case; whether they will need to meet the same threshold between the two. Or would subdivision consent, being something that already kind of exists, require less scrutiny by the consenting authority—when you’re looking at subdivision, I’m assuming? I just want to check with the Minister if that is something where there might be a difference between land use consent and subdivision consent.

In terms of, I guess, clauses 7 and 8—and this is to do with clause 8, “Conditions about vesting of bed of lake or river”—this may include conditions requiring that land that is a bed of a lake or river are to be vested in a territorial authority. Previously, we have seen that, when you’re looking at the land use consent, if the territorial authority or the consenting authority receives an application, that application must also be sent to Maritime New Zealand. I wonder, in this particular case—and I can give a reference for the other one, but in this particular case, it doesn’t necessarily specify. I want to check with the Minister if, when you’re applying for subdivision consent, the territorial authority or the consenting authority will also need to send that subdivision consent application to Maritime New Zealand.

Committee of the whole House

Schedule 7, in relation to subdivision: in fact, the subdivision provisions in the bill are largely a carry-over from the Resource Management Act (RMA). I’m advised that there were very few submissions at the Environment Committee in relation to this. It is largely a lift and shift, with a few tweaks on the way through, and the system works pretty well. The Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan has actually outlined some of the way the process works right now already in his own speech.

Committee of the whole House

I move, That debate on this question now close.

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): There’s a bit left in here, but we’re getting there.

Committee of the whole House

A fast pass through the conditions of planning consents questions—the first is at clause 150. I want to ask about—

Hon Chris Bishop: Which one?

ARENA WILLIAMS: Clause 150, on page 134, and I’ll also ask you about clause 151. The consent conditions are three categories. They have to be whether the applicant agrees, whether they directly connect to the adverse effect that has been created by the consent, or whether they’re only administrative. I’m asking about the requirement that they are directly connected to the adverse effect.

In a large housing development, you’ll have ones that are obviously connected to that, and those are provided for here—stormwater, roads—but I want to ask you about whether you can, at the local authority level, require through the directly connected requirement things like parks, playgrounds, and spaces for early childhood education.

In clause 151, a similar question about the conditions you can actually impose—I want to ask whether that is intended to provide an independent power to require environmental restoration or whether that’s out in this regime. It’s very common, for instance, to have a requirement in the consent where you would also be required to do planting or to do a restoration of wetland. The direct connection seems to take that out of the new regime.

Committee of the whole House

I’m advised that in relation to the parks point, the answer is yes—if it is in the plan, for example.

Arena Williams: So that’s directly connected.

Hon CHRIS BISHOP: Well, if it’s in the plan rule, yes, it is, because, following the funnel, you have to give effect to the plan rule. It might be, for example—I’m just making this up—in a large subdivision, say, 100 lots, that there needs to be a park in the subdivision or the land re-zoned or anything. Some councils will do that; some won’t. Some will set the threshold at different rates. There may be standardised zoning provisions which may assist with that.

So the short answer is yes, but the point of the “direct connection” point is to make sure that people are doing things that are directly connected to the adverse effects of what they’re doing. You can’t impose conditions that aren’t. The flipside is also true, which is that you could have conditions but they can’t just be because the council feels like it; they have to be directly connected to the effects. To be honest, that’s actually the status quo under the Resource Management Act, basically.

Committee of the whole House

Just to follow up, then, I think that the answer to the question about clause 151—is the power to require environmental restoration, say planting or restoration of a wetland, if it’s in the plan, directly connected enough to meet the requirements at clauses 150 and 151?

Committee of the whole House

Yes is the short answer.

Committee of the whole House

I move, That debate on this question now close.

A party vote was called for on the question, That debate on this question now close.

Ayes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Motion agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): The question is that the Minister’s amendments to Part 4 set out on Amendment Paper 709 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendments be agreed to.

Ayes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Amendments agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): The question is that Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendments to clause 108 and 125 and inserting new clause 129A be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendments be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendments not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): Lan Pham’s amendment to clause 131 set out on Amendment Paper 730 is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

The Hon Rachel Brooking’s tabled amendment to clause 139(1)(d) inserting subparagraph (i) is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

The question is that Oriini Kaipara’s tabled amendment to clause 149A to insert new subclauses (3) to (5) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Noes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That Part 4 as amended be agreed to.

Ayes 67

New Zealand National 48; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 4; Ferris; Kapa-Kingi.

Part 4 as amended agreed to.

Committee of the whole House

Part 5 Key roles, and Schedules 9, 10, and proposed new Schedule 10A

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): Members, we come to Part 5, the debate on clauses 182 to 216, “Key roles”, including Schedule 9, “Environment Court”; Schedule 10, “Planning Tribunal”; and proposed new Schedule 10A, “Statutory officer”, in the Minister’s tabled amendments. The question is that Part 5 stand part.